1AC – Wages –

1AC – Util [1:20]

Value is Justice. Prefer because justice present in the resolution, evaluate this round on who proves they are most just. VC is Util.

We can't obtain evidence of goodness without desire – aposteriori knowledge outweighs.

Sayre-McCord 01 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, "Mill's "Proof" Of The Principle of Utility: A More Than Half-Hearted Defense", Social Philosophy and Policy, 2001, accessed: 1 April 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/mills-proof-of-the-principle-of-utility-a-more-than-halfhearted-defense/FDBE07CBE08D4E17523930BF8C7BBC32, R.S.

How is the argument supposed to go, if not by way of these multiple fallacies? Let us start with the principle of evidence and the analogy Mill draws between visibility and desirability. What is the analogy supposed to be if not one that commits Mill to interpreting "desirable" as "capable of being desired"? When it comes to visibility, no less than desirability, Mill explicitly denies that a "proof" in the "ordinary acceptation of the term" can be offered.25 As he notes, "To be incapable of proof by reasoning is com mon to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct."26 Nonetheless, support -- that is, evidence, though not proof -- for the first premises of our **knowledge** is **provided by** "our **senses, and** our internal **consciousness.**" Mill's suggestion is that, when it comes to the first principles of conduct, desire play the same epistemic role that the senses play, when it comes to the first principles of knowledge. To understand this role, it is important to distinguish the fact that someone is sensing something from what is sensed, which is a distinction mirrored in the contrast bet ween the fact that someone is desiring something and what is desired. In the case of our senses, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning sensible qualities traces back to what is sensed, to the content of our sense-experience. Likewise, Mill is suggesting, in the case of value, the evidence we have for our judgments concerning value traces back to what is desired, to the content of our desires. Ultimately, the grounds we have for holding the principles we do must, he thinks, be traced back to our experience, to our senses and desires. Yet the evidence we have is not that we are sensing or desiring something but what it is that is sensed or desired.27 When we are having sensations of red, when what we are looking at appears red to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is red. Moreover, if things never looked red to us, we could never get evidence that things were red, and would indeed never have developed the concept of redness. Similarly, when we are desiring things, when what we are considering appears good to us, we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible evidence) that the thing is good. Moreover, **if we never desired** things, **we could never get evidence** that **things were good, and** would indeed **never have developed** the concept of **value.** 28 Recall that desire, for Mill, like taste, touch, sight, and smell, is a "passive sensibility." All of these, he holds, provide us with both the content that makes thought possible and the evidence we have for the conclusions that thought leads us to embrace. "Desiring a thing" and "thinking of it as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences)" are treated by Mill as one an d the same, just as seeing a thing as red and thinking of it as red are one and the same.29 Accordingly, a person who desires x is a person who ipso facto sees x as desirable.30 Desiring something, for Mill, is a matter of seeing it under the guise of the good.31 This means that it is important, in the context of Mill's argument, that one not think of desires as mere preferences or as just any sort of motive. They constitute, according to Mill, a distinctive subclass of our motivational states, and are distinguished (at least in part) by t heir evaluative content.32 Thus, Mill is neither assuming nor arguing that something is good because we desire it; rather, he is depending on our desiring it as establishing that we see it as good. Mill's aim is to take what people already, and he thinks inevitably, see as desirable and argue that those views commit them to the value of the general happiness (whet her or not their desires follow the deliverances of t heir reason). Those who, like Mill, desire the general happiness already hold the view that the general happiness is desirable. They accept the claim that Mill is trying to defend. As Mill knows, however, there are many who do not have this desire -- many who desire only their own happiness, and some who even desire that others suffer. These are the people he sets out to persuade, along with others who are more generous and benevolent, but who nonetheless do not see happiness as desirable, and the only thin g desirable, as an end. Mill's argument is directed at convincing t hem all -- whether their desires follow or not -- that they have grounds for, and are in fact already com mitted to, regarding the happiness of others as valuable as an end. At the same time, while desiring something is a matter of seeing it as good, one could, on Mill's view, believe that something is good without desiring it, just as one can believe something is red without seeing it as red. While desire is supposed to be the fundamental source of our concept of, and evidence for, desirability, once the concept is in place there are contexts in which we will have reason to think it applies even when the corresponding sensible experience is lacking. Indeed, in Chapter IV, Mill is concerned not with generating a desire but with justifying the belief that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end, and so concerned with defending the standard for determining what should be desired.33 Mill recognizes that whatever argument he might hope to offer will need to appeal to evaluative claims people already accept (since he takes to heart Hume's caution concerning inferring an 'ought' from an 'is').34 The claim Mill thinks he can appeal to -- that one's own happiness is a good (i.e. desirable) -- is something licensed as available by people desiring their own happiness. Yet he is not supposing here that the fact that they desire their own happiness, or anything else, is proof that it is desirable, just as he would not suppose that the fact that someone sees something as red is proof that it is. Rather, he is supposing that if people desire their own happiness, or see something as red, one can rely on t hem having available, as a premise for further argument, the claim that their own happiness is desirable or that the thing is red (at least absent contrary evidence).35 As he puts it in the third paragraph, "If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end nothing could ever convince any person that it was so." Thus, in appealing to the analogy bet ween judgments of sensible qualities and judgments of value, Mill is not trading on an ambiguity, nor does his argument here involve identifying being desirable with being desired or assuming that "desirable" means "desired." He is instead relying consistently on an empiricist account of concepts and their application -- on a view according to which we have the concepts, evidence, and knowledge we do only thanks to our having experiences of a certain sort. In the absence of the relevant experiences, he holds (with other empiricists), we would not only lack the required evidence for our

judgments, we would lack the capacity to make the judgments in the first place. **In** the **presence of** the relevant **experience**s, though, **we have** both the concepts and the required **evidence** -- "not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require."36

Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses. Evolutionary knowledge is reliable – broad consensus and robust neuroscience prove.

Blum et al. 18 Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, "Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies", U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/, R.S.

Pleasure is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain's pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us "what we are," i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason,

foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic

interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: "Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees." This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: "It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction)." Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain's reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson's, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans' ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual's physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

Prefer additionally:

Actor spec – resolution is a question of what states ought to do – outweighs since different moral agents have different standings and ethical obligations.

A - side constraints freeze action because government policies always require trade-offs—the only justifiable way to resolve those conflicts is by benefiting as many as possible

B - No act-omission distinction for states since they implicitly assume culpability in regulating the public domain by creating permissions and prohibitions.

