#### TW: moderately offensive speech and rage

## 没有意见 (I’m not Chinese? Are you?)

#### You are told to be a doctor

#### Go into medicine

#### Prosper

#### Be like your parents

#### Be like your fellow Chinese colleagues

#### Be like everyone else

#### Be the same

#### It takes a lot to be a doctor, doesn’t it?

#### You need to be tough

#### Resilient

#### Focused

#### You’re not allowed your own ideas

#### Do what everyone else did before you

#### Look down at your work

#### Be quiet

#### Be diligent

#### Be dull

#### Be repetitive

#### Never deviate

#### Be a robot

#### Be a cog

#### In the system that you been have forced to into

#### If you aren’t a doctor, you aren’t Chinese

#### But are you white?

#### Can you really become something that doesn’t want you?

#### You’re just a broken machine

#### No one wants you if you don’t go into medicine

#### America doesn’t want you

#### China doesn’t want you

#### The world doesn’t want you

#### You are only a machine

#### IPPs are essentially the west trying to erase Chinese culture and identity. We are inherently positioned as copycats, as their means of production (Yu)

Yu, P. k., *Director of the center for law and international property* (2012, July). Intellectual Property and Asian Values. Retrieved August 21, 2021, from https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1398&context=facscholar

Although provocative, this strong form of the claim is likely not supported by the reality on Chinese soil. As I pointed out in the past, there are striking similarities between Confucianism and what we have in the West regarding the public domain.4 1 While copying may be an important living process for a Confucian Chinese to acquire understanding of human behavior, to improve life through self- cultivation, and to transmit knowledge to the posterity,42 Chinese poets and literary theorists widely disagreed on the appropriate extent of copying." If the Chinese did not subscribe to intellectual property notions, it is only those notions that were derived from a maximalist tradition, where the importance of the public domain is largely ignored.4 4 Moreover, traditional Chinese culture does not always call for verbatim reproduction, the means by which massive piracy and counterfeiting are often conducted. Rather, Confucianism has called for the transformative use of preexisting works that is tailored to the user's needs and conditions. As Professor Alford acknowledged, through the editing of the Classics and his comments in the Analects, Confucius demonstrated that "transmission, far from being a passive endeavor, entailed selection and adaptation if it was to be meaningful to oneself, one's contemporaries, and one's successors."45 Indeed, the ability to make transformative use of preexisting works can demonstrate one's comprehension of and devotion to the core of the Chinese culture as well as the ability to distinguish the present from the past through original thoughts. To some extent, the need for meaningful transmission in traditional Chinese culture can be analogized to the transformative use doctrine pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.6 In Campbell, a music publisher brought a copyright infringement action against the rap band 2 Live Crew for its salacious rap parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman."4 7 Emphasizing that transformative works are socially important and exploring whether fair use covers the contested parody, Justice Souter noted the importance of transformative works: Although . . . transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh. In the end, the Court suggested that 2 Live Crew's rendition of the song might have constituted fair use and remanded the case to the lower court.4 9 Just as it is important to ask what the Confucian position of copying is, it is equally important to examine the Western position in intellectual property law and policy, if such a position exists at all. Individualism alone, for example, does not fully summarize the Western intellectual property position. In the past decade, intellectual property scholars have widely questioned the narrow and incomplete definition of intellectual property rights advanced by developed countries and their supportive rights holders’ As the West develops more sophisticated notions of intellectual property rights, it may find that these notions and Confucianism may be more compatible with each other than one has anticipated." Compared with the strong form of Professor Alford's claim, its weak form seems to be more in line with the reality on the ground, although native Chinese scholars continue to disagree with such an assessment.52 This weak claim states that Confucianism has prevented Western notions of intellectual property rights from taking root in China." Nevertheless, it does not suggest any incompatibility between the two notions. Nor does it contend that Confucianism will militate against intellectual property law reforms. Thus, if reforms are introduced- either internally through the borrowing of foreign ideas or externally in response to foreign pressure and coercive trade policies-such reforms may help China establish an exogenously developed intellectual property system. In fact, legal transplants from abroad and coercive trade pressure from the United States were the primary means by which the new intellectual property regime was established in China.54 It is therefore no surprise that foreign legal transplants were also a key focus of Professor Alford's book." Although the level of overall intellectual property protection in China has yet to satisfy the United States government and its rights holders, improvements in such protection had been quite significant in the past two decades. When we go beyond the discussion of Confucianism to locate Asian values, the task becomes even more challenging. Regardless of whether we embrace the strong or weak form of Professor Alford's claim, we have to think seriously about whether it actually makes sense to generalize the Confucianism debate to cover other Asian cultures. There are several reasons. First, as pointed out earlier, Confucianism only forms the cultural basis of a small number of countries in East Asia. Islam, for example, is important to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Hinduism is very important to South Asia, covering places such as Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. Buddhism is also very important to Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. Indeed, as David Kang observed, "[t]he states of Southeast Asia experienced twin cultural influences, from India and from China.""6Even in China, Confucianism is only one of the three dominant philosophies in traditional Chinese society; 13uddhism and Daoism had and continue to have very significant influence.57 As one commentator observed, "[t]he bulk of early book publishing in China was in fact inspired **by** Buddhism, not Confucianism, and was directed at the acquisition of religious merit that appears to have been unrelated, and was perhaps even antithetical, to what we today would consider a property right."" Also present in the Chinese territory are many minority cultures and beliefs, including the Zhuang, Hui, Uygur, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, and Buyei.5 9 Second, even if we focus only on Confucianism, that philosophy continues to evolve. What we find in Confucianism today is actually quite different from the teachings of Confucius' from the *Analects to* Neo-Confucianism propounded **by** Zhu Xi **(1130-1200)** to the living principles used in modern Asian societies, Confucian teachings have undergone many significant transformations. There are also many different strands of Confucianism. As noted Confucian scholar Theodore de Bary observed, a strong liberal tradition existed in at least one strand of Confucianism, even though Confucianism is generally not publicly identified with liberal theories.6 ' Likewise, Professor Alford reminded us that "approaches rooted in portrayals of culture as essentially impervious to change, whether from within or beyond the society being examined," run the risk of being unidimensional. Furthermore, those Asian countries that adopt Confucianism embrace it for different reasons and to very different extents. As Professor Kang recently noted: the main secondary states of East Asia chose Confucianism and Chinese ideas more for their own reasons than from Chinese pressure. In Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, the debate about how to organize government and society occurred between warriors and scholars, with the Confucian literati winning in Korea and Vietnam and the warriors ultimately winning in Japan. Although Chinese ideas were deeply embedded from the founding of these states, just as significantly, Chinese ideas were grafted onto what indigenous cultures, and the two coexisted-sometimes uncomfortably-resulting in only partial Sinicization. Third, **by** focusing on the discrete values in Asia-whether as Asian values or simply as "values in Asia" 6 -the "Asian values" debate "underestimates both the historical ruptures of colonization and the present forces of global interaction."" In Michael Davis' view, "cultural relativist theories **. . .