# 1nc

Best of luck!

## Off

### 1

#### Interpretation: If the aff defends a reduction of intellectual property rights, they must specify what an intellectual property right is in the 1AC.

#### Violation: they didn’t

#### There is not a universal definition for intellectual property rights and boundaries are subjective

Stengel ‘4

Intellectual Property in Philosophy Author(s): Daniel Stengel Source: ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 1 (2004), pp. 20-50 Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag Stable URL: [http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681627 //](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23681627%20//) Phoenix weird formatting is due to copy and paste from source

Secondly, intellectual property objects do not have well-defined boundaries. The boundaries of a house or a car are instantly clear. The content of a book has invisible boundaries, which can be resolved precisely in court only. In daily life, it is difficult to determine whether one has crossed a boundary. On the one hand, it is a known tact that it is not allowed to copy a book as a whole. On the other hand, one knows that it is within legal boundaries to copy just one sentence of a text. Somewhere in between we will find the limit of protection of an intellectual product. Boundaries are changing and are therefore subject to revision. While a Century ago a translation was seen as a work of the translator, today the 'unauthorised' trans lation is considered a breach of the copyright of the original author. Similarly in patents, the doctrine of équivalents was introduced. Before, one could re-build the patented invention with minor changes, as long as one did not re-bulld the invention as such. The doctrine of équivalents prevents such evasive action to be taken, but a décision about what is an équivalent and what is not has to be made case by case.20 Another boundary concerns the idea-expression dichotomy of intellectual proper ty. On the one hand, it is possible to have an idea without owning it. The same applies to information or data: a census taker can collect data, but he does not receive a copyright because this data is not seen as sufficiently original. Some data seems to be placed firmly and irrevocably in the public domain.21 On the other hand, one can own an intellectual product/idea just by the expression or utterance thereof; the ex pression seems to be worthy of protection. Pure information cannot be appropriated, but if the information is produced, assembled, expressed or presented in a particular way, an appropriation of the information becomes possible and is therefore subject to intellectual property law.

#### Standards

#### 1] Shiftiness – They can redefine what a right is in the 1AR to no link out of DAs and kill counterplan competition. We lose links to core topic DAs about specific rights since they could shift the definition and argue that someone could copy most of it but not all of it or if we read an exception PIC they could argue the exception isn’t a right, etc.

#### 

#### That outweighs on magnitude – we don’t have a 2NC to read new offs so the shifty 1ar devastates the 2n and means they win every debate.

#### 2] Real world education – To make a policy change, legislaters must be very specific on what they are legislating to a) ensure their goal is met in their legislation b) ensure no unforeseen side effects like loopholes happen and c) ensure their law is functional.

#### That outweighs on longevity – anything not applicable to the real world loses it’s value as soon as we graduate but our practical education from debate will stay with us forever.

#### Spec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – a) it’s carded by one of the most authoritative sources in the topic literature b) if we win abuse it means our model is good c) it’s only fair to hold us to our argument – anything else explodes the prep burden because it means we have to answer any argument that could possibly be similar to ours

#### Paradigm issues

#### 1 – Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start and we can’t come back

#### 2 - Comes before 1AR theory — A - If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff, B – Neg abuse outweighs aff abuse because we control the depth of the debate if we can’t engage depth is impossible

#### 3 - Use competing interps on Spec – A – spec is a yes/no question, you can’t be half specify or mostly specify B - reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4 - No RVIs – A - Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat, B - discourages checking real abuse C - Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quick

### 2

#### The rhetoric of global health security shifts into and justifies Western notions of securitization first that places its own well-being while others suffer and receive the byproduct of what the West doesn’t need

Rushton 11 - (Rushton, S. (2011). [Research Fellow in the Centre for Health and International Relations at Aberystwyth University. He has written widely on global health with a particular focus on international responses to HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases; the architecture of global health governance; the links between health and security; and issues surrounding conflict and health.]. Global Health Security: Security for whom? Security from what? Political Studies, 59(4), 779–796. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00919.x) a^c

