## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government.

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a vacuum, not a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### The article “a” implies a nonspecific or generic reading of the word “just government”.

Walden 20 Walden University [The Writing Center provides a broad range of writing instruction and editing services for students at Walden University, including writing assistance for undergraduates, graduate students, and doctoral capstone writers], “"A" or "An"” last modified July 14 2020, <https://academicguides.waldenu.edu/writingcenter/grammar/articles> SM

When to Use "A" or "An" "A" and "an" are used with singular countable nouns when the noun is nonspecific or generic. I do not own a car. In this sentence, "car" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any car. She would like to go to a university that specializes in teaching. "University" is a singular countable noun. Although it begins with a vowel, the first sound of the word is /j/ or “y.” Thus, "a" instead of "an" is used. In this sentence, it is also generic (it could be any university with this specialization, not a specific one). I would like to eat an apple. In this sentence, "apple" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any apple.

#### Violation: they spec Palestinian gov

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### 2] Limits – there are infinite governments that could be just – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. laws about the right to strike in the US are different than in New Zealand – means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing.

#### 3] TVA – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole adv, solves your offense

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs – it constrains your ability to evaluate the rest of the flow because they require fair evaluation.

#### Drop the debater – to deter future abuse and set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention but we creates a race to the top where we create the best norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

#### The labor movement is built on the exploitation of indigenous populations. The aff’s “right to strike” only seeks to benefit the settler labor movement. Settler labor movements fight for higher wages and living standards while simultaneously exploiting indigenous labor and excluding indigenous workers from the labor market. The collective dispossession of the indigenous population ties the settler community together through settler quietism. The aff’s foundational assumptions perpetuate the destruction of Native life and governance.

Englert 20 [Englert, S. Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands (2020), Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession. Antipode, 52: 1647-1666. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12659>] AX

Dispossession – deprive of land

In order to reflect on the particular nature of accumulation by dispossession within a settler colonial context, another issue should be raised: that of the internal social relations within settler colonial societies. Indeed, the most striking aspect of settler colonial societies is the development of a colonial polity in which settlers live, produce, and reproduce themselves socially. They do so on the back of the dispossession of indigenous populations through which they acquire land, resources, and, depending on the context, labour. This—perhaps obvious—characteristic leads to the development of internal class relations and conflicts, alongside confrontations between settlers and indigenous peoples. The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter [and] attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. ([2012](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0014):83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society … In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.[5](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-note-1005_77) This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon ([2001](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0011)) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine. The specificity of Zionism in the history of settler colonialism, its lack of a colonial metropolis, had real consequences for the Zionists in Palestine. Firstly, it could not impose—at first—its control over the land through military force. Secondly it could not organise the transfer of populations to the colony in the same way a state could. In the words of Shafir ([1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0041):155): “Zionism, then, was a colonisation movement which simultaneously had to secure land for its settlers and settlers for its land”. The dual need for land and labour was at the heart of many political developments in the Yishuv. If the question of land was resolved first through acquisition from largely absentee land owners and then (and most extensively) through military violence, the question of immigration came close several times to bringing the whole colonial project to its knees, as the European Jewish population tended to reject Zionism as a political response to the poverty and discrimination they faced. Two distinct political responses emerged within the early settler population. On the one hand, the Jewish farmers and their sponsors hoped to develop a cash crop producing agricultural sector focused on export to Europe and the exploitation of cheap Palestinian workers. This vision was based, as demonstrated by Shafir ([1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0041)), on the model of other European projects—especially the French settler colonies of North Africa. On the other hand, the nascent Labour Zionist movement demanded better wages and working conditions for Jewish workers in Palestine, which they argued would be the only way to attract and retain new settlers. This, they claimed, necessitated full separation between the Jewish and Palestinian sectors, removing thereby the “unfair competition” of the cheaper indigenous labour force. This led to the development of a series of new Labour Zionist institutions to organise this “Conquest of Hebrew Labour”, by organising strikes, pickets, and boycotts of Jewish owned businesses that employed Palestinian workers or sold products made by them. The Kibbutzim, the Histadrut,[6](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-note-1006_81) and the early Zionist militias were all born out of the process of organising this campaign (Lockman [1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0024)). For example, the Histadrut’s constitution, passed at its founding congress, made clear that it was a Zionist body committed to the project of settlement through the development of an exclusively Jewish society. It stated that the Histadrut’s goal was to: … unite all the workers and labourers in the country who live by their own labour without exploiting the labour of others, in order to arrange for all settlement, economic and also cultural affairs of all the workers in the country, so as to build a society of Jewish labour in Eretz Yisra’el. (quoted in Lockman 1996:68) The similarity between the logic of this statement and that of the white South African strikers mentioned above is remarkable. This struggle—waged against Palestinian workers and Jewish farmers—led to a partial victory for the Labour Zionist movement (Lockman [2012](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0025)). Key industries, such as construction and agriculture, were taken over by Labour Zionist institutions such as Solal Boneh and the Kibbutzim. At the same time, Jewish representation in colonial institutions was increased through collaboration with the British Mandate authorities especially in the context of crushing the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The Labour Zionists took over the Yishuv’s political leadership and created a dominant Jewish sector, without however being able to establish a fully segregated one. It did set in motion the logic of separation as well as laying the infrastructure for a Jewish state, which would be made a reality by its militias’ military violence and mass expulsion of Palestinians during the Nakba. This case study shows that the Labour Zionist movement developed on the basis of opposing Jewish farmers as well as Palestinian workers, a political focus that also shaped its key institutions. The campaign for Hebrew Labour also demonstrates that the “elimination of the native” in the settler colonial context is not a given, as in the Wolfe-an framework, but the outcome of a specific set of struggles that pit both the indigenous population against the settlers, as well as different settler classes against one another.

