## 1

#### CP Text:

#### 1] A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers except for police officers to strike.

- A police officer is a warranted law employee of a police force. "police officer" is a generic term not specifying a particular rank.(wikipedia)

#### 2] A just government ought to, through the corresponding union body in their society, threaten to remove police unions from the set of member unions unless they: eliminate due-processes protections police have won that prevent accountability from police misconduct through processes outlined in greenhouse

#### Only the CP can force police unions to change

Greenhouse, 20, The New Yorker, “How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of Power”, Steven Greenhouse is an American labor and workplace journalist and writer. He covered labor for The New York Times for 31 years, 2010 Society of Professional Journalists Deadline Club Award: Beat reporting for newspapers and wire services, for "World of Hurt" with N.R. Kleinfield; 2010 New York Press Club Award: Outstanding enterprise or investigative reporting, for "World of Hurt" with N.R. Kleinfield; 2009 The Hillman Prize for The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for the American WorkerURL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses>, KR

The string of police killings captured on mobile phones increased public dismay with police unions. After the killing of George Floyd, they became a pariah. Many protesters, and even some unions, including the Writers Guild of America, East, have called on the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the nation’s main labor federation, to expel the International Union of Police Associations, which represents a hundred thousand law-enforcement officers. The Association of Flight Attendants adopted a resolution demanding that police unions immediately enact policies to “actively address racism in law enforcement and especially to hold officers accountable for violence against citizens, or be removed from the Labor movement.” The Service Employees International Union, with two million members, has called for “holding public security unions accountable to racial justice,” and the Seattle area’s main labor coalition issued an ultimatum to the local police union: acknowledge and address racism in law enforcement or risk being kicked out.

If the A.F.L.-C.I.O. expelled the International Union of Police Associations, it would be a huge blow to police unions. So far, Richard Trumka, the federation’s president, has balked at kicking out a member union, saying that it’s best to work to reform unions from inside labor’s tent. “The short answer is not to disengage and just condemn,” Trumka said. “The answer is to totally reëngage and educate,” to improve police unions.

Suddenly, it seems, there are countless proposals to make police unions more accountable. Campaign Zero, a reform group, wants to eliminate many of the due-process protections that the police have won. Javier Morillo, a former president of a Twin Cities union that represents thousands of janitors, wrote an unusually sharp critique of a fellow union, the Minneapolis Police Federation: “Until we see big, fundamental and structural change in the [police] department and the union, Black and brown residents of Minneapolis cannot feel safe.” Morillo wrote that, “for decades, arbitrators have relied on bad precedent” to “justify overturning discipline against officers.” Paige Fernandez, the A.C.L.U.’s policing policy adviser, said that community members should join city officials at the bargaining table during police-contract negotiations. “There should be public input from communities that have been historically overpoliced, black communities and low-income communities,” Fernandez said.

Benjamin Sachs, the Harvard labor-law professor, argues that the union movement needs to join the push for police reform. “When unions use the power of collective bargaining for ends that we . . . deem unacceptable it becomes our responsibility—including the responsibility of the labor movement itself—to deny unions the ability to use collective bargaining for these purposes,” he wrote. “We have done this before. When unions bargained contracts that excluded Black workers from employment or that relegated Black workers to inferior jobs, the law stepped in and stripped unions of the right to use collective bargaining in these ways.” Sachs proposes amending the law to curb the range of subjects over which police unions can bargain, perhaps even prohibiting negotiations over anything involving the use of force.

Some labor leaders warn that conservatives are using today’s outrage against police unions to promote their long-term agenda of hobbling or eliminating public-sector unions. “Everyone should have the freedom to join a union, police officers included,” Lee Saunders, the president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, wrote. “The tragic killing of George Floyd should not be used as a pretext to undermine the rights of workers.”

Randi Weingarten, the president of the American Federation of Teachers, told me that it’s important to persuade police unions to stop vehemently defending every police officer who is accused of misconduct. She pointed to her own union’s past. “Our position used to be that the member was always right, that, whatever happened, you did everything in your power to keep the member’s job,” she said. “It didn’t matter if you knew there was a problem.” She added that as public anger mounted against this hard-line approach—many said that it was shortchanging children—local A.F.T. branches moved away from rigidly defending every teacher accused of misconduct or poor performance. Weingarten told me, “Ultimately, if we are members of our community, we have to hold ourselves to a standard of treating people respectfully and decently, and misconduct has no place in that.” McCartin, the labor historian, told me, “Police unions haven’t done nearly as much as the teachers to counter the perception that they’re indifferent to the public’s concerns. They can learn a lot from the teachers.”

Last week, Patrick Yoes, the president of the Fraternal Order of Police, the nation’s largest law-enforcement group, told NPR he agrees that reforms are needed. “We welcome the opportunity to sit down and have some meaningful, fact-based discussions on ways to improve the law-enforcement community,” Yoes said. But some police-union leaders are less amenable to reform. Last week, Michael O’Meara, the president of the New York State Association of P.B.A.s, said, “Stop treating us like animals and thugs and start treating us with some respect. . . . We’ve been vilified.”