1AC – Advantage

Increased concentration of buyer power in labor markets drives inequality

Lauren **Sillman 20**. Antitrust Associate, Clifford Chance LLP; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of Iowa. "ANTITRUST FOR CONSUMERS AND WORKERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS IN MERGER REVIEW." https://lawjournal.ku.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/4_Sillman_Antitrust_V30_I1.pdf

A détente is especially desirable today in light of the severe stagnation in American wages. In the past thirty-five years, U.S. gross domestic product has all in all grown but the **purchasing power** of the average worker **has barely changed**.3 Labor's share of national income declined precipitously in the 2000s, and in the five years after the Great Recession it was lower than at any point since World War II.4 Because most people get most of their income from labor, and because those who get most of their income from capital tend to be wealthy, **this income shift has dramatic consequences for inequality.**

Economists and policymakers have advanced numerous explanations for this troubling trend ranging from the decline of unions, to tighter monetary policy, to increased trade liberalization, and more.5 One explanation that has received attention in recent years is an apparent epidemic of market concentration and flagging competition.6 **A growing body of evidence suggests that over time fewer and fewer firms have come to dominate sectors across the economy**.7 One study found that from 1982 to 2012, the share of sales by the sectors' top four firms increased in manufacturing, finance, services, utilities, retail trade, and wholesale trade.8 Average markups above cost—a manifestation of market power—rose from eighteen percent in 1980 to sixty-seven percent in 2014.9 This increase in concentration is due, in part, to a growing wave of mergers. By one count over 325,000 mergers have been announced since 1985.10 That year, around 2,000 mergers with a value of a little over $300 billion were announced.11 In 2018, 15,000 mergers occurred—valued at just under two trillion dollars.12

The ability of firms to charge prices for their products or services that **exceed the competitive level harms workers** in their role as consumers, and the **reverberating inefficiencies have consequences for wages as well**.13 Workers are harmed more directly, though by firms with buyer power in labor markets. Instead of enabling firms to charge high prices for the goods or services they sell, buyer power—also known as monopsony power—allows firms to push wages below the level workers would receive in competitive labor markets.

A recent study applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is used to measure market concentration. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ("the agencies") used HHI in merger review, and found that **at least forty percent of job markets fell into the "highly concentrated" category**, making them especially susceptible to anticompetitive behavior by employers.14 The hiring markets for the twenty-five percent most concentrated occupations in almost every commuting zone in the country have concentration levels nearly tripled the "highly concentrated" threshold.15 In commuting zones across middle America, the hiring market for nearly every occupation is highly concentrated.16 As discussed below, a concentrated labor market generally increases the buyer power of participants in that market.

Recent research on labor supply elasticity, which is an indicator of vulnerability to employers' market power, further challenges traditional assumptions of competitiveness in labor markets.17

The rise of monopsonies saps worker bargaining power and deepens wage inequality.

Joseph E. **Stiglitz 21**. Joseph E. Stiglitz is an economist and professor at Columbia University. He is the co-chair of the High-Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress at the OECD, and the Chief Economist of the Roosevelt Institute. He has served as chief economist of the World Bank and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001"Fostering More-Competitive Labor Markets" Inequality and the Labor Market: The Case for Greater Competition. Brookings Institution Press. (2021) https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv13vdhvm.6

Of course, this is not the world in which we live. Even the corner grocery store knows it can raise its prices a little bit without losing all of its customers, which is what the standard competitive theory suggests. More and more, firms have demonstrated high and increasing levels of **market power** (Philippon 2019; Stiglitz 2019). At the same time, **the bargaining power of workers** has **weakened**.

It was never an equal match. An employer typically can find an alternative worker far more easily than a worker can find an alternative employer. This is especially so during slack periods in the labor market, or in places where there has been persistent unemployment. Leaving or losing a job is often greatly disruptive to workers and their families. There are mortgages to pay, children to feed, bills coming due. **From the perspective of workers, jobs are not easily substitutable**.

As the chapters in this volume make abundantly clear, this imbalance of market power has **consequences**. It enables firms to raise prices for goods and services—**lowering the real incomes of workers**. It enables firms to **suppress wages of workers** below what they would be in a competitive marketplace—contributing to the **inequality crisis facing the country**. This **economic inequality** gets translated into **political inequality**, especially in our **money-driven politics**, resulting in rules that evermore **favor big corporations at the expense of workers**. The growing **political inequality**, in turn, **hampers economic performance**, and ensures that most of the benefits of our anemic economic growth go to those at the very top (Stiglitz 2012).

In the middle of the 20th century, John K. Galbraith (1952) described an economy based on countervailing power—where labor institutions and government checked the power of large corporations and financial institutions. But policy choices over the past half century have upset this balance in ways that have weakened not only the **workers**, but also the **economy** and the country. This volume explores what has happened by concentrating on one understudied part of the problem: the labor market.

Labor market inequities create slow and unstable growth---COVID proves.

Joseph E. **Stiglitz 21**. Joseph E. Stiglitz is an economist and professor at Columbia University. He is the co-chair of the High-Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress at the OECD, and the Chief Economist of the Roosevelt Institute. He has served as chief economist of the World Bank and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in

economics in 2001“Fostering More-Competitive Labor Markets” Inequality and the Labor Market: The Case for Greater Competition. Brookings Institution Press. (2021) https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv13vdhvm.6

Why **It Matters**

It should be fairly obvious why these imperfections in the labor market matter so much: one of the most disturbing aspects of growth in the United States in recent decades is the **growing inequality** (see, e.g., Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2019; Stiglitz 2012, 2019; and a rash of other books on the topic). Most of the gains in the economy have gone to the top 10 percent, the top 1 percent, and the top 0.1 percent. Some of the growing inequality has to do with increases in wage disparity—known as labor market polarization. But much of it has to do with the **decreasing share of national income going to workers**.8 This is where the **decreasing market power of workers** and the increasing market power of corporations comes in. This decreasing market power is more than just changes in technology or even globalization: it is also the broader **changes in our economy, society, and politics**—and especially the changes described earlier in this introduction and elsewhere in this volume—that have led to this growing imbalance of market power.

Research at the **I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014) and elsewhere (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2019) has highlighted the broader consequences of this growing inequality, even **on economic performance**. Economies that are more unequal are **less stable** and **grow more slowly**. In The Price of Inequality I explain the reasons that we pay such a high price for inequality.

The COVID-19 crisis has provided a dramatic illustration: inequalities in income translate into **inequalities in health**, especially in a society, like that of the United States, that relies on markets to dispense healthcare. The virus is not an equal opportunity virus—it appears to have the most devastating effects on people who have underlying health conditions. Our health inequalities are undoubtedly one of the reasons that the United States led the world in **COVID**-19 **deaths**.

Short-sighted employers did not provide sick leave and government did not require it—even when Congress seemed to recognize that workers without sick leave, who live paycheck to paycheck with virtually no money in the bank, would go to work even when they were sick. They had to work in order to survive, but that meant they helped to **spread the disease**. After lobbying by the large corporations, Congress decided that employers with more than 500 employees—almost half of the private labor force— were exempt from providing sick leave. With so few workers unionized, employees simply did not have the bargaining power to demand paid sick leave, personal protective equipment, or COVID-19 tests. Government should have required all these things, of course, and it had the power to do so under OSHA, but chose not to. Workers were desperate for the protection, but **lacked the bargaining power** to get it.

Monopsonies are key---inequality hollows out economics resilience---shocks are inevitable, only worker stability makes recovery possible.

Kate **Bahn 21**. Washington Center for Equitable Growth Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, "Kate Bahn testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on monopsony, workers, and corporate power". Equitable Growth. 7-14-2021. https://equitablegrowth.org/kate-bahn-testimony-before-the-joint-economic-committee-on-monopsony-workers-and-corporate-power/

Thank you Chair Beyer, Ranking Member Lee, and members of the Joint Economic Committee for inviting me to testify today. My name is Kate Bahn and I am the Director of Labor Market Policy and the interim Chief Economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. We seek to advance **evidence-backed ideas and policies** that promote **strong, stable and broad-based growth**. Core to this mission is understanding the ways in which inequality has **distorted, subverted and obstructed economic growth** in recent decades.

Mounting evidence, which I will review today, demonstrates how the rising concentration of corporate power has **increased economic inequality** and made the **U.S. economy less efficient**. Reversing the trends that have led to a "second gilded age" is critical to encouraging a **resilient economic recovery** following the pandemic-induced economic crisis of 2020 and encouraging a **healthy, competitive economy** for the future.

