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#### Pharma innovation is risky and requires monetary incentive to be profitable

**Swagel 21** Phillip L. Swagel, Director of the Congressional budget office 4-xx-2021, "Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Congressional Budget Office, <https://www.cbo.goc/publication/57126#_idTextAnchor020>

Every year, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry develops a variety of new drugs that provide valuable medical benefits. Many of those drugs are expensive and contribute to rising health care costs for the private sector and the federal government. Policymakers have considered policies that would lower drug prices and reduce federal drug expenditures. Such policies would probably reduce the industry’s incentive to develop new drugs. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office assesses trends in spending for drug research and development (R&D) and the introduction of new drugs. CBO also examines factors that determine how much drug companies spend on R&D: expected global revenues from a new drug; cost to develop a new drug; and federal policies that affect the demand for drug therapies, the supply of new drugs, or both. What Are Recent Trends in Pharmaceutical R&D and New Drug Approvals? The pharmaceutical industry devoted $83 billion to R&D expenditures in 2019. Those expenditures covered a variety of activities, including discovering and testing new drugs, developing incremental innovations such as product extensions, and clinical testing for safety-monitoring or marketing purposes. That amount is about 10 times what the industry spent per year in the 1980s, after adjusting for the effects of inflation. The share of revenues that drug companies devote to R&D has also grown: On average, pharmaceutical companies spent about one-quarter of their revenues (net of expenses and buyer rebates) on R&D expenses in 2019, which is almost twice as large a share of revenues as they spent in 2000. That revenue share is larger than that for other knowledge-based industries, such as semiconductors, technology hardware, and software. The number of new drugs approved each year has also grown over the past decade. On averace, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 38 new drugs per year from 2010 through 2019 (with a peak of 59 in 2018), which is 60 percent more than the yearly average over the previous decade. Many of the drugs that have been approved in recent years are “specialty drugs.” Specialty drugs generally treat chronic, complex, or rare conditions, and they may also require special handling or monitoring of patients. Many specialty drugs are biologics (large-molecule drugs based on living cell lines), which are costly to develop, hard to imitate, and frequently have high prices. Previously, most drugs were small-molecule drugs based on chemical compounds. Even while they were under patent, those drugs had lower prices than recent specialty drugs have. Information about the kinds of drugs in current clinical trials indicates that much of the industry’s innovative activity is focused on specialty drugs that would provide new cancer therapies and treatments for nervous-system disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease. What Factors Influence Spending for R&D? Drug companies’ R&D spending decisions depend on three main factors: Anticipated lifetime global revenues from a new drug, Expected costs to develop a new drug, and Policies and programs that influence the supply of and demand for prescription drugs. Various considerations inform companies’ expectations about a drug’s revenue stream, including the anticipated prices it could command in different markets around the world and the expected global sales volume at those prices (given the number of people who might use the drug). The prices and sales volumes of existing drugs provide information about consumers’ and insurance plans’ willingness to pay for drug treatments. Importantly, when drug companies set the prices of a new drug, they do so to maximize future revenues net of manufacturing and distribution costs. A drug’s sunk R&D costs—that is, the costs already incurred in developing that drug—do not influence its price. Developing new drugs is a costly and uncertain process, and many potential drugs never make it to market. Only about 12 percent of drugs entering clinical trials are ultimately approved for introduction by the FDA. In recent studies, estimates of the average R&D cost per new drug range from less than $1 billion to more than $2 billion per drug. Those estimates include the costs of both laboratory research and clinical trials of successful new drugs as well as expenditures on drugs that do not make it past the laboratory-development stage, that enter clinical trials but fail in those trials or are withdrawn by the drugmaker for business reasons, or that are not approved by the FDA. Those estimates also include the company’s capital costs—the value of other forgone investments—incurred during the R&D process. Such costs can make up a substantial share of the average total cost of developing a new drug. The development process often takes a decade or more, and during that time the company does not receive a financial return on its investment in developing that drug. The federal government affects R&D decisions in three ways. First, it increases demand for prescription drugs, which encourages new drug development, by fully or partially subsidizing the purchase of prescription drugs through a variety of federal programs (including Medicare and Medicaid) and by providing tax preferences for employment-based health insurance. Second, the federal government increases the supply of new drugs. It funds basic biomedical research that provides a scientific foundation for the development of new drugs by private industry. Additionally, tax credits—both those available to all types of companies and those available to drug companies for developing treatmentscof uncommon diseases—provide incentives to invest in R&D. Similarly, deductions for R&D investment can be used to reduce tax liabilities immediately rather than over the life of that investment. Finally, the patent system and certain statutory provisions that delay FDA approval of generic drugs provide pharmaceutical companies with a period of market exclusivity, when competition is legally restricted. During that time, they can maintain higher prices on a patented product than they otherwise could, which makes new drugs more profitable and thereby increases drug companies’ incentives to invest in R&D. Third, some federal policies affect the number of new drugs by influencing both demand and supply. For example, federal recommendations for specific vaccines increase the demand for those vaccines and provide an incentive for drug companies to develop new ones. Additionally, federal regulatory policies that influence returns on drug R&D can bring about increases or decreases in both the supply of and demand for new drugs. Trends in R&D Spending and New Drug Development Private spending on pharmaceutical R&D and the approval of new drugs have both increased markedly in recent years, resuming a decades-long trend that was interrupted in 2008 as generic versions of some top-selling drugs became available and as the 2007–2009 recession occurred. In particular, spending on drug R&D increased by nearly 50 percent between 2015 and 2019. Many of the drugs approved in recent years are high-priced specialty drugs for relatively small numbers of potential patients. By contrast, the top-selling drugs of the 1990s were lower-cost drugs with large patient populations. R&D Spending R&D spending in the pharmaceutical industry covers a variety of activities, including the following: Invention, or research and discovery of new drugs; Development, or clinical testing, preparation and submission of applications for FDA approval, and design of production processes for new drugs; Incremental innovation, including the development of new dosages and delivery mechanisms for existing drugs and the testing of those drugs for additional indications; Product differentiation, or the clinical testing of a new drug against an existing rival drug to show that the new drug is superior; and Safety monitoring, or clinical trials (conducted after a drug has reached the market) that the FDA may require to detect side effects that may not have been observed in shorter trials when the drug was in development. In real terms, private investment in drug R&D among member firms of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an industry trade association, was about $83 billion in 2019, up from about $5 billion in 1980 and $38 billion in 2000.1 Although those spending totals do not include spending by many smaller drug companies that do not belong to PhRMA, the trend is broadly representative of R&D spending by the industry as a whole.2 A survey of all U.S. pharmaceutical R&D spending (including that of smaller firms) by the National Science Foundation (NSF) reveals similar trends.3 Although total R&D spending by all drug companies has trended upward, small and large firms generally focus on different R&D activities. Small companies not in PhRMA devote a greater share of their research to developing and testing new drugs, many of which are ultimately sold to larger firms (see Box 1). By contrast, a greater portion of the R&D spending of larger drug companies (including those in PhRMA) is devoted to conducting clinical trials, developing incremental “line extension” improvements (such as new dosages or delivery systems, or new combinations of two or more existing drugs), and conducting postapproval testing for safety-monitoring or marketing purposes.