Mindful of the Black Lives Matter protests, many mayors and cities will seek to push through contract changes in the next round of police bargaining, but no one should expect police unions to roll over. Many police-union officials believe that the harder the line they take in defending officers (and ignoring the public’s concerns) the better their chances of being reëlected by their members. As a result, the unions’ critics might have a better shot at winning reforms through city councils and state legislatures. O’Meara’s remarks make clear that police unions often have an us-against-the-world view. The question now is whether police unions will get the message that they shouldn’t think only of protecting their members, that they should also think of the original purpose of labor unions: protecting all workers—in other words, protecting the public.

#### Excessive police union bargaining from strikes destroys accountability for police misconduct

Greenhouse, 20, The New Yorker, “How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of Power”, Steven Greenhouse is an American labor and workplace journalist and writer. He covered labor for The New York Times for 31 years, 2010 Society of Professional Journalists Deadline Club Award: Beat reporting for newspapers and wire services, for "World of Hurt" with N.R. Kleinfield; 2010 New York Press Club Award: Outstanding enterprise or investigative reporting, for "World of Hurt" with N.R. Kleinfield; 2009 The Hillman Prize for The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for the American WorkerURL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses>, KR

Police unions have long had a singular—and divisive—place in American labor. What is different at this fraught moment, however, is that these unions, long considered untouchable, due to their extraordinary power on the streets and among politicians, face a potential reckoning, as their conduct roils not just one city but the entire nation. Since the nineteen-sixties, when police unions first became like traditional unions and won the right to bargain collectively, they have had a controversial history. And recent studies suggest that their political and bargaining power has enabled them to win disciplinary systems so lax that they have helped increase police abuses in the United States.

A 2018 University of Oxford study of the hundred largest American cities found that the extent of protections in police contracts was directly and positively correlated with police violence and other abuses against citizens. A 2019 University of Chicago study found that extending collective-bargaining rights to Florida sheriffs’ deputies led to a forty per cent statewide increase in cases of violent misconduct—translating to nearly twelve additional such incidents annually.

In a forthcoming study, Rob Gillezeau, a professor and researcher, concluded that, from the nineteen-fifties to the nineteen-eighties, the ability of police to collectively bargain led to a substantial rise in police killings of civilians, with a greater impact on people of color. “With the caveat that this is very early work,” Gillezeau wrote on Twitter, on May 30th, “it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the non-white population.”

Other studies revealed that many existing mechanisms for disciplining police are toothless. WBEZ, a Chicago radio station, found that, between 2007 and 2015, Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority investigated four hundred shootings by police and deemed the officers justified in all but two incidents. Since 2012, when Minneapolis replaced its civilian review board with an Office of Police Conduct Review, the public has filed more than twenty-six hundred misconduct complaints, yet only twelve resulted in a police officer being punished. The most severe penalty: a forty-hour suspension. When the St. Paul Pioneer Press reviewed appeals involving terminations from 2014 to 2019, it discovered that arbitrators ruled in favor of the discharged police and corrections officers and ordered them reinstated forty-six per cent of the time. (Non-law-enforcement workers were reinstated at a similar rate.) For those demanding more accountability, a large obstacle is that disciplinary actions are often overturned if an arbitrator finds that the penalty the department meted out is tougher than it was in a similar, previous case—no matter if the penalty in the previous case seemed far too lenient.

To critics, all of this highlights that the disciplinary process for law enforcement is woefully broken, and that police unions have far too much power. They contend that robust protections, including qualified immunity, give many police officers a sense of impunity—an attitude exemplified by Derek Chauvin keeping his knee on George Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes, even as onlookers pleaded with him to stop. “We’re at a place where something has to change, so that police collective bargaining no longer contributes to police violence,” Benjamin Sachs, a labor-law professor at Harvard, told me. Sachs said that bargaining on “matters of discipline, especially related to the use of force, has insulated police officers from accountability, and that predictably can increase the problem.”

For decades, members of the public have complained about police violence and police unions, and a relatively recent development—mobile-phone videos—has sparked even more public anger. These complaints grew with the killings of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Walter Scott, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile, and many others. Each time, there were protests and urgent calls for police reform, but the matter blew over. Until the horrific killing of George Floyd.

Historians often talk of two distinct genealogies for policing in the North and in the South, and both help to explain the crisis that the police and its unions find themselves in today. Northern cities began to establish police departments in the eighteen-thirties; by the end of the century, many had become best known for using ruthless force to crush labor agitation and strikes, an aim to which they were pushed by the industrial and financial élite. In 1886, the Chicago police killed four strikers and injured dozens more at the McCormick Reaper Works. In the South, policing has very different roots: slave patrols, in which white men brutally enforced slave codes, checking to see whether black people had proper passes whenever they were off their masters’ estates and often beating them if they did something the patrols didn’t like. Khalil Gibran Muhammad, a historian at Harvard, said that the patrols “were explicit in their design to empower the entire white population” to control “the movements of black people.”

