## 1

#### Interpretation: debaters must include the URL in citations for their evidence.

#### Violation: they didn’t – examples include their Doel and Virilio card.

#### Standards:

#### [1] NSDA rules – the unified manual says to include the URL.

NSDA 21 National Speech and Debate Association, “High School Unified Manual,” 1 September 2021, National Speech and Debate Association, accessed 11 September 2021, pg. 30, <https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/High-School-Unified-Manual-2021-2022.pdf> AX

Written source citation. To the extent provided by the original source, a written source citation must include:

1. Full name of primary author and/or editor

2. Publication date

3. Source

4. Title of article

5. Date accessed for digital evidence

6. Full URL, if applicable

7. Author qualifications

8. Page number(s)

#### That’s a voter – if we can choose what rules to break, I can make speeches however long I want, which is a side constraint to substance. Also proves the shell is reasonable and predictable because it’s by far the most common standard.

#### [2] Evidence ethics – no way to check whether their quote exists because we can’t find it on the internet – they can just make up whatever “evidence” they want, and there’s not enough time for us to verify that it is actually legit evidence. Pasting into a search engine doesn’t solve – a) Lots of cards used to be on the web but no longer exist b) difficult to find the correct version or one without a paywall.

#### That’s a voter – a) debate is meaningless if we’re academically dishonest and have no argument credibility, b) uncredible evidence means we don’t know if their claims are true, which also serves as a substantive indict, and c) debate should prepare for the real world, in which small ev ethics violations are punished severely – large repercussions the control internal link to other impacts.

#### Also links to inclusion – small school debaters tend to use cards from the wiki. Bad citations negatively impact their research. That’s a voter because inclusion is a prereq to debate.

#### DTD – a) in real life, you don’t get a quote cut out of your essay; you get a 0 on it – it’s best to teach good norms now, and b) deters future abuse.

#### Competing interps – a) reasonability is arbitrary, b) collapses because brightlines concede offense-defense paradigm, c) only CI prevents abuse since it can set norms, not decide rounds on a case-by-case basis.

#### No RVIs – a) you don’t win for being academically honest, b) people will bait theory to win on the RVI, which causes abuse.

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## 2

**Pleasure is the root of all good, and pain is the root of all bad, proves that all moral theories devolve to Util**

**Moen 15** Ole Martin Moen, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Department of Philosophy, 9-12-2015, Springer, “An Argument for Hedonism”, [file:///C:/Users/axema/Documents/Debate/NSD%202020/Homework/AnArgumentForHedonism.pdf](file:///C:\Users\axema\Documents\Debate\NSD%202020\Homework\AnArgumentForHedonism.pdf) AX

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. ‘‘Pleasure’’ and ‘‘pain’’ are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: ‘‘What for?’’ This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: ‘‘To buy soda.’’ This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: ‘‘What is buying the soda good for?’’ This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: ‘‘Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.’’ If I then proceed by asking ‘‘But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?’’ the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: ‘‘We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.’’4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says ‘‘This is painful!’’ we never respond by asking: ‘‘And why is that a problem?’’ We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Continues**

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as ‘‘pleasures and satisfactions.’’ The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and ‘‘proportion in objects contemplated,’’ and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: ‘‘Hedonists,’’ he writes ‘‘do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.’’24 Ross writes that ‘‘[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.’’25 Roger Crisp observes that ‘‘those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.’’26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonicintrinsic values are potentially explainable by appealtojust pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality ofintrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?

**Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well being. Prefer Additionally:**

**1)Preventing extinction is a pre-req to all other frameworks. Even if extinction is good, we still have reason to prevent it.**

**MacAskill 14**, William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014. AX Accessed 9/19/21 <http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MacAskill-Normative-Uncertainty.pdf>

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would [to] know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

**2) Weighability: only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to hang out with my friends, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is so much worse than the first.**

**3] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework**

**4] Actor specificity: [a] Governments aren’t philosophers—officials don’t know how to apply more complex moral principles but they know how to do studies. Empirically proven—congressional reports are always about end-states and helping the majority[b] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.**

**Prefer this interp:**

**A] Resolvability – it is impossible way to weigh between deontological violations but you only need basic math for util. That outweighs – every round needs a winner.**