#### Patents are the only way to offset the high price of creating drugs especially for rare conditions. Removing patents cause market failure

Glassman 21 [Amanda; 5/6/21; Executive vice president and a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington and London; “*Big Pharma Is Not the Tobacco Industry*,” Barron, <https://www.barrons.com/articles/big-pharma-is-not-the-tobacco-industry-51620315693>]

Patents are a way to prevent market failure and allow for greater investment in research. However, patent-protected drugs face no price caps nor competitors for about twenty years, giving patent holders market exclusivity. In an ideal world, medicine would be accessible to all. To continually create new and better medications, however, somebody has to invest in research for them, and unfortunately, the amount of financial capital required is no small figure. In 2014, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development estimated that it takes around $2.6 billion and a ten-year long time commitment to develop and license a new prescription drug. Without patents, certain pharmaceutical companies wouldn’t invest in research themselves but would instead wait around for another group to discover and license the drug. Then, those companies could price the drug lower than their competition. This would result in a market failure, in terms of a positive externality, as other companies would benefit from the research of one group without having to pay for it. Corporations wouldn’t want to invest their time and money in something they wouldn’t be able to profit from due to competition. Thus, the amount of pharmaceutical innovations in society would be less than the socially optimal quantity. Patents are a way to combat this market failure. By giving pharmaceutical companies a twenty-year patent where prices can’t be regulated by the government or altered by competition, companies are incentivized to make these huge financial and temporal investments. Similarly, corporations wouldn’t want to invest in research for drugs that treat only a small group of people such as people with “orphan diseases” like Lou Gehrig’s or Tourette’s. In the United States, an “orphan disease” afflicts only around 200,000 people, which in the eyes of companies, constitutes a small market when considering the amount of research required for developing prescription drugs. To stimulate production of these drugs, the U.S. government passed the Orphan Drug Act, giving companies seven years of market exclusivity for treating certain rare conditions. Much like a patent protected drug, an orphan drug could be set at any price during these seven years, as it doesn’t face competition nor government restrictions.

#### Pharma innovation prevents extinction

Engelhardt 8, H. Tristram. Innovation and the pharmaceutical industry: critical reflections on the virtues of profit. M & M Scrivener Press, 2008 (doctorate in philosophy (University of Texas at Austin), M.D. (Tulane University), professor of philosophy (Rice University), and professor emeritus at Baylor College of Medicine)

Many are suspicious of, or indeed jealous of, the good fortune of others. Even when profit is gained in the market without fraud and with the consent of all buying and selling goods and services, there is a sense on the part of some that something is wrong if considerable profit is secured. There is even a sense that good fortune in the market, especially if it is very good fortune, is unfair. One might think of such rhetorically disparaging terms as "wind-fall profits". There is also a suspicion of the pursuit of profit because it is often embraced not just because of the material benefits it sought, but because of the hierarchical satisfaction of being more affluent than others. The pursuit of profit in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is tor many in particular morally dubious because it is acquired from those who have the bad fortune to be diseased or disabled. Although the suspicion of profit is not well-founded, this suspicion is a major moral and public-policy challenge. Profit in the market for the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is to be celebrated. This is the case, in that if one is of the view (1) that the presence of additional resources for research and development spurs innovation in the development of pharmaceuticals and med-ical devices (i.e., if one is of the view that the allure of profit is one of the most effective ways not only to acquire resources but productively to direct human energies in their use), (2) that given the limits of altruism and of the willingness of persons to be taxed, the possibility of profits is necessary to secure such resources, (3) that the allure of profits also tends to enhance the creative use of available resources in the pursuit of phar-maceutical and medical-device innovation, and (4) if one judges it to be the case that such innovation **is both necessary to maintain the human species in an ever-changing and always dangerous environment in which new microbial and other threats may at any time emerge** to threaten human well-being, if not survival (i.e., that such innovation is necessary to prevent increases in morbidity and mortality risks), as well as (5) in order generally to decrease morbidity and mortality risks in the future, it then follows (6) that one should be concerned regarding any policies that decrease the amount of resources and energies available to encourage such innovation. One should indeed be of the view that the possibilities for profit, all things being equal, should be highest in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries. Yet, there is a suspicion regarding the pursuit of profit in medicine and especially in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries.

#### Pharma spills-over – has cascading global impacts that are necessary for human survival.

NAS 8 National Academy of Sciences 12-3-2008 “The Role of the Life Sciences in Transforming America's Future Summary of a Workshop”

