# 1AC Apple Valley Round 4

**Spikes on bottom**

## Framework

**Permissibility and presumption affirm:**

1. **Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason – means that presuming neg is incoherent because it relies on some presumptive truths about ethics and the world in general**
2. **Intuition - we naturally believe statements true e.g. if I told you my name is Shrey, you’d believe me**
3. **Probability - Logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation**

**Being is always a prior question—to make any claim about the subject we must first understand how the subject functions.**

**Manzi ‘13**, Yvonne (University of Kent). “Jean-Paul Sartre: Existential “Freedom” and the Political.” E-International Relations Students. January 23rd, 2013. <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/23/jean-paul-sartre-existential-freedom-and-the-political/> RCT//SR

Philosophers have been pondering the notion of freedom for thousands of years. From Thucydides, through to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the concept of freedom has continually been dealt with to some degree in political thought. This is an important concept because we must decide whether individuals are free, whether they should be free, what this means and what kinds of institutions we are to build around these ideas. In political thought, the notion of freedom can be looked at through the lens of Isaiah Berlin’s renowned essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”. He begins with stating that in political philosophy, the dominant issue is the question of obedience and coercion. Why should an individual obey anyone else? May individuals be coerced? Why should we all not live as we like? These are all questions of freedom. In a long and detailed discussion, Berlin then makes the distinction between positive and negative freedom.1 Carter clearly and concisely explains the distinction; “negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints… Positive liberty is the possibility of acting … in such a way as to take control of one’s life” (2008). Key to negative freedom2 is the notion of non-interference. One only lacks political liberty if he/she is “prevented from attaining a goal by human beings” (Berlin 1969, 122). Simply being incapable of achieving a goal (such as not being able to fly like a bird or not being able to walk because of an injury) does not count as being un-free in this sense. There are numerous political philosophers who fall under this category outlined by Berlin. They agree on the definition of freedom but disagree about how wide it should be. Two of these philosophers are Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.3 Because in the state of nature human goals cannot be harmonised, these classical thinkers assumed that human freedom must be limited by law. However, they also recognised that a minimum area of human freedom should also be protected in order to allow for the basic human capacities/qualities to develop. For Hobbes, individuals must surrender all of their rights to the Leviathan under a social contract, except for one fundamental right – the right to self-preservation (Hobbes 1651). For Locke, the ‘minimal’ area of protected freedom for each individual is a bit broader in that individuals have rights to their property and to the fruits of their labour (Locke 1689). There is infinite debate in that “we cannot remain absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-surrender is self-defeating” (Berlin 1969, 126). Positive freedom is ‘positive’ in the sense that individuals will want to be their own masters. In Berlin’s words, by virtue of positive freedom, one will “wish to be a subject, not an object” (1969, 131). Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of ‘true liberty’ may be placed under this category. Individuals should pursue an ideal of ‘true liberty’ in which they will be able to achieve their full human potential and live virtuously. True liberty is achieved when individuals can let go of amour propre (the love of oneself) and instead become possessed by amour de soi (the desire for self-preservation and self-mastery) (Rousseau 1762). Positive freedom therefore is less about what individuals are forbidden from doing, and more about what individuals can do to reach their full human potential. Under a state of positive freedom “I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes” (Berlin 1969, 131). The point I would like to make is that Berlin’s approach in dealing with the concept of freedom is not enough. All the thinkers I have mentioned relate to something which we can call political freedom as opposed to philosophical freedom.4 Jean-Paul Sartre discusses the latter. In his essay, Berlin claims that “conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self” (1969, 134). What Sartre does is precisely this; he begins with an understanding of the subject and of ‘human nature’ that is different from all the aforementioned ones, and he arrives at a conception of freedom that is just as different. I argue that Sartre’s concept of freedom should not have been omitted from debates in political thought. I am not arguing that Sartre’s conception of freedom should be inserted into Berlin’s framework, nor am I arguing that Berlin overlooked him. I am arguing that Berlin’s discussion is not enough. We need a conception of freedom that operates at the level of the political, because it is on top of the political that everything else in politics is built. I take the political to be the field of relations below ‘politics’. This is where the conditions for understanding politics are shaped. Chantal Mouffe makes a similar distinction; she borrows Heidegger’s vocabulary and claims that “politics refers to the ontic level, while ‘the political’ has to do with the ontological one”5 (Mouffe 2005, 8). The ontic generally refers to physical or factual reality, while the ontological refers to ‘being’, or the first-person phenomenological experience (Heidegger 1927). In this case, the two terms are slightly adapted to the theory. Politics is at the ontic level because it has to do with the conventional practices and policies, while the political is at the ontological level because, for Mouffe, it concerns the ‘being’ of society, or in her words “the very way in which society is instituted” (2005, 9). Existentialism and Jean-Paul Sartre Existentialist6 philosophers such as Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre were well-known in their time for being involved in resistance, unforgiving of collaborationism and conformity, and for having an active interest in revolutionary movements7. When coupled with the fact that freedom is one of the most significant themes that are examined by existentialist philosophers, one wonders why this branch of philosophy has not been more appropriately dealt with in political thought. Perhaps it is because existentialism indeed appears to be more of a life-philosophy than a tradition fit for the conception of political theory and policy. I argue that before political theories, policies and institutions can be conceived, one must first be able to appropriately situate the human condition. Existentialism provides a unique and compelling account of what it means to be ‘human’, which allows for Sartre’s conception of freedom to be reasonably developed. What is primarily worth noting is the context in which the existentialist ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre arose. After the world wars, there was a break down in traditional ideas of philosophy. There was no true sense of community, no faith in human nature, and an increasing belief that perhaps the divine did not truly exist if it allowed for atrocities such as the holocaust to happen (Flynn 2006). Philosophy had to return to its origins; ‘what do we know and how do we know it?’ was the question. Existentialists answered ‘all we really know is that we exist’. Existentialism therefore revolves around questions of existence and the human experience. We will start from the same position – notions of existence and subjectivity. Existentialists maintain that we cannot know anything if not from our subjectivity. The first and only real thing we know is that we exist and that we experience everything subjectively. This leads us into questions of being. Hegel distinguished between the being of objects (being-in-itself), and human Being (or Geist) – this provided one of the bases for Sartre’s later distinction (Hegel 1807). Heidegger provided a second contribution, which in a sense defines the core of this philosophical tradition. He claimed that we cannot reflect on the meaning of being in relation to our existence, if we do not first understand it philosophically8 (Heidegger 1927). Heidegger especially critiqued the Cartesian question of existence, claiming that such a question arises from an ontologically inadequate beginning (Ibid, 83). He criticised the notion of substance, and he argued that individuals are Dasein, or ‘beings-in-the-world’. Inherent in the existentialist tradition are also ideas of meaninglessness and angst. Sartre, as an atheist, rejected the idea that there is a divine meaning to one’s life or that there is a purpose for which each individual is born. In The Myth of Sisyphus (2000), Camus introduced the notion of absurdity which arises from the clash between the world’s resounding silence (meaninglessness) and the individual’s expectation of purpose or direction. Heidegger also accepted this, and in Being and Time he maintained that the realisation of this meaninglessness leads to a feeling of Angst (1927, 173).9 “What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum, but the possibility of things at hand in general, that is, the world itself” (Ibid, 175). For Heidegger, Dasein is not only ‘being-in-the-world’, but also ‘potentiality-for-being’. Sartre, in a similar fashion, claims that individuals can surpass themselves and pursue possibilities outside of themselves (Sartre 2007, 66). A last notion which is worth mentioning is primarily a Sartrean one; that of authenticity. “Existence is authentic to the extent that the existent10 has taken possession of himself and… has moulded [themselves] ~~himself~~ [in their] ~~his~~ own image” (Macquarrie 1972, 206).