**B] ground – a) most articles are written through the lens of util because they’re crafted for policymakers and the public who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Even if another framework is substantively true, there isn’t good discussion of it in the topic lit so we can’t have good debates. Impacts to real world education. B)** **every impact functions under util whereas other ethics flow to one side exclusively. Kills fairness since we both need arguments to win and harms education since we have little args**

**Permissibility negates – Neg is to deny the truth of obligation, the aff must prove an obligation**

**Presumption negates – because its more likely a statement is false then it is true – Eg. there are only a few correct answers but infinite wrong answers**

## 3

**Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.**

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

**Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180**

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle. That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry. “Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.” As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a [2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services. For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another. Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost. To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence. Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding. And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities. There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike. Making friends The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders. “China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China. Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895). And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

**Loss of stability causes the CCP to escalate tensions and lash out – uniquely threatens Taiwan.**

**Blumenthal and Urda 9/28** [09-28-20, Dan Blumenthal, Jakob Urda, The National Interest, “China’s aggressive tactics aim to bolster the Communist Party’s legitimacy”, https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-aggressive-tactics-aim-to-bolster-the-communist-partys-legitimacy/, Jakob Urda is a Masters Student at Georgetown University and research specialist at a technology consultancy. He has previously worked at the Chicago Project on Security and Threats and studied in the Institute for the Study of War’s War Studies Program. Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of the forthcoming book The China Nightmare: the Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State (AEI Press, November 17, 2020] //Lex AKu