At the turn of the twentieth century, many police officers—frustrated, like other workers, with low pay and long hours—formed fraternal associations, rather than unions, to seek better conditions—mayors and police commissioners insisted that the police had no more right to join a union than did soldiers and sailors. In 1897, a group of Cleveland police officers sought to form a union and petitioned the American Federation of Labor—founded in 1886, with Samuel Gompers as its first president—to grant them a union charter. The A.F.L. rejected them, saying, “It is not within the province of the trade union movement to especially organize policemen, no more than to organize militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are often controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement.”

After the First World War, millions of workers began protesting that their wages lagged far behind inflation, and many police officers got swept up in the ferment. In 1919, Boston’s city police applied to the A.F.L. for a charter; they were angry about their meagre salaries and having to pay hundreds of dollars for uniforms. The police commissioner, Edwin Upton Curtis, forbade his officers from joining any outside organization other than patriotic groups, such as the American Legion. The police proceeded to unionize, and Curtis suspended nineteen of the union’s leaders for insubordination. When most of the city’s fifteen hundred police officers walked off the job, rioting and widespread looting engulfed the city. Curtis fired eleven hundred strikers, and Calvin Coolidge, who was then the governor of Massachusetts, supported his hard line, saying, “There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime.” Coolidge’s stance thrust him into the national spotlight. He went on to serve as Vice-President and President.

For decades, that stance deterred police unionization. But, in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, with private-sector unions winning middle-class wages and solid benefits for millions of workers, police officers again started rumbling for a union. Their fraternal orders weren’t doing enough; the police wanted collective bargaining. Officers became increasingly impatient, and militant. In the early sixties, police engaged in a work slowdown in New York and a sit-in in Detroit.

In 1964, New York’s mayor, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., blessed a compromise between his police commissioner and the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association. The P.B.A. renounced the right to strike and was recognized as the bargaining agent for the city’s police. Wagner had previously agreed to bargain with other municipal unions, but he had held off with the police, because of its singular role and of fears that officers might strike. (The National Labor Relations Act of 1935—sponsored by Wagner’s father, Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr.—gave most private-sector workers a federal right to unionize and collectively bargain, but left it up to individual states and cities to decide whether to grant the same rights to government employees.) As a full-fledged union, the P.B.A. didn’t wait long to declare war against any push for increased accountability. In 1966, New York’s new mayor, John V. Lindsay, after being pressed by the Congress of Racial Equality, added four civilian members to the city’s Civilian Complaint Review Board; the original three members were deputy police commissioners. Then, as now, many African-Americans complained about police misconduct. The P.B.A., which renamed itself the Police Benevolent Association last year, bitterly resisted adding civilians to the board. When the City Council held a hearing on civilian review, the union mounted a five-thousand-member picket line in protest. The P.B.A. then organized a public referendum aimed at eliminating the board. It put up posters showing a young white woman exiting a subway and heading onto a dark, deserted street. “The Civilian Review Board must be stopped,” the poster read. “Her life . . . your life . . . may depend on it. . . . [A] police officer must not hesitate. If he does . . . the security and safety of your family may be jeopardized.” As the vote approached, the P.B.A.’s president, John Cassese, had played on racial divisions, declaring, “I’m sick and tired of giving in to minority groups with their whims and their gripes and shouting.” Lindsay, the American Civil Liberties Union, and New York’s two senators—the Republican Jacob Javits and the Democrat Robert F. Kennedy—opposed the P.B.A.-backed referendum. In a humbling defeat for liberals, sixty-three per cent of New Yorkers voted to abolish the review board.

Across the U.S., a similar dynamic played out. First, many cities followed New York’s lead and agreed to bargain with their police unions. Initially, newly established unions focussed on winning better wages and benefits. A major recession in the early eighties and the anti-tax fervor of the Reagan era caused budget crunches in many cities. Local leaders told police unions and other public-sector unions that they had little money for raises. In turn, the police demanded increased protections for officers facing disciplinary proceedings.

Since the eighties, police contracts in New York and many other cities have added one protection after another that have made it harder to hold officers accountable for improper use of force or other misconduct. Such protections included keeping an officer’s disciplinary record secret, erasing an officer’s disciplinary record after a few years, or delaying any questioning of officers for twenty-four or forty-eight hours after an incident such as a police shooting. “They have these unusual protections they’ve bargained very hard for, measures that insulate them from accountability,” William P. Jones, a history professor at the University of Minnesota and the president of the Labor and Working-Class History Association, told me. Jones said that other public-employee unions have some of the same protections but that police unions “are particularly effective utilizing them in their favor.”

In 2017, a Reuters a special report on police-union contracts in eighty-two cities found that most required departments to erase disciplinary records, in some cases after only six months. Eighteen cities expunged suspensions from an officer’s record in three years or less. Anchorage, Alaska, removed demotions, suspensions, and disciplinary transfers after twenty-four months. Reuters also found that almost half of the contracts let officers accused of wrongdoing see their entire investigative file—including witness statements, photos, and videos—before being questioned, making it easier for them to finesse their way through disciplinary interrogations.