**Our existence is existential—meaning is created internally and externally produced through our will. Rules presumes a higher rule to interpret the previous rule making it infinitely regressive, so the only solution is to become our own person and create our own understandings of the self since there will always be a disconnect between how others interpret us via a norm and how we interpret ourselves.**

**Crowell ‘04**, Steven, 8-23-2004, "Existentialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/> RCT//SR

Finally, the self-understanding, or project, thanks to which the world is there for me in a meaningful way, already belongs to that world, derives from it, from the tradition or society in which I find myself. Though it is “me,” it is not me “as my own.” My very engagement in the world alienates me from my authentic possibility. This theme is brought out most clearly by Heidegger: the anti-Cartesian idea that the self is defined first of all by its practical engagement entails that this self is not properly individual but rather indisinguishable from anyone else (das Man) who engages in such practices: such a “they-self” does what “one” does. The idea is something like this: Practices can allow things to show up as meaningful—as hammers, dollar bills, or artworks—because practices involve aims that carry with them norms, satisfaction conditions, for what shows up in them. But norms and rules, as Wittgenstein has shown, are essentially public, and that means that when I engage in practices I must be essentially interchangeable with anyone else who does: I eat as one eats; I drive as one drives; I even protest as one protests. To the extent that my activity is to be an instance of such a practice, I must do it in the normal way. Deviations can be recognized as deviations only against this norm, and if they deviate too far they can't be recognized at all.11 Thus, if who I am is defined through existing, this “who” is normally pre-defined by what is average, by the roles available to me in my culture, and so on. The “I” that gets defined is thereby “anonymous,” or “anyone”; self-making is largely a function of not distinguishing myself from others. If there is nevertheless good sense in talking of the singularity of my existence, it will not be something with which one starts but something that gets achieved in recovering oneself from alienation or lostness in the “crowd.” If the normative is first of all the normal, however, it might seem that talk about a norm for the singularity of existence, a standard for thinking about what is my ownmost just as I myself, would be incoherent. It is here that the idea of “authenticity” must come into focus. 2.3 Authenticity: By what standard are we to think our efforts “to be,” our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it is instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do “as” myself and as “anyone,” so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen). What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what “one” does (what “moral people” do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to “do what one does,” including feeling “the right way” about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself. 12 Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of “transparency” with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous “one-self” that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus “become” what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.13

**This requires the will to power, or the ability to be yourself absent power structures attempting to define you. Other frameworks collapse - the very assertion and interpretation of them is a form of our will to power and desire to master ethics.**

**Grimm 1**, Ruediger Hermann (1977). \_Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge\_. W. De Gruyter // sosa RCT//SR

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40 . One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order: there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language — indeed, our whole conceptual scheme — is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity — even if it is a necessary assumption — is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power.

**Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to engage in a self-affirming will to power, allowing for a process of becoming ones’ true self regardless of the norms imposed on us. Other frameworks constrain our thought rather than letting us explore new modes of ethics, meaning we’d never find the best ethical solutions**

**Higgs ‘02**, Philip. “Deconstruction and Re-Thinking Education.” South African Journal of Education, Education Association of South Africa, 2002, [www.ajol.info/index.php/saje/article/view/24866](http://www.ajol.info/index.php/saje/article/view/24866). RCT//SR

Much of present day educational discourse is vulnerable to an ideologically driven educational practice which emphasises that persons be educated for the maintenance and development of environ- mentally and sociologically determined functions, as well as for the promotion of the economy (Higgs:1998). In such a context, education becomes the handmaiden of the state, and, at the same time, serves the state’s programmes of political intent. Educational discourse which poses fundamental questions, has, as Aronowitz (2001:ii) notes, vir- tually disappeared from the mainstream literature. Present day educa- tional discourse, no longer sees the need to interrogate the givens of education, or the social and political contexts in which education functions. As a result, nearly all educational discourse is reduced to what Aronowitz (2001:xvi-xvii) describes as the application of “ ... technologies of managing consent, where teaching is increasingly a function of training for test taking.” All this can be regarded as an aberration of education, as the mystification of education in the service of dominant ideologies that see education as a process of information transfer (mainly of a scientific, technical and legislative kind), and which, in turn, aim to ensure conformity to political and economically acceptable norms. ¶ In the light of this, it can be concluded that, what is needed today, is an awakening of the educational or a return to education. In short, present day educational discourse must re-think itself.

**To clarify, the AC is not consequentialist--offense comes from the intrinsic nature of the action. Consequentialism fails--**

1. **Induction fails – no guarantee the past is the same as the future and to justify that is based on past inductions which is circular**
2. **Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure e.g. 5 headaches vs a migraine**
3. **Butterfly effect – each consequence has a future consequence and so on so we never know if it really did net good**
4. **Subjectivity - everyone takes pleasure and pain in different things so we can’t know what maximizes it**
5. **Infinite universe has infinite pleasure and pain - to add a finite amount does nothing because infinity + finity is still infinity**
6. **Culpability -- can’t be held responsible for consequences because we can’t know all of them and it’s out of our control, intents are the only verifiable basis**

**Prefer the role of the ballot additionally because:**

1. **Constitutivism - every argument is an act of self becoming because we channel our creativity to express ourselves through our choice to read different arguments, which means only my fw allows arguments to be made. That means my ROB is inescapable and other ROBs collapse to some function of the will to power**
2. **Its the only way to orient pedagogical spaces to generate real value. That outweighs - a) we cultivate traits to gain value out of and revise other pedagogical strategies and b) best for material change through creating a sense of empowerment and alleviating dogmatism through new ideas**

**Bingham 2001**(Charles, Professor of Education at DePaul, WHAT FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE CANNOT STAND ABOUT EDUCATION: TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF SELF-REFORMULATION. Educational Theory, 00132004, Summer 2001, Vol. 51, Issue 3, pp. 345-6)