This article seeks to interrogate the concept of ‘health security’,and in particular the‘global health security’ variant which has become a major feature of the policy discourse in recent years. The discussion centres around two questions that have become extremely well established within security studies:‘whose security?’ and ‘security from what?’The article is motivated by what appear to be the early signs of discontent from some developing states over the concept of global health security and its political implications. The developing world is being asked to bear many of the costs of ensuring global health security, but suspicions are evident in some quarters that these measures may in fact be primarily about the protection of the West. Commentators such as William Aldis (2008) have correctly argued that the concept of global health security has been widely used but rarely adequately defined. There is, therefore, a clear need for greater scrutiny of the concept, but also of its political implications. The article begins by examining the concept of health security and arguing that there is in fact a good deal more consensus on its core features than we are often led to believe. It is argued that the state is generally viewed as the referent object (although alternative conceptualisations drawing on human security approaches are in evidence in some places) and that there is also a high level of commonality in the dominant policy discourse over what the major threats to health security are. This, it is argued, centres around a relatively small number of health issues: rapidly spreading infectious diseases; HIV and AIDS; and biological weapons/bioterrorism. This limited range of widely recognised ‘health security threats’, the article argues, tells us a good deal about the political agendas that underpin the concept. These are a particular set of health risks that are primarily seen as major threats by Western developed nations. Views from the Global South about the most pressing threats to health within their nations are often strikingly different. Indeed, many of the diseases that have been widely framed and officially accepted in the West as major health security risks are endemic in parts of the Global South. This is the first step in the argument that the discourse of health security has tended to be a relatively narrow one, focusing in practice (although this is rarely made explicit) on the protection of the West from threats emanating from the developing world. The nature of existing global health governance responses, which tend to be overwhelmingly characterised by a focus on containment rather than prevention (Aldis, 2008; Labonté and Gagnon, 2010, p. 5), heightens unease about ‘whose security’ really counts. The second part of the article builds upon this discussion of the politicised nature of health security and examines the currently popular concept of ‘global health security’. Through an examination of some of the most high-profile uses of the global health security concept I argue that the focus tends to be overwhelmingly (albeit implicitly) on securing states against the ingress of disease (and in particular rapidly spreading infectious diseases that worry the West). Despite the ‘global’ rhetoric, global health security seems to have much more in common with traditional ideas of national and international security (which Sara E. Davies [2010] has referred to as the ‘statist perspective’ in global health) than concepts such as human security (or Davies’ ‘globalist perspective’) which might allow for the inclusion of a broader range of threats to human well-being. In the concluding section I argue that much of the controversy around global health security is the result of a feeling in some quarters that this discourse relates primarily to a Western conception of risk, and that the result has been the prioritisation of measures designed to contain disease within the developing world rather than measures designed to address the root causes of disease. Importantly the argument is not that addressing the deficiencies in the global health security regime is unimportant, or that such activities should not be carried out. Clearly, protecting populations from disease is a good in itself, and populations in the West have as much right as those elsewhere to benefit from such protection. Furthermore, global health security measures might, as some claim, have ‘trickle-down’ benefits for developing countries in the long run. Nevertheless, there is the need for a far more explicit recognition of the primary beneficiaries from the system, and of who is bearing the costs. Only in the light of such a recognition can meaningful debates be carried out over the appropriate prioritisation of such activities in relation to other global health governance challenges. Health Security: Essentially Contested or Essentially Agreed? In People, States and Fear Barry Buzan (1991, p. 7) famously described security as an ‘essentially contested’ concept, one of a number of such concepts that generate ‘unsolvable debates about their meaning and application’. Although this idea has been widely repeated, others took Buzan to task for his claim, arguing that security does not fulfil some of the criteria of true ‘essentially contestedness’ (Baldwin, 1997, pp. 10–2); that the debates that are taking place around security are in fact a relatively new phenomenon (McSweeney, 1999); and that in any case there is widespread agreement over the core elements of security (Booth, 2007, pp. 99–100). Notwithstanding this debate over whether the concept of security must necessarily always be contested, most would at least agree that security has been the subject of a wide variety of definitions, several proposals for redefinition (Tickner, 1995) and numerous attempts at either broadening its scope or defending its boundaries (Walt, 1991). Given that, it should not be a surprise to find that the comparatively young concept of ‘health security’ is still some way away from a universally agreed definition. It is certainly the case that the health security tag is being used in a variety of ways. It is often used alone, but equally often in conjunction with a variety of modifiers – ‘national health security’ (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2009); ‘international health security’ (Chiu et al., 2009);‘global health security’ (WHO, 2001) – or in conjunction with concepts such as that of ‘human security’. Writing in Health Policy & Planning in 2008, William Aldis argued that the huge range of different definitions of ‘health security’ currently in circulation have created ‘confusion and mistrust’. He outlined the recent debates that have erupted over whose interests are being served in health security and the growing concerns of some developing nations that the costs and benefits of ‘global health security’ are not being equitably distributed. In response to these concerns Aldis (2008, p. 370) argued that stakeholders need to find a definitional consensus. He concluded his article by stating that: Ambiguity and confusion surrounds the concept of ‘health security’. This has caused damage to international relationships, and is likely to lead to more problems in the future. The global

#### Securitized discourse perpetuates symptom-led solutions to global threats – narrow focus on insecurity rationalizes military violence as a control mechanism, reinforces existing power structures

**Ahmed,** Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, former prof for Department of International Relation @ U of Sussex, **2011** (Dr. Nafeez, "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society," Global Change, Peace & Security, 23:3, pgs. 350-351, Taylor Francis, Accessed 7/6/19 JCP-GN)

Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87 By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’ them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. ‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89 The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism.

