## 1

#### Time fractures the subject. Thinking only affects a subject as a being in time and so is not a transcendent feature. Transcendent subjecthood fails because differentiation through times causes instability

Deleuze 68

[Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repitition. Translated by Paul Patton. 1968. Accessed 9/17/21 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1g09x57>]

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though Descartes's Cogito operated with two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. The determination (I think) implies an undetermined existence (I am, because 'in order to think one must exist') - and determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. The entire Kantian critique [is] amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. The determination ('I think') obviously implies something undetermined ('I am'), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the 'I think': 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 Kant therefore adds a third logical value: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no[t] longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the 'I think' cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the self - that is, the passive position (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, namely time. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?

**The aff tries to extract moments in history and glue them together as a whole account, but that fails to recognize the constant unfolding of time --- time does not exist in the binary between history and the present, rather it exists fluidly in a constant unfolding. LORRAINE:**

[Lorraine, Tamsin “Deleuze and Guattari’s Immanent Ethics. Theory, subjectivity, and duration” LHP Bool Squad – AA and MK]

¶ The key difference between Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology and a more traditional one can be read as a response to Bergson’s claim that traditional ontology spatializes time. To understand a state of affairs in terms of what is spatially present in extended space without taking into account[ing for] the dynamic unfolding of time insisting in that state of affairs is to miss an important part of our present reality, one that we need to take into account if we are to engage in skillful living. Instead of understanding each state of affairs as a ¶ static state from which the next state of affairs can be deduced, we need to understand each state of affairs not only in terms of what is overtly manifest in them, but in terms of implicit tendencies toward unfolding capacities of the bodies involved. These tendencies may or may not actually materialize, but they nevertheless have dynamic impact on what occurs. ¶ Giovanna Borradori, in a helpful commentary, explains that according to Bergson, describing events in terms of properties or causal effects requires extracting them from becoming. Entities are “in” time, but when viewed as becoming “through” time they are “phases of becoming.” Describing events in terms of properties or causal effects requires extracting them from becoming. Extracting an event from becoming reduces it to a present state “where the changing character of time is ontologically deactivated. This way, the event is rendered a steady, self-contained presence that allows us to think of it ‘as if ’ it were located in space” (Borradori 2001, 5). Time taken as a durational whole cannot be divided into homogeneous units. In order to measure time, we need “to ontologically deactivate the passing character, or durational feature of time, and spatialize it” (ibid.). Bodies are comprised of tendencies, some of which are expressed in a specific duration. What is expressed depends on how tendencies differ from one another. A tree comprised of tendencies toward bending and falling will finally express falling and crashing to the ground if enough tendencies intensifying those tendencies (saturated ground, strong wind) also are expressed. It is the difference among tendencies (a tendency to absorb water vs. a tendency to become saturated) where certain tendencies manifest rather than others that gives expression, during a specific time, to a specific overt thing we can perceive (by spatializing time) in terms of properties and causes. If we understand phenomena in terms of overt causes with determinable effects and the manifest properties of individual bodies, we miss the interplay of imperceptible tendencies that are a part of the condition of any actual event. For Deleuze and Guattari, a thing “is the expression of a tendency before being the effect of a cause” (Deleuze 1999, 45, quoted in Borradori 2001, 7). This way of looking at things suggests that we interpret phenomena as the “dynamic expression of forces” (Borradori 2001, 10). Thus, on Deleuze and Guattari’s view, the world becomes “a multiplicity of virtual tendencies, in a constant state of becoming” rather than a set of static things (14). The virtual is Deleuze and Guattari’s term for this real, if imperceptible, aspect of the dynamic flow of time. ¶ On Deleuze and Guattari’s (Bergsonian) view, to think time in terms of what unfolds moment by moment in a Newtonian conception of extended space strips it of its dynamic intensity. Time as it is lived is rather a durational whole that shifts qualitatively as it unfolds in specific forms of reality, shifting further tendencies in becoming in the process. If we stabilize out of the flux of time an understanding of space in terms of stable objects ¶ and fixed relations, it is because this allows us to live. Instead of living in a constant flow of the continuously new, we perceive the world in terms of our memories of the past; we perceive not this completely new moment of living tree, but a tree that extends past tree-memories. Instead of patterns of becoming, we perceive constant forms that remain the same over time. We then extract from these forms an extended space to which we attach a spatialized time. Thus, although our lives are always unfolding in dynamic temporalities, we take the constant forms that are the effects of relatively “territorialized” routines of life—habitually repeated patterns of inorganic, organic, semiotic, cultural, and social forms of life—to be the reality.

**The aff is localized in the wake of black oppression, where the violent trauma of the slave trade tore blackness from its subject position and completely denied the relationality between whiteness and blackness. To maintain this narrative, however, is the last thing we should do. The relation between whiteness and blackness may inevitably define blackness, but understanding the constant interrelatedness of those identities is essential to finding life-affirming moments in spite of structural antagonisms.**

**Drabinski 10** [John E. Drabinski, 2010 “What is Trauma to the Future?: On Glissant’s Poetics.” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences, Volume 18, Number 2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp. 303-306.] MK

The rhizome is generated by these conditions: the intersection and clinging of abyss to birth, root and the death that brings birth back to its glittering bitterness. The bitterness glitters; there is, in one sense or another, light. A glitter to and after what is drowned? How can this make sense? Simply put: life goes on, however marked it may be by the abyssal absence of birth and root and death. Life goes on, so trauma is a beginning as much as it is an end. For the Caribbean situation, this beginning is the unrooted subject, the rhizome, the nomad. What does it mean, then, to think as nomad working from the bitter glittering death that is birth and root? Glissant’s “answer” is simple: the persistence of the Imaginary. By Imaginary, Glissant here means the ability to imagine, conceive, and know the world otherwise. This imaginary is organic in the sense of a connectedness to land and body, but this is always a sense of organicity read against itself; there is always the tortured geography and the salt in the wound. The Caribbean context—Caribbeanness (Antillanité)— is therefore a method for Glissant, not a state of being. The formation of the Imaginary, creativity and its actualization in creation, works with the tools of BirthAbyss, RootAbyss, and DeathAbyss (my terms), but not in order to overcome them. Rather, they provide the posttopological map—indeed, a “map” rendering topology impossible—deployed in response to that tortured geography that renders the world opaque. And always rich in its opaqueness, giving a bitter-yet-nourishing salt to the rhizome. This is organic intellectual work without the privileges of loss. It is, rather, intellectual work of repetition without resolution, sustained contradiction without neutralizing the right to obscurity. Glissant writes: An “intellectual” effort, with its repetitive thrusts (repetition has a rhythm), its contradictory moments, its necessary imperfections, its demands for formulation (even a schematic one), very often obscured by its very purpose. For the attempt to approach a reality so often hidden from view cannot be organized in terms of a series of clarifications. We demand the right to obscurity. Through which our anxiety to have a full existence becomes part of the universal drama of cultural transformation: the creativity of marginalized peoples who today confront the ideal of transparent universality. (CD, 2) Transparency confronted with a different kind of intellectual, engaged with a very different sense of depth and soil than what engages Gramsci’s organic intellectual. Gramsci’s intellectual understands the hidden intelligibility, a certain kind of transparency (at least as a regulative ideal), of his social class. Glissant’s nomad, beginning with the abyss, has depth as sea, soil as salted and tortured. Thinking after trauma, toward the future, must confront transparency and universality, not because it is a remnant of an Old World order, hopelessly square or even quaint, but because of the conditions of thinking in the Caribbean context. There is no history or memory lost. That would be a privilege enabling recollection with all of its regulative ideals—the way universality is so often smuggled in against obscurity. If there is rhizome, and its abysses are method, not a state of being to be clarified or overcome, then the future must be mapped and unmapped across a geos that puts salt in wounds. The future does not return to its losses to mourn. Rather, the future is created with gratuitous gestures affirming opacity. Glissant calls this affirmation of opacity Relation. The term is, of course, to be read against itself, for relation traditionally signifies either correlation or dialectic, both of which clarify, resolve, and fix. But nomadic subjectivity works relation against itself, so Glissant will define relation as detour, exile, and errantry. Relation, in other words, rejects filiation in the aporetic name of “chaotic network.” What would filiation mean, filiation with a landscape initiated by genocide, then enslavement? Without filiation, there is only the moment of creation, a creation whose encroachments are not of a gasping light—unlike, say, Celan—but of an abyss whose death shadow glitters. Returns are always detours, for Glissant, and so it is with the condition of the specific postcoloniality of the Caribbean, both as a state of arrival and a method. A last word. Let us turn to the question of place. A tortured geography puts the nomad out of place with an act of violence to roots. So where is connection? How does place become something other than abandonment and a MemorialAbyss to impossible suffering? Postnatural, abyssally born, place is nonfilial and nomadically traversed, which is not to say it ceases to or cannot be. Rather, there is always the defining fragility. Thus, Glissant moves the rhizome from noun to verb: “Is this some community we rhizomed into fragile connection to a place?” (PR, 206). The rhizome rhizomes—herein lies the simplicity of Glissant’s intellectual and the fiat, ex nihilo character of creativity after trauma, toward the future. The rhizome’s rhizome is both an act of self-movement— an abyss cannot propel—and that moment wherein the collective is at stake. The organic intellectual rhizomes after trauma, and that intellectual’s organicity always moves with abyssal shadows, unrooted. It is worth noting here, in close, how profoundly significant intellectual work is for Glissant, as he rejects political action or violence as the decisive moment of identity formation (pace Fanon, of course). Indeed, this is why the political murder plotted by the eight Martinican protagonists in his novel The Ripening can barely be said to begin the formation of collective identity. Intellectual work is this beginning, as it forges fragile connections—nomads in collectivity—that construct a “we” in poetry, architecture, painting—a new history in the nominative. And all of these (as well as other aesthetic adventures) are defined by their (at least possible) nonfilial, rhizomatic character, as well as a finitude that is never a loss, but always only another detour. This is surely not without anxieties. How then to do things with tears? Deliverance from the mist. Deliverance rhizomes. That is, nomads, for Glissant, become within a death moved from a bitter glittering to an abyssal glow with its own ghosts, its own ambivalent salt, its own, in a word, future.