Nietzsche's self-radicalizing project should thus be understood as a re-description of learning that turns upside-down prevalent educational assumptions about the self. For example, commonsense notions of the self hold that there is a self that arrives at school and educational experience is negotiated by that self. The student may negotiate educational experience by different means -- by means of reasoning, narrative, or emotions, for example -- but in any case, the self is always there during this process. According to this commonsense view of education, there is a lack of education when the self cannot negotiate (by whatever means) the educational experience that is to be obtained at school. But as Nietzsche points out, a model of education that treats such a self as pre-given is already a lack of education from the very start. If we begin by assuming that there is some self that is being educated, then we have already bracketed much educational work. As he puts it, such a steadfast understanding of self is part of our "great stupidity."[17] When we assume that forms of selves are pre-given, we inoculate conceptions of self from being the subject of education. Yet that is what most education does: It treats the self as if it is not something that needs to be taught as a set of forms, and thus it naturalizes the self as inviolable by the very act of not teaching multiple forms of self. As Nietzsche reminds us, education so conceived is actually based on a moral paradigm of steadfast self-hood. When it comes to moral convictions, a person is usually praised for being steadfast and immovable. For example, a person who has a steadfast commitment to social justice or to religious principles is called exemplary, not uneducable. For Nietzsche, any such understanding of education is confused at a very deep level. For education to be educative, it cannot be grounded in the primary assumption that there is someone who is at a very deep level (say, at the level where we hold our most cherished beliefs) unchangeable. To be so grounded is to consider human beings educable and expect the self to stay steadfast. Educational aims claim to be comprehensive, yet they are predicated upon a moral understanding of steadfastness that is incompatible with profound self-learning. Nietzsche explains this predicament: At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some call them henceforth their "convictions." Later -- we see them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we are -- rather to the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very "deep down."[18] For Nietzsche, self-integrity is premised upon a certain unteachable-ness. Teachable-ness, in contrast, cannot be an attribute of self-same selves. Learning must be an assault on "the problem of who we are." For, who we are is fundamentally a "great stupidity." Following Nietszche, our "convictions," our "self-knowledge," and our "faiths" are matters that go against learning. These steadfast parts of self that are now considered the rock upon which learning takes place are, instead, the subjective elements that are most in need of education. It is the decentering of these self-stabilities that must be at the heart of learning for Nietzsche. Education worthy of its name cannot take calm harbor among self-same assumptions that guide moral paradigms. Education must instead assail self-integrity. Pedagogy must make overt efforts to make teachable "the great stupidity we are."

## Offense

**I defend the res as a general principle, which means specific instances that the aff is wrong don’t disprove our general thesis, just as penguins don’t disprove birds fly. Cx and before round check all interps to deter frivolous theory and maximize substance. The aff is a method of self affirmation in the debate space to cultivate new forms of subjectivity--the very assertion of the resolution for the ballot as true is integral to the process of becoming**

**Grimm 2**, Ruediger Hermann (1977). \_Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge\_. W. De Gruyter // sosa

In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory — the unknown — is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is: the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised.

**Only engagement with active power, ie my own independent willing is productive--my specific reading of the resolution as true through my own lens is a form of self-transformation that could only ever be generated by the aff, as the negative’s will will structurally be reactive to mine**

**Newman 2k**, Saul. "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment." Theory & Event, vol. 4 no. 3, 2000. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/32594. //sosa RCT//SR

Furthermore, perhaps one could envisage a form of political community or collective identity that did not restrict difference. The question of community is central to radical politics, including anarchism. One cannot talk about collective action without at least posing the question of community. For Nietzsche, most modern radical aspirations towards community were a manifestation of the ‘herd’ mentality. However it may be possible to construct a ressentiment-free notion of community from Nietzsche’s own concept of power. For Nietzsche, active power is the individual’s instinctive discharge of his forces and capacities which produces in him an enhanced sensation of power, while reactive power, as we have seen, needs an external object to act on and define itself in opposition to.[66] Perhaps one could imagine a form of community based on active power. For Nietzsche this enhanced feeling of power may be derived from assistance and benevolence towards others, from enhancing the feeling of power of others.[67] Like the ethics of mutual aid, a community based on will to power may be composed of a series of inter-subjective relations that involve helping and caring for people without dominating them and denying difference. This openness to difference and self-transformation, and the ethic of care, may be the defining characteristics of the post-anarchist democratic community. This would be a community of active power — a community of ‘masters’ rather than ‘slaves’.[68] It would be a community that sought to overcome itself — continually transforming itself and revelling in the knowledge of its power to do so.

**For spec: An unconditional right to strike is:**

**NLRB 85** [National Labor Relations Board; “Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: Volume 1,” Jan 1985; <https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA__v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA__v4xwC&rdot=1>]

\*\*Edited for gendered language

As for the so-called absolute or unconditional right to strike—there are no absolute rights that do not have their corresponding responsibilities. Under our American Anglo-Saxon system, each individual is entitled to the maximum of freedom, provided however (and this provision is of first importance), his [their] freedom has due regard for the rights and freedoms of others. The very safeguard of our freedoms is the recognition of this fundamental principle. I take issue very definitely with the suggestion that there is an absolute and unconditional right to concerted action (which after all is what the strike is) which endangers the health and welfare of our people in order to attain a selfish end.

**The right to strike is an instance of self expression and a demand for power and self determination--that creates an obligation for governments to recognize it in order to cultivate conditions of self-becoming for workers**

**Gourevitch**, A. (**2018**). The Right to Strike: A Radical View. American Political Science Review, 1–13. doi:10.1017/s0003055418000321 //SR

There is more than one way to justify the right to strike and, in so doing, to explain the shape that right ought to have. As we shall see, there is the liberal, the socialdemocratic, and the radical account. Any justification of a right must give an account not just of the interest it protects but of how that right is shaped to protect that interest. In the case of the radical argument for the right to strike, which I will defend against the other two conceptions, the relevant human interest is liberty. Workers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce that oppression. Their interest is a liberty interest in a double sense. First, it is an interest in not being oppressed, or in not facing certain kinds of forcing, coercion, and subjection to authority that they shouldn’t have to.Any resistance to those kinds of unjustified limitations of freedom carries with it, at least implicitly, a demand for liberties not yet enjoyed.19 That is a demand for a control over portions of one’s life that one does not yet enjoy. Second, and consequently, the right to strike is grounded in an interest in using one’s own individual and collective agency to resist—or even overcome— that oppression. The interest in using one’s own agency to resist oppression flows naturally from the demand for liberties not yet enjoyed. After all, that demand for control is in the name of giving proper space to workers’ capacity for self-determination, which is the same capacity that expresses itself in the activity of striking for greater freedom. On this radical view, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to liberty. It has intrinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self emancipation or the winning of greater liberty through one’s own efforts. It has instrumental value insofar as the strike is on the whole an effective means for resisting the oppressiveness of a class society. For the right to strike to enjoy its proper connection to liberty, workers must have a reasonable chance of carrying out an effective strike, otherwise it would lose its instrumental value as a way of resisting oppression. If prevented from using a reasonable array of effective means, exercising the right to strike would not be a means of reducing oppression and, therefore, strikes would also be of very limited value as acts of self-emancipation. It would not be an instance of workers attempting to use their own capacity for self-determination to increase the control they ought to have over the terms of their daily activity.