#### The alternative is to re-evaluate and categorize the current global health security narrative into typological nomenclatures. Only through typological nomenclature can we achieve balanced pedagogy without desensitizing issues of global health while maintaining healthy discourse of what warrants intervention and proper response.

Wenham 19 - (Wenham, C. (2019). [Clare Wenham is Assistant Professor of Global Health Policy at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). She specializes in global health security and the politics and policy of pandemic preparedness and outbreak response, through analysis of influenza, Ebola, Zika, and COVID-19.]. The oversecuritization of global health: changing the terms of debate. International Affairs, 95(5), 1093–1110. doi:10.1093/ia/iiz170) [pp. 1105 – 1106] a^c

working in global health emergency response themselves become the object of a different security threat and find themselves in the firing line. This may have a damaging impact on future recruitment into global health security-related activity. Second, if health care workers are unable to carry out their jobs, emergency response efforts will be limited, increasing the risk to global health security of the spread of the pathogen. Such security concerns have had direct impacts on the response to Ebola in the DRC, with WHO and MONUSCO forces agreeing that the security situation will directly lead to an increase in cases of infection,73 for example when those undertaking contact-tracing are disrupted in their efforts and lose track of their work, which is so vital to the success of any disease control strategy.74 Third, there is a broader impact on preparedness within global health security. For example, if children are not vaccinated against polio, the risk of disease transmission rises. Accordingly, we are witnessing an unusual turn in the security–health nexus whereby the practice of health security now poses its own security threat. This will need to be considered in depth, and a sophisticated management plan developed that offers a clear way forward to ensure the safety of those working on the front line of health security and their ability to carry out their activities without coming to harm, as well as to ensure global health security more broadly. This will require self-reflection within the global health security regime to identify the shortcomings and risks associated with military involvement and to assess whether the continued focus on prevention, detection and response remains the most suitable policy pathway in the face of more systemic development needs, or whether current approaches may in fact perpetuate insecurity and inequalities. Emergencization and normalization Initially, the global health security narrative was used as a rhetorical tool by health policy-makers to justify extraordinary measures to combat the rare crisis events, leveraging more attention to and financing for responses to emerging infectious diseases. However, the increased normalization of the discursive tool, which has moved beyond words to operationalized action, suggests that perhaps health security is no longer the exception but the norm in global health policy, raising questions of its utility as a concept. What will an extraordinary response to the next ‘big one’ look like if extraordinary has become the norm? What does this mean for dealing with large-scale outbreaks—and, conversely, for the more endemic, everyday health issues which may find themselves further relegated down the list of prioritized activities in global health? One concern is that, with the frequent use of the global health security narrative, the global health community has created a perpetual state of emergency and routinized health security to the extent that it barely seems shocked when another health emergency arises.75 Compare, for example, the response to the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the DRC and that to the west African outbreak of 2014–16. It took four meetings of the Emergency Committee of the International Health Regulations (IHR) for the DRC Ebola outbreak to be declared a PHEIC, despite the legal criteria having been met long before. Moreover, there has been considerably less mainstream media coverage of this outbreak globally. Although these outbreaks are markedly different in scale and context, the contrast may also suggest a fatigue in the global health security narrative.76 I propose that one solution would be to create a typology within the global health security narrative to distinguish the different types of concerns. This might entail reserving the term ‘global health emergency’ for the really big events, with a tiered scale below this level for global health security crises, global health security threats and, for smaller issues, global health security concerns, as well as encouraging the greater use of regional, national and local language to describe health security threats. While this would raise the challenging possibility of those pathogens and events lower down the typology not getting the desired attention, and the potential for further discrepancies between financing mechanisms and actors involved within the tiered structure, the use of relevant language would enable global health security to maintain its legitimacy. In effect, this principle is already embodied within the PHEIC process and the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), each of which is deployed only for an exceptional event. However, there is currently a mismatch between these labels and the broader global health security narrative—and, importantly, global health security activity. Securitized responses are evident prior to PHEIC declarations and beyond PEF-eligible pathogens. There should be greater consistency within the global health security regime and narrative to reserve the intended power of global health security for those situations in which it is most urgently needed. This typology mirrors previous calls to include a gradient system in the PHEIC process, to denote exigent outbreaks which need international support and increased financing while allowing the PHEIC to maintain its power for major events.77 Changing the terminology in this way may also facilitate better evaluation of the use of the military in global health security, particularly in more routine health security provision, such as preparedness and capacity-building. The reduction of such activity may possibly—though this is speculative—reduce the risks posed to health care workers within health security operations. Sustainability A further point on which global health security needs to reflect is the tendency of securitized responses to favour short-term, reactive, fire-fighting policy and

#### Vote negative to inherit the mindset of the critical intellectual. Only through this mindset can we interrogate the outdated norms within the 1AC and is an ignition to sustaining social movements.

