## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not defend that anyone other than workers have the unconditional right to strike.

#### A worker is a person who works for a larger organization or company

New South Wales Government

<https://www.safework.nsw.gov.au/about-us/glossary/glossary-acordion/worker> [Home](https://www.safework.nsw.gov.au/)/ [About us](https://www.safework.nsw.gov.au/about-us)  / [Glossary](https://www.safework.nsw.gov.au/about-us/glossary) / Worker // Phoenix

Worker

Definition of the term ‘worker’.

Anyone who performs paid work in any capacity for an employer, business or organisation is considered a worker. However, the term can also include unpaid workers such as volunteers or work experience students.

You're considered a worker if you are:

an employee

a trainee, apprentice or work experience student

a volunteer

an outworker

a contractor or sub contractor

an employee of a contractor or sub contractor

an employee of a labour hire company.

#### Strikes are work stoppages to further workers’ interests

Garcia and Andres ’17

Leyton García, Jorge Andrés THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AS A FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT: RECOGNITION AND LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Revista Chilena de Derecho, vol. 44, núm. 3, 2017, pp. 781-804 Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Santiago, Chile <https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=177054481008> // Phoenix

Nevertheless, a review of the relevant sources can help us to clarify the issue. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque himself provides us with certain parameters. He indicates that for the purposes of his analysis of the position of the right to strike as a Convention right, a myriad of activities can be considered as a form of strike action. He provides what can be considered as a general definition of what is a strike. He argues that the right to strike “encompasses any work stoppage, however brief and limited, with a view to defending and furthering the workers’ interests and rights by exerting pressure on employers, including sympathy or secondary strike in the case of workers who take action in support of colleagues employed by another employer”33.

#### Violation: They defend climate protests which use students instead of workers and aim to raise awareness rather than worker’s interest

#### Climate strikes are not workers – it’s young people wanting a future – at worst decks solvency since climate strikes are already happening

Sengupta ’19

Sengupta, Somini. “Protesting Climate Change, Young People Take to Streets in a Global Strike.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2019, [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climate-strike.html. //](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climate-strike.html.%20//) Phoenix

Anxious about their future on a hotter planet and angry at world leaders for failing to arrest the crisis, masses of young people poured into the streets on every continent on Friday for a day of global climate protests. Organizers estimated the turnout to be around four million in thousands of cities and towns worldwide.

It was the first time that children and young people had demonstrated to demand climate action in so many places and in such numbers around the world.

They turned out in force in Berlin, where the police estimated 100,000 participants, with similar numbers in Melbourne and London. In New York City, [the mayor’s office estimated](https://twitter.com/NYCMayor/status/1175118915317436417) that 60,000 people marched through the narrow streets of Lower Manhattan, while organizers put the total at 250,000. By the dozens in some places, and by the tens of thousands in others, young people demonstrated in cities like Manila, Kampala and Rio de Janeiro. A group of scientists rallied in Antarctica.

“You had a future, and so should we,” demonstrators chanted as they marched through New York City.

#### Strikes do not raise awareness – that’s what protests do

Mazumder ’20

Mazumder, Shom. “What Protests Can (and Can't) Do.” FiveThirtyEight, FiveThirtyEight, 8 June 2020, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-protests-can-do/. // Phoenix

Political science, it turns out, actually has a lot to say about protests, even though it’s really hard to pinpoint what makes one protest effective and another not. Broadly speaking, though, there are four main ways the literature tries to evaluate a protest:

1. Did it raise awareness?

2.Did public opinion change?

3.Were there institutional changes as a result?

4.Were there electoral consequences, either intended or unintended?

First, protests, at their most basic level, [raise awareness](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2939043?seq=1) about issues that might not yet be in the mainstream. This might not sound all that important, but [research by political scientist Deva Woodly](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-politics-of-common-sense-9780190203986?cc=us&lang=en&) of The New School shows that protest movements can fundamentally alter the way we talk — and think — about a specific issue.

#### Limits – They explode the prep burden since an aff could defend any person combatting any issue they like and calling it a strike. This means we would have to prep against anyone doing anything – obviously absurd. They could not be a worker and could be striking against non-work related issues.

#### Ground – All of our ground is contextual to workers like the Essential Workers PIC, Health Workers PIC, Business Confidence DA, Econ DA, etc. Removing the requirement for workers means we are left with nothing.