## Advantage

**Global democracy is collapsing now.**

Amy **Slipowitz, 9-27**-21, "The Devastating Impact of COVID-19 on Democracy," <https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/devastating-impact-covid-19-democracy> //SR

The global spread of COVID-19 has laid bare our vulnerability to health threats and triggered a fundamental rearrangement of everyday life. As of late September, 4.7 million people had died across nearly every country. While the pandemic's health implications are clear, more subtle—yet just as insidious—is its impact on democracy and freedom worldwide. The volume of repressive responses to COVID-19 in both dictatorships and democracies reflects a growing global trend toward authoritarianism, which features the politicization of natural crises. The pandemic serves as another reminder of the imperative to protect and strengthen freedom and democratic governance around the world. COVID-19 and the Global Decline in Democracy The pandemic has exacerbated the 15-year decline in global democracy that Freedom House has documented in Freedom in the World, its seminal evaluation of political rights and civil liberties. Of the 79 countries and territories that experienced a net decline in freedom in 2020, 35 of these declines—or nearly 45 percent—were related to the pandemic. This year's unequal and politicized vaccine distribution, along with the spread of new variants, threatens to prolong the health crisis while further damaging global democracy. Limits on rights, such as freedom of movement and assembly, can be legitimate responses to a public health emergency—provided they are proportionate, limited in duration, and nondiscriminatory. However, states too often went beyond these criteria with COVID-19. Governments across the world enforced lockdown measures with violence, criminalized forms of free speech, and designed far-reaching states of emergency that sidestepped due process protections and increased executive powers. Did COVID-19 Lay the Groundwork for Further Deterioration? Beyond COVID-19's immediate impact is the pandemic's potential to deepen the existing democratic recession in years to come. Government responses to COVID-19 have parallels to the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when governments in the United States and other countries instituted sweeping surveillance programs and restricted due process rights. Many of these programs remain with us in some form 20 years later. The protracted spread of COVID-19 similarly triggered a shift toward disproportionate government powers and a rash of adverse consequences for democratic norms that will be challenging to roll back. Authoritarians turned pandemic responses into another hammer in their toolbox. In Cambodia, the one-party legislature passed new guidelines for states of emergency that authorize limiting or even banning movement and gatherings. The guidelines also empower the government to surveil digital communications and impose penalties for spreading information deemed to cause alarm or undermine national security. The government has yet to invoke the new emergency provisions, suggesting that authorities exploited the pandemic to create new powers for use during future crackdowns. The military in Myanmar has attempted to delegitimize the civilian leaders deposed in February's coup by pointing to purported violations of COVID-19 restrictions. Both President U Win Myint and de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi stand accused of breaching pandemic-related limitations on interacting with crowds, in addition to other unrelated charges. A surge in coronavirus cases, driven by the Delta variant, led to their trials being suspended. They each face years in jail with their likely imprisonment effectively turning back the clock to a time before the military began sharing power with elected civilians. The weaponization of COVID-19 responses is not limited to dictatorships. In Hungary, the increasingly authoritarian government of Viktor Orbán passed a series of emergency measures in the spring of 2020 that allowed it to rule by decree before coronavirus cases climbed to significant numbers in the fall. Misuse of these new powers included the redirection of tax revenues away from municipalities led by opposition parties. Orbán and his allies have since politicized vaccine distribution ahead of next year's parliamentary elections, falsely claiming in a political campaign that the opposition was anti-vaccination. In El Salvador, the administration of President Nayib Bukele, who has dragged the country toward authoritarianism, cited the public health threat from COVID-19 to further restrict government transparency, including by closing two Court of Auditors offices that had supposedly been monitoring both the finance ministry and the office of the president. In May 2021, lawmakers from Bukele's party ousted five judges from the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber, which had ruled against the administration, including against its draconian responses to COVID-19. The pandemic has hit marginalized populations hard, with structural inequality causing disproportionate spread and powerful actors seeking a scapegoat for the crisis. Governments and societies frequently blamed disadvantaged populations for spreading the virus. Such smears were levied against Muslims in India, refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia, and Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica, among other examples. The scapegoating in India was a natural extension of the government's discrimination against the Muslim minority, which has severely damaged Indian democracy. In It for the Long Haul Even with the development of effective vaccines, many people around the world have not been vaccinated—only a shocking two percent of Africans have received vaccinations, for example. The lack of vaccine access has fueled the spread of dangerous mutations, further imperiling global health and democracy. In shaping emergency response plans and preparing for future crises, governments must implement expert consensus within an international human rights framework to minimize politicization. Emergency response plans should be legitimate, proportionate, time-restricted, and nondiscriminatory and should ensure that the entire population has access to factual information. Authoritarian leaders are unlikely to adhere to these principles, so democratic governments and other stakeholders must identify and condemn human rights abuses and the undermining of accountability mechanisms both at home and in other countries. Perpetrators should also be held to account. These steps will complement other actions that should be taken to strengthen democracy and counter authoritarianism, including supporting civil society and grassroots movements, prioritizing the fight against kleptocracy and international corruption, and improving laws that guard against foreign influence over government officials. The pandemic also presents an opportunity to bolster democracy more broadly. COVID-19 has shone a spotlight on the weaknesses of democracies, such as the politicization of natural phenomena and the disproportionate impact on certain population segments. Through emergency response and recovery efforts, governments now have the opportunity to address these types of weaknesses more holistically in democratic governance. By committing to broader democratic principles and human rights protections, we can begin to reverse the democratic decline and respond to COVID-19 and future crises better.