Introduction

The United States boasts one of the wealthiest economies in the world, but decades of **increasing income inequality**, job polarization, and stagnant wages for most Americans has **plagued our labor market** and demonstrated that a rising tide does not lift all boats. Furthermore, economic evidence demonstrates how inequality results in an **inefficient** allocation of talent and resources while increasing corporate concentration that enriches the few while holding back the **entire economy from its potential**. Understanding the causes and consequences of the concentration of corporate power will guide policymaking in order to ensure that the **economic recovery** in the next phase of the pandemic will be **broadly shared** and ensure a more **resilient economy**.

"Monopsony" is a key economic concept to understand in this discussion. Monopsony is the labor market equivalent of the better-known phenomenon of "monopoly," but instead of having only one producer of a good or service, there is effectively only one buyer of a good or service, such as only one employer hiring people's labor in a company town. Like in monopoly, this phenomenon is not limited to when a firm is strictly the only buyer of labor. Today I will explain the circumstances and effects of employers having significant monopsony power over the market and over workers.

When employers have outsized power in employment relationships, they are able to set wages for their workers, rather than wages being determined by competitive market forces. Given this monopsony power, **employers undercut workers**. This means paying them less than the value they contribute to production. One recent survey of all the economic research on monopsony finds that, on average across studies, employers have the power to keep wages over one-third

less than they would be in a perfectly competitive market. Put another way, in a theoretical competitive market, if an employer cut wages then all workers would quit. But in reality, these estimates are the equivalent of a firm cutting wages by 5 percent yet only losing 10 percent to 20 percent of their workers, thus **growing their profits without significantly impacting their business**.

It is not only important for workers to earn a fair share so they can support themselves and their families, but also critical to ensure that our economy **rebuilds to be stronger and more resilient**. Prior to the current public health crisis and resulting recession, earnings inequality had been growing since at least the 1980s while the labor share of national income has been declining in same period. This is cause for **concern** as recent evidence suggests that the **labor share of income has a positive impact on GDP growth in the long-run**.

The unprecedented **economic shock** caused by the coronavirus pandemic revealed how economic inequality leads to a **fragile economy**, where those with the least are hit the hardest, **amplifying recessions** since lower-income workers typically spend **more of their income in the economy**. But the crisis also demonstrated how economic policy targeted toward **workers** and families can provide a **foundation for growth**. This is because **workers are the economy**, and pushing back against the concentration corporate power by providing resources to **workers** is the foundation for **strong, stable and broadly shared growth**.

The Causes of Monopsony

The concept of monopsony was initially developed by the early 20th century economist Joan Robinson, who examined how lack of competition led to unfair and inefficient economic outcomes. The prototypical example of monopsony is a company town, where there is one very dominant employer and workers have no choice but to accept low wages since they have no outside options. This is the most extreme case, but it is important to note that firms have monopsony power in any circumstance where workers aren't moving between jobs seamlessly in search of the highest wages they can get.

Firms can use monopsony power to **lower workers' wages** any time workers:

- Have few potential employers
- Face job mobility constraints
- Can only gather imperfect information about employers and jobs
- Have divergent preferences for job attributes
- Lack the ability to bargain over those offers

I will go through each of these factors in turn and demonstrate how labor markets are unique compared to other markets in dealing with competitive forces.

While concentrated labor markets are not the norm, they are **pervasive** across the United States, especially within certain sectors or locations. When markets are very concentrated,

employers can give workers **smaller yearly raises** or make **working conditions worse**, knowing that their workers have **nowhere to go** to find a better job with better pay. (See Figure 1.)

A study published in the journal Labour Economics by economists Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum finds that **60 percent of U.S. local labor markets are highly concentrated** as defined by U.S. antitrust authorities' 2010 horizontal merger guidelines. This accounts for 20 percent of employment in the United States. Research by economists Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury, and Bledi Tsaka goes further by estimating workers' outside options, or the likelihood a worker is able to change into a different occupation or industry. This study finds that even with a more expansive definition of job opportunities more than 10 percent of the U.S. workforce is in local labor markets where pay is being **suppressed by** employer **concentration by at least 2 percent**, and a significant proportion of these workers facing few outside options are facing pay suppression of 5 percent or more. As study co-author Anna Stansbury noted, "for a typical full-time workers making $50,000 a year, a 2 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $1,000 per year and a 5 percent pay reduction is equivalent to losing $2,500 per year."

Certain sectors are now **very concentrated**, such as the healthcare industry. In a paper by the economists Elena Prager and Matt Schmitt, they find that hospital mergers led to negative wage growth among skilled workers such as nurses or pharmacy workers. Consolidation and outsized employer power, alongside other phenomenon such as the fissuring of the workplace, may have broader impacts on the structure of the U.S. labor market when it affects the overall structure of the labor market, including the **hollowing out of middle class jobs** that have historically been a pathway for **upward mobility**.

It's the key internal link to growth---wage depression constrains worker supply, constrains output, and decreases investment.

Sharon **Block &** Benjamin **Elga 21**. Sharon Block is the former executive director of the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School, where she also teaches. She currently serves as the Associate Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. Benjamin Elga is the founding executive director of Justice Catalyst and Justice Catalyst Law. "The Legal Case for Reform". Inequality and the Labor Market: The Case for Greater Competition. Brookings Institution Press. (2021) https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctv13vdhvm.7

Intuitively, it seems likely that less expensive inputs or lower wages would mean savings for firms to pass on to the consumers. But it turns out that inefficiencies and **lack of competition** in upstream markets have ripple effects that can **harm everyone**. In a competitive market, employers pay the market wage; when there are vacancies, a marginal increase in pay will follow so employers can fill those vacancies. Labor monopsonists have **different incentives**. If they raise pay to fill a marginal vacancy, they might also have to raise pay for their existing employees. The small increase in pay needed to attract one more worker could mean a **massive swing in overall labor cost** (Krueger 2017). So even if growth would generally be good for the company, they might **not be able to add the workers** they need specifically because of the **special dynamics of controlling too much of the market**.

This is an extreme example, but the same general principle applies when employers have the market power to **depress wages below competitive levels**. When the marginal cost of filling vacancies and growing one's business to efficient levels diverges from the firm's individual incentives for doing so, **firms are constricted and leave jobs unfilled**. Constraining inputs like labor leads to **constrained outputs**, and if firms are producing less of the products that consumers want, then prices for those products go up. After all, **supply constraints and price increases are two sides of the same coin, economically**. Fewer workers ultimately means **fewer goods**, and fewer goods means **higher prices** for the limited amount of goods available.4 Over time, this problem is magnified because **fewer workers are incentivized to enter the field** at all. The supply of **qualified workers will go down**, further reducing the firm's ultimate output below efficient levels. In the end, **everyone suffers** except the firm with market power, which captures outsized profits.

Think: Why does America have a **chronic undersupply of nurses or teachers**, as well as stagnant wages (Council of Economic Advisers 2016)? In a competitive market, undersupply would lead to **higher wages and increased entry** to the field. If wages are inefficiently underpriced, we end up without enough nurses and ballooning healthcare costs. (Not to mention that, in the case of nurses, we end up with worse health outcomes for consumers!) This is part of the reason it is so problematic to interpret the consumer welfare standard to mean that **short-term** consumer prices are increased: presumed price effects could be **irrelevant** or **misleading** as to the overall effect on consumers.