#### Paradigm Issues

#### 1 – Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start and we can’t come back

#### 2 - Comes before 1AR theory — A - If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff, B – Neg abuse outweighs aff abuse because we control the depth of the debate if we can’t engage depth is impossible

#### 3 - Use competing interps on T – A – T is a yes/no question, you can’t be half topical or mostly topical B - reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4 - No RVIs – A - Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat, B - discourages checking real abuse C - Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quick

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not defend that only one or a small subset of just governments recognize an unconditional right to strike. To clarify, debaters must defend that all just governments recognize an unconditional right to strike.

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “Just government” in the topic – indefinite articles are not specific and refer to the entire class of the object being modified

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: They specify [X COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES]

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Limits – Allowing them to get away with specifying one country explodes the prep burden because the adjective ‘just’ does not have a clear definition. They could choose any country on Earth and have some absurd definition of ‘just’ to prove why their niche country is topical. They could choose a group of countries and make an infinite caselist through any possible grouping of countries. Only a whole rez affs solves – this is also offense under pragmatics since it’s a pragmatic reason our interp is good. PICs turning limits is incoherent absent a warrant for why a whole rez aff causes PICs.

#### 2] Semantics – It matters since otherwise each debater has their own subjective understanding of the topic. It is the only objective interpretation that has an intent to define indefinite articles. Reasons why semantics is bad/wrong is not a reason the shell is wrong but a reason to change the topic since it does not change the meaning of the topic.

c/a paradigm issues

## 3

#### Counterplan text: UK ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike for workers except for police officers and other law enforcement workers.

#### [1] Empirics prove – when police unions get more power, police abuse it.

Greenhouse 6/18

Greenhouse, Steven, “How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of Power.” The New Yorker, 18 June 2020, [https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses. //](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses.%20//) Phoenix

Police unions have long had a singular—and divisive—place in American labor. What is different at this fraught moment, however, is that these unions, long considered untouchable, due to their extraordinary power on the streets and among politicians, face a potential reckoning, as their conduct roils not just one city but the entire nation. Since the nineteen-sixties, when police unions first became like traditional unions and won the right to bargain collectively, they have had a controversial history. And recent studies suggest that their political and bargaining power has enabled them to win disciplinary systems so lax that they have helped increase police abuses in the United States.

A 2018 University of Oxford study of the hundred largest American cities found that the extent of protections in police contracts was directly and positively correlated with police violence and other abuses against citizens. A 2019 University of Chicago study found that [extending collective-bargaining rights](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55ad38b1e4b0185f0285195f/t/5d92b749ad13ae3d9b293125/1569896278868/Sheriffs+Unions+Misconduct.pdf) to Florida sheriffs’ deputies led to a forty per cent statewide increase in cases of violent misconduct—translating to nearly twelve additional such incidents annually.

In a forthcoming study, Rob Gillezeau, a professor and researcher, concluded that, from the nineteen-fifties to the nineteen-eighties, the ability of police to collectively bargain led to a substantial rise in police killings of civilians, with a greater impact on people of color. “With the caveat that this is very early work,” Gillezeau [wrote](https://twitter.com/robgillezeau/status/1266834185055956997) on Twitter, on May 30th, “it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the non-white population.”

## Case

### 1NC – Unions Turn

#### Unions prevent climate action – they want to keep their fossil fuel jobs

Kahn ‘20

DEBRA KAHN, SAMANTHA MALDONADO and CATHERINE BOUDREAU. “Unions Fracture over Climate.” POLITICO, 1 Sept. 2020, [https://www.politico.com/newsletters/the-long-game/2020/09/01/unions-fracture-over-climate-490237. //](https://www.politico.com/newsletters/the-long-game/2020/09/01/unions-fracture-over-climate-490237.%20//) Phoenix

A DIVIDED MOVEMENT — Organized labor is often viewed as a cheerleader for the left, helping shape the agendas of Democratic lawmakers. But in statehouses from coast to coast and at the national level, unions have had no problem blocking green initiatives if they decide they're not in their members' interests.

Those who stand to lose the most from tightening environmental policies have been wielding their power the past few months to kill proposals in statehouses across the country. Broadly, the split among unions is most marked between trade unions whose jobs are tied to the fossil fuel industry and those representing the service sector, like health care, government and custodial workers.

“In recent years, the public employees have been siding mostly with the environmentalists and the private sector have been siding with our opinion, which is yes, we're pro-environment but ... we also want to be able to afford to live here and have jobs here,” said Kate Gibbs, deputy director of the Engineers Labor-Employer Cooperative, a trades union.

