# Neg

## Theory

### Disclosure

**A. Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all previously read positions before the debate on their NDCA wiki page under their own name with full citations, tags, and first three/last three words.**

**B. Violation: They didn’t disclose for this tournament.**

**C. Standards:**

**1. Evidence Quality – Disclosure generates an information database that encourages debaters to find the best evidence on the topic. Key to education since we have better debates with better arguments.**

**Nails 13** [(Jacob, NDT Policy Debater at Georgia State University), “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third Party Disclosure)”,NSDUpdate,10/10/2013EM] I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, **disclosure streamlines research.** Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, **the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can** contribute to and **build off of. Students can look through** the **different studies** on the topic **and choose the best ones** on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. **Quality of evidence increases across the board.**

**2] Level Playing Field – big schools can go around and scout and collect flows but independents are left in the dark so round reports are key to prep- they give you an idea of overall what layers debaters like going for so you can best prepare your strategy when you hit them. Accessibility first and independent voter – it’s an impact multiplier**

**Fairness is a voter because it’s a prereq to debate and education is a voter because it’s the only portable impact.**

## K

#### Strike – a form of power to engage in collective bargaining

#### Our volition is the structure of our will and it is binding—it is the only way we can feel anything like emotions, form relations or use reason to make decisions and generate intentions.

#### Our will is dependent on our interactions with the people around us, which explains why the subject can be fluid and stable at the same time. I am different now than I was 10 years ago, but if I did something messed up we shouldn’t immediately forget about it.

#### Motivation determines what our conceptions of goodness are what leads us to take actions in support of it—we respond to things differently depending on how they affect our will. We cannot strictly abide by external rules because they disregard individuality and contextual circumstances, but still need an objective set of rules for people to remain ethical.

#### The only solution is a concept of alienation: a criterion concerned with how someone is able to exercise their volition, not what they will. Alienation is the obstruction of ones will and their relations with the world.

#### Since everyone is presumed equal, everyone has an obligation to establish conditions of non-alienation, including the state. Thus: the standard is resisting alienation

#### Independently prefer:

#### 1. Performativity—every argument assumes creative productivity i.e. that you are able to pursue an end and that this is done consciously. Thus embracing the standard is a prior question to the very nature of debate since we cannot make any arguments without it.

#### 2. Moral accountability requires non-alienation. If you are alienated from your ends there is no way you can be morally responsible for what you do because it wasn’t you rationally willing and doing it. Thus the only way to identify moral responsibility is to not be alienated. This means the AC is key to actualize any other ethic.

#### Impact Calc: The standard is not consequentialist—it’s not concerned with the effects of removing subsidies on fossil fuels or the alternati ves that would replace them. It’s only concerned with the procedures of subsidies.

**Capitalism is alienating because the laborer is distanced from the act or working, it turns a life into becoming means rather than an end. Jaeggi 16** Rachel Jaeggi; et al. *Alienation*; Columbia University Press, 2016; Rahel Jaeggi is Professor for Practical Philosophy with Emphasis on Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy at the Humboldt University of Berlin – brackets for gendered language

