# 1ac

### fw

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being – Prefer

#### [1] Actor specificity – state actors can only use util – outweighs since different actors have different obligations.

#### A – Aggregation – all policies benefit some and hurts others – only util can resolve these cuz it gives a clear weighing mechanism

#### B – Collectivism – States are composed of many actors who inevitably disagree about intent means they can only use consequentialism because they don’t have to agree

#### C – Bureaucrats aren’t philosophers – policymakers do not have experience with dense frameworks so they don’t understand how to apply them to specific instances but they do understand that pain is bad and pleasure is good because it’s intrinsic to existing.

#### [2] Extinction first –

#### a. Wager – if there is any chance of goodness existing, we ought to preserve our existence to maximize it.

#### b. Sequencing – if their framework is true, people dying is bad because it means those people can’t use their framework

#### c. Repugnance – if their framework cannot explain why people dying is bad – you should reject it because it cannot disavow of atrocities. You shouldn’t vote for a framework that can’t say the holocaust was a bad thing.

#### d. Performativity – us having a moral debate proves moral uncertainty because it means we are not certain about which framework is true - means we should preserve our ability to find the true framework

#### [3] Consequentialism is key to identifying inequities – other theories allow people to hide behind intent and sidestep liberating changes

**McCluskey 12**

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By similarly making structures of inequality appear beyond the reach of law reform, the "unintended consequences" message helps update and reinforce the narrowing of protections against intentional racial harm. Justice is centrally a question of whose interests and whose harms should count, in what context and in what form and to whom. Power is centrally about being able to act without having to take harm to others into account. This power to gain by harming others is strongest when it operates through systems and structures that make disregarding that harm appear routine, rational, and beneficial or at least acceptable or perhaps inevitable. By portraying law's unequal harms as the "side effects" of systems and structures with unquestionable "main effects," the "unintended consequences" story helps affirm the resulting harm even as it seems to offer sympathy and technical assistance. In considering solutions to the financial market problems, the policy puzzle is not that struggling homeowners' interests are overwhelmingly complex or uncertain. Instead, the bigger problem is that overwhelmingly powerful interests and ideologies are actively resisting systemic changes that would make those interests count. The failure to criminally prosecute or otherwise severely penalize high-level financial industry fraud is not primarily the result of uncertainty about the harmful effects of that fraudulent behavior, but because the political and justice systems are skewed to protect the gains and unaccountability of wealthy executives despite the clear harms to hosts of others. The unequal effects of the prevailing policy response to the crisis are foreseeable and obvious, not accidental or surprising. It would not take advanced knowledge of economics to readily predict that modest-income homeowners would tend to be far worse off than bank executives by a policy approach that failed to provide substantial mortgage forgiveness and foreclosure protections for modest-income homeowners but instead provided massive subsidized credit and other protections for Wall Street. Many policy actions likely to alleviate the unequal harm of the crisis similarly are impeded not because consumer advocates, low-income homeowners, or racial justice advocates hesitate to risk major changes in existing systems, or are divided about the technical design of alternative programs or more effective mechanisms for enforcing laws against fraud and racial discrimination. Instead, the problem is that these voices pressing for effective change are often excluded, drowned out or distorted in Congress and in federal agencies such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, or in the media, in the mainstream economics profession, and to a large extent in legal scholarship about financial markets. More generally, those diverse voices from the bottom have been largely absent or marginalized in the dominant theoretical framework that constructs widespread and severe inequality as unforeseeable and largely inevitable, or even beneficial. Moreover, justice requires careful attention to both harmful intent and to complex harmful effects. But the concept of "unintended consequences" inverts justice by suggesting that the best way to care for those at the bottom is to not care to make law more attentive to the bottom. "Unintended consequences" arguments promote a simplistic moral message in the guise of sophisticated intellectual critique-the message that those who lack power should not seek it because the desire for more power is what hurts most. Further, like Ayn Rand's overt philosophy of selfishness, that message promotes the theme that those who have power to ignore their harmful effects on others need not-indeed should not-be induced by law to care about this harm, because this caring is what is harmful. One right-wing think tank has recently made this moral message more explicit with an economic values campaign suggesting that the intentional pursuit of economic equality is a problem of the immoral envy of those whose economic success proves they are more deserving.169 Legal scholars and advocates who intend to put intellectual rigor and justice ahead of service to financial elites should reject stories of "unintended consequences" and instead scrutinize the power and laws that have so effectively achieved the intention of making devastating losses to so many of us seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial.