Environmental protection and union jobs are a fault line among Democrats, which will only be magnified nationwide if Joe Biden defeats President Donald Trump in November. Biden will be under pressure from the left to enact major climate action similar to the "Green New Deal," which many national labor union leaders oppose. The Democratic National Committee last month [scrapped language in its platform](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/19/sponsor-of-climate-language-blasts-dnc-398734) calling for an end to fossil fuel tax breaks and subsidies, despite Biden's campaign arguing the move would ultimately benefit unions.

Take California, where Democrats dominate state government. In a recent tug of war over the blue-collar constituency, the unions proved decisive. Electrical and ironworkers, pipe fitters, boilermakers and construction workers, along with oil companies and the state Chamber of Commerce, persuaded three Democratic senators to vote against a bill that would have mandated no-drill zones around certain populous areas — killing the effort for the year.

"We've got a little bit stronger voice for working people than most other people," said Robbie Hunter, president of the State Building and Construction Trades Council of California, the parent organization for 160 local unions that represent 400,000 workers across more than a dozen different trades, which spearheaded opposition to the bill.

In Pennsylvania, Democratic state lawmakers [were recently frustrated](https://www.penncapital-star.com/commentary/pa-s-building-trade-unions-need-to-be-allies-not-opponents-of-a-cleaner-climate-opinion/) by AFL-CIO, Building Trades and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers' support of a bill that would block the state from joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions from the power sector.

“It's this fundamental tension,” a California state lawmaker said on condition of anonymity to avoid political repercussion. “It underlies everything from the Green New Deal at the national level to California's climate action agenda.”

### 1NC – Solvency

#### 1] Empirics prove – Climate strikes do nothing – emissions went up after students’ strikes

Harvey ‘19

Harvey, Fiona. “Greta Thunberg Says School Strikes Have Achieved Nothing.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 6 Dec. 2019, [https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/06/greta-thunberg-says-school-strikes-have-achieved-nothing. //](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/06/greta-thunberg-says-school-strikes-have-achieved-nothing.%20//) Phoenix

The global wave of school strikes for the climate over the past year has “achieved nothing” because greenhouse gas emissions have continued to rise, [Greta Thunberg](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/greta-thunberg) has told activists at UN climate talks in Madrid.

Thousands of young people were expected to gather at the UN climate conference and in the streets of the Spanish capital on Friday to protest against the lack of progress in tackling the climate emergency, as officials from more than 190 countries wrangled over the niceties of wording in documents related to the Paris accord.

In the four years since the [landmark agreement](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/paris-climate-deal-200-nations-sign-finish-fossil-fuel-era) was signed, greenhouse gas emissions have risen by 4% and the talks this year are not expected to produce new commitments on carbon from the world’s biggest emitters.

Thunberg, whose [solo protest](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/greta-thunberg-schoolgirl-climate-change-warrior-some-people-can-let-things-go-i-cant) in Sweden in 2018 has since snowballed into a [global movement](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/dec/01/island-states-want-decisive-action-to-prevent-inundation), spoke at a press conference before a march through the centre of Madrid. She said that although schoolchildren had been striking around the world, this “has not translated into action” from governments.

“I’m just an activist and we need more activists,” she said. “Some people are afraid to change – they try so desperately to silence us.”

Thunberg expressed hope for the UN negotiations but doubted whether governments had got the message, and warned the world could not afford continued inaction.

“I sincerely hope COP25 will reach something concrete and increase awareness among people, and that world leaders and people in power grasp the urgency of the climate crisis, because right now it does not seem that they are,” she said.

Although young people would keep striking, Thunberg said, they wanted to stop – if governments made credible promises and showed a willingness to act.

“We can’t go on like this; it is not sustainable that children skip school and we don’t want to continue – we would love some action from the people in power. People are suffering and dying today. We can’t wait any longer,” she said.

#### 2] Fossil fuels are deeply rooted in the economy – strikes aren’t enough

Hayes 19 [Jason; Contributor to The Hill, director of environmental policy at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a research and education institute in Midland, Mich; “A global climate strike isn't enough,” The Hill; 9/19/19; <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/461809-a-global-climate-strike-isnt-enough>] Justin

A collective of influential green groups and corporations is supporting a campaign for a global climate strike from Sept. 20-27. The strike pushes young people to walk out of schools and workplaces to protest the energy sources that keep us alive and thriving. That many people are concerned about the global climate is obvious, but how will encouraging them to abandon their jobs or schools for a day or two, or seven, reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

The campaign website — globalclimatestrike.net — tells people they must “demand an end to the age of fossil fuels.” But, in the United States, we rely on these fuels for over 80 percent of the energy we use to provide basic necessities such as food, clean water, heating and air conditioning, medicine, transportation and so much more.

