**1AC - NSD Camp Tournament R6**

**Framing**

**Permissibility and presumption affirm:**

* **Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason – means that presuming neg is incoherent because it relies on some presumptive truths about ethics and the world in general**
* **Intuition - we naturally believe statements true e.g. if I told you my name is Shrey, you’d believe me**

**Being is always a prior question—in order to make any claim about the subject we must first understand how the subject functions. Anything else ensures we’re placing obligations on the wrong actor, agents aren’t properly conditioned to follow other theories, and ethics become impossible since no one could be held culpable for their actions**

**Manzi ‘13**, Yvonne (University of Kent). “Jean-Paul Sartre: Existential “Freedom” and the Political.” E-International Relations Students. January 23rd, 2013. <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/23/jean-paul-sartre-existential-freedom-and-the-political/> RCT//SR

Philosophers have been pondering the notion of freedom for thousands of years. From Thucydides, through to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the concept of freedom has continually been dealt with to some degree in political thought. This is an important concept because we must decide whether individuals are free, whether they should be free, what this means and what kinds of institutions we are to build around these ideas. In political thought, the notion of freedom can be looked at through the lens of Isaiah Berlin’s renowned essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”. He begins with stating that in political philosophy, the dominant issue is the question of obedience and coercion. Why should an individual obey anyone else? May individuals be coerced? Why should we all not live as we like? These are all questions of freedom. In a long and detailed discussion, Berlin then makes the distinction between positive and negative freedom.1 Carter clearly and concisely explains the distinction; “negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints… Positive liberty is the possibility of acting … in such a way as to take control of one’s life” (2008). Key to negative freedom2 is the notion of non-interference. One only lacks political liberty if he/she is “prevented from attaining a goal by human beings” (Berlin 1969, 122). Simply being incapable of achieving a goal (such as not being able to fly like a bird or not being able to walk because of an injury) does not count as being un-free in this sense. There are numerous political philosophers who fall under this category outlined by Berlin. They agree on the definition of freedom but disagree about how wide it should be. Two of these philosophers are Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.3 Because in the state of nature human goals cannot be harmonised, these classical thinkers assumed that human freedom must be limited by law. However, they also recognised that a minimum area of human freedom should also be protected in order to allow for the basic human capacities/qualities to develop. For Hobbes, individuals must surrender all of their rights to the Leviathan under a social contract, except for one fundamental right – the right to self-preservation (Hobbes 1651). For Locke, the ‘minimal’ area of protected freedom for each individual is a bit broader in that individuals have rights to their property and to the fruits of their labour (Locke 1689). There is infinite debate in that “we cannot remain absolutely free, and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-surrender is self-defeating” (Berlin 1969, 126). Positive freedom is ‘positive’ in the sense that individuals will want to be their own masters. In Berlin’s words, by virtue of positive freedom, one will “wish to be a subject, not an object” (1969, 131). Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of ‘true liberty’ may be placed under this category. Individuals should pursue an ideal of ‘true liberty’ in which they will be able to achieve their full human potential and live virtuously. True liberty is achieved when individuals can let go of amour propre (the love of oneself) and instead become possessed by amour de soi (the desire for self-preservation and self-mastery) (Rousseau 1762). Positive freedom therefore is less about what individuals are forbidden from doing, and more about what individuals can do to reach their full human potential. Under a state of positive freedom “I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes” (Berlin 1969, 131). The point I would like to make is that Berlin’s approach in dealing with the concept of freedom is not enough. All the thinkers I have mentioned relate to something which we can call political freedom as opposed to philosophical freedom.4 Jean-Paul Sartre discusses the latter. In his essay, Berlin claims that “conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self” (1969, 134). What Sartre does is precisely this; he begins with an understanding of the subject and of ‘human nature’ that is different from all the aforementioned ones, and he arrives at a conception of freedom that is just as different. I argue that Sartre’s concept of freedom should not have been omitted from debates in political thought. I am not arguing that Sartre’s conception of freedom should be inserted into Berlin’s framework, nor am I arguing that Berlin overlooked him. I am arguing that Berlin’s discussion is not enough. We need a conception of freedom that operates at the level of the political, because it is on top of the political that everything else in politics is built. I take the political to be the field of relations below ‘politics’. This is where the conditions for understanding politics are shaped. Chantal Mouffe makes a similar distinction; she borrows Heidegger’s vocabulary and claims that “politics refers to the ontic level, while ‘the political’ has to do with the ontological one”5 (Mouffe 2005, 8). The ontic generally refers to physical or factual reality, while the ontological refers to ‘being’, or the first-person phenomenological experience (Heidegger 1927). In this case, the two terms are slightly adapted to the theory. Politics is at the ontic level because it has to do with the conventional practices and policies, while the political is at the ontological level because, for Mouffe, it concerns the ‘being’ of society, or in her words “the very way in which society is instituted” (2005, 9). Existentialism and Jean-Paul Sartre Existentialist6 philosophers such as Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre were well-known in their time for being involved in resistance, unforgiving of collaborationism and conformity, and for having an active interest in revolutionary movements7. When coupled with the fact that freedom is one of the most significant themes that are examined by existentialist philosophers, one wonders why this branch of philosophy has not been more appropriately dealt with in political thought. Perhaps it is because existentialism indeed appears to be more of a life-philosophy than a tradition fit for the conception of political theory and policy. I argue that before political theories, policies and institutions can be conceived, one must first be able to appropriately situate the human condition. Existentialism provides a unique and compelling account of what it means to be ‘human’, which allows for Sartre’s conception of freedom to be reasonably developed. What is primarily worth noting is the context in which the existentialist ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre arose. After the world wars, there was a break down in traditional ideas of philosophy. There was no true sense of community, no faith in human nature, and an increasing belief that perhaps the divine did not truly exist if it allowed for atrocities such as the holocaust to happen (Flynn 2006). Philosophy had to return to its origins; ‘what do we know and how do we know it?’ was the question. Existentialists answered ‘all we really know is that we exist’. Existentialism therefore revolves around questions of existence and the human experience. We will start from the same position – notions of existence and subjectivity. Existentialists maintain that we cannot know anything if not from our subjectivity. The first and only real thing we know is that we exist and that we experience everything subjectively. This leads us into questions of being. Hegel distinguished between the being of objects (being-in-itself), and human Being (or Geist) – this provided one of the bases for Sartre’s later distinction (Hegel 1807). Heidegger provided a second contribution, which in a sense defines the core of this philosophical tradition. He claimed that we cannot reflect on the meaning of being in relation to our existence, if we do not first understand it philosophically8 (Heidegger 1927). Heidegger especially critiqued the Cartesian question of existence, claiming that such a question arises from an ontologically inadequate beginning (Ibid, 83). He criticised the notion of substance, and he argued that individuals are Dasein, or ‘beings-in-the-world’. Inherent in the existentialist tradition are also ideas of meaninglessness and angst. Sartre, as an atheist, rejected the idea that there is a divine meaning to one’s life or that there is a purpose for which each individual is born. In The Myth of Sisyphus (2000), Camus introduced the notion of absurdity which arises from the clash between the world’s resounding silence (meaninglessness) and the individual’s expectation of purpose or direction. Heidegger also accepted this, and in Being and Time he maintained that the realisation of this meaninglessness leads to a feeling of Angst (1927, 173).9 “What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it everything objectively present together as a sum, but the possibility of things at hand in general, that is, the world itself” (Ibid, 175). For Heidegger, Dasein is not only ‘being-in-the-world’, but also ‘potentiality-for-being’. Sartre, in a similar fashion, claims that individuals can surpass themselves and pursue possibilities outside of themselves (Sartre 2007, 66). A last notion which is worth mentioning is primarily a Sartrean one; that of authenticity. “Existence is authentic to the extent that the existent10 has taken possession of himself and… has moulded [themselves] ~~himself~~ [in their] ~~his~~ own image” (Macquarrie 1972, 206).