Yet for the CCP, external aggression is a necessary tool to combat internal weakness. The CCP is obsessed with its fragilities, such as the threat of losing popular support and legitimacy and demands for more justice and freedoms. When Chinese people criticize their government, China must act more aggressively abroad. Beijing uses external aggression to fan Chinese nationalism and cast the CCP as the protector of the people and champion of a new era of Chinese glory. Coronavirus was a true moment of weakness for the CCP, as it exposed fissures in China’s overcentralized authoritarian political system to light. A now-infamous example of Chinese paranoia over potentially out-of-control domestic crises was the case of Dr. Li Wenliang. On February 7, Li, a doctor who warned of the coronavirus but was quickly censored by the Wuhan police, died from the virus himself. Li’s death quickly became the top trending topic on Chinese social media with hashtags such as “We want freedom of speech.” The CCP censored all mentions of Li or any coronavirus failings, fearing more organized protests. Simultaneously, the coronavirus battered China’s economic growth, which underpins the CCP’s claim to legitimacy, with an unprecedented 6.8 percent Q1 contraction. Far from the unified front which Beijing seeks to project, the coronavirus revealed the CCP’s dysfunction. For example, Dali, a midsize city, intercepted and distributed a shipment of surgical masks headed to the hard-hit municipality of Chongqing. Similarly, the City of Qingdao instructed customs officials to hold on to a shipment of masks and medical products headed to Shenyang. At the same time, Hong Kong dealt the CCP a major political embarrassment when it halted traffic coming in from the mainland. These reports demonstrate the government’s inability to enforce basic order among competing cities and provinces. In response to the tumult caused by the coronavirus crisis, the CCP mobilized popular support by reigniting conflicts with its neighbors. On April 2, during the peak of the coronavirus, a Chinese maritime security vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Parcel islands. Just two weeks later on April 16, China escalated a month’s long standoff with Malaysia by deploying the coast guard to a disputed oil shelf. China also stepped up its military activities targeting Taiwan—who’s coronavirus response was strong and effective—with as many as three incursions in a single week in June. These episodes were widely condemned by the international community, but greeted with nationalist revelry at home. The need to project strength and unity domestically explains the timing of China’s border dispute with India. In May, violent brawls broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers near Sikkim. On June 15, the Indian government reported that twenty Indian soldiers were killed by Chinese soldiers in the Galwan River Valley, a disputed border region controlled by India but claimed by China. The CCP has made full use of the crisis to rally nationalism. China’s foreign ministry issued statements blaming India for the clashes and state-propaganda popularized the slogan “China is not afraid.” The Global Times, a propaganda outlet, cast the clashes as an Indian invasion, saying “India has illegally constructed defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley region.” Importantly, Chinese state-owned news outlets were also running news about India’s poor coronavirus response at the time, in contrast to its own “successes.” The recent border clashes mirror China’s 2017 standoff with India at Doklam, a strategic point near Bhutan. During the conflict, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made statements that cast the conflict as an Indian attack upon China, and state media circulated images from the 1962 Sino-Indian War, to remind the China populace that Beijing had defeated Delhi before. The India clashes coincided with another threat to CCP legitimacy: a fight to remove pro-democracy advocates from the Hong Kong Legislative Council. China ended up harshly cracking down on the supposedly autonomous city as well. Understanding China’s weaknesses is essential for policymakers attempting to make sense of its aggression. This dynamic is not only a Xi Jinping phenomenon: China’s modern history shows that domestic crises are often followed by belligerence. A study that pre-dated Xi’s rule, with a dataset of over three thousand interactions between the United States and China, found that the CCP was twice as likely to initiate disputes when the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) experienced a substantial drop. The SSE is a barometer of elite sentiment in China because the government pledges to protect elite investments and uses SSE listings to reward party insiders. Insight into the CCP’s domestic political objectives helps determine the magnitude of the conflict and appropriate response. The editor of the Global Times wrote that a belligerent foreign policy was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.” Policymakers can use history to deduce what levels of aggression are “necessary” for the CCP’s goals. In India, it is unlikely that clashes will escalate into invasion because the current skirmishes satisfy the CCP’s purpose of bolstering legitimacy. However, Taiwan may be in particular danger from China’s reactionary aggression. This is because the ways in which conflict with Taiwan would bolster the CCP’s legitimacy align more closely with more violent coercion—reunification is a core element of the CCP’s platform and Taiwan’s clear success fighting the coronavirus is a major blow to Beijing’s legitimacy. Because Taiwan’s “threat” to the CCP stems from its mere existence, it is particularly vulnerable to reactionary aggression. Xi is a self-proclaimed follower of Mao. So, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis is a powerful example; Mao needed to generate support for the great leap forward and deflect criticism from poor economic growth. To stir the nation, Mao seized islands controlled by Taiwan and threatened an invasion of the country until restrained by American nuclear brinksmanship. Over the last three months, China has faced another crisis in the form of historic floods. The Yangtze river basin has been inundated, affecting sixty-three million Chinese and inflicting over twenty-five billion dollars in direct damages. Many Chinese have raised concerns that the government’s massive infrastructure projects have worsened the crisis by draining wetlands and promoting development in flood-prone areas. Poor transparency has stirred more backlash as the CCP has been accused of hiding the extent of damages and censoring criticism. One political commentator in Beijing even predicted that the “Chinese public will question Beijing from this year’s continuous natural and man-made disasters, and even question China’s governance model and its effectiveness.” Instead of hoping that the crisis created by the current floods will give China’s neighbors breathing space, the United States should brace itself for the possibility of renewed aggression. The CCP must prove its worthiness to the tens of millions of displaced people across China, making it prone to lashing out. Taiwan may be an appealing target; it has been spared from flooding and has been visible in assisting neighboring countries like Japan with post-flood reconstruction. Already, China has begun live-fire sea-crossing drills near Taiwan.

**Attempts at Taiwan cause US draw in, even during decline**

**Bernstein 20** Richard Bernstein,, 8-17-2020, "The Scary War Game Over Taiwan That the U.S. Loses Again and Again," No Publication, https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the\_scary\_war\_game\_over\_taiwan\_that\_the\_us\_loses\_again\_and\_again\_124836.html mvp

But as the U.S. seeks a closer alliance with Taiwan – illustrated by the visit of Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar there last week, the highest-level official U.S. delegation to the island in 40 years – the possibility of war between the two superpowers may be more than theoretical: A bill now before both houses of Congress, the Taiwan Defense Act, would end the long-held American policy of “strategic ambiguity” – which aims to keep China guessing as to the U.S. response to any attempt to take Taiwan by force – and require the U.S. “to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat” an attempt by China “to use military force to seize control of Taiwan.”

**US-China war goes nuclear**

Talmadge 18, Caitlin [**PoliSci PhD from MIT**, Government BA from Harvard, Prof of Security Studies at Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.] “Beijing’s Nuclear Option.” Foreign Affairs. October 15, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option TG

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

**Extinction – nuke war fallout creates Ice Age and mass starvation**

Steven Starr 15. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html> TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on.

But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes.

The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making.

The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades.

Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter.

Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.