Joseph McCartin, a labor historian at Georgetown, told me that one political factor explains why police unions have won so many protections. “They have more clout than other public-sector unions, like the teachers or sanitation workers, because they have often been able to command the political support of Republicans,” he said. “That’s given them a big advantage.”

#### Police misconduct erodes democracy – only holding them accountable can change the situation

Bonner, 18, University of Victoria, “Three Ways Police Abuse Affects Democracy”, 4/27/18, Michelle Bonner is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria. Among other publications, she is the co-editor of Police Abuse in Contemporary Democracies , URL: <https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/globalsouthpolitics/2018/04/27/three-ways-police-abuse-affects-democracy/>, KR

On August 9, 2014, 18-year-old Michael Brown was fatally shot by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. He was suspected of petty theft but was unarmed. A subsequent trial found the officer’s actions to be justified as self-defense. Despite the institutions of democracy working as they are designed, large protests (themselves met with police repression and arrests) registered profound public disagreement with the outcome. For many protesters this was one example, among numerous others, of police abuse aimed at African Americans that undermines their inclusion in American democracy.

Such powerful disagreements are not unique to democracy in the United States. Abuse of police authority happens in all democracies. It can include arbitrary arrest, selective surveillance and crowd control, harassment, sexual assault, torture, killings, or even forced disappearances. In newer democracies, police abuse is often thought to be a legacy of a previous authoritarian regime or civil war. Its persistence is understood to reflect weak democratic institutions and poorly functioning police forces. In established democracies, police abuse is more often thought to be an exception that is easily addressed through existing or tweaked institutions of accountability, such as the judiciary. Yet, as we argue in Police Abuse in Contemporary Democracies, police abuse has more significant implications for all democracies. We examine three.

Citizenship. Democracy includes the exercise and protection of rights for all citizens. This includes the right to protest, to mobility and not to be arbitrarily arrested or tortured. Rather than the courts, police are the first state actors to decide when citizen rights are protected and when they are ignored. They also have a great deal of discretion to decide who are (potential) wrongdoers and how much force to use to confront them. Marginalized groups in many countries find that it is in fact the police who determine the boundaries of their rights as citizens. Not all citizens’ rights are protected in the same way, creating pockets of authoritarian rule within democracy.

Some citizens, based on their identity, find, for example, that police watch them more closely, will arbitrarily arrest them for being in the “wrong place”, and police are more likely to mistreat them during arrest or while they are held in custody. This is particularly true for those who are economically poor (we examine cases from India, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and South Africa). It also includes racialized minority groups such as Arabs in France or Blacks in France, South Africa and the United States (cases examined in the book). It can also include those who hold political views considered “radical” such as alter-globalization activists in Canada or those protesting or striking against neoliberal economic polices in South Africa (also examined in the book). That is, police abuse creates an unequal experience of democracy as it pertains to citizenship rights. To change this, we argue that we need to better understand how police use their discretion, why they profile some citizens over others, and the consequences of police profiling on the quality of democracy for all citizens. Another answer would be to strengthen police accountability.

Accountability. At first glance it might appear, at least in established democracies, that we already have the answer to reducing police abuse. If police abuse their power then they will be held accountable by the judiciary. This is an important feature of liberal democracy. Yet, the studies in our book reveal that in fact, in many countries (we examine the US, Chile, and to a lesser extent Argentina and India) the judiciary tends to be very lenient with police abuse.

Police have the right in a democracy to use violence. As the case of Michael Brown highlights, right and wrong is determined by the willingness of the judiciary to accept the justification provided by the police officer for his or her action (or inaction). In the case of Michael Brown, the office claimed he killed in self-defense and the courts accepted this justification as valid. As our chapters on Chile and the United States reveal, judicial accountability is often very sensitive to the need for police to maintain a good public image. So police wrongdoing is frequently blamed on an individual officer, a “bad apple”, or the judiciary accepts the officer’s justification in order to reinforce the power of all officers’ to respond as they see fit to different situations.

Of course, as in the Michael Brown case, the public can voice their disagreement with the judiciary. Yet, as one chapter on the US shows, whether or not the public perceives that the police have abused their powers and whether or not they demand judicial accountability is influenced by unconscious racial bias. To overcome these biases and the reluctance on the part of the judiciary to punish the police, another chapter suggests we need to encourage and support a wide variety of grassroots organizations, like Cop Watch, that are dedicated to keeping an eye on police conduct. All the authors agree that the answers to reducing police abuse lie beyond judicial or institutional police reforms. Tweaking institutions is not enough to reduce police abuse.

Socioeconomic Inequality. Finally, most studies of democracy argue that a certain level of socioeconomic equality is needed to sustain it. High levels of inequality of wealth weaken democracy. Political economists, including those in the World Bank, agree that neoliberal economic policies increase inequality in wealth. Yet, to ensure the implementation and protection of neoliberal economic policies, many governments rely on police abuse targeted against those who either oppose these policies or who are excluded from the economic model.

