# 1N

## Off

### 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose affirmative frameworks, advocacy text and advantage areas thirty minutes before round

#### Violation: They didn’t

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash – not disclosing incentivizes bad affirmatives that rely on surprise tactics to win the round – our interp forces contextual debates instead of generics that barely link if at all.

#### 2] Reciprocity – They get an infinite amount of time to frontline their aff while we get only four minutes in round – means they’ll be ahead on any debate

#### 3] Shiftiness- Not knowing enough about the affirmative coming into round incentivizes 1ar shiftiness about what the aff is and what their framework/advocacy entails. That means even if we could read generics or find prep, they’d just find ways to recontextualize their obscure advocacy in the 1ar. Shiftiness outweighs on reversibility since the 2N can’t come back from a shift 1ar and read new offs.

#### 4] Academic Integrity – Breaking a new aff means we don’t have enough time to check the citations of your cards nor do we have enough time to go through all of the brackets and modifications to your evidence. 4 minutes is obviously not enough to make a strategy, compile a doc, and go through an entire AC of evidence. Academic Integrity outweighs on Longevity since High School prepares you for college and colleges will expel you for academic dishonesty.

#### Paradigm Issues:

#### Use Competing Interps on New Affs Bad –

#### A. It’s a yes/no question on disclosing a new aff since you can’t disclose half a plantext “States ought to eliminate” means nothing.

#### B. Reasonability changes every round and forces the judge to intervene to determine what is reasonable.

#### No RVIs

#### A.Encourages debaters to read New Affs just to bait the shell and win on the RVI – kills substance

#### Discourages checking real abuse since debaters will think they will lose to the RVI

#### Drop the Debater

#### A.Our interp affects their entire 1AC since we couldn’t prepare for any argument – so drop the argument doesn’t make sense.

#### Comes over 1AR Theory

#### A.Their abuse outweighs on Scope since it affected every speech that came after the 1AC while ours only affects the debate after the 1N.

#### B. If we had to be abusive it was because we had no other choice because their abuse was that bad

### 2

Truth

#### Our interpretation is the topic should determine the division of aff and neg ground – winning that : Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. should always be sufficient condition for voting negative – hold the line, 1AC prove there’s no I-meet.

#### “Resolved” is a formal decision.

Merriam-Webster

[Unlike Words and Phrases ’64, this card actually exists on the internet! <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved>] pat

a: to declare or decide by a formal resolution and vote

b: to change by resolution or formal vote

the house resolved itself into a committee

#### The Role of the Ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating – any alternative framework must explain why we switch sides, why there has to be a winner and a loser, and why there are structural rules. The frame for evaluating offense is that debate is a game and we’re all here to win – that means procedural questions come first.

#### Vote neg for predictable limits – abdicating government actions sanctions picking any interpretation for debate – that incentivizes retreat from controversy and forces the neg to first characterize the aff and then debate it which eliminates the benefit of preround research – two impacts –

#### 1. Clash – a common point of engagement ensures effective clash, which is a linear impact – negation is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale. The topic of discussion is up to the affirmative, but depth and nuanced engagement is determined by negative ground. Any impact intrinsic to debate, not just discussion, comes from negation because it starts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement.

#### 2. Fairness – prioritize preserving the competitive aspects of debate – games cannot operate unless both sides can be confident in advance they have an equal chance of winning – the fact they’ve asked you to vote for them proves we all agree that debate is a competition.

#### TVA and switch-side solve the 1AC – [affirm the topic AND center the orientation of the debate space is some form of antiblackness] – any 1AR response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation and reading the rest of their theory on the negative solves their offense.

### 3

#### The aff’s ontological commitments are disconnected from political economy – that locks in pathologizing attitudes toward black workers and can’t redress specific causes of structural inequality.

Reed ‘18

Touré F Reed (teaches twentieth-century US and Afro-American history at Illinois State University). “Between Obama and Coates,” Catalyst vol. 1, issue 4, Winter 2018. <https://catalyst-journal.com/vol1/no4/between-obama-and-coates> rc/Pat