### plan

#### Thus, the Plan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

### pandemic

#### The pandemic is raging across the globe – vaccines are our only safeguard

Steenhuysen 7/21

Julie Steenhuysen, Alistair Smout and Ari Rabinovitch Reuters, 7-26, 21, How the Delta Variant Upends Assumptions About the Coronavirus, [https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2021-07-26/how-the-delta-variant-upends-assumptions-about-the-coronavirus //](https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2021-07-26/how-the-delta-variant-upends-assumptions-about-the-coronavirus%20//) Phoenix

The Delta variant is the fastest, fittest and most formidable version of the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 the world has encountered, and it is upending assumptions about the disease even as nations loosen restrictions and open their economies, according to virologists and epidemiologists. Vaccine protection remains very strong against severe disease and hospitalizations caused by any version of the coronavirus, and those most at risk are still the unvaccinated, according to interviews with 10 leading COVID-19 experts But the evidence is mounting that the Delta variant, first identified in India, is capable of infecting fully vaccinated people at a greater rate than previous versions, and concerns have been raised that they may even spread the virus, these experts said As a result, targeted use of masks, social distancing and other measures may again be needed even in countries with broad vaccination campaigns, several of them said. Israel recently reinstated mask-wearing requirements indoors and requires travelers to quarantine upon arrival. U.S. officials are considering whether to revise mask guidance for the vaccinated. Los Angeles County, the most populous in the United States, is again requiring masks even among the vaccinated in indoor public spaces. Even in Canada, where hospitalizations and COVID-19 cases continue to decline, national data from the Public Health Agency of Canada warns the Delta variant stands a chance of unravelling some of that progress. The data suggests that, despite ground gained on COVID-19 nationally, the Delta variant may result in “greater than previously expected resurgence this fall and winter.” “The biggest risk to the world at the moment is simply Delta,” said microbiologist Sharon Peacock, who runs Britain’s efforts to sequence the genomes of coronavirus variants, calling it the “fittest and fastest variant yet. The major worry about the Delta variant is not that it makes people sicker, but that it spreads far more easily from person to person, increasing infections and hospitalizations among the unvaccinated. Public Health England said on Friday that of a total of 3,692 people hospitalized in Britain with the Delta variant, 58.3 per cent were unvaccinated and 22.8 per cent were fully vaccinated In Canada, though COVID-19 cases are declining, Variants of Concern represent the majority of reported COVID-19 cases — approximately 70 per cent. For the week of June 20, 2021, cases of the Delta variant sat at 39 per cent, while Alpha cases sat around 38 per cent — the first time the two variant cases were reported in similar proportions. In Singapore, where Delta is the most common variant, government officials reported on Friday that three-quarters of its coronavirus cases occurred among vaccinated individuals, though none were severely ill. Israeli health officials have said 60 per cent of current hospitalized COVID-19 cases are in vaccinated people. Most of them are age 60 or older and often have underlying health problems. In the United States, which has experienced more COVID-19 cases and deaths than any other country, the Delta variant represents about 83 per cent of new infections. So far, unvaccinated people represent nearly 97 per cent of severe cases. Dr. Monica Gandhi, an infectious diseases doctor at the University of California, San Francisco, said many vaccinated people are “so disappointed” that they are not 100% protected from mild infections. But the fact that nearly all Americans hospitalized with COVID-19 right now are unvaccinated “is pretty astounding effectiveness,” she said “There is always the illusion that there is a magic bullet that will solve all our problems. The coronavirus is teaching us a lesson,” said Nadav Davidovitch, director of Ben Gurion University’s school of public health in Israel. The Pfizer Inc/BioNTech vaccine, one of the most effective against COVID-19 so far, appeared only 41% effective at halting symptomatic infections in Israel over the past month as the Delta variant spread, according to Israeli government data. Israeli experts said this information requires more analysis before conclusions can be drawn. “Protection for the individual is very strong; protection for infecting others is significantly lower,” Davidovitch said. MA study in China found that people infected with the Delta variant carry 1,000 times more virus in their noses compared with the original version first identified in Wuhan in 2019. “You may actually excrete more virus and that’s why it’s more transmissible. That’s still being investigated,” Peacock said. Virologist Shane Crotty of the La Jolla Institute for Immunology in San Diego noted that Delta is 50% more infectious than the Alpha variant first detected in the UK. “It’s outcompeting all other viruses because it just spreads so much more efficiently,” Crotty said. Genomics expert Eric Topol, director of the Scripps Research Translational Institute in La Jolla, California, noted that Delta infections have a shorter incubation period and a far higher amount of viral particles. “That’s why the vaccines are going to be challenged. The people who are vaccinated have got to be especially careful. This is a tough one,” Topol said. In the United States, the Delta variant has taken hold just as many Americans – vaccinated and not – have stopped wearing masks indoors. “It’s a double whammy,” Topol said. “The last thing you want is to loosen restrictions when you’re confronting the most formidable version of the virus yet.” The development of highly effective vaccines may have led many people to believe that once vaccinated, COVID-19 posed little threat to them. “When the vaccines were first developed, nobody was thinking that they were going to prevent infection,” said Carlos del Rio, a professor of medicine and infectious disease epidemiology at Emory University in Atlanta. The aim was always to prevent severe disease and death, del Rio added.The vaccines were so effective, however, that there were signs they also prevented transmission against prior coronavirus variants. “We got spoiled,” he said.

#### TRIPS creates unchecked variants and a deep inequality – waiver is needed

Gupta and Namboodiri 2021

[Vineeta, Sreenath, Health Affairs, "America And The TRIPS Waiver: You Can Talk The Talk, But Will You Walk The Walk?" July 13, <https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210712.248782/full/> // Phoenix

The TRIPS waiver is critical to combating the COVID-19 pandemic around the world. Demand for the vaccine has already surpassed supply, with high-income countries taking a large share of reserved doses. Given that no single vaccine manufacturer could produce enough vaccines to meet the demand of the entire globe, supporters of the waiver ponder the ethics of multinational manufacturers holding exclusive rights to information and technology, preventing other companies from entering the markets that are not being served—primarily in low- and middle-income countries. Sharing vaccine-related information will not only help get the pandemic in check now, but it could also encourage firms to develop the next round of vaccines that will be necessary to address new variants.

The TRIPS waiver is critical to ensuring an equitable distribution of vaccines around the globe. High-income countries already have widespread vaccination campaigns well underway, while many low-income countries have yet to administer a single dose. Without a TRIPS waiver, the gap between vaccination rates in high-income and low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) will only widen.

#### The brink is now – lack of access creates vaccine-resistant variants

Barry 7/21

Robinson, 7-26, 21, What history tells us about the delta variant — and the variants that will follow, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/26/what-history-tells-us-about-delta-variant-variants-that-will-follow/> John M. Barry is the author of “The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History” and Distinguished Scholar at Tulane University’s School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. // Phoenix

As is obvious to everyone, the delta variant is surging. Given its infectiousness, this is hardly surprising; as covid-19 adapted to humans, variants became successively better at infecting people, and delta is more than three times as contagious as it was spreading last year. And delta is not the last variant we will see. This raises many questions, and the three most important are: Will it become more virulent — causing more serious disease and death? Will the virus escape the protection natural immunity and vaccines now afford? And, if the answer to either of the first two questions is yes, how can we respond? Right now, the best we can do is make educated guesses. There’s no solid information yet on delta’s virulence, although it seems more dangerous. It wreaked havoc in India, but it’s difficult to know how much of the death toll can be attributed to increased virulence and how much to an overwhelmed health-care system. Anecdotal accounts here also speak to increased virulence, including in younger adults. We also know that delta produces about 1,200 times the viral load of the original virus — and viral load correlates with severity and death. That fact is not comforting. Neither is history. All five influenza pandemics we have details about developed more virulent variants before settling down. The pandemic beginning in 1889 was more than twice as deadly in Britain in the second year as in the first, and in many countries the third year was deadlier still. Full coverage of the coronavirus pandemic In 1918′s epidemic, the first wave was both mild — the British Grand Fleet suffered 10,313 first wave cases but only four deaths — and not very transmissible. A variant caused an explosive second wave. The 1957 influenza pandemic led to a significant increase in deaths, but in 1960, after both a vaccine was developed and many people supposedly had immunity from prior infection, a variant caused peak mortality to exceed pandemic levels. In 1968, the United States saw the most deaths in the first year, but in Europe — again after a vaccine and naturally acquired immunity were in play — the second year was deadlier. During the 2009 influenza pandemic, variants emerged that caused breakthrough infections and increased viral loads and deaths in the United States, and studies found “greater burden of severe illness in the year after the pandemic” outside the United States as well As a general rule, viruses do eventually become less dangerous as they adapt to new hosts and as immune systems respond better. That should happen here eventually. But whether or not delta has increased in virulence, another still more dangerous variant may surface. That makes the next question even more important: Will covid-19, in some form, escape immune protection? The answer is: probably. Unless its opportunity to mutate is cut off by stopping its spread — an impossibility with billions worldwide unprotected by vaccine — eventually a variant will likely emerge that evades current vaccines and natural infection. Studies of coronaviruses that cause the common cold demonstrate that mutations over time cause the ability of antibodies to neutralize those viruses to decline.

#### Future mutations will cause extinction – it only takes one ‘super-spreader’

Bar-Yam 16

Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)//Elmer rc by Phoenix

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

### bioterror

#### COVID-19 has heightened and exposed vulnerabilities for bioterror

Trushar and D’Souza 7/21

Trushar R. Patel Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair, and Michael Hilary D'Souza Masters Student. “Coronavirus Is Not a Bioweapon - but Bioterrorism Is a Real Future Threat.” The Conversation, 8 July 2021, theconversation.com/coronavirus-is-not-a-bioweapon-but-bioterrorism-is-a-real-future-threat-135984. // Phoenix

The pandemic’s effect on the world isn’t a conventional attack on government targets or the military. Rather, it’s a widespread and indiscriminate attack on [global citizens and the economy](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51706225). This outbreak has directly impacted the lives of billions of people, making it the most effective model for future terrorist activities and a new model for circumventing the conventions of modern warfare.

Striking at international vulnerabilities

An act of bioterrorism could have the same effect on our lives and the economy. Terrorist organizations actively seek to cripple a target economy through the employment of simple technologies in coordinated and sophisticated attacks on key infrastructure. This has normally ranged between simple targeted shootings and improvised explosives but can also include biochemical weapons such as [mustard gas](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/29/chemical-weapons-found-in-mosul-in-isis-lab-say-iraqi-forces).

Locally, we are aware that Canada’s economy is especially vulnerable to sudden global shockwaves. This is largely because of our subsistence on resource development projects like oil and natural gas, and our [bottle-necked relationships with the United States](https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/house-speaker-pelosi-announces-agreement-on-north-american-trade-pact-to-replace-nafta).

A little less than 10 per cent of Canada’s economy is dependent on mining, agriculture and [resource extraction](https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610043403), combined with another 10 per cent contributed by manufacturing. A strike to any of these industries would ripple insecurities across the country and hurt a fifth of Canada’s GDP.

For instance, a key infrastructure in Canada is the rail corridor that operates from coast-to-coast. The corridor is already overburdened with the transport of crude oil and mired in [rail derailments](https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/rail-slow-down-impact-1.5457262) that cause disruptions to the national economy. The combined price drop in oil and the Canadian National Rail blockades initiated by the [Wet’suwet’en solidarity movement](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51550821) against the Coastal GasLink Pipeline created [market volatility](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tasker-teck-frontier-future-oilsands-1.5475658) and invariably shutdown Canada’s ability to transport goods, causing [temporary layoffs](https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/business/reuters/canada-loses-record-2-million-jobs-temporary-layoffs-add-more-pain-447387/) and concern from [foreign investors](https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/choke-point-how-the-blockade-movement-has-sent-tremors-across-canadas-economy-and-beyond) developing the project.

Although the [economic impact](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rail-blockades-economic-impact-1.5497236) of the blockades was low compared to the pandemic, the effect of disruption is important. It demonstrates the ease with which foreign and domestic terrorists can operate to undermine Canadian sovereignty and stability by targeting a few, important Canadian industries.

The effect of the blockades stalling trade and forcing [temporary layoffs](https://www.ctvnews.ca/business/cn-employees-heading-back-to-work-after-temporary-layoffs-as-blockades-wind-down-1.4836665) is similar in consequence to the imposed self-isolation preventing Canadians from working, