## 1 – T

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater may defend only an advocacy that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. To clarify, extra-T bad.

#### Violation: They defended getting rid of private space exploration. Actions are specifically extra-T because the res poses a value question instead of an action.

#### Standards:

#### [1] Limits and ground – extra-T means they can literally defend anything they want, which means they can get offense from fiating no structural violence, solving any extinction impact, etc. which makes it impossible to debate insofar as we’re forced to negate a utopian society.

#### [2] Predictability – the aff can take us on whatever unpredictable adventure they want because we have no clue what they’ll fiat outside of the res. That explodes my prep burden as they have infinite time to prep and frontline their aff whereas we have 30 minutes at best to come up with a 1N to something random.

#### [3] Reciprocity – we debate with the assumption of the topic; it’s irreciprocal if the aff can arbitrarily change it last-minute, which is definitionally unfair.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness – a) debate is a competitive activity that objective evaluation to function, and b) debaters quit if it’s unfair, which makes it an internal link to all other impacts.

#### Paradigm issues:

#### DTD – a) deters future abuse so they won’t reviolate, and b) T indicts the entire aff.

#### Prefer CI – a) you can’t be “reasonably topical,” b) reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention, c) collapses because brightlines concede offense-defense paradigm, d) only CI sets fairness norms because it establishes a rule instead of deciding rounds on a case-by-case basis, and e) it’s reasonable to expect you to affirm what you’re supposed to which means any violation is sufficient.

#### No RVIs – a) you don’t win for being fair, b) people will bait theory to win on the RVI, which causes abuse, c) people will be scared to call out real abuse for fear of being out-teched on the RVI, and d) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong, which forces me to argue for bad norms.

## 2 – ROTB

**The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.**

**[1] Linguistics – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true. That outweighs – a) Controls the internal link to predictability and prep which is key for clash and substantive education b)** **Key to jurisdiction since the judge can only endorse what is within their burden.**

#### [2] Every statement is a question of truth – for example, saying “the res is false” is the same as saying, “it is true that the res is false.” That means other ROTBs collapse to truth testing.

#### Permissibility negates:

#### [1] “Unjust” is defined:

Oxford Languages No Date Oxford Languages, dictionary, “unjust,” no date, Google, accessed 13 January 2022, pg. 1, https://www.google.com/search?q=define+unjust&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS909US909&oq=define+unjust&aqs=chrome.0.35i39j0i512l3j0i10i512j0i512l2j0i10i512j0i512l2.1248j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.

#### **A neutral action, like walking, does not violate what is moral and is therefore not unjust.**

#### [2] Statements are more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways but true in only one.

#### [3] We require an active reason to believe something; that’s why arguments need warrants.

## 3 – Determinism

#### I negate, resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### **FREE WILL IS AN ILLUSION! Determinism is true and negates.**

#### Every effect has a cause precisely predetermined by the laws of nature.

Westacott 18 Emrys Westacott, Professor of Philosophy at Alfred University, Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, "Hard Determinism Explained," 17 January 2018, ThoughtCo, accessed 31 December 2021, Pg. 1, <https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-hard-determinism-2670648> ~ST~

To say that every event is determined by prior causes and the operation of laws of nature means that it was bound to happen, given those prior conditions. If we could rewind the universe to a few seconds before the event and play the sequence through again, we’d get the same result. Lightning would strike in exactly the same spot; the car would break down at exactly the same time; the goalkeeper would save the penalty in exactly the same way; you would choose exactly the same item from the restaurant’s menu. The course of events is predetermined and therefore, at least in principle, predictable.

One of the best-known statements of this doctrine was given by the French scientist Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827). He wrote:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.

Science cannot really prove that determinism is true. After all, we often do encounter events for which we don’t have an explanation. But when this happens, we don’t assume that we are witnessing an uncaused event; rather, we just assume that we haven’t discovered the cause yet. But the remarkable success of science, and especially its predictive power, is a powerful reason for supposing that determinism is true. For with one notable exception–quantum mechanics (about which see below) the history of modern science has been a history of the success of deterministic thinking as we have succeeded in making increasingly accurate predictions about everything, from what we see in the sky to how our bodies react to particular chemical substances.

Hard determinists look at this record of successful prediction and conclude that the assumption it rests on–every event is causally determined–is well-established and allows for no exceptions. That means that human decisions and actions are as predetermined as any other event. So the common belief that we enjoy a special sort of autonomy, or self-determination, because we can exercise a mysterious power we call “free will,” is an illusion. An understandable illusion, perhaps, since it makes us feel that we are importantly different from the rest of nature; but an illusion all the same.

#### Takes out justice:

#### [1] Injustice is only possible with an alternative.

Robb 20 David Robb, Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College, "Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," 9 July 2020, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 2 January 2022, Pg. 1, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alternative-possibilities/> ~ST~

No doubt the principle’s appeal can in part be traced to ordinary moral practice. One day at the cafeteria, Kurt steals John’s lunch. Under normal circumstances, we hold Kurt responsible for his act. But now add that he had to act as he did. Suppose, for example, that Kurt was coerced by a bully to steal John’s lunch; or he is suffering from a neurological disorder compelling him to act; or he was brainwashed. These are some of the many ways in which his alternatives can be closed off. But however this happens, once the alternatives are gone—once Kurt must act as he does—blaming him no longer seems appropriate.