**The plan solves--empirics, civic participation, inequality reduction, and empowerment against corruption**

**Nussbaum 19** [Karen Nussbaum, former Director of the United States Women's Bureau at the Department of Labor with a BA from Goddard College, 2019, “Unions and Democracy,” Labor Studies Journal, <https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X19890523>]/Kankee

Working America, the community affiliate of the AFL-CIO, sees the effects of declining unions as they go door to door in working-class communities. With twelve million conversations over the last sixteen years, they found fewer people who had a family member in a union. Without the anchor of a labor union, Working America canvassers found that working people were vulnerable to right-wing social wedge issues, and since 2016 more explicitly racist appeals. Unions, a Cornerstone of Civic Life Unions provide trusted information to members about issues and elections and boost voter civic participation. Union members are 12 points more likely to vote than nonunion workers (Freeman 2003). The passage of Right to Work laws reduced turnout by 2 percent in presidential elections (Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson 2018). And democracy declines with union density. In states with low union density (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 2018), new voter suppression laws (Brennan Center for Justice n.d.) were passed in ten states,6 compared to two states with high union density.7 How does the union have this impact? By engaging it’s members on politics. Consider one historical example. One million women belonged to the United Auto Workers (UAW) Union Women’s Auxiliary in the 1950s. The Auxiliary’s membership was far more than the union’s. It was the biggest political action organization in the country. The women had an ambitious agenda. They lobbied for free nurseries for working mothers, maternity leave, equal pay, and an end to job discrimination against African Americans. And, according to the UAW, the women led discussions around the dinner table with their children about the role of work and unions. Union influence on members was tested when Barack Obama ran for president in 2008. Elected labor leaders struggled with how to communicate to white members who didn’t want to vote for a black man. Rich Trumka, then secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, led by example in a speech to the United Steelworkers that fall. He described meeting a woman in his home town of Nemocolin, Pennsylvania. They talked about the election. “I just don’t trust Obama,” she said. When Trumka pressed her on why, she admitted, “because he’s black.” Trumka then said, Look around. Nemacolin’s a dying town. There’re no jobs here. Kids are moving away because there’s no future here. And here’s a man, Barack Obama, who’s going to fight for people like us and you won’t vote for him because of the color of his skin. He went on to tell his steelworker audience, Brothers and sisters, we can’t tap dance around the fact that there are a lot of folks out there just like that woman. A lot of them are good union people; they just can’t get past this idea that there’s something wrong with voting for a black man. Well, those of us who know better can’t afford to look the other way. Labor leaders around the country leaned into this complicated, racially charged discussion with members. A massive member outreach campaign reached one-third of union members at the workplace, and 83 percent received mail from their unions about the election. Sixty-seven percent of union members voted for Obama that year.8 The Culinary Workers Union 226, UNITE HERE in Las Vegas is a stunning example of member political mobilization today. They represent 60,000 workers who come from 178 countries and speak more than forty languages. Despite these challenges, they have good paying, stable jobs in hotels and casinos. They are engaged and militant, and run the most impressive political outreach program in the country by building community among their members. Their members can get two months of time off to work on elections, and they have been turning the state a political “blue.” Organizers for Working America connect with working people on economic issues and find common ground outside of a workplace context through door-todoor canvassing. Canvasser Mike Logan worked on the 2017 Virginia governor’s race near Lynchburg, a very conservative part of the state. “Who are you voting for?” Mike asked a middle-aged white male voter. “The Republican.” “What’s your biggest issue?” Mike continued. “Confederate statues.” “Well, check out this petition for expanding Medicaid,” Mike pressed on. “Oh yeah, my daughter’s on Medicaid,” the voter responded, signing the petition, talking to Mike about the election, and being open to now voting for the Democrat. Those conversations resulted in moving the vote by 8 points in a part of the state that voted more than 20 points for Trump the year before.9 The Rise of Authoritarianism The democratic civic space provided by unions and the subsequent decline of unions as a countervailing force to corporate power, contributes to the appalling trends of the last fifty years: Gilded Age levels of inequality, devastated communities, and heightened civic polarization by race, religion, and ethnic origin. These conditions have led to a wave of autocratic governments around the globe. Alarm is growing. How Democracies Die (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019) is a New York Times bestseller; The People Vs. Democracy (Mounk 2019) warns, “this may be our last chance to save democracy.” When people lose high-paying, unionized jobs they do not just lose their footing in the middle class; rather they also stand to lose a whole set of social connections that structure their lives and give them meaning. Cas Mudde (2019) in The Far Right Today describes the evolution of right-wing ideologies since World War II. “In the fourth wave, which roughly started in the 21st century, radical right parties have become mainstreamed and, increasingly normalized, not just in Europe, but across the world.” Unions, Bridging Divides I talked to union leaders in Minnesota about how they deal with the rise of anti-democratic ideologies and how they bridge divides among their members in a state that voted both for Ilhan Omar in Minneapolis and Donald Trump in the southern and northern parts of the state. “We need more organizations where people take minutes!” insisted Bethany Winkels,10 political director of the Minnesota AFL-CIO: There’s a lack of opportunity for people to experience democracy—debate issues, argue about how to spend dues money, vote, take minutes—the tools of transparency and accountability. People need to experience power on issues. They need structures and systems. Unions are a place where people can get that, and can change their minds. Political strategist Michael Podhorzer says, “there is a growing consensus that unions are an agent keeping authoritarianism at bay.”11 He cites the daily work of union activists who handle grievances, bargain contracts, and organize new workers. In each instance, to be successful you have to include everyone. And success is tangible, in better wages and benefits, fair working conditions, and solidarity. He notes that studies show that union members are more likely to have racially progressive views than nonunion working people. “Can you have a liberal progressive America without unions? (Plumer 2012)” asks historian Nelson Lichtenstein? “History says no. For 200 years the existence of the union movement has been wedded to the rise of democracy. We saw this here, in South Korea, in Spain, in Africa.” And the decline of unions is wedded to the rise of the authoritarianism. A major shift by working-class voters in Brazil elected right-winger Jair Bolsonaro in October 2018. Brazilian sociologist Ruy Braga (2019) argues that “Bolsonaro’s election marked the decline of trade unions as the primary site of working-class organization; and the rise of Evangelical churches in their place” with collective identities being shaped by the church rather than by unions. Braga points to a painful symbol of this shift in influence in the working class—the sale of the labor federation, CUT, headquarters in Sao Paulo to the World Church of the Power of God. On the positive side is Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011. The union federation backed the uprising, 150,000 workers went on strike, and President Ben Ali fled the country. The Nobel Committee recognized the role of unions in promoting democracy when it granted the 2015 Peace Prize to the Tunisian General Labor Union as one of four civic society partners (the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet), which created a constitutional form of government. Solutions: Policy + Organizing We can strengthen unions and rebuild this crucial element of civic society through public policy. The key bill for broadening the rights of workers to organize in Congress is the Protect the Right to Organize (PRO) Act. It eliminates right to work provisions, expands the coverage of eligible workers, prohibits the use of permanent replacement workers during strikes, repeals the restriction on secondary activity, provides for first contract arbitration, addresses misclassification of workers and the overuse of independent contractors, and imposes much tougher penalties for employer violations. There are other bills focused on expanding bargaining rights to all public sector workers. But good legislation will need much more than rhetorical from politicians. Lynn Rhinehart, labor lawyer and former general counsel of the AFL-CIO, argues that as part of strengthening protections for workers engaged in collective action, giving workers the power to act in solidarity with each other beyond the borders of their own workplaces is key: Workers should have the right to require multiple employers to sit down and bargain with them at the same time. And the law needs to allow for strikes, picketing, and other solidarity actions by workers outside their own workplace, including up and down the supply chain.12