Fostering Industries to Counter Global Problems The life sciences have applications in areas that range far beyond human health. Life-science based approaches could **contribute to advances in** many industries, from energy production and pollution remediation, to clean manufacturing and the production of new biologically inspired materials. In fact, biological systems could provide the basis for new products, services and industries that we cannot yet imagine. Microbes are already producing biofuels and could, through further research, provide a major component of future energy supplies. Marine and terrestrial organisms extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which suggests that biological systems could be used to help manage climate change. Study of the complex systems encountered in biology is decade, it is really just the beginning.” Advances in the underlying science of plant and animal breeding have been just as dramatic as the advances in genetic can put down a band of fertilizer, come back six months later, and plant seeds exactly on that row, reducing the need for fertilizer, pesticides, and other agricultural inputs. Fraley said that the global agricultural system needs to adopt the goal of doubling the current yield of **crops while reducing key inputs like pesticides, fertilizers, and water** by one third. “It is more important than putting a man on the moon,” he said. Doubling agricultural yields would “change the world.” Another billion people will join the middle class over the next decade just in India and China as economies continue to grow. And all people need and deserve secure access to food supplies. Continued progress will require both basic and applied research, The evolution of life “put earth under new management,” Collins said. Understanding the future state of the planet will require understanding the biological systems that have shaped the planet. Many of these biological systems are found in the oceans, which cover 70 percent of the earth’s surface and have a crucial impact on weather, climate, and the composition of the atmosphere. In the past decade, new tools have become available to explore the microbial processes that drive the **chemistry of the oceans**, observed David Kingsbury, Chief Program Officer for Science at the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. These technologies have revealed that a large proportion of the planet’s genetic diversity resides in the oceans. In addition, many organisms in the oceans readily exchange genes, creating evolutionary forces that can have global effects. The oceans are currently under great stress, Kingsbury pointed out. Nutrient runoff from agriculture is helping to create huge and expanding “dead zones” where oxygen levels are too low to sustain life. Toxic algal blooms are occurring with higher frequency in areas where they have not been seen in the past. Exploitation of ocean resources is disrupting ecological balances that have formed over many millions of years. Human-induced changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere are changing the chemistry of the oceans, with potentially catastrophic consequences. “If we are not careful, we are not going to have a sustainable planet to live on,” said Kingsbury. Only by understanding the basic biological processes at work in the oceans can humans live sustainably on earth.

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#### **The Role of the Ballot is to deconstruct and challenge western thought and practice – this means detaching from western centric ways of knowledge production and engrained biases.**

McKittrick 15 **(**Katherine KcKittrick, Queen’s University, “Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis”, <https://books.google.com/books/about/Sylvia_Wynter.html?id=Dj1zBgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false>, 2015)

Following in the steps of Frantz Fanon, Humberto Maturana, and Francisco Varela, Sylvia Wynter’s works have been pursuing a cognitive shift that in this essay I characterize as decolonial. Why decolonial? Why not postmodern or postcolonial? Wynter’s work has consistently called into question whether the “post”—in poststructural, postmodernity, postcolonial—is a useful conceptual frame, thus putting it aside in order to understand, instead, how particular epistemologies are unthinkable and/or unarticulated within hegemonic Western categories of knowledge and philosophy of knowing. Wynter is a radical thinker. She powerfully explores the roots of Western and colonial knowledge systems and uncovers the otherwise veiled link between racial, gendered, and sexual belonging, differential ways of knowing and imagining the world, and the overarching governing codes that have created, maintained, and normalized practices of exclusion. She is not looking to change or supersede epistemic categories and established knowledge, but rather seeks to undo the systems through which knowledge and knowing are constituted. At the same time, Wynter is not proposing to contribute to and comfortably participate in a system of knowledge that left her out of humanity (as a black / C aribbean woman), but rather delink herself from this very system of knowledge in order to engage in epistemic disobedience. Under the rules of the epistemic canon, and according to its racial mandates, if you have been classified in / as difference, then you are required to submit and assimilate to the canon or remain outside. Wynter does not follow either of these pathways. She instead engages what I call the decolonial option, a practice of rethinking and unraveling dominant worldviews that have been opened up by Indigenous and black and Caribbean thinkers since the sixteenth century in América (with accent) and the Caribbean. The decolonial option does not simply protest the contents of imperial coloniality; it demands a delinking of oneself from the knowledge systems we take for granted (and can profit from) and practicing epistemic disobedience. Wynter’s decolonial project calls into question the concept of the Human and its epistemological underpinnings.1 Her work draws on the research of Chilean scientist, philosopher, and intellectual Humberto Maturana (in collaboration in an early stage with Francisco Varela) and black and Caribbean intellectuals and social theorists. Wynter draws on Maturana’s insights, in particular his work on autopoiesis, which uncovers the interconnectedness of “seeing” the world and “knowing” the world: specifically, he shows that what is seen with the eyes does not represent the world outside the living organism; rather, it is the living organism that fabricates an image of the world through the internal / neurological processing of information. Thus, Maturana made the connection between the ways in which human beings construct their world and their criteria of truth and objectivity and noticed how their / our nervous system processes and responds to information. It is across both neurobiological cognition and decolonial practices that Sylvia Wynter’s work and her intellectual disobedience emerge. Wynter suggests that if we accept that epistemology gives us the principles and rules of knowing through which the Human and Humanity are understood, we are trapped in a knowledge system that