The details of these two cases make clear that they fail as precedents for African American reparations. Not only is there no contemporary equivalent to the political antislavery movement that had informed the Royall act, but — in contrast to Belinda Royall — the more than 40 million blacks in the United States cannot expect restitution from traitors to the nation’s independence. Likewise, in contrast to postwar Germany, the US is the world’s dominant ideological, financial, and military power. The nations with which we have warred over the past few decades are, thus, in no position to pressure the US — indirectly or directly — to make restitution to African Americans. Because Coates’s ontological commitment to race can only permit a politics of moral pleading, the specific material and ideological issues that inform political decisions are inconsequential. The only details that matter to him are the grievance and the justness of the cause. Coates’s narrow focus on the righteousness of these cases ultimately allows him to insinuate parallels between them and the case for African American reparations in the absence of a material basis for comparison. And since reparations presumes that whites’ pathological commitment to white-skin privilege precludes political alliances — short lived or otherwise — based on mutual interest, Coates’s case for recompense has to center on special pleading. But pleading is not politics and Coates’s case for reparations is not a blueprint for a feasible political movement. If, as Coates argues, the white working and middle classes are so racist that they elected Donald Trump to erase the allegedly progressive economic agenda implemented by the nation’s first (neoliberal) black president, then why would they support reparations — a program from which they could never benefit? While Coates may believe that moral suasion is the engine of political change, the historical record makes clear that coalitions built on mutual interest, rather than the kind of altruistic noblesse oblige reparations would require, have been essential to blacks’ material advancement. Reparations’ appeal, however, is not rooted in its feasibility. This is why the absence of historical precedent for Coates’s formal case for reparations is ultimately beside the point. Whatever Coates’s intent, the appeal of his work is owed, in large part, to reparations’ political infeasibility. Indeed, “The Case for Reparations” and all of Coates’s subsequent related essays are less calls to arms to end racial disparities, than a case for a national conversation about race — albeit under a different name. At its most ambitious, Coates’s formal case for reparations is merely a call for moving Representative John Conyers’s H.R. 40 out of committee — where it has languished, in one form or another, since 1989 — to debate on the floor of the House of Representatives. Coates’s reflections on H.R. 40 make clear that he is willing to settle for far less than material redress. Conyers’s bill does not outline a schedule for restitution, but simply calls for exploration of the feasibility of reparations. Still, Coates contends that moving the bill out of committee alone will pay dividends for both blacks and whites. Describing reparations as “the full acceptance of our collective biography — the price we must pay to see ourselves squarely,” Coates implies that material compensation may not be a necessary fix for black suffering. “Perhaps after a serious discussion and debate — the kind that H.R. 40 proposes,” he says, “we may find that the country can never fully repay African Americans. But we stand to discover much about ourselves in such a discussion.…” Insinuating that the exercise alone has the potential to check racism’s eternal sway, Coates asserts “the recovering alcoholic may well have to live with his illness the rest of his life. But at least he is not living a drunken lie.” Coates’s penchant for substituting metaphor for analysis is more than mere rhetorical flourish. His reliance on moralistic abstractions not only allows him to skirt the political challenges that would confront a movement centered on material compensation for African Americans alone, but it accommodates bipartisan indifference to the damaging effects of neoliberal economic and social welfare policies on disproportionately black and brown working people. Leaving little doubt that his case for reparations owes more to Dr Phil or perhaps even the Rite of Exorcism than the Freedom Budget, Coates concludes his discussion of Conyers’s H.R. 40 by declaring: “What is needed is an airing of family secrets, a settling with old ghosts. What is needed is a healing of the American psyche and the banishment of white guilt.” Whereas Obama’s soaring post-racialism licensed the continuation of liberal indifference to the plight of economically marginal people via underclass metaphors, Coates’s post-post-racial commitment to racial ontology signs off on white liberal hand-wringing and public displays of guilt as alternatives to practicable solutions to disparities. To be sure, this is not Coates’s formal intent, even if the words on the page imply that Coates might find a racial Festivus to be an acceptable alternative to material compensation. But because reparations is a political dead end, Coates is offering white liberals — and even a stratum of conservatives — who are either self-consciously or reflexively committed to neoliberal orthodoxies, absolution via public testimony to their privilege and their so-called racial sins. The combination of Coates’s apparent sincerity and his racial militancy help to obscure reparations’ conservatism. Its militant trappings notwithstanding, reparations — a project that presumes the realness of race (the permanency of racism) and the sanctity of private property — is a fundamentally reactionary political program. Coates is no less fond of tales of black pathology than Obama, even if Coates chooses to admonish whites instead of poor blacks. Indeed, Coates’s accounts of the material “plunder” of black bodies are often wed to the psychological trauma inflicted on African Americans — from the fear-fueled beatings he received at the hands of his father to the hypermasculine bravado that he inaccurately describes as a uniquely black, male, street code. Commentators ranging from Michelle Alexander to David Brooks thus frequently remark on the anger and frustration that permeates Coates’s prose, as Coates both voices and personifies black alienation. It should go without saying that many black Americans, myself among them, are justifiably frustrated about disparities, the rise of a much emboldened far right, and liberals’ failure to deliver on promises to ameliorate inequality. But by embracing a framework that presumes that African Americans are frustrated by an eternal white racism, abstracted from political economy, Coates paints a picture of perpetual black alienation that reinforces — his sincerity and good intentions notwithstanding — the underclass framework that has contributed to liberals’ and conservatives’ failure to redress structural sources of inequality.

#### The 1AC turns debate into an infoshop and posits insurrection as political strategy – neither can replace the hard work of movement building – only collective organization can create the conditions for revolution.

Olson ‘12

[Joel, political theory at Northern Arizona University. 03/31/2012. “Between Infoshops and Insurrection: U.S. Anarchism, Movement Building, and the Racial Order.” <https://libcom.org/library/between-infoshops-insurrection-us-anarchism-movement-building-racial-order>] Pat

An infoshop is a space where people can learn about radical ideas, where radicals can meet other radicals, and where political work (such as meetings, public forums, fundraisers, etc.) can get done. In the infoshop strategy, infoshops and other “autonomous zones” model the free society. Building “free spaces” inspires others to spontaneously create their own, spreading “counterinstitutions” throughout society to the point where they become so numerous that they overwhelm the powers that be. The very creation of anarchist free spaces has revolutionary implications, their proponents argue, because it can lead to the “organic” (i.e. spontaneous, undirected, nonhierarchical) spreading of such spaces throughout society in a way that eventually challenges the state. An insurrection is the armed uprising of the people. According to the insurrection strategy, anarchists acting in affinity groups or other small informal organizations can engage in actions that encourage spontaneous uprisings in various sectors of society. As localized insurrections grow and spread, they combine into a full-scale revolution that overthrows the state and capital and makes possible the creation of a free society. Infoshops serve very important functions and any movement needs such spaces. Likewise, insurrection is a focal event in any revolution, for it turns the patient organizing of the movement and the boiling anger of the people into an explosive confrontation with the state. The problem is when infoshops and insurrection get taken as revolutionary strategies in themselves rather than as part of a broader revolutionary movement. In the infoshops model, autonomous spaces become the movement rather than serving it. In the insurrection model, spontaneous upheaval replaces the movement by equating insurrection with revolution rather than seeing it as but one part of the revolutionary process. The infoshops and insurrection models, in other words, both misunderstand the process of social transformation. Radical change may be initiated by spontaneous revolts that are supported by subterranean free spaces, but these revolts are almost always the product of movement building. Social movements are central to radical change. The classical anarchists understood this, for they were very concerned to build working class movements, such as Bakunin’s participation in the International Working Men’s Association, Berkman and Goldman’s support for striking workers, Lucy Parson’s work in the International Working People’s Association, and the Wobblies’ call for “One Big Union.” To be sure, they also built free spaces and engaged in “propaganda by the deed,” but these were not their sole or even dominant activities. They did them in order to build the anarchist movement, not as a substitute for movement building. Yet surprisingly much of the contemporary anarchist scene has abandoned movement building. In fact, the infoshops and insurrection models both seem to be designed, in part, to avoid the slow, difficult, but absolutely necessary work of building mass movements. Indeed, anarchist publications like Green Anarchy are explicit about this, deriding movement building as inherently authoritarian. A revolution is not an infoshop, or an insurrection, or creating a temporary autonomous zone, or engaging in sabotage; it cannot be so easy, so “organic,” so absent of political struggle. A revolution is an actual historical event whereby one class overthrows another and (in the anarchist ideal) thereby makes it possible to abolish all forms of oppression. Such revolutions are the product of mass movements: a large group of people organized in struggle against the state and/or other institutions of power to achieve their ends. When movements become powerful enough, when they sufficiently weaken elites, and when fortune is on their side, they lead to an insurrection, and then perhaps a revolution. Yet in much of the anarchist scene today, building free spaces and/or creating disorder are regarded as the movement itself rather than components of one. Neither the infoshops nor insurrection models build movements that can express the organized power of the working class. Thus, the necessary, difficult, slow, and inspiring process of building movements falls through the cracks between sabotage and the autonomous zone.