**Our existence is existential—meaning is created internally and externally produced through our will. Every rule presumes a higher rule to interpret the previous rule making it infinitely regressive, so the only solution is to become our own person and create our own understandings of the self since there will always be a disconnect between how others interpret us via a norm and how we interpret ourselves.**

**Crowell ‘04**, Steven, 8-23-2004, "Existentialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/> RCT//SR

Finally, the self-understanding, or project, thanks to which the world is there for me in a meaningful way, already belongs to that world, derives from it, from the tradition or society in which I find myself. Though it is “me,” it is not me “as my own.” My very engagement in the world alienates me from my authentic possibility. This theme is brought out most clearly by Heidegger: the anti-Cartesian idea that the self is defined first of all by its practical engagement entails that this self is not properly individual but rather indisinguishable from anyone else (das Man) who engages in such practices: such a “they-self” does what “one” does. The idea is something like this: Practices can allow things to show up as meaningful—as hammers, dollar bills, or artworks—because practices involve aims that carry with them norms, satisfaction conditions, for what shows up in them. But norms and rules, as Wittgenstein has shown, are essentially public, and that means that when I engage in practices I must be essentially interchangeable with anyone else who does: I eat as one eats; I drive as one drives; I even protest as one protests. To the extent that my activity is to be an instance of such a practice, I must do it in the normal way. Deviations can be recognized as deviations only against this norm, and if they deviate too far they can't be recognized at all.11 Thus, if who I am is defined through existing, this “who” is normally pre-defined by what is average, by the roles available to me in my culture, and so on. The “I” that gets defined is thereby “anonymous,” or “anyone”; self-making is largely a function of not distinguishing myself from others. If there is nevertheless good sense in talking of the singularity of my existence, it will not be something with which one starts but something that gets achieved in recovering oneself from alienation or lostness in the “crowd.” If the normative is first of all the normal, however, it might seem that talk about a norm for the singularity of existence, a standard for thinking about what is my ownmost just as I myself, would be incoherent. It is here that the idea of “authenticity” must come into focus. 2.3 Authenticity: By what standard are we to think our efforts “to be,” our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it is instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do “as” myself and as “anyone,” so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen). What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what “one” does (what “moral people” do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to “do what one does,” including feeling “the right way” about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself. 12 Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of “transparency” with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous “one-self” that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus “become” what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.13

**This requires the will to power, or the ability to be yourself absent power structures attempting to define you. Other frameworks collapse - the very assertion and interpretation of them is a form of our will to power and desire to master ethics.**

**Grimm 1**, Ruediger Hermann (1977). \_Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge\_. W. De Gruyter // sosa RCT//SR

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40 . One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order: there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language — indeed, our whole conceptual scheme — is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity — even if it is a necessary assumption — is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power.