**They recreate the oppression they try to fight --- in attempting to eliminate difference through a politics of inclusion, they in turn target individuals who represent deviancy. EVANS ’10:**

Brad Evans, 2010 “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424.

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘Liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, The more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order To achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), These wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how Liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, Doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of The threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘Killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While killing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of The most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal order.

**The alternative is to dismantle the face --- this undermines the faciality machines that they seek recognition through and their normative value. BIGNALL ’12:**

[Bignall, Simone. “Dismantling the Face: Pluralism and the Politics of Recognition.” University of New South Wales. 2012. LHP MK]

Deleuze and Guattari assert: ‘If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings’ (1987: 188). While faciality involves a politics of territorialisation and form, dismantling the face involves a politics of deterritorialisation and transformation. The starting point for such a transformative politics is the face itself: ‘the white wall of the signifier, the black hole of subjectivity and the facial machine are impasses, the measure of our submissions and subjections; but we are born into them, and it is there we must stand battle’ (189). For Deleuze and Guattari, battling the face requires the cultivation of an intimate knowledge and awareness about the face one inhabits, and they warn: ‘find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight’ (188). Dismantling the face therefore requires a careful analysis of the signifying discourses and representations that make up one’s social context, as well as a critical and reflexive understanding about how these shape identity. This includes analysis of how it is at times possible for one to selectively constitute one’s own identity in relation to the multiplicity of established significations one is ‘born into’. The ‘ruin of representation’ is a central aspect of Deleuze’s task in Difference and Repetition and indeed forms a consistent thread through his entire oeuvre, including his work with Guattari (see Olkowski 1999). The aim in Difference and Repetition is to shake off the ‘four iron collars of representation: identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception’ (Deleuze 1994: 262). In A Thousand Plateaus, the discussion of faciality likewise involves a critique of representation; in particular, how faces ‘form loci of resonance that select sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a dominant reality’(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 168). For Deleuze, at the heart of representation and aligned forms of political practice is the misconception that the established regime of power/knowledge (the face) causally structures the productive force of desire and assemblage. Within this model of causation, an established signifier or set of significations predetermines the possibility of recognition and limits the potential for inventing new configurations of meaning and, hence, of social organisation. The imposition of an already given order of meaning upon an actual variety of subject-forming events reduces them to a limited and predetermined interpretation of experience. This is described, for example, by the limiting formalities that circumscribe and regulate political participation in liberal democracies, which ask citizens to choose between particular sets of already-existing features. According to Deleuze and Guattari, all interpretation then becomes assimilated to an existing structure of meaning: ‘You don’t so much have a face as slide into one’ (1987: 177). Deleuze and Guattari encourage us to understand alternatively that the subject and the signifier are not the (already-given) causes of signifiance, but are in fact themselves reactive effects of a process in which meaning is constructed through the association of elements into a coherent form (see for example Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 129). They assert: ‘concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an abstract machine of faciality (visigéité), which produces them’ (1987: 168). This engendering involves the process of ‘facialisation’, in which the face ‘takes shape’ and ‘begins to appear’ as certain regular features are inscribed and emerge as fixed strata upon a mobile ‘surface’, thereby forming the landscape of the face with the repetition of their occurrence over a period of time (ibid.). These features are not inevitable characteristics of the facial landscape, however; they occur according to a particular and contingent coding of elemental conjunctions to define a particular emergence of faciality. Thus, a ‘concrete face’ is always defined by the assembly rules embodied within the ‘abstract machine of faciality’ that causes the face to emerge as such. When the established regime of the face is erroneously taken as the cause of signifiance, it operates as a ‘site of transcendental illusion’ which suggests the apparent inevitability of that regime of signs (Deleuze 1994: 265). When everything must conform in advance to a regime of signification already given, then there is no room for creative divergence in the productive process. There is nothing new, no new desires or alternative associations that might construct different expressions in the established face, which grimly sets its features into a representative order. In this way, in the rigid structures of a formed face, ‘the whole of desiring-production is crushed, subjected to the requirements of representation, and to the dreary games of what is representative and represented in representation’(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 54). It is helpful to read ‘Plateau 7 – Year Zero: Faciality’ in conjunction with ‘Plateau 5–587BC–AD70: On Several Regimes of Signs’. Here, Deleuze and Guattari analyse ‘a certain number of semiotics displaying very diverse characteristics’ (1987: 135). They explain that there is such diversity in the forms of expression, such a mixture of these forms, that it is impossible to attach any particular privilege to the regime of the ‘signifier’. If we call the signifying semiotic system semiology, then semiology is only one regime of signs among others, and not the most important one. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 111) In fact, any particular regime of signs subsists in a milieu where competing regimes circulate. Similarly, any given discourse is not a fixed or closed system of signification, but is flexible and relative to other modes of expression and possible interpretations. An object might occupy many classifications simultaneously, and thus can transfer between meanings. A complex ‘mixture’ of various semiotic regimes constitutes a ‘milieu’ or ‘landscape’ that furnishes material for the constitution of the sense of a particular body. The milieu constitutes an exterior context in which any particular organisation of meaning subsists. At its points of contact with this milieu, a representation is fundamentally unstable, as its elements combine, shift, transfer and pass between other regimes of sense. Thus, there are possible ‘passages’ between regimes of signs, enabling movements of destratification or the mixing and translation of established regimes of signification. Whereas the semiotic regime of the signifier works by capturing and reducing diverse meanings to a uniform representation of ‘truth’, alternative and polyvocal regimes of sense and expression are always possible (136; see also Deleuze 2004). The potential for discovery of these alternative and contesting regimes of sense, however, ‘requires a rethinking of the majoritarian face and a willingness to envisage more than one system of comprehension and function for the face’ (MacCormack 2004: 138). Deleuze and Guattari suggest: when the face is effaced, when the faciality traits disappear, we can be sure that we have entered into another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal occur, becomings-molecular, nocturnal deterritorialisations overspilling the limits of the signifying system. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 115) Fanon writes: I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny. I should constantly remind myself that the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence. In the world in which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself. I am a part of Being to the degree that I go beyond it. (Fanon 1967: 229) Because dominant meanings are always open to a contextualising milieu in which mixed and conflicting regimes of signs subsist, their stability is challenged as they come into contact and are forced to shift and morph in partial destratifications in order to accommodate such conflicting significations. Thus, ‘dismantling the face’ involves locating the points at which meaning shifts and becomes unstable: searching for the points in a collection of social discourses where meaning is contradictory, or the points in one’s own identity where one occupies multiple and contradicting classifications. One may be simultaneously altruistic and selfish, active and passive, free and constrained, wilful and aimless, friend and lover, parent and professional, and so forth. In finding such points of ambiguous identification, one is potentially able to apply pressure to the signifying system in which one is embedded, perhaps provoking an ‘uncertain moment’ where conventional significations collapse and established meanings shift (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 189). At such moments, the ‘abstract machine of faciality’ that shapes the emergence of particular and concrete facial assemblages may become (partially) transparent. The increased visibility of the constructive mechanisms underlying a set ‘face’ undermines its pretensions to inevitability and stability.