Antitrust enforcement is supposed to be dynamic and to be able to keep up with the state of economic theory.5 But **this** cross-pollination **is not in evidence**. For example, even though inefficiency anywhere in the supply chain leads to worse outcomes for consumers, product market cases outnumber labor market cases by a factor of nearly 15, and in mergers by closer to 35. Moreover, no recent merger has been blocked on the basis of labor market effects alone (Levi 1948, 540, fn10). A quick foray into how antitrust law has developed follows.

1 – Growing economic inequality drives diversionary nationalism and makes war inevitable.

Frederick **Solt 11**. Ph.D. in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Assistant Professor, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Southern Illinois at the time of publication. "Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride." The Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3, pgs. 821-830, July 2011.

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states **instill the nationalist myth** in their citizens to **divert their attention from great economic inequality** and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect **diversion**, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has

been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a **far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments** than the international context. Given that **nuclear weapons**—either their own or their allies'—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more **hostility towards immigrants and minorities**. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame **ethnic animosities**. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the **likelihood of war**. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a **cause of war**, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for "a more **militaristic foreign affairs posture** and a more interventionist role in world politics" (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the **growth in economic inequality** over the last quarter century should be expected to lead to more aggressive foreign policies and **more international conflict**. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then **rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world**. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.

2 – Slow growth collapses the liberal order AND causes global hotspot escalation---extinction.

Michael **Oppenheimer 21**. Clinical Professor, Center for Global Affairs, New York University. Senior Consulting Fellow, Scenario Planning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Former Executive Vice President, The Futures Group. Member, Council on Foreign Relations. Member, The Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Member, The American Council on Germany, The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction. "The Turbulent Future of International Relations."

Four structural forces will **shape** the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the "non-westernization of IR"3); and **secular economic stagnation**, a product of **long**er **term** global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. **Environment**al events, **global health** challenges, **internal political developments**, policy mistakes, **technology breakthroughs** or failures, will intersect with structure to **define** our future. But these four structural forces will **impact** the way states behave, in the **capacity** of great powers to **manage** their **differences**, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade. Some of these structural forces could be **managed** to promote prosperity and **avoid war**. Multipolarity (inherently more

prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of **prosperity**, convergent values, and **effective** conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been **fully accepted** by states, global institutions, and private actors as **imperative for growth** and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at **significantly** lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president.7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing "structural adjustment programs,"8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9 But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of **increasing** internal polarization and **cross border conflict**, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened **global institutions** and norms of behavior, and **reduced** collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of **global warming**, accelerating **tech**nology **change**, **nuc**lear weapon**s innovation** and **prolif**eration. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10 Secular Stagnation This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has **declined** relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state's coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world **financial crisis** of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, **weakened** faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The **skewed** distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became **intolerable** as growth rates declined. A combination of **aging** populations, **accelerating** technology, and global **populism/nationalism** promises to make this growth decline **very difficult** to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call "**secular stagnation**" increases the likelihood that **illiberal** globalization, **multipolarity**, and **rising nationalism** will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a **long** period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation "may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times." Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers' ideas, explains: …rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result. Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth… This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible. …in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development. Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12 The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order **more difficult to resuscitate** post-Trump. Domestic politics will become **more** polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for **diminishing** resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become **politically toxic**. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from "secular stagnation" a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that **limited** the damage of previous downturns, will be **unavailable**. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump's trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will **further curb** the **investments** essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the **intersection** of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers' recommended policy **response** to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing **wage rates** and remittance **revenues** for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates. Illiberal Globalization Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will **profoundly** alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and **future** conditions these institutions will become the **battlegrounds**—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration's frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may **embrace renewed collaboration** in global **trade** and **finance**,

macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but **repairing the damage** requires the heroic assumption that America's own identity has not been **fundamentally** altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically proTrump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are **structural**, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of **diffusing material power**, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them. What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China's long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration's hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a "dead letter regime."18 As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will **shrink**, incentivizing **less investment**, increasing **costs** and **prices**, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose **growth** and **poverty reduction** depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from **excess** savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with **further retrenchment**. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods: We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That's why we're in Bangladesh. That's why we're looking at Africa. We're putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That's predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That's what America used to be.20 The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the **more dangerous**, **less prosperous** world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents **geopolitical conflict** by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from **intensifying** competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels **increased** nationalism/populism, which further **contributes to conflict**. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the **constraints of interdependence** on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a **precursor** and **enabler** of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled "Will Today's Global Trade Wars Lead to **World War Three**,"21 which examines the preWorld War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present: Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a **variety of steps** to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it **easier** for the key combatants to **conceive of a general war**. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the **economic constraints** on military aggression are **eroding**. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago. …In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports. …The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By **reducing** their **interdependence**, however, they made that option **conceivable**. …the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is **scarier than the pre-1914 era**. Back then, the world's hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called "the financial balance of terror"—**no longer look so binding**. And there are **far too many** hot spots—the **Korean peninsula**, the **S**outh **C**hina **S**ea, **Taiwan**—where the kindling seems awfully dry. Multipolarity We can define multipolarity as a wide distribution of power among multiple independent states. Exact equivalence of material power is not implied. What is required is the possession by several states of the capacity to coerce others to act in ways they would otherwise not, through kinetic or other means (economic sanctions, political manipulation, denial of access to essential resources, etc.). Such a distribution of power presents inherently graver challenges to peace and stability than do unipolar or bipolar power configurations,22 though of course none are safe or permanent. In brief, the greater the number of consequential actors, the greater the challenge of coordinating actions to avoid, manage, or de-escalate conflicts. Multipolarity also entails a **greater potential for sudden changes** in the