#### Neoliberal policies disproportionately harm black people – any method which separates race from labor obscures causes and solutions to anti-blackness.

Reed ‘18

Touré F Reed (teaches twentieth-century US and Afro-American history at Illinois State University). “Between Obama and Coates,” Catalyst vol. 1, issue 4, Winter 2018. <https://catalyst-journal.com/vol1/no4/between-obama-and-coates> rc/Pat

The parameters and function of even targeted programs are necessarily shaped by their broader political and ideological context. Coates’s commitment to racial ontology, however, precludes any serious attempt to either ground racism in the material world or to historicize liberal policy prescriptions beyond their failure to redress disparities. But if the endgame is to address the economic disadvantages that blacks face and, by extension, the attendant social problems that afflict lower-income black and brown communities disproportionately, it is difficult to see how the neoliberal consensus — which is antagonistic to the notion of government intervention for the public good — could engender targeted initiatives that benefit poor and working-class blacks rather than elites. Indeed, it is no coincidence that affirmative action’s focus shifted from material redress to diversity at the dawn of American neoliberalism. It is likewise no coincidence that in an era in which neoliberalism has become hegemonic, social justice has come to merge with entrepreneurialism — producing a “progressive” politics that not only casts charter schools, NGOs, and sundry internet startups as alternatives to state action, but lionizes black/brown businesspeople (including the occasional rap and R&B mogul) as the new generation of civil rights leaders. Reparations’ repudiation of post-racialism’s absurd claim that the principal obstacles confronting blacks in the twenty-first century are poor blacks’ social pathology and middle-class blacks’ anachronistic cynicism is not without value. When articulated by the nation’s first “authentically” black president, post-racialism legitimated the Democratic commitment to neoliberal economic and social welfare policies that promised poor blacks few, if any, material rewards and middle-class blacks a seat at a shrinking table. Coates’s instincts about the limitations of personal responsibility ideology, then, are basically correct. Unfortunately, the benefits derived from Coates’s critique of post-racialism’s basic tenets are more than offset by the problems engendered by his commitment to ontological racism. Specifically, Coates’s insistence that race operates independently of economic exploitation not only obscures the cause of these inequities, but his mystification of race permits no tangible solutions. I will take a moment to dabble in the mystic’s trade to channel the spirit of Phaedra Parks and bluntly state that everybody knows that reparations ain’t gonna happen — certainly Coates’s white readers know this. But consider what that means. Coates identifies reparations as the only fix for the racial inequities he traces to an ineradicable racism. Since reparations is not a feasible politics, Coates’s fatalism about racism — his good intentions notwithstanding — licenses perpetual inequality. Simply put, if white racists will always be with us, as Coates suggests, then poor blacks will always be with us too. Postwar liberal orthodoxies have failed to redress racial disparities. The culprit, however, is not the sway of a metaphysical racism, but rather the roots of contemporary disparities can be traced to far more comprehensible forces such as: the tensions within the New Deal between the regulatory and compensatory state models and the related mid-century tensions between institutional and commercial Keynesians; the contrasting influences of the New Deal and the Cold War on the parameters of liberal discourse about race and inequality; and neoliberalism’s rise from the ashes of the Keynesian consensus. In other words, the problem is not, as Coates insists, that liberals have long attempted to redress black poverty by reducing racism to class exploitation, resulting in universal policies that focus on economic sources of inequality as an alternative to addressing racism. Indeed, since the 1960s, liberal policymakers have generally ignored the impact on African Americans of issues such as deindustrialization, the decline of the union movement, and retreat of the public sector. Whereas the Keynesian consensus still allowed liberals of the 1960s and 1970s to pursue anti-poverty policies centered on the expansion of social services and even state-centered regulation of employer-employee relations via affirmative action, the neoliberal consensus ensured that centrist-Democratic presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama would pursue agendas that chipped away at the public-good framework that established the rights and protections that have benefitted disproportionately black, poor, and working-class Americans at the very same time they either championed or personified diversity. In this context, Coates’s insistence that so-called racial issues exist in a world apart from economic issues is not a critique of postwar liberalism, but it is, at best, a call for continuing along the same path that has failed most black Americans since the Johnson administration. At worst, it is a call for no more than ritualized acknowledgment of white privilege and black suffering. Racial ideology does, indeed, inform how we perceive people and their place in the pecking order, as is its purpose. Racism, thus, influences inequities. It does so, however, within a larger political-economic framework. Efforts to redress racial disparities that do not consider the work that race does in American labor and housing markets will be doomed to fail, just as they have since the War on Poverty. So, while it is unlikely that Coates set out to be neoliberalism’s most visible black emissary of the post-post-racial era, his insistence that we must treat race as a force that exists independently of capitalism has, ironically, earned him this accolade.

#### Wilderson fails to account for the intersection of white supremacy and capital and historical shifts in racial violence – vote negative to forefront political economy in understandings of anti-blackness – that’s the only way to create global linkages and meaningful struggle for black liberation.

