## 1

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must defend the appropriation of outer space

#### Outer space starts 372 miles above the surface of earth.

National Geographic No Date [National Geographic Society, "Atmosphere," <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/atmosphere/>] Sachin

Earth’s atmosphere stretches from the surface of the planet up to as far as 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles) above. After that, the atmosphere blends into space. Not all scientists agree where the actual upper boundary of the atmosphere is, but they can agree that the bulk of the atmosphere is located close to Earth’s surface—up to a distance of around eight to 15 kilometers (five to nine miles). While oxygen is necessary for most life on Earth, the majority of Earth’s atmosphere is not oxygen. Earth’s atmosphere is composed of about 78 percent nitrogen, 21 percent oxygen, 0.9 percent argon, and 0.1 percent other gases. Trace amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, water vapor, and neon are some of the other gases that make up the remaining 0.1 percent. The atmosphere is divided into five different layers, based on temperature. The layer closest to Earth’s surface is the troposphere, reaching from about seven and 15 kilometers (five to 10 miles) from the surface. The troposphere is thickest at the equator, and much thinner at the North and South Poles. The majority of the mass of the entire atmosphere is contained in the troposphere—between approximately 75 and 80 percent. Most of the water vapor in the atmosphere, along with dust and ash particles, are found in the troposphere—explaining why most of Earth’s clouds are located in this layer. Temperatures in the troposphere decrease with altitude. The stratosphere is the next layer up from Earth’s surface. It reaches from the top of the troposphere, which is called the tropopause, to an altitude of approximately 50 kilometers (30 miles). Temperatures in the stratosphere increase with altitude. A high concentration of ozone, a molecule composed of three atoms of oxygen, makes up the ozone layer of the stratosphere. This ozone absorbs some of the incoming solar radiation, shielding life on Earth from potentially harmful ultraviolet (UV) light, and is responsible for the temperature increase in altitude. The top of the stratosphere is called the stratopause. Above that is the mesosphere, which reaches as far as about 85 kilometers (53 miles) above Earth’s surface. Temperatures decrease in the mesosphere with altitude. In fact, the coldest temperatures in the atmosphere are near the top of the mesosphere—about -90°C (-130°F). The atmosphere is thin here, but still thick enough so that meteors will burn up as they pass through the mesosphere—creating what we see as “shooting stars.” The upper boundary of the mesosphere is called the mesopause. The thermosphere is located above the mesopause and reaches out to around 600 kilometers (372 miles). Not much is known about the thermosphere except that temperatures increase with altitude. Solar radiation makes the upper regions of the thermosphere very hot, reaching temperatures as high as 2,000°C (3,600°F). The uppermost layer, that blends with what is considered to be outer space, is the exosphere. The pull of Earth’s gravity is so small here that molecules of gas escape into outer space.

#### Megaconstellations satelites reach 340 Miles above earth’s surface.

Mann 19, [Adam Mann, 5-24-2019, "Starlink: SpaceX's satellite internet project," Space, <https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html>] Sachin

The first 60 Starlink satellites were launched on May 23, 2019, aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. The satellites successfully reached their operational altitude of 340 miles (550 kilometers) — low enough to get pulled down to Earth by atmospheric drag in a few years so that they don't become space junk once they die.

#### Violation: 340 miles is less than the 372 miles necessary to be considered outer space; they explicitly defend only megaconstellations

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Limits and ground: the aff interpretation explodes the topic to allow any aff about space generally which structurally alters the neg research burden because there’s a qualitative difference between outer space and the atmosohere. Means we get no ground bc of how unpredictable the AC could be from round to round – kills core neg generics like space col bad and mining that don’t link if you specify a part of space

#### 2] Precision – Justifies the aff arbitrarily doing away with words in the resolution which gives way to affs about anything which obliterates neg prep.

#### Use competing interps - Topicality is a binary question, you can’t be reasonably topical and it invites a race to the bottom of intervention

#### Drop the debater – dropping the argument doesn’t rectify abuse since winning T proves why we don’t have the burden of rejoinder against their aff.

#### No RVIS – it’s your burden to be topical

## 2

#### Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure are coming now.

Underwood 20 [Kimberly Underwood, 6-24-2020, "China is Retooling, and Russia Seeks Harm to Critical Infrastructure," SIGNAL Magazine, <https://www.afcea.org/content/china-retooling-and-russia-seeks-harm-critical-infrastructure>] [pT]

Intelligence leader warns of the mounting threats of cyber espionage, digital attacks and influence operations from adversaries.