To make things worse, the energy sources offered up as replacements for fossil fuels — typically wind and solar — couldn’t even exist without fossil fuels. Natural gas, oil and coal are needed to mine, refine, process and ship the metals, rare earth minerals, silicone, plastics and various chemicals that go into renewables. Without steel, there are no towers to hold up wind turbines. Without rare earths, there are no solar panels. Adding to this conundrum is the fact that wind and solar cannot provide reliable power. They are intermittent, meaning they must be propped up by more reliable energy sources, such as natural gas.

A group of environmental policy experts has put together MyClimatePledge.com as our response, because we’d like to challenge climate strikers and to help them appreciate that striking won’t be enough.

#### 3] Strikes do nothing – strikers lack leverage

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

But strikers must have the leverage to accomplish their goals

Strikers represent the demand for climate action. But who will supply these policies and what leverage do strikers have over these policymakers? This is where climate strikes could run into a problem.

Strikers have leverage when their absence from work disrupts activities that are valuable to policymakers. If railway workers go on strike, trains cannot run and the public is upset. When airline pilots go on strike, people cannot fly, and airlines lose revenue. By some accounts, the 48-hour strike of British Airways pilots (regarding a pay dispute) in September 2019 will cost the company about £100 million.

What leverage do the climate strikers have? Assuming most of the strikers are students, what costs might their strikes impose on the actors that need to change their climate policies (namely, governments and fossil fuel firms)?

Student strikes probably do not disrupt the government or fossil fuel firms. The main bearer of these costs are the conscientious teachers who need to figure out how they are going to make up for the lost teaching time.

### 1NC – Democracy Adv

#### [1] No democracy impact---new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine democratic peace theory

Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should. There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk. Militaries are less closely tied to voters Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it. In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process. The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts. Adversaries are proliferating and changing The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex. Technology is reducing constraint New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties. Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy. While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly. Multiple warrants and empirics prove democracy increases terrorism

#### [2] Multiple warrants and empirics prove democracy increases terrorism

Piazza 14 (James, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University, “Democracy and Terrorism: A Complex Relationship”, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=179658)> //BS 12-18-2017