**Spills over--key to worker rights as a whole and ILO credibility**

**Bellace 18** [Janice R. Bellace, Samuel Blank Professor of Legal Studies at the The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, 2018, “ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL TRADE,” Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/cllpj39&i=533]/Kankee

VII. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: A PILLAR OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION Since 1948, there has never been a resolution, or a protocol relating to Convention No. 87 that has challenged the notion that the right to strike is an inextricable corollary to freedom of association. One might consider why. Within the ILO, the right to strike is often expressed in a narrowly legal fashion, by latching on to the phrasing in Article 3 of Convention No. 87; namely, it is as an intrinsic corollary to the workers' right to formulate their own programs and activities. But it is more than that: it plays a critical role in realizing freedom of association. Without the right to strike, without the ability to threaten economic loss to the employer, unions lack bargaining power. Without the ability to press demands and to back up those demands with the threat of using economic weapons, workers effectively cease to be able to bargain. Any book on negotiation will devote significant space to the basic concept of leverage.11 2 When negotiating, one does not move the other side to change its position without leverage. It is similar in collective bargaining. A union does not move the employer to change its offer without leverage, which in most cases is the threat of a strike. Without that leverage, collective bargaining slips back into a form of powerless consultation, what some derisively label "collective begging." As a result, without the right to strike, freedom of association would be a hollow term, a meaningless right. Some might assert that the workers still enjoy the right of freedom of association because they still have the right to form their own organizations, and to engage in collective bargaining. But even more detrimental than the negative impact on bargaining outcomes is the impact the lack of bargaining power has on union organization. Workers join unions to better their terms of employment through collective strength. If the workers lack bargaining power and they realize it, they often decline to join a union on the grounds that it would be futile to do so as the union will achieve nothing. If workers do join a union, and the union engages in collective bargaining and then calls a strike to press demands, and the strike fails, the union will be seriously weakened and it may collapse. Often the strike fails because of a legally sanctioned event; e.g., the employer fires the workers and they have no recourse, or the local court enjoins the strike, or the strikers are arrested for disorderly conduct. Permitting governments to believe that they can ratify Convention No. 87 and claim to be promoting freedom of association while retaining unbounded ability to regulate industrial action is dangerous. It will encourage some governments to enact legislation so severely restricting the ability of workers to engage in industrial action that an organized labor movement in the country will shrink and eventually collapse. Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining must exist if autonomous workers' associations with any legitimacy are to exist in many countries. The pertinent question is whether there can be freedom of association without a right to strike. The answer, as history has demonstrated, is no. Although the outright intransigent stance of the Employers expressed in 2012 has receded,"l 3 there remains significant continuing resistance to the right to strike. The arena for challenging this has moved to the Committee on Freedom of Association. As noted above, the CFA is a tripartite committee of the Governing Body. By tradition, it issued decisions on a consensus basis. The refusal of the Employer members to give full support to the right to strike has resulted in cases being deprived of a definitive resolution. If the Employers are seriously committed to upholding freedom of association and the right to strike but wish to have parameters on the right to strike set and are willing to do so through the process of tripartite consultation and consensus, the mechanism exists. They could propose that the ILC adopt a Protocol to Convention No. 87, one that represents a modern view of the guarantee of freedom of association and which pinpoints tripartite agreement on the parameters of the right to strike. The starting point would be the Digest of decisions and principles of the Committee on Freedom of Association. 114 Part 10 deals with the right to strike.1 15 It would be a straightforward exercise to go paragraph by paragraph to determine where there is agreement or disagreement with the principle as stated, and to note what situations might not be covered or not covered satisfactorily. One value of such an exercise would be to pinpoint exactly where the Employers disagree with the understanding of what the parameters of the right to strike are. They have indicated that somehow what the Committee of Experts has said exceed what the convention says, but have given no information as to what specific view is unsatisfactory. All parties and the Committee of Experts agree that governments have the responsibility of setting national laws and regulations on the right to strike, but the Employers indicate that the Committee of Experts has viewed the governments' right as too narrow. But once again, nothing specifically is cited as an example. Servais has commented that "a number of issues remain unsettled on the limits to the exercise of industrial action" and cites three that "appear especially difficult to resolve."" 6 These are the extent of the essential services exception where strikes can be restricted or prohibited, the use of the principle of proportionality,' 17 and the legitimacy of solidarity (secondary) industrial action. At the present time, a bedrock value of the ILO is being eroded, the ILO's supervisory system operates without the full support and respect of the all three tripartite constituencies, and the Organization's own legitimacy as the leading source of labor standards in international law is being undermined. As the ILO nears it centenary, there is an urgent need for the ILO constituents to imbue the foundational principle of freedom of association with specific meaning'" and for member States to respect and promote this principle.

**Democracy solves every impact--stability, alliances, and adventurism**

**Kroenig 20** Matt. 4/3. Professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University – you know who he is. “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China” <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/why-china-ill-equipped-great-power-rivalry/609364/>) 1/20/2021

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Watch White Noise, the inside story of the alt-right The Atlantic’s first feature documentary ventures into the underbelly of the far-right movement to explore the seductive power of extremism. Stream Now Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the United States built the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Daniel Blumenthal: The Unpredictable Rise of China Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt recently wrote in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many economists predict that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and some have suggested that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950 only to nearly fight a nuclear war with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and “hiding its capabilities and biding its time” abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. According to the Asia Society, he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, taking contested territory from neighbors in the South China Sea and conducting military exercises with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000 years of history” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the protests this year in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—the CCP spends more on domestic security than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. Shadi Hamid: China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including North Macedonia this week. The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of lauding autocratic China’s firm response in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually misrepresented the numbers of COVID-19 infections and deaths in China, and European nations have rejected and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits.