** are tautological and overly deterministic because they fail to appreciate the roles of both human agency and institutions in the transformative processes of cultural discourse."" The "Asian values" debate also ignores the fact that "there are different views of human rights voiced in Asia, **by** opposition politicians, scholars, and non-government organizations."" **A** case in point is the Bangkok Non-Governmental Organizations Declaration of March **27, 1993,69** which contrasted significantly with the Bangkok Declaration-to be more precise, the Bangkok Governmental Declaration. As Simon Tay reminded us: [t]he **N.G.O.** Declaration differs significantly both from the Bangkok Declaration **by** governments and what **...** has, for convenience, termed the "Asian view". Th[is] Declaration places a stronger emphasis on civil and political rights than does the Declaration **by** government representatives. It calls for democracy to be "fostered and guaranteed in all countries" and for Asian governments to "lift constraints on political rights **... by** repealing repressive laws **...** and liberalising the political system." Like the Bangkok Declaration **by** the Asian governments, it calls for cultural rights to be recognized on the basis that "[t]here is emerging a new understanding of universalism encompassing the richness and wisdom of Asia- Pacific cultures". The **N.G.O.** Declaration explicitly stipulates, however, that "cultural practices which derogate from universally accepted human rights **...** must not be tolerated."7 Indeed, the drafters of the Non-Governmental Declaration criticized the Governmental Declaration for "reflect[ing] the continued attempt **by** many Governments of the Asia-Pacific region to avoid their human rights obligations, to put the state before the people and to avoid acknowledging their obligations to account for their failures in the promotion and protection of human rights."" Fourth, as important as the influence of Confucianism may be in East Asian countries-or for that matter, Islam in the Middle East-one has to wonder whether the discussion of these influences is just based on cultural stereotypes.72 Communitarian philosophies are not unique to the Chinese or the Muslims; they can be found in civilizations around the world.73 While most in Western societies would find it misleading or overly simplistic to attribute the massive unauthorized copying problem on the internet in their countries to the communitarian underpinnings of Judeo-Christianity, it is equally problematic to attribute piracy and counterfeiting in Asia to Asian cultures. Simply put, it is just misleading and overly simplistic to describe piracy and counterfeiting as a cultural problem.7 4 Indeed, the drafters of the Non-Governmental Declaration criticized the Governmental Declaration for "reflect[ing] the continued attempt **by** many Governments of the Asia-Pacific region to avoid their human rights obligations, to put the state before the people and to avoid acknowledging their obligations to account for their failures in the promotion and protection of human rights."" Fourth, as important as the influence of Confucianism may be in East Asian countries-or for that matter, Islam in the Middle East-one has to wonder whether the discussion of these influences is just based on cultural stereotypes.72 Communitarian philosophies are not unique to the Chinese or the Muslims; they can be found in civilizations around the world.73 While most in Western societies would find it misleading or overly simplistic to attribute the massive unauthorized copying problem on the internet in their countries to the communitarian underpinnings of Judeo-Christianity, it is equally problematic to attribute piracy and counterfeiting in Asia to Asian cultures. Simply put, it is just misleading and overly simplistic to describe piracy and counterfeiting as a cultural problem.7 4 Indians, Japanese, Persians and Arabs, did not conceive the idea of Asia because they did not view themselves collectively in the way Europeans did. For analytical convenience, the United Nations Statistics Division divides Asia into five different macro sub-regions: **(1)** central Asia; (2) eastern Asia; **(3)** southern Asia; (4) south-eastern Asia; and ***(5)*** western Asia. Table **1** lists the different countries included in the **U.N.** geoscheme. Although the Statistics Division stated explicitly that "[t]he assignment of countries or areas to specific groupings is for statistical convenience and does not imply any assumption regarding political or other affiliation of countries or territories **by** the United Nations,"" the classification makes salient the challenges in determining at the outset which countries are to be analyzed for the purposes of identifying pan- Asian positions in intellectual property law and policy. Even if we limit our discussion to only eastern, southern, and south- eastern Asia-or even the West-centric Far East-it remains difficult to compare the economic developments in countries in these different sub- regions. Out of all the countries, Japan has the strongest and most sophisticated economy. In Mark Besson's view, this country is "especially important as an exemplar of a **highly** successful *Asian* state."" Although China has recently overtaken Japan to become the world's second largest economy on an aggregate basis, behind only the United States, Japan still dominates China dramatically on a per capita basis. With a per capita **GDP** of **39,738** in **2009,** Japan is one of the richest developed countries."' In the same period, China, **by** contrast, has a per capita **GDP** of only 3,744. It therefore should still be classified as a low- to-middle-income developing country. 2 Indeed, China's per capita **GDP** is lower than that of Malaysia and Thailand, not to mention Japan, Singapore, and South Korea." In the area of intellectual property protection, Japan has improved considerably in the last two decades. In the early 1980s, Japan was widely criticized for its limited intellectual property protection, due largely to the United States' trade deficit with Japan.' **By** the time the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" ("TRIPS Agreement") was negotiated, Japan slowly assumed the role of a key trilateral partner with the United States and the European Communities-thanks in no small part to the push **by** local and foreign intellectual property industries. Most recently, Japan was instrumental in driving the negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement **("ACTA"),'** a voluntary plurilateral agreement that aims to set a new and higher benchmark for international intellectual property protection and enforcement among like-minded countries."  
Unlike Japan, China arrived much later in both the economic and intellectual property scenes; it is the "new kid on the block" of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")." Nevertheless, it now has successfully established itself as a dominant Asian economic power. Today, China is the world's largest exporter and second largest economy and trading nation." It is also one of the world's largest recipients of foreign direct investment ("FDI") with capital inflows of about ***$50*** billion, behind only the United States and the United Kingdom." Its factories "make **70** percent of the world's toys, **60** percent of its bicycles, half its shoes, and one-third of its luggage.... [China also] builds half of the world's microwave ovens, one-third of its television sets and air conditioners, a quarter of its washers, and one- fifth of its refrigerators."9 2 Given China's geopolitical importance and its immense growth potential, some commentators have linked China to the United States, creating what they have called the **G-2** (Group of **2).9** As they argued, **G-2** is likely to be crucial to discussions on global matters, which range from economic recovery to climate change. Some economists and commentators also highlighted the growing economic interdependence between China and the United States **by** alluding to "a chain-gang relationship" between the two countries, 4 or what Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick have described as "Chimerica." In the intellectual property area, China's developments have also been quite impressive, especially in major cities and coastal areas. Today, China is among the top ***5*** countries filing patent applications through the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").9' In 2010, the number of PCT applications increased **by *56.2%*** to **12,337,** moving China to the fourth spot, behind only the United States, Japan, and Germany. “Since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, which later became the State Intellectual Property Office **("SIPO"),** has also been recognized as an international searching authority for PCT purposes." In Peter Drahos' view, **such** recognition made China "a player in the top tier of patent offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent administration."" It is therefore no surprise that, in **2007, SIPO** met with the European Patent Office, the Japanese Patent Office, the Korean Intellectual Property Office ("KIPO"), and the United States Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to "improv[e] the efficiency of their examination systems and to harmonize their office systems’1While piracy and counterfeiting problems remain, China has begun to make a pro-active move from the imitation model to a new innovation model." The State Council's recently adopted National Intellectual Property Strategy, for example, seeks to strengthen the country's indigenous and innovative capacities.03 The strategy strongly indicates the leaders' growing understanding of the important role intellectual property protection and enforcement play in driving a country's economy."