Democracies may be less susceptible to violence and conflict than other forms of government, but does that also include terrorism? Not according to James Piazza. Democratic states are more likely to experience this type of violence even though they have attributes that are well-suited to combat it. By James Piazza for ISN Democracy, as a system of government, is widely lauded by political scientists for its ‘pacific effects.’ Experts have produced some good evidence that democratic regimes rarely go to war with one another and have also observed that democracies are much less susceptible to civil wars and internal armed conflicts than nondemocratic regimes. These pacific effects are typically explained as the product of norms and decision-making procedures within democracies that reinforce the peaceful and orderly resolution of disputes. But is it also true that democratic rule reduces terrorism and terrorist activity? The answer to this question is complex, conditional and nuanced – a reflection of the supporting evidence. While key qualities of democracies do make them more likely to experience terrorism than authoritarian regimes, some characteristic features of democratic governance have also been found to reduce terrorism. This disparate conclusion – that democracy might be a panacea for the scourges of inter- and intra-state war but not for terrorism – is likely due to the fact that terrorism is a distinct manifestation of political violence. To start with, terrorism is much lower in intensity than inter- or intra-state war. It is a tactic used by political actors or individuals characterized by conventional weakness and, often, political marginality. As opposed to conventional military force, terrorism typically involves the use of violence or the threat of violence, often against civilians, in order to influence a wider audience and to prompt a much stronger opponent to offer concessions. It is therefore most frequently deployed in situations where the opponent – usually a state – is much stronger and has ample capacity, such as through a free media, to project influence. Democracy and terrorism: The evidence According to the Global Terrorism Database, regimes of all types in the post-Cold War period (1991-2012) experienced an average of about 18 terrorist attacks (both domestic and transnational) per year**.** Democratic regimes, however, experienced 62% more terrorism than did nondemocratic regimes – 21.3 attacks per year as opposed to 13.2 attacks for nondemocracies. This pattern holds regardless of the region of the world the countries are located in, the type of terrorist threat they face, and other factors such as population size and level of economic development. What accounts for this disparity? Answers to this question are best understood in terms of 1) the structural factors that make a country an attractive setting for terrorist attacks and 2) the factors that impel individuals and groups to engage in terrorism in the first place. We might expect democracies to produce fewer aggrieved individuals and groups than authoritarian regimes, because, in comparison to authoritarian systems, democracies are more responsive to public demands and tend to provide more avenues for the peaceful and orderly redress of grievances. The reality, however, is that democracies are both more attractive and more vulnerable to terrorism than nondemocracies. Democracies afford political dissidents the right to engage in autonomous political behavior. While this maximizes opportunities for peaceful legal and political activism, it also facilitates illegal and violent activities, terrorism included**.** Democratic institutions preserve the rights of the accused and place restrictions on the police and authorities to a far greater degree than do nondemocratic regimes. This, of course, complicates counterterrorism in the areas of surveillance, interrogation and prosecution of terrorists and their supporters. Even more importantly, democracies encourage a free media that will report on terrorist atrocities, giving terrorists the opportunity to influence a much wider audience than would be the case in countries where the media is controlled by the government. These commonly-cited features make democracies especially vulnerable to terrorism and less well equipped to engage in counterterrorism. Scholars of terrorism, however, have also identified less obvious factors endemic to democracies that may actually encourage terrorism. For example, democracies tend to be wealthier and better developed than authoritarian regimes, rendering them more “target rich” for terrorist groups. Democracies are also more likely to be prominent countries on the world stage and symbols of the political status quo, making them more likely to be opposed by terrorists, who are quintessential anti-status-quo actors. Cross-national empirical research on transnational terrorism conducted by Burcu Savun and Brian Phillips suggests that because democracies are more likely to pursue active, interventionist foreign policies than nondemocratic states, they are more likely to become embroiled in foreign controversies that earn the ire of terrorists. Another interesting study by Erica Chenoweth finds empirical evidence that, by tolerating a larger volume and a wider range of political activities – such as forming political organizations, lobbying, protesting, etc. – democracies have more competitive political environments, which perversely increases returns to terrorist attacks by political actors interested in “doing something drastic” to gain attention. In contrast, although nondemocracies might produce more angry and aggrieved citizens that, lacking a nonviolent means to meaningfully participate in politics, might be prompted to support terrorist and extremist movements, authoritarian regimes can more easily repress political dissent and manage and control the activities of their citizens. Most importantly, authoritarian regimes muzzle and control the media, reducing the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy. One might expect that, in nondemocratic regimes, the combination of heightened political frustrations and state-controlled media would lead to higher rates of transnational terrorism. A case in point here would be the 1969 kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick by the leftist Revolutionary Movement 8th October (MR-8). The MR-8 militants hoped that, by kidnapping a prominent foreign figure, they could bypass the Brazilian military government’s regime of media censorship to communicate their political grievances to the wider Brazilian public. However, the empirical evidence does not support this as a cross-national trend in the data. In the 1991-2012 period, democracies experienced higher rates of transnational terrorism than nondemocracies (around 23.6% more) and saw their citizens commit more acts of transnational terrorism against other countries (25.9% more) than citizens of authoritarian regimes.

#### [3] Independently, the political vacuum from the transition to democracy is filled by terrorists

Attkisson 15 (Sharyl, an Emmy award-winning investigative journalist, is a senior independent contributor to The Daily Signal. She is the author of "Stonewalled." Send an email to Sharyl, “How Arab Spring Opened the Door to Terrorism’s Ugly March,” <http://dailysignal.com/2015/03/12/arab-spring-opened-door-terrorisms-ugly-march/)> //BS 12-18-2017 \*\*[edited for] ~~islamophobic language~~