fails to notice that the stories of what it means to be Human—specifically origin stories that explain who / w hat we are—are, in fact, narratively constructed. Wynter’s commentaries on Man1, Man2, and the making of the Human should thus be understood alongside historical and epistemological epochs (medieval, classical) that present humanness through intelligible cosmogonies that, as Denise da Silva argues in this collection, require a juridical- economic colonial presence. To study “Man” or “Humanity” is therefore to study a narrativization that has been produced with the very instruments (or categories) that we study with. In short, it is precisely the practice of accepting the principles and rules of knowing that produces narratives that naturalize, for example, evolution and dysselection and thus biocentric Human origin stories. It follows that we fail to notice that evolution, dysselection, and biocentricity are origin stories with an ontological effect. Put simply: we tend to believe our cosmogonies as natural truth(s); this belief system is calcified by our commitment to this belief system; the schema self-replicates, as we continually invest in its systemic belief qualities. In this way, Wynter’s writings on the Human and who/what we are are reflective of Maturana’s autopoietics. Wynter refuses to embrace the entity of the Human independently of the epistemic categories and concepts that created it by suggesting instead that our conceptualizations of the Human are produced within an autopoietic system. The problem of the Human is thus not identity- based per se but in the enunciations of what it means to be Human—enunciations that are concocted and circulated by those who most convincingly (and powerfully) imagine the “right” or “noble” or “moral” characteristics of Human and in this project their own image-experience of the Human into the sphere of Universal Humanness. The Human is therefore the product of a particular epistemology, yet it appears to be (and is accepted as) a naturally independent entity existing in the world. Implicit in this epistemological framework are the worldviews of those who have been cast as non- Human or less-than- Human: Frantz Fanon’s les damnés, imperial constructs who can only be understood as the difference outside. Les damnés are the anthropos in relation to humanitas as humanitas is defined by those who conceive of themselves as Human. Here, clearly, imperial epistemologies emerge alongside the widespread coloniality of knowledge: Christian theology, secular philosophy, and sciences that were formed and shaped under European geographic monarchies and n ation-s tates (which also provided the unification of Western knowledge systems in six modern / i mperial languages grounded in Greek and Latin). This is the belief system that Wynter’s work unveils: the naturalization of and thus a steadfast belief in modes of thinking—the principles and rules of knowing—that calcify a commitment to an epistemological tract that profits from replicating itself. By unveiling this system, she draws attention to the conditions through which the epistemologies of les damnés are made. The epistemologies of les damnés do not seek to arrive at a perfect or true definition of the Human, for there is no Human “out there” beyond the Western imperial concept of Man/Human from the Renaissance on. Sylvia Wynter’s decolonial project understands that the European Renaissance stamped a concept of Man that brought together the colonization of time, the colonization of space, and the perfection of geometric forms that have been immortalized in the famous Vitruvian Man, drawn by Leonardo de Vinci circa 1487–1490. The correlations in this image between the Human body and the universe hide the fact that the body depicted and the experience upon which Leonardo was relying was a Greco- Roman concept of the human figure. The complicity between colonization of time (specifically detaching Man / Human from a Christian medieval idea of human dependency from God) and the colonization of space (specifically the emergence of “Indians” in the European consciousness coupled with the image of Africans, as descendants of Ham, already embedded in the consciousness of European Christians) prompted a system of categories to emerge: derived from Greek and Latin, this system disqualified Africans from Humanness (thus rendering them appropriate for enslavement) and excluded Indians from the proportions, rationality, and knowledge of God. Wynter’s writings demonstrate that Western epistemology built itself on a concept of Human and Humanity that, in turn, served to legitimate the epistemic foundation that created it. That is, Human and Humanity were created as the enunciated that projects and propels to universality the local image of the enunciator. The enunciator assumes, and thus postulates, that his concept of Human and Humanity is valid for every human being on the planet. However, once the universality of the Human has been postulated— and we encounter this formulation in many official documents telling us that humans are “all born equal”—hierarchies are needed and put into place to establish differences between all who were “born equal.” Indeed, after we are born, we inhabit a world made of inequality. The discourse that “we are all born equal” is inflected with practices of inequity that shape how we live in the world differentially. The mirage of totality—of epistemic totality that is laden with seeming egalitarian open-mindedness entrenched in our various birthrights—is the trap that Wynter has not only recognized but also struggled against. Columbus’s arrival in the Americas in 1492 and other voyages outside of Europe are landmarks of the moment in which the concepts of Man and of Human became one and the same and, at the same time, came to be understood in relation to race and racism. The epistemology from which Indians were observed and described was, of course, not the epistemology of the Indians. And, given that the arrival of Columbus and his contemporaries did not, in fact, correspond to the worldview of the Indians (and the rest of the non-E uropean world), New World subjects did not imagine that they were being classified by a structure of knowledge that will soon become both hegemonic and dominant. With this in mind, racism and epistemology become part of the package whose point of reference is Man- as- Human—a reference point that corresponds to Wynter’s project to move “beyond Man, toward the Human,” which can be found across her works. By uncoupling Man (the Vitruvian Man) as a model of Humanity, the point is not to find the true and objective definition of “what is Human,” but to show that such projects are filled with an imperial bend, a will to objectivity and truth—a truth that, as Maturana explains, bolsters the belief system that supports such an epistemology. The year 1492 is, for many, a turning point in the history of the world. Sylvia Wynter and many black intellectuals (such as C. L. R. James, George Lamming, Wilson Harris, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and so forth) draw attention to the significance of plantations and palenques and kilombos, colonization, nationalism and independence, gender, and the state in relation to fifteenth-century global