U.S. adversaries are trying to take control of cyberspace as a medium, resulting in implications to our freedom of maneuver and access in cyberspace, says Brig. Gen. Gregory Gagnon, USAF, director of Intelligence (A2), Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), Joint Base Langley-Eustis. Increasing cyberspace activity is coming from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

“We are seeing it not just in volume, but we are seeing an expansion in the ways that they use cyberspace, whether it is to steal information, whether it is to directly influence our citizens or whether it is to disrupt critical infrastructure,” Gen. Gagnon reports. The general spoke at the AFCEA Tidewater chapter’s recent monthly virtual luncheon.

China and Russia continue to pose the greatest espionage and cyber attack threats to the United States, but the intelligence leader anticipates that other adversaries and strategic competitors will also build and integrate cyber espionage, cyber attacks and influence operations into how they conduct business.

“Our strategic competitors will increasingly use cyber space capabilities including cyber espionage, cyber attack and continued influence operations to seek political, economic and military advantage over the United States, our allies and our partners,” he said. “This is not an ‘if,’ it is a yes. They are doing it and they will continue.”

Gen. Gagnon warned that China in particular is using cyber espionage to collect intelligence, target critical infrastructure and steal intellectual property. It is all part of China’s plan to move from being a regional actor to being seen as a global power. The shift also means a greater role for the adversary’s military. The Chinese military is in the process of transitioning from a defensive, inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary and power projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy, he noted.

“What is going on in China is a dynamic revectoring of the objectives and goals of the People's Liberation Army,” Gen. Gagnon said. “This is not a small change. This is a major change in course and direction. They're doing it to be a power projection arm of a Chinese foreign policy that engages both in military diplomacy and operations around the globe, but also in predatory economic activity.”

Moreover, China’s military spending in 2018 exceeded $200 billion, an increase of about 300% since 2002, the general stated. And while it is not the $750 billion that the United States government spends every year on military defense, the Chinese funding does not reflect the same level of investment in manpower or healthcare.

A good portion of their $200 billion directly funds technology and capabilities. “A big chunk of our budget is not buying kit,” Gen. Gagnon explained. “If you're the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], you don't have the same extensive retirement programs that you have to pay for,” he said. “You don't have this extensive healthcare which you have to provide. So, when you think about $200 billion, think about that buying kit and buying operations. That is significant.”

#### Mega constellations function as critical infrastructure that increase resiliency and protect against cyberattacks.

Hallex and Cottom 20 [Matthew A. Hallex is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Travis S. Cottom is a Research Associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses. “Proliferated Commercial Satellite Constellations: Implications for National Security.” 2020. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-97/jfq-97_20-29_Hallex-Cottom.pdf?ver=2020-03-31-130614-940>] [pT]

While potentially threatening the sustainability of safe orbital operations, new proliferated constellations also offer opportunities for the United States to increase the resilience of its national security space architectures. Increasing the resilience of U.S. national security space architectures has strategic implications beyond the space domain. Adversaries such as China and Russia see U.S. dependence on space as a key vulnerability to exploit during a conflict. Resilient, proliferated satellite constellations support deterrence by denying adversaries the space superiority they believe is necessary to initiate and win a war against the United States.28 Should deterrence fail, these constellations could provide assured space support to U.S. forces in the face of adversary counterspace threats while imposing costs on competitors by rendering their investments in counterspace systems irrelevant. Proliferated constellations can support these goals in four main ways.

First, the extreme degree of disaggregation inherent in government and commercial proliferated constellations could make them more resilient to attacks by many adversary counterspace systems. A constellation composed of hundreds or thousands of satellites could withstand losing a relatively large number of them before losing significant capability. Conducting such an attack with kinetic antisatellite weapons—like those China and Russia are developing—would require hundreds of costly weapons to destroy satellites that would be relatively inexpensive to replace.

Second, proliferated constellations would be more resilient to adversary electronic warfare. Satellites in LEO can emit signals 1,280 times more powerful than signals from satellites in GEO.29 They also are faster in the sky than satellites in more distant orbits, which, combined with the planned use of small spot beams for communications proliferated constellations, would shrink the geographic area in which an adversary ground-based jammer could effectively operate, making jammers less effective and easier to geolocate and eliminate.30

Third, even if the United States chooses not to deploy national security proliferated constellations during peacetime, industrial capacity for mass-producing proliferated constellation satellites could be repurposed during a conflict. Just as Ford production lines shifted from automobiles to tanks and aircraft during World War II, one can easily imagine commercial satellite factories building military reconnaissance or communications satellites during a conflict.

