## Off

### 1

#### The standard is maximizing expected well being – Prefer

#### [1] Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses. Evolutionary knowledge is reliable – broad consensus and robust neuroscience prove.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### [2] Actor specificity – state actors can only use util – outweighs since different actors have different obligations.

#### A – Aggregation – all policies benefit some and hurts others – only util can resolve these cuz it gives a clear weighing mechanism

#### B – Collectivism – States are composed of many actors who inevitably disagree about intent means they can only use consequentialism because they don’t have to agree

#### C – Bureaucrats aren’t philosophers – policymakers do not have experience with dense frameworks so they don’t understand how to apply them to specific instances but they do understand that pain is bad and pleasure is good because it’s intrinsic to existing.

#### [3] Extinction first –

#### a. Wager – if there is any chance of goodness existing, we ought to preserve our existence to maximize it.

#### b. Sequencing – if their framework is true, people dying is bad because it means those people can’t use their framework

#### c. Repugnance – if their framework cannot explain why people dying is bad – you should reject it because it cannot disavow of atrocities. You shouldn’t vote for a framework that can’t say the holocaust was a bad thing.

#### d. Performativity – us having a moral debate proves moral uncertainty because it means we are not certain about which framework is true - means we should preserve our ability to find the true framework

### 2

#### Failure to keep global inflation in check collapses the world economy

Seddon and Wheatley 9/3 Max Seddon in Moscow and Jonathan Wheatley in London SEPTEMBER 3 2021 Inflation could spark new global financial crisis, says Russia’s central bank Warning highlights country’s growing concern over worldwide increases in prices Max Seddon Add to myFT MOSCOW BUREAU CHIEF Jonathan Wheatley Add to myFT EMERGING MARKETS CORRESPONDENT https://www.ft.com/content/624b3082-6774-4967-aab1-d5d617eb49b0 //avery

Russia’s central bank says a new financial crisis on the scale of the 2008 collapse could happen in less than 18 months if global inflation is not kept in check. A surge in public and private sector debt levels during the recovery from the pandemic could cause the global economy to “deteriorate drastically and rapidly” if the US Federal Reserve has to jack up interest rates to quell inflation, the Bank of Russia warned in its annual monetary policy forecast. The report, published on Thursday, said global gross domestic product growth could slow to just 1.1 per cent as higher interest rates prompt investors to dump risky assets. Emerging market countries with high levels of foreign debt would be particularly hurt. “Risk premiums will increase significantly, the most indebted countries will struggle to service their debt, and a significant financial crisis will begin in the global economy in the first quarter of 2023 — one comparable to the 2008-2009 crisis, with a long period of uncertainty and a protracted recovery,” the central bank said. The prediction is not the central bank’s central scenario. This instead foresees a broad economic recovery with inflationary pressures dissipating by the end of this year and is “significantly more likely” than its alternative scenarios of financial crisis, a worsening pandemic or rising global inflation. Even so, the warning indicates Russia’s growing concern over increasing inflation worldwide. Whereas US and European central bank officials have said they consider price increases to be temporary, Russian central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina told the Financial Times in July that growing inflationary pressure in Russia was likely to be a long-term phenomenon. Russia’s warning also comes as inflationary pressures build across emerging Europe. The region’s easing of coronavirus restrictions has brought economic output in the second quarter back to pre-pandemic levels. At the same time, however, this “recovery has been accompanied by a marked increase in price pressures. Consumer and producer price inflation reached multiyear highs in July and shows no sign of letting up,” Capital Economics, a consultancy, said in a note to clients. Several large emerging markets have raised interest rates aggressively this year in an attempt to keep rising inflation under control. Ukraine has raised its policy rate by 2 percentage points, Russia by 2.25 points and Brazil by 3.25. But pressures remain strong. Inflation in Brazil is running at 9 per cent, well above the central bank’s 3.75 per cent target, and economists expect the policy rate to rise to 7.5 per cent by the end of the year, from 5.25 per cent today. “Against this global setting, the CBR [Russian central bank] did the right thing of getting ahead of inflation with hikes,” said Elina Ribakova, deputy chief economist at the Institute of International Finance.

#### Strikes strongly negatively impact stock market and asset valuation

Wisniewski 20 THE INFLUENCE OF GENERAL STRIKES AGAINST GOVERNMENT ON STOCK MARKET BEHAVIOR Tomasz Piotr Wisniewski\*, Brendan John Lambe\*\* and Alexandra Dias\* \*The Open University \*\*De Montfort University, Alfaisal University \*\*\*University of York <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/sjpe.12224> //avery

There is a rich literature on industrial relations focusing on strikes against employers and the ramifications these have for the market capitalization of affected companies (see for instance Neumann, 1980; Kramer and Vasconcellos, 1996; Kramer and Hyclak, 2002). In comparison, the body of work on general strikes, while illuminating, is less voluminous. Within this scholarship, attention is directed toward the unionized workers (Johnson, 2000; Hamann et al., 2013b) or governments (Hamann et al., 2013c; Klomp and de Haan, 2013). Ours is a paper which views the instances of general strikes from a different angle, namely that of capital providers. Specifically, we show that general strikes hold grave ramifications for stock markets. The losses to shareholders holding a passive portfolio invested locally are estimated in our preferred model to be in the order of 6.11% in the year of the event. This loss does not appear to be attributable to other factors in the macroeconomic, financial, and political arena, as we comprehensively control for these. The fact that our result is not a consequence of confounding influences is further reaffirmed by the event study analysis which shows the presence of negative returns in the days immediately surrounding strike action. The estimated price declines are too substantial to be entirely justified by the output forgone due to the walkout. Apparently, investors look at this event from a much broader perspective. Such a manifestation of discontent within the workforce can exacerbate policy uncertainty and, in turn, lead to an increase in discount rates. This rationalization could imply significant price declines and increases in market riskiness. Interestingly, during the years in which general strikes take place, substantial aggrandizement in risk is clearly observable. Annualized standard deviation of index returns goes up by 1.19 percentage points, while the annualized Value-at-Risk jumps by 2.21 cents for every dollar invested. When we examine government long-term bond yields during the period of a labor standoff, we find a statistically significant increase, reflecting possible fiscal considerations of concessions. Clearly, these documented tendencies are problematic from the investors’ point of view. General strikes appear to reduce the reward to capital holders, while simultaneously heightening the risks involved. Furthermore, 2 Data sourced from World Development Indicators. STRIKES AGAINST GOVERNMENT 95 Scottish Journal of Political Economy © 2019 Scottish Economic Society governments should bear in mind the additional negative externalities which their tense relations with organized labor could generate. Since a large proportion of the electorate may be affected through their shareholdings, the penalties to incumbents may ultimately be borne out at the ballot box. Since governments are further penalized by increased costs of servicing public debt, they should engage in a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of countering the discontent of organized labor. Our findings are also relevant to trade union leaders who are contemplating a mass walkout against government policies. Since negative stock returns can deplete pension pots, the costs of general strikes to workers need to be accounted for accurately. Clearly, the real costs of striking surpasses the total of wages forgone. While there are many theories related to firm-level labor disputes, theorizing about general strikes is in a rather embryonic state. Although some attempts to address this issue have been made by Kelly and Hamann (2010), fellow researchers should still endeavor to formulate conceptual frameworks explaining this phenomenon. Only after we gain a full understanding of the causes underlying general strikes will we be able to construct reliable predictive models. Such models could be potentially useful to those who trade actively in the stock market.

#### Falling evaluation causes interest rate hikes and derails all recovery attempts

Curran and Anstey 21 Pandemic-Era Central Banking Is Creating Bubbles Everywhere Cheap money provided by central banks has been inflating assets and reshaping how we save, invest, and spend. So what’s next? By Enda Curran and Chris Anstey January 24, 2021, 4:00 PM CST From Bloomberg Markets Anstey is a senior editor in Boston and Curran is chief Asia economics correspondent in Hong Kong. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-24/central-banks-are-creating-bubbles-everywhere-in-the-pandemic> //avery