Dawson ‘16

[Michael, political science at University of Chicago. Spring 2016. “Hidden in Plain Sight: A Note on Legitimation Crises and the Racial Order.” <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/685540>] Pat

We can better understand the relationship between the attacks on black bodies and continued systemic economic subordination of black communities by drawing on two different strands of theorizing. One, often identified with Afro-pessimism, focuses on the history of the devaluation and destruction of black bodies. The other, mostly grounded in contemporary Euro-American left political theory, attempts to “revise” Marxism in order to incorporate insights garnered from primarily feminist and ecological studies and movements. Frank Wilderson III, who is identified with Afro-pessimism, argues that “The United States is constructed at the intersection of both a capitalist and white supremacist matrix.” That is a good starting point, but it does not go far enough. It helps us, however, extend Fraser’s analysis. Unlike Wilderson, we must recognize that only by understanding simultaneously the intersections of the logics of capitalism and white supremacy can we hope to forge an analytical framework that might provide a guide for understanding and combating the multiple logics that have devastated black and other communities still categorized and treated as less than fully human—that is, who have rights less than those of full citizens. I am in broad agreement with Wilderson when he claims, “the emergence of the slave, the subject-effect of an ensemble of the direct relations of force, marks the emergence of capitalism itself. Let us put a finer point on it: violence toward the black body is the precondition for the existence of Gramsci’s single entity ‘the modern bourgeois-state’ with its divided apparatus, political society and civil society. This is to say violence against black people is ontological and gratuitous as opposed to merely ideological and contingent. Furthermore, no magical moment (i.e. 1865) transformed paradigmatically the black body’s relation to this entity.” Wilderson’s last point, however, is very ahistorical. While the gratuitous elements remained across eras, both the political economy and blacks’ relationship to it changed in fundamental ways. Even more ahistorical is the claim “We are off the record.” Being on the “record” is the essence, as Baptist and Johnson show in their historical research on slavery, of what Wilderson gets wrong. Blacks in the United States have always been part of the record—look at any slave owner’s record book, or the records of a Detroit auto factory in 1968, or the records of any prison today. We have been both on the record while simultaneously having a record—as sociologist Debra Pager puts it— we have always been “marked.” It is not that the “black American subject does not generate historical categories of Entitlement, Sovereignty, and/or Immigration.” What we need to understand and counter is how those categories morph, collide, and in some cases collapse when viewed through the historical prism of black exploitation. On a very deep yet pragmatic level it is ludicrous of Wilderson to assert that “work is a white category. The fact that millions upon millions of black people work misses the point. The point is we were never meant to be workers; in other words, capital/white supremacy’s dream did not envision us as being incorporated incorporative. From the very beginning we were meant to be accumulated and die.... Today, at the end of the twentieth century, we are still not meant to be workers. We are meant to be warehoused and die.” This is fundamentally wrong: we were brought here to work, and to die. The two phenomena were and remain interconnected—and connect blacks in the United States to the other populations that were meant to work and/or die whether in the plantations of sub-Saharan Africa or the mines of the Andes. Times change, including American blacks’ relationship to labor markets and the state. Our task is to understand those changes in order to create a society free from exploitation, oppression, and racial murder. Wilderson gets it wrong when he argues “again, the chief constant to the dream is that, whereas desire for black labour power is often a historical component to the institutionality [sic] of white supremacy, it is not a constituent element.” Yes, black labor was a “constituent element of white supremacy”—certainly at least from slavery through late Jim Crow. It is arguable to what extent it remains so in the United States, given the changing relationship between race and capitalism and specifically between blacks and the US labor market. Working-class blacks within the United States constitute one of the populations around the globe that have increasingly found their labor and bodies disposable. All of these “disposable” populations have been on the “wrong” side of the superior/inferior binary that is the hallmark of the abode of racial expropriation. As my coauthor Megan Francis and I argue, this relationship is not static and changes as the configuration of the relationship between the economy, the state, and civil society evolves in tandem with capitalist society itself. Today’s crisis is based in part on the partial victories of the mid-twentieth century against Jim Crow and superexploitation within the United States and against colonialism in the global South. As the ability to superexploit nonwhite populations in the metropole (such as in the United States) became more difficult and the ability to directly rip off the former colonies also became more difficult, populations somewhat protected from the worst ravages of capitalism, such as unionized labor and the white American middle class, saw many of their hard-won gains disappear as neoliberal regimes gained power, from the United States and the United Kingdom to the European Union and eventually the entire world. As these populations saw their benefits and privileges (as well as their incomes and wealth) pressured by an ever more rapacious capitalism, resentment increased against primarily nonwhite communities—particularly black and immigrant communities. The result has been an ever more toxic racial/ethnic/religious landscape in the United State, but also throughout the global North. Frank Wilderson III asks, “What does it mean to be free?” and answers by then asking “What does it mean to suffer?” Yet, what he misses in his psychological analysis of “white fantasies and shared pleasures” that lead to violence aimed at blacks is the history of the changes in the political economy that has led to a new “twoness,” one different from that of Du Bois: a black subjectivity that combines the potential disposability of the slave with exploitation of the black worker. It is not a case of either/or. Black freedom—from both exploitation and gratuitous violence—can only be gained by confronting the matrices of both capital and white supremacy. Indeed, this has been the case since what Beckert has called the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century era of war (mercantile)-capitalism. The “twoness” of the combined black (disposable) slave/worker has in its synthesis a political demand: for self-determination. The combined status of slave and worker still provides an extremely antagonistic site for blacks in the United States, due to continued arbitrary violence from the state and white civil society, as well as continued racialized economic subordination and exploitation. Consequently, it is still the case that the black demand for the freedom to choose their path from domination, exploitation and arbitrary violence remains justified in this post–civil rights era. The power of racialized logics within the United States has always made this an even more difficult task than it would be in a society that did not divide its population into superior and inferior humans. Fraser correctly argues that central to this task is creating counterhegemonic narratives. But she also correctly states, “what grounds hegemonic worldviews—and their counterhegemonic rivals—are suppositions about the subject positions and capacities for agency available to social actors, the proper responsibilities and actual capabilities of public powers, the structure and operation of the reigning social order, the principles and frames of justice by which that order is to be evaluated, and the historical availability of desirable and feasible alternatives. It is the set of entrenched assumptions about such matters, as embedded in common sense, that shapes the responses of social actors to ‘system disturbances.’” As I have demonstrated in some depth elsewhere, the racialization of American politics has meant that there are vast racial differences, particularly between blacks and whites in what is understood as political and sociological “common sense.” In times of heightened racial conflict and polarization, blacks and whites do not even see the same world, recognize the same “facts.” The contradictions within the capitalist and racial orders suggest we may live in a time of conjuncture. As Althusser suggests, “The conjuncture is thus no mere summary of its elements, or enumeration of diverse circumstances, but their contradictory system, which poses the political problem and indicates it historical solution.” The problem now is determining the “historical solution.” The contradictions that underlie the current crisis have their own specific aspects. But due to the fact that progressive and black movements remain relatively weak, it is also possible that reactionary movements could decisively win in these times. This is the context within which movements such as Black Lives Matter organize and fight. Given the evolution of racialized capitalism, they, and we, have no choice but to simultaneously fight white supremacy and economic injustice. We must insist on the full human rights for Sandra Bland and her fellow victims of a racist and murderous state as well as terrorists such as Dylan Roof. We must fight new modes of state expropriation that seek to recover revenue for capitalists and the state by violating the most basic of human rights such as the shutting off of water to poor families in Detroit; the use of the police in communities such as Ferguson to extract unconstitutional revenues from black “citizens”; or the state-enabled use of tax liens in cities such as Chicago to enable entrepreneurial thieves to legally steal black homes and property. In the United States part of the power of white supremacy is that we often overlook the importance of analyzing its logics when we fight for justice, even though the abode of race is hidden in plain sight.