Fourth, deploying and maintaining constellations of hundreds or thousands of satellites will drive the development of low-cost launches to a much higher rate than is available today. Inexpensive, high-cadence space launch could provide a commercial solution to operationally responsive launch needs of the U.S. Government. In a future where space launches occur weekly or less, the launch capacity needed to augment national security space systems during a crisis or to replace systems lost during a conflict in space would be readily available.31

#### Cyberattacks cause extinction – false warnings, stealing nukes, and introducing vulnerability.

**Moniz et al. 18** [Ernest J. Moniz, Sam Nunn, and Des Browne, September 2018, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age,” <https://media.nti.org/documents/Cyber_report_finalsmall.pdf>] [pT]

Cyber-based threats target all sectors of society—from the financial sector to the entertainment industry, from department stores to insurance companies. Governments face an even more critical challenge when it comes to cyberattacks on their most critical systems. Attacks on critical infrastructure could have extraordinary consequences, but a successful cyberattack3 on a nuclear weapon or related system—a nuclear weapon, a delivery system, or the related Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) systems—could have existential consequences. Cyberattacks could lead to false warnings of attack, interrupt critical communications or access to information, compromise nuclear planning or delivery systems, or even allow an adversary to take control of a nuclear weapon.

Given the level of digitization of U.S. systems and the pace of the evolving cyber threat, one cannot assume that systems with digital components—including nuclear weapons systems—are not or will not be compromised. Among the reasons: nuclear weapons and delivery systems are periodically upgraded, which may include the incorporation of new digital systems or components. Malware could be introduced into digital systems during fabrication, much of which is not performed in secure foundries. In addition, there are a range of external dependencies, such as connections to the electric grid, that are outside the control of defense officials but directly affect nuclear systems. Finally, the possibility always exists that an insider, either purposefully or accidentally, could enable a cybersecurity lapse by introducing malware into a critical system.

Increased use of digital systems may also adversely affect the survivability of nuclear systems. New technologies can enhance reliability and performance, but they can also lead to new vulnerabilities in traditionally survivable systems, such as submarines or mobile missile launchers.4

## 3

#### States ought to:

#### --Announce that appropriation of outer space by private actors violates the Outer Space Treaty and that this is a settled matter of customary international law

#### --Announce that this action is taken pursuant to *opinio juris* (the belief that the action is taken pursuant to a legal obligation) and that non-compliant actors are in violation of international law

#### --Fully comply, not appropriating outer space in a manner inconsistent with these proclamations

#### Solves the Aff.

[Fabio](https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021) **Tronchetti 8**. Dr. Fabio Tronchetti works as a Co-Director of the Institute of Space Law and Strategy and as a Zhuoyue Associate Professor at Beihang University, “The Non–Appropriation Principle as a Structural Norm of International Law: A New Way of Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,” Air and Space Law, Volume 33, No 3, 2008, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Air+and+Space+Law/33.3/AILA2008021>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

The non–appropriation principle represents the fundamental rule of the space law system. Since the beginning of the space era, it has allowed for the safe and orderly development of space activities. Nowadays, however, the principle is under attack. Some proposals, arguing the need for abolishing it in order to promote commercial use of outer space are undermining its relevance and threatening its role as a guiding principle for present and future space activities. This paper aims at safeguarding the non–appropriative nature of outer space by suggesting a new interpretation of the non–appropriation principle that is based on the view that this principle should be regarded as a customary rule of international law of a special character, namely ‘a structural norm’ of international law.

## 4

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### Russia will demand concessions over Ukraine – it’s their top priority and violates Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Maynes 1/24 – NPR Moscow correspondent, reporting in Russia for over a decade

Charles Maynes, last updated at time of cutting: 1-24-2022, “4 things Russia wants right now,” *NPR*, https://www.npr.org/2022/01/12/1072413634/russia-nato-ukraine DD

MOSCOW — First U.S. and Russian diplomats faced off in Geneva. Then NATO received a Russian delegation in Brussels. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe sponsored talks in Vienna. And finally, the U.S. and Russian chief diplomats met, again in Geneva, last week.

Russia courted all this attention by massing some 100,000 troops and military equipment near Ukraine, raising fears of a Russian invasion. Analysts read Russia's buildup as an attempt to pressure the U.S. and its European allies into concessions on a series of far-reaching "security guarantees" sought by Moscow.

1. Russia wants a guarantee Ukraine can never join NATO

Russia's main demand is a commitment from NATO to end its further expansion into former Soviet republics — especially Ukraine. Russia wants NATO to rescind a 2008 promise that Ukraine could someday join the defense alliance. Many observers see it as a distant prospect that Ukraine could join NATO because it doesn't meet membership requirements. But Moscow doesn't see it that way. "We don't trust the other side," Russia's chief negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, said after bilateral talks with the U.S. finished. "We need ironclad, waterproof, bulletproof, legally binding guarantees. Not assurances. Not safeguards. Guarantees. With all the words — 'shall, must' — everything that should be put in."

Russia's reasoning: President Vladimir Putin views Ukraine as an extension of what he calls "historical Russia" — a part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, and within Moscow's "sphere of influence" today. The threat of Ukraine's westward turn after a street revolution ousted the country's pro-Russian president in 2014 was the driving force behind Russia's annexation of Crimea later that year. Ukraine's desire to join the Western alliance also led to Russia's sponsorship of separatists in the country's eastern Donbas region — in effect sabotaging its path to membership by fueling a civil war.