**Specifically triggers lose nukes and escalates**

**Brown 19**—Analyst for the Department of Defense’s Nuclear Enterprise, aiding in nuclear strategy research and conducting exercises to verify nuclear surety policy, spent six years in the United States Air Force working in nuclear security operations, Master's of Art in International Relations and intends to pursue a Ph.D., conducting research on nuclear strategy and deterrence [Gerald, 12/16/2019, “Conflict and Competition: Limited Nuclear Warfare and the New Face of Deterrence”, Global Security Review,<https://globalsecurityreview.com/conflict-competition-limited-nuclear-warfare-new-face-deterrence/>] AMarb

Proliferation to autocratic states is a cause for concern, primarily because they are considerably less stable than democratic states and may be more willing to utilize a nuclear weapon. The inherently volatile nature of these regimes poses a significant challenge. North Korea has a very poor and impoverished populace, held under authoritarian rule. Regimes such as these are not known for their longevity and stability. The threat of regime change and revolt from within is a realistic consideration with autocratic states. If this occurred, it could result in the loss of a nuclear weapon, or their domestic use to quell a rebellion.[20] It could also escalate into conflict as Chinese and U.S. forces both seek to secure their nuclear assets and end up in conflict with each other. China would certainly not accept U.S. forces along the Yalu river, and both would want to immediately seek to ensure the stability of Pyongyang’s nuclear assets. Autocratic states could also safely assume that Western powers would prefer it if they were a democratic government friendly to the West. With the international liberal orders push for global democracy, autocratic rulers are likely to fear Western interference. After Pyongyang’s recent success, a nuclear weapons capability may appear to be an effective way to prevent Western interference and ensure its sovereignty. With smaller autocratic states, the constant external and internal threats to the stability of their regimes breed paranoia and volatility. Leading government officials tend to be promoted based on loyalty rather than competence, and disagreement or discontent with the dictator may be punished harshly, stifling progress and ingenuity. These regimes also tend to have strong military leadership directing the country. Pakistan is notable in this regard, where the military maintains significant control over the government and has a history of instigating a military coup when they dislike civilian leadership. Pakistan has had four separate military coups since its creation, with military dictators constantly consolidating their power into the executive branch.[21] Military leadership is far more likely to see nuclear weapons use as a viable option, which increases the instability of nuclear autocratic regimes even further. Civilian leadership has arguably been a key factor in preventing nuclear use thus far. Military officers often possess a different mindset and attitude on the subject than civilian leadership due to their career path. During the Cold War, there were numerous instances where the Joint Chiefs of Staff were far more willing to utilize nuclear weapons in a preventive war and were reined in by U.S. civilian leadership.[22]

**Extinction**

**Starr 15** [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology] “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

**Here’s normal means for spec--solves enforcement and encourages striking**

**Neill 12** [Emily CM; “The Right to Strike: How the United States Reduces it to the Freedom to Strike and How International Framework Agreements can Redeem it,” 1/1/12; Labor & Employment Law Forum Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 6; <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1047&context=lelb>]