balance of power, as one state may **defect** to another coalition or opt out, and as a result, the greater the degree of **uncertainty** experienced by all states, and the greater the **plausibility** of downside assumptions about the **intentions** and **capabilities** of one's adversaries. This psychology, always present in international politics but particularly powerful in multipolarity, **heightens the potential for escalation of minor conflicts**, and of states launching **preventive** or **preemptive** wars. In multipolarity, states are always on edge, entertaining **worst-case** scenarios about actual and potential enemies, and **acting** on these fears—expanding their armies, introducing new weapon systems, altering doctrine to **relax** constraints on the **use of force**—in ways that reinforce the worst fears of others. The risks inherent in multipolarity are **heightened** by the attendant **weakening of global institutions**. Even in a state-centric system, such institutions can facilitate communication and transparency, helping states to manage conflicts by reducing the potential for misperception and escalation toward war. But, as Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu argues in his chapter on the United Nations, the **influence** of multilateral institutions as agent and actor is **clearly in decline**, a result of bottom-up populist/nationalist pressures **experienced** in many countries, as well as the **coordination problems** that increase in a system of multiple great powers. As conflict resolution institutions atrophy, great powers will find themselves in "**security dilemmas**"23 in which verification of a rival's intentions is unavailable, and **worst-case assumptions** fill the gap created by uncertainty. And the supply of conflicts will **expand** as a result of growing **nationalism** and **populism**, which are premised on hostility, paranoia, and isolation, with governments seeking **political legitimacy through external conflict**, producing a **siege mentality** that deliberately cuts off communication with other states. Finally, the transition from unipolarity (roughly 1989–2007) to multipolarity is **unregulated** and **hazardous**, as the existing superpower **fears** and **resists** challenges to its primacy from a rising power or powers, while the rising power entertains new ambitions as entitlements now within its reach. Such a "power transition" and its dangers were identified by Thucydides in explaining the Peloponnesian Wars,24 by Organski (the "rear-end collision")25 during the Cold War, and recently repopularized and brought up to date by Graham Allison in predicting conflict between the US and China.26 A useful, and consequential illustration of the inherent challenge of conflict management during a power transition toward multipolarity, is the weakening of the arms control regime negotiated by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Despite the existential, global conflict between two nuclear armed superpowers embracing diametrically opposed world views and operating in economic isolation from each other, the two managed to avoid worst-case outcomes. They accomplished this in part by institutionalizing verifiable limits on testing and deployment of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Yet as diplomatically and technically challenging as these achievements were, the introduction of a third great power, China, into this twocountry calculus has proven to be a deal breaker. Unconstrained by these bilateral agreements, China has been free to build up its capability, and has taken full advantage in ramping up production and deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, thus challenging the US ability to credibly guarantee the security of its allies in Asia, and greatly increasing the costs of maintaining its Asian regional hegemony. As a result, the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty is effectively dead, and the New Start Treaty, covering strategic missiles, is due to expire next year, with no indication of any US–Russian consensus to extend it. The US has with logic indicated its interest in making these agreements trilateral; but China, with its growing power and ambition, has also logically rejected these overtures. Thus, all three great powers are entering a period of nuclear weapons competition unconstrained by the major Cold War arms control regimes. In a period of **rapid advances** in technology and worsening great power relations, the **nuclear competition** will be a defining characteristic of the next decade and beyond. This dynamic will also **complicate** nuclear **nonprolif**eration efforts, as both the demand for nuclear weapons (a consequence of rising regional and global insecurity), and supply of nuclear materials and technology (a result of the weakening of the nonproliferation regime and deteriorating great power relations) will increase. Will deterrence prevent war in a world of several nuclear weapons states, (the current nuclear powers plus South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Turkey), as it helped to do during the bipolar Cold War? Some neorealist observers view nuclear weapons proliferation as stabilizing, extending the balance of terror, and the imperative of restraint, to new nuclear weapons states with much to fight over (Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example).27 Others,28 examining issues of **c**ommand a**n**d **c**ontrol of nuclear weapons deployment and use by **newly acquiring** states, **asymmetries** in doctrines, **force structures**, and **capabilities** between rivals, the **perils** of variable rates in transition to weapons deployment, problems of **communication** between states with deep mutual grievances, the heightened **risk of transfer** of such weapons to **n**on-**s**tate **a**ctor**s**, have grave doubts about the **safety** of a multipolar, nuclear-armed world.29 We can at least conclude that prudence dictates **heightened** efforts to slow the pace of proliferation, while realism requires that we face a proliferated future with eyes wide open. The current distribution of power is not perfectly multipolar. The US still commands the world's largest economy, and its military power is unrivaled by any state or combination of states. Its population is still growing, despite a recent decline in birth rates. It enjoys extraordinary geographic advantages over its rivals, who are distant and live in far worse neighborhoods. Its economy is less dependent on foreign markets or resources. Its political system has proven—up to now—to be resilient and adaptable. Its global alliance system greatly extends its capacity to defend itself and shape the world to its liking and is still intact, despite growing doubts about America's reliability as a security guarantor. Based on these mostly material and historical criteria, continued American primacy would seem to be a good bet, if it chooses to use its power in this way.30 So why multipolarity? The clearest and **most frequently cited** evidence for a **widening** distribution of global power away from American unipolarity is the narrowing gap in GDP between the US and China. The IMF's World Economic Outlook forecasts a $0.9 trillion increase in US GDP for 2019–2020, and a $1.3 trillion increase for China in the same period.31 Many who support the American primacy case argue that GDP is an imperfect measure of power, that Chinese GDP data is inflated, that its **growth rates** are in decline while Chinese debt is rapidly increasing, and that China does poorly on other factors that contribute to power—its low per capita GDP, its political succession challenges, its environmental crisis, its absence of any external alliance system. Yet GDP is a good place to start, as the single most useful measure and long-term predictor of power. It is from the overall **economy** that states **extract** and **apply** material power to leverage desired behavior from other states. It is true that robust future Chinese growth is not guaranteed, nor is its capacity to convert its wealth to power, which is a function of how well its political system works over time. But this is equally the case for the US, and considering recent political developments is **not a given** for either country. As an alternative to measuring inputs—economic size, political legitimacy, technological innovation, population growth—in assessing relative power and the nature of global power distribution, we should consider outputs: what are states doing with their power? The input measures are useful, possibly predictive, but are usually deployed in the course of making a foreign policy argument, sometimes on behalf of a reassertion of American primacy, sometimes on behalf of retrenchment. As such, their objectivity (despite their generous deployment of "data") is open to question. What is undeniable, to any clear-eyed observer, is a **real decline in American influence** in the world, and a rise in the influence of other powers, which **predates** the Trump administration but has accelerated into America's free fall over the last four years. This has produced a **de facto multipolarity**, whether explainable in the various measures of power—actual and latent—or not. This decline results in part from policy mistakes: a reckless squandering of material power and legitimacy in Iraq, an overabundance of caution in Syria, and now pure impulsivity. But more fundamentally, it is a product of **relative decline in American capacity**—political and **economic**—to which American leadership is adjusting **haphazardly**, but in the direction of **retrenchment/restraint**. It is highly revealing that the last two American presidents, polar opposites in intellect, temperament and values, agreed on one fundamental point: the US is overextended, and needs to retrench. The fact that neither Obama nor Trump (up to this point in his presidency) believed they had the power at their disposal to do anything else, tells us far more about the future of American power and policy—and about the emerging shape of international relations—than the power measures and comparisons made by foreign policy advocates. Observation of recent trends in US versus Russian relative influence prompts another question: do we understand the emerging characteristics of power? Rigorously measuring and comparing the wrong parameters will get us