#### The WTO is an agent of contemporary capitalism which exports imperialism

**Fukuda 2010** (Yasuo Fukuda, January 2010, “WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM: DECAYING CAPITALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE,” World Review of Political Economy, <https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/22161/0101106701.pdf>)

Studies on imperialism can be traced back to J. A. Hobson (1902) and R. Hilferding (1909). Based on their works, Lenin (1917) characterized imperialism as a regime of governance by monopoly capital, concluding that imperialism is a decaying stage of capitalism. Lenin outlined [by] five pillars by which to define imperialism. The first is monopoly capital gaining control of the major industries of a country. The growth of monopoly capital is a consequence of market concentration caused by competition among firms. Once market concentration reaches a certain point, it becomes possible for a small number of winners to form collusions, such as cartels, which transform the nature of the economy, leading to the dominance of monopoly capital. The second pillar is the formation of business relationships between industrial and financial monopoly capital. Monopoly capital also forms cozy relationships with government through the financing of political campaigns and through revolving doors. In short, monopoly capital wields governing power over national economies through market concentration, collusions among large firms, and direct political influence. The third pillar is foreign investment. Drawing on its political influence, monopoly capital effects the transfer of wealth from workers, farmers, small to medium-sized businesses, and the self-employed to monopoly capital. The resulting distortion of income distribution causes disproportionate growth among industries—especially between manufacturing and farming—and suppresses consumption. This leads to over-accumulation, which forces monopoly capital to export merchandise and invest abroad. The fourth pillar is global divisions among monopoly capital through cartels. These divisions occur in the same way as those which take place at the national level; competition among large firms, and the market concentration which follows, leads to the formation of global cartel agreements. The fifth pillar is colonization of less-developed countries by the Great Powers, operating at the behest of monopoly capital. Such colonization is an outcome of global competition among opposing elements of monopoly capital. Monopoly capital takes advantage of colonization to monopolize control of natural resources and export markets, and as a means to protect capital invested in less-developed countries against appropriation. Figure 1 shows how the five pillars are related. The figure starts with monopoly capital as governing powers, from which follows a causal relationship down to the last outcome, competition for colonization. In other words, colonization is the final outcome of the governing power of monopoly capital. This is why Lenin considered monopoly capital to be the key to imperialism.1 monopoly capital as governing power ↓ distorted income distribution and unbalanced growth ↓ accumulation of redundant capital ↓ merchandise export and foreign investments ↓ global competition and global collusion ↓ struggles for colonization Figure 1 Lenin’s “Imperialism” Looking at contemporary capitalism from the viewpoint of Lenin’s “Imperialism,” it is clear that four of the five pillars (excepting the fifth) are still applicable to capitalism under the WTO regime. First, a small number of multinational corporations typically control more than half the market-share of major industries. For example, in the commercial seed market, the world’s top three corporations (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta of Switzerland) control almost half of the world market. Cargill, along with its top four competitors, handle 85 percent of world grain trade. In the pharmaceutical industry, the top ten corporations hold a combined 54.8 percent share of the world market (ETC Group 2008). In banking, the world’s top 45 banks account for nearly 40 percent of the gross tier 1 capital of the top 1,000, and about 45 percent of the total assets (The Banker, June 24, 2009). It hardly needs saying that these companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments, and through political contributions, lobbying, revolving doors, and the like.