With investors chasing returns wherever they can find them, the rising tide of money is flowing through to bonds sold by companies from poorer economies, too. This is the case even in nations that have been among the hardest hit by the pandemic. When AC Energy, part of Philippine conglomerate Ayala Corp., sold a $300 million perpetual green bond at 5.1% in November, CFO Dizon described the demand as “overwhelming.” Vaccine optimism, along with expectations for a strong recovery in 2021, helped clear the route for AC Energy’s fundraising. “In the morning we announced the mandate and in the evening we priced,” she says. “That usually takes two days. But we saw that the market was very strong, so our bankers recommended to just close everything in the day.” For all the market optimism that abounded as the new year began, one thing was clear: The global economy will need a powerful recovery to justify lofty valuations in global stock markets. In October, high-flying equities persuaded Einhorn’s Greenlight Capital to bet against what he called a “bubble basket of mostly second-tier companies and recent IPOs trading at remarkable valuations.” But to those who think that central bank stimulus is a solid foundation on which to make bets, Einhorn says the history of monetary policy in Japan and Europe shows that “artificially controlled long-term interest rates are no justification for stratospheric equity valuations.” The surge in equities since the financial system’s darkest days in late March of last year—an advance that saw the S&P 500 index soar 68% from its low that month to the end of the year—also had companies rushing to take advantage of flattering valuations. Initial public offerings raised about $180 billion on U.S. exchanges in 2020, more than double the prior year’s total and far above the previous high of $102 billion set in 2000, according to data Bloomberg compiled. That included some blockbuster debuts, such as Airbnb Inc. more than doubling, up 113%, on its first day of trading, and DoorDash Inc. jumping 86%. The IPO wave was also powered by a new investment structure involving so-called special-purpose acquisition companies that’s become increasingly popular in recent years. SPACs raise money through public offerings, using the funds to buy stakes in target companies they identify after they’re listed. Until fairly recently, these companies focused on “value” sectors, where assets are perceived to be underpriced. Then came 2020. Not only did a record number of SPACs come to market, but 31% of them didn’t even specify an industry they were targeting, according to Goldman analysts led by David Kostin in a December report. Total proceeds more than quintupled. From the start of July through mid-December, the market averaged more than one SPAC IPO a day. “With the Fed committed to keeping the funds rates near zero, our view is that SPAC activity will continue at a high pace in 2021,” the report said. Amid all the rippling effects—from central banks to government bonds to equities, real estate, and emerging markets—the most worrying dynamic for many is the ­explosion of new debt, both public and private. Borrowing grew $15 trillion in the first three quarters of 2020, to a record of more than $272 trillion, according to the Institute of International Finance. The Washington-based group warns that emerging-market debt, excluding banks, is quickly approaching 210% of gross domestic product, up from 185% in 2019 and 140% a decade ago. The fear is that falling revenues will make paying back that debt harder, even with low interest rates. If inflation rises and central banks are forced to dial back on easing, then bond markets globally will feel the pain, perhaps even derailing any recovery. The Taper Tantrum of 2013 is illustrative. When then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke announced a future tapering of his quantitative easing program, U.S. Treasury yields shot higher, roiling markets around the world. This time around the exit ramp will be even more fraught with danger, given the larger scale of stimulus. Even if things do work out as currently envisaged, there are risks. Japan is an example of the kinds of challenges that crop up if monetary policy remains stuck in place for a long time. Japanese investors have been effectively forced out of their country’s government bond market by the Bank of Japan’s voracious QE, destabilizing institutions that traditionally relied on parking investments in those securities, especially regional banks. The Yoshihide Suga administration is working with the BOJ to rationalize the entire regional banking industry to head off potentially disruptive collapses in coming years. Other big investors, including the vast savings system run out of post offices, have turned to overseas investments, leaving them vulnerable if the yen appreciates and makes foreign assets worth less in domestic terms. “The liquidity bazooka buys time and pushes up asset prices but has zero value in improving economic trend growth. Like a black hole, once you are in it, it is extremely difficult to get out. That’s where we are in central banking, we are in a liquidity black hole” Another weakness highlighted by Japan’s ­generation-long experiment with ultra-easy monetary settings is that the quantitative easing has undermined longer-term productivity by propping up businesses that probably should’ve been allowed to fail. That’s what happens when governments and companies can borrow so cheaply that there’s no incentive to make structural fixes that inflict short-term pain such as job losses. “Central banks [in advanced economies] are in a global liquidity trap,” says Jerome Jean Haegeli, chief economist at the Swiss Re Institute in Zurich. “The liquidity bazooka buys time and pushes up asset prices but has zero value in improving economic trend growth. Like a black hole, once you are in it, it is extremely difficult to get out. That’s where we are in central banking, we are in a liquidity black hole.” The time for maximum bullishness—when policy­makers are going all-out to jump-start their economies—may be coming to an end, leaving a trickier period looming on the horizon, says Richard Yetsenga, the chief economist of ­Melbourne-based Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. “While the risk profile for growth has been declining,” he says, “for asset prices and financial stability, it will soon be ­increasing.” —With Matthew Brockett, ­Katherine Burton, Elena Popina, Tassia Sipahutar, and Cecilia

#### Russian economic decline causes nuclear war – Extinction

Ståhl 15 Dr. Benjamin, CEO of the Blue Institute, PhD in Business Studies and Economics from Uppsala University, MA in International Relations from the University of Kent, and Johan Wiktorin, Founder and CEO of the Intelligence Company Brqthrough, Licensed Master of Competitive Intelligence and Former Member of the Swedish Armed Forces, “What’s At Stake?: A Geopolitical Perspective on the Swedish Economic Exposure in Northeast Europe”, Swedish Growth Barometer, 7/1/2015, https://blueinst.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/whats-at-stake\_geopolitical-perspective.pdf

Scenario 1: Disintegration If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate and the regime continue to distance themselves from the West, the centre may not be capable to maintain legitimacy and keep the periphery together. Already, some regions and counties are highly indebted. In other parts, ethnic Russians are a minority. Regions in eastern Russia, rich in raw materials, may look to China for funding. It is, however, probable that Beijing will not want to undermine the stability in Russia. Closer to the region in focus in this report, Kaliningrad is an area that could distance itself from the Kremlin. Economic problems and security concerns form a background that could lead to a political uprising. A “Kaliningrad-Maidan” development is at the heart of this scenario. Triggers could also come from outside Kaliningrad, in or in the immediate surrounding of the Russian Federation, or from other factors such as severe pollution. The other countries in the region would in all probability remain cool in this situation, considering the county’s military importance for the Russian government. However, a mutiny like the ones in Kroonstad in June 1917, March 1921 or on the frigate Storozjevoj in November 1975 cannot be excluded. Economic and political tensions in Europe could weaken the EU and worsen the development at the same time. A Greek withdrawal from the EU, triggered by its exit from the Eurozone, could set such a movement in motion. A Podemos-led government in Spain could undermine confidence for the single market, at a time when Europe also faces the consequences of a highly unstable North Africa, with a large flow of migrants. Attempts by Russia to influence certain members in the EU, such as Hungary and Cyprus, could sow further discord in the EU. At the most severe levels of disintegration, France could adopt policies effectively blocking EU and NATO response in a time of increased tensions. Britain may opt out of the union altogether, or be forced out if their demands for special status is rejected by the other member states. In all varieties of disintegration, uncertainty concerning the control over the nuclear arsenals will increase. The US will become involved both diplomatically and financially in order to bring clarity and establish control over the arsenals. Should Russia, in that situation, ask for military support for this, it is highly probable that the US would acquiesce: such operations in other parts of the world were the object of joint US-Russian exercises just a few years ago. Scenario 2: Ultra-nationalism If Russian domestic and international policy continues to become more radicalised, it might take ever more drastic forms. As the economy deteriorates, wages fall and shortages become common, a focus on nostalgic nationalism, using belligerent rhetoric and demonstrations of military power, could be used to deflect growing discontentment. A logical target would be to “protect” zones which are perceived as Russian, e.g. where there are Russian ethnic minorities or even just Russian-speaking areas. Such rhetoric was and is used in the Ukraine. The coming years will tell what the Russian ambitions are in the Ukraine. Offensives to secure and expand their supply lines, and weakening those of the Ukraine, are probable, and more ambitious plans, such as the opening of new directions in Kharkiv or Odessa, are possible. As a distraction, conflicts in Moldavia can be fuelled. If the West, primarily the US, UK and Poland, support Ukraine with military means, the risk increases for further escalation of the conflict. Remaining passive, on the other hand, runs the risk that Russia perceives that it could act against other targets. A second country that could be the target of Russian nationalism is Belarus. Judging by president Putin’s justification of the annexation of Crimea, Belarus would similarly be a legitimate candidate for “re-inclusion” in Russia. There are indications that the regime in Belarus are worried about such a development and acting to thwart it. In late 2014, Lukashenko appointed a new government, and has increased the emphasis on “Belorussian”. The fragmented (and thoroughly infiltrated) opposition has declared that it will not field candidates in elections this autumn, since they deem the threat of president Putin to be greater than of Lukashenko himself. Belarus has also passed laws permitting prosecution of non-regular armed troops, as a consequence of the Russian method employed in the annexation of Crimea. In the economic sphere, Russia has complained that Belarus is profiting from sanctions against Russia. Any attempts from Russia to enter Belarus’ with military means would probably not be met by any effective resistance from the Belorussian security apparatus. The opportunities for Russia are in some ways more favourable here than in Ukraine, due to the close cooperation between the countries’ armies and intelligence services. Passive resistance cannot be ruled out but would not mean much in a short-term. However, tensions with other former Soviet Union republics, with the EU and with NATO would surely increase. Polish and Lithuanian forces would probably mobilize to counteract spillover effects. EU policy would be substantially revised. Belorussian citizens would attempt to flee, primarily to neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The Russian government would also threaten the Baltic states, in order to undermine their economies and try to influence policy in these countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be in a precarious situation. While they need to strengthen their civil and military defence, they must retain credibility with their allies and not be perceived as to exaggerate the Russian threat. The higher the tensions, the more sensitive the world is to psychological influence. Russia would, in this scenario, also fan nationalism in other parts of Europe through political and financial support. West Balkan is particularly vulnerable, as the EU and the US have invested considerable political capital in the region with only mixed success. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia have stagnated in their political and economic development with high levels of unemployment, political polarisation and even the establishing of Islamic fundamentalist cells: a fertile ground for nationalist movements. Finally, Russian ultra-nationalism would also be directed inwards, with an escalated persecution of the domestic political opposition, independent media, and nationalisation of foreign assets. This will be combined with attacks on minority groups, especially on Jews. This scenario could happen separately or as a precursor to the final, and most dangerous, scenario. Scenario 3: Test of strength In this scenario, Russia would attempt to break NATO through challenging of one or more of the Baltic states. The objective would be to demonstrate to alliance members that NATO’s response is too late and too weak. A precondition for success is a distraction through a crisis by an intermediator, which would tie down especially American attention and resources. The distraction could come in many forms, e.g. by partnering with North Korea, fanning war in the Middle East, or even hidden support for terrorists. If the current polarisation in US domestic politics continues, any reaction will be obstructed and delayed. An especially vulnerable window of opportunity is in the period between the presidential elections in November 2016 and the installation of the new president in January 2017, which could create a legitimacy problem for the American political system when it comes to the possibilities of directly confronting Russia quickly. An attack on any Baltic state would directly affect Swedish territory and air space. In the worst-case scenario, it will happen immediately before open conflict with NATO. The Baltic states each offer different opportunities for Russia, but they all have in common that they lack any strategic depth, which means that an open invasion would be accomplished in a few days, unless support from other alliance members is forthcoming. Estonia, which is the most powerful of the three, both economically and military, poses as a potential threat to the trade over St Petersburg. To control the maritime traffic through the Gulf of Finland is an important motive for Russia to influence Estonian politics. The population of Estonia, with 25 percent ethnic Russians, could be used to legimize action and as grounds for destabilisation, especially around the border town Narva where more than 90% of the population is ethnic Russian. Latvia is the most vulnerable of the three states. The economy is weaker; the Russian minority is about the same as in Estonia; and Russian organised crime has a strong hold. Especially the eastern parts of the country are vulnerable to Russian influence. Lithuania only have about six percent ethnic Russians and a stronger military tradition. On the other hand, Lithuania offers access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s attempts to decrease their dependence on energy from Russia has annoyed the Russian regime, as is evident in the harassments by the Russian navy of the cabling operation which will connect the Lithuanian grid to Sweden. There are also some tensions surrounding the Polish minorities in the country which Russia could exploit. How fast Sweden will become involved depends on the extent of open, armed actions against one or all of the Baltic States. If a confrontation occurs with non-regular or paramilitary means, maintaining dominance over Swedish territory and territorial waters will be in focus. The same will be the case for Finland, but Finnish action could be influenced by Russian fabrication of tensions in Karelia, that Helsinki could be blamed for. NATO would try to respond in a controlled manner, i.e. prioritizing transports by air and sea. This would mean greatly increased traffic in and over the Baltic Sea. Tensions will rise drastically, with increased risks of miscalculations on both sides. Sweden and Finland are expected to act together with the rest of the EU and the US. If no direct military threat emerges against Sweden, then Sweden cannot count on any enforcements from the rest of the world apart from mutual information exchange. The instance that the citizens in the Baltic states perceive a risk of a Russian incursion, the probability is high that a flow of refugees will commence. From Lithuania, the biggest flow will be to Poland while Latvian will flee to Sweden, mainly Gotland. Refugees from Estonia can be expected to flee towards Finland or Sweden depending on where in the country they live and where they have relations or connections. In the worst-case scenario, Swedish and Finnish territory will become an arena for hostilities. As Russian readiness exercises have shown, airborne and marine infantry could rapidly and with surprise occupy parts of Gotland and Åland. A possible option is also to mine the Danish Straits in connection with this. By supplies of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, Russian forces can temporarily extend their air and coastal defence in the Baltic Sea, protecting an incursion by land into the Baltic states. NATO would be faced with a fait accompli. The invasion does not need to happen in all three states nor include the entire territory of a country. The only thing that is needed is a demonstration of NATO’s inability to defend alliance members. This would establish a new security order. Depending on the level of conflict that Russia would be willing to risk, air and navy bases in Sweden and Finland could be struck with missiles from the ground, air and sea. It is, however, likely that the governments would be issued an ultimatum to remain neutral, with only a few hours to comply. Public announcement of the ultimatum would put immense pressure on the political system and weaken resistance. Such diplomatic tactics could be reinforced by forced cyber attacks on the electricity and telecommunication networks. During the coldest months of the year, the vulnerability would be the highest. At the same time, Sweden would be expected to support their Western partners’ need for transports into the theatre of action. If Russia would close the Danish Straits, any military support to the Baltic states would need to move over Swedish territory; such as air support Norwegian air bases or aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea. There would also be demands to clear of mines in Oresund, and possibly for allowing equipment and troop transports to harbours on the east coast for further transport across the Baltic Sea. The Swedish to such demands would have consequences for generations to come. If Gotland would not be occupied by Russian forces, NATO would demand to set up bases on the island. The smallest indication of acquiescing to such demands would have the Russians racing to the island. Furthermore, Russia would coordinate activities in the far north, with submarines of all kinds and possibly even direct action in northern Finland and even in northern Sweden, in order to expand Russian air defence. Faced with the risk of direct confrontations between Russian and American forces, Russia could mount land-based as well as amphibian operations in the north of Norway and on Svalbard, to improve the defence of Murmansk. Following a similar strategy, occupying parts of Bornholm would make it more difficult for NATO to support their members. This is probably not necessary, but it is a possible option. In most people’s minds, there is a sharp line between the Baltic states’ eastern borders and Russia, the crossing of which is unconceivable. By first gaining the control over Gotland and Åland, the Russian General Army Staff could circumvent a mental Maginot line, in the same way as Germany attacked France through Benelux in May 1940. Russian success in this scenario hinges on speed and the ability to contain the conflict. The first message to Washington will entail the understanding that this is not a direct conflict between the US. For Russia, the uncertainty is therefore how US interests are perceived from an American perspective. For the US, it is not just the credibility of NATO that is at stake but also the unity of the EU. This has global connotations since allies (and enemies) in the Middle East and Asia will also form assumptions regarding the willingness and ability of the US to act in order to protect their allies. The risk is obviously that Russia miscalculates and underestimates the difference between, for instance, the departing presidential administration perceptions of US security interests on the one hand with the wider US security establishment’s perception of these on the other. During the whole process, the threat of nuclear strikes would hover over all decision makers, which increases the degree of uncertainty. Nuclear tests in the period before a test of strength cannot be ruled out, especially since Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence could lose credibility over time. Direct threats of using the nuclear weapons is, however, completely excluded in this scenario.