Jones 99 - (Richard, Director of School of Government @ Cardiff, "Emancipation: Reconceptualizing Practice," in Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, Online: <http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/Security%20Strategy%20and%20Critical%20Theory.pdf>) //reformatted by a^c

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus¶ undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant¶ hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every¶ relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350).¶ Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims:¶ It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common¶ sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact¶ between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve¶ unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual–moral¶ bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only¶ of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332–333)¶ According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual–moral bloc” should take place¶ under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolò¶ Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtù–ous¶ state, Gramsci believed that the modern prince could lead the working class on its journey toward its¶ revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125–205).¶ Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in¶ emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class¶ whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary¶ potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely¶ pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the¶ revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by¶ the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and¶ their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the¶ deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move.¶ Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser¶ 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to¶ class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward¶ the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned¶ to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those¶ associated with class conflict. 1¶ This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory¶ theory.¶ Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The¶ history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which¶ the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means¶ with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how¶ disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the¶ “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the¶ experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior¶ (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties¶ have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution.¶ Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous.¶ History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic¶ intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of¶ these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may¶ be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that¶ ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas¶ and material reality.¶ One clear security–related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and¶ abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the¶ ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength¶ from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short–term policy but on the dominant¶ discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between¶ critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in¶ tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security.¶ As Thomas Risse–Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace¶ researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse–Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently¶ popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security¶ Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it¶ certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of¶ common security were taken up by a number of different intellectual communities, including the liberal¶ arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in¶ the center–left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the¶ influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute¶ (Landau 1996: 52–54; Risse–Kappen 1994: 196–200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995).¶ These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social¶ movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in¶ response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions¶ quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse–Kappen 1994: 207).¶ Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse–Kappen notes:¶ When the Reagan administration brought hard–liners into power, the US arms control¶ community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and¶ what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together¶ with pressure from the European allies. (Risse–Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993:¶ 90–110)¶ Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and¶ intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security¶ in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior.¶ The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the¶ Soviet Union. Through various East–West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash¶ conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and¶ advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense”¶ (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse–Kappen 1994; Landau¶ 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including¶ Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin, and Sergei¶ Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders¶ Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse–Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail¶ Gorbachev.¶ Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is¶ clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East–West¶ relations in order to facilitate much–needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material¶ reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant¶ changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of¶ Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the¶ territory of the former Soviet Union.¶ At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the¶ common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¶ (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its¶ expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important¶ aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security¶ before it (Claude 1984: 223–260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably¶ become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the¶ parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of¶ common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects¶ of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonstrates in relation to NATO expansion).¶ The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be¶ politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer¶ place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and¶ critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution of society.¶ Critical Security Studies and the Theory–Practice Nexus¶ Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic¶ intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the¶ party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of¶ the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that¶ this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different¶ coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for¶ emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he¶ suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing¶ experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless”¶ (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of¶ those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather¶ than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’état the¶ prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full–square within the critical theory¶ tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the¶ voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation.¶ The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters.¶ They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a¶ broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a¶ reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the¶ conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self–consciously aligned¶ to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human¶ rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.”¶ Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis¶ of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in¶ Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323–377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view¶ of power as a centaur, half man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and¶ reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and through which ruling or¶ dominant ideas become widely dispersed. 2¶ In particular, Gramsci describes how ideology becomes¶ sedimented in society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and¶ even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values¶ that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once¶ seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery,¶ are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well–worn phrase, “All that is solid¶ melts into the air.”¶ Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of¶ emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229–239).¶ Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal¶ democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even¶ molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative¶ counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by¶ helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn¶ helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new¶ historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate¶ model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice.¶ The Tasks of Critical Security Studies¶ If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of a war of position, then the main task of¶ those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing¶ hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and¶ expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the¶ justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the¶ prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also¶ involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve¶ to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the¶ often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing¶ attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind¶ its positivist facade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion¶ of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth”¶ (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more¶ familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even¶ along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.”¶ Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for¶ example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the¶ difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to¶ influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter¶ aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore,¶ critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to¶ lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical¶ security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As¶ Gramsci notes, “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci¶ 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116–121). Thus, by criticizing¶ the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different¶ understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing a part in eroding the¶ legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic¶ position.¶ There are a number of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy.¶ As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to¶ other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for¶ instant punditry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we¶ try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture.... As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our¶ perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11).¶ Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the¶ ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues:¶ In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed¶ not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their¶ unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in¶ Kellner 1992: vii)¶ Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes.¶ The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against.¶ Rather, through their educational activities, proponents of critical security studies should aim to provide¶ support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of¶ the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in¶ supporting the struggles of social movements.¶ That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned;¶ instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean¶ peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts¶ are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account¶ of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of¶ critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate¶ and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993:¶ 5–13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and¶ strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts.¶ If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical¶ theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual¶ orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the¶ possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean¶ years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such¶ as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played¶ a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in¶ Adornian terms of a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were¶ picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice.¶ Obviously, one would be naive to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop¶ alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already¶ and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused¶ by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49–62).¶ Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are¶ extremely risk–averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by¶ following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on.¶ The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability¶ of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen¶ 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course,¶ the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a¶ very real interest in marginalizing dissent.¶ Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices¶ of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s,¶ when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries¶ far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival¶ of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