It’s not your imagination. Global terrorism, dominated by ~~Muslim~~ extremist groups, is by far the worst it’s been in modern times. In the past six years, the United States has added 21 names to its list of foreign terrorist organizations: all but one of them radical Muslim groups. That’s more than the previous 10 years combined. At the same time, the number of terrorist acts has shattered previous records. Experts predict data for 2014, which is still being compiled, will likely reflect more than 15,000 terrorist attacks: a vast increase over 2013—which was already the deadliest year for global terrorism since data was first collected in 1970. The Institute for Economics and Peace reported 10,000 terrorist incidents killed 18,000 people in 2013. Nine countries were added to the list of nations where more than 50 lives were lost to terrorist attacks in a single year. Arab Spring Devolves Into Terrorist Winter Eleven terrorist groups have been added to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations since the Arab Spring. “Arab Spring” is the popular name given to the democratic wave of civil unrest in the Arab world that began in December 2010 and lasted through mid-2012. It turns out the revolutionary movement created an ideal environment for terrorism to grow and thrive. “Terrorists realized they could exploit the confusion and vacuum in power created by the uprisings,” says a U.S. intelligence officer stationed in Libya during the Arab Spring movement. He says terrorists used social media to stoke civil unrest and take advantage of the chaos. In the Arab Spring’s wake, Egypt and Tunisia disbanded the security structures that had helped keep jihadists in check, and freed many ~~Islamist and jihadist~~ [extremist] political prisoners. In Libya, parts of the country fell entirely outside government control, providing openings for violent terrorist movements.“Many of the regimes weakened or deposed by the Arab Spring were among Washington’s most effective counterterrorism partners,**”** noted Juan Zarate in an analysis written in June 2011.

#### [4] DPT just means democracies go to war with non-democracies way more

Muller 15 (Harald, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, “Democracy, Peace, and Security”, Lexington Books) //BS 12-17-2017

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they disagree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

#### [5] Democracy will catastrophically delay action on climate change---authoritarianism is necessary to ensure rapid state-led transformation

Mann & Wainwright ’18 (Geoff, teaches political economy and economic geography at Simon Fraser University, where he directs the Centre for Global Political Economy, Joel *Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future*, pp. 38-40, ME)

Relative to the institutional means currently available to capitalist liberal democracy and its sorry attempts at “consensus,” this trajectory has some distinct advantages with respect to atmospheric carbon concentration, notably in terms of the capacity to coordinate massive political-economic reconfiguration quickly and comprehensively. In light of our earlier question—how can we possibly realize the necessary emissions reductions?—it is this feature of Climate Mao that most recommends it. As the climate justice movement struggles to be heard, most campaigns in the global North are premised on an unspoken faith in a lop-sided, elite-biased, liberal proceduralism doomed to failure given the scale and scope of the changes required. If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the liberal model of democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction. Climate Mao reflects the demand for rapid, revolutionary, state-led transformation today. Indeed, calls for variations on just such a regime abound on the Left. Mike Davis and Giovanni Arrighi have more or less sided with Climate Mao, sketching it as an alternative to capitalist Climate Leviathan.35 We might even interpret the renewal of enthusiasm for Maoist theory (including Alain Badiou’s version) as part of the prevailing crisis of ecological-political imagination.36 Minqi Li’s is arguably the best developed of this line of thought, and like Arrighi he locates the fulcrum of global climate history in China, arguing that Climate Mao offers the only way forward: [U]nless China takes serious and meaningful actions to fulfill its obligation of emissions reduction, there is little hope that global climate stabilization can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the [present] Chinese government will voluntarily take the necessary actions to reduce emissions. The sharp fall of economic growth that would be required is something that the Chinese government will not accept and cannot afford politically. Does this mean that humanity is doomed? That depends on the political struggle within China and in the world as a whole.37 Taking inspiration from Mao, Li says a new revolution in the Chinese revolution—a re-energization of the Maoist political tradition—could transform China and save humanity from doom. He does not claim this is likely; one need only consider China’s massive highway expansions, accelerated automobile consumption, and subsidized urban sprawl.38 But he is right that if an anticapitalist, planetary sovereign is to emerge that could change the world’s climate trajectory, it is most likely to emerge in China.

**[6] Climate change causes extinction – ocean acidification, water and resource wars, econ collapse, and regional conflicts.**

Pachauri and Meyer 15 (Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report” <http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf> IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp)

SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. {2.3} Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system, **accompanied by ocean acidification**, increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature (medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4} A large fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years. Marine organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes (medium confidence). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5} Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more 13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally(high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), intensifying competition for water among sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2} Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2} In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2} Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2} Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2} Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. Climate change can indirectlyincrease risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2} 2010 )

### 1NC – Impact Defense

#### 1] No climate impact

Zycher 21 --- Benjamin Zycher is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, doctorate in economics from UCLA, a Master in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, and a Bachelor of Arts in political science from UCLA, “The Case for Climate-Change Realism”, National Affairs, Summer 2021, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-case-for-climate-change-realism

Beyond exhibiting extreme overconfidence in a cherry-picked analysis of climate-change causes, politicians and activists frequently ground their alarmism in frightening predictions about consequences that are likewise far from certain. This is not only true within the very new (and still quite unreliable) field of predictive climate science; it is true even in the context of ongoing climate phenomena. Indeed, politicians and journalists frequently characterize dramatic or unusual climate phenomena as the product of anthropogenic climate change, yet there is little evidence to support those claims