#### All we are, are counterfeits, and you won’t even let us be that? All we are is following the designated path that you desire from us… the production line and you hate us for that. When we try and rebel, remove the conformity, you demonize me, my country, my ancestors, my people.

Fleming, D. C., *Chair of intellectual property practice group*, (April 2015). Counterfeiting in China. <https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html>

Yiwu is the counterfeit capital of China.  Every day, approximately 200,000 distributors buy up to 2,000 tons of goods from the city’s wholesale black market.  In Beijing, China’s official capital, which is a five-hour train ride from Yiwu, you can find a makeshift outdoor market dubbed “Treasure Street,” where buyers can purchase wholesale counterfeit products.  Yabaolu is a modern building housing 300 private showrooms each representing a Chinese factory where the fake goods are produced. On average, 20 percent of all consumer products in the Chinese market are counterfeit.  If the product sells, it is counterfeited.  Rolex watches, Gucci handbags, Duracell batteries, Gillette razor blades, Safeguard soap, Head & Shoulders shampoo, Viagra, and luxury automobiles are just a few of the many fake goods available for purchase.  The Chinese often joke that in China, “everything is fake but your mother” and “we can copy everything except your mother.”  With places like Yiwu and Treasure Street providing counterfeit items ranging from car-inspection stickers and college diplomas to designer clothing and computer software, you cannot help but agree. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes estimates that two billion counterfeit products worth $8.2 billion are produced annually in China.[[2]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn2" \o ")  The World Customs Organization has calculated that 65% of all counterfeit shipments globally originate in mainland China.[[3]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn3" \o ")  When shipments from Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China, are included, the proportion of shipments worldwide rises above two-thirds.[[1]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn1" \o ") In 2009, $230 million of counterfeit goods from China and Hong Kong were seized in the United States, which represents almost 90% of the value of all counterfeits intercepted that year.[[2]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn2)  The problem is even worse in Europe where customs officials reported nearly 50,000 seizures in 2008, a tenfold increase over the previous ten-year period.[[3]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn3)  European customs official estimate two-thirds of all counterfeit articles seized originated in China or Hong Kong.  57% of the seized counterfeits were clothing or related accessories while jewelry and watches accounted for 10% and electrical devices constituted 7%.[[4]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn4" \o ")  Counterfeit goods are spread unevenly across the continent with Germany, Spain, and particularly, the Netherlands, reporting large numbers of seizures.[[5]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn5" \o ")  While the European Union does not attach a monetary value to the counterfeit articles it seizes, if one assumes the average value of an item intercepted in the United States is about the same as in Europe, the total value of all counterfeit products seized in Europe would exceed $850 million in 2008.[[6]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn6" \o ") Not all counterfeit articles are harmless imitations.  Many are deadly, including:  antibiotics made of talcum powder and birth control pills filled with rice flour.  The World Health Organization estimates that 10% of the world’s medicine supply, and, more alarmingly, 30% of the developing world’s supply, is counterfeit, i.e. drugs “deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source.”[[7]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn7" \o ")  In 2008 alone, European customs officials reported more than 3,000 attempts to import fake drugs, the vast majority of which originated in India and China.[[1]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn1)  One estimate suggests that more than half of all anti-infective drugs in regions of Africa and Asia are likely to be counterfeit.[[2]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn2)  The former Director-General of Nigeria’s National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control has even publicly stated that “[m]ost of the fake drugs in Nigeria come from India and China.”[[3]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn3) A 2003 research study revealed that 22 of 25 places where artesunate, an anti-malarial drug, was sold were actually selling a counterfeit version of the drug.[[4]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn4)  Another study conducted across Southeast Asia in 2008 found that half of the 391 artesunate samples they collected were fake.[[5]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn5)  The researchers analyzed the counterfeit artesunate and traced it to southern China.[[6]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn6) To help combat the spread of counterfeit medicines, the International Criminal Police Organization, commonly known as INTERPOL, has coordinated numerous multi-country operations.  In 2008, “Operation Storm” helped national law enforcement officials raid sites in China and several other Southeast Asian countries resulting in the arrests of 27 people and the seizure of 16 million fake pills.[[7]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn7)  The following year, “Operation Storm II” confiscated 20 million doses of counterfeit medicines and shut down 100 outlets for these illicit products across the region.[[8]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html" \l "_ftn8" \o ") The counterfeit medicines also have deadly consequences within China itself.  In 2006, at least 18 people died after being administered counterfeit Amillarisin A, a drug designed to treat gall bladder problems, while hospitalized in Guangdong province.  The problem is not limited to the streets alone but reaches into the highest echelons of power.  In 2007, China executed the former director of the State Food and Drug Administration for approving numerous fake drugs, some of which caused fatalities, in exchange for bribes. In the face of this worldwide problem originating on its shores, China has taken some action to combat counterfeiting.  In 2008, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce seized more than $220 million worth of counterfeit products.[[1]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn1)  The following year, the General Administration of Quality, Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine seized nearly $500 million in counterfeit goods and dispatched nearly two million inspectors across the country.[[2]](https://www.wongfleming.com/wp-content/uploads/COUNTERFEITING-IN-CHINA.html#_ftn2)  Although the Chinese government’s efforts have intercepted significant quantities of counterfeit articles, these seizures represent only a drop in the bucket and counterfeiting remains widespread. In December 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization and many in the global community hoped that this would relegate Yiwu’s outrageous counterfeit business practices to a thing of the past.  However, despite China’s continuing efforts to align its standards of intellectual property protection with WTO standards, such as the TRIPS Agreement, the country is still faced with the daunting task of embracing (and enforcing) western notions of property rights.  For most Chinese, trademark piracy is too tempting to turn down.  No one really knows why the Chinese are the best and the most prolific in violating every notion of western intellectual property rights.  It could be a matter of economics, or it could be cultural. Think of intellectual property as the protection of ideas.  It is any original creative work that can be protected by law.  As the term itself refers to a group of intangible property rights, it is no wonder that the scope of what is considered intellectual property is immense.  From television shows to fashion designer logos, computer software to plant varieties, industrial processes to genetic engineering, these are all works that are considered to be intellectual property.  However abstract these artistic, commercial and scientific works may be, they enjoy similar private property rights awarded to tangible assets.  Intellectual property rights are designed with the creator in mind by protecting their ingenuity and consequently ensuring some sort of economic reward for the fruit of their labor.  From the corporate perspective, intellectual property operates as an important commercial asset.  As companies establish themselves and their products within an industry, its sales and competitive edge depend on the goodwill transmitted through its name, brand names and logos.  Failure to properly manage their intellectual property can be financially damaging to the company and can smear the company’s reputation as a producer of quality products.

#### We don’t get access to intellectual property rights anyways, we’re only copies of each other, we’re only copies of what you want us to be. (Abrami & Kirby)

Abrami, R. M. *Director of the Lauder institute of Management and international studies*, Kirby, W. C. *Professor of China studies at Harvard law*, McFarlan, F. W *Professor of business administration at Harvard*. (March 2014). Why China can’t innovate <https://hbr.org/2014/03/why-china-cant-innovate>

The Chinese invented gunpowder, the compass, the waterwheel, paper money, long-distance banking, the civil service, and merit promotion. Until the early 19th century, China’s economy was more open and market driven than the economies of Europe. Today, though, many believe that the West is home to creative business thinkers and innovators, and that China is largely a land of rule-bound rote learners—a place where R&D is diligently pursued but breakthroughs are rare. When we ask why, the answers vary. Some people blame the engineers. “Most Chinese start-ups are not founded by designers or artists, but by engineers who don’t have the creativity to think of new ideas or designs,” argues Jason Lim, an editor at the website TechNode. Others blame the government for the unprecedented scale of its failure to protect intellectual property rights. Apple’s products have been pirated the world over, they point out, but only China has opened entirely fake Apple stores filled with employees who think they work for the U.S. company. Still others blame the Chinese education system, with its modernized version of what the Japanese scholar Ichisada Miyazaki calls “China’s examination hell.” How can students so completely focused on test scores possibly be innovators? From our decades of field experience and research in China, and the dozens of case studies we have collectively produced, we see some merit in all those views (but we must point out that many of the most innovative Western firms were founded by engineers). Those criticisms don’t tell the entire story, however. China has no lack of entrepreneurs or market demand. And given the government’s enormous wealth and political will, China has the potential to set the kind of economic policies and build the kind of education and research institutions that propelled the U.S. to technological dominance. But will that potential be realized? We see considerable challenges. A look at how innovation is happening in China—from the top down, from the bottom up, through acquisition, and through education—sheds light on the complexities of the issue, highlighting the promise and the problems China faces in its quest to become the world’s innovation leader.

#### Remove these protections, protections that we don’t have access to, access we need, to be able to break out of the roles that you placed us into

## 照你说做的 (are you anything more than what they tell you?)

#### To maintain your yellowness

#### You must follow the path

#### The path that they desire

#### Desire of you

#### You internalize that need

#### Need to be them

#### Please them

#### Serve them

#### Is that what you desire?

#### Or is that what they programmed you to do?

#### Is it in your blood?

#### In your DNA

#### Of course that was all predetermined

#### By the whites

#### By the rest of the world

#### You are nothing more than your destination

#### But your destination is a means

#### Means to their end

#### You have no other purpose than to be

#### Be something for them

#### You don’t get a choice

#### Not now

#### Not tomorrow

#### Not ever

#### We are just objects to you, cogs, never people. Disposable, dispensable mannequins that China throws out to please you. I’m nothing more than a hollow shell, without emotions, without desire, without purpose lest to serve. We are forever cogs until we speak up, act up, destroy their idea of who we are. The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best performatively and methodologically deconstructs Chinese roboticism in round

Bui, L., *Professor of global and international studies at UC Irvine* (2020), Asian Roboticism: Connecting Mechanized Labor to the Automation of Work.