nowhere at best and mislead us into misguided policies at worst. How often have we heard, with puzzlement, that Putin punches far above his weight? Could it be that we misunderstand what constitutes “weight” in the contemporary and emerging world? Putin may be on a high wire, and bound to come crashing down; but the fact is that Russian influence, leveraging sophisticated communications/social media/influence operations, a strong military, an agile (Putin-dominated) decision process, and taking advantage of the egregious mistakes by the West, has been advancing for over a decade, shows no sign of slowing down, and has created additional opportunities for itself in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Arctic. It has done this with an economy roughly the size of Italy’s. There are few signs of a domestic political challenge to Putin. His external opponents are in disarray, and Russia’s main adversary is politically disabled from confronting the problem. He has established Russia as the Middle East power broker. He has reached into the internal politics of his Western adversaries and influenced their leadership choices. He has invaded and absorbed the territory of neighboring states. His actions have produced deep divisions within NATO. Again, simple observation suggests multipolarity in fact, and a full explanation for this power shift awaiting future historians able to look with more objectivity at twenty-first-century elements of power. When that history is written, surely it will emphasize the extraordinary polarization in American politics. Was multipolarity a case of others finding leverage in new sources of power, or the US underutilizing its own? The material measures suggest sufficient capacity for sustained American primacy, but with this latent capacity unavailable (as perceived, I believe correctly, by political leadership) by virtue of weakening institutions: two major parties in separate universes; a winnertake-all political mentality; deep polarization between the parties’ popular bases of support; divided government, with the Presidency and the Congress often in separate and antagonistic hands; diminishing trust in the permanent government, and in the knowledge it brings to important decisions, and deepening distrust between the intelligence community and policymakers; and, in Trump’s case, a chaotic policy process that lacks any strategic reference points, mis-communicates the Administration’s intentions, and has proven incapable of sustained, coherent diplomacy on behalf of any explicit and consistent set of policy goals. Rising Nationalism/Populism/Authoritarianism The evidence for these trends is clear. Freedom House, the go-to authority on the state of global democracy, just published its annual assessment for 2020, and recorded the fourteenth consecutive year of global democratic decline and advancing authoritarianism. This dramatic deterioration includes both a weakening in democratic practice within states still deemed on balance democratic, and a shift from weak democracies to authoritarianism in others. Commitment to democratic norms and practices—freedom of speech and of the press, independent judiciaries, protection of minority rights—is in decline. The decline is evident across the global system and encompasses all major powers, from India and China, to Europe, to the US. Right-wing populist parties have assumed power, or constitute a politically significant minority, in a lengthening list of democratic states, including both new (Hungary, Poland) and established (India, the US, the UK) democracies. Nationalism, frequently dismissed by liberal globalization advocates as a weak force when confronted by market democracies’ presumed inherent superiority, has experienced a resurgence in Russia, China, the Middle East, and at home. Given the breadth and depth of right-wing populism, the raw power that promotes it—mainly Russian and American—and the disarray of its liberal opponents, this factor will weigh heavily on the future. The major factors contributing to right-wing populism and its global spread is the subject of much discussion.32 The most straightforward explanation is rising inequality and diminished intergenerational mobility, particularly in developed countries whose labor-intensive manufacturing has been hit hardest by the globalization of capital combined with the immobility of labor. Jobs, wages, economic security, a reasonable hope that one’s offspring has a shot at a better life than one’s own, the erosion of social capital within economically marginalized communities, government failure to provide a decent safety net and job retraining for those battered by globalization: all have contributed to a sense of desperation and raw anger in the hollowed-out communities of formerly prosperous industrial areas. The declining life expectancy numbers33 tell a story of immiseration: drug addition, suicide, poor health care, and gun violence. The political expression of such conditions of life should not be surprising. Simple, extremist “solutions” become irresistible. Sectarian, racial, regional divides are strengthened, and exclusive identities are sharpened. Political entrepreneurs offering to blow up the system blamed for such conditions become credible. Those who are perceived as having benefited from the corrupt system—long-standing institutions of government, foreign countries and populations, immigrants, minorities getting a “free ride,” elites—become targets of recrimination and violence. The simple solutions of course, don’t work, deepening the underlying crisis, but in the process politics is poisoned. If this sounds like the US, it should, but it also describes major European countries (the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), and could be an indication of things to come for non-Western democracies like India. We have emphasized throughout this chapter the interaction of four structural forces in shaping the future, and this interaction is evident here as well. Is it merely coincidence that the period of democratic decline documented by Freedom House, coincides precisely with the global financial and economic crisis? **Lower growth**, increasing joblessness, **wage stagnation**, superimposed on longer-term widening of inequality and **declining** mobility, constitute a **forbidding stress test** for democratic systems, and many continue to fail. And if we are **correct** about secular stagnation, the **stress will continue**, and authoritarianism’s fourteen-year run will not be over for some time. The antidemocratic trend will gain additional impetus from the illiberal direction of globalization, with its growth suppressing protectionism, weaponization of global economic exchange, and weakening global economic institutions. Multipolarity also contributes, in several ways. The **former hegemon** and author of globalization’s liberal structure has **lost its appetite**, and arguably its capacity, for leadership, and indeed has become part of the problem, succumbing to and promoting the global right-wing populist surge. It is suffering an **unprecedented** decline in life expectancy, and recently a decline in the birth rate, signaling a degree of rot commonly associated with a collapsing Soviet Union. While American politics may once again cohere around its liberal values and interests, the time when American leadership had the self-confidence to shape the global system in its liberal image is gone. It may build coalitions of the like-minded to launch liberal projects, but there will be too much power outside these coalitions to permit liberal globalization of the sort imagined at the end of the Cold War. In multipolarity, the values around which global politics revolve will reflect the diversity of major powers, their interests, and the norms they embrace. Convergence of norms, practices, policies is out of the question. Global collective action, even in the face of global crises, will be a long shot. To expect anything else is fantasy Unbrave New World and Future Challenges At the outset of this chapter we described these structural forces as interacting to produce more conflict and diminished prosperity. We also predicted a world with shrinking collective capacity to address new challenges as they arise. What specifically will such a world look like? We address below three principal challenges to global problem solving over the next decade. Interstate Conflict In the world experienced by most readers of this volume, conflict is observed **within weak states**, sometimes promoted by **regional competitors**, by **terrorist groups**, or by **great powers**, acting through **surrogates** or by **indirect** means. Sometimes, as in Syria, this conflict **spills over to contiguous states** and contributes to **regional instability**, and challenges other regions to **respond** effectively, a challenge that Europe has not met. Much of this will continue, but the global significance of such local conflicts will be **greatly** magnified by increasing great power conflict, which will feed—rather than manage or resolve—local instabilities and will in turn be exacerbated by them. Great powers will **jockey** for advantage, **support** their local partners, **escalate preemptively**. Conflicts **initially confined** to failing states or unstable regions will be **redefined** by great powers as **global in scope and significance**. This tendency of states to view local conflicts in the context of a zero-sum, global struggle for power is familiar to students of the Cold War, but now with the additional challenges to collective action, expanded uncertainty and worst-case thinking associated with the power transition to multipolarity. We can easily observe **increased** conflict in US–China relations, as we will in US–Russia relations as future US administrations try to make up for ground lost during the Trump presidency, especially in the Middle East. We can observe it among powerful states with **mutual historical grievances**, now with a **weakening** presence of the **hegemonic security guarantor** and having to consider the **renationalization** of their defense: **Japan-So**uth **Ko**rea, **Germany-France**. We can observe it among **historical** rivals operating in rapidly changing security landscapes: **India-China**. We can observe it within the **Mid**dle **East**, as internal rivalries are **appropriated** by regional powers in a contest for regional dominance. We can observe it clearly in **Syria**, where the regime’s violent suppression of Arab Spring resistance led to all-out civil war, attracted **outside support** to proxy forces by aspiring regional hegemons **Saudi Arabia** and **Iran**, enabled the **rise of ISIS**, and eventually to great power intervention, principally by **Russia**. In a world of effective great power collaboration or American primacy, the Syrian civil war might have been settled through power sharing or partition, or if not, contained within Syria. The collapse of Yugoslavia, occurring during a period of US “unipolarity” and managed effectively, demonstrates the possibilities. Instead, with the US retrenching, Middle East rivals **unconstrained** by great powers, and great power competition rising, the Syria civil war was fed by outside powers, then **metastasized into the region**, and—in the form of **refugee** flows—into Europe, fundamentally altering European politics. Libya may be at the early stages of this scenario. This is not the end of the Syria story. Russia has established itself as a major player in Syria and the Middle East’s power broker, the indispensable country with leverage throughout the region. China is poised to reap the financial and power benefits of Syrian reconstruction. The US has just demonstrated, in its act of war against the Iranian regime, its willingness, without consultation, to put its allies’ security in further jeopardy, accentuating the risks of security ties with Washington and generating added opportunities for Russia and China. The purpose here is not to critique US policy, but to point out the dramatically shifting power balance in a critical region, toward multipolarity. The dangers of such a **shift** will **become apparent** as some future US president attempts to **reassert** US influence in the region and finds a **crowded** playing field. Can a multipolar distribution of power among several states whose interests, values, and political practices are divergent, all experiencing bottom-up nationalist pressures, all seeking advantages in the oversupply of regional instability, be made to work? I think not. Will this **more dangerous world** descend into **direct** military