For one thing, there is no observable upward trend in the number of "hot" days between 1895 and 2017; 11 of the 12 years with the highest number of such days occurred before 1960. Since 2005, NOAA has maintained the U.S. Climate Reference Network, comprising 114 meticulously maintained temperature stations spaced more or less uniformly across the lower 48 states, along with 21 stations in Alaska and two stations in Hawaii. They are placed to avoid heat-island effects and other such distortions as much as possible. The reported data show no increase in average temperatures over the available 2005-2020 period. In addition, a recent reconstruction of global temperatures over the past 1 million years — created using data from ice-sheet formations — shows that there is nothing unusual about the current warm period.

Rising sea levels are another frequently cited example of impending climate crisis. And yet sea levels have been rising since at least the mid-19th century. This rise is tied closely with the end of the Little Ice Age that occurred not long before, which led to a rise in global temperatures, some melting of sea ice, and a thermal expansion of sea water. There is some evidence showing an acceleration in sea-level rise beginning in the early 1990s: Satellite measurements of sea levels began in 1992 and show a sea-level rise of about 3.2 millimeters per year between 1993 and 2010. Before 1992, when sea levels were measured with tidal gauges, the data showed an increase of about 1.7 millimeters per year on average from 1901 to 1990.

But because the datasets are from two different sources — satellite measurements versus tidal gauges — they are not directly comparable, and therefore they cannot be interpreted as showing an acceleration in sea-level rises. Moreover, the period beginning in 1993 is short in terms of global climate phenomena. Since sea levels have risen at a constant rate, remained constant, or even fallen during similar relatively short periods, inferences drawn from them are problematic. It is of course possible there has been an acceleration in sea-level rise, but even still, it would not be clear whether such a development stemmed primarily from anthropogenic or natural causes; clearly, both processes are relevant.

A study of changes in Arctic and Antarctic sea ice yields very different inferences. Since 1979, Arctic sea ice has declined relative to the 30-year average (again, the degree to which this is the result of anthropogenic factors is not known). Meanwhile, Antarctic sea ice has been growing relative to the 30-year average, and the global sea-ice total has remained roughly constant since 1979.

Extreme weather occurrences are likewise used as evidence of an ongoing climate crisis, but again, a study of the available data undercuts that assessment. U.S. tornado activity shows either no increase or a downward trend since 1954. Data on tropical storms, hurricanes, and accumulated cyclone energy (a wind-speed index measuring the overall strength of a given hurricane season) reveal little change since satellite measurements of the phenomena began in the early 1970s. The number of wildfires in the United States shows no upward trend since 1985, and global acreage burned has declined over past decades. The Palmer Drought Severity Index shows no trend since 1895. And the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report, published in 2014, displays substantial divergence between its discussion of the historical evidence on droughts and the projections on future droughts yielded by its climate models. Simply put, the available data do not support the ubiquitous assertions about the causal link between greenhouse-gas accumulation, temperature change, and extreme weather events and conditions.

Unable to demonstrate that observed climate trends are due to anthropogenic climate change — or even that these events are particularly unusual or concerning — climate catastrophists will often turn to dire predictions about prospective climate phenomena. The problem with such predictions is that they are almost always generated by climate models driven by highly complex sets of assumptions about which there is significant dispute. Worse, these models are notorious for failing to accurately predict already documented changes in climate. As climatologist Patrick Michaels of the Competitive Enterprise Institute notes:

During all periods from 10 years (2006-2015) to 65 (1951-2015) years in length, the observed temperature trend lies in the lower half of the collection of climate model simulations, and for several periods it lies very close (or even below) the 2.5th percentile of all the model runs. Over shorter periods, such as the last two decades, a plethora of mechanisms have been put forth to explain the observed/modeled divergence, but none do so completely and many of the explanations are inconsistent with each other.

Similarly, climatologist John Christy of the University of Alabama in Huntsville observes that almost all of the 102 climate models incorporated into the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) — a tracking effort conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory — overstate past and current temperature trends by a factor of two to three, and at times even more. It seems axiomatic to say we should not rely on climate models that are unable to predict the past or the present to make predictions about the distant future.

