

First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn't seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo "An Argument for Hedonism" Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. "Pleasure" and "pain" are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.² The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: "What for?" This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: "To buy soda." This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: "What is buying the soda good for?" This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: "Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it." If I then proceed by asking "But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?" the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.³ As Aristotle observes: "We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself."⁴ Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says "This is painful!" we never respond by asking: "And why is that a problem?" We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Prefer:

1] Actor specificity:

A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

D] Extinction comes first under any framework

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. "Moral Agreement on Saving the World" Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is

only that **we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world.** According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. **Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here.** If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how **reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world.** This is for the familiar reason that there are **so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions.** There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, **even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people.** Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, **this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter.** Even John Rawls wrote, **“All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”** **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk,** at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). **To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being.** To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – **suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being,** in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But **once these elements are included,**

we can (roughly, as above) argue that **this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler's recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I'd have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I've just argued that **there's agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree.** But **even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.** Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It's possible they'll be miserable. **It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if** at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, **all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.** While there are some non-crazy **views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness**, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won't get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless **seem to be fairly implausible views.** And **even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.** Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: "We live during the hinge of history. **Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast.** We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. **If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period.** Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.... **Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.**" (From chapter 36 of *On What Matters*)

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THE PIC GOES COMPLETELY CONCEDED

Counterplan: A just government ought to recognize the conditional right of workers to strike with the condition that strikers are not asking for employers to discriminate and don't utilize violence/discrimination during the strikes.

****TW: semi-graphic depictions of anti-black violence**

Outweighs under their fw – solves the entire aff – if their framework doesn't think that racism is bad it's probably not a good framework

Enforcement in the card.

BPSC [Unfair Labor Practices by Union, <http://bpscllc.com/unfair-labor-practices-by-unions.html>, N.D., Business & People Strategy Consulting Group, California's trusted source for workplace human resources and employment law] [SS]

Causing or Attempting to Cause Discrimination: Section 8(b)(2) makes it **an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause** or attempt to cause **an employer to discriminate** against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). The section is violated by agreements or arrangements with employers, other than lawful union-security agreements, that condition employment or job benefits on union membership, on the performance of union membership obligations or on arbitrary grounds. But union action that causes detriment to an individual employee does not violate Section 8(b)(2) if it is consistent with nondiscriminatory provisions of a bargaining contract negotiated for the benefit of the total bargaining unit, or if the action is based on some other legitimate purpose. **A union's conduct, accompanied by statements advising** or suggesting **that action is expected of an employer**, may be enough to find a violation of this section **if the union's action can be shown to be a causal factor in the employer's discrimination**. Contracts or informal arrangements with a union under which an employer gives preferential treatment to union members also violate Section 8(b)(2). However, an employer and a union may agree that the employer will hire new employees exclusively through the union hiring hall if there is no discrimination against nonunion members on the basis of union membership obligations. In setting referral standards, a union may consider legitimate aims such as sharing available work and easing the impact of local unemployment. The union may also charge referral fees if the amount of the fee is reasonably related to the cost of operating the referral service. A union that attempts to force an employer to enter into an illegal union-security agreement, or that enters into and keeps in effect such an agreement, also violates Section 8(b)(2), as does a union that attempts to enforce such an illegal agreement by bringing about an employee's discharge. Even when a union-security provision of a bargaining contract meets all statutory requirements, a union may not lawfully require the discharge of employees under the provision unless they were informed of the union-security agreement and their specific obligation under it. A union violates Section 8(b)(2) if it tries to use the union-security provisions of a contract to collect payments other than those lawfully required, such as assessments, fines and penalties. Other examples of Section 8(b)(2) violations include: Causing an employer to discharge employees because they circulated a petition urging a change in the union's method of selecting shop stewards Causing an employer to discharge employees because they made speeches against a contract proposed by the union Making a contract that requires an employer to hire only members of the union or employees "satisfactory" to the union Causing an employer to reduce employees' seniority because they engaged in anti-union acts **Refusing referral or giving preference on the basis of race** or union activities when making job referrals to units represented by the union Seeking the discharge of an employee under a union-security agreement for failure to pay a fine levied by the union

The East St. Louis riots lead to over 200 deaths and were one of the worst race related riots in history – it all started with a racist union striking in favor of discrimination and a lack of government intervention.

People's World '17

[This week in history: East St. Louis rocked by race riot, 1917, <https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/this-week-in-history-east-st-louis-rocked-by-race-riot-1917/>, June 26 2017, voice for progressive change and socialism in the United States. It provides news and analysis of, by, and for the labor and democratic movements to our readers across the country and around the world.] [SS]