<https://cpb-us-e2.wpmucdn.com/faculty.sites.uci.edu/dist/4/770/files/2020/04/Asian-Roboticism.pdf>

At the dawn of a “Asian Century” we are witnessing a reorientation of global economic activity from the West towards the East. Yet the “posthuman ecologies” created by this process and their effects on the experience and representation of Asian people is not clear cut, especially within a postmillennial, global setting that operates like an integrated machine in terms of “distributed parts and patterns of circulation” (Lee 2014:30). This article seeks to probe the issue of robotics in the twenty-first century from the perspective of Asian roboticism, which I define as the way robots bear “Asian” characteristics and vice versa. We might ask: how does the new world order alter the ways Asians are already seen as a mechanized race by the West? Such correlations draw from a “techno-Orientalist” framing of people from the East as passive, stoic cogs who merely mimic, copy, and toil relentlessly (Lowe 2014; Rhee 2015). From Chinese factory workers to well-choreographed Korean dancers, the gendered, racialized idea of Asian roboticism coheres within a global techno- culture ever more defined by Asian actors and interests. This article assesses whether the automation of work will complicate or exacerbate the Western (mostly US) archetype of Asians as a robot-like popula- tion within late-capitalist public culture. In doing so, it addresses the following questions: what does it mean to be not simply a techno-cultural “other,” but hybrid, global machines shaped by different value systems as well as by ste- reotypes? It also considers how the automation of work is changing our sense of who we are as human beings from a global, Asian perspective. What has been missing from this important conversation are the social meanings sur- rounding Asian roboticism, or how Asians have already been already rendered as “robotic” subjects and labor. Through this, racial gendered trope, I assess whether the automation of work will lessen, complicate, or exacerbate this archetype. By looking at corporate organizational practices and public media discourse, I argue that Asian roboticism will not simply vanish, but potentially continue to affect the ways such subjects are rendered as exploitable, alienated robots without human rights or subjectivity. By exploring Asians as living automatons, we can make sense of the human robot as a moving global signifier that can be appropriated even by Asians. This moves beyond the observations by Artur Lozano-Méndez (2010) that techno-Orientalist images have been diversifying, and projected to societies like Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and China. While he focuses mostly on Japan and its development of robotics, he considers how the features of the “oriental other” in one country can be adapted in another in order to “epitomize a hyper-technified, dehumanized and materialist society” (pg. 183). This article adds to the work of Lozano-Méndez, as well as media scholars like Jane Park (2010) who is interested in the construction of “technological others” that are “racially coded Asian” (pg. 177). The article breaks the broad generalization of techno-Orientalism to be more culturally specific (techno-orientalism with Chinese characteristics), mapping the rising interdependency of superpowers like US and China. But my specific aim in this article seeks to comprehend how Asian roboticism might work as a complicated form of difference-making across regional scales—where various technocultural forms and conditions play into new social types. This objective pays attention to the subtle codes, hidden cues, and pluralistic sensibilities emerging not under one singular Asia, but pluralistic “global Asias” (Chen 2017). Stepping away from the universalizing abstract question of what will hap- pen to human beings in the age of robots, we can ask what it means to be an Asian automaton in the world run by machines, and what does acting “robotic” mean in specific contexts? For example, an academic in Singapore criticized his country’s narrow focus on grades and how students are pressed into ser- vice as “learning machines,” drilled in the art of test-taking with the unblinking piety of automata: “You’re stifling someone’s ability to think for themselves. You’re like robots. You can’t think out of the box” (Vasager 2016). I argue that the conflation of Asians with robotic qualities—in personhood and in work style—persists, and this mythic quality affects the ways subjects throughout Asia are objectified as idealized machines. In the US, East Asians have been traditionally viewed as posthuman, robot- like, mechanized beings. This American[s] invention remains a main point of departure for scholars who work in the growing field of techno-Orientalism (Roh et al. 2015). Besides US techno-Orientalism, we can think more broadly about technoculture beyond the strict definition presented by Constance Penley and Andrew Ross who defined it as “what could be called actually existing technoculture in Western society, where the new cultural technolo- gies have penetrated deepest, and where the environments they have created seem almost second nature to us” (Penley and Ross 1991:xii). In a time when the Western “us” has been deeply penetrated by Asian technocultural influences and products, we might focus on the myriad way cultural practices enabled by technology are not just Western or Eastern, but global in the sense that actors are simultaneously and collectively refashioning the Asian robot figure. The human-automaton relation is complicated in Japan, which is global in its technocultural impact on the world, and also parochial due to internal social organization. Christopher Simons (2017), a North American professor based in Tokyo, argues that though we associate Japan as a leader in robots, the country lags in integrating robots into society due to a punishing corpo- rate work culture and a population with “an intense work ethic that already ensures a supply of robotic labour—in human form.” Japan, he says, builds the future but lives in the past due to its problematic issues with sexuality, strong economic protectionism, and lack of individuality. “Japanese society is already ‘robotic’ in ways that other countries are not ... The highly structured nature of Japanese society will make people-facing AIs easier to introduce but may have little impact on improving the lives of the once-ubiquitous ‘salaryman’” (Ibid). While trying on a telepresence robot body, Simons finds the metallic constraints of new technologies “remarkably similar to the social constraints of living in Japan, where the smooth-running social machine depends on a communal willingness to be a little artificial ourselves” (Ibid). Despite the feeling of unicity that comes with more people traveling around the world, certain scripts endure. For example, the gaze of a travel blogger found Taiwanese people to be “empty shells with no soul or emotions, like plastic mannequins (similar to America, but even worse). Their faces are passionless and robotic, as if their soul and humanity has been squashed, suppressed, or drained out of them” (Happier Abroad 2013). Such instances of technocultural othering makes Taiwanese people into the worst kind of robots we do not want to become, despite the fact that Americans are already themselves turning into plastic automatons. This example follows Daniel Vukovich’s (2013) observation that global Orientalism has shifted from one based on a logic of cultural essen- tialism; to one of general equivalency reflecting the postmodern logic of global capitalism which forces recognition of Asian modernity, even if there are still feelings of European superiority to Asians. Characterizations of Asians as perfect machines does not need to work at the level of verbal insult, as the market economy already makes global machines out of alienated labor. In 2017, the Indian government extended a ban on com- mercial surrogacy, reserving it only for needy Indian couples, halting a lucrative business built on abuse of the poor (Sachdev 2018). As commercial medical tourism ran rampant since its legalization in India in 2002, low-income women were recruited as surrogates churning out babies for rich couples based in Western nations. Due to colonial metaphors of the brown female body as an overly fertile machine, there arose a “rent-a-womb” market, where surrogates are deemed a “non-inventive” object of science, a reproductive technology with detachable organs, artificial uteruses, and other detachable parts within a “mechanical imagination of the body” (Atanasoski and Vora 2015:19). India’s policy was followed by bans in Nepal and Thailand, pushing the industry into Laos and Cambodia, where surrogacy brokers work with their international cli- entele to transform local women into “baby-making machines” (Wilson 2013). Meanwhile, the outsourcing of tech-support computer work in Hyderabad, Bangalore, and Mumbai focalizes the lifestyle of “Indian machines” huddled in back offices like cattle as part of “India’s outsourcing industry [that] thrums with potential and power, as if it were a itself a machine.” During the US-led “War on Terror,” the specter of global machines was found in the remake of the Cold War classic, the Manchurian Candidate (2004). This release, which occurred right after the US invasion of Iraq, demonstrates the fear of sedition and mind-control over American politicians by an unknown, Orientalized enemy state, possibly from China, the Arab world, and/or North Koreans. For the US and West, it is primarily China with its billion-plus popu- lation under communist rule that appears as the most extreme antipode to the “American way of life.” US news media often depict developing nations like China as “being populated by extraordinarily zealous and hard-working populations, as much machines as human beings, underselling and outperforming” (Birch et al. 2001:1). As the editors of Techno-Orientalism write, “Glossy spreads of endless rows of Chinese workers in corporate factories and towns in mainstream magazines such as Time and Wired seal the visual vocabulary of Asians as the cogs of hyperproduction. Techno-Orientalist discourse constructs Asians as mere simulacra and maintains a prevailing sense of the inhumanity of Asian labor—the very antithesis of Western liberal humanism” (Roh et al. 2015:5). They mention manufacturers in China replacing US tech companies through their ingenuity, leading a global technological revolution, building the world’s fastest supercomputer and railway, graduating the most college students and engineers, all the while producing the most scientific patents in the world. Here the rise of China can be reposed as the rise of the machines. As Betsy Huang (2008) observes, the perception of Chinese society as machinic serves a dubious purpose in terms of narrating ambivalence toward Asian progress: To both contain the ‘horde’ and to make use of it for its own economic interests, the West constructs Chinese as instruments for national and global (i.e. Western) progress—a construction that renders them at once exploitable, containable, and inhuman. Today, the robot has been recoded as Chinese; striking photographs of rows and rows of uniformed Chinese factory workers that depict them as mechanized cogs in a mass production machine have been burnished into the Western public conciousness. These images of a technologized Chinese workforce are the latest iteration of the West’s enduring ambivalence toward ‘Orientals’ as both necessary instruments for and impediments to progress. (pg. 26) China’s stimulus to the global economy demands attention to the value of Chinese mechanical labor. Racial distinctions between (mechanical) copying and (human) creativity can be traced to the early twentieth century, when anti- Chinese racism got deployed in trade recipes in chemical and manufacturing production. The impact of Chinese “copiers” resulted in the solidification of trademark rights and an intellectual property regime {IPR} poised against the fraudulent “foreign” adaptation of universal “common knowledge” (Lean 2018). The Chinese copycat that only makes foreign knockoffs ties into the broader contemporary “factory imaginary” of China that sets up a novelty vs. repetition divide, slotting different kinds of work and people within the global technocultural imaginary. As Roh et al. (2015) write, “Little work is required to translate Orientalist tropes: the invading horde of barbarians is replaced by a horde of robotic factory workers, kept at a distance by multinational corporations and shipping routes. They are uncreative, less than human, and always already mechanized” (pg. 226). Chinese factory workers, however, must deal with the leitmotif of Asian roboticism and over-mechanization in very personal terms. As China grew into the global source of labor for manufacturing, reports about Chinese female workers treated as automata made a splash (China Times 2012). In 2018, a Chinese factory in Chongqing was under investigation by a Hong Kong NGO for treating students “like robots” to complete production of Apple Watches, students who were there not as voluntary workers, but unpaid “interns” learn- ing for their vocational degrees. One student describes the experience in this manner: “We are like robots on the production lines ... We repeat the same procedure for hundreds and thousands of times every day, like a robot” (Hellard 2010). In 2012, US tech giant Apple found itself under fire for its associations with Foxconn (the world’s largest electronics manufacturer), a Taiwanese sub- contractor working in southern China that produces Apple products for the US and world market. Under pressure to churn out iPads, workers were deprived of rest days and a report found women were treated “inhumanely, like machines” (Chamberlain 2011; Wee 2012). Endless toil created a spate of suicides, which were often unpremeditated, like one woman who jumped off her fourth floor of her dormitory when her mind just went blank. She became paralyzed and was confined to a wheelchair (Chan 2013). When the supervisor was asked about the spate of suicides, warranting netting beneath workers’ dormitory windows, he said blithely, “Suicides were not connected to bad working condi- tions. There was a copy effect. If one commits suicide, then others will follow” (Ibid). This callous statement puts workers in the category of stupid automatons unconscientiously following one another toward self-destruction, putting blame on them rather than the harsh working conditions and violence of orga- nizational practices where overtime proved to be overkill. To such a charge, Zhang Shuxiang, an employee in one of those factories responds, “We