The overall temperature trend is not the only parameter the models predict poorly. As an example, every CMIP climate model predicts that increases in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas should create an enhanced heating effect in the mid-troposphere over the tropics — that is, at an altitude over the tropics of about 30,000-40,000 feet. The underlying climatology is simple: Most of the tropics is ocean, and as increases in greenhouse-gas concentrations warm the Earth slightly, there should be an increase in the evaporation of ocean water in this region. When the water vapor rises into the mid-troposphere, it condenses, releasing heat. And yet the satellites cannot find this heating effect — a reality suggesting that our understanding of climate and atmospheric phenomena is not as robust as many seem to assume.

The poor predictive record of mainstream climate models is exacerbated by the tendency of the IPCC and U.S. government agencies to assume highly unrealistic future increases in greenhouse-gas concentrations. The IPCC's 2014 Fifth Assessment Report, for example, uses four alternative "representative concentration pathways" to outline scenarios of increased greenhouse-gas concentrations yielding anthropogenic warming. These scenarios are known as RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6, and RCP8.5. Since 1950, the average annual increase in greenhouse-gas concentrations has been about 1.6 parts per million. The average annual increase from 1985 to 2019 was about 1.9 parts per million, and from 2000 to 2019, it was about 2.2 parts per million. The largest increase that occurred was about 3.4 parts per million in 2016. But the assumed average annual increases in greenhouse-gas concentrations through 2100 under the four RCPs are 1.1, 3.0, 5.5, and an astounding 11.9 parts per million, respectively.

The studies generating the most alarmist predictions are the IPCC's Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C and the U.S. government's Fourth National Climate Assessment, both of which were published in 2018. Both assume RCP8.5 as the scenario most relevant for policy planning. The average annual greenhouse-gas increase under RCP8.5 is over five times the annual average for 2000-2019 and almost four times the single biggest increase on record. Climatologist Judith Curry, formerly of the Georgia Institute of Technology, describes such a scenario as "borderline impossible."

RCP6 is certainly more realistic. It predicts a temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius by 2100 in the average of the CMIP models. But on average, those CMIP models overstate the documented temperature record by a factor of at least two. Ultimately, models with a poor record of successfully accounting for past data and highly unrealistic future greenhouse-gas concentrations should not be considered a reasonable basis for future policy formulation.

#### 2] Even if there is some impact, it definitely does not trigger extinction

* peer-reviewed journal shows IPCC exaggeration
* history proves resilience
* no extinction- warming under Paris goals
* rock breaking strategy could offset warming

IBD 18 [Investors Business Daily, Citing Study from Peer reviewed journal by Lewis and Curry, “Here's One Global Warming Study Nobody Wants You To See”, 4/25/18, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/global-warming-computer-models-co2-emissions/]

Settled Science: A **new study published in a peer-reviewed journal finds** that **climate models exaggerate** the global warming from CO2 emissions by as much as 45%. If these findings hold true, it's huge news. No wonder the mainstream press is ignoring it.

In the study, authors Nic Lewis and Judith Curry looked at actual temperature records and compared them with climate change computer models. What they found is that the planet has shown itself to be far less sensitive to increases in CO2 than the climate models say. As a result, they say, the planet will warm less than the models predict, even if we continue pumping CO2 into the atmosphere.

As Lewis explains: "Our results imply that, for any future emissions scenario, future warming is likely to be **substantially lower** than the central computer **model-simulated** level projected by the (United Nations **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange), and highly unlikely to exceed that level.

How much lower? Lewis and Curry say that their findings show temperature increases will be 30%-45% lower than the climate models say. If they are right, then there's **little to worry about**, even if we don't drastically reduce CO2 emissions.

The planet will warm from human activity, but not nearly enough to cause the sort of end-of-the-world calamities we keep hearing about. In fact, the resulting warming would be **below the target** set at the Paris agreement.

This would be tremendously good news.

The fact that the Lewis and Curry study appears in the peer-reviewed American Meteorological Society's Journal of Climate

lends credibility to their findings. This is the same journal, after all, that recently published widely covered studies saying the Sahara has been growing and the **climate boundary** in central U.S. **has shifted 140 miles to the east** because of global warming.

The Lewis and Curry findings come after another study, published in the prestigious journal Nature, that found the **long-held view that a doubling of CO2 would boost global temperatures** as much as 4.5 degrees Celsius **was wrong.** The most temperatures would likely climb is 3.4 degrees.

It also follows a study published in Science, which found that rocks contain vast amounts of nitrogen that plants could use to grow and absorb more CO2, potentially offsetting at least some of the effects of CO2 emissions and reducing future temperature increases.