**penn r2 Neg JF**

I negate the resolution resolved - Appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

**1 - Determinism**

**Determinism is true and negates.**

**[1] Cognition –** the best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical evidence show free will doesn’t exist**. Lavazza**

[Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, 2016, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY] SHS ZS

All these **experiments** seem to **indicate** that **free will is an illusion.** Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many ways. A possible view is that, in some way, **determinism can be observed directly within ourselves.** This interpretation might lead to the conclusion that **free will is just an illusion**. In fact, if one considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains), such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually defined. For it, in fact, **all events are linked by casual relations in the form of natural laws**, **which started long before we were born** and which we cannot escape. However, **determinism has generally been regarded as a metaphysical claim**, not refutable by empirical findings. One could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case, endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior as the causal product of choices that every time produce different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned; cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, **another feature of freedom seems to be a pure illusion**, namely the role **of consciousness**. **The experiments considered** thus far heavily question **the claim that consciousness** actually **causes voluntary behavior**. **Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating in the movement, while consciousness “comes after”,** when “**things are done**”. **Therefore**, [and] **consciousness cannot trigger our voluntary decisions.** But the role of consciousness in voluntary choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers, 1996). Empirical research in psychology also shows that **our mind works and makes choices without our conscious control**. As proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and Aarts et al. (2004), **we are “built” to have the impression to consciously control our actions or to have the power to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive illusion**. Many priming experiments show **that people act “mechanically**” (even when their behavior might appear suited to the environment and even refined). **Automatic cognitive processes**, of which we aren’t always aware, **originate our decisions**, and they were only discovered thanks to the most advanced scientific research. **Ultimately, consciousness**, which should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice, **is thus allegedly causally ineffective**: a mere epiphenomenon, to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This is what has been called Zombie Challenge, “based on an amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that demonstrate the surprising ways in which **our everyday behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold in the complete absence of consciousness**” (Vierkant et al., 2013).

**[2] Molecular Physics –** our existence can be modeled by the molecules which comprise our bodies, which are all regulated by the laws of physics. **Coyne**

[Jerry Coyne, [Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at The [University of Chicago](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Chicago)], “Why You Don’t Really Have Free Will,” USAToday, January 1st, 2012. SM] SHS ZS

<https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2012/01/denying-free-will-promotes-relativism>

The first is simple: **we are biological creatures**, **collections of molecules that must obey the laws of physics**. All the success of science rests on the regularity of **those laws**, which **determine the behavior of every molecule** **in the universe. Those molecules**, of course, **also make up your brain** — **the organ that does the "choosing."** And **the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment,** an environment including the other people we deal with. **Memories**, for example, **are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells**. **Everything that you** think, say, or **do**, **must come down to molecules and physics**. True "**free will," then, would require us to somehow step outside of our brain's structure and modify how it works**. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because "we" are simply constructs of our brain. W**e can't impose a nebulous "will" on the inputs to our brain** that can affect its output of decisions and actions, any more than a programmed computer can somehow reach inside itself and change its program.

**Takes out justice:**

**[1] Labelling an action as unjust is only possible with an alternative.**

**Robb 20** David Robb, Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College, "Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," 9 July 2020, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 2 January 2022, Pg. 1, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alternative-possibilities/> ~ST~

No doubt the principle’s appeal can in part be traced to ordinary moral practice. One day at the cafeteria, Kurt steals John’s lunch. Under normal circumstances, we hold Kurt responsible for his act. But now add that he had to act as he did. Suppose, for example, that Kurt was coerced by a bully to steal John’s lunch; or he is suffering from a neurological disorder compelling him to act; or he was brainwashed. These are some of the many ways in which his alternatives can be closed off. But however this happens, once the alternatives are gone—once Kurt must act as he does—blaming him no longer seems appropriate.

**[2] It is impossible to label something as unjust without free will.**

**Miller 17** David Miller, Professor of Political Theory and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, "Justice," 26 June 2017, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed 2 January 2022, pg. 1, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/#UtilJust> ~ST~

Finally, the definition reminds us that justice requires an agent whose will alters the circumstances of its objects. The agent might be an individual person, or it might be a group of people, or an institution such as the state. So we cannot, except metaphorically, describe as unjust states of affairs that no agent has contributed to bringing about – unless we think that there is a Divine Being who has ordered the universe in such a way that every outcome is a manifestation of His will. Admittedly we are tempted to make judgements of what is sometimes called ‘cosmic injustice’ – say when a talented person’s life is cut cruelly short by cancer, or our favourite football team is eliminated from the competition by a freak goal – but this is a temptation we should resist.