## Case

### LBL

#### Blake 19 should be reviewed with caution – its debate produced ev which means it geared towards debaters to cherrypick the warrants

Epistemic disobedience is too vague and unpred for the neg to prepare against

The rob does not provide a way to weigh offense

### Presumption

#### Their call for the ballot plays into the redemptive narrative of humanism – even if the content of the aff refuses anti-blackness and is pessimistic towards the world, the form of repeatedly researching, arguing, and having judges affirm their method assumes the capacity of communication to return wholeness to the Black body and change grammars of suffering – that means they’re in a double bind – either –

#### deliberation over anti-blackness can change its structure which disproves their ontology claims – vote neg because they’re wrong and they reject material change – or –

#### it means the ballot does nothing and the 1AC can’t change or disrupt the nature of the world – vote neg because at best there’s no reason to debate or vote for the aff, and at worst it’s a cruelly optimistic investment into the system they criticize.

### 1N – Framing – 1:10

#### Their ROTB is self serving, arbitrarily limits the scope of engagement, and begs the question of the rest of the debate.

#### Reject framing arguments that over-parametricize content – debate should be an open forum to attack ideas from different directions – anything else brackets out certain modes of knowledge production which their ev would obviously disagree w/.

#### The rob –

#### 1. Competition- The competitive nature of debate wrecks the interactive nature of debate – the judge must decide between two competing speech acts and the debaters are trying to beat each other – this is the wrong forum for interaction

#### 2. Spillover- How does educational orientations spill over beyond this space? Empirically denied – judges vote on this shit on this time and nothing ever happens.

#### 3. Prescription- certain interactions are prescripted – eg subjectivity– can’t be reformulated so easily

#### 4. Competition takes out the aff – the ballot becomes a securitizing object that prevents engagement with death

Ritter 13. JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### 5. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

Ritter 13 [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted.

### Ontology

#### Blackness is not ontological –

#### a. Communication – our ability to do so proves antagonisms are movable – fatalism is net worse.

King-Watts ‘15

[Eric, Media and Technology Studies @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2015. “Critical Cosmopolitanism, Antagonism, and Social Suffering.” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00335630.2015.995433] Pat