Our chapters on South Africa and Canada reveal repressive police responses to protests and strikes against neoliberal economic policies. Our chapters on France, South Africa, the United States, and Brazil all document government official’s encouragement of police abuse as the appropriate response to rising crime; preventive socioeconomic programmes, shown to better reduce crime, run counter to neoliberal economic policies. For example, in Brazil, state officials have drawn from international experience to establish Pacification Police Units (UPPs). UPPs occupy favelas (shantytowns) in large numbers in order to control crime, opening up opportunities for police abuse. Indeed, globally, with the spread of neoliberal economic policies, we have seen the rise of tough on crime rhetoric and policies in many countries. From this perspective, if we want to reduce police abuse, it is important to consider how some models of political economy might be more compatible with democracy than others.

To conclude, most people associate police abuse with authoritarian regimes. Yet, it occurs in all democracies and, if not checked, can reduce or even erode democracy. While in our book we examine three key ways police abuse affects democracy, there are many other ways it can do so, such as impacting elections, public policy, and or the construction of political ideologies. Given the global decline of democracy noted by academics and international organizations, such as Freedom House, it is important that we begin to ask how we can better address police abuse and the fuzzy line between democracy and authoritarianism that it represents.

**Extinction**

**Kasparov 17**

Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf>

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and **the world has become much worse off as a result**. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of **terror, war**, refugees, and **military intervention** that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There **existential threat** today is not found on a map, but it **is very real**. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. **Terrorist** movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in **North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail,** and, at the center of the web, an **aggressive KGB dictator in Russia**. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And **they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated**. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but **this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home**, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. **Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully**. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of **democracy is the only** proven **remedy for** nearly **every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism**–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

#### PICs are good

#### 1] No ground loss --- the counterplan is less than the plan, and they can weigh whatever we PIC’d out of

#### 2] Any skew is self-incurred --- they chose the plan, and could have been prepared to defend every single part of the 1AC --- don’t punish us for Aff laziness

## 2

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being. Our framework is only concerned with minimizing death. Calc indicts don’t link—my framework evaluates offense—police strikes are bad because as far as we know, it would cause suffering.

#### [1] Death outweighs— [a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security—my framework constrains every NC and K and [b] it’s the worst form of evil

Paterson 3 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics.

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81  In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### [2] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### [3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first which is the most intuitive. That outweighs:

#### [A] Parsimony – metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely.

#### [B] Hijacks – intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.

#### [4] Use epistemic modesty: [a] clash – disincentives debaters going all in for framework meaning we get the ideal balance between normative and applied philosophy [b] real world education – in real life people constantly change their minds about credence between frameworks and compare and weigh those harms [c] strat – makes skep triggers worthless, that’s bad because they function as necessary but insufficient burdens on the aff

#### [5] Reject calc indicts and util triggers permissibility arguments:

#### [A] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

#### [B] Morally abhorrent – it would say we have no obligation to prevent genocide and that slavery was permissible which is morally abhorrent and makes debate unsafe for minority debaters