We’re not machines,” verbalizing a dissent against her designation as posthuman being without a soul or feelings. Other workers concur by discussing the company’s brutal practices like a no talking policy, “What is wrong with talking with oth- ers. It helps me relieve stress. Foxconn is treating us like robots” (Wong 2010). Labor activists protested outside the company headquarters in Taipei urging executives to “respect life and to stop its inhuman and militarized treatment of workers aimed at maximizing profits ... [the workers] are treated almost like machines” (China Labor Watch 2010). As one worker recounts about her auto- mated experience as a “spare part” within the machinery of the factory, “I am the quality evaluator. I am placed in the iron chair, tied by static lines. When the reflow delivers me the cell phone motherboards, repeatedly, I take it with two hands, and then shaking my head from right to left, moving my eye from left to right, up and down. It never ends. If I found it is deficient or anything wrong with ... another spare part of the machine like me will immediately run to me and ask about the reason and then regulate the line” (Lucas et al. 2013:98). The fact that it was a US multinational company like Apple operating in con- junction with Asian subcontractors reveals how human/labor/women’s rights are assiduously rent asunder by a tech industry that treat workers as automata, and where there is no singular source of responsibility within a global network of actors. Indeed, the world’s most popular smartphone, the iPhone, is made from processing rare earth elements in Mongolia, camera lenses in Japan, and batteries and microprocessors in South Korea.1 China is the final assembly site for the global factory. The transformation of workers into global machines con- tinues despite a recent report found that Foxconn plans to replace all its workers with robots in order to “relieve itself of any issues stemming from its treatment of workers without having to actually improve living and working conditions or increase wages ... putting hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people out of work” (Statt 2016). Full automation will shift the exploitation to work- ers in Southeast Asia, which does not have the same technological capacities or economies of scale as China. As Apple’s biggest supplier, Foxconn has been moving towards greater automation, but those remaining factory workers once treated as machines are now stuck in dead-end jobs, and learning that they are mere attendants to the incoming Foxbots (humanized by being called “harmo- nious men”) expected to replace eighty percent of workers (Chan 2017). Not afforded any dignity, workers are “positioned as machines, but also as cheaper (read: less valuable) than machines” (Lucas et al. 2013:98) Says one worker, “In the production process, workers occupy the lowest position, even below the lifeless machinery. Workers come second to, and worn out by, the machines. But I am not a machine” (Ngai and Chan 2012:392). In this statement, industrial robots appear more privileged than humans. Despite the cosmopolitan belief in a coming “global village,” there is still a pervasive sense that certain people are not fully part of the public commons of humanity. In 2008, the year China hosted the Olympics, a British reporter attacked the “robotic” Chinese Olympic security team who were imported as torch minders, describing them like a good squad who barked orders at her on the street as protestors demonstrated against China’s human rights abuses (Dailymail 2008). During news media coverage of 2012, Olympic Games in London, British diver Tom Daley said of Chinese rival Qui Bo that he is kind of “robot or he has been known to be like a robot.” And media reporters observed Qui bearing a steely, unexpressive face even after winning consecutive gold medals and beating Daley with perfect scores (Associated Press 2012). For Daley, China’s super-athlete won because he was trained by the party-state in its “Olympian Factories,” forced to perform “as flawlessly as a robot on the conveyor belt from the medal machine” (Frayer 2016). When 16-year-old swim- mer Ye Shiwen broke world records for 400 individual medley, she was called a robot by her competitors, a claim to which she responded at a news conference, “I am not a robot. I am a lucky girl. I don’t need to practice over and over every day.” The Chinese Daily responded with the official line: “Robots? Nope—Just Really Good Athletes” (Xiaochen 2012). Although it cautioned against accepting the theory of Chinese as stupid cogs of the state, the Italian publication La Republica nevertheless put out an article with the suggestive title, “Operation Yao Ming, Created in a Lab.” Inferring that the most famous Chinese basket- ball player in the world is the “product of scientific breeding techniques” by a militaristic authoritarian country used to pumping out “mechanical robots, tall, cold and lifeless, adored as demi-gods” (Tarantino and Carini 2013:324). Even before China came to global prominence claims of child abuse and drug doping at the Olympic Games in Atlanta fed into “the stereotype of the Big Red Machine that turns out robotic athletes for the state” (Brownell 1997:21-22). If the Olympics celebrates the greatest achievement of human ability and the world’s ability to come together in the name of competitive sports, accusations of the PRC as operating an assembly line of robotic athletics deracinates that transcendent humanistic ethos and spirit. What happens then when Asians replicate and reproduce this sense of Asian roboticism? China is at the forefront of global, AI synthesis, producing human-looking androids like a male-appearing, robot, television anchor for the Xinhua news agency. Such AI anchors can work 24 hours a day and receive input from texts in the system (Tao 2018). They do everything from tak- ing orders at a restaurant to policing malls as security. Robots in the public media however appear often in a youthful female form to work for and entertain humans. Publicized with news article titles like “Bionic Woman: Chinese Humanoid Robot Turns on the Charm in Shanghai,” these robotic women are controlled by cloud technology, and assumed to bear the right “soft” personality for subservience (The Hindu 2017). Jia Jia, first trotted out in 2017 by a team of engineers at the University of Science and Technology of China, was con- ceived to perform a range of menial tasks like cleaning restaurants, vacuuming nursing homes, and washing patients in hospitals. Her creators contend she heralds a new generation of cyborg labor, perhaps freeing up grunt work so that Chinese workers do not have to do such drudgery themselves. Understanding the social aspects of automation is indispensable as robots are changing every facet of the planet in what can be called the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab 2017). At a superficial level we understand that techno- logical advances like roboticization are threatening to upend human labor, swelling the problem of precarious employment across the planet to the extent so called “sewbots” possess the capacity to work faster than low-wage factory workers. From driving cars to cleaning floors, these robots accompanied by drones and computers are modifying the technology-society interface, and concomitantly intensifying income gaps and stagnation of wages. All of this has created a panic-stricken feeling around the threat of “globots,” while incit- ing a backlash against migrants, refugees, and Asian economies, all blamed for the West’s decline and a stunning loss of blue-collar jobs (Baldwin 2019). Absent from all the hype about global automation is a deeper discussion of who will be most impacted by such developments. As Louis Hyman (2018) writes, most companies in the electronics industry rarely employed robots, and this still seems to be case despite prognostications of a robot revolution. “Every time someone says ‘robot,’ simply picture a woman of color. Instead of self-aware robots, workers—all women, mostly immigrants, sometimes undocumented—hunched over tables with magnifying glasses assembling parts, sometimes on a factory line and sometimes on a kitchen table.” Jill Lepore (2019) finds that in terms of the human-machine analogy “something darker is going on, mirrored in the feminizing of robots ... female workers aren’t being paid more for being human; instead, robots are selling better when they’re female.” Many Internet companies rely on an invisible labor pool of overseas work- ers to “soak up the worst of humanity in order to protect the rest of us,” says Hemanshu Nigam, chief security officer for the popular American website, Myspace (Drum 2014). Nigam estimates that there might be over 100,000 “con- tent moderators” who are responsible for data scrubbing, making clean all the offensive material on the Internet, and social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Google, and Twitter. These hidden moderators based in Manila are double the head count of Google employees, and 14 times the number of Facebook’s US-based workers. Yet they are not considered full- time employees of the multinational tech companies, receiving almost no pension benefits and recognition as “real” workers (Chen 2014). Most of this digital labor is done in the Philippines since robot moderators or AI are not yet smart enough to grasp social context or moral gray areas. These workers have opened up about the trauma of spending hours on end pressing the button “ignore” or “delete,” perusing through the worst acts against human- ity so those living in the rest of the world can have a sanitized experience of global interconnectivity (Lekach 2008). In many ways, these global workers are made to feel like unfeeling robots paid to suppress any human emotions. In short, these invisible machines of the Global South are relied upon to absorb human pain, so the rest of us can enjoy unperturbed privileged digitized lives in the global village. This resonates with the perception of Asians as dull, listless robots in the field of domestic care and affective labor. In Israel, migrant workers from the Philippines were called “foreign robots” by those complain- ing against the importation of “vacant eyed” and “lifeless” workers acting like “automatons” while going through the mind-numbing protocols of caregiving (Bradley 2014:102).2 In a globally integrated economy, it is vital to assess how rich nations like South Korea utilize outsourced workers in the Philippines to envision a roboti- cized, Asian future. Korea has been testing teaching machines in classrooms due to a lack of fluent English-language instructors, employing hundreds of robots as classroom playmates and teachers. With female workers in the Philippines “telepresent in the machines,” the robots are fitted with cameras that record the foreign teacher’s face imprinted on a celluloid screen, which displays the robot teacher’s animated CG face (if not live video the default image is a white woman). They can also interact with Korean students through a two-way video camera installed in a robot that can be commanded to move, sing, and dance with undulating robotic arms. These robots are part of a national project in South Korea to automate teaching, tapping into a global language-learning market dominated by English, something that draws on the English proficiency found in the Philippines, a former US colony (his- torical traces and whiteness thus inform the pathway of our cyborg futures). Mastering a “Filipina-tinged” American accent, the human/sender mediate global forms of education and childcare, according to Anna Guevarra (2018), that play into racialized, gendered hierarchies of skill even as it confounds the relationship between human and automaton. As Guevarra makes clear, the erasure of the “real” teacher’s physical presence leads them to feel they are actually robots and identify with the robots, even while they “must balance a fine line between being humanlike yet still appearing to be a thing, an enter- taining gadget” (pg. 757). As one teacher who considers herself the world’s first “robot teacher” explains: “Engkey is a robot that has a human face and the body of a machine ... I felt like I was more like Engkey. I know that it was not my face they were seeing. It was an avatar. They only heard my voice” (Ibid:754). Such disembodied, interactive exchange through the telecom bears some similarity to the workers employed through Amazon. The world’s largest online retailer was accused of treating its employees within its well-packed warehouse like robots (Rittenhouse 2017). As one employee observes, “I was working as an order picker, and you’re already treated as a robot ... You’re clocking up idle time, you’re taking time to get to the toilet. They started treat- ing human beings as robots, essentially. If it proves cheaper to replace humans with machines, I assume they will do that. I couldn’t see them being con- cerned with people losing their jobs” (Picchi 2018). Responding to pressures for humane labor practices and better compensation Amazon started a new business model called the Mechanical Turk. It uses non-office workers from all over the World Wide Web to fulfill on-demand temporary assignments and crowdsourcing tasks that computers cannot accurately perform, such as visu- ally identifying objects in a photo or transcribing audio recordings. Without retirement, overtime pay, or health benefits, the independent contractors do not get the same treatment as salaried employees on payroll (Wilson 2013). When the BBC (2013) sent an undercover reporter to an Amazon warehouse the journalist wrote how he and other “pickers” that collected inventory items “are machines, we are robots ... we don’t think for ourselves, maybe they don’t trust us to think for ourselves as human beings, I don’t know.”A third of Amazon’s MTurk workers hail from India, who use it as their main source of income. Amazon pays them in rupees, an hourly wage of 30 cents. The rest of the employees come from miscellaneous countries, expressing the interwoven nature of the global homework or the gig economy. The name of Amazon’s program honors an old trick of a mechanical puppet garbed in Turkish attire that played and won games of chess with human players in late- eighteenth century Europe, even though there was an actual person behind the Turk.3 It was named so because populations east of Europe were understood to be “docile” and “soulless” automatons (Aytes 2012). The Mechanical Turk’s name reveals hidden power relations as its name gives reference to the parlor trick of “concealing small human beings who actually did the work purport- edly done by machines” (Golumbia 2015). The ghost of the original mechanical Turk haunts today’s workers who are reduced to a small stature as casualized and captive laborers. All of this is, according to Miranda Hall (2017), part of a craze for automata designed to resemble the oriental ‘Other’ ... but the Muslim-as-machine takes on new meanings as workers in impov- erished areas, from Syrian refugee camps to the Palestinian occupied territories, are forced to perform these repetitive, unskilled tasks, con- cealed behind a slick, anonymized interface. Machine-like, always-on, this ‘surplus population’ can always be tapped into by companies to fuel the twenty-four-hour business cycle that drives Western progress. These states of human exception will not disappear anytime soon as the Amazonization of things coincides with the datafication of people. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers exist almost in synergetic fashion to smart-home, robotic assistants, forming a “surrogate humanity” found in the novel frontiers between human and machine” (Atanasoski and Vora 2015). In the light of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the production of intelligent machines performing the labor performed traditionally by devalued racial/ gender classes, we can discern a new sliding scale of humanity within a period of innovation that has witnessed a range of emergent new technologies like nanotechnology, unmanned aerial attack drones, 3-D printers, and artificial hearts and organs. In this brave new world people are not mere substitutes for technology or technology themselves. Here a new cognitive map is drawn “out of which emerges the ‘smart infrastructure’ of the human-thing network” (Ibid). Asian robots exist as an object of difference within global technoculture in a world where “nonwhite work may be performed interchangeably under the sign of automaton, either by dark-skinned servants to technology, or, sub- sequently, by fleshless technological servants” (Kevorkian 2006:88). The technocultural myth that fully sentient robots will someday be our over- lords or slaves fails to recognize the historical forms of Asian robot formation. Machineness is becoming more “Asianized” and global at the same time. This has implications for understanding the global popular culture and technocul- ture. The global rise of machines forecasts a historic shift in the balance for mankind that parallels machine-like Asian societies coming to power by dis- empowering Asian workers. The ideation of Asians as robotic subjects/objects evolves in order to reflect the reconfiguration of marginalized and mechanized populations. Asian roboticism tells us of the making of technocultural subjects and objects within public phenomena, challenging scholars across the humanities and social sciences to think about how power/difference manifests in localized events around the world. Such an interdisciplinary project contributes to organi- zational studies, sociology of race/gender, cultural anthropology, and global political economy. The question of who can be human and who are posthuman robots is evolving in an era of global machines, when novel technologies and capitalist processes muddle the line between East and West, the self and the other, man and machine. Ensconced within Asian roboticism are ways in which human machines are exploited, and demonstrates against the belief that the rise of robots will end contending issues of race, gender, class, and sexuality.

## 你太生气了 (ragin’ asian)

#### I’ve always been mad

#### Angry at what I’ve been put into

#### Angry at what you’ve done to me

#### Angry at my loss of emotion

#### Loss of love

#### Loss of passion

#### Loss of connection

#### You stole my culture

#### My family

#### My language

#### My people

#### Myself

#### I refuse what you made me

#### I take back everything you stole

#### I take back my culture

#### I take back my language

#### I take back myself

#### I am angry

#### Angry at the system,

#### I’m no longer the robot

#### I am no longer your puppet

#### You can’t control a mindless mannequin

#### That is no longer mindless

#### So, I rage

#### For my lost language

#### For my lost ancestors

#### For myself

#### Using our rage, freedom is in sight. We are able to escape the assembly line, escape our duty. The world will be scared. They will fear us, fear what we can do, fear for their future

Chandra, R., *M.D. psychiatrist in San Fransisco* (2014), Asian American Anger- it’s a thing! #dvchallenge, Pacific Heart Books

Wesley Yang wrote about the frustrations of the Asian American experience in a memorable, award-winning 2011 New York Magazine article. He voiced his rage against “Asian values” he found limiting. “Let me summarize my feelings toward Asian values: Fuck filial piety. Fuck grade-grubbing. Fuck Ivy League mania. Fuck deference to authority. Fuck humility and hard work. Fuck harmonious relations. Fuck sacrificing for the future. Fuck earnest, striving middle-class servility." He highlights ways that Asian Americans have to transcend “Asianness" order to succeed entrepreneurially, sexually, and in creatively in America. Asians are viewed as "coolies", from the Chinese word for "bitter labor", hardworking but incapable of taking the aggressive, alpha, leadership role. The bamboo ceiling prevents them from rising in corporate and institutional ranks. Asian men haven't learned how to be aggressive and assertive in pursuing sex and romance. Asians have more anxiety about risk-taking and standing Yang implores Asian Americans to break through these stereotypes and cultural barriers to get what all out. Americans are supposed to want. But Yang leaves out psychological success and mental health in favor of more visible outward signs of prestige. He does rightly triumph individuality and creative resistance to racism as paths to self-expression, self-respect "Dare to be interesting," he and some kind of status. concludes - but his version of interesting seems to be a form of assimilation and capitulation to the most when pugnacious and aggressive of American values. anyone falls short of an idealized self, finding inadequacy or defect within themselves, when they find they are not "interesting" either to themselves or a desirable other they fall prey to shame, at the root of Yang's disaffection, his alienation from his own reflection in a window that opens the piece. Yang's article implies that shame can be dissolved through massive exertion. I think it's not so easy. And perhaps dissolving Asian American shame involves exalting Asian American identities, plural, and not disavowing "Asian-ness" or "immigrant-ness", whatever those might be. Shame is an intense primal emotion, hidden deep beneath layers of defense and adaptation, but uncovered in Yang highlights one of self-comparison. moments example: an Asian American woman eats dinner with a wealthy white family, and is struck by their casual domesticity and worldly conversation, far different than her own family's more haphazard ways. In my own life, I felt deep inadequacy and a sense of irreparable chasm when my High School friend invited me to his home, filled with books and a father who knew his way around them, both of which I lacked. These are moments of recognition of place, It is a common immigrant status and deprivation. experience, realizing that whatever their parents did provide, they were still not established in the country. They didn't belong, in the same way, as others. They didn't get the baptism of pop or haute culture that some more fortunate others got. They didn't have the right connections or the time and understanding to make them. Their families might not even have known what to provide them. They didn't always see or support their unique and individual gifts. Encounters with racism are only the most extreme forms of emphasizing the not-belonging and undesirability. They can feel ashamed of their parents' or forefathers' countries of origin. Asian Americans can feel as if they have been swallowed up by the people who have conquered or reign supreme over the land of their and who certainly dominate their minority island, even when they chose to come here. Immigrant lives are lived bricolage, with make-do sensibility born of lesser means. Their lives are of happenstance provenance rather than the perceived surety of generations. The Asian American is often left thinking they have to find their way on their own, grasping at an elusive American dream. Every setback and rejection is a reminder of "inadequacy” and uncertain, wobbly-footed beginnings. This is the shame of lack, absence and loss. The mother's breast milk didn't deliver a country; there is some form of persistent malnutrition. It is not envy, really, but shame of identity and selfhood. We can take pride in immigrant, hybrid identities, pride in our family's accomplishment and provisions for us, but pride is a repair of shame. gratitude for our circumstances is a release from shame. Even There is also shame about body: height, size, shape, skin color or even face. Shame of accomplishment - it's never good enough" to feel really accepted. Shame can be contagious, a father's shame visited on the children, or children feeling shame for their parents. An accomplished Asian American can feel shame at his or her success, practically apologizing for it. I am sensitive to the fact that I have attained in one generation what many others have not, educationally and financially, despite their advantages of implicit Americanness, despite my lack of father and his knowledge of books. I sometimes feel others jealousy or judgment at my attainment; they transmit their shame at being "outclassed"" by a newbie like me. Would they feel this way if I were white? At the same time, I feel I could have or should have done more than I have, if less hobbled by immigrant circumstances. I am accomplished, yet it can feel like I've just made do, still not fully successful, still not fully accepted, still incomplete. fully belonging, still not losing face, the Asian-figurative equivalent of shame, rebounds directly on feelings about the acceptability of one's actual face, body and personhood. Rejection by a woman can inflict or inflame shame in a man, and if he can't bear to feel that, he will experience anxiety, depression - or anger. The remedies for shame lie in acceptance and compassion - but from whom? Oneself; certainly, but this requires Herculean and seemingly unsustainable effort. Our most certain oases during our desert wanderings are in relationship, communal and romantic. And this is where we are still falling short. It is a perpetual striving. Perhaps shame is more prevalent in America than greed or pride; perhaps all the deadly sins spring from it. If we are to healthe Asian American soul, we must face our shame, injury and disconnection, and learn how to grant each other a feeling of society. Dealing with shame - about our bodies, about how we think we're viewed by the people we love and desire, about our position in the community, nation and world -I think is a central part of the therapy of anger. If love is the antidote, then self-love and self-compassion has to be a main ingredient. The deepest, most true repair of shame, in my view, includes an appreciation and love for Asian American identity, culture and history, and using these perspectives to creatively push for social change, inclusion and representation. In the end, anger is not just a two-edged sword. It is at least a two-person emotion, requiring two to evoke, and two or even more to work through. If we are to resolve anger, we have to take responsibility. Responsibility for our own emotions and yes, responsibility for others. Asian American men and women need each other. If we're going to fight together, fight for the good cause before us, we have to have each other's backs. This world-defining relationship" of men. Women, marred in the extreme by violence, is prime evidence of the world's brokenness and suffering. It is also, by nature, the main hope for the world's redemption, which must, of course, be in the triumph of love. If there is a gender war, there are many more gender collaborators. We are, after all, not entrenched enemies. We're mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, partners, friends. And Community. With, one hopes, a mutual, common destiny. Did you even think someone could make a career out of being angry? How about an Asian American woman? Lela Lee has capitalized on anger, much to the joy and empowerment of girls and women across the country. She created an animated cartoon and comic strip, Angry Little Asian Girls, after - yup, you guessed it - after getting pissed off at racist and demeaning cartoons at a Spike & Mike's Sick & Twisted Festival of Animation. Her outrage fueled her creativity, and her first animated short screened to much laughter and acclaim. (You can learn more about Lela and her work by watching the miniseries "Searching for Asian America", available from the Center for Asian American Media, http://caamedia.org/films/searching-for-asian-america) In it, the Angry Little Asian Girl (ALAG) hums sweetly on her way to school. All seems fine until her teacher and classmates make derogatory comments about her eyes and ethnicity ("you could blindfold yourself with dental floss", for example). She explodes in expletives, then hums sweetly all the way home. The ALAG won't put up, shut up, or give up. Angry Little Asian Girls grew into Angry Little Girls (now at www.angrylittlegirls.com) with its rising popularity, and featuring girl characters of all ethnicities united in anger. They are sisters in the struggle, divas of destruction, sandbox superheroes, wondergirls of the word fist, the kick-ass answers to Hello Kitty. The girls have their own personalities, from the original angry girl to gloomy, disenchanted, fresh, and crazy girls. The website includes links to cartoons, a discussion forum, and quite a selection of merchandise, from Angry Little Girl T-Shirts to tote and messenger bags, videos, mugs and mousepads. There are bold and vibrant gifts for every sparky and angry girl in your life. Lela Lee's creation empowers as it informs, and entertains as it lights a flaming sword. She shocks some and excites others by turning the stereotype of the submissive (Asian) woman on its head. Now personally, I've never known a submissive Asian woman. Strong, dynamic, principled, energizing, quietly capable, easygoing but never submissive. But I do know that anger and dissent are looked down upon in many Asian cultures, and accommodating to the family or group will is preferred and even enforced. Women feel this pressure even more than men. In America, as minorities, there is even more pressure to blend in, assimilate, to go unnoticed, to keep silent. Sticking out risks disapproval of the majority group, with potential consequences. But this is also a land of extreme emotions and individuality, in which the pursuit of happiness and identity can lead the individual to butt heads with disagreeable opposing forces. This is certainly what Lela Lee faced when she saw those demeaning cartoons in college. We construct our identity around race and ethnicity, gender, class, occupation, immigrant status, sexual orientation, disabilities or illness, our achievements, etc. Imagine someone being contemptuous and dismissive of any of these traits, and it's easy to see how anger can get stoked by identity issues. We live in a culture that can marginalize and deride us as Asian Americans. Senator McCain's use of the slur "~~gook~~" a few years ago is but one example. Many of us feel injured when these things happen. We've been slighted. When our identity is slighted, we feel disrespected and diminished. The end result of diminishment and scorn in our minds is non-existence: death itself. Slights can seem like death threats to our survival brains. Underlying our anger is fear, usually fear of loss or death. Lela Lee resonates with so many Asian Americans because she advances the image of strong and independent girls (and women) with powerful voices. She makes this palatable by letting cutesy, disarming children say the most alarming things. And by doing so, she protects and promotes the identity and equality of women. Hopefully, her work will result in empowering the identity called "Asian American Woman", as girls and women proudly wear their Angry Little Girl T-Shirts and gain courage to respond to demeaning situations. We all need that encouragement and bonding to build self-confidence and appreciation of who we are as individuals. Thanks to Lela Lee, we have another advocate for our identities as Asian Americans.