### 3

#### Budget passes now – leadership and base pressure get moderate Dems in line.

Alexander Bolton 9/9/21. Senior reporter. “Democratic leaders betting Manchin will back down in spending fight”. The Hill. Sept 9 2021. https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/571421-democratic-leaders-betting-manchin-will-back-down-in-spending-fight

Democrats are racing ahead with a $3.5 trillion spending package that would boost funding for social programs and raise taxes despite rumblings from Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) that he might not support legislation with that price tag.

Democratic leaders are betting they can pressure Manchin to back down on his push for spending that’s closer to $1.5 trillion or $2 trillion.

In doing so, they’re essentially daring Manchin and other moderates like Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) to vote against the eventual budget reconciliation package, knowing that the base would erupt in anger over any Democratic lawmakers who buck the party on such a high-profile vote.

Senate and House committees are scrambling to reach consensus on sections of the so-called human infrastructure bill under their jurisdictions by Friday, and Democratic staff working on the legislation haven’t received any indication that it will be pared back to appease Manchin.

Progressive activists warn that if the bill falls well below the $3.5 trillion target set by Senate and House leaders, there will be significant backlash.

Manchin warned in a Wall Street Journal op-ed last week that he won’t vote for a $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill — putting President Biden’s agenda in peril since Democrats can’t afford a single defection in the 50-50 Senate — but his shot across the bow isn’t deterring fellow Democrats.

Axios reported Tuesday evening that Manchin won’t support a package that exceeds $1.5 trillion, a number the West Virginia Democrat floated earlier this year as a potential spending target.

Manchin’s office on Wednesday declined to confirm that $1.5 trillion is a red line for him. But the figure is in line with previous comments.

Manchin told ABC News’s “This Week” in June that he wouldn’t support a large spending package if Congress could only come up with enough revenue and savings to offset the cost of a $1.5 trillion or $2 trillion bill.

In last week’s Wall Street Journal op-ed, Manchin wrote that “ignoring the fiscal consequences of our policy choices will create a disastrous future for the next generation of Americans.”

But those warnings are falling on deaf ears in the Democratic leadership and the broader Democratic caucuses.

Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) on Wednesday brushed off Manchin’s threat and told reporters that negotiators are still planning to unveil a bold and ambitious proposal.

“In our caucus — there are some in my caucus who believe $3.5 trillion is too much, there are some in my caucus who believe it’s too little,” Schumer said on a press call Wednesday morning. “I can tell you this: In reconciliation we’re all going to come together to get something big done and, second, it’s our intention to have every part of the Biden plan in a big and robust way.”

Asked about Manchin’s call for a “strategic pause,” Schumer insisted “we’re moving full speed ahead.”

“We want to keep going forward. We think getting this done is so important to the American people for all the reasons we have outlined,” he said. “We are moving forward on this bill.”

Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) told reporters Wednesday that colleagues putting together the legislation will stick with the $3.5 trillion goal, though she acknowledged the final number might be different.

“I don’t know what the number will be. We are marking at $3.5 trillion,” she said.

A senior Democratic staffer said Senate and House committees, which face an end-of-week deadline to finish their elements of the reconciliation package by the end of this week, haven’t received any indication the final version will be pared down from the $3.5 trillion top-line spending goal laid out in the budget resolutions passed last month by each chamber.

“We’re working our asses off,” said the aide. “All we’re doing is working. We have been under orders to get to agreement with our House counterparts by close-of-business Friday.”

Senate Budget Committee Chairman Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), who has primary jurisdiction over the reconciliation process, says the spending target agreed to by congressional Democrats already represents a significant compromise with moderates.

“The overwhelming majority of members of the budget committee — and I think a good 80 or more percent of Democratic members of the Senate — supported a $6 trillion bill,” Sanders said of the spending number he originally floated ahead of the budget debate.

Sanders argues that $3.5 trillion is what needs to be spent on transforming the nation’s energy economy to address climate change and “dealing with the needs of the working class.”

“To my mind, this bill at $3.5 trillion is already a major, major compromise. And at the very least this bill should be $3.5 trillion,” he said Wednesday.

Democratic strategists warn of a backlash from the party’s base if the legislation — which includes substantial spending on long-term care for the elderly and disabled, an extension of the child tax credit, funding for expanded child care and significant investments in renewable energy sources — falls well below $3.5 trillion.

“The reaction from progressives, which is already being indicated, would be very bad. People would be very disappointed,” said Mike Lux, a Democratic strategist.

But Lux said the threats from moderates should be viewed more as bargaining positions.

“People are doing a lot of posturing right now and throwing out broad numbers and broad statements. The fact is that Joe Manchin and other Democrats in the House and Senate voted for the $3.5 trillion budget outline,” he said. “We’re going to have to work very hard to get everybody on board with the budget plan again.

“There are going to be a lot of changes, a lot of compromises that everybody is going to have to make. The most important thing is to stay calm and keep talking to each other. Sooner or later we’ll get to a package that both Joe Manchin and [Rep. Alexandria Ocasio Cortez] can embrace because we need everybody,” he added. “I think it will work itself out in the end.”