### 3

#### 1. Language Shapes Perception – their claims that discourse is detached from reality ignore the structure of policy proposals where discourse is tailored to produce a political response – securitized rhetoric shapes perception of our environment to motivate action through preemptive interventions and escalation

#### 2. Only language focus sheds light on the practice of security— threat framing determines our understanding of problems and how to address them

Koon, researcher in the Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins University, Hawkins, Assistant Professor, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, and Mayhew, PROFESSOR IN HEALTH POLICY, SYSTEMS AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH at London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 2016

(Adam D., Benjamin, Susannah H., “Framing and the health policy process: a scoping review,” Health Policy and Planning, pgs. 3, February 11, Oxford Academic, Accessed 1/24/19 JCP-GN)

As noted, the concept of framing is used in related, yet distinct, ways in other academic disciplines. Within these different approaches, frames are seen to function in a variety of ways. In Goffman’s conception, frames balance structure and agency because our world is framed by events and experiences and yet we actively frame events and experiences (Gamson et al. 1992). Both overtly and covertly, frames highlight certain aspects of a problematic situation, while obscuring others in order to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies (Entman 1993). This is important in the policy world because frames determine what the actors in the policy community will consider the facts to be and how competing problem definitions lead to normative prescriptions for action (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Framing precludes certain policy responses, identifying legitimate participants through political discourse and galvanizing coalitions of interest (Schattschneider 1960). Moreover, when comparing multiple perspectives on how to address a particular problem, the problem itself may change through framing (Fischer 2003). Additionally, actors may try to strategically change the problem by reframing a policy dilemma to incorporate a broader array of interests and potentially free the decision-making process from the gridlock of conflicting frames (Scho¨n and Rein 1994). This highlights the transformative nature of discourse in the sense that ‘frames in communication’ influence ‘frames in thought’ (Druckman 2011).

#### National security policy relies upon linguistic demarcations of the boundaries of our community to justify war

Mutimer 2k

David Mutimer, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at York University (Canada), 2000 ("Imagining Security," The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security, Published by Lynne Rienner (Boulder, CO), ISBN 1555877877, p. 17-19)