**The impact is ressentiment - which leaves the agent in a state worse before and no longer motivated to be ethical, collapsing to a system of nihilism and functions as the root cause of violence**

**Newman 1**, Saul. "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment." Theory & Event, vol. 4 no. 3, 2000. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/32594. //sosa RCT//SR

Has anarchism as a political and social theory of revolution been invalidated because of the contradictions in its conception of human subjectivity? I do not think so. I have exposed a hidden strain of ressentiment in the essentialist categories and oppositional structures that inhabit anarchist discourse — in notions of a harmonious society governed by natural law and man’s essential communality, and its opposition to the artificial law of the State. However I would argue that anarchism, if it can free itself from these essentialist and Manichean categories, can overcome the ressentiment that poisons and limits it. Classical anarchism is a politics of ressentiment because it seeks to overcome power. It sees power as evil, destructive, something that stultifies the full realization of the individual. Human essence is a point of departure uncontaminated by power, from which power is resisted. There is, as I have argued, a strict Manichean separation and opposition between the subject and power. However I have shown that this separation between the individual and power is itself unstable and threatened by a ‘natural’ desire for power — the power principle. Nietzsche would argue that this desire for power — will to power — is indeed ‘natural’, and it is the suppression of this desire that has had such a debilitating effect on man, turning him against himself and producing an attitude of ressentiment. However perhaps one could argue that this desire for power in man is produced precisely through attempts to deny or extinguish relations of power in the ‘natural order’. Perhaps power may be seen in terms of the Lacanian Real — as that irrepressible lack that cannot be symbolized, and which always returns to haunt the symbolic order, disrupting any attempt by the subject to form a complete identity. For Jacques Lacan: “...the real is that which always comes back to the same place — to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it.”[45] Anarchism attempts to complete the identity of the subject by separating him, in an absolute Manichean sense, from the world of power. The anarchist subject, as we have seen, is constituted in a ‘natural’ system that is dialectically opposed to the artificial world of power. Moreover because the subject is constituted in a ‘natural’ system governed by ethical laws of mutual cooperation, anarchists are able to posit a society free from relations of power, which will replace the State once it is overthrown. However, as we have seen, this world free of power is jeopardized by the desire for power latent in every individual. The more anarchism tries to free society from relations of power, the more it remains paradoxically caught up in power. Power here has returned as the real that haunts all attempts to free the world of power. The more one tries to repress power, the more obstinately it rears its head. This is because the attempts to deny power, through essentialist concepts of ‘natural’ laws and ‘natural’ morality, themselves constitute power, or at least are conditioned by relations of power. These essentialist identities and categories cannot be imposed without the radical exclusion of other identities. This exclusion is an act of power. If one attempts to radically exclude power, as the anarchists did, power ‘returns’ precisely in the structures of exclusion themselves. Nietzsche believes that this attempt to exclude and deny power is a form of ressentiment. So how does anarchism overcome this ressentiment that has shown to be so self destructive and life-denying? By positively affirming power, rather than denying it — to ‘say yes’ to power, as Nietzsche would put it. It is only by affirming power, by acknowledging that we come from the same world as power, not from a ‘natural’ world removed from it, and that we can never be entirely free from relations of power, that one can engage in politically-relevant strategies of resistance against power. This does not mean, of course, that anarchism should lay down its arms and embrace the State and political authority. On the contrary, anarchism can more effectively counter political domination by engaging with, rather than denying, power. Perhaps it is appropriate here to distinguish between relations of power and relations of domination. To use Michel Foucault’s definition, power is a “mode of action upon the action of others.”[46] Power is merely the effect of one’s actions upon the actions of another. Nietzsche too sees power in terms of an effect without a subject: “... there is no being behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; ‘the doer’ is invented as an afterthought.”[47] Power is not a commodity that can be possessed, and it cannot be centered in either the institution or the subject. It is merely a relationship of forces, forces that flow between different actors and throughout our everyday actions. Power is everywhere, according to Foucault.[48] Power does not emanate from institutions like the State — rather it is immanent throughout the entire social network, through various discourses and knowledges. For instance, rational and moral discourses, which anarchists saw as innocent of power and as weapons in the struggle against power, are themselves constituted by power relations and are embroiled in practices of power: “power and knowledge directly imply one another.”[49] Power in this sense is productive rather than repressive. It is therefore senseless and indeed impossible to try to construct, as anarchists do, a world outside power. We will never be entirely free from relations of power. According to Foucault: “It seems to me that...one is never outside (power), that there are no margins for those who break with the system to gambol in.”[50] However, just because one can never be free from power does not mean that one can never be free from domination. Domination must be distinguished from power in the following sense. For Foucault, relations of power become relations of domination when the free and unstable flow of power relations becomes blocked and congealed — when it forms unequal hierarchies and no longer allows reciprocal relationships.[51] These relations of domination form the basis of institutions such as the State. The State, according to Foucault, is merely an assemblage of different power relations that have become congealed in this way. This is a radically different way of looking at institutions such as the State. While anarchists see power as emanating from the State, Foucault sees the State as emanating from power. The State, in other words, is merely an effect of power relations that have crystallized into relations of domination. What is the point of this distinction between power and domination? Does this not bring us back to original anarchist position that society and our everyday actions, although oppressed by power, are ontologically separated from it? In other words, why not merely call domination ‘power’ once again, and revert back to the original, Manichean distinction between social life and power? However the point of this distinction is to show that this essential separation is now impossible. Domination — oppressive political institutions like the State — now comes from the same world as power. In other words it disrupts the strict Manichean separation of society and power. Anarchism and indeed radical politics generally, cannot remain in this comfortable illusion that we as political subjects, are somehow not complicit in the very regime that oppresses us. According to the Foucauldian definition of power that I have employed, we are all potentially complicit, through our everyday actions, in relations of domination. Our everyday actions, which inevitably involve power, are unstable and can easily form into relations that dominate us. As political subjects we can never relax and hide behind essentialist identities and Manichean structures — behind a strict separation from the world of power. Rather we must be constantly on our guard against the possibility of domination. Foucault says: “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous...If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.”[52] In order to resist domination we must be aware of its risks — of the possibility that our own actions, even political action ostensibly against domination, can easily give rise to further domination. There is always the possibility, then, of contesting domination, and of minimizing its possibilities and effects. According to Foucault, domination itself is unstable and can give rise to reversals and resistance. Assemblages such as the State are based on unstable power relations that can just as easily turn against the institution they form the basis of. So there is always the possibility of resistance against domination. However resistance can never be in the form of revolution — a grand dialectical overcoming of power, as the anarchists advocated. To abolish central institutions like the State with one stroke would be to neglect the multiform and diffuse relations of power they are based on, thus allowing new institutions and relations of domination to rise up. It would be to fall into the same reductionist trap as Marxism, and to court domination. Rather, resistance must take the form of what Foucault calls agonism — an ongoing, strategic contestation with power — based on mutual incitement and provocation — without any final hope of being free from it.[53] One can, as I have argued, never hope to overcome power completely — because every overcoming is itself the imposition of another regime of power. The best that can be hoped for is a reorganization of power relations — through struggle and resistance — in ways that are less oppressive and dominating. Domination can therefore be minimized by acknowledging our inevitable involvement with power, not by attempting to place ourselves impossibly outside the world of power. The classical idea of revolution as a dialectical overthrowing of power — the image that has haunted the radical political imaginary — must be abandoned. We must recognize the fact that power can never be overcome entirely, and we must affirm this by working within this world, renegotiating our position to enhance our possibilities of freedom. This definition of power that I have constructed — as an unstable and free-flowing relation dispersed throughout the social network — may be seen as a non-ressentiment notion of power. It undermines the oppositional, Manichean politics of ressentiment because power cannot be externalized in the form of the State or a political institution. There can be no external enemy for us to define ourselves in opposition to and vent our anger on. It disrupts the Apollonian distinction between the subject and power central to classical anarchism and Manichean radical political philosophy. Apollonian Man, the essential human subject, is always haunted by Dionysian power. Apollo is the god of light, but also the god of illusion: he “grants repose to individual beings...by drawing boundaries around them.” Dionysius, on the other hand is the force that occasionally destroys these “little circles,” disrupting the Apollonian tendency to “congeal the form to Egyptian rigidity and coldness.” [[54]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-anarchism-and-the-politics-of-ressentiment#fn54) Behind the Apollonian illusion of a life-world without power, is the Dionysian ‘reality’ of power that tears away the “veil of the maya.”[[55]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-anarchism-and-the-politics-of-ressentiment#fn55) Rather than having an external enemy — like the State — in opposition to which one’s political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual ‘return’ of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the ‘return’ of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power — in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche.[[56]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-anarchism-and-the-politics-of-ressentiment#fn56) This is to accept the notion of self-overcoming’.[[57]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-anarchism-and-the-politics-of-ressentiment#fn57) To ‘overcome’ oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that that dominate us — this is what he calls subjectification.[[58]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-anarchism-and-the-politics-of-ressentiment#fn58) We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose. This we have seen in the case of anarchism. In order to avoid this Manichean logic, anarchism must no longer rely on essentialist identities and concepts, and instead positively affirm the eternal return of power. This is not a grim realization but rather a ‘happy positivism’. It is characterized by political strategies aimed at minimizing the possibilities of domination, and increasing the possibilities for freedom.

**Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to engage in a self-affirming will to power, allowing for a process of becoming ones’ true self regardless of the norms imposed on us.**

**Higgs ‘02**, Philip. “Deconstruction and Re-Thinking Education.” South African Journal of Education, Education Association of South Africa, 2002, [www.ajol.info/index.php/saje/article/view/24866](http://www.ajol.info/index.php/saje/article/view/24866). RCT//SR

Much of present day educational discourse is vulnerable to an ideologically driven educational practice which emphasises that persons be educated for the maintenance and development of environ- mentally and sociologically determined functions, as well as for the promotion of the economy (Higgs:1998). In such a context, education becomes the handmaiden of the state, and, at the same time, serves the state’s programmes of political intent. Educational discourse which poses fundamental questions, has, as Aronowitz (2001:ii) notes, vir- tually disappeared from the mainstream literature. Present day educa- tional discourse, no longer sees the need to interrogate the givens of education, or the social and political contexts in which education functions. As a result, nearly all educational discourse is reduced to what Aronowitz (2001:xvi-xvii) describes as the application of “ ... technologies of managing consent, where teaching is increasingly a function of training for test taking.” All this can be regarded as an aberration of education, as the mystification of education in the service of dominant ideologies that see education as a process of information transfer (mainly of a scientific, technical and legislative kind), and which, in turn, aim to ensure conformity to political and economically acceptable norms. ¶ In the light of this, it can be concluded that, what is needed today, is an awakening of the educational or a return to education. In short, present day educational discourse must re-think itself.