#### [6] Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue

Blum et al. 18

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear

#### [7] Naturalism is true and leads to util – ignore non-material circumstances.

Papineau 9 Papineau, David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/>.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the conservation of kinetic plus potential energy came to be accepted as a basic principle of physics (Elkana 1974). In itself this does not rule out distinct mental or vital forces, for there is no reason why such forces should not be ‘conservative’, operating in such a way as to compensate losses of kinetic energy by gains in potential energy and vice versa. (The term ‘nervous energy’ is a relic of the widespread late nineteenth-century assumption that mental processes store up a species of potential energy that is then released in action.) However, the **conservation of energy** does **imply**  that any such special forces must be governed by strict **deterministic laws:** if mental or vital forces arose spontaneously, then there would be nothing to **ensure** that they never led to energy increases. During the course of the twentieth century received scientific opinion became even more restrictive about possible causes of physical effects, and came to reject sui generis mental or vital causes, even of a law-governed and predictable kind. Detailed physiological research, especially into nerve cells, gave no indication of any physical effects that cannot be explained in terms of basic physical forces **that** also **occur outside** living bodies. By the middle of the twentieth century, belief in sui generis mental or vital forces had become a minority view. **This led to** the widespread acceptance of the doctrine now known as the‘causal closure’or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm, according to which **all** physical **effects** **can be accounted for by** basicphysical causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of fundamental forces) non-physical causes of physical effects. As a result, the default philosophical view was a non-naturalist interactive pluralism which recognized a wide range of such non-physical influences, including spontaneous mental influences (or ‘determinations of the soul’ as they would then have been called). The nineteenth-century discovery of the conservation of energy continued to allow that sui generis non-physical forces can interact with the physical world, but required that they be governed by strict force laws. This gave rise to an initial wave of naturalist doctrines around the beginning of the twentieth century. Sui generis mental forces were still widely accepted, but an extensive philosophical debate about the significance of the conservation of energy led to a widespread recognition that any such mental forces would need to be law-governed and thus amenable to scientific investigation along with more familiar physical forces.[5] By the middle of the twentieth century, the acceptance of the casual closure of the physical realm led to even stronger naturalist views. The causal closure thesis implies that any **mental** and biological causes **must** themselves **be physical**ly constituted**, if they are to produce** physical **effects.** It thus gives rise to a particularly strong form ofontological naturalism, namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical effects must itself be physical. From the 1950s onwards, philosophers began to formulate arguments for ontological physicalism. Some of these arguments appealed explicitly to the causal closure of the physical realm (Feigl 1958, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). In other cases, the reliance on causal closure lay below the surface. However, it is not hard to see that even in these latter cases the causal closure thesis played a crucial role. Thus, for example, consider J.J.C. Smart's (1958) thought that we should identify mental states with brain states, for otherwise those mental states would be "nomological danglers" which play no role in the explanation of behaviour. Or take David Lewis's (1966) and David Armstrong's (1968) argument that, since mental states are picked out by their causal roles, and since we know that physical states play these roles, mental states must be identical with those physical states. Again, consider Donald Davidson's (1970) argument that, since the only laws governing behaviour are those connecting behaviour with physical antecedents, mental events can only be causes of behaviour if they are identical with those physical antecedents. At first sight, it may not be obvious that these arguments require the causal closure thesis. But a moment's thought will show that none of these arguments would remain cogent if the closure thesis were not true, and that some physical effects (the movement of matter in arms, perhaps, or the firings of the motor neurones which instigate those movements) were not determined by prior physical causes at all, but by sui generis mental causes. Sometimes it is suggested that the indeterminism of modern quantum mechanics creates room for sui generis non-physical causes to influence the physical world. However, even if quantum mechanics implies that some physical effects are themselves undetermined, it provides no reason to doubt a quantum version of the causal closure thesis, to the effect that the chances of those effects are fully fixed by prior physical circumstances. And this alone is enough to rule out sui generis non-physical causes. For such sui generis causes, if they are to be genuinely efficiacious, must presumably make an independent difference to the chances of physical effects, and this in itself would be inconsistent with the quantum causal closure claim that such chances are already fixed by prior physical circumstances. Once more, it seems that anything that makes a difference to the physical realm must itself be physical. Even if it is agreed that anything with physical effects must in some sense be physical, there is plenty of room to debate exactly what ontologically naturalist doctrines follow. The causal closure thesis says that (the chance of) every physical effect is fixed by a fully physical prior history. So, to avoid an unacceptable proliferation of causes, any prima facie non-physical cause of a physical effect will need to be included in that physical history. But what exactly does this require? The contemporary literature offers a wide range of answers to this question. In part the issue hinges on the ontological status of causes. Some philosophers think of causes as particular events, considered in abstraction from any properties they may possess (Davidson 1980). Given this view of causation, a mental or other apparently non-physical cause will be the same as some physical cause as long as it is constituted by the same particular (or ‘token’) event. For example, a given feeling and a given brain event will count as the same cause as long as they are constituted by the same token event. However, it is widely agreed that this kind of ‘token identity’ on its own fails to ensure that prima facie non-physical causes can make any real difference to physical effects. To see why, note that token identity is a very weak doctrine: it does not imply any relationship at all between the properties involved in the physical and non-physical cause; it is enough that the same particular entity should possess both these properties. Compare the way in which an apple's shape and colour are both possessed by the same particular thing, namely that apple. It seems wrong to conclude on this account that the apple's colour causes what its shape causes. Similarly, it seems unwarranted to conclude that someone's feelings cause what that