****Bracketed for racial language**

The East St. Louis riots (or massacres) of May and July 1917 **were an outbreak of labor- and race-related violence that caused up to 200 deaths** and extensive property damage. East St. Louis, Ill., is an industrial city on the east bank of the Mississippi River across from St. Louis, Mo. **These incidents** of 100 years ago **have been described** as the worst case of labor-related violence and **among the worst race riots in 20th-century American history**. In 1917 the U.S. had an active economy boosted by World War I. With many workers now absent in the armed forces, industries were in need of labor. Seeking better work and living opportunities, as well as an escape from harsh conditions, the Great Migration of African Americans out of the South toward industrial centers across the North was well underway. Blacks were arriving in St. Louis during Spring 1917 at the rate of 2000 per week. Traditionally **white unions sought to strengthen their bargaining position by** hindering or **excluding black workers**, while industry owners utilized blacks as replacements or strikebreakers, adding to deep-seated societal divisions. At the same time **Louisiana farmers were worried about losing their labor force, and** had **requested** East St. Louis Mayor Fred W. Mollman's assistance **to help discourage black migration**. Many blacks found work at the Aluminum Ore and the American Steel companies in East St. Louis. Some **whites feared job and wage security from** this **new competition**. That February, **470 African American workers were hired to replace white workers who had gone on strike** against Aluminum Ore. **Tensions** between the groups **escalated, including rumors of black men and white women fraternizing at a labor meeting** on May 28, following which some **3000 white men marched** into downtown East St. Louis **and began attacking African Americans**. The mobs stopped trolleys and streetcars, pulling black passengers out and beating them on the streets. With mobs destroying buildings and assaulting people, Ill. Gov. Frank O. Lowden called in the National Guard to prevent further rioting, and the mood eased somewhat for a few weeks. **The** East St. Louis Central **Labor Council** responded to the rioting **implying that** "southern **[black people]** Negroes **were misled by false advertisements and unscrupulous employment agents** to come to East St. Louis in such numbers under false pretenses of secure jobs and decent living quarters." Little was done to prevent further problems. No precautions were taken to ensure white job security or to grant union recognition. **No reforms were made in the police force which did little to quell the violence**. This further increased the already-high level of hostilities towards African Americans. On July 2, a car occupied by white males drove through a black area of the city and several shots were fired into a standing group. An hour later, a car containing four people, including a journalist and two police officers passed through the same area. Black residents, possibly assuming they were the original suspects, opened fire, killing one officer instantly and mortally wounding another. Later that day, thousands of white spectators who assembled to view the detectives' bloodstained automobile marched into the black section of town and started rioting. **After cutting the water hoses of the fire department, the rioters burned entire sections of the city, shot inhabitants as they escaped the flames, and lynched several [black people]** blacks. Guardsmen were called in, but according to contemporary accounts, they joined in the rioting rather than stop it. Young white women and girls brandishing clubs chased a black woman and called upon the men to kill her. After the riots, the St. Louis Argus said, "The entire country has been aroused to a sense of shame and pity by the magnitude of the national disgrace enacted by the blood-thirsty rioters in East St. Louis Monday, July 2." According to the Post-Dispatch of St. Louis, "All the impartial witnesses agree that the police were either indifferent or encouraged the barbarities, and that **the major part of the National Guard was indifferent or inactive. No organized effort was made to protect the [black people]** Negroes or disperse the murdering groups.... Ten determined officers could have prevented most of the outrages. **One hundred men acting with authority** and vigor **might have prevented any outrage**." After the riots, varying estimates of the death toll circulated. The police chief estimated that 100 blacks had been killed. The renowned journalist Ida B. Wells reported in The Chicago Defender that 40-150 black people were killed. **The NAACP estimated deaths at 100-200. Six thousand** blacks **were left homeless** after their neighborhood was burned. The coroner specified nine white deaths, but the deaths of black victims were less clearly recorded: Activists argued that the true number of deaths would never be known because many corpses were neither recovered nor had passed through the hands of undertakers. The ferocious brutality of the attacks and the failure of the authorities to protect innocent lives contributed to the radicalization of many blacks across the nation. Marcus Garvey, president of The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), declared, "This is no time for fine words, but a time to lift one's voice against the savagery of a people who claim to be the dispensers of democracy." On July 6 the Chamber of Commerce met with the mayor to demand the resignation of top police officials and radical reform. In addition to the lives lost, mobs had caused extensive property damage. The Southern Railway Company's warehouse was burned, with over 100 carloads of merchandise. A white theatre valued at more than \$100,000, 44 freight cars and 312 houses were destroyed. In response to the rioting, the NAACP sent W.E.B. DuBois and Martha Gruening to investigate the incident. They compiled a report entitled "Massacre at East St. Louis," which was published in the NAACP's magazine, The Crisis. In New York City on July 28, 10,000 black people carrying signs marched down Fifth Avenue in a Silent Parade, protesting the riots. The march was organized by the NAACP and Du Bois, and other groups in Harlem. Women and children were dressed in white; the men were dressed in black. Authorities were slow to respond to calls for an investigation. President Woodrow Wilson stated that his Department of Justice could not find enough evidence to justify federal action in the matter. A Special Committee formed by the U.S. House of Representatives launched an investigation into police actions during the East St. Louis Riot. It found that the National Guard and the East St. Louis police force had not acted adequately during the riots, revealing that the police often fled from the scenes of murder and arson. Some even fled from station houses and refused to answer calls for help. The investigation also resulted in the indictment of several members of the East St. Louis police force. Among those brought to trial was Dr. LeRoy Bundy, a dentist and prominent leader in the East St. Louis black community, who was formally charged with inciting a riot. The trial was held in the St. Clair county court. Bundy, along with 34 defendants, of whom ten were white, were given prison time in connection to the riot.

It's competitive – unconditional right to strike doesn't include reasonable limits. ITUC '14

[THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE ILO: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ITUC), March 2014, https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_final_brief_on_the_right_to_strike.pdf, The International Trade Union Confederation is the world's largest trade union federation.] [SS]

Between the extremes of an unconditional right to strike and a an absolute **prohibition** on strikes “in accordance with national law,” the international community is converging on the **general principle** of the **right to strike within reasonable limits**. The authors of this document acknowledge the tension between countries’ varying degrees of limitations on the right to strike and the normal requirement of uniformity of state practice to find customary international law. It is believed that the tension can be resolved by distinguishing between divergence in detail and convergence in principle. Procedural requirements in national law are details; the right to strike within reasonable limits is the common principle.