**To clarify, the AC is not consequentialist--offense comes from the intrinsic nature of the action. Consequentialism fails--**

* **Induction fails – no guarantee the past is the same as the future and to justify that is based on past inductions which is circular**
* **Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure e.g. 5 headaches vs a migraine**
* **Butterfly effect – each consequence has a future consequence and so on so we never know if it really did net good**

**Prefer the role of the ballot additionally because:**

* **Constitutivism - every argument is an act of self becoming because we channel our creativity to express ourselves through our choice to read different arguments, which means only my fw allows arguments to be made. That means my ROB is inescapable and other ROBs collapse to some function of the will to power**
* **Its the only way to orient pedagogical spaces to generate real value. That outweighs - a) we cultivate traits to gain value out of and revise other pedagogical strategies and b) best for material change because students feel empowered in their own convictions and stand up for what they believe**

**Bingham 2001**(Charles, Professor of Education at DePaul, WHAT FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE CANNOT STAND ABOUT EDUCATION: TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF SELF-REFORMULATION. Educational Theory, 00132004, Summer 2001, Vol. 51, Issue 3, pp. 345-6)

Nietzsche's self-radicalizing project should thus be understood as a re-description of learning that turns upside-down prevalent educational assumptions about the self. For example, commonsense notions of the self hold that there is a self that arrives at school and educational experience is negotiated by that self. The student may negotiate educational experience by different means -- by means of reasoning, narrative, or emotions, for example -- but in any case, the self is always there during this process. According to this commonsense view of education, there is a lack of education when the self cannot negotiate (by whatever means) the educational experience that is to be obtained at school. But as Nietzsche points out, a model of education that treats such a self as pre-given is already a lack of education from the very start. If we begin by assuming that there is some self that is being educated, then we have already bracketed much educational work. As he puts it, such a steadfast understanding of self is part of our "great stupidity."[17] When we assume that forms of selves are pre-given, we inoculate conceptions of self from being the subject of education. Yet that is what most education does: It treats the self as if it is not something that needs to be taught as a set of forms, and thus it naturalizes the self as inviolable by the very act of not teaching multiple forms of self. As Nietzsche reminds us, education so conceived is actually based on a moral paradigm of steadfast self-hood. When it comes to moral convictions, a person is usually praised for being steadfast and immovable. For example, a person who has a steadfast commitment to social justice or to religious principles is called exemplary, not uneducable. For Nietzsche, any such understanding of education is confused at a very deep level. For education to be educative, it cannot be grounded in the primary assumption that there is someone who is at a very deep level (say, at the level where we hold our most cherished beliefs) unchangeable. To be so grounded is to consider human beings educable and expect the self to stay steadfast. Educational aims claim to be comprehensive, yet they are predicated upon a moral understanding of steadfastness that is incompatible with profound self-learning. Nietzsche explains this predicament: At times we find certain solutions of problems that inspire strong faith in us; some call them henceforth their "convictions." Later -- we see them only as steps to self-knowledge, signposts to the problem we are -- rather to the great stupidity we are, to our spiritual fatum, to what is unteachable very "deep down."[18] For Nietzsche, self-integrity is premised upon a certain unteachable-ness. Teachable-ness, in contrast, cannot be an attribute of self-same selves. Learning must be an assault on "the problem of who we are." For, who we are is fundamentally a "great stupidity." Following Nietszche, our "convictions," our "self-knowledge," and our "faiths" are matters that go against learning. These steadfast parts of self that are now considered the rock upon which learning takes place are, instead, the subjective elements that are most in need of education. It is the decentering of these self-stabilities that must be at the heart of learning for Nietzsche. Education worthy of its name cannot take calm harbor among self-same assumptions that guide moral paradigms. Education must instead assail self-integrity. Pedagogy must make overt efforts to make teachable "the great stupidity we are."

**Offense**

**I affirm the resolution as a general principle which means pics don’t negate as they don’t disprove my general thesis, just as penguins don’t disprove birds fly. I’m willing to clarify in cx or before round to deter friv theory and maximize substance. The aff is a method of self affirmation in the debate space to cultivate new forms of subjectivity - the very assertion of the resolution for the ballot as true is integral to the process of becoming**

**Grimm 2**, Ruediger Hermann (1977). \_Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge\_. W. De Gruyter // sosa

In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory — the unknown — is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is: the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised.