confrontation between great powers, and could such confrontation lead to use of nuclear weapons? Here the question becomes, what will this more dangerous world actually look like; what instruments of coercion will be available to states as technology change accelerates; how will states employ these instruments; how will deterrence work (if at all) among several states with large but unequal levels of destructive capacity, weak command, and control, disparate— or opaque—strategies and simmering rivalries; can conflict management work in a world of weak institutions? The collapse of the Cold War era nuclear arms control regime, the threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented by the demise of the JCPOA, and multiple indications of an accelerating nuclear arms race among the three principle powers, augurs badly. Given the structural forces at play, and without predicting the worst, we are indeed entering perilous times. Global Poverty and Inequality Despite the challenges of volatility and disruptive change inherent in globalization, the world under American liberal leadership has managed a dramatic reduction of extreme poverty. According to World Bank estimates, in 2015, 10 percent of the world's population lived on less than $1.90 a day, down from nearly 36 percent in 1990.34 In fact, as of September 2018, half the world is now middle class or wealthier.35 The uneven success of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) exemplifies this achievement, and demonstrates what is possible when open markets are managed through strong global institutions, effective leadership and interstate collaboration. What this liberal hegemonic system did not achieve, however, was a fair distribution of the gains from globalization within states, and among those states that for various reasons were not full participants in this system. This record of partial achievement leaves us with a full agenda for the next fifteen years, but without the hegemonic leadership, strong institutions, ascendant liberalism or robust global growth that enabled previous gains. There are powerful reasons to question the sustainability of these poverty reduction gains, leading to doubts about the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals, which have replaced the MDGs as global development targets.36 (See Jens Rudbeck's chapter and Sidhu's UN chapter for SDGs). Skeptics have pointed to slowing global growth, specifically in China, whose demand for imported commodities was a major factor in developing country growth and job creation; growing protectionism in developed country markets, fueled by bottom-up forces of nationalism, and from top-down by a weakened global trading regime and increased geopolitical rivalry; the effects of accelerating climate change on agriculture, migration and communal conflict in poor countries; and the growth burst among poor countries from the rapid transition to more efficient use of resources, a transition that is now slowing down.37 Perhaps the greatest concern in this scenario is a general deterioration in the developing country foreign investment climate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major contributor to growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation among poor countries. It has incentivized growthfriendly policies, reduced corruption, introduced technology and effective management practices, and linked poor countries to foreign markets through global supply chains.38 It has stimulated growth of indigenous manufacturing and service companies to supply new foreign investments. It has been the major cause of economic convergence between rich and poor countries. From 2000 to 2009, developing economies' growth rates were more than four percentage points higher than those of rich countries, pushing their share of global output from just over a third to nearly half.39 However, FDI flows into poor countries are imperiled by the structural forces discussed here. Political instability arising from slower growth and environmental stress will increase investors' perception of higher risk, reinforcing their developed country bias. Protectionism among developed countries will threaten the global market access upon which manufacturing investment in developing countries is premised, causing firms to pare back their global supply chains. As companies retrench from direct investment in poor countries, the appeal to those countries of Chinese debt financed infrastructure projects, under the Belt-Road Initiative with little or no conditionality, but at the risk of "debt traps," will increase. Global Warming The question posed at the beginning of this section is whether the international system, evolving toward multipolarity and rising nationalism, will find the collective political capital to confront challenges as they arise. Global warming is the mother of all challenges, and the weakness in the system's capacity to respond is clear. With the two major political/economic powers and greenhouse gas emitters locked in deepening geopolitical conflict (and with one of them locked in climate change denial, possibly through 2024), the chances of significantly slowing global warming or even ameliorating its effects are very slim. We are reduced to the default option, nation-specific adaptation to climate change, which will impose rising human, political and economic costs on all, and will widen the gap between rich countries with adaptive capacity (of varying degrees), and the poor, who will suffer deteriorating economic, political, and social conditions. (For a contrary, optimistic view see Michael Shank's chapter, which credits new actors—like cities—as playing a more constructive role in climate mitigation.) This would bring to a close liberal globalization's greatest achievement; the raising of 1.1 billion people out of extreme poverty since 1990,40 with all its associated gains in quality of life (in the WHO Africa region, for example, life expectancy rose by 10.3 years between 2000 and 2016, driven mainly by improvements in child survival and expanded access to antiretrovirals for treatment of HIV).41 Several forces are at work here. The problem itself is graver—in magnitude and in rate of worsening—than predicted by climate scientists. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the major source of information on global warming, has consistently underpredicted the rate of climate deterioration. This holds true even for its "worst-case scenarios," meaning that what was meant as a wake-up call has in fact reinforced complacency.42 (see Michael Shank's chapter for further discussion of climate change). The IPCC, in its 2019 report, has tried to undo the damage by emphasizing the acceleration in the rate of warming and its effects, the only partially understood dynamic of climate change, and—given wide uncertainty—the possibility of unpleasant surprises yet to come. This strengthens the scientific case for urgency—to both severely limit greenhouse gas emissions, and to increase investment in ameliorating the effects. Unfortunately, the crisis comes at a moment when the climate for collective action is ice cold. Geopolitical competition incentivizes states to out produce each other, regardless of the environmental effects. Multipolarity complicates collective action. Economic stagnation mandates job creation, making regulation politically toxic. Bottom-up nationalism/populism causes states to pursue "relative gains," meaning that if the nation is seen as gaining in a no-holds-barred economic competition with others, the negative environmental effects can be tolerated. A post-Trump presidency would help, with the US rejoining the Paris Agreement, and lending its weight to tighter regulation, increased R and D, and stronger economic incentives to reduce carbon emissions. Keep in mind, however, that President Obama was fully behind such efforts, but in a deeply polarized America was unable to implement measures needed to fulfill the Paris obligations through legislation, and his executive orders to do this were swiftly overturned by Trump. Conclusion It may be tempting to hope that post-Trump, the US can regain its global leadership and exert its considerable power in a liberal direction, but with enough self-awareness of its relative decline to share responsibility with others. This was, I believe, the broad direction of the Obama strategy, evidenced by the JCPOA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: liberal, collective solutions to global problems, as US dominance receded. This would constitute an optimistic scenario, and it confronts two major problems: can US internal politics support it (can, for example, the country legislate controls on carbon, essential for the global credibility and durability of such commitments); and is the world ready to reengage with American leadership, given the damage to its reputation and the structural forces discussed in this chapter? My educated guess is no, on both counts. The rot within is extensive, the concrete evidence clear in the economic inequality/immobility numbers, the life expectancy numbers, the deep political polarization, between the two major parties, between regions, between cities and rural areas. We are in fact a long way from fitness for global leadership, and the recognition of this by others will accelerate the decline of American influence. The rest of the world is well on its way toward adjusting to post-American hegemony, some by renationalizing their defense, or by cutting deals with

adversaries, by building new alliances or by seizing **new** opportunities for influence in the vacuum left by American retrenchment. The evidence for this will accumulate. Observe the current and emerging Middle East, where all these post-hegemonic strategies are visible.