I have been asked by more than one graduate student at more than one university how I hope to reconcile the claims of Afro-Pessimism with my insistence that voice is a fundamental human capacity. I maintain, more or less consistently, that voice is a public occurrence animated by the acknowledgment of the ethical and affective dimensions of speech. The repetition of the inquiry is energized by the fact and mode of Afro-Pessimism being taken up in debate and argument organizations, programs, and competitions. I am not going to attempt to complete this reconciliation in this space, in part because I have not quite accomplished it. But I do have to briefly sketch out the terms of the challenge in order to try to evaluate the strengths and limits of critical cosmopolitanism as an academic practice that would ask “why and how” Communication Studies might interact with the Afro-Pessimistic enclave in Black Studies. While criticizing the work of Black film theory, Frank Wilderson embarks upon an ambitious and provocative campaign meant to foster an understanding of the conditions of impossibility for Black subjectivity within the contemporary ontological paradigm. The term “Afro-Pessimism” signals the work of scholars who are “theorists of structural positionality.” As such, Blackness and Whiteness are interrogated as emerging through a conjuncture with brutal modern technologies of organization and domination, and the birth of the very idea of race. Put simply, it took the modern invention of slavery and colonialism to bring about the racial ideologies that make Blackness and Whiteness intelligible. The Slave/Black, then, should not be considered exploited labor or simply oppressed. “Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Black’s first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his or her customs and sources on which they are based.’” The Black occupies a coordinate that marks a fundamental structural antagonism with the West, with Whiteness and, indeed, with the Human. It is quite easy to see why the term “Pessimism” is apt. The Black names the condition of state violence, a flesh-object brought into the world for “accumulation and fungibility.” The Black is essential to the production of Western subjectivity and to notions of what it means to be human. “In short, White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity: Without the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent, uncertain at best.” Not only is the Black incapacitated as a structural determinate, the Black is “a structural position of noncommunicability.” But there is a form of communication here nevertheless because the Black paradoxically signifies the “outside” that allows for the articulation of “anti-Black solidarity.” There is theoretical and historical support for such an analysis. For example, the early twentieth-century Americanization projects used Blackness as an exclusionary trope meant to help spur non-White immigrants from Europe and Asia toward Whiteness. And here is where the term “Pessimism” seems inadequate. As a structurally overdetermined body-image in the Western imaginary and symbolic field, Blackness registers near-nothingness: “In perceiving Black folk as being alive, or at least having the potential to live in the world, the same potential that any subaltern might have, the politics of Black film theorists’ aesthetic methodology and desire disavowed the fact that ‘[Black folk] are always already dead wherever you find them.’” Given this dire diagnosis, why and how might we interact with Afro-Pessimism? Speaking from the point of view of a Black rhetorical scholar (and a scholar of Blackness), the answer to why is virtually self-evident: thinking through Blackness as a condition of possibility for rhetorical action and social justice is a life-long pursuit that, given the tragic killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014, feels especially burning. Given the affective intensity of the charge of Black noncommunicability, a failure to meaningfully interact would engender a different kind of “violence”; in this case a structural injunction sponsored by a lingering and recurring anxiety regarding the authority of Communication Studies. And so how might we interact? If I take up the orientation of critical cosmopolitanism, I need to recognize immediately that my efforts can be dismissed by the Afro-Pessimist as colonial; that is, as a reiteration of the sort of practices that presume that one’s epistemologies can translate other’s bodies of knowledge into comprehensible and useful concepts and constructs. And yet, we must begin where we are, not where we hope to be. Hence, I want to make two modest and one not-so-modest suggestions for how Communication Studies in general and Rhetorical Studies in particular might interact: first, Wilderson calls for “a new language of abstraction” to elaborate “Blackness’s grammar of suffering.” But in my reading, Afro-Pessimism is already too reliant on a language of abstraction. Lois McNay, in The Misguided Search for the Political, recently contends that theories of political power are overwrought owing to a social weightlessness brought about through high abstraction. She recommends the reinvigoration of the concept of “social suffering”—not as an entrenched category of victimage but, rather, as the habitus of lived experience that must be articulated to analyses of structural positionality. Second, I agree with McNay (who says nothing about Afro-Pessimism, by the way) that structural antagonisms are not static, but are movable and moving configurations. The Afro-Pessimist in Wilderson’s account must agree that when a non-Black person is thrust toward the horrible condition approximating (but not identical to) the Black’s structural position, that adjustment can rightfully be called a “Blackening.” As a happening—and not an event that has simply always already happened—this racialized procedure makes itself felt and knowable in the dense social fabric of the everyday. If the Black is in a structural position that delimits the impossibility of capacity, might we enjoin an analysis of the vocabulary of that impossibility itself? And since a “Blackening” receives intelligibility from the structural position of the Black, might we gain some productive understanding from a scrutiny of key discursive and material forms of “Blackening”? Was not Michael Brown “Blackened” in and through (and not only a priori to) his bodily encounter with state violence? Given my ongoing scholarly interest in the Zombie, I am willing to concede that an Afro-Pessimist might claim that Brown was, at the moment he was shot to death, “the dead but sentient thing, the Black” struggling “to articulate in a world of living subjects.” This concession functions as an assertion: the Zombie is not wholly outside Western intelligibility; it haunts the nether regions between Human and Black. Its undead existence is material and social, and supplies some vital resources for inventing a new language—a grammar of (Black) suffering. Perhaps “there is no way to Africa through the Black,” but maybe there is a route through the Zombie. I have argued for such a project using the terminology of reanimating Zombie voices. Lastly, we might think of this gloomy predicament as a tenuous point of contact with Afro-Pessimism. Wilson’s intellectual history provides the basis for such a conception. Communication Studies has been (and continues to anguish over the extent that it still is) in the structural position of inferior and alienated. There should be no shame in admitting that the discipline, in relation to both the Social Sciences and the Humanities, has been and is subject to being “Blackened.” Indeed, its originary moment, as I alluded to above, meant the rejection of a set of nationalistic proprietary politics that treated Speech teachers like disposable labor. By any reasonable measure, that structural positioning—despite the fact that the people involved were White—was a racialization, a “Blackening.” Let’s be perfectly clear: there is no identification being made here with the fundamental antagonism associated with the Black. However, this racialized politics (among other political registers) might provide a new critical vocabulary for Communication scholars if we do the painful work of coming to grips with the discursive and material practices of “Blackening.” There are structures of different scales. Academic structural dynamics are not dissociated from the identity ideologies implicated in nationalism and cosmopolitanism, citizenship and exile, privilege and destitution, Whiteness and Blackness. Indeed, Wilderson’s critique is launched from and resides within those very same structural dynamics. It seems to me then that, at the very least, our shared social suffering with Afro-Pessimism—although of vastly different magnitudes and qualities—should be asserted as a mode of transnational fidelity.

#### b. Brain Studies – they prove racial biases are malleable, not libidinal, and can be broken down through common goals – that creates empathy and reduces violence.

Cikara and Van Bavel ‘15

Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. “The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems.” June 2, 2015. rc/Pat

-           Brain study – people form strong group associations on things like political affiliation, hobby, occupation, etc. that are more salient than race – proves racism not neurologically hardwired

-           Measured by amygdala activity

-           Study methods

o    An intergroup interaction was induced, and then the effects were evaluated – total 64 individuals in 8 groups

o    A neurological examination of individuals’ amygdala during visual stimuli

o    A study of fear response before and after various positive contact

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### c. History – Blackness is and always was a created category propped up by policies – it’s a contingent structure that their abstraction locks in.

Olaloku-Teriba ‘18

Annie Olaloku-Teriba. “Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness.” *Historical Materialism*, issue 26(2). March 2018. <http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/articles/afro-pessimism-and-unlogic-anti-blackness> rc/Pat