**Only engagement with active power, ie my own independent willing is productive- my specific reading of the resolution as true through my own lens is a form of self-transformation that could only ever be generated by the aff, as the negative’s will will structurally be reactive to mine**

**Newman 2**, Saul. "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment." Theory & Event, vol. 4 no. 3, 2000. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/32594. //sosa RCT//SR

Furthermore, perhaps one could envisage a form of political community or collective identity that did not restrict difference. The question of community is central to radical politics, including anarchism. One cannot talk about collective action without at least posing the question of community. For Nietzsche, most modern radical aspirations towards community were a manifestation of the ‘herd’ mentality. However it may be possible to construct a ressentiment-free notion of community from Nietzsche’s own concept of power. For Nietzsche, active power is the individual’s instinctive discharge of his forces and capacities which produces in him an enhanced sensation of power, while reactive power, as we have seen, needs an external object to act on and define itself in opposition to.[66] Perhaps one could imagine a form of community based on active power. For Nietzsche this enhanced feeling of power may be derived from assistance and benevolence towards others, from enhancing the feeling of power of others.[67] Like the ethics of mutual aid, a community based on will to power may be composed of a series of inter-subjective relations that involve helping and caring for people without dominating them and denying difference. This openness to difference and self-transformation, and the ethic of care, may be the defining characteristics of the post-anarchist democratic community. This would be a community of active power — a community of ‘masters’ rather than ‘slaves’.[68] It would be a community that sought to overcome itself — continually transforming itself and revelling in the knowledge of its power to do so.

**An unconditional right to strike is defined as:**

**NLRB 85** [National Labor Relations Board; “Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: Volume 1,” Jan 1985; [https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"& HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdot=1" HYPERLINK "https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA\_\_v4xwC&rdot=1"rdot=1](https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA__v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA__v4xwC&rdot=1)]

\*\*Edited for gendered language

As for the so-called absolute or unconditional right to strike—there are no absolute rights that do not have their corresponding responsibilities. Under our American Anglo-Saxon system, each individual is entitled to the maximum of freedom, provided however (and this provision is of first importance), his [their] freedom has due regard for the rights and freedoms of others. The very safeguard of our freedoms is the recognition of this fundamental principle. I take issue very definitely with the suggestion that there is an absolute and unconditional right to concerted action (which after all is what the strike is) which endangers the health and welfare of our people in order to attain a selfish end.

**The right to strike is an instance of self expression and a demand for power and self determination--that creates an obligation for governments to recognize it in order to cultivate conditions of self-becoming for workers**

**Gourevitch**, A. (**2018**). The Right to Strike: A Radical View. American Political Science Review, 1–13. doi:10.1017/s0003055418000321 //SR

There is more than one way to justify the right to strike and, in so doing, to explain the shape that right ought to have. As we shall see, there is the liberal, the socialdemocratic, and the radical account. Any justification of a right must give an account not just of the interest it protects but of how that right is shaped to protect that interest. In the case of the radical argument for the right to strike, which I will defend against the other two conceptions, the relevant human interest is liberty. Workers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce that oppression. Their interest is a liberty interest in a double sense. First, it is an interest in not being oppressed, or in not facing certain kinds of forcing, coercion, and subjection to authority that they shouldn’t have to.Any resistance to those kinds of unjustified limitations of freedom carries with it, at least implicitly, a demand for liberties not yet enjoyed.19 That is a demand for a control over portions of one’s life that one does not yet enjoy. Second, and consequently, the right to strike is grounded in an interest in using one’s own individual and collective agency to resist—or even overcome— that oppression. The interest in using one’s own agency to resist oppression flows naturally from the demand for liberties not yet enjoyed. After all, that demand for control is in the name of giving proper space to workers’ capacity for self-determination, which is the same capacity that expresses itself in the activity of striking for greater freedom. On this radical view, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to liberty. It has intrinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self emancipation or the winning of greater liberty through one’s own efforts. It has instrumental value insofar as the strike is on the whole an effective means for resisting the oppressiveness of a class society. For the right to strike to enjoy its proper connection to liberty, workers must have a reasonable chance of carrying out an effective strike, otherwise it would lose its instrumental value as a way of resisting oppression. If prevented from using a reasonable array of effective means, exercising the right to strike would not be a means of reducing oppression and, therefore, strikes would also be of very limited value as acts of self-emancipation. It would not be an instance of workers attempting to use their own capacity for self-determination to increase the control they ought to have over the terms of their daily activity.

**Advantage**

**Global democracy is collapsing now.**

**Freedom House 3/3** [Freedom House. Freedom House works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. We act as a catalyst for freedom through a combination of analysis, advocacy, and action. Our analysis, focused on 13 central issues, is underpinned by our international program work. “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated”. 3-3-2021. . <https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated>.]