1AC – Solvency

Thus, the plan: The United States ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

Post plan strikes are equally as frequent, but the plan creates minimal uncertainty of economic consequences and maximizes incentives to settle quickly at the bargaining table.

Malin 93 [Martin H. Malin, Chicago-Kent College Of Law, 1993, "Public Employees' Right to Strike: Law and Experience," University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol26/iss2/3/, accessed 11-4-2021] BCortez

- "Enjoin" in this context means to prohibit someone from performing (a particular action) by issuing an injunction. Legal context + card later talks about injunctions

The ease of enjoining a lawful strike not only increases the probability of having a strike , but it may also reduce the urgency for settling a strike. As strike-induced losses mount and the parties approach the point where the strike will cause substantial damage, their interests in cutting losses and avoiding further damage increase the pressure to settle. Where, however, the result of continuing the strike is not the risk of greatly escalating losses, but **rather a judicial back-towork order**, the **pressure and sense of urgency to settle is diminished.**346

The Illinois and Ohio approaches to enjoining lawful public employee strikes have much to commend them. First, both states **confine injunctions to the very narrow group of strikes** that pose a clear and present danger to public health and safety.3 47 Thus, they **do not allow injunctive relief to significantly reduce the uncertainties of a strike's consequences** and, accordingly, **maintain maximum pressure on the parties to settle**. Second, Ohio and Illinois place primary responsibility for determining whether a clear and present danger exists on the labor boards and provide specific procedures for resolving postinjunction bargaining impasses. 8 Thus, they remove the primary decision regarding whether to issue an injunction from the potentially politically-charged atmosphere of the state trial courts, thereby removing many of the concerns that tempt judges in other jurisdictions to mediate the contract talks. The judge's role is confined to a purely judicial function-reviewing the labor board's determination, issuing the injunction, and sending the parties to the next phase of the statutory procedures. CONCLUSION

Experience shows that granting public employees the right to strike is an appropriate policy. Public employee strikes do not distort the democratic process as once was feared. Fact-finding coupled with artificial strike prohibitions do not provide a real alternative to the right to strike. States which supposedly rely on fact-finding actually rely on the strike to motivate the parties to settle. Interest arbitration does provide a true strike substitute, but it is a poor one, tending to stifle innovation and creative problem solving in negotiations. Experiences in Illinois and Ohio show that legalizing public

employee strikes **does not cause an increase in strikes** and **may encourage more realistic bargaining**.

Legislatures which recognize public employees' right to strike should subject them to only minimal regulation. Mandatory prestrike fact-finding, currently imposed in several states, carries with it the danger of stifling bargaining in much the same way as interest arbitration, while making those strikes which do occur more difficult to settle. If fact-finding is not required, **most strikes will settle quickly.** Those strikes that do not settle quickly usually should be allowed to run their courses. **Liberal standards for strike injunctions cause more harm than good.** They **strain the judiciary and reduce the incentives to settle at the bargaining table.** An injunction standard narrowly confined to strikes which endanger public health and safety, applied in the first instance by a labor relations board rather than a court, and coupled with specific poststrike impasse resolution procedures, relieves the strain on the judiciary and maximizes incentives to settle at the bargaining table.

Protecting the right to organize is key to reverse monopsony power

Bahn 19 [Kate Bahn, 8-29-2019, "The once and future role of strikes in ensuring U.S. worker power," Equitable Growth, https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-of-strikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/ , accessed 10-31-2021] BCortez

The role of monopsony power in the U.S. labor market

Monopsony power is a situation in the labor market where individual employers exercise effective control over wage setting rather than wages being set by competitive forces (akin to monopoly power, where a limited number of firms exercise pricing power over their customers.) In a new Equitable Growth working paper by Mark Paul of New College of Florida and Mark Stelzner of Connecticut College, the **role of collective action** in offsetting employer monopsony power is examined in the context of **institutional support for labor.** Paul and Stelzner construct an abstract model with the assumption of monopsonistic markets and follow the originator of monopsony theory Joan Robinson's **insight that unions can serve as a countervailing power against employer power.**

Their model shows that **institutional support for unions**, such as legislation **protecting the right to organize**, is **necessary for this dynamic process of balancing employers' monopsony power.** In an accompanying column, the two researchers write that they **"find that a lack of institutional support will devastate unions' ability to function as a balance to firms' monopsony power, potentially with major consequences … In turn, labor market outcomes will be less socially efficient."**

In short, policies and enforcement that support collective action such as strikes not only creates benefits for workers directly but also addresses a larger problem of concentrated market power.

Institutional support for collective action linearly increases worker power, wages, and employment – only our evidence assumes employers are wage setters

Stelzner and Paul 18 [Mark Stelzner Mark Paul, 7-5-2018, "How does market power affect wages? Monopsony and collective action in an institutional context," Equitable Growth, https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/how-does-market-power-affect-wages-monopsony-and-collective-action-in-an-institutional-context/, accessed 10-31-2021] BCortez

Essentially, collective action neutralizes, to some degree, the wage setting power of the firm reducing the rent firms siphon from workers. Increases in the wage which reduce profits decrease that rent. Notice, this result is completely counter to the normal conception of workers' collective action. As outlined above, this outcome is contingent on the starting point. Here we have started from assumption that firms have wage setting power. This starting point completely recenters the role of collective action from one of rent seeking to rent reducing. **Higher levels of institutional support** for workers will lead to further **neutralization of wages setting power, higher wages, and the firm hiring more units of labor.** In Figure 3, we graph the profit maximizing wage for the firm for three different levels of government support.14 �b is when government support is completely on the side of employers (i.e. when � = 0). �8 is greater than �b, and �K is greater than �8. ��6n, ��6o, and ��6p are the corresponding marginal revenue curves, and the light and dark blue lines are the marginal cost and supply curve, respectively. As we can see, higher levels of government support for collective activity shifts up the intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curve leading to a higher profit maximizing wage chosen by the firm. **Greater government support for labor increases the probability** of winning from collective action and thus leads to more such activity. As a result, the **firm has more of an incentive to raise the wage such to reduce interference in production.**

3. Efficient Contract Bargaining As we can see, **if the institutional support is present, there is some level of collective action at the profit maximizing wage chosen by the firm.** For workers, collective action via conformance to their best response function is necessary to counterpose employers' wage setting power. If workers' planned collective activity, as outlined in their best response function, was viewed as a bluff, employers would have no reason to increase in the wage. Thus, in this noncooperative setting (i.e. binding agreements cannot be made between parties), preemptive wage increases by the employer are dependent on labor engaging in collective action, and the increased wage motivates labor to reduce, but not eliminate, collective action in most cases. As a result, if labor and management can make binding agreements on the wage and level of collective activity, there is plenty of space for Pareto improving contracts between labor and management.15 Management could increase the wage, and labor could decrease collective action both reaping gains. Reduction in collective activity would benefit management through an increase in production without an increase in cost, and if management was contractually bound to a certain wage, workers would also benefit through eliminating the disutility of engaging in collective action without any negative repercussions on their wage. In Figure 4, we demonstrate the space for Pareto improving contracts on the wage and collective action. Point a represents the noncooperative outcome where the employer preemptively increases the wage. The Pareto frontier represents all points that are Pareto-efficient. From each of the points on the Pareto frontier, no other outcome exists which could increase the profit of the firm or utility of workers without decreasing either.

Thus I Affirm, now open for cx