Fanon’s elucidation exposes the slave as contingently black, not ‘paradigmatically black’. What is the difference? The Afro-pessimist sees the world as structured by a non-black solidarity in preventing the ontological possibility of black life. Were ‘black’ meant as a metaphor for the condition of total alienation from self, this might make sense. However, because the Afro-pessimist imaginary ties itself to a morphological account of blackness, this leads us to a theoretical dead end. In this world-view, it therefore becomes necessary to begin by treating ‘race’ as a problem fundamentally rooted in the formation of sociality – in which the Black precedes the historical order and the processes, both violent and mundane, which create her. By contrast, to think through the implications of contingency is to confront the reality that these racial categories – categories that Wilderson and Sexton treat as absolute – are actually unstable as evidence that something else is afoot. It is to see ‘race’ not as an anchor, but as a mystification conjured to weather crises of legitimacy. For example, we can examine how Sexton links the condition of the Afro-American slave, the free black and the African thus: ‘because blackness serves as the basis of enslavement in the logic of a transnational political and legal culture, it permanently destabilises the position of any nominally free black population’.[46] The presumption of a shared (presumably global) legal and political culture within which the assertion that blackness was a basis of enslavement might be made is quite mistaken. Even in the US, the centralisation of the legal and political status of blacks only emerged at the moment of formal abolition following the American Civil War. Prior to this, the internal border system of the US produced divergent rationales and attendant juridical technology for enslavement. The South might be considered to fit the relationship that Sexton suggests. For example, Supreme Court judges in Georgia argued that the free black was ‘associated still with the slave in this State’. However, the North tells a different story, wherein free blacks were likened to ‘white women and children… denied many political rights but did not therefore forfeit their basic status as citizens’. In any case, the debates within slave states in the late antebellum period included the proposition of ‘forcing their free black populations to elect between re-enslavement and leaving the state’. The concerns of legislators and judges in the South, that free black populations might inspire slave revolts and undermine the racial order, indicate that their motivations were not paradigmatic but pragmatic. This is to say that these political and legal elites were well aware of the fragility of the racial order that they had created. Indeed, on the relationship between the free black and the slave, a sketch of the thinking of legislators in the Northern and Southern states offers a radically different picture to Sexton’s. Rather than being a given, the position of the free black was both contested and geographically dependent. Interestingly, during an 1820 Congressional debate regarding a clause in Missouri’s proposed constitution which would bar free blacks from entering the state, it was the condition of Native Americans which structured the logic regarding the position of free blacks: ‘the Indians born in the states continue to be aliens and so, I contend, do the free negroes’.[50] Contrary to Sexton’s assertion of the exceptional nature of the Afro-American experience in this regard, legislators consciously rooted their position in a nexus of other ‘undesirables’ which included both Native Americans and white ‘paupers’. The preoccupation with the condition of ‘poor whites’ is certainly not a new phenomenon. Legislators in the antebellum South were consumed with the implications of (white) pauperism which meant that, ‘the adjudged pauper is subordinated to the will of others, and reduced to a condition but little removed from that of chattel slavery, and until recently, by statute of 1847, c. 12, like the slave, was liable to be sold upon the block of the auctioneer, for service or support.’[51] Moreover, it is important to note that the Northern and Southern states proffered different rationales for the contested status of free blacks, and that, at this time, the federal government’s role in determining the parameters of the claimable rights of individuals ‘was largely restricted to establishing the requirements for naturalization and the requirements for alien ownership of federal lands’. The fragility of hierarchies of race is inherent to the project of racialism. Rather than emanating from some assuredness regarding the morphological provenance of racialised ‘personhood’ and ‘unpersonhood’, what we see here is the adoption of specific policy-practices in order to construct a world in which the insurrection against domination that the American Revolution represented could co-exist with the continued brutal exploitation that slavery represented. And so, the slave was not created so that the American might exist; instead, the black was created so that slavery might survive republican fervour. Indeed, we must be careful about operating at a level of abstraction which would enable the post hoc justifications of enslavement concocted by Southern slave owners embattled by a crisis of legitimacy to shape the historiography of chattel slavery. Wilderson and Sexton want us to believe both that the myriad forms of exploitation – indentured servitude, ghettoisation, mass incarceration, police brutality et cetera – which followed the formal abolition of slavery constitute a continuation of enslavement (or its ‘afterlife’), and that the position of the slave is fundamentally different from the position of the ‘white’ or ‘Indian’ indentured servant who often performed similar labour and whose resistance incurred violent repression. Such a framework mystifies three crucial facts: first, that the ‘blackness’ of the category of slave was both contingent and unstable; second, that to exceptionalise African enslavement obscures the many categories of ‘alien’ which were comparable to the negro in the US context; third, that natal alienation was not from some African collectivity but from specific and diverse social formations in Western Africa.

#### Err negative given the scope of their claims---any risk they’re wrong about ontology is a reason to vote neg.

O’Donnell ‘20

[Patrick O'Donnell, B.A. Columbia University; M.A. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; M.A. Johns Hopkins University; Ph.D. Johns Hopkins University, “Ontology, Experience, and Social Death: On Frank Wilderson’s Afropessimism,” 2020, https://philpapers.org/archive/ODOOEA.pdf, EA]

Wilderson’s political vision is a “grenade without a pin,” or a “looter’s creed” which strives to bring about the Fanonian “end of the world” (174). Yet if your politics requires you to “burn the ship or the plantation…. from the inside out” with yourself inside, you should be extremely sure that this politics is rooted in a true and comprehensive vision of Black people’s situation in the world. Pinless grenades and looter’s creeds can fall into anyone’s hands. They can harm countless bystanders. Their volatility makes them unpredictable. What if the theoretical conceits of Afropessimism not only fail to bring about the end of the world, but give succor to projects dedicated to making an already awful anti-Black world worse? Ironically, those with reactionary anti-Black politics, or those in thrall to the magic of Whiteness and convinced of the subhumanity of Blackness, should appreciate the work that Wilderson accomplishes here. In fascist hands, a claim like “it is absolutely necessary for Blacks to be ~~castrated, raped, genitally mutilated and violated, beaten, shot~~, and maimed” in order for non-Blacks to achieve “confirmation of Human existence” is just the sort of work a society running on the myth of Black inhumanity and subpersonhood requires.

More predictably, Afropessimism takes aim at leftist coalitional, solidarity-based, and intersectional politics. It is not just that historically existing forms of socialism, feminism, and multiculturalism have left Black people out (which they often have). Rather, in Wilderson’s mind, these forms of politics terrorize Black people simply by positing analogies and similarities among diverse forms of Black and non-Black oppression (220). The monolithic view of Blackness Afropessimism presents seems to have little room for the idea that Black people are lots of things besides Black, and that their interests and concerns are often formed in ways similar to non-Blacks’ interests. To be sure, we should mark a distinction between Wilderson’s politics and misappropriations of his vision. Yet if Black people are literally terrorized by working-class struggle, multicultural coalitions, immigration rights, feminism, and other forms of counter-hegemonic politics, one might wonder why Black liberation strategies should bother accommodate the stated interests of people who are, in addition to Black, queer, religious, anti-capitalist, female, poor, immigrant, working class, indigenous, and/or incarcerated.