Acts of interpretation are indispensable to the reproduction of practices**,** understood in this fashion.First, before a person can engage in a practice, he or she must determine that previous examples of conduct are part of a single pattern—that is, that they are instances of a single practice rather than multiple practices or random activity. Even having recognized that these prior instances of behavior form a practice, she must formulate a guide to her own activity from these prior instances. Of course, such interpretive acts are often unconscious and are rarely, if ever, entirely individual. We are not often in the position of trying to engage in an unfamiliar practice without assistance. Rather, we share these crucial interpretive acts with others in our society. We recognize collectively that certain patterns of behavior are parts of the same practice, and we teach others, in more or less formal ways, the standards of conduct that govern these behaviors. In a short book published in 1956, Kenneth Boulding outlined a similar conception of social life around the concept of *the image****:*** “The image not only makes society, society continually remakes the image. This hen[end page 17]and egg process is perhaps the most important key to the understanding of the dynamics of society. The basic bond of any society, culture, subculture, or organization is a 'public image,' that is, an image the essential characteristics of which are shared by the individuals participating in the group.” **16** Practices are stable patterns of behavior produced by acting in terms of the image; on the other hand, the image is seen in those same patterns of behavior, and thus it is reproduced**.** What Boulding callsthe image is necessarily social; it is a public image shared by members of a society. Thus the acts of interpretation that produce practices are not subjective, as they appear in the previous paragraph, but intersubjective*.* 17 Charles Taylor has provided a clear example of the nature of constitutive intersubjective meanings in practices:“Take the practice of deciding things by majority vote. It carries with it certain standards, of valid and invalid voting, and valid and invalid results, without which it would not be the practice that it is.” **18** All those who participate in the practice must share an image of the practice in which they are engaged. They must share a certain collection of rules for fair and unfair voting, as well as knowing what essential behaviors they are expected to perform. They must also understand that they are independent agents but also parts of a collective who can decide as a whole through the aggregation of independent decisions**.** As Taylor concludes,“In this way, we say that the practices which make up a society require certain self-descriptions on the part of the participants.” **19** The image of majority voting constitutes the practice of voting by enabling the actors and actions necessary for the practice and defining the relationships between the actors and those between the actors and the practice**.** The same is true for the practices in which states engage**,** which are the object of study in international relations.A practice such as waging war, perhaps the definitive practice of the traditional study of international relations, is conducted in terms of certain standards, as is voting**. 20** Intersubjectively held meanings establish the conditions under which war may or may not be waged, as well as establishing which violent conduct is and which is not to be counted as war. The image constitutive of war is socially held, adjudged, contested, and taught. Thus, when the United States went to war in Vietnam, it was recognized by the society of states to be waging war, despite its subjective labeling of the violence as a police action. On the other hand, the U. S. War on Drugs was recognized by those same states to be metaphorically warlike rather than an instance of the practice of waging war, despite the use of military and paramilitary violence**.** If intersubjective meanings constitute practices, engaging in practices involves acting toward the world in the terms provided by a particular set of intersubjective meanings. Practices can therefore be said to carry with them sets of meanings. If we investigate state action in terms of practices, we can ask questions about the constitutive intersubjective meanings,[end page 18]about the world these practices make through reproducing meaning**.** As Roxanne Doty has argued,“Policy makers … function within a discursive space that imposes meanings on their world and thus creates reality.” **21** At this point I reconnect to the argument with which this chapter began, becausethe reality that is created in this discursive space involves the identification of the objects of action, the actors, and the interests that are pursued. The intersubjective understandings that constitute practices can be thought of**,** adapting Boulding's usage,as images that frame a particular reality. This framing is fundamentally discursive; it is necessarily tied to the language through which the frame is expressed**.** A problem—for example, that of the proliferation of weapons—is not presented to policymakers fully formed. Weapons proliferation as a problem does not slowly dawn on states but rather is constituted by those states in their practices. What is more, this practically constituted image of a security problem shapes the interests states have at stake in that problem and the forms of solutions that can be considered to resolve it. To understand how an image shapes interest and policy, it is useful to consider the place of metaphor in shaping understanding**.**

## On

### AT-Framing

#### Exclusively focusing on policymaking crowds outs critical questioning.

Biswas 7

(Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics – Whitman College, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist”, Millennium, 36(1), p. 117-125, JD)

It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the disciplinary traps that have, ironically, circumscribed the ability of scholars whose very business it is to think about global politics to actually think globally and politically. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking *politics* seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the *global* seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about *feeling and thinking globally* concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

### AT-Solvency

#### Economic globalization and free trade are deployed as a ruse to authorize military intervention and global violence.

Roberts, Secor and Sparke 3

(Professor and Chair Department of Geography, Assistant professor at University of Kentucky in the department of Geography and Matthew is a professor at the University of Washington. “Neoliberal Geopolitics” 2003. <http://faculty.washington.edu/sparke/neoliberalgeopolitics.pdf>, JD)