#### The aff reaffirms the authority of the colonialist Palestinian government that pushes a colonialist narrative and suppresses anti-colonialist movements

Moaswes 21 Abdulla Moaswes 21 July 2021, <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/colonialism-dehumanisation-and-neoliberal-state-building-in-palestine-48531> AX

The Palestinian Authority perpetuates the Zionist colonisation narrative that casts Palestinians as economically backwards. While recent months have seen a significant increase in global support for Palestinian liberation in response to Israel’s attempts at forcibly dispossessing Palestinians of their homes, the absence of one putatively important actor has been notable. Said actor, the Palestinian Authority (PA), has instead focused its energies on violently suppressing Palestinian protest, especially those that have arisen in response to the PA’s alleged assassination of activist Nizar Banat. While the PA’s involvement in suppressing Palestinian popular protest may surprise some, it makes perfect sense to those familiar with the failed state-building project that the Authority has sought to pursue in the decades following its establishment. Neoliberal state-building Among the cornerstones of the PA’s state-building project is a commitment to neoliberal economic principles, solidified by President Mahmoud Abbas’s appointment of former World Bank economist Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister in 2007. In accordance with these principles, the PA has bound itself to creating institutions that facilitate capital accumulation both within the territories that it governs as well as outside of them, even — perhaps, especially — at the expense of the will of Palestinian civil society and grassroots activists and communities. Fayyad may have resigned as Prime Minister in 2013, but the PA has not moved on from his focus on neoliberal state-building. The most charitable reading of such an approach to governance in Palestine suggests that the PA’s intentions are to demonstrate that Palestinians can self-govern within the boundaries of the world’s most hegemonic economic logic. This approach and ordering of priorities, however, requires subjugating the political will, right to self-determination and economic agency of Palestinians due to the inherent paternalism it entails, especially when implemented by a leadership whose own popular legitimacy remains deeply suspect. It also continues a tradition of relying on ideas of economic rationalism as a pretext and vocabulary to dehumanise Palestinians, delegitimise their anticolonial resistance and argue for the colonisation of their land. Historical discourses on Palestinian economic backwardness The Zionist settlement and colonisation of Palestine largely relied on perpetuating myths that erased the presence of Palestinians from their historic homeland. Even among scholars and propagandists who acknowledged Palestinian presence, narratives of economic backwardness downplayed its significance and even acted as a pretext for colonisation. Nahla Zu’bi describes two primary trends within Israeli scholarship about the economy of Palestine under the British Mandate.The first trend, represented by historian Smiha Flapan, argued for the existence of “two separate "national economies": a "Jewish capitalist economy", which was able to develop rapidly, and a "traditional and backward Palestinian economy," which wasn’t able to do so, due to competition and “a crisis of modernization in the Arab sector”. The second trend, represented by Israeli intelligence community veteran Yuval Arnon Ohana, downplays the economic agency of the majority of Palestinians, instead suggesting that acts of protest during the Mandate were instigated by Palestinian political and economic elites who feared the potential impact of Jewish immigration and capital on “their existing status and their means of political and economic control”. According to Zu’bi, this was because Ohana believed that “British colonialism in Palestine was a force for progress” and that Jewish capital “provided the unemployed fellaheen with wide employment opportunities” – ignoring the fact that the fellaheen (Palestinian agricultural