person's neuronal discharges cause, simply on the grounds that these are both aspects of the same particular event. This could be true, and yet the mental property of the event could be entirely irrelevant to any subsequent physical effects. Token identity on its own thus seems to leave it open that the mental and other prima facie non-physical properties are ‘epiphenomenal’, exerting no real influence on effects that are already fixed by physical processes (Honderich 1982, Yalowitz 2006 Section 6, Robb and Heil 2005 Section 5). These considerations argue that causation depends on properties as well as particulars. There are various accounts of causation that respect this requirement, the differences between which do not matter for present purposes. The important point is that, if mental and other prima facie non-physical causes are to be equated with physical causes, [any] non-physical properties must somehow be constituted by physical properties. If your anger is to cause what your brain state causes, the property of being angry cannot be ontologically independent of the relevant brain properties. So much is agreed by nearly all contemporary naturalists. At this point, however, consensus ends. One school holds that epiphenomenalism can only be avoided by type-identity, the strict identity of the relevant prima facie non-physical properties with physical properties. On the other side stand ‘non-reductive’ physicalists, who hold that the causal efficacy of non-physical properties will be respected as long as they are ‘realized by’ physical properties, even if they are not reductively identified with them. Type-identity is the most obvious way to ensure that non-physical and physical causes coincide: if exactly the same particulars and properties comprise a non-physical and a physical cause, the two causes will certainly themselves be fully identical. Still, type-identity is a very strong doctrine. Type identity about thoughts, for example, would imply that the property of thinking about the square root of two is identical with some physical property. And this seems highly implausible. Even if all human beings with this thought must be distinguished by some common physical property of their brains—which itself seems highly unlikely—there remains the argument that other life-forms, or intelligent androids, will also be able to think about the square root of two, even though their brains may share no significant physical properties with ours (cf. Bickle 2006). This ‘variable realization’ argument has led many philosophers to seek an alternative way of reconciling the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis, one which does not require the strict identity of non-physical and physical properties. The general idea of this ‘non-reductive physicalism’ is to allow that a given non-physical property can be ‘realized’ by different physical properties in different cases. There are various ways of filling out this idea. A common feature is the requirement that non-physical properties should metaphysically supervene on physical properties, in the sense that any two beings who share all physical properties will necessarily share the same non-physical properties, even though the physical properties which so realize the non-physical ones can be different in different beings. This arguably ensures that nothing more is required for any specific instantiation of a non-physical property than its physical realization—even God could not have created your brain states without thereby creating your feelings—yet avoids any reductive identification of non-physical properties with physical ones. (This is a rough sketch of the supervenience formulation of physicalism. For more see Stoljar 2001 Sections 2 and 3.) Some philosophers object that non-reductive physicalism does not in fact satisfy the original motivation for physicalism, since it fails to reconcile the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis (Kim 1993. Robb and Heil 2005 Section 6). According to non-reductive physicalism, prima facie non-physical properties are not type-identical with any strictly physical properties, even though they supervene on them. However, if causes are in some way property-involving, this then seems to imply that any prima facie non-physical cause will be distinct from any physical cause. Opponents of non-reductive physicalism object that this gives us an unacceptable proliferation of causes for the physical effects of non-physical causes—both the physical cause implied by the causal closure thesis and the distinct non-physical cause. In response, advocates of non-reductive physicalism respond that there is nothing wrong with such an apparent duplication of causes if it is also specified that the latter metaphysically supervene on the former. The issue here hinges on the acceptability of different kinds of overdetermination (Bennett 2003). All can agree that it would be absurd if the physical effects of non-physical causes always had two completely independent causes. This much was assumed by the original causal argument for physicalism, which reasoned that no sui generis non-physical state of affairs can cause some effect that already has a full physical cause. However, even if ‘strong overdetermination’ by two ontologically independent causes is so ruled out, this does not necessarily preclude ‘weak overdetermination’ by both a physical cause and a metaphysically supervenient non-physical cause. Advocates of non-reductive physicalism argue that this kind of overdetermination is benign, on the grounds that the two causes are not ontologically distinct—the non-physical cause isn't genuinely additional to the physical cause (nothing more is needed for your feelings than your brain states). There is room to query whether non-reductive physicalism amounts to a substantial form of naturalism. After all, the requirement that some category of properties metaphysically supervenes on physical properties is not a strong one. A very wide range of properties would seem intuitively to satisfy this requirement, including moral and aesthetic properties, along with any mental, biological, and social properties. (Can two physically identical things be different with respect to wickedness or beauty?) Supervenience on the physical realm is thus a far weaker requirement than that some property should enter into natural laws, say, or be analysable by the methods of the natural sciences. Indeed some philosophers are explicitly anti-naturalist about categories that they allow to supervene on the physical—we need only think of G.E. Moore on moral properties, or Donald Davidson and his followers on mental properties (Moore 1903, Davidson 1980). In response, those of naturalist sympathies are likely to point out that any viable response to the argument from causal closure will require more than metaphysical supervenience alone (Horgan 1993, Wilson 1999). Supervenience is at least necessary, if non-reductive physicalists are to avoid the absurdity of strong overdetermination. But something more than mere supervenience is arguably needed if non-reductive physicalists are to make good their claim that non-physical states cause the physical effects that their realizers cause. Metaphysical supervenience alone does not ensure this. (Suppose ricketiness, in a car, is defined as the property of having some loose part. Then ricketiness will supervene on physical properties. In a given car, it may be realized by a disconnected wire between ignition and starter motor.This disconnected wire will cause this car not to start. But it doesn't follow that this car's then not starting will be caused by its property of ricketiness. Most rickety cars start perfectly well.) So it looks as if the causal closure argument requires not only that non-physical properties metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but that they be natural in some stronger sense, so as to qualify as causes of those properties' effects. It is a much-discussed issue how this demand can be satisfied. Some philosophers seek to meet it by offering a further account of the nature of the relevant non-physical properties, for example, that they are second-order role properties whose presence is constituted by some first-order property with a specified causal role (Levin 2004). Others suggest that the crucial feature is how these properties feature in certain laws (Fodor 1974) or alternatively the degree of their explanatory relevance to physical effects (Yablo 1992). And reductive physicalists will insist that the demand can only be met by type-identifying prima-facie non-physical properties with physical properties after all.