**We can identify two dimensions of the deficit in the relation to self and world that Marx theorizes as alienation: first, the inability meaningfully to identify with what one does and with those with whom one does it; second, the inability to exert control over what one does**—that is, the inability to be, individually or collectively, the subject of one’s actions. **Alienation from the object—from the product of one’s own activity—means at once loss of control and dispos- session: the alienated worker** (as the seller of her labor power) **no longer has at her [their] disposal what she herself [they] has produced; it does not belong to her**. Her product is exchanged on a market she does not control and under conditions she does not control**. Alienation also means that the object must appear to her as fragmented: laboring under conditions of specialization and the division of labor, the worker has no relation to the product of her [their] work as a whole.** As someone who is involved in one of the many specialized acts that make up the production of Adam Smith’s famous pin, she has no relation to the pin as a finished product, as small as the pin might be**. Put differently, the product of her [their] specific labor—her specific contribution to the production of the pin—does not fit for her into a meaningful whole, a unity with significance**. The same pairing of powerlessness and loss of meaning (or impoverish- ment) marks the worker’s alienation from her own activity**. Alienated labor is, on the one hand, unfree activity, labor in which and into which one is forced**. In her labor the alienated worker is not the master of what she does. Standing under foreign command, her labor is determined by an other, or heteronomous. “If he relates to his own activity as to an unfree activity, then he relates to it as an activity performed in the service, under the domination, the coercion, and the yoke of another human being.”**5 And, being powerless, the worker can neither comprehend nor control the process as a whole of which she is a part but that remains untransparent to her. At the same time, alienated labor is also characterized by—as a counterpart to the product’s fragmentation—the fragmentation and impoverishment of laboring activity**. Thus Marx also regards as alienated the dullness and limited character of the labor itself, “which make the human being into as abstract a being as possible, a lathe, etc., and transforms her into a spiritual and physical monstrosity” (as he says in his “Comments on James Mill**”). Alienation from others, from the world of social relations of cooperation, also reflects these two dimensions: in alienated labor the worker has no control over what she, together with others, does. And in alienated labor others are for her, one could say, “structurally indifferent**.”6 It is interesting and of great importance for his theory that Marx denounces not only the instrumentalization of the worker by the owner of her labor power but also the instrumental relation to herself that the worker acquires through it. From Marx’s perspective, the instrumental relation that the worker develops (or is forced to develop) to herself and to her labor under condi- tions of alienation also appears problematic—or, more forcefully, “inhuman.” What is alienating about alienated labor is that it has no intrinsic purpose, that it is not (at least also) performed for its own sake. **Activities performed in an alienated way are understood by those who carry them out not as ends but only as means. In the same way, one regards the capacities one acquires from or brings to the activity—and therefore also oneself—as means rather than ends. In other words, one does not identify with what one does. Instrumental- ization, in turn, intensifies into utter meaninglessness: When Marx says that under conditions of alienation life itself becomes a means** (“life itself appears only as a means to life”)7—**what should be an end takes on the character of a means—he is describing a completely meaningless event, or, as one could say, the structure of meaninglessness itself.** Formulated differently, for Marx the infinite regress of ends is meaninglessness. In this respect Marx is an Aris- totelian: there must be an end that is not itself in turn a means.8 Here we see the concept’s many layers**: as alienated one does not possess what one has oneself produced (and is therefore exploited and dispossessed);9 one has no control over, or power to determine, what one does and is therefore powerless and unfree; at the same time, one is unable to realize oneself in one’s own activities and is therefore exposed to meaningless, impoverished, and instrumental relations with which one cannot identify and in which one experiences oneself as internally divided.** Conversely, the “real appropriation” that Marx contrasts with this type of alienation represents a form of wealth that goes beyond the mere distribution of property.10 **Appropriation in this sense includes taking possession of, gaining power over, and finding meaning in something. Thus the content of what could one could call Marx’s conception of the good life is an idea of self-realization understood as an identificatory, appropriative relation to oneself and to the world.**

#### The only hope is to reclaim our power is committing ourselves to the communist horizon as an organizing principle for collectivity. Any individual act of resistance will be coopted because one person's power is not enough to overturn violence. Commitment to a universal principle of communism becomes a way of combatting alienation through authentic politics. Dean 16

[Jodi, Prof. of Political Science @ Hobart and William Smith, Crowds and Party, pp. 153-154. Dean received her B.A. in History from [Princeton University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University) in 1984. She received her MA, MPhil, and PhD from [Columbia University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University) in 1992. Before joining the Department of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, she taught at the [University of Texas at San Antonio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Texas_at_San_Antonio). She has held visiting research appointments at the Institute for the Human Sciences in Vienna, [McGill University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McGill_University) in Montreal, and [Cardiff University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardiff_University) in Wales.]