workers) were forced into unemployment in the first place due to the expropriation of the lands they made their living off of. In addition to the racism inherent in such arguments, the whole premise of the Palestinian economy existing as entirely pre-capitalist during the days of the British Mandate is untrue; Palestine had already been an important part of the world capitalist system in the 19th century. As the PA and other enablers of Israeli settler colonialism continue to do today, these narratives use racist economic arguments as a method of distraction from the ideologically-motivated dispossession and destruction that Palestinians faced and continue to face. Developmentalism and dehumanisation Today, ideas of economic backwardness and helplessness remain pervasive within narratives of “developing” those who live under the PA’s supposed rule. The presence of NGOs, for instance, accountable to their mostly foreign funders, depoliticises the plight of the Palestinian people, rendering them victims of an objective circumstance rather than as a people oppressed by politically and ideologically manufactured conditions. The NGO sector has also grown alongside the PA’s deepening commitment to neoliberalism. Funding cycles peddled by actors allergic to directly addressing political realities and the agency of the oppressed further racist ideas about pathological victimhood and development, not so different from the colonial dehumanisation that informed so-called civilising missions in the past. Outside the realm of NGOs, the PA has also tried to push a developmentalist agenda that aimed to compromise on resistance in exchange for funding. An early example of this under Fayyad’s rule was the 2007 Palestine Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). According to Sami Tayeb, this plan and others were presented to donors with the objective of gaining support for a Palestinian state “but only if Palestinians could first achieve good governance, economic growth and security”. US-sponsored proposals, such as Donald Trump’s 2020 Peace Plan, have built on this approach, attempting to further and permanently dispossess Palestinians of their land by offering a series of economic incentives that would only more deeply entrench the neoliberal attempt at a state-building project. In drafting proposals like the PRDP, the PA solidified its role as a subcontractor to Israel’s colonial occupation. It seeks to prevent popular protest and resistance, which are not only perceived as indicators of bad governance and poor security, but also an obstacle to attracting the type of large-scale investments required to execute the development projects that act as a smokescreen for the disenfranchisement of the majority of Palestinians. Returning to the violence with which the PA have confronted Palestinian popular protests this year, it is clearer than ever that the PA’s undemocratic insistence on building an integrated, neoliberal economy as a path to state-building makes it so profoundly out of touch with the demands of the people they claim to represent. So much so that at a time of unprecedented support and visibility for the Palestinian cause, they can only count themselves among the institutions that enact violence upon Palestinian people – purportedly in the name of the good governance and economic rationalism that only the PA and other Palestinian elites understand. The neoliberal and developmentalist logics that currently dominate the politics of Israel, the United States, global and regional powers and the PA itself indicate that little has changed, and that normative ideas of economic rationalism continue to be used as a pretext for perpetual colonial violence enacted upon Palestinians.

#### Thus the alternative is generative refusal – a simultaneous affirmation of indigenous sovereignty and a political force to generate action

Wrightson 20 KELSEY R. WRIGHTSON PhD in Political Science at the University of British Columbia, She is continuing to research Indigenous peoples' arts and practices of sovereignty. November 2 2020“Generative Refusal: Creative Practice and Relational Indigenous Sovereignty” <https://www.exeley.com/borderlands/pdf/10.21307/borderlands-2020-013> AX