IFAs open the door to collective bargaining by creating a space that alters the traditionally antagonistic employer-employee engagement and is more hospitable to the organizing process.83 MNC commitment to respect the core ILO principles of freedom of association and the rights to organize and collectively bargain through IFAs are instrumental to realizing that purpose.84 1. The Creation and Proliferation of International Framework Agreements An IFA is an agreement negotiated between an MNC and typically85 a global union86 to establish an ongoing relationship between the signatories and ensure adherence to uniform labor standards by the MNC in all countries in which it operates.87 IFAs are the first and only formally-negotiated instruments between unions and corporations at the global level and a significant development in labor relations.88 Since the signing of the first IFA in 1988, they have spread at a steadily increasing rate. 89 Their proliferation since 2000 has been especially dramatic—with the number of IFAs signed in 2003-2006 nearly doubling the number signed in the first fifteen years.90 By 2008, approximately sixty-five agreements had been concluded.91 At the end of 2010, that number had jumped to seventy-six.92 2. Context of Framework Agreements: Corporate Social Responsibility While both corporate codes of conduct and IFAs can be traced to a consumer driven push for corporate social responsibility, a key difference separates the two: credibility. In the late 1980’s, MNCs in the United States began to respond to campaigns by non-governmental organizations accusing MNCs of international human rights abuses by elaborating internal codes of conduct.93 These codes, unilaterally written and implemented, tend to be vague and provide for no enforcement mechanism.94 The voluntary, self-enforcing nature of these commitments has led critics to conclude that they are mere marketing ploys lacking in credibility or having any real social impact.95 IFAs were developed, in part, as an alternative to corporate codes of conduct to raise labor standards.96 Unlike unilateral codes, IFAs are negotiated between the two principal actors—employers and workers—in the employment relationship.97 Involvement of the very party the agreement is meant to protect attaches greater meaning and significance to the instrument.98 The purpose of IFAs is to promote fundamental labor rights by regulating corporate conduct on a global level.99 This brings us to another key distinction between corporate codes of conduct and IFAs: their concrete normative content. 3. Core ILO Principles as the Substantive Content of IFAs Whereas codes tend to be vague in their commitments, MNCs commit themselves to concrete international labor norms through framework agreements. The key areas of IFAs are the acceptance of the four core labor standards, as articulated in the 1998 ILO Declaration.100 The Declaration itself is typically not mentioned, but rather the four rights are referred to in IFAs by their convention numbers.101 Thus, apart from a very few exceptions, IFAs refer explicitly to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to organize and collective bargaining, respectively.102 As previously discussed, ILO standards are the principal source of international labor norms.103 ILO Conventions 87 and 98 are perhaps the most important of ILO principles since the right to organize and bargain collectively is essential to the defense of working conditions like wages, hours, and health and safety through the collective bargaining process.104 4. Scope of IFAs, MNCs and Supply Chains One of the most important features of IFAs is their goal of addressing behavior not only within the signatory MNC, but along their supply chains as well.105 According to one study, of the IFAs in existence as of 2008, eighty eight percent explicitly indicated that the norms of the agreements applied to their subsidiaries and seventy-three percent contained provisions defining their application to suppliers and subcontractors.106 These provisions contain varying degrees of commitment on behalf of the signatory MNC. Some MNCs agree to place very concrete obligations on supply chain parties, going so far as to detail sanctions to be imposed upon non-compliant suppliers.107 Others contain provisions that are less mandatory, limiting the MNC’s obligation to informing or encouraging its suppliers and subsidiaries to respect the principles of the agreement. For instance, the PSA Peugeot Citroen IFA was amended in 2010, changing its once relatively firm language by which suppliers are “required” to make similar commitments to a much weaker provision in which the MNC agrees to “request” that its suppliers a similar commitment in respect of their own suppliers and sub-contractors.108 III. ANALYSIS The principal weapon workers have to leverage their bargaining power is the strike.109 The permanent strike replacement policy renders this weapon almost meaningless by subjecting workers that employ it to a risk of job loss. This practice deviates from international norms on freedom of association, the right to organize, and bargain collectively, as enunciated in Conventions 87 and 98, and reaffirmed in the ILO 1998 Declaration to the point of rendering the right to strike a mere freedom to strike.110 Fortunately, IFAs have the potential to bring many U.S. operating companies into compliance with international standards on the right to strike, which prohibits the use of permanent replacements. This Section first addresses the effect of the permanent replacement doctrine on the right to strike in the United States. It next argues that as a member of the ILO, the U.S. is obligated to amend this policy to guarantee workers protection in their right to strike. Finally, it argues that even if the U.S. permits permanent strike replacements, certain U.S. companies are bound to IFAs that prohibit them from taking advantage of the policy. A. Interference with the Right to Strike is an Abridgement of ILO Principles Collective bargaining is the mechanism through which workers present their demands to an employer and, through negotiations, determine the working conditions and terms of employment.111 The right to strike arises most often in the context of collective bargaining, though as a weapon of last resort.112 The employment relationship is an economic one—with most workers’ demands encompassing improved pay or other working conditions.113 To bring balance to the employment relationship at the bargaining table, one of the primary weapons available to workers in defending their interests is the threat of withholding labor to inflict costs upon the employer.114 The principle of the strike as a legitimate means of action taken by workers’ organizations is widely recognized in countries throughout the world, almost to the point of universal recognition.115 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association holds the position that the right to strike is a basic consequence of the right to organize.116 Interference or impairment of the right to strike is inconsistent with Articles 3, 8, and 10 of Convention 87 guaranteeing workers freedom of association and the right to take concerted actions to further their interests. Article 3 recognizes the right of workers’ organizations to organize their activities and to formulate their programs.117 Article 10 states that the term “organization” means any organization for furthering and defending the interests of workers.118 When read together with Article 10, Article 3 protects activities and actions that are designed to further and defend the interests of workers. Recall that strikes are recognized as an essential means through which workers further and defend their interests.119 Article 8 declares that no national law may impair the guarantees of the Convention.120 Because strike action falls under the activities protected by Article 3, which are aimed at furthering and defending workers’ interests, limitations on the right to strike may contravene Conventions 87 and 98.121 This subsection addresses the lawful practice of hiring of permanent replacements for striking workers in the United States as it relates to ILO principles. 1. The Use of Permanent Strike Replacements Reduces the ‘Right’ to Strike to the Unprotected ‘Freedom’ to Strike In refraining from ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the United States government has insisted that U.S. law sufficiently guarantees workers protections of the principles of freedom of association, the rights to organize, and bargain collectively.122 While Section 13 of the NLRA addresses the right to strike,123 in reality, enforcement of the NLRA falls short of its goals and departs from international norms, which afford the right to strike fundamental status.124 The Mackay doctrine, permitting permanent replacement of strikers renders the right a mere privilege, or freedom, because it removes meaningful protection of the right by stripping employers of a duty to refrain from interference with striking.125 Wesley Hohfeld’s famous account of legal rights provides a useful analytical framework for distinguishing between the colloquial uses of the “rights” and their implications.126 Under this framework, rights are distinguished from what he calls privileges, or freedoms, by the existence or inexistence of a corresponding duty. All rights have a corresponding duty, or a legal obligation to respect the legal interest of the right-holder and refrain from interfering with it.127 In the example of the right to strike, the correlative is the employer’s duty to not interfere with the employees’ right.128 On the other hand, a ‘freedom’ is the liberty to act, but without the imposition of a duty upon others.129 When one has the freedom to act, others simply do not have a right to prevent her from acting.130 In the strike context, if employees enjoy the freedom to strike, an employer does not have the right to stop the employees from striking, but does not have a duty to not interfere with the act of striking.131 In establishing the Mackay permanent strike replacement Doctrine, the Supreme Court reasoned that the ‘right’ to strike does not destroy an employer’s right to protect and continue business by filling the vacancies of the strikers.132 In so holding, the Court actually transformed the ‘right’ to strike it into the ‘freedom’ to strike by removing a corresponding affirmative duty not to interfere with the exercise of the right from the employer.133 The hire of permanent replacements interferes with strike action by inflicting substantial repercussions upon the employees that undertake the action, loss of employment opportunities.134 The Mackay doctrine forces an employee to choose to strike—at the risk of losing the very job that is the object of the gains and benefits sought— rendering the act virtually useless.135 The threat of being permanently replaced has, in fact, discouraged workers from exercising their ‘right’ to strike.136 Application of the Mackay doctrine produces results that are inconsistent with the NLRA’s provisions regarding protected activity, making the diminution of protection for striking employees even more apparent. In recognizing an employer right to hire permanent replacements, the Mackay Court created a loophole for employers who otherwise are prohibited from firing striking employees under the Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which proscribes retaliation against employees that engage in protected union activity.137 While the act of permanently replacing strikers is lawful, firing strikers is unlawful, although both acts produce the same result: loss of a job as a consequence of striking.138 The result renders the NLRA’s protections for striking workers a dead letter. Although employers have a duty to refrain from retaliation against workers engaged in union activity in the form of firing, employers do not have a duty to refrain from reaching the same result through a different tactic—permanent replacement.139 Thus, this removal of a duty to refrain from interference renders the ‘right’ to strike, an unprotected ‘freedom’ to strike that yields to an employer’s corresponding freedom to replace strikers.140 In other words, the Mackay doctrine preserves the NLRA Section 13 reference to strike action as a lawful recourse for workers, but not one afforded the status of a protected right.

## Underview

**[1] 1AR Theory:**

**[a] AFF gets it to check infinite neg abuse**

**[b] Drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory.**

**[c] No RVI – 6 minute 2n can just dump on a 20 second 1ar shell and win on sheer brute force**

**[d] Competing Interps--6 minutes on a 20 second shell is more than enough to justify their interp**

**[e] Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and it teaches portable skills that we use lifelong**

**[2] Reasonability w/ a bl of sufficient defense on aff counter interps**

**[a] Time-crunched 1ar can’t generate offense, weigh, and cover all standards - reasonable interps allow for leeway and time for topic ed**

**[b] 6 minute 2n brute force lets them hyper-inflate the abuse - reasonability counteracts that bias**

**[c] Affs speak in the dark and can’t predict their bidirectional shells - means we need leeway since negs always have generics to engage in but we don’t**

**[3] Drop the Arg on neg shells**

**[a] 7 minute NC to spam theory means our time crunched speeches can’t win every layer - dropping the abusive parts of the aff while still letting us win on other layers gives substance ed and resolves the skew**

**[b] They have infinite ways to negate with counter-advocacies while we only have the res - letting us kick abuse gives us infinite routes to affirm that you have to disprove as well, which is key to reciprocity**

**[4] Neg may not take prep time--they already have 30 minutes of pre round prep which should compensate--no prep is key to reciprocity**

**[5] If I win one layer vote aff**

**[a] Time skew--neg has 7 minutes to uplayer and makes the round impossible to win**

**[b] It forces you to engage with the aff creating substantive discussion on something we both had time to prep for**

**[6] Neg interps are counterinterps since the AC takes a stance and came lexically prior - means you re-evaluate the AC under their interp and evaluate the debate after the 1ar so both of us get one rebuttal**

**[7] The neg must extend all arguments twice in either the 1nc or 2nr – aff has to waste time extending twice in the 1ar and 2ar so its reciprocal**

**[8] No neg analytics – I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.**