**The role of the ballot is to promote pedagogy of becoming --- it allows us to create a learning environment that account for the flow of forces and the dynamic interaction between values. SEMETSKY:**

[“Deleuze, Education and Becoming” Inna Semetsky. Monash University, Australia. LHP AA]

Deleuze’s pedagogy of the concept, if we situate it in the concrete context of schooling, is therefore an important example of indeed [for] “expanding educational vocabularies” (Noddings, 1993a, p. 5). Because specialization is defined as self- organization, it is accompanied by specific features that, in turn, affect the concept of learning which, in its own becoming-other, cannot but break out from old vocabularies. Communication in an autopoietic mode points towards naturalizing the concept of learning which therefore becomes an emergent property of the transactions between teachers, students and the subject-matter, even in the absence of direct instruction and teaching as traditionally defined. In this respect it is the self-organizing learning process that leads to an increase in complexity and the growth of intelligence: it functions as the process of both intellectual and moral growth that necessarily includes in itself, in accord with Dewey’s philosophy, an added capacity for growth. Folds that are formed in the critical junctions, where different rhizomatic lines cross and interact, are themselves the tightest relations functioning in the capacity of a self-organized criticality and therefore capable of increasing the system’s complexity: they create a perplexity, a novelty, that would have required a decision-making, a choice. Indeed, we “are never separable from the world: the interior is only a selected exterior, the exterior, a projected interior” (Deleuze, 1988b, p. 125). Specialization as making a selection among many available options not only requires that those options are present but also stimulates the mode of thinking and acting so that students would not be horrified by possible contradictions and choices that may seem to oppose each other. Rather than perceiving a sense of failure, students – even when folded in conflicting situations, or precisely when enfolded in such situations – may extract from them forces that vitalize the system by diversifying it, that is, by enriching the system with variations. The tension, or difference, that may exist between seemingly contradictory choices, itself becomes [is] a contingent factor feeding back into the educational process and, according to the dynamic of complex systems, amplifying – and le pli, as we remember, means the fold – its potential for self-organization by acting from within as the quasi-necessary and immanent condition for growth. The value of the idea of interest in education, emphasized by Dewey (1916/1924) represents, [is] within the paradigm of self-organization an immanent condition created by the dynamic and “moving force of objects – whether perceived or presented in imagination” (Dewey, 1916/194, pp. 152-153). The very problematic involved in selecting an alternative and making a choice would, according to Dewey, induce learning. In this respect there won’t be any special educative aim that is imposed from without. The school environment, the milieu per se, would have created conditions to actualize students’ many potentials – and thus having become what Noddings calls an excellent system of education, that is, one that serves “to open opportunities – never to close them” (Noddings, 1993a, p. 13). The absence of any external aim inherent in the self-organizing dynamics functioning in an autopoietic manner also eliminates the hierarchical power structure specific to traditional present-day schooling. What takes place is the heterogeneous distribution of knowledge that, in its shared activity (Dewey, 1916/1924), becomes available to all who are