**Determinism negates:**

**a) Determinism means that all actions are predetermined, which means that prescribing an action is incoherent because we are not in control to implement the aff- this negates independently of the permissibility debate**

**b) Free will is necessary to impose moral obligations upon actors and Determinism denies the existence of free will. This means that moral obligations are incoherent and triggers a state of permissibility**

**Coates 19** [D. Justin Coates (2019) Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49:2, 208-229, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1516057] ZS

Suppose I promise you that I’ll help you move but I then fail to deliver. Now suppose that you discover that I made that promise only under extreme duress. Plausibly, you would conclude that my utterance ‘I promise that . . .’ was infelicitous in some crucial way and that therefore, it wasn’t binding. That is, if I promised only as a result of extreme duress, then I couldn’t come to be obligated to keep that promise even though I (apparently) performed a speech act that, in other conditions, would be sufficient to create an obligation. Similarly, if you find out that I’ve been coerced to make the promise, or if I only made the promise because I was forced to take a drug that made me especially susceptible to agree to whatever others asked of me, or . . . you’d probably conclude that I was not morally obligated to keep the promise. So too, if I was a young child, who was only at the very earliest stages of understanding the social and normative significance of ‘I promise.’ In all these cases, I think there’s a simple and unified explanation for why the outward utterance, ‘I promise to help you move’ fails to actually obligate: none of the agents’ promises were made of their own free will. Unlike categorical moral obligations, which (putatively) bind us simply because we are moral agents, promissory obligations are voluntarily undertaken. This means that the promisor’s will has to be implicated in her promise in the right way. And when the promisor is under extreme duress, or coerced, or . . ., then her will is not free, and she does not come to be obligated to follow through on the promise that she apparently makes. But notice: the hard incompatibilist tells us that, although normal adult humans are not identical to those under duress, subject to coercion, or . . ., their actions are similarly unfree. After all, on hard incompatibilism, we are no more the source of our actions than any of the characters assembled above. If hard incompatibilism is true, it seems true of no one that they have made a promise ‘of their own free will.’ However, this is just to insist that no one has ever genuinely been subject to a promissory obligation. Hard incompatibilism is apparently at odds with the very idea of promissory obligation.

**2 – Skep**

**Skep is true and negates,**

**First is external world skep, We cannot know if anything actually exists because there is a possibility that it does not. Negate on presumption because you cannot know if private entities even exist.**

**Sinnot-Armstrong**

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 6-14-2002, "Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/>

Skeptical Hypotheses The final kind of argument derives from René Descartes (1641)**.** I do not seem justified in believing that what I see is a lake if I cannot rule out the possibility that it is a bay or a bayou**.** Generalizing, if there is any contrary hypothesis that I cannot rule out, then I am not justified in believing that what I see is a lake. This is supposed to be a common standard for justified belief. When this principle is applied thoroughly, it leads to skepticism. All a skeptic needs to show is that, for each belief, there is some contrary hypothesis that cannot be ruled out. It need not be the same hypothesis for every belief, but skeptics usually buy wholesale instead of retail, so they seek a single hypothesis that is contrary to all (or many common) beliefs and which cannot be ruled out in any way. The famous Cartesian hypothesis is of a demon who deceives me in all of my beliefs about the external world, while also ensuring that my beliefs are completely coherent**. This possibility cannot be ruled out by any experiences** or beliefs,because of how the deceiving demon is defined. This hypothesis is also contrary to my beliefs about the lake. So my beliefs about the lake are not justified, according to the above principle. And there is nothing special about my beliefs about the lake. Everything I believe about the external world is incompatible with the deceiving demon hypothesis**.** Skeptics conclude that no such belief is justified.

**Second is agency, Self-reflective intentionality is the basic characteristic of moral agents because it is the basis for assigning culpability. For instance, we don’t claim someone is morally responsible when they are unaware of what they are doing. However, private entities aren’t agents– self-reflection occurs in the individuals comprising the entity, not the entity itself, so moral prohibitions can’t be assigned to them.**

**Third is rule-following, Moral obligations require us to act immediately since waiting in the face of injustice is itself an injustice. However, we need to be fully informed to avoid formulating a rule incorrectly and unjustly, so obligations are internally contradictory.**

**Fourth is paradoxes**

**A] Good Samaritan- In order to say I want to fix X problem, you must say that you want X problem to exist, since it requires the problem to exist to solve, which makes a moral attempt inherently immoral. This also means affirming negates because you need the resolution to not have happened in order to have an obligation.**

**B] Meno’s- In order to discover something, it must already be known – this makes the quest for knowledge incomprehensible and impossible**

**C] Rule following – there is nothing inherent in a rule that mandates a certain interpretation – for example, there is nothing inherent in an arrow about showing direction. That means we can’t set moral rules because those rules need rules to interpret them – the moral rule they set is infinitely regressive.**

**D] Derrida’s – a moral action must be immediate because waiting allows for injustice to occur, however in acting early we suspend our cognitive deliberation and thus lack the ability to make a fully informed, just decision.  Thus, striving for morality is inherently immoral and obligations are contradictory.**

**Underview**

**1] ) Permissibility negates under TT OR Comparative Worlds-**

**a) Under TT the role of the ballot is to prove or disprove the aff and permissibility means that the aff’s moral obligation can’t be true**

**b) Under Comparative Worlds the role of the ballot is to decide whether we have a moral obligation to get to the world of the aff but we can’t obligate actors to get to the world of the aff**

**2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.**

**4] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.**

**[5] Neg Flex – Aff sets the terms for the round, gets infinite prep, and gets the last word which means they have a substantive advantage on every layer – neg permissibility is key to compensate so I get access to more diverse ground and layering.**

**Presumption Negates –**

**1] We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason something is false does not mean it is assumed to be true.**

**2] Statements are more often false then true. If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.**

**3] The neg burden is to deny the evidence of truth so if there’s no offense as to why the resolution is true the neg has fulfilled their burden.**

**ROB**

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution. Prefer because my opponent doesn’t offer an alternate ROB.**