#### Labor protections require Biden to spend political capital

Casella ‘20  
Megan Casella, 10-9, 20, Unions predict a Great Awakening during a Biden presidency, [https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/09/unions-biden-administration-426880 //](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/09/unions-biden-administration-426880%20//) DebateUS!

**Labor leaders are eyeing a** Joe **Biden victory** in November **as the start of a union revival**, one with the potential to undo decades of policies that have diminished union influence, undermined the right to organize and exacerbated income inequality. And they’re planning on playing a central role. “It’s clear to me it’s going to be the most significant pro-labor, pro-worker administration in a long, long, long time,” said Harold Schaitberger, president of the International Association of Fire Fighters — the first union to endorse Biden during the Democratic primary. Reversing America's decades-long decline in union membership, however, will be a difficult task for even the most labor-friendly administration. Just over 10 percent of workers were represented by unions last year, according to Labor Department data — a share that has been cut in half since 1983. And unless Democrats win the Senate as well as the White House, it will be an uphill battle for Biden to move any of the legislation union leaders are advocating for. Labor officials have reason to be confident, though, that they'll have a line into the Biden administration, should he win next month's election. The former vice president and veteran senator has longstanding relationships with union leaders built over more than 40 years in politics. He's already named two union presidents — Teresa Romero of the United Farm Workers and Lonnie Stephenson of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers — to his transition team’s advisory board. At least five others served as members of the unity task forces Biden set up with Sen. Bernie Sanders over the summer, which published formal policy recommendations that helped shape the Democratic Party’s official platform. Many expect Biden to appoint a union leader to his Cabinet — the Departments of Labor and Education are most often mentioned — or in senior positions throughout various agencies. And he has pledged to create a Cabinet-level working group comprised of labor representatives, “that will solely focus on promoting union organizing and collective bargaining." His policy plans across the board are peppered with references to expanding the right to join a union. And senior campaign officials, led by Biden’s longtime confidant and campaign aide Steve Ricchetti, have been holding a biweekly evening call with union leaders to keep them apprised of campaign developments and to allow them to offer their input. “He’s doing more of this outreach than any other candidate that I’ve known on the Democratic side,” said Lee Saunders, president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, who has been with his union since the late 1970s. “When he talks about organized labor, when he talks about the importance of unions, he really means it.” Still, it's **an open question whether the labor movement can convince Biden and his team that it is worth spending the “political capital that will have to be spent in order to** get major labor law reforms,” said Robert Reich, a former Labor secretary under Bill Clinton. “It’s a chicken and egg problem,” Reich said. “Because right now, organized labor doesn’t have very much clout.”

#### PC is key to reconciliation---plan’s distraction foils it and causes defection---it’s laser-thin

Elliot 9-16 (PHILIP ELLIOTT, Staff writer @ Times, Democrats Face a Grueling Two Weeks as Infighting Erupts Over Infrastructure, <https://time.com/6098810/house-democrats-reconciliation/>, y2k)

House Democrats yesterday finished penning a 2,600-page bill that finally outlines the specifics of their ambitious “soft” infrastructure plan that won’t attract a single Republican vote. But no one was really rushing to Schneider’s for bottles of bubbly. For a party ready to spend $3.5 trillion to fund its social policy agenda, there were plenty of glum faces on Capitol Hill.

In fact, one key piece of the legislation—a deal that would finally let Medicare negotiate lower prices with drug companies—fell apart in the Energy and Commerce Committee when three Democrats voted against it. It found resurrection a short time later when Leadership aides literally plucked it from the Energy and Commerce team and delivered it to the Ways and Means Committee for its approval instead. Even there, though, one Democrat voted against it, saying the threat it posed to pharmaceutical companies’ profits would doom it in the Senate. “Every moment we spend debating provisions that will never become law is a moment wasted and will delay much-needed assistance to the American people,” Rep. Stephanie Murphy of Florida later argued.

Put another way? Brace for some nasty politics over the next two weeks as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi tries to get this bill to a vote before the budget year ends on Sept. 30. And those 2,600 pages had better be recyclable.

Democrats can only afford three defectors if they want to usher this bill into law, and they’re perilously close to failure. So far, five centrist Democrats in the House have said they prefer a scaled-back version of the Medicare component. But if Pelosi gives the five centrists that win, she risks losing the support of progressives who are already sour that things like a punitive wealth tax and the end to tax loopholes aren’t present in the current version of the bill.

As it stands now, letting Medicare negotiate drug prices would save the government about $500 billion over the next decade. The scaled-back version doesn’t have an official cost, but a very similar version got its score in the Senate last year: roughly $100 billion in savings. Because Democrats are using a budgeting loophole to help them avoid a filibuster and pass this with bare majorities, that $400 billion gap matters a lot more than on most bills. Scaling back the Medicare savings means they would also have to scale back their overall spending on the bill—a big line in the sand for progressives who say they’ve already compromised too much.

All of this, of course, comes as President Joe Biden and his top aides in the White House have been trying to get Senate centrists onboard. Just yesterday, he met separately with Sens. Kyrsten Sinema and Joe Manchin, fellow Democrats who have expressed worries about the $3.5 trillion price tag but have been vague about what exactly they want to cut back on. With the Senate evenly divided at 50-50, and Vice President Kamala Harris in position to break the ties to Democrats’ victories, any shenanigans from those two independent thinkers scrambles the whole package.

Oh, and that other bipartisan infrastructure plan that carries $550 billion in new spending? It’s still sitting on the shelf in the House. Pelosi said she’d bring it to the floor only when the bigger—and entirely partisan—bill was ready. And there’s plenty of grumbling about that package, too.

If this is all beginning to sound like a scratched record that keeps repeating, it’s because this has become something of a pattern here in Washington. Things look pretty grim for legislation in town these days, despite Democrats controlling the House, the Senate and the White House. Their margin for error is literally zero, and so hiccups from a half-dozen centrists can forewarn a doomed agenda.

So far, Pelosi has been a master of holding the line on crucial votes and has managed to maneuver her team to victories, including on an earlier pandemic relief package that passed with only Democratic votes. Now she’s trying again, but the clock is ticking, and $3.5 trillion is an eye-popping sum of money that rivals the spending the United States unleashed to close out World War II.

#### Full $3.5 Trillion budget is key to meaningfully reducing emissions and mitigating climate change

Temple 8-23

(James, senior editor for technology, MIT Technology Review, 8/23/21, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/23/1032393/the-3-5-trillion-budget-bill-could-transform-the-us-power-sector-and-slash-climate-pollution/amp/>) // DebateUS!

In the coming weeks, Congress may pass one of the most important climate policies in US history. The $3.5 trillion budget plan includes a provision known as the Clean Electricity Payment Program, which would use payments and penalties to encourage utilities to increase the share of electricity they sell from carbon-free sources each year. If it works as hoped, the legislation would ensure that the power sector generates 80% of its electricity from sources like wind, solar, and nuclear plants by 2030, cutting more than a billion tons of annual greenhouse-gas emissions. The measure would mark a foundational step in President Joe Biden’s ambitious climate plan, which aims to put the nation on track to eliminate climate pollution from electricity generation by 2035—and achieve net-zero emissions across the economy by midcentury.

#### Warming causes extinction and turns their impacts - death spirals make resilience impossible.

Beard et al. 21 [S.J. Beard, Lauren Holt, Asaf Tzachor, Luke Kemp, Shahar Avin, Phil Torres, and Haydn Belfield, \* Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, “Assessing climate change’s contribution to global catastrophic risk,” 2021, *Futures*, Vol. 127, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2020.102673, EA – Table 1 & Fig. 2 Omitted]

3.1. Climate change and planetary boundaries

While most of the impacts of climate change so far have fallen within the range of what was experienced during the Holocene, the rate of change is faster than in the Holocene and we are now beginning to see climate change push beyond these boundaries. In the latest edition of the planetary boundaries’ framework, climate change is placed in the zone of increasing risk, implying that while this boundary has been breached, there remains some potential for normal functioning and recovery (Steffen et al., 2015). It thus lies between what the authors identify as the ‘safe zone’ and other ‘high risk’ transgressions, such as disruption to the biochemical flows of nitrogen and phosphorus and loss of biosphere integrity.

As part of their discussion of BRIHN Baum and Handoh (2014) note that climate change is the planetary boundary for which the risk to humanity has received most meaningful consideration and they suggest that this attention is deserved. Yet little research attention has been paid to climate change’s extreme or catastrophic effects. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that, despite currently falling outside of the area of high risk, climate change has the clear potential to push humanity across a threshold of irreversible loss by “changing major ocean circulation patterns, causing massive sea-level rise, and increasing the frequency and severity of extreme events… that displace people, and ruin economies.” Even if humanity was resilient to each of these individual impacts, a global catastrophe could occur if these impacts were to occur rapidly and simultaneously.

One scenario that has received comparatively more attention is that of the global climate crossing a tipping point that would trigger environmental feedback loops (such as declining albedo from melting ice or the release of methane from clathrates) and cascading effects (such a shifting rainfall patterns that trigger desertification and soil erosion). After this point, anthropogenic activity may cease to be the main driver of climate change, making it accelerate and become harder to stop (King et al., 2015).

Other scenarios can be discerned from the numerous historical cases in which the modest, usually regional, climatic changes experienced during the Holocene have been implicated in the collapse of previous societies, including the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku, the Akkadians, the Western Roman Empire, the lowland Maya, and dozens of others (Diamond, 2005, Fagan, 2008). These provide a precedent for how a changing climate can trigger or contribute to societal breakdown. At present, our understanding of this phenomena is limited, and the IPCC has labelled its findings as “low confidence” due to a lack of understanding of cause and effect and restrictions in historical data (Klein et al., 2014). Further study and cooperation between archaeologists, historians, climate scientists and global catastrophic risk scholars could overcome some of these limitations by identifying how the impacts of climate change translate into social transformation and collapse, and hence what the impacts of more rapid and extreme climatic changes might be. There is also the potential for larger studies into how global climate variations have coincided with collapse and violence at the regional level (Zhang, Chiyung, Chusheng, Yuanqing, & Fung, 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). However, these need to be interpreted and generalized with care given the differences between pre-industrial and modern societies.