In Dancing on our Turtle’s Back, Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2011, p. 32) pushes back against understanding Indigenous resistance as ‘antagonism’ but instead the desire to move towards resurgent new forms. She says ‘I have spent enough time taking down the master’s house, and now I want most of my energy to go into visioning and building our new house’. From this moment of refusal, resistance then is both generative and imaginative, visioning and building rather than dismantling. In Stó:Lō, scholar Dylan Robinson’s analysis of Indigenous soundscapes, he argues that critical sovereign listening ‘understands that in entering Indigenous sound territories as guests, we will be unable to hear Indigenous sovereignty, at the same time that Indigenous peoples affirm sovereignty of their lands through the felt history of song’ (Robinson, 2020, p. 53). This is a vital decoupling of the practice of Indigenous sovereignty from the perceptions of those subject to Indigenous sovereignty as guests or settlers on sovereign territories. Robinson states that ‘sovereign speech does not necessarily provoke specific forms of sovereign listening … by decoupling the deterministic relationship between sovereign object and reception, we can gain a more nuanced understanding of Indigenous and settler forms of sensory experience’ (Robinson, 2020, p. 63). Decoupling acts from reception offers the space for understanding Indigenous sovereignty as deeply relational, but not requiring recognition. Audra Simpson argues, ‘just because the settler state cannot hear or comprehend the articulations of Indigenous sovereignty, does not mean that they are not happening’ (A Simpson, 2000, p. 114). Indigenous practices of sovereignty need not be recognized and affirmed by the settler state in its juridical or normative forms to nevertheless be a manifestation of Indigenous sovereignty. Robinson describes the colonial practice of ‘hungry listening’, or listening for settler consumption. In resistance, sovereign practices of listening refuse that ear, sometimes through spatializing sovereignty to create ‘irreconcilable spaces’ that ‘unwelcome non-Indigenous desire’ (Robinson, 2020, p. 236). Audra Simpson describes ‘refusal’ as ‘a political and ethical stance that stands in stark contrast to the desire to have one’s distinctiveness as a culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the requirement of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and upheld, and raises the question of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position of recognizing’ (Simpson, 2014, p. 11). Simpson identifies here the dual nature of a politics of refusal, simultaneously enacting a new reality while offering a critique of the assumed sovereignty of the settler colonial state. In turning away, the practice of refusal is the ‘imagination of the political under conditions of falsehood’ (Simpson, 2017, p. 2), and simultaneously enacts a critique of the state, and generative of Indigenous sovereignty as otherwise. Decoupling sovereign actions from the perception and reception of those actions as sovereign challenges the assumed settler authority to recognize what and whom can be sovereign, again opening the space to answer Starblanket and Stark’s call for governance as the business of all living things. Through the acts of doing, the relations these actions generate with the land and with others, this work becomes sovereign enactment in itself, refusing the authority of the state to authorize in favour of generating or creating something else. Embedding refusal within a relational analytic through his analysis of sensory sovereignty, by decoupling sovereign actions from sovereign perceptions, Robinson makes a vital interjection into understanding Indigenous sovereignty as both contemporary practice, but also within a larger historic context. Despite the ongoing settler colonial violence and dispossession, Indigenous sovereign acts continue, no matter the perception or recognition. These relational forms invite, but do not require, recognition. In these moments of refusal ‘this is political life that, in its insistence on certain things—such as nationhood and sovereignty—fundamentally interrupts and casts into question the story that settler states tell about themselves’ (A Simpson, 2014, p. 177). While secondary to the generative and creative relations that Indigenous sovereignty produce, this refusal, and the moments of distribution concomitantly enact a critique. Detangling the generative relations of sovereignty from a disruptive critique of the settler colonial state allows both acts to exist simultaneously, without capitulating to the authority of colonial recognition. Rather than demanding engagement from Indigenous forms and relations of sovereignty, refusal, or this generative no, takes critique into a realm that is responsive to, but not dependant on, the engagement of Indigenous nations. This critique offers an opportunity for settler colonial relations to take up the generative refusal as a call to action. Taking seriously the assertion of Starblanket and Stark that governance is the business of all living things, this calls for non-Indigenous subjects and subjectivities to constitute themselves as refusable. As a response to Audra Simpson’s call for refusal as consents revenge, to be refusable is not just imagining the possibilities of a world created through that generative ‘no’ but inviting it. It starts from acknowledging ‘the trickery of consent’ (A Simpson, 2016, p. 3), and affirming that these ongoing structures, events and experiences of settler colonial violence were not consented to, are not consented to. Moreover, it affirms that recognition, and the assumption of the consent to be recognized, is not the starting point of ethical relations. To be refusable is to invite action. To be refusable does not require being refused, but it does mark a moment of constituting oneself as acknowledging and understanding the diverse sovereignties of Indigenous nations and that to be refused is always a possibility and sometimes a necessity.