Washington - March 3, 2021 — Authoritarian actors grew bolder during 2020 as major democracies turned inward, contributing to the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, according to [*Freedom in the World 2021*](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege), the annual country-by-country assessment of political rights and civil liberties released today by Freedom House. The report found that the share of countries designated Not Free has reached its highest level since the deterioration of democracy began in 2006, and that countries with declines in political rights and civil liberties outnumbered those with gains by the largest margin recorded during the 15-year period. The report downgraded the freedom scores of 73 countries, representing 75 percent of the global population. Those affected include not just authoritarian states like China, Belarus, and Venezuela, but also troubled democracies like the United States and India. In one of the year’s most significant developments, India’s status changed from Free to Partly Free, meaning less than 20 percent of the world’s people now live in a Free country—the smallest proportion since 1995. Indians’ political rights and civil liberties have been eroding since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014. His Hindu nationalist government has presided over increased pressure on human rights organizations, rising intimidation of academics and journalists, and a spate of bigoted attacks—including lynchings—aimed at Muslims. The decline deepened following Modi’s reelection in 2019, and the government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 featured further abuses of fundamental rights. The changes in India formed part of a broader shift in the international balance between democracy and authoritarianism, with authoritarians generally enjoying impunity for their abuses and seizing new opportunities to consolidate power or crush dissent. In many cases, promising democratic movements faced major setbacks as a result. In Belarus and Hong Kong, for example, massive prodemocracy protests met with brutal crackdowns by governments that largely disregarded international criticism. The Azerbaijani regime’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh indirectly threatened recent democratic gains in Armenia, while the armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region dashed hopes for the tentative political opening in that country since 2018. All four of these cases notably featured some degree of intervention by an autocratic neighbor: Moscow provided a backstop for the regime in Belarus, Beijing propelled the repression in Hong Kong, Turkey’s government aided its Azerbaijani counterpart, and Ethiopia’s leader called in support from Eritrea. The malign influence of the regime in China, the world’s most populous dictatorship, ranged far beyond Hong Kong in 2020. Beijing ramped up its global disinformation and censorship campaign to counter the fallout from its cover-up of the initial coronavirus outbreak, which severely hampered a rapid global response in the pandemic’s early days. Its efforts also featured increased meddling in the domestic political discourse of foreign democracies, as well as transnational extensions of rights abuses common in mainland China. The Chinese regime has gained clout in multilateral institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, which the United States abandoned in 2018, as Beijing pushed a vision of so-called noninterference that allows abuses of democratic principles and human rights standards to go unpunished while the formation of autocratic alliances is promoted. “This year’s findings make it abundantly clear that we have not yet stemmed the authoritarian tide,” said Sarah Repucci, vice president of research and analysis at Freedom House. “Democratic governments will have to work in solidarity with one another, and with democracy advocates and human rights defenders in more repressive settings, if we are to reverse 15 years of accumulated declines and build a more free and peaceful world.” A need for reform in the United States While still considered Free, the United States experienced further democratic decline during the final year of the Trump presidency. The US score in [Freedom in the World](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege) has dropped by 11 points over the past decade, and fell by three points in 2020 alone. The changes have moved the country out of a cohort that included other leading democracies, such as France and Germany, and brought it into the company of states with weaker democratic institutions, such as Romania and Panama. Several developments in 2020 contributed to the United States’ current score. The Trump administration undermined government transparency by dismissing inspectors general, punishing or firing whistleblowers, and attempting to control or manipulate information on COVID-19. The year also featured mass protests that, while mostly peaceful, were accompanied by high-profile cases of violence, police brutality, and deadly confrontations with counterprotesters or armed vigilantes. There was a significant increase in the number of journalists arrested and physically assaulted, most often as they covered demonstrations. Finally, the outgoing president’s shocking attempts to overturn his election loss—culminating in his incitement of rioters who stormed the Capitol as Congress met to confirm the results in January 2021—put electoral institutions under severe pressure. In addition, the crisis further damaged the United States’ credibility abroad and underscored the menace of political polarization and extremism in the country. ”January 6 should be a wake-up call for many Americans about the fragility of American democracy,” said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House. “Authoritarian powers, especially China, are advancing their interests around the world, while democracies have been divided and consumed by internal problems. For freedom to prevail on a global scale, the United States and its partners must band together and work harder to strengthen democracy at home and abroad. President Biden has pledged to restore America’s international role as a leading supporter of democracy and human rights, but to rebuild its leadership credentials, the country must simultaneously address the weaknesses within its own political system.” “Americans should feel gratified that the courts and other important institutions held firm during the postelection crisis, and that the country escaped the worst possible outcomes,” said Abramowitz. “But the Biden administration, the new Congress, and American civil society must fortify US democracy by strengthening and expanding political rights and civil liberties for all. People everywhere benefit when the United States serves as a positive model, and the country itself reaps ample returns from a more democratic world.” The effects of COVID-19 Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global democratic decline. Repressive regimes and populist leaders worked to reduce transparency, promote false or misleading information, and crack down on the sharing of unfavorable data or critical views. Many of those who voiced objections to their government’s handling of the pandemic faced harassment or criminal charges. Lockdowns were sometimes excessive, politicized, or brutally enforced by security agencies. And antidemocratic leaders worldwide used the pandemic as cover to weaken the political opposition and consolidate power. In fact, many of the year’s negative developments will likely have lasting effects, meaning the eventual end of the pandemic will not necessarily trigger an immediate revitalization of democracy. In Hungary, for example, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took on emergency powers during the health crisis and misused them to withdraw financial assistance from municipalities led by opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa dissolved Parliament in early March and, with new elections repeatedly delayed due to COVID-19, ruled without a legislature for several months. Later in the year, both Hungary and Sri Lanka passed constitutional amendments that further strengthened executive power. The resilience of democracy Despite the many losses for freedom recorded by [Freedom in the World](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege) during 2020, people around the globe remained committed to fighting for their rights, and democracy continued to demonstrate its remarkable resilience. A number of countries held successful elections, independent courts provided checks on executive overreach, journalists in even the most repressive environments investigated government transgressions, and activists persisted in calling out undemocratic practices.