Societies also have a long history of adapting to, and recovering from, climate change induced collapses (McAnany and Yoffee, 2009). However, there are two reasons to be sceptical that such resilience can be easily extrapolated into the future. First, the relatively stable context of the Holocene, with well-functioning, resilient ecosystems, has greatly assisted recovery, while anthropogenic climate change is more rapid, pervasive, global, and severe. Large-scale states did not emerge until the onset of the Holocene (Richerson, Boyd, & Bettinger, 2001), and societies have since remained in a surprisingly narrow climatic niche of roughly 15 mean annual average temperature (Xu, Kohler, Lenton, Svenning, & Scheffer, 2020). A return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles could thus have more devastating and long-lasting effects in a world of rapid climate change and ecological disruption (Gowdy, 2020).7 Second, modern human societies may have developed hidden fragilities that amplify the shocks posed by climate change (Mannheim 2020) and the complex, tightly-coupled and interdependent nature of our socio-economic systems makes it more likely that the failure of a few key states or industries due to climate change could cascade into a global collapse (Kemp, 2019).

A third set of plausible scenarios stem from climate change’s broader environmental impacts. Apart from being a planetary boundary of its own, Steffen et al. (2015) point out that climate change is intimately connected with other planetary boundaries (see Table 1). Climate change is thus identified by the authors as one of two ‘core’ boundaries with the potential “to drive the Earth system into a new state should they be substantially and persistently transgressed.” This transformative potential was elaborated on in subsequent work exploring how the world could be pushed towards a ‘Hothouse Earth’ state, even with anthropogenic temperature rises as low as 2 °C (Steffen et al., 2018).

The connection between climate change and biosphere integrity (the survival of complex adaptive ecosystems supporting diverse forms of life) is particularly strong. The IPCC is highly confident that climate change is adversely impacting terrestrial ecosystems, contributing to desertification and land degradation in many areas and changing the range, abundance and seasonality of many plant and animal species (Arneth et al., 2019). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has reported that climate change is restricting the range of nearly half the world’s threatened mammal species and a quarter of threatened birds, with marine, coastal, and arctic ecosystems worst affected (Diaz et al., 2019). According to one estimate, climate change could cause 15–37 % of all species to become ‘committed to extinction’ by mid-century (Thomas et al., 2004).

Disruption to biosphere integrity can have profound economic and social repercussions, ranging from loss of ecosystem services and natural resources to the destruction of traditional knowledge and livelihoods. For instance, desertification, which threatens a quarter of Earth’s land area and a fifth of the population, is already estimated to cost developing nations 4–8 % of their GDP (United Nations, 2011). Many other rapid regime shifts involving loss of biosphere integrity have been observed, including shifts in arid vegetation, freshwater eutrophication, and the collapse of fish populations (Amano et al. 2020). There is a theoretical possibility of still more profound regime shifts at the global level (Rocha, Peterson, Bodin, & Levin, 2018). However, the contribution of loss of biosphere integrity to GCR is yet to be assessed. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that it is unlikely to threaten human civilization, due both to a lack of plausible mechanisms for this threat and the fact that “local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses.” However, in their classification of GCRs, Avin et al. (2018) suggest the potential for ecological collapse to threaten the safety boundaries of multiple critical systems with diverse spread mechanisms at a range of scales, from the biogeochemical and anatomical to the ecological and sociotechnological. Note that both these studies were conducted for largely conceptual purposes and should not be taken as rigorous analyses of this risk, this topic warrants further investigation.

3.2. Classifying climate change’s contributions to global catastrophic risk

Climate change’s contribution to GCR goes well beyond its impact on the earth system. Taking Avin et al.’s list of critical systems, we note that previous studies have mostly focused on the effects of climate change on physical and biogeochemical systems (e.g. global temperature and sea-level rise) or the lower-level critical systems that are most directly related to human health and survival (e.g. Heath Stress). However, these represent a very limited assessment of risk as it only accounts for climate change as a direct hazard/ threat and our "ontological" vulnerabilities to it. A more comprehensive risk assessment must consider the higher-order critical systems threatened by climate change passively (through a lack of alternatives) and actively (through intentional design).

The probability of a global catastrophe is higher when sociotechnological and environmental systems are tightly coupled, creating a potential for reinforcing feedback loops. If environmental change produces social changes that perpetuate further environmental change, then this could actively work against our efforts at adaptation. When this change has the potential to produce significant harm, via human vulnerabilities and exposure, we describe such loops as ‘global systems death spirals.’ These spirals could produce self-perpetuating catastrophes, whereby the energy and resources required to reverse or adapt to collapse are beyond the means of dwindling human societies. Feedback loops like this could thus create tipping points beyond which returning to anything like present conditions would become extremely difficult. Global systems would shift to very different states in which the prospects for humanity would likely be bleaker.

In the rest of this section, we explore just one potential spiral, between an ecological system (the biosphere) and two sociotechnological systems (the human food and global political systems). We explore each system and its interactions. Fig. 2 illustrates our model of this spiral.

3.2.1. The human food system

Climate change’s impact on biosphere integrity (discussed in the previous section) could harm the human food system due to loss of ecosystem services, disruption of the cycles of water, nitrogen and phosphates, and changes in the dynamics of plant and animal health (B´elanger & Pilling, 2019). Crossing this planetary boundary is already having severe implications for global food security, including loss of soil fertility and insect-mediated pollination (Diaz et al., 2019).

Systems for the production and allocation of food are already enduring significant stress. The sources of stress include climate change, soil erosion, water scarcity, and phosphorus depletion. The natural resource base, arable land and freshwater upon which food production rely are being degraded. While global food productivity and production has increased dramatically over the past century to meet rising demand from an expanding global population and rising standard of living, these constraints and risks are increasing the vulnerability of our global food supply to rapid and global disruptions that could constitute global catastrophes (Baum, Denkenberger, Pearce, Robock, & Winkler, 2015).

Climate change will further reduce food security in at least three interconnected ways. First, it will affect growing conditions, including direct threats to agricultural yields from heat, humidity, and precipitation in many regions; although initially improving conditions in some (Lott, Christidis, & Stott, 2013). Second, it will increase the range of agricultural pests and diseases (Harvell et al., 2002). Third, it will increase the occurrence of extreme weather events that impair the integrity of food production and distribution networks, from production to harvest, post-harvest, transport, storage, and distribution, thereby increasing our vulnerability and exposure to supply shocks (Bailey et al., 2015). The IPCC estimates, with medium confidence, that at around 2 °C of global warming the risk from permafrost degradation and food supply instabilities will be ‘very high’, while at around 3 °C of global warming the risk from vegetation loss, wildfire damage, and dryland water scarcity will also be very high (Arneth et al., 2019). Very few studies have considered the impacts of 4 °C of global warming or more; however, the IPCC highlighted one study finding that any potential agricultural gains from climate change will be lost by this point and there could be a decrease of 19 % in maize yields and 68 % in bean yields in Africa, an 8 % reduction in yields in South Asia, and a substantial negative impact on fisheries by 2050 (Porter et al., 2014). Furthermore, multiple extreme weather events could disrupt food distribution networks (Bailey and Wellesley, 2017).

While there are opportunities to adapt, disruption to the entire global food system cannot be resolved via food aid alone. Indeed, there is the potential for isolationist or heavy-handed responses that would do more harm than good. Given the high degree of interconnectivity and feedback within the global food system, our initial research suggests that any one of these climate change effects could trigger scenarios that would critically undermine the global food system’s ability to meet the minimum nutrition for well-being; making food security for all an unachievable goal, let alone rise to the challenge of continuing to grow (A. Tzachor, 2019, 2020); this would constitute what Kuhlemann (2019) terms a ‘threshold of significance.’

3.2.2. The global political system

Disrupting the global food system can create and exacerbate conflict and state failure (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011). However, once again, this needs to be seen against the backdrop of a global political system under stress, with climate change as a significant contributing factor. Climate change influences political systems in many ways, from being a locus of activism and a stimulus for reform to driving rising inequality and population displacement (Arneth et al., 2019; Diffenbaugh & Burke, 2019). This is not a new phenomenon, changes in the climate are believed to have contributed to conflict between people and states throughout human history, driven by resource scarcity, population displacement, and inequality (Lee, 2009; Mach et al., 2019). As part of a comprehensive risk assessment of climate change, King et al. (2015) conducted an extensive literature review on climate change and conflict and used this to inform a series of international wargaming exercises. These found that climate change is expected to increase international conflict while highlighting the role that population displacement, state failure, and water and food insecurity would play in this (see also Mach et al., 2019; Natalini, Jones, & Bravo, 2015).

Quantitative studies of the impact of climate change on violence and conflict have provided more mixed results. A survey of empirical studies by Detges (2017) found that there may be multiple differing trends: extreme weather events appear to have more significant effects on violence than do long-term climate trends, while levels of small-scale conflict and interpersonal violence appear to be more affected than large-scale conflicts and international war. Empirical studies also highlight how climate change’s impact on conflict is predominantly as a risk multiplier and intensifier. Thus, climate change may contribute more by increasing our vulnerability to other conflict-inducing factors, such as loss of livelihood, forced migration, environmental change, and food insecurity, than by acting as a direct cause of conflict (Abel, Brottrager, Cuaresma, & Muttarak, 2019; Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013; Schubert et al., 2008).8

Of particular relevance to GCR is the effect of climate change on the risk of nuclear war (Parthemore, Femia, & Werrell, 2018). However, to our knowledge, this has never been rigorously assessed, although the potential is certainly there. One recent model of the risk of nuclear war highlighted how varied, and common, incidents with the potential to trigger a nuclear exchange are (Baum, de Neufville, & Barrett, 2018). It outlined 14 different causal pathways to an exchange, including the escalation of conventional wars and international crises, human error, and the emergence of new non-state actors. For all but two of these, they identify historical examples of potentially precipitating incidents, with 60 incidents in total (i.e. a little less than one a year). This suggests that the absence of nuclear war was less due to a lack of potential causes, tan the global political system’s ability to defuse them. Thus, the real significance of climate change may be its capacity to undermine this system: the combination of social, political, and environmental disruption, a lingering sense of global injustice, and rising food, water, and energy insecurity could increase the probability that crises escalate or that false alarms are mistaken for genuine emergencies. This topic needs further research.