Armed with their simple master narrative about the inexorable force of economic globalization, neoliberals famously hold that the global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring worldwide peace and prosperity. Like Modernity and Development before it, Globalization is thus narrated as the force that will lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy. In the most idealist accounts, such as those of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1999:xviii), the process of marketized liberalization is represented as an almost natural phenomenon which, “like the dawn,” we can appreciate or ignore, but not presume to stop. Observers and critics of neoliberalism as an emergent system of global hegemony, however, insist on noting the many ways in which states actively foster the conditions for global integration, directly or through international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Gill 1995). Under what we are identifying as neoliberal geopolitics, there appears to have been a new development in these patterns of state-managed liberalization. The economic axioms of structural adjustment, fiscal austerity, and free trade have now, it seems, been augmented by the direct use of military force. At one level, this conjunction of capitalism and war-making is neither new nor surprising (cf Harvey 1985). Obviously, many wars—including most 19th- and 20th-century imperial wars—have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns. Likewise, one only has to read the reflections of one of America’s “great” generals, Major General Smedley Butler, to get a powerful and resonant sense of the long history of economically inspired American militarism. “I served in all commissioned ranks from Second Lieutenant to Major General,” Butler wrote in his retirement, [a]nd during that period, I spent most of that time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. In short I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it. I helped make Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested. (quoted in Ali 2002:260). If it was engaged in a kind of gangster capitalist interventionism at the previous fin-de-siècle, today’s American war-making has been undertaken in a much more open, systematic, globally ambitious, and quasi-corporate economic style. Al Capone’s approach, has, as it were, given way to the new world order of Jack Welch. To be sure, the Iraq war was, in some respects, a traditional national, imperial war aimed at the monopolization of resources. It was, after all, partly a war about securing American control over Iraqi oil. Russia’s Lukoil and France’s TotalFinaElf will thereby lose out vis-à-vis Chevron and Exxon; more importantly, the US will now be able to function as what Christian Parenti (2003) calls an “energy gendarme” over key oil supplies to East Asia and Europe. Other, still more narrowly national circuits of American capitalism benefited from the war—including, for example, Kellogg Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Vice President Dick Cheney’s Halliburton that, having helped the Pentagon orchestrate the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, is now receiving generous contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure using proceeds from Iraq’s “liberated” oil sales. But these classically imperial aspects of the hostilities are not our main focus here. Instead, our central concern is with how a neoliberal world vision has served to obscure these more traditional geopolitics beneath Panglossian talk of global integration and (what are thereby constructed as) its delinquent others. In the neoliberal approach, the geopolitics of interimperial rivalry, the Monroe doctrine, and the ideas about hemispheric control that defined Butler’s era are eclipsed by a new global vision of almost infinite openness and interdependency. In contrast also to the Cold War era, danger is no longer imagined as something that should be contained at a disconnected distance. Now, by way of a complete counterpoint, danger is itself being defined as disconnection from the global system. In turn, the neoliberal geopolitical response, it seems, is to insist on enforcing reconnection—or, as Friedman (2003:A27) put it in an upbeat postwar column, “aggressive engagement.” It would be wrong, of course, to suggest that even this vision is brand new. Much like the broken neoliberal record of “globalization is inexorable,” the vision can be interpreted as yet another cover for the century-old package of liberal development nostrums that critics (eg Smith 2003) and apologists (eg Bacevich 2002) alike argue lie at the defining heart of “American Empire.” But what distinguishes this moment of neoliberal geopolitics is that the notion of enforced reconnection is today mediated through a whole repertoire of neoliberal ideas and practices, ranging from commitments to market-based solutions and public-private partnerships to concerns with networking and flexibility to mental maps of the planet predicated on a one-world vision of interdependency. Thomas Barnett merely represents one particularly audacious and influential embodiment of this trend.

### At – stramiello 18 ev

#### Their rhetoric of a China threat functions as political myth, constructing China as the other threatening the West

**Song,** associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, **2015**

(Weiqing, “Securitization of the "China Threat" Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account,” China Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pgs. 160-161, JSTOR, Accessed 1/24/19 JCP-GN)

This question highlights another kind of speech act involved in identity building. It is interesting for analysts to consider the identity or identities that a particular piece of language is being used to enact (i.e., to persuade an audience to recognize an identity or identities as opera tive). What identity or identities does a particular use of language attri bute to others, and how does this help the speaker or writer to enact his or her own identity?68 It matters little whether the content communicated is factual. The real purpose is to convince an audience of its urgency and consequently persuade them to take action. The mode of securitization here is based on political myth. One cannot falsify political myths because they are not a matter of "scientific hypothesis" but rather the "expression of a determination to act."69 This mode uses rhetoric, visual spectacle and other kinds of art, rituals, and social practices, among other forms of communication. It relies to a large extent on ascriptive factors such as ethnicity, race, culture, and civilization. In contrast to the scientific and analogical modes, the mythical mode of securitization pursues a logic that is psychologically intuitive rather than logically deductive or inductive. In extreme cases, it can be bluntly discriminatory. In the mode of political myth, the China threat issue is structurally incorporated by a group of securitizers into the "basic discourses" of culture and civilization. The issue does not appear to be a question of security because it is assigned to a broader context wherein a country as different as China is expanding its reach throughout the world. However, the real purpose of construct the China threat as such, and ultimately to call for action against it. Securitizers working in this mode thus promulgate political myths about the issue. A myth is rendered specifically "political" not by its content but by the relationship between a given narrative and the political conditions of a given group.70 In the documentary titled The Chinese Are Coming, the securitizers use a differentiating logic to construct China as a country, nation, and culture/civilization that is quite alien to the West. When Chinese sailors in the harbor of Luanda offer to share their lunch with the narrator, for example, he merely observes that their style of cooking is unfamiliar. A more dramatic scene occurs at Kafue, a large wildlife national park in Zambia. Some chopsticks and a hanko ("seal" in Japanese), both made of ivory, are presented to the audience. Although there is no evidence of the market(s) to which these items are exported, the blame for the killing of elephants in Africa is attributed to China. The conclusion is then drawn that "there are aspects of Chinese culture that represent a threat to the very wildlife the tourists come to see." Similarly, another study provides evidence that most Western attempts to portray Chinese firms as cruel, unconcerned with human rights, and the "worst employers" in Africa are highly inaccurate, with methodological mistakes and elemen tary empirical errors.71 It is clear that the essence of a political myth does not lie in its truthfulness, but rather in how it is articulated to compel attention and action. The above are only a few examples of a series of acts of exclusion and marginalization perpetrated by Western agents seeking to construct China as culturally alien.72 The linking method is also used in this process. For example, in an act of narrativized "reality" wherein Rowlatt takes the same railway route as British colonizers from Angola into the heartland of Africa to tell the story of the Chinese in Africa today, China is alleged to be following Britain's footsteps in colonizing the African continent. The reality of Chinese neocolonization is narrated as "real";73 narrative serves more as the means by which the status of reality is conferred on an event. Through similar narrative activities, securitizers try to construct "a figured world,"74 or a story of a simplified world that equates typicality with veracity. In this figured world, the Chinese identity is differentiated from the Western model of the "normal" and linked with a threatening "other." It is conceived as an expanding power, growing at a phenomenal speed and posing many challenges to the world.