How do and can we imagine political change underthe conditions of communicative capitalism? Is political change just aggregated personal transformation, communism as viral outbreak or meme-effect, #fullcommunism? Do we think that “autonomous zones of freedom and equality will emerge like so many mushrooms out of the dregs left behind in capital flight and the shrinking of state social provisioning? Or do we optimistically look to democracy, expecting (all evidence to the contrary) that communism, or even upgraded social democracy, will arise out of electoral politics? All these **fantasies imagine that political change can come about without political struggle.** **Each pushes away the fact of antagonism, division, and class struggle as if late neoliberalism were not already characterized by extreme inequality, violence, and exploitation, as if the ruling class did not already use military force**, police force, legal force, and illegal force **to maintain its position.** Politics is a struggle over power. **Capital uses every resource—state, non-state, interstate—to advance its position. A Left that refuses to organize itself in recognition of this fact will never be able to combat it.** “In communicative capitalism, **individual acts of resistance**, subversion, cultural production, and opinion expression, no matter how courageous, **are easily absorbed into the circulatory content of global personal media networks**. Alone, they don’t amplify; they can’t endure. **They are easily forgotten** as new content rushes into and through our feeds. We indulge in fantasies of the freedom of our expression, our critical edge and wit, disavowing the way such individuated freedom is the form of collective incapacity. Against states and alliances wielded in the service of capital as a class, diverse and separate struggles are so many isolated resistances, refusals to undertake the political work of pulling together in organized, strategic, long-term struggle. The constant churn of demands on our awareness disperses our efforts and attention. What **the Left should** **be** doing is **coordinating**, consolidating, and linking **its efforts so that they can amplify each other**. We don’t need multiple, different campaigns. **We need an organized struggle against capitalism capable of operating along multiple issues in diverse locations**. “Crowds push back. From the perspective of the party, we see them as the insistent people. Fidelity to the insistence of the egalitarian discharge demands that **we build the infrastructure capable of maintaining the gap of their desire. The more powerful the affective infrastructure we create, the more we will feel its force, interiorizing the perspective of the many into the ego-ideal that affirms our practices and activities and pushes us to do more than we think we can.**

#### Capitalism depoliticize the left in favor of local forms of resistance. Thus the Role of the Ballot is to is to endorse the debater with the best educational praxis for revolutionary planning.

#### Thus, I negate: States ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike

#### This is not a call for state action as such, but rather a call and recognition to return to the revolutionary tradition of dictatorship of the proletariat. The right to strike is a tool of bourgeois crisis management that controls revolutionary energy. The only proper way to strike is a violent, revolutionary strike against the foundations of capitalism itself.

**Crepon 19**

Marc Crepon is a professor of philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure.. “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s “Toward the Critique of Violence””. Translated by Micol Bez. DOI: 10.1215/26410478-7708331, published August 2019, accessed 11-4-21 // mk

In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. **We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed unconditionally**. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, after claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufficient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that justifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufficient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufficient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support. The second conflict of interpretation concerns what is at stake in the strike. For the state, the strike implies a withdrawal or act of defiance vis-à-vis the employer, while for the workers it is a means of pressuring, if not of blackmail or even of “hostage taking.” The diference is thus between an act of suspension (which can be considered nonviolent) and one of extortion (which includes violence). Does this mean that “pure means” are not free of ambiguity, and that there can be no nonviolent action that does not include a residue of violence? It is not clear that Benjamin’s text allows us to go this far. Nevertheless, the problem of pure means, approached through the notion of the right to strike, raises the following question: Could it be that the text “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” which we are accustomed to reading as a text on violence, deals in fact with the possibility and ambiguity of nonviolence? The opposition between the aforementioned conflicts of interpretation manifests itself in Benjamin’s excursus on the revolutionary strike, and specifically in the opposition between the political strike and the proletarian general strike, and in the meaning we should attribute to the latter. As previously discussed, the state will never admit that the right to strike is a right to violence. Its interpretative strategy consists in denying, as much as possible, the effective exercise of the right that it theoretically grants. Under these conditions, the function of the revolutionary strike is to return the strike to its true meaning; in other words, to return it to its own violence. In this context, the imperative is to move beyond idle words: a call to strike is a call to violence. This is the reason why such a call is regularly met with a violent reaction from the state, because trade unions force the state to recognize what it is trying to ignore, what it pretends to have solved by recognizing the right to strike: the irreducible violence of class struggles. This means that the previously discussed alternative between “suspension” and “extortion” is valid only for the political strike—in other words, for a strike whose primary vocation is not, contrary to that of the proletarian general strike, to revolt against the law itself. Essentially, the idea of a proletarian general strike, its myth (to borrow Sorel’s words), is to escape from this dichotomous alternative that inevitably reproduces and perpetuates the violence of domination.