[6] There is no agreed view on the requirements for prima facie non-physical properties to have physical effects. This difficult issue hinges, inter alia, on the nature of the causal relation itself, and it would take us too far afield to pursue it further here. For the purpose of this entry, we need only note that the causal closure argument seems to require that properties with physical effects must be ‘natural’ in some sense that is stronger than metaphysical supervenience on physical properties. Beyond that, we can leave it open exactly what this extra strength requires. Some philosophers hold that mental states escape the causal argument, on the grounds that mental states cause actions rather than any physical effects. Actions are not part of the subject matter of the physical sciences, and so a fortiori not the kinds of effects guaranteed to have physical causes by any casual closure thesis. So there is no reason, according to this line of thought, to suppose that the status of mental states as causes of actions is threatened by physics, nor therefore any reason to think that mental states must in some sense be realized by physical states (Hornsby 1997, Sturgeon 1998). The obvious problem with this line of argument is that actions aren't the only effects of mental states. On occasion mental states also cause unequivocally physical effects. Fast Eddie Felsen's desire to move a pool ball in a certain direction will characteristically have just that effect. And now the causal closure argument bites once more. The snooker ball's motion has a purely physical cause, by the causal closure thesis. This will pre-empt Fast Eddie's desire as a cause of that motion, unless that desire is in some sense physically realized (Balog 1999, Witmer 2000). Other philosophers have a different reason for saying that mental states, or more particularly conscious mental states, don't have physical effects. They think that there are strong independent arguments to show that conscious states can't possibly supervene metaphysically on physical states. Putting this together with the closure claim that physical effects always have physical causes, and abjuring the idea that the physical effects of conscious causes are strongly overdetermined by both a physical cause and an ontologically independent conscious cause, they conclude that conscious states must be ‘epiphenomenal’, lacking any power to causally influence the physical realm (Jackson 1981; 1985. See also Chalmers 1995).[7] The rejection of physicalism about conscious properties certainly has the backing of intuition. (Don't zombies—beings who are physically exactly like humans but have no conscious life—seem intuitively possible?) However, whether this intuition can be parlayed into a sound argument is a highly controversial issue, and one that lies beyond the scope of this entry. A majority of contemporary philosophers probably hold that physicalism can resist these arguments. But a significant minority take the other side.[8] If the majority are right, and physicalism about conscious states is not ruled out by independent arguments, then physicalism seems clearly preferable to epiphenomenalism. In itself, epiphenomenalism is not an attractive position. It requires us to suppose that conscious states, even though they are caused by processes in the physical world, have no effects on that world. This is a very odd kind of causal structure. Nature displays no other examples of such one-way causal intercourse between realms. By contrast, a physicalist **naturalism** about conscious states will **integrate the mental** realm **with** the causal unfolding of the spatiotemporalworld in an entirely familiar way. Given this, general principles of theory choice would seem to argue strongly for physicalism over epiphenomenalism.[9] If we focus on this last point, we may start wondering why the causal closure thesis is so important. If general principles of theory choice can justify physicalism, why bring in all the complications associated with causal closure? The answer is that causal closure is needed to rule out interactionist dualism. General principles of theory choice may dismiss epiphenomenalism in favour of physicalism, but they do not similarly discredit interactionist dualism. As the brief historical sketch earlier will have made clear, interactionist dualism offers a perfectly straightforward theoretical option requiring no commitment to any bizarre causal structures. Certainly the historical norm has been to regard it as the default account of the causal role of the mental realm.[10] Given this, arguments from theoretical simplicity cut no ice against interactionist dualism. Rather, the case against interactionist dualism hinges crucially on the empirical thesis that all physical effects already have physical causes. It is specifically this claim that makes it difficult to see how dualist states can make a causal difference to the physical world. It is sometimes suggested that physicalism about the mind can be vindicated by an ‘inference to the best explanation’. The thought here is that there are many well-established synchronic correlations between mental states and brain states, and that physicalism is a ‘better explanation’ of these correlations than epiphenomenalism (Hill 1991, Hill and McLaughlin 1999). From the perspective outlined here, this starts the argument in the middle rather than the beginning, by simply assuming the relevant mind-brain correlations. This assumption of pervasive synchronic mind-brain correlations is only plausible if interactionist dualism has already been ruled out. After all, if we believed interactionist dualism, then we wouldn't think dualist mental states needed any help from synchronic neural correlates to produce physical effects. And it is implausible to suppose that we have direct empirical evidence, prior to the rejection of interactive dualism, for pervasive mind-brain correlations, given the paucity of any explicit examples of well-established neural correlates for specific mental states. Rather our rationale for believing in such correlations must be that the causal closure of the physical realm eliminates interactive dualism, whence we infer that mental states can only systematically precede physical effects if they are correlated with the physical causes of those effects. G.E. Moore's famous ‘open question’ argument is designed to show that moral facts cannot possibly be identical to natural facts. Suppose the natural properties of some situation are completely specified. It will always remain an open question, argued Moore, whether that situation is morally good or bad. (Moore 1903.) Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. **If moral facts cannot influence the physical world,** then it is hard to see how we **can have** any **knowledge of them.**

#### [8] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

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