#### The affirmative’s project of commercial activity weaponizes exchange as a method of dominating the world and creating a colonial empire.

Koshy ‘99

[Susan Koshy, “From Cold War to Trade War: Neocolonialism and Human Rights”, Social Text, Spring 1999, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/466713>, pages 1-16]

In the New World Order, neocolonial power operates less through military force than through economic domination. What we are witnessing in our time is the scramble among developed countries (which now no longer refers exclusively to the former colonial powers) not for territory but for the competitive edge in trade and commerce, especially through monopolistic control over vital sectors of profitability (informa-tion, biotechnology, and technological innovations).2 Consequently, the shaping of trade policy has become increasingly crucial to the assertion of global domination, and the political changes of the post-Cold War era have worked to establish closer linkages between trade and human rights standards. Within this context, the human rights arguments of many Western liberals and labor activists, while ostensibly oppositional within a nation-state framework, are often complicitous with neocolonial domina- tion in an international framework. Simultaneously, the oppositional dis- courses of Third Worldism have been undercut by the collapse of social- ist states; they have also been co-opted in many arenas to serve statist and corporate agendas, thus rendering the articulation of resistance a more vexed project, especially at a time when resistance has become more frac- tured, local, and issue-specific. In the face of these challenges, what are we to make of the idea of human rights both as a philosophical concept and a politicohistorical pro- ject? Does the imbrication of much current human rights discourse in global capitalism and Eurocentrism mean that it should be abandoned as a vehicle for social transformation?3 What is its potential as a counter- hegemonic discourse? This essay will critique the deployment of human rights discourse in international relations, while simultaneously affirming the political necessity of retaining the project of universal human rights as an ongoing and historically specific endeavor. A brief summary will help to illuminate the growing importance of trade control in the post-Cold War era. Following World War II, "imperial overstretch" rendered the pursuit of economic and political power through colonial domination a more costly and problematic enterprise. Imperial overstretch refers to the weakening of a country's economic base through high military spending and the diversion of resources involved in the acquisition and domination of additional territory. The shift from colonialism to neocolonialism thus effected, in part, a transition to a more efficient form of domination. As a result, trade rather than conquest came to be seen as a critical means of international control. However, the threat of Communism and the ideological conflicts of the Cold War created an environment where political strength still depended heavily on military strength. So, it was only with the end of the Cold War that the focus on trade intensified, inaugurating the shift from the Cold War to the Trade War era. For the United States, the end of the Cold War deprived the state of ideological justification for equating human rights protection with anti- communism as had been the case, particularly in the Reagan years. How- ever, the temporary lack of focus in U.S. foreign policy dealings was rapidly replaced by a growing recognition of the crucial importance of trade to the consolidation of power and the possibility of coupling trade and human rights concerns. The strategies to acquire and retain trade control are currently in the process of being worked out with several important groups (transnational corporations [TNCs], labor, environmental groups, consumer protection groups, human rights activists, media) competing to define the "national interest." Inconsistencies and vacillations on trade and foreign policy are symptomatic of this contest. Although the "national interest" is frequently invoked as if it signified a fixed and determinate agenda, it is further com- plicated by the contradictions between global capitalism and the nation- state that have disrupted the ready accommodation between big business and big government that had been worked out during the Fordist era. As David Harvey observes, the state is now in a much more problematic position. It is called upon to regulate the activities of corporate capital in the national interest at the same time as it is forced, also in the national interest, to create a "good business climate" to act as an inducement to trans-national and global finance capital, and to deter (by means other than exchange controls) capital flight to greener and more profitable pastures.38 Harvey goes on to say that under a regime of flexible accumulation, state intervention is more crucial than ever "particularly regarding labour con- trol." However, it should be pointed out that while the weakening of the nation-state is a global phenomenon, there are still vast discrepancies between the relative power of various nation-states. Furthermore, although developed nations are also subject to the forces of global capital, they have succeeded in shoring up the regulatory powers of their own states, while simultaneously breaking down those of developing nations. As Raghavan explains, the transnationalisation of the world economy has been going on at an accel- erated pace. But the TNCs are now coming up against the reality of the nation state and the postwar order, and finding it constraining. The US which still is the dominant home of the TNCs and the leading country in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) is hence directing its effort to limit the national space of others, through demands for "liberalisation" and "deregulation." But this is confined to selected areas and sectors, and there is little talk of it in the high technology areas, which are subject to high degrees of regu- lation and state support and intervention. Often in these areas mercantilist concerns for goods, services, patents and other industrial property protec- tion to ensure monopoly rentier incomes, are masked under pleas of "secu- rity" and safeguarded and protected.39

#### Climate colonialism maintains the status quo where developed nations export their climate burden onto less developed nations.

Schönhöfer ’19 [“CLIMATE COLONIALISM AS A NEW POWER STRUCTURE”, October 2019, https://www.goethe.de/prj/eco/en/pol/21689473.html]

how Germany – along with the other industrialized nations – is living at the ecological expense of other countries, an idea widely known as ‘climate colonialism’.  “This is based on a development model that made the industrialized countries rich through exploiting less highly developed nations.  The rich countries are outsourcing burdens to countries with smaller footprints,” molecular biologist and philosopher Christoph Rehmann-Sutter explains in his essay Stoppt den Klima-Kolonialismus (Stop Climate Colonialism). Colonialism, he argues, is associated with an imperial structure of domination in which nations built settlements in remote areas to bring goods and products back home.  This definition can also be applied to climate issues, Rehmann-Sutter adds, if we take the one-sided distribution of global economic power into account. “When I talk about climate colonialism, I do so with the proviso that this form of spatial and temporal relocation of productive areas makes it more difficult to recognize the imperial structures the countries involved employ to dominate the inhabitants of the other countries. There are, of course, still power structures between the rich industrialized countries and the territories formerly colonized by them, especially at the economic level.” As sociologist Stephan Lessnich says the same thing another way in his book Living Well at Others' Expense: The Hidden Costs of Western Prosperity: “We are not living beyond our means. We are living at the expense of others.” He also researches the impact of Western prosperity and has come to the same conclusion. There are many examples of how developing and emerging nations are providing the raw materials industrialized countries depend on for growth while simultaneously acting as their waste bins, from high-tech agriculture in Europe that depends on destructive soybean cultivation in Argentina and the deforestation of Thailand’s mangrove forests to raise cheap shrimp to the import of sand for the construction industry currently eroding Africa’s coastlines and the mounds of our plastic waste swirling in the North Pacific. Unchecked growth brings climate disasters, and ecological inequality promotes migration and flight.