3.3. The emergence of a global systems death spiral

Yet, we should not conclude that a nuclear exchange is the only, or even most likely, scenario in which political instability might produce a global catastrophe. Conflict and political instability, even of moderate severity, are themselves two of the most significant drivers of biodiversity loss due to breakdowns in monitoring, governance, and (public and private) property rights (Baynham-Herd, Amano, Sutherland, & Donald, 2018). This closes a potentially reinforcing feedback loop between loss of biosphere integrity, food insecurity and political breakdown.

The mechanisms by which these cascading failures might spread include many of the natural, anthropogenic, and replicator effects identified by Avin et al. (2018), making them harder to contain. At the natural level, climate change involves changes to the global atmospheric and biogeochemical systems and poses other naturally spreading harms, like global ecological collapse. At the anthropogenic level, the global interconnectedness of sociotechnological systems means that while small shocks are easier to recover from, larger shocks can be harder to contain and control. Finally, biological and informational replication can also spread the negative impacts of climate change, from vector-borne diseases and invasive species to climate fatalism and dangerous geoengineering technologies.

Given these numerous spread mechanisms, critical system failures could precipitate global catastrophes. Furthermore, the spiral we have explored is unlikely to be the only set of interlinked systemic disruptions that climate change could initiate (other death spirals could involve bio-insecurity and disease), nor are these the only causal connections between these three systems. Until we understand the nature of such death spirals better, we must act cautiously. We now turn to consider what this would mean.

### 4

#### Counterplan text: Just governments/[THE AFF’S COUNTRY] ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike for workers except for police officers and other law enforcement workers.

#### [1] Empirics prove – when police unions get more power, police abuse it.

Greenhouse 6/18

Greenhouse, Steven, “How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of Power.” The New Yorker, 18 June 2020, [https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses. //](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses.%20//) Phoenix

Police unions have long had a singular—and divisive—place in American labor. What is different at this fraught moment, however, is that these unions, long considered untouchable, due to their extraordinary power on the streets and among politicians, face a potential reckoning, as their conduct roils not just one city but the entire nation. Since the nineteen-sixties, when police unions first became like traditional unions and won the right to bargain collectively, they have had a controversial history. And recent studies suggest that their political and bargaining power has enabled them to win disciplinary systems so lax that they have helped increase police abuses in the United States.

A 2018 University of Oxford study of the hundred largest American cities found that the extent of protections in police contracts was directly and positively correlated with police violence and other abuses against citizens. A 2019 University of Chicago study found that [extending collective-bargaining rights](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55ad38b1e4b0185f0285195f/t/5d92b749ad13ae3d9b293125/1569896278868/Sheriffs+Unions+Misconduct.pdf) to Florida sheriffs’ deputies led to a forty per cent statewide increase in cases of violent misconduct—translating to nearly twelve additional such incidents annually.

In a forthcoming study, Rob Gillezeau, a professor and researcher, concluded that, from the nineteen-fifties to the nineteen-eighties, the ability of police to collectively bargain led to a substantial rise in police killings of civilians, with a greater impact on people of color. “With the caveat that this is very early work,” Gillezeau [wrote](https://twitter.com/robgillezeau/status/1266834185055956997) on Twitter, on May 30th, “it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the non-white population.”

## On

### Framing

#### [1] Extinction first under Rawls – all people under the veil of ignorance would agree to prevent extinction because no matter who they are they would be affected

#### [2] Rawls collapses to util -

#### Rawls aggregates consequences to determine justice

Rawls ‘99

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press, 1999. Lindale PP

Distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid. So while the distinctive role of conceptions of justice is to specify basic rights and duties and to determine the appropriate distributive shares, the way in which a conception does this is bound to affect the problems of efficiency, coordination, and stability. We cannot, in general, assess a conception of justice by its distributive role alone, however useful this role may be in identifying the concept of justice. We must take into account its wider connections; for even though justice has a certain priority, being the most important virtue of institutions, it is still true that, other things equal, one conception of justice is preferable to another when its broader consequences are more desirable.

#### It’s the backbone of Justice

Rawls ‘99

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press, 1999. Lindale PP

It has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be supported by the convictions of common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of principle between the claims of liberty and right on the one hand and the desirability of increasing aggregate social welfare on the other; and that we give a certain priority, if not absolute weight, to the former. Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on natural right, which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different persons as if they were one person is excluded. Therefore in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. Justice as fairness attempts to account for these common sense convictions concerning the priority of justice by showing that they are the consequence of principles which would be chosen in the original position. These judgments reflect the rational preferences and the initial equality of the contracting parties

#### [3] Gambler’s Objection – under the veil of ignorance, someone may set up inequal conditions gambling on the probability that they may benefit.

#### [4] Attachment Objection – we can never understand another perspective, a white man will never know what it’s like to be a black man because of their differing perspectives, this means the veil is impossible to access.

LBL

Fairness is not possible in the world of the aff where police officers can continue their violence and the economy collapses, this indepently proves that most fair fw always regress to util

### Democracy

#### [1] No democracy impact---new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine democratic peace theory

Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should. There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk. Militaries are less closely tied to voters Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it. In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process. The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts. Adversaries are proliferating and changing The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex. Technology is reducing constraint New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties. Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy. While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly. Multiple warrants and empirics prove democracy increases terrorism

#### [2] Multiple warrants and empirics prove democracy increases terrorism

Piazza 14 (James, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University, “Democracy and Terrorism: A Complex Relationship”, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=179658)> //BS 12-18-2017

Democracies may be less susceptible to violence and conflict than other forms of government, but does that also include terrorism? Not according to James Piazza. Democratic states are more likely to experience this type of violence even though they have attributes that are well-suited to combat it. By James Piazza for ISN Democracy, as a system of government, is widely lauded by political scientists for its ‘pacific effects.’ Experts have produced some good evidence that democratic regimes rarely go to war with one another and have also observed that democracies are much less susceptible to civil wars and internal armed conflicts than nondemocratic regimes. These pacific effects are typically explained as the product of norms and decision-making procedures within democracies that reinforce the peaceful and orderly resolution of disputes. But is it also true that democratic rule reduces terrorism and terrorist activity? The answer to this question is complex, conditional and nuanced – a reflection of the supporting evidence. While key qualities of democracies do make them more likely to experience terrorism than authoritarian regimes, some characteristic features of democratic governance have also been found to reduce terrorism. This disparate conclusion – that democracy might be a panacea for the scourges of inter- and intra-state war but not for terrorism – is likely due to the fact that terrorism is a distinct manifestation of political violence. To start with, terrorism is much lower in intensity than inter- or intra-state war. It is a tactic used by political actors or individuals characterized by conventional weakness and, often, political marginality. As opposed to conventional military force, terrorism typically involves the use of violence or the threat of violence, often against civilians, in order to influence a wider audience and to prompt a much stronger opponent to offer concessions. It is therefore most frequently deployed in situations where the opponent – usually a state – is much stronger and has ample capacity, such as through a free media, to project influence. Democracy and terrorism: The evidence According to the Global Terrorism Database, regimes of all types in the post-Cold War period (1991-2012) experienced an average of about 18 terrorist attacks (both domestic and transnational) per year**.** Democratic regimes, however, experienced 62% more terrorism than did nondemocratic regimes – 21.3 attacks per year as opposed to 13.2 attacks for nondemocracies. This pattern holds regardless of the region of the world the countries are located in, the type of terrorist threat they face, and other factors such as population size and level of economic development. What accounts for this disparity? Answers to this question are best understood in terms of 1) the structural factors that make a country an attractive setting for terrorist attacks and 2) the factors that impel individuals and groups to engage in terrorism in the first place. We might expect democracies to produce fewer aggrieved individuals and groups than authoritarian regimes, because, in comparison to authoritarian systems, democracies are more responsive to public demands and tend to provide more avenues for the peaceful and orderly redress of grievances. The reality, however, is that democracies are both more attractive and more vulnerable to terrorism than nondemocracies. Democracies afford political dissidents the right to engage in autonomous political behavior. While this maximizes opportunities for peaceful legal and political activism, it also facilitates illegal and violent activities, terrorism included**.** Democratic institutions preserve the rights of the accused and place restrictions on the police and authorities to a far greater degree than do nondemocratic regimes. This, of course, complicates counterterrorism in the areas of surveillance, interrogation and prosecution of terrorists and their supporters. Even more importantly, democracies encourage a free media that will report on terrorist atrocities, giving terrorists the opportunity to influence a much wider audience than would be the case in countries where the media is controlled by the government. These commonly-cited features make democracies especially vulnerable to terrorism and less well equipped to engage in counterterrorism. Scholars of terrorism, however, have also identified less obvious factors endemic to democracies that may actually encourage terrorism. For example, democracies tend to be wealthier and better developed than authoritarian regimes, rendering them more “target rich” for terrorist groups. Democracies are also more likely to be prominent countries on the world stage and symbols of the political status quo, making them more likely to be opposed by terrorists, who are quintessential anti-status-quo actors. Cross-national empirical research on transnational terrorism conducted by Burcu Savun and Brian Phillips suggests that because democracies are more likely to pursue active, interventionist foreign policies than nondemocratic states, they are more likely to become embroiled in foreign controversies that earn the ire of terrorists. Another interesting study by Erica Chenoweth finds empirical evidence that, by tolerating a larger volume and a wider range of political activities – such as forming political organizations, lobbying, protesting, etc. – democracies have more competitive political environments, which perversely increases returns to terrorist attacks by political actors interested in “doing something drastic” to gain attention. In contrast, although nondemocracies might produce more angry and aggrieved citizens that, lacking a nonviolent means to meaningfully participate in politics, might be prompted to support terrorist and extremist movements, authoritarian regimes can more easily repress political dissent and manage and control the activities of their citizens. Most importantly, authoritarian regimes muzzle and control the media, reducing the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy. One might expect that, in nondemocratic regimes, the combination of heightened political frustrations and state-controlled media would lead to higher rates of transnational terrorism. A case in point here would be the 1969 kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick by the leftist Revolutionary Movement 8th October (MR-8). The MR-8 militants hoped that, by kidnapping a prominent foreign figure, they could bypass the Brazilian military government’s regime of media censorship to communicate their political grievances to the wider Brazilian public. However, the empirical evidence does not support this as a cross-national trend in the data. In the 1991-2012 period, democracies experienced higher rates of transnational terrorism than nondemocracies (around 23.6% more) and saw their citizens commit more acts of transnational terrorism against other countries (25.9% more) than citizens of authoritarian regimes.