### Eu-wto

#### Lake 18 is wrong -

#### History proves interdependence does not deter conflict

Spaniel and Malone 3/5/**19** [William Spaniel, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone, Department of Political Science, Stanford. The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War. March 5, 2019. <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>] **Italics in original**

However, not all scholars believe opportunity costs are a panacea for war.2 The historical record contains empirical inconsistencies in this relationship. At times, conflicts have arisen despite increased economic interdependence between parties, fueling concerns over when and whether opportunity costs reduce conflict. We therefore ask a simple question: holding all else equal, does increasing opportunity costs for war decrease the probability of conflict?3

#### Interdependence is bad – better and more recent studies -

#### As economic costs of war grow, they incentivize more aggressive negotiation strategies that exploit leverage – that makes conflicts more likely

Spaniel and Malone 3/5/19 [William Spaniel, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone, Department of Political Science, Stanford. The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War. March 5, 2019. <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>]

In this paper, we develop a model that reconciles this puzzle by showing both proponents and skeptics of the opportunity cost mechanism are right. Instruments like trade have competing effects on the probability of war. How is this true? Despite raising the price of war, opportunity costs also have an indirect, second-order effect of exacerbating uncertainty about a state’s resolve, which is among the most popular mechanisms that explain war.4 Which effect is stronger? We show that the latter effect can dominate in equilibrium—that is, the probability of war increases despite raising opportunity costs.

The intuition falls back on screening models where a proposer is uncertain about its opponent’s willingness to fight. Broadly, the uninformed state can pursue two strategies under these conditions. First, it can offer a generous amount that resolved types would accept. This has the benefit of avoiding the costs of war. Alternatively, it can propose a stingy settlement and screen the opponent’s willingness to fight, causing unresolved types to accept while inducing resolved types to reject. The latter benefits the proposer by giving it a large share of the settlement when the opponent accepts, but also forces it to pay the costs of war if its screening offer backfires.

#### Interdependence can just as easily cause more war even between nuclear states

Spaniel and Malone 3/5/19 [William Spaniel, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone, Department of Political Science, Stanford. The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War. March 5, 2019. <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>]

This paper has more general implications for trade-conflict research. It complements growing calls to disaggregate the effects of instruments like trade (Martin et al. 2008). Empirical analyses must carefully trace what precisely parties do not know about each other to draw the correct inference. It also suggests states should be careful in interpreting how other states value or benefit from mutual trade flows. A free trade agreement championed by one state may be perceived as relatively less beneficial in another state. This uncertainty may undermine the credibility to abide by the agreement in the long-run.

We also highlight the need for future research to consider screening incentives in trade deals themselves. Although the proposer benefits from greater trade—both from the direct economic benefit and indirect ability to steal more surplus from the receiver— trade can harm unresolved receivers and incentivize screening. This could generate some constraints in the deals a state is willing to sign, in fear that the rearranged incentives under uncertainty could hurt its ability to effectively bluff later. A more unified approach to trade and crisis negotiations would yield additional interesting insights.

Moving forward, the results speak to other lines of research in international relations theory predicated on changing costs of conflict. We couched our results in the interdependence literature due its clear application. However, the comparative static speaks to cases where the receiver’s costs increase more generally.23 Framed this way, the results have clear implications for other literatures. For example, standard nuclear deterrence theory argues that possessing nuclear weapons increases the costs of war for potential challengers due to the risk of a retaliatory nuclear response (Morgenthau 1961, 280; Gilpin 1983, 213-219). The logic of alliance formation similarly relies on the assumption that entering these pacts induces peace by raising an opponent’s costs of conflict (Morrow 1994). Together, these mechanisms assume raising the costs of war should decrease conflict. Our results demonstrate this effect is likely more conditional than previously realized. We find increased costs of conflict can exacerbate issues with uncertainty over resolve even if both states possess destructive weaponry. This promises to shed new insights into how raising costs affects deterrence and coercive bargaining in other contexts.