#### Climate change leads to extinction

Paster ’21 [“Could climate change make humans go extinct?”, August 30, 2021, Patrick holds a master's degree in international journalism from Cardiff University in the U.K. and is currently finishing a second master's degree in biodiversity, evolution and conservation in action at Middlesex University London, https://www.livescience.com/climate-change-humans-extinct.html]

One way climate change could trigger a societal collapse is by creating food insecurity. Warming the planet has a range of negative impacts on food production, including increasing the water deficit and thereby reducing food harvests, Live Science previously reported. Food production losses can increase human deaths and drive economic loss and socio-political instability, among other factors, that may trigger a breakdown of our institutions and increase the risk of a societal collapse, according to a study published Feb. 21 in the journal Climatic Change. Kemp studies previous civilization collapses and the risk of climate change. Extinctions and catastrophes almost always involve multiple factors, he said, but he thinks if humans were to go extinct, climate change would likely be the main culprit. "If I'm to say, what do I think is the biggest contributor to the potential for human extinction going towards the future? Then climate change, no doubt," Kemp told Live Science. All of the major mass-extinction events in Earth's history have involved some kind of climatic change, according to Kemp. These events include cooling during the Ordovician-Silurian extinction about 440 million years ago that wiped out 85% of species, and warming during the Triassic-Jurassic extinction about 200 million years ago that killed 80% of species, Live Science previously reported. And more recently, climate change affected the fate of early human relatives. While Homo sapiens are obviously not extinct, "we do have a track record of other hominid species going extinct, such as Neanderthals," Kemp said. "And in each of these cases, it appears that again, climatic change plays some kind of role." Scientists don't know why Neanderthals went extinct about 40,000 years ago, but climatic fluctuations seem to have broken their population up into smaller, fragmented groups, and severe changes in temperature affected the plants and animals they relied on for food, according to the Natural History Museum in London. Food loss, driven by climate change, may have also led to a tiny drop in Neanderthal fertility rates, contributing to their extinction, Live Science previously reported.

#### The alternative is the engage in a scholarly analysis of imperialism and the way it relates to macro and micro level politics. By exposing the omissions and gaps in the affirmative’s knowledge production we are able to see the origins of imperialism within the political and education real as a starting point to separate ourselves from them.

Shome ‘06

[Raka Shome, “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An “Other” View”, Communication Theory, March 17 2006, Wiley interscience]

The importance of a postcolonial position to any scholarly practice is that it urges us to analyze our academic discourses and connect them to the larger political practices of our nations. This means that in examining our academic discourses, the postcolonial question to ask is: To what extent do our scholarly practices-whether they be the kind of issues we explore in our research, the themes around which we organize our teaching syllabi, or the way that we structure our conferences and decide who speaks (and does not speak), about what, in the name of intellectual practices - legitimize the hegemony of Western power structures? In posing this question, the postcolonial perspective does not suggest that as scholars writing in the West all that we do is legitimize the imperial political practices of Western nations. Rather, the argument is that we need to examine our academic discourses against a larger backdrop of Western hegemony, neocolonial, and racial politics. We need to engage in “contrapuntal lines of a global analysis” where we see “texts and worldly institutions . . . working together” (Said, 1993, p. 318). In the pursuit of our scholarly goals, we often do not stop to think or ask questions about why, for example, research agenda A seems more important to us than research agenda B? What is the ideology that operates in us that makes research agenda A seem more significant than research agenda B? How are we always already “interpellated” into examining A but not B? What does that interpellation say about our role in reproducing and participating in the hegemonic global domination of the rest by the West? What does it mean, for instance, when I am told that there is a market for research agenda A but none for research agenda B? Or that if I did pursue research agenda By I would have to do it in a way that would make it marketable? And what way would that be? Whose way would that be? Who decides what is marketable? What does the decision have to do with the political practices of our nations? How does this market serve the capitalistic and racist hegemony of Western nations? And what is my position, as an intellectual, in reproducing this hegemony? The point in asking such questions is to recognize the latent ideological structures that inform our scholarship and practices. As Van Dijk (1993) puts it, often “under the surface of sometimes sophisticated scholarly analysis and description of other races, peoples, or groups . . . we find a powerful ideological layer of self-interest, in-group favoritism, and ethnocentrism” (p. 160). In fact, even when we do sometimes try to break out of the Eurocentric canons informing contemporary academic scholarship by including alternate cultural and racial perspectives in our syllabi, we often do not realize that instead of really breaking free of the canon, all that we do is stretch it, add things to it. But the canon remains the same and unchallenged. Our subject positions in relation to the canon remain the same and challenged. Instead of examining how the canon itself is rooted in a larger discourse of colonialism and Western hegemony, we frequently use the canon to appropriate “other” voice^.^ The question than arises, so what is to be done? Perhaps the first step here is to do what Spivak (1990) suggests: to unlearn our privilege (p. 9). And the first step toward that unlearning requires self-reflexivity; it requires seeing ourselves not sequestered in an academic institution but connecting things that we think or not think, say or not say, teach or not teach, to the larger political and ideological practices of our nations in their interactions with the rest of the world. The solution, however, is not merely to do more rhetorical studies on nonwhite people (e.g., Campbell’s, 1986, study on African American women speakers), for that only becomes a matter of extending, instead of displacing or challenging, the canon by adding “others.” Rather, the solution is to critically examine and challenge the very value system on which the rhetorical canon and our scholarship is based. For instance, rhetoric as a discipline has been traditionally built on public address. But historically public address has been a realm where imperial voices were primarily heard and imperial policies were articulated. The colonized did not always have access to a public realm, or if they did, their speeches were not always recorded in mainstream documents, since the means of production rested with the imperial subject. All this perhaps means that we have built a lot of our understanding of rhetoric, and the canon of rhetoric, by focusing on (and often celebrating) imperial voices. This calls for a reexamination of our paradigms. The move here is parallel to that made by feminists in their challenges of the masculinist biases of the discipline. If rhetorical scholars are to reexamine the discipline in relation to issues such as imperialism, neocolonialism, and race, then they need to perhaps do what Spivak (see explanation) suggests, “unlearn” a lot of the rhetorical tradition and evaluate critically what kinds of knowledge have been (and continue to be) “privileged, legitimated [and] displaced” in our texts and theories and “what configuration of socio-political [and racial] interests” this privileging, displacing, and legitimizing has served (and continues to serve) (Conquergood, 1991, p. 193). For one thing, this means engaging in some serious “soul searching” to uncover why scholarship in our discipline has been and continues to be so white (Rakow, 1989, p. 2l2).’ It is through such postcolonial self-reflexivity of our discipline, as well as our individual scholarship, that we will be able to continue the task of pushing the traditional paradigms of rhetoric further in order to create spaces for racially and culturally marginalized voices and perspectives on rhetoric to emerge - voices and perspectives that would comprise sensitive postcolonial responses to the neocolonial and racist circumstances of our present time. Second, the postcolonial critique of Western discursive imperialism that constructs racial “others” and that legitimizes the contemporary global power structures has important implications for rhetorical criticism, in that it beckons us to recognize postcolonialism as a timely and important critical and political perspective. As Williams and Chrisman (1 994) emphasizes with great urgency in their introduction to Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, it is alarming “how many of the attitudes, the strategies, and even how much of the room for manoeuvre of the colonial period [still] remain in place” (p. 3) in contemporary social, cultural, and I would add, academic practices. Given this, it is unfortunate that in our literature we hardly find articles, especially in our mainstream journals, that examine neocolonial representations of racial “others” or that analyze, for instance, the discursive processes through which the (white) “West” gets constantly legitimized in political, cultural, and social discourses.