**The plan solves:**

**First, the plan increases rights, improves communication, fosters political participation, condemns authoritarian threats/violence, and fosters democratic unions**

Harley **Shaiken and** David **Madland**, 12-9-**2008**, "Issue Brief: Unions Are Good for the Economy and Democracy," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2008/12/09/5276/issue-brief-unions-are-good-for-the-economy-and-democracy/> //SR

Unions are good for democracy. They give workers a voice on the job and in politics, and have been essential to the passage of some of the most important legislation of the past 100 years. Unions improve communication between workers and managers. Unions give workers a voice on the job and improve communication between workers and management. Without unions, day-to-day competitive pressures leave quitting as the only option for workers to address serious problems—an expensive solution for all concerned. Unions have helped pass important legislation that helps all Americans. In the political arena, unions have pressed for improved minimum wages, health care coverage, retirement plan protections, overtime pay, and social security. When workers are able to join together in a democracy, the voice of workers can help balance out the power of business interests. Unions foster political participation. Unions are democratic membership organizations and foster the political participation of their members. They educate their members about the political process and train them how to work together for a common goal. The Employee Free Choice Act is needed. Under current law, workers are often denied workplace freedoms and face a Herculean task joining a union. Workers attempting to unionize are often intimidated. Workers attempting to unionize face a hostile legal environment and aggressive antiunion employers. Expensive antiunion campaigns often seek to influence workers’ votes by using threats—sometimes that the wrong vote could cost workers their jobs—one-on-one pressure, and mandatory meetings. One out of five union organizers or activists is likely to be fired during union election campaigns. The current law is a failure. Labor law contains few penalties for employers who routinely harass, intimidate, and even fire people who try to join a union. Even after a vote in favor of unionization, employers often exercise their available rights of appeal and engage in bad-faith bargaining as a delay tactic that can go on for years. Workers want to join unions. Only 12 percent of American workers today are members of unions—but that’s not because they don’t want to be. A December 2006 Peter Hart Research Associates Poll reports that 58 percent of non-managerial American workers would join a union if they could. The Employee Free Choice Act would restore workers’ voices. The bill would make joining a union and getting a first contract fairer and easier. The Employee Free Choice Act promotes workers’ rights. The bill would reform the labor-relations system to restore workers’ basic democratic right to make a free choice to join a union. The Employee Free Choice Act is fair. It would ensure fairness in the union selection process through three main provisions: workers would have a fair and direct path to join unions through simple majority sign-up, employers who break the rules governing the unionization process would face stiffer penalties, and a first contract mediation and arbitration process would be introduced to thwart bad-faith bargaining. The Employee Free Choice Act is democratic and restores previously won rights. The bill would allow workers to join a union through simple majority sign-up or an election—as previous labor law allowed. The Employee Free Choice Act allows majority sign up or an election. The bill would allow an employee to choose to join a union through simple majority sign-up—a system that works well at the small number of workplaces that choose to permit it. The act does not deny workers their right to vote in a union election, as some conservatives maintain, but rather allows workers to choose between signing a membership card and having an election. Workers won rights in 1935. Workers won important collective bargaining protections over 70 years ago with the passage of the Wagner Act. The Wagner Act placed the federal government squarely on the side of collective bargaining and the right to organize. An employer’s duty was to remain completely neutral in a representation election, in recognition that economic dependence defines the relationship between employers and workers. Employer persuasion could not be separated from employer coercion. The Wagner Act promoted majority sign up. Elections were just one way for workers to unionize during the 1930s. The National Labor Relations Board only required an election when genuine questions arose around a majority sign-up process. Almost a third of all union certifications between 1938 and 1939 occurred without an election according to labor historian Dr. David Brody, and under these legal rules millions of workers exercised their basic democratic rights, pouring into unions. Unfortunately, important safeguards requiring employer neutrality during union selection processes began to be dismantled starting in the 1940s. The Taft Hartley Act took away the NLRB’s right to certify unions with simple majority sign up in 1947—employers from that point on could recognize their workers’ petition, or request an additional election—where rules favor the employer. The Employee Free Choice Act is necessary to restore workers’ rights, boost the wages and benefits of Americans, and strengthen our economy. Passing the bill would help restore workplace democracy for workers attempting to organize, boost unionization rates, and improve the economic standing and workplace conditions for millions of American workers.

**Democracy solves every impact by being comparatively more stable than autocracies**

**Kroenig 20** Matt. 4/3. Professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University – you know who he is. “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China” <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/why-china-ill-equipped-great-power-rivalry/609364/>) 1/20/2021

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Watch White Noise, the inside story of the alt-right The Atlantic’s first feature documentary ventures into the underbelly of the far-right movement to explore the seductive power of extremism. Stream Now Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the United States built the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Daniel Blumenthal: The Unpredictable Rise of China Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt recently wrote in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many economists predict that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and some have suggested that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950 only to nearly fight a nuclear war with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and “hiding its capabilities and biding its time” abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. According to the Asia Society, he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, taking contested territory from neighbors in the South China Sea and conducting military exercises with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000 years of history” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the protests this year in Hong Kong and Xinjiang—the CCP spends more on domestic security than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. Shadi Hamid: China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including North Macedonia this week. The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of lauding autocratic China’s firm response in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually misrepresented the numbers of COVID-19 infections and deaths in China, and European nations have rejected and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits.

**Underview**

1] 1AR Theory

* AFF gets it to check infinite neg abuse
* Drop the debater – the short 1AR irreparably skewed from abuse on substance and time investment on theory.
* No RVI – 6 minute 2n can just dump on a 20 second 1ar shell and win on sheer brute force
* Competing Interps--6 minutes on a 20 second shell is more than enough to justify their interp