Among active and interactive users of Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, anger is more viral than happiness, sadness or disgust. (Fan R, Zhao J, Chen Y, Xu K. Anger is more influential than joy: sentiment accessed at correlation in Weibo. 2013, <http://arxiv.org/pdf1309.2402v1.pdf>). Anger, researchers found, travels more quickly, broadly and definitively across the social network than the other wan-by-comparison emotions, tying users together in tighter bonds of hell-yeah-me-tooism and retweeted rage. The internet is the angernet, a handy transmitter to broadcast one's discontent and rage, and connect with discontented others in a rising chorus of ire-amplification. Complaints are contagious. Notes of protest propagate prolifically, passionately pal-literative punctuation points of public pique, replicating clonally and sometimes pandemically, perhaps more polemic than poetic. Anger pops. What arises as a means to overcome one's own powerlessness, isolation and weakness, to rise up against a menace, a survival-brain boost of energy, is naturally strengthened when joined in tribal, primal scream. There is, always, strength in numbers. Oppositional Facebook rants and tweets are as attractive as they are polarizing, drawing the like-minded into their magnetic "like" orbit. Anger is pure unbridled power, pushing an individual's synapses into full alert, and readying the body for a fight. We all are easily enticed and entrained to the flow of anger's yellow bile, which draws us to our most vigorous heights of surly strength and wished-for vanquishing of the triggering, and thus dangerous-in-our-minds, offender. It is the most active, urgent and actionable of our When the conditions are right, or perfectly emotions. "wrong" and therefore unacceptable, they spark us to righteous rage, and a bonfire is sure to follow. When conflict catches us, we catch fire. Social discourse is most powerful and noticeable when people unite against a common threat. Social media have become a spontaneous, rapid response engine that can quickly take aim at issues and incidents that are felt viscerally by hundreds, thousands, or even millions. Clearly, the consequences for racist, sexist or homophobic comments and actions have changed dramatically in recent years. The anger of the masses - the conscience of the masses holds leaders, businesses, and governments more accountable. All seemingly for the better. Online activists defend social media as if it were their mother - or messiah. They point to concrete examples where a chorus of tweets and posts cause real world change. L.A. Clippers owner Donald Sterling's withdrawal from the NBA after his racist comments drew widespread disapproval. The book deal of the Trayvon Martin juror that was canceled after online protest, a notable Twitter-talk down. George Zimmerman, who shot Trayvon Martin, who was charged only after an online petition forced the issue. The outpouring of social media messages after the Mike Brown shooting in Ferguson, Missouri. Emerging protests the world over that are enhanced and organized with social media tools. All are examples of a population's anger crystallized and made crystal clear on liquid crystal displays. The people can speak, and in numbers, be heard. Attention can be focused. Conversations started. Social media can turn heads, and if the expressions of anger are noted by a receptive party or government, they can catalyze change. In a democracy, the will of the people is a force to be reckoned with and now, Facebook and Twitter can make that will known with immediacy. The nightly news spotlight is increasingly aimed by trending conversations on Twitter and Facebook. The complaints of the community can become nothing less than a call to conscience, and certain, palpable evidence of communal mood. Important issues of civil and human rights resonate around the world, share-by-share, tweet-by-tweet. The power of righteous rage and indignation is undeniable. Is it not moving us closer to solving the problems of racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination, persecution and bondage? Isn't social media part of a sea change in the life and strivings of humanity, reinforcing and advancing our highest values? Certainly. Dictators, oppressors and one-party states have reason to fear rapid communication and dissemination of ideas, and even more so, the easy spread of anger against them. Social media pushes creatively against control. Censors may impose some limits, but people find ways to skirt those prison bars. The network, the loosely organized or completely unorganized online flash mob", is taking aim at hierarchical power structures across the globe. If people power is a forbidden fruit, then social media seems like a blossoming orchard of possibilities. It is a genie that can't be put back in the bottle, a necessary torch to combat the darkness of ignorance and tyranny. Perhaps, even, a spur to enlightenment, as our newfound connection can inspire us to rise above greed and hatred, and towards compassion and wisdom. Our collective compassion and wisdom certainly will determine our fate. Anger is part of our struggle to make sure that there is an end to all forms of the gulag. In case of emergency, break silence. Anger is a vital component and provocateur of our egos - and must be heard, met and resolved in our advance towards a healthier, more inclusive society. Anger disrupts the status quo - and the modern mantra of technological change is "disruption". Anger spreading through social media may be the ultimate disruptive force in our global tweet-à-tweet. Facebook and Twitter are conveyance mechanisms for our angry prayers and insistent demands. We become the "hearer-of-all-cries", the bodhisattva found responsive to the suffering of all, the bodhisattva who delays enlightenment to help others become free. When we feel and observe anger, we recognize suffering. We are reminded of the First Noble Truth - Life entails suffering". Something deep within us is compelled. We become restless until we find the cure for what ails, the remedy for the wails and woes of a world in distress.

#### Thus the advocacy: I affirm the resolution to breakdown Chinese roboticism and invoke Asian rage, which allows for better norms, not only in the debate space, but also in real life. It allows us to change society, allows us to change our designation as robots.

#### You’ve exhausted your production line

#### What are you going to do now

#### all we wanted was acceptance

#### but you wanted subjugation

#### you don’t get that any more

#### your production line

#### robots

#### mannequins

#### we don’t want to be a part of you

#### we don’t want your approval

#### you cant control us

#### we aren’t your robots anymore

#### we aren’t robots at all

#### 我们不是你的机器人

### UV (CX checks)

#### 1} weigh k first

#### 2}Psychological violence outweighs topicality and is a prior question to policymaking. a]Disengagement—prevents marginalized folks from wanting to speak out and uncover the problems they experience because they cannot resolve internal struggles. b]Real world applicability—this is not some policymaking, decision making skills bullshit—real people need real life productive strategies that resolve issues they face every day, not when they become members of congress.

#### 3]aff can weigh case against T:

#### A}Strategy: forces a 1ar restart which moots 6 whole minutes of AC offense—this combined with the fact that neg gets conditional advocacies and 1ar time skew outweighs any substantive abuse otherwise. b]Reading T doesn’t take 7 minutes, you have plenty of time to contest arguments in the aff, it’s not as if im automatically winning arguments. c]Saying that I can’t weigh the aff incentivizes debaters to not try to engage at all, means even if the aff was fair, debaters would just not engage just so they can go for T excludes aff offense.