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### 3

#### Counter plan: Low-Income Countries should establish public-private parterships

**Solve: presently LICs don’t have the capacity to effectively distribute vaccines making patent removal worthless. Establishing PPPs solves – allows local control over vaccines and allows private investors to access new markets thereby creating infrastructure for future pandemics.**

Rubin and Saidel 8-31 Harvey Rubin and Nicholas Saidel, 8-31-2021, "Innovation beyond patent waivers: Achieving global vaccination goals through public-private partnerships," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/08/31/innovation-beyond-patent-waivers-achieving-global-vaccination-goals-through-public-private-partnerships/> //Nato /

The international effort to achieve global COVID-19 vaccination goals faces a dilemma. Stakeholders in this space are at odds over how to treat intellectual property (IP) rights now that viable vaccines are on the market but are inaccessible to vulnerable populations in low- and middle-income countries (LMICS). A key aspect of this debate is whether to grant patent waivers for COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics. We suggest looking beyond patent waivers with an innovative solution based on public-private partnerships (PPPs), an approach that could be more effective in combating the on-going COVID-19 pandemic and simultaneously help prepare LMICS for future health crises. BACKGROUND Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) provides a [forum](https://www.jhsph.edu/covid-19/articles/wto-trips-waiver-for-covid-19-vaccines.html) for member states to lower barriers to international trade. The WTO also [serves](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm) as a legal and institutional framework for executing multilateral agreements related to the global trading system. One of these agreements is known as Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS governs the protection of IP rights, such as patents and trademarks. Technologies that prevent, contain, and treat COVID-19—the death toll from which exceeds [4.3 million people](https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/health/coronavirus-maps-and-cases/) with [over 200 million](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04/world/europe/coronavirus-200-million-cases.html) infected—are protected under TRIPS. This intersection of global public health and international trade regulations has spurred a debate as to whether an exception to TRIPS for COVID treatments is warranted. The two schools of thought on the patent waiver issue can be roughly characterized as follows: Pro-patent protection: The first school that patent protections on COVID-19 vaccines are necessary because pharmaceutical companies will otherwise be disincentivized to innovate and invest in vaccine research and development, and they will unfairly lose market share to competitors and adversarial nations such as China. This theory also that removing IP protections will not serve the intended objective of increasing vaccination rates as the developing world lacks the infrastructure and expertise to roll out effective domestic production. Advocates of patent protection argue that the WTO already allows countries to apply for “compulsory licensing,” which waives IP during emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Proponents of continued patent protection see voluntary commitments from industry, developed world governments, and large NGOs as a more effective means of addressing the problem. Pro-patent waiver: Conversely, others removing IP protections is a necessity as companies located in high-income countries hold most, if not all, of the COVID-19 vaccine IP and sell the vaccines to governments mostly in the developed world. According to this view, the price of these vaccines, combined with export restrictions and the inability of LMICs to manufacture their own vaccines at a lower price and without fear of litigation from patent holders, are among the main reason why vaccines are not reaching the world’s most vulnerable communities. They further that the compulsory license process is both time consuming and cumbersome and that providing basic medical services for these vulnerable communities should be prioritized over industry profits. Finally, a more diffuse global vaccine manufacturing architecture would be more effective and in line with health as a human right. The patent waiver issue gained traction in response to the stark disparity in global health outcomes as COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics were brought to market. Data from May 2021 [indicates](https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/more-million-covid-deaths-4-months-g7-leaders-failed-break-vaccine-monopolies) that “people living in G7 countries were 77 times more likely to be offered a vaccine than those living in the world’s poorest countries.” Data from the end of June 2021 [reflects](https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n1837.full) that “46% of people in high-income countries had received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine compared with 20% in middle-income countries and only 0.9% in low-income countries.” This global health inequity is in part due to high-income countries purchasing more vaccines than they need. For example, Canada has [secured](https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n1837.full) vaccine doses for 434% of its population. Another issue is vaccine price in relation to cost and LMIC’s purchasing power: One report [states](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/great-vaccine-robbery-pharmaceutical-corporations-charge-excessive-prices-covid-19) that Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna have been charging governments up to 24 times the potential cost of production. Furthermore, Pfizer/ BioNTech are charging their lowest reported price of $6.75 to the African Union, yet [one dose costs the same](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/great-vaccine-robbery-pharmaceutical-corporations-charge-excessive-prices-covid-19) as Uganda spends per citizen on health annually. These incongruities represent an injustice to the world’s underserved populations, and they demand the development of innovative ideas regarding how to overcome price and access obstacles. In October 2020, India and South Africa led a group of LMIC’s request to the WTO to waive certain TRIPS provisions. The [request](https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669R1.pdf&Open=True), modified as of May 25, 2021, asks for a three-year waiver of IP protection for products and technologies related to COVID-19 prevention, treatment, and containment. Normally, WTO protections for IP last around 20 years. The Biden administration is [currently on board with the waiver](https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/551992-biden-backs-covid-19-vaccine-patent-waivers), and the EU is open to negotiations. However, some EU member states like Germany remain steadfast in rejecting this idea, and the EU has [proposed](https://news.yahoo.com/eu-present-wto-plan-boost-074524190.html) its own non-waiver plan. The WTO will likely take months [deliberating](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/debate-over-patent-waiver-covid-19-vaccines-what-know) this matter, and it usually renders decisions unanimously, though a TRIPS waiver would technically only require a three-quarters majority to pass. As it stands now, [talks](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/waiver-ip-protections-covid-19-vaccines-still-under-consideration-wto) at the WTO stalled in late July with little progress and are now on hold for the summer holiday. SOLUTION An optimal solution to the currently inequitable global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines requires more innovation than a temporary waiver of patents. A process is needed whereby LMICs can take some level of ownership over the manufacturing and distribution of critical vaccines and medicines without the bureaucratic red tape associated with compulsory licensing. We suggest that PPPs between pharmaceutical companies and relevant governmental ministries that are well-funded by access to the capital markets through impact bonds is a comprehensive, sustainable solution to the problem of achieving global vaccination goals. A PPP can be [defined](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/health-economics-policy-and-law/article/abs/publicprivate-partnerships-in-the-health-sector-the-danish-experience/B3EB8135E4303250D7DE4870899593A2) as: Co-operation of some sort of durability between specific public and private actors in which they jointly develop infrastructure, products, and services (including knowledge and dissemination of information) and share risks (financial and/or prestige), cost and resources, which are applied in the development and delivery process. This solution has three essential components: first, identifying the incentives for the private sector to participate in the partnership; second, inducing the public sector to transfer some of its mission and responsibilities to the partnership; and third, access to capital markets. As the current authors [wrote](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0030438716000089) in 2016: Private sector entities can profit from PPPs—especially with LMICs that present a new or unsaturated market for a wide range of a pharmaceutical company’s products. Increased brand recognition, increased market penetration, entry into new markets, preserving the existing customer base, gaining new customers, and garnering favorable status for introduction of new products are all attractive concepts for private sector partners. Relaxed barriers to market entry (e.g., tariffs and taxes) and access to LMIC raw data would also motivate a private sector entity to forge a relationship with public entities. The public sector can be incentivized to formalize a PPP for pharmaceutical and vaccine-related issues like supply chain management, data capture and analysis, quality control, and inventory optimization. PPPs would assist in speeding up the scaling required to develop sufficient quantities of COVID-19 vaccines and medicines, and LMICs would be better prepared for future pandemics. Access to the capital markets through “impact bonds” can provide a source of sustainable funds. Impact bonds work in a series of steps (see Figure 1. below): Investors purchase bonds and provide up-front risk capital to finance the program(s). Prior to issuance of the bonds, well-defined metrics leading to specific sets of outcomes for success of the partnership need to be negotiated. The progress toward fulfilling these outcomes will be monitored and rigorously measured by an independent organization at every stage. When the partnership demonstrates that it has met its goals, the outcome payers—who can be public sector entities (i.e., Ministries of Health or Finance), the private sector, development banks, or combinations of all three—are contractually and legally required to repay the investors. The key advantage of this approach is the additional accountability for outcomes that investment brings. Investors’ interest in achieving measurable success provides a framework that incentivizes flexible and effective program implementation. Risk is transferred to the investor, and the focus on rigorously measured outcomes ensures that scarce donor funding is only used for tangible, verifiable outcomes. The metrics, goals, and outcomes must be uniquely crafted for each country in which the impact bond is issued. Ultimately, a successful PPP might lead to healthier populations, more robust and cost-effective national healthcare systems, and economic growth. Source: [Understanding Social Impact Bonds, OECD Working Paper, 2016](https://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/UnderstandingSIBsLux-WorkingPaper.pdf) As Brookings Institution scholars [wrote](https://www.brookings.edu/research/usaids-public-private-partnerships-a-data-picture-and-review-of-business-engagement/#:~:text=On%20a%20conceptual%20level%2C%20public-private%20partnerships%20are%20a,agency%2C%20a%20for-profit%20business%2C%20and%20a%20nonprofit%20entity.) in a review of USAID’s PPPs: “On a conceptual level, public-private partnerships are a win-win, even a win-win-win, as they often involve three types of organizations: a public agency, a for-profit business, and a nonprofit entity. PPPs use public resources to leverage private resources and expertise to advance a public purpose. In turn, non-public sectors—both businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—use their funds and expertise to leverage government resources, clout, and experience to advance their own objectives, consistent with a PPP’s overall public purpose. The data from the USAID data set confirm this conceptual mutual reinforcement of public and private goals.” A case study is further illustrative of how PPPs play an integral role in pandemic-related solutions. Established in 2003, The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ([PEPFAR](http://www.pepfar.gov/)) is a U.S. government foreign aid program focused on controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic in more than 50 countries. PEPFAR has saved millions of lives; experts [note](https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0585) that PPPs played a key role in this effort, strengthening logistics, supply chains, and HIV lab practices: PEPFAR’s Supply Chain Management System took advantage of private industry’s best practices in logistics, and a partnership with the medical technology company BD (Becton, Dickinson and Company) improved laboratory systems throughout sub-Saharan Africa. We found that setting ambitious goals, enlisting both global and local partners, cultivating a culture of collaboration, careful planning, continuous monitoring and evaluation, and measuring outcomes systematically led to the most effective programs. Other examples of successful PPPs in global health include the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI); the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria; Global Alliance for TB Drug Development, Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi); International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI); Medicines for Malaria Venture; Harnessing Non-State Actors for Better Health for the Poor; and PPPs for Universal Health Coverage. CONCLUSION Patent waivers will not correct the lack of capacity in the majority of LMICs that is necessary to implement domestic production of vaccines. Cold chain infrastructure, logistics and data systems, robust supply chains (including access to the raw materials needed for disease testing and vaccine/medicine production), and storage and administration need to be developed.