#### [3] Independently, the political vacuum from the transition to democracy is filled by terrorists

Attkisson 15 (Sharyl, an Emmy award-winning investigative journalist, is a senior independent contributor to The Daily Signal. She is the author of "Stonewalled." Send an email to Sharyl, “How Arab Spring Opened the Door to Terrorism’s Ugly March,” <http://dailysignal.com/2015/03/12/arab-spring-opened-door-terrorisms-ugly-march/)> //BS 12-18-2017 \*\*[edited for] ~~islamophobic language~~

It’s not your imagination. Global terrorism, dominated by ~~Muslim~~ extremist groups, is by far the worst it’s been in modern times. In the past six years, the United States has added 21 names to its list of foreign terrorist organizations: all but one of them radical Muslim groups. That’s more than the previous 10 years combined. At the same time, the number of terrorist acts has shattered previous records. Experts predict data for 2014, which is still being compiled, will likely reflect more than 15,000 terrorist attacks: a vast increase over 2013—which was already the deadliest year for global terrorism since data was first collected in 1970. The Institute for Economics and Peace reported 10,000 terrorist incidents killed 18,000 people in 2013. Nine countries were added to the list of nations where more than 50 lives were lost to terrorist attacks in a single year. Arab Spring Devolves Into Terrorist Winter Eleven terrorist groups have been added to the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations since the Arab Spring. “Arab Spring” is the popular name given to the democratic wave of civil unrest in the Arab world that began in December 2010 and lasted through mid-2012. It turns out the revolutionary movement created an ideal environment for terrorism to grow and thrive. “Terrorists realized they could exploit the confusion and vacuum in power created by the uprisings,” says a U.S. intelligence officer stationed in Libya during the Arab Spring movement. He says terrorists used social media to stoke civil unrest and take advantage of the chaos. In the Arab Spring’s wake, Egypt and Tunisia disbanded the security structures that had helped keep jihadists in check, and freed many ~~Islamist and jihadist~~ [extremist] political prisoners. In Libya, parts of the country fell entirely outside government control, providing openings for violent terrorist movements.“Many of the regimes weakened or deposed by the Arab Spring were among Washington’s most effective counterterrorism partners,**”** noted Juan Zarate in an analysis written in June 2011.

#### [4] DPT just means democracies go to war with non-democracies way more

Muller 15 (Harald, director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, “Democracy, Peace, and Security”, Lexington Books) //BS 12-17-2017

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they disagree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

#### [5] Democracy will catastrophically delay action on climate change---authoritarianism is necessary to ensure rapid state-led transformation

Mann & Wainwright ’18 (Geoff, teaches political economy and economic geography at Simon Fraser University, where he directs the Centre for Global Political Economy, Joel *Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future*, pp. 38-40, ME)

Relative to the institutional means currently available to capitalist liberal democracy and its sorry attempts at “consensus,” this trajectory has some distinct advantages with respect to atmospheric carbon concentration, notably in terms of the capacity to coordinate massive political-economic reconfiguration quickly and comprehensively. In light of our earlier question—how can we possibly realize the necessary emissions reductions?—it is this feature of Climate Mao that most recommends it. As the climate justice movement struggles to be heard, most campaigns in the global North are premised on an unspoken faith in a lop-sided, elite-biased, liberal proceduralism doomed to failure given the scale and scope of the changes required. If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the liberal model of democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction. Climate Mao reflects the demand for rapid, revolutionary, state-led transformation today. Indeed, calls for variations on just such a regime abound on the Left. Mike Davis and Giovanni Arrighi have more or less sided with Climate Mao, sketching it as an alternative to capitalist Climate Leviathan.35 We might even interpret the renewal of enthusiasm for Maoist theory (including Alain Badiou’s version) as part of the prevailing crisis of ecological-political imagination.36 Minqi Li’s is arguably the best developed of this line of thought, and like Arrighi he locates the fulcrum of global climate history in China, arguing that Climate Mao offers the only way forward: [U]nless China takes serious and meaningful actions to fulfill its obligation of emissions reduction, there is little hope that global climate stabilization can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the [present] Chinese government will voluntarily take the necessary actions to reduce emissions. The sharp fall of economic growth that would be required is something that the Chinese government will not accept and cannot afford politically. Does this mean that humanity is doomed? That depends on the political struggle within China and in the world as a whole.37 Taking inspiration from Mao, Li says a new revolution in the Chinese revolution—a re-energization of the Maoist political tradition—could transform China and save humanity from doom. He does not claim this is likely; one need only consider China’s massive highway expansions, accelerated automobile consumption, and subsidized urban sprawl.38 But he is right that if an anticapitalist, planetary sovereign is to emerge that could change the world’s climate trajectory, it is most likely to emerge in China.

**[6] Climate change causes extinction – ocean acidification, water and resource wars, econ collapse, and regional conflicts.**

Pachauri and Meyer 15 (Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report” <http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf> IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp)

SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. {2.3} Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system, **accompanied by ocean acidification**, increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature (medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4} A large fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years. Marine organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes (medium confidence). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5} Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more 13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally(high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), intensifying competition for water among sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2} Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2} In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2} Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2} Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2} Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. Climate change can indirectlyincrease risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2} 2010 )

### Case

#### Aff gets circumvented -

#### 1] Employers interfere and threaten employees

Eldin 4/23

Eidlin, Barry. “Perspective | It's All Too Easy for Employers to Interfere in Union Elections.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 23 Apr. 2021, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/its-all-too-easy-for-employers-to-interfere-in-union-elections/2021/04/23/f2378ca6-a2d1-11eb-85fc-06664ff4489d\_story.html. //](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/its-all-too-easy-for-employers-to-interfere-in-union-elections/2021/04/23/f2378ca6-a2d1-11eb-85fc-06664ff4489d_story.html.%20//) Phoenix

When workers at the [Kumho Tire plant](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/) in Macon, Ga., petitioned for a union election on Sept. 18, 2017, they thought they were in good shape. Nearly 80 percent of them, 250 total, had signed cards showing support for unionizing. In the lead-up to the vote, management made clear where it stood. “My supervisor would stop me every day and say, ‘How you gonna vote, man? You gotta vote no!’ ” one worker, who remained anonymous out of fear of retaliation, told labor scholar [Gordon Lafer](https://www.gordonlafer.com/). “No question I was going to vote yes, but I couldn’t let them know that, ’cause I was in fear for my job security.” One month later, when the ballots were counted, workers voted 164 to 136 against unionization.

Earlier this month, we saw a more prominent example of this phenomenon, when workers at the Amazon warehouse in Bessemer, Ala., voted by more than 2 to 1 [against joining a union](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/09/technology/amazon-defeats-union.html). (Amazon chief executive Jeff Bezos owns The Washington Post.) It followed several other high-profile organizing defeats in recent years, including autoworkers at [Volkswagen](https://labornotes.org/2019/06/why-uaw-lost-again-chattanooga) in Tennessee and [Nissan](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/business/nissan-united-auto-workers-union.html) in Mississippi, as well as [Boeing](https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeings-south-carolina-workers-resoundingly-defeat-union/) employees in South Carolina.

Employers publicly interpret these results to suggest that workers simply don’t want unions. “Labor bosses should understand that when workers vote against forming a union, it signifies that the arguments made by organizers were not compelling or persuasive,” [Kristen Swearingen](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/09/amazon-alabama-union-drive-defeat-480581), chair of the Coalition for a Democratic Workplace, an anti-union lobby group, said after the Amazon defeat.

The evidence suggests otherwise. Current polling data shows that nearly [two-thirds](https://news.gallup.com/poll/318980/approval-labor-unions-remains-high.aspx) of Americans approve of unions, and [nearly half](https://iwer.mit.edu/2018/08/30/who-wants-to-join-a-union-a-growing-number-of-americans/) of nonunion workers would vote to join one if given the opportunity. But if unions are so popular, why don’t workers vote for them?

The problem is that union elections today are nothing like the elections we learned about in civics class. We would rightly question the outcome of an election anywhere else if monitors reported that one side was surveilling and interrogating voters, forcing them to attend propaganda meetings denouncing its opponents, restricting the opposition’s ability to campaign, and [threatening](https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/webform/uploads/silentwar_0.pdf) voters’ livelihood. But [all of this](https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/) is the [normal](https://www.epi.org/blog/amazons-anti-union-campaign-is-part-of-a-long-history-of-employer-opposition-to-organizing-passing-the-pro-act-would-be-a-critical-first-step/), largely legal course of events for union elections in the United States, where competing parties do not get equal time to make their cases and voters do not have freedom of expression without retaliation. Even when employers cross the line — as they do in more than [40 percent](https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/) of elections — the [penalties](https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/) are so trivial that it pays to break the law. Given the obstacles, it’s remarkable that unions win as many elections as they do.