Those sympathetic to Wilderson might suggest that Black people have little to lose by abandoning solidarity-based politics. Yet not-so-ancient history suggests that there may be higher stakes here. As Paul Ortiz (2018) has recently demonstrated, many of the material, political, social, and symbolic gains for Black and Latinx people throughout the 18th and 19th centuries were generated by an emancipatory internationalism that drew explicit analogies between Black and non-Black freedom struggles. The United States’ interest in slavery of course first and foremost oppressed Black people. Yet because slavery was so deeply interwoven with the oppression of non-Black people as well (in the form of Indian removal and extermination, violent expropriation of Mexican land in a war to expand slavery, etc.), Black and non-Black abolitionists were able to engage the problem of Black oppression not in isolation, but with a view to how it undergirded a more generally unacceptable social order. Of course, just because solidarity was a useful tool for achieving those political goals doesn’t mean it will work now. Yet in a time when Black oppression has once again become one of the clearest symptoms of a more broadly unacceptable social order, perhaps it is wise to remember this emancipatory spirit.

### Sharpe

#### Wake Work limits the possibility for Black humanity and freedoms – prefer a method of revolutionary world-making.

Bickerstaff ‘17

Jovonne Bickerstaff 2-28-2017 “We who would build: Re-visioning resistance & theorizing beyond the gaze” <https://aadhum.umd.edu/2017/02/centralizing-blackness-digital-work/> (Postdoctoral ​Associate for the ​​​African American History, Culture and Digital Humanities ​​(AADHum)​ initiative)//Elmer rc/Pat

Outlining her concept of “Black studies in the wake,” Christina Sharpe emphasizes its call “to be at the intellectual work of a continued reckoning the longue of Atlantic chattel slavery, with black fungibility, antiblackness… accounting for the narrative, historical, structural, and other positions black people are forced to occupy.” Drawing on Alexander Weheliye, Kim Gallon, by contrast, characterizes Black Studies as “a mode of knowledge production” that “investigates processes of racialization with a particular emphasis on the shifting configurations of black life.” Building on the Duboisian tradition of intellectual activism that advances scholarship while furthering social justice, both suggest that the real and vital work on black people necessarily speaks to race—that is, analyzing the consequences of and resistance to the project of racialization. I can see how interrogating the racial project of whiteness that shapes black folks’ lives can be a way of speaking truth to power for African Americanist scholars. Still, focusing so acutely on unpacking racism and racialization as sole or primary path of resistance gives me pause. I wonder if we’ve framed what Black Studies does—and more importantly can do—too narrowly. Might our pre-occupation with black struggle, whether in the conditions of or resistance to oppression, make us complicit in the diminishing the fullness of black humanity and what we might explore in it? Can we imagine examining black experience without making America’s racialization project the dominant idiom? Recently, activist Brittany Packnett developed a Twitter thread which began, “We have two hands: one is to battle, one is to build.” Certainly, we African Americanists know how to battle. So much of our training as scholars prepares us for it; we’re socialized to privilege the work of critique and deconstruction. Given how black folk have been conceptualized or written out of cannons, our proclivity towards confrontational debate may be more pronounced. We feel the pulse of that resistance when Gallon characterizes Black Studies as “the comparative study of the black cultural and social experiences under white Eurocentric systems of power.” But… is that enough? Is our conception of black scholarly resistance too narrow? Taking Packnett’s call for a multifaceted strategy of resistance to heart, I must ask, when do we build? These questions are central to who I’ve become as a scholar. Surely, I do my share of confrontational resistance, interrogating problematic paradigms, particularly when I teach. Still, as my research agenda solidifies, I’m more compelled by that call to build. Centering black experience has been my entry point for moving beyond critique to imagine new narratives and inquiry to engage in what I term theorizing beyond gaze—orienting my own work and my hopes for the AADHum Initiative. “From my perspective there are only black people. When I say “people”, that’s what I mean… No African American writer had ever done what I did… even the ones I admired… I have had reviews in the past that have accused me of not writing about white people… As though our lives have no meaning and no depth without the white gaze. And I have spent my entire writing life trying to make sure that the white gaze was not the dominant one … I didn’t have to be consumed by or concerned by the white gaze… The problem of being free to write the way you wish to without this other racialized gaze is a serious one for an African American writer” [emphasis added]. —Toni Morrison Freedom for her, Nina Simone once quipped, was the absence of fear. As a scholar and writer, my vision of freedom is more akin to Toni Morrison’s and begins with one radical tool: choice. I name, frame, and lay claim to different terrains: examining understudied populations (couples in enduring relationships), raising novel questions (how emotional strategies for resilience impact intimacy), and situating my research in unorthodox literatures (sociology of emotions vs. “the black family”). In every case, each she/he/they that I describe is, by default, black. Refusing to explicitly qualify race in work on black people can be jarring because having non-white experiences centered is so rare. In addition to disturbing notions of black folks as the perpetual other, theorizing beyond the gaze forces us to recognize how failing to fully account for positionality undermines our theorizing. If we uphold confrontation as the primary or most effective tool of resistance, I fear we risk neglecting how resistance requires and has always relied as much on subversive tactics like theorizing beyond the gaze as on direct action. In the AADHUM initiative, I hope that helps us think through how can we begin to construct a “meaningful intellectual and activist challenge that circumvents the analyses of injustice that re-isolate the dispossessed, à la McKittrick’s invocation of Gilmore. It’d be easy (and reductive) to see black Twitter simply as an offshoot of mainstream Twitter use. But what if we saw it instead as innovation narrative, à la Steve Jobs and iPods and iPhones, whereby they’re responsible for optimizing technology use in ways that reveal its fullest potential? Or conversely, could we invert the arrows of co-optation, which typically focuses on stolen African American products, to reveal how communities of color used Twitter and Vine towards subversive ends of mobilizing social change (i.e. BLM), celebrating black joy in the mannequin challenge or viral memes on Vine? Ultimately, how, when and why we enter as African Americanists, seems to turn largely on who we are working for and what we are working towards. The aim is not to abandon the battle, but simply to recognize that, while necessary, it is insufficient. My hope in the AADHum initiative is that we move towards what Brittney Cooper calls “liberatory world-making” —imagining new ways of seeing and thinking about that intersection of digital studies and African American research. We battle and we build… and we choose the work to which we’ll devote our hands each day. Today, I build.