#### [2] It is impossible to label something as unjust without free will.

Miller 17 David Miller, Professor of Political Theory and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, "Justice," 26 June 2017, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 2 January 2022, pg. 1, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/#UtilJust> ~ST~

Finally, the definition reminds us that justice requires an agent whose will alters the circumstances of its objects. The agent might be an individual person, or it might be a group of people, or an institution such as the state. So we cannot, except metaphorically, describe as unjust states of affairs that no agent has contributed to bringing about – unless we think that there is a Divine Being who has ordered the universe in such a way that every outcome is a manifestation of His will. Admittedly we are tempted to make judgements of what is sometimes called ‘cosmic injustice’ – say when a talented person’s life is cut cruelly short by cancer, or our favourite football team is eliminated from the competition by a freak goal – but this is a temptation we should resist.

## Case

### Underview

#### Reject 1AR theory arguments – a) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to one of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. That also means reasonability on 1ar theory since some level of intervention. b) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them c) 1AC theory solves infinite abuse

### Framework

#### Consequentialism fails:

#### [1] Is-ought fallacy – the existence of pleasure and pain doesn’t mean they are good and bad, and don’t let them say “because it feels that way.”

#### [2] Prediction fails – util relies on predicting the future, but policymakers are worse than monkeys, which takes out all their impacts insofar as they are reliant on predictions.

**Menand 05** Louis Menand, professor of English at Harvard University, “Everybody’s An Expert” 27 November 2005, The New Yorker, accessed 7 September 2021, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS recut

Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### [3] Reject util in questions of justice – three warrants.

Miller 17 David Miller, Professor of Political Theory and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, "Justice," 26 June 2017, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 26 December 2021, pg. 1, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/#UtilJust> ~ST~ brackets for clarity

Yet despite these efforts to reconcile justice and utility, three serious obstacles still remain. The first concerns what we might call the currency of justice: justice has to do with the way that tangible benefits and burdens are assigned, and not with the happiness or unhappiness that the assignees experience. It is a matter of justice, for example, that people should be paid the right amount for the jobs that they do, but, special circumstances aside, it is no concern of justice that John derives more satisfaction from his fairly-earned income than Jane does from hers (but see Cohen 1989 for a different view). There is so to speak, a division of labour, under which rights, opportunities, and material benefits of various kinds are allocated by principles of justice, while the conversion of these into units of utility (or disutility) is the responsibility of each individual recipient (see Dworkin 2000, ch. 1). Utilitarians will therefore find it hard to explain what from their point of view seems to be the fetishistic concern of justice over how the means to happiness are distributed, rather than happiness itself.

The second obstacle is that utilitarianism judges outcomes by total[s]ling up utility levels, and has no independent concern for how that utility is distributed between persons. So even if we set aside the currency issue, utilitarian theory seems unable to capture justice’s demand that each should receive what is due to her regardless of the total amount of benefit this generates. Defenders of utilitarianism will argue that when the conduct-guiding rules are being formulated, attention will be paid to distributive questions. In particular, when resources are being distributed among people we know little about individually, there are good reasons to favour equality, since in most cases resources have diminishing marginal utility – the more of them you have, the less satisfaction you derive from additional instalments. Yet this is only a contingent matter. If some people are very adept at turning resources into well-being – they are so-called ‘utility monsters’ – then a utilitarian should support a rule that privileges them. This seems repugnant to justice. As Rawls famously put the general point, ‘each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice which….even the welfare of every one else cannot override’ (Rawls 1971, p. 28; Rawls 1999, pp. 24–25).

The third and final difficulty stems from utilitarianism’s thoroughgoing consequentialism. Rules are assessed strictly in the light of the consequences of adopting then, not in terms of their intrinsic properties. Of course, when agents follow rules, they are meant to do what the rule requires rather than to calculate consequences directly. But for a utilitarian, it is never going to be a good reason for adopting a rule that it will give people what they deserve or what they are entitled to, when desert or entitlement are created by events in the past, such as a person’s having performed a worthwhile action or entered an agreement. Backward-looking reasons have to be transmuted into forward-looking reasons in order to count. If a rule such as pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must be kept’) is going to be adopted on utilitarian grounds, this is not because there is any inherent wrongness in defaulting on a compact one has made, but because a rule that compacts must be kept is a useful one, since it allows people to co-ordinate their behaviour knowing that their expectations about the future are likely to be met. But justice, although not always backward-looking in the sense explained, often is. What is due to a person is in many cases what they deserve for what they have done, or what they are entitled to by virtue of past transactions. So even if it were possible to construct a forward-looking rationale for having rules that closely tracked desert or entitlement as these are normally understood, the utilitarian still cannot capture the sense of justice – why it matters that people should get what is due to then – that informs our common-sense judgements.

#### [4] Util is morally abhorrent because it justifies slavery insofar as more people benefit than are harmed – that’s an independent voter because it supports atrocities that people are personally affected by.

#### [5] Every consequence causes another consequence – when do we evaluate “the consequence?

### Offense

#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson, Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center, “The Future of Space Commercialization,” 25 January 2017, Niskanen Center, accessed 14 January 2022, Pg. 3-5, <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> //Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

1. <http://dictionary.com/browse/negate> (Dictionary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate> (Merriam-Webster, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate> (The Free Dictionary, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate> (Vocabulary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> (Oxford Dictionaries, accessed 11 September 2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm> (Dictionary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm> (Merriam-Webster, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/affirm> (The Free Dictionary, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/affirm> (Vocabulary.com, accessed 11 September 2021)

   <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/affirm> (Oxford Dictionaries, accessed 11 September 2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)