#### 2] Lack of infrastructure and forced waivers means employees either give up their rights or can’t enforce them

Capps ‘19

Capps, Kriston. Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 21 May 2019, [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-21/how-corporations-get-around-local-labor-laws. //](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-21/how-corporations-get-around-local-labor-laws.%20//) Phoenix

At issue are forced arbitration clauses that require employees (and consumers) to waive their rights to class-action lawsuits. Such contracts are becoming increasingly ubiquitous: According to a [new report](https://www.epi.org/publication/unchecked-corporate-power/) from the Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, and National Employment Law Project, forced arbitration will apply to more than 80 percent of the non-union private-sector workforce by 2024.

“The right to be paid a livable minimum wage, to take meal and rest breaks, to safe workplaces, and to equal earning and promotion opportunities regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, or other social category—all of these important rights are at risk of being hollowed out by underenforcement,” the report reads.

Forced arbitration also represents a kind of corporate preemption of local and state law. From Albuquerque to Tacoma, more than 40 cities and counties have passed a [higher minimum wage](https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker/) than state law requires. Some two dozen municipalities have [local paid sick leave laws](http://www.paidsickdays.org/research-resources/current-sick-days-laws.html) on the books. And in at least a dozen cities and counties, worker protections cover “safe” days—paid time off for victims of domestic violence.

Ninety-eight percent of workers abandon their claims when their only option is arbitration.

In Oregon, for example, workers such as Rojas ostensibly enjoy the broadest paid leave policy around, with guaranteed paid time off for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and stalking to seek counseling or other social services. As of 2018, state law requires restaurants and other employers to provide a [good-faith estimate of work schedules](https://www.oregon.gov/boli/TA/Pages/Predictive-Employee-Scheduling.aspx), even for part-time shift workers. These rights are in addition to a minimum wage that is higher than the federal level (and indexed to inflation)—and [higher still in the Portland metro area](https://www.oregon.gov/boli/whd/omw/pages/minimum-wage-rate-summary.aspx).

Yet wage theft is a pervasive problem for the entire economy. In the 10 most populous states, some 2.4 million workers lose $8 billion every year to minimum wage violations, [according to the report](https://www.epi.org/files/uploads/Unchecked-Corporate-Power.pdf).

There are two forces eroding the enforcement of these workplace rights. One is austerity: State and federal budgets for the public agencies meant to protect workers have been cut to the bone, leaving them understaffed even as the workforce they monitor has grown. In Oregon, for example, the state’s department of labor has 35 wage and hour enforcement investigators—meaning that each investigator has a caseload of roughly 4,400 businesses and 55,000 workers. And that’s the best ratio among the six states in this study: Massachusetts’s 19 investigators are each responsible for nearly 189,000 workers.

The other threat to enforcement is forced arbitration. Last year, the Supreme Court [affirmed in Epic Systems v. Lewis](https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/the-supreme-court-may-make-it-even-harder-to-sue-your-employer/559280/) that companies can require workers to resolve disputes through binding arbitration. Since then, the court has ruled that corporations can require employees to contractually [waive their right to class arbitration](https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lamps-plus-inc-v-varela/). Chief Justice John Roberts has steadily ruled for the rights of corporations, and against plaintiffs.

#### Strikes fail and spark backlash

Grant and Wallace 91 [Don Sherman Grant; Ohio State University; Michael Wallace; Indiana University; “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” University of Chicago Press; March 1991; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781338.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca3144a9ae9e4ac65e285f2c67451ffb>]//SJWen

\*\*RM = Resource-Mobilization, or Strikes

3. Violent tactics.-Violent tactics are viewed by RM theorists exclu- sively as purposeful strategies by challengers for inciting social change with little recognition of how countermobilization strategies of elites also create violence. The role of elite counterstrategies has been virtually ig- nored in research on collective violence. Of course, history is replete with examples of elites' inflicting violence on challenging groups with the full sanction of the state. Typically, elite-sponsored violence occurs when the power resources and legal apparatus are so one-sidedly in the elites' favor that the outcome is never in doubt. In conflicts with weak insiders, elites may not act so openly unless weak insiders flaunt the law. Typically, elite strategies do not overtly promote violence but rather provoke violence by the other side in hopes of eliciting public condemnation or more vigorous state repression of challenger initiatives. This is a critical dynamic in struggles involving weak insiders such as unions. In these cases, worker violence, even when it appears justified, erodes public support for the workers' cause and damages the union's insider status.

4. Homogeneity and similarity.-Many RM theorists incorrectly as- sume that members of aggrieved groups are homogeneous in their inter- ests and share similar positions in the social structure. This (assumed) homogeneity of interests is rare for members of outsider groups and even more suspect for members of weak-insider groups. Indeed, groups are rarely uniform and often include relatively advantaged persons who have other, more peaceful channels in which to pursue their goals. Internal stratification processes mean that different persons have varying invest- ments in current structural arrangements, in addition to their collective interest in affecting social change. Again, these forces are especially prev- alent for weak insiders: even the group's lowest-status members are likely to have a marginal stake in the system; high-status members are likely to have a larger stake and, therefore, less commitment to dramatic change in the status quo.

Internal differences may lead to fragmentation of interests and lack of consensus about tactics, especially tactics suggesting violent confronta- tion. While group members share common grievances, individual mem- bers may be differentially aggrieved by the current state of affairs or differentially exposed to elite repression. White's (1989) research on the violent tactics of the Irish Republican Army shows that working-class members and student activists, when compared with middle-class partici- pants, are more vulnerable to state-sponsored repression, more likely to be available for protest activities, and reap more benefits from political violence. When we apply them to our study of strike violence, we find that differences in skill levels are known to coincide with major intraclass 1120 Strikes divisions in material interests (Form 1985) and are likely to coincide with the tendency for violent action. For instance, skilled-craft workers, who are more socially and politically conservative than unskilled workers, are less likely to view relations with employers as inherently antagonistic and are prone to separate themselves from unskilled workers, factors that should decrease their participation in violence.

#### Strikes alienate the worker by homogenizing interests and sparking countermobilization.

Grant and Wallace 91 [Don Sherman Grant; Ohio State University; Michael Wallace; Indiana University; “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” University of Chicago Press; March 1991; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781338.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aca3144a9ae9e4ac65e285f2c67451ffb>] Justin

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#### Strikes backfire – decks public support which leads to anti-union legislation and support in union-free competition

Schneider ‘12

Christian Schneider . “Beware of Backfire.” City Journal, 11 Sept. 2012, [www.city-journal.org/html/beware-backfire-11081.html. //](http://www.city-journal.org/html/beware-backfire-11081.html.%20//) Phoenix

If Wisconsin governor Scott Walker has spent the last 18 months painting a portrait of public-employee unions as intransigent and selfish, the Chicago Teachers Union this week provided him with confirmation. On Monday, 25,000 Chicago teachers (average salary: $76,000 before benefits) walked out of their classrooms, leaving nearly 350,000 schoolchildren and their parents in the lurch. The teachers are fighting to protect their lavish pay and benefit packages and also trying to stave off a new accountability plan that would evaluate their effectiveness using students’ test scores.

The Chicago strike serves as a counterpoint to events in Wisconsin after Walker’s election in 2010. In a protracted, contentious battle, Walker virtually eliminated collective bargaining for public employees, weakening the unions’ power significantly. Illinois is now demonstrating what Wisconsin might have looked like without Walker’s reforms. Those reforms didn’t come easy: for a year and a half, Wisconsin was paralyzed by demonstrations and union disruptions. But the union tantrums in Wisconsin clearly backfired, and in a recall election this past June, Walker won by a greater margin than he had in 2010, against the same opponent. Walker is now a national star on the Republican scene, while public-union membership is plummeting.

There’s no reason to believe that the Chicago teachers’ strike won’t similarly backfire on union loyalists. For one, the teachers’ demands are well beyond what normal citizens consider just. In recent negotiations, the CTU rejected a 16 percent pay increase over the next four years, which in today’s economic climate would seem like a generous deal to virtually anyone who doesn’t work for a public-employee union. Instead, the union demanded a 30 percent pay increase, in part to compensate for an extended school day. And the negotiations addressed only salaries. With new accounting rules in place, the Chicago Public Schools’ annual contribution for teacher pensions will jump from $231 million to $684 million between 2013 and 2014, according to the Illinois Policy Institute. Next year, pension costs will eat up nearly half of the education funding that Chicago schools receive from the state.

Perhaps most egregious are teachers’ attempts to duck accountability to save union jobs. Under Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel’s plan, a public school teaching position would no longer be a sinecure; teachers would have to justify their employment with their students’ test scores. While this makes sense to the public—Barack Obama’s own secretary of education, Arne Duncan, has fought for similar accountability plans nationwide—unions see it as a threat to job security, which, to them, clearly takes precedence over student learning.

Even to those inclined to support unions, these issues are losers. People out of work and parents scrambling to find care for their kids are likely to lose sympathy with teachers quickly as the strike drags on. The fact that Emanuel, a Democrat, is the one getting tough with the CTU is a sign that the union’s demands are out of line even by mainstream liberal standards. (On Monday, Republican vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan issued a statement saying that he “stands with Rahm Emanuel,” which made me check to see if my office was properly ventilated.)

The strike could also damage support for the teachers by drawing a clear contrast between heavily unionized public schools and union-free charter schools. Currently, Chicago has nearly 100 charter schools, and 52,000 of the students in those schools will be attending classes on schedule and outperforming public school students academically. A study by the Illinois Policy Institute examined the Chicago district’s open-enrollment, non-selective high schools and found that nine of the ten top performers were charters—all while the average Chicago-area charter-school teacher earns about $49,000 per year. Charter schools, of course, are also anathema to the CTU—but by walking out on the city’s schoolchildren, the unionized teachers are only reminding parents that another option exists, one that works better at lower cost.

It’s possible, of course, that the CTU could prevail in this dispute and win valuable concessions from Emanuel. But it’s also possible—if the mayor remains strong—that Chicago’s teachers have given Illinois the shove it needs to start moving toward the Wisconsin model.