NATO's counter: The U.S. argues that countries have a right to choose their own alliances and NATO has a long-standing "open door policy" for potential membership. "NATO has never expanded through force or coercion or subversion. It is countries' sovereign choice to choose to come to NATO and say they want to join," Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said after a meeting between Russian and NATO officials in Brussels earlier this month. Russia's actions are making the idea of NATO membership more appealing to Ukrainians, according to opinion polls. It is unlikely, however, that Ukraine will meet the requirements anytime soon.

#### Concessions on sovereignty spark global allied prolif.

Gawthorpe 14 – teaching fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Andrew Gawthorpe, 3-14-2014, “Could Ukraine Drive Nuclear Proliferation in Asia?” *The Diplomat*, https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/could-ukraine-drive-nuclear-proliferation-in-asia/ DD

Recent events in Eastern Europe raise the issue not only of Russia’s future actions but also the lessons that will be drawn regarding other revisionist states. In East Asia, a China that is nurturing territorial ambitions of its own and has recently become less shy about asserting them will watch to see how the West reacts to Vladimir Putin’s expansionism. So will China’s East Asian neighbors, who fear they may become the next Ukraine.

One of the most potentially disturbing effects of the situation in Ukraine is the possibility it may drive nuclear proliferation. The present crisis in that country could well have been a nuclear nightmare. When the USSR was unraveling in the early 1990s, a sizeable portion of its strategic forces, along with tactical nuclear weapons, were deployed in Ukraine. Had the new Ukrainian government in Kiev taken control of these weapons upon becoming independent, it would have been the third-largest nuclear power in the world. behind only the U.S. and the Russia.

Concerned about nuclear proliferation throughout Europe if new nuclear powers were created by the Soviet Union’s demise, the U.S. pressured Ukraine to denuclearize and to return its nuclear forces to Russia. Basking in a post-independence glow and seeking U.S. support on other issues, Kiev went along. This was the origin of the so-called Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Ukraine promised to give up its nuclear weapons in return for Russia, Britain and the U.S. guaranteeing its sovereignty and territorial integrity. With the wholesale invasion of Crimea by Russian forces in recent days, Kiev can be forgiven for asking if the agreement is any longer worth the paper it’s written on.

Since Russia’s occupation of Crimea, a former Ukrainian foreign minister has called for his country to restock its nuclear arsenal and some Western analysts have questioned whether Putin would have acted so boldly if Ukraine still had its nuclear deterrent. The question can be expected to occur to leaders of other countries who are concerned about the territorial ambitions of their neighbors or the sincerity of Western security assurances.

The issue is of particular salience in East Asia, where China has recently been flexing its muscles in a range of territorial disputes. Regional powers such as Japan and Taiwan must be watching America’s unwillingness to forcefully confront a nuclear-armed Russia and wondering how much backbone the exhausted and drained superpower would have if China made similar moves. This is especially the case since the Obama administration’s so-called “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific seems to be much more an excuse for disengaging from the Middle East than it is a real exercise in strengthening the American alliance system in the Asia-Pacific.

Any such moves towards proliferation would be unwise. Acquiring nuclear weapons may appear to provide an effective way for countries worried about their neighbors’ territorial ambitions to deter them, but the truth is not so simple. While nuclear weapons provide an effective deterrent against an all-out attack, they are not necessarily effective in deterring lower-level conflict. Just as it is implausible to imagine that Ukraine would have responded to the appearance of balaclaved soldiers in Crimea with a first strike, so it is equally implausible to imagine any country responding to the Chinese declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the same manner.

Revisionist powers are adept at nibbling away at international norms and agreements slowly and avoiding big, sweeping gestures. Countries responding to such a nibble with nuclear brinksmanship risk making their adversaries look reasonable by comparison, giving nuclear weapons questionable utility in territorial disputes. And if their use is indeed threatened and taken seriously, the result can be a dangerous cycle of escalation.

#### East Asian prolif breaks deterrence and escalates.

Cimbala 15 – Stephen J., Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, “New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy” Ashgate Publishing Ltd

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas—not including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use. North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.1'' A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

## 5

#### Interp – the aff must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Violation – they’re extra topical – they defend implementing a leasing system regulated by the UN.

#### Vote neg for limits – extra-topicality allows them to tack on infinite planks to artificially improve aff solvency and spike out of DAs, like fiating enforcement or random possible modifications to extraterrestrial property rights. The counter-interp sets a precedent that the scope of aff fiat doesn’t have to be bounded by the resolution, which outweighs on magnitude. No drop the arg – we shouldn’t have to always read T just to get back to what we should’ve been debating to begin with – it incentivizes adding random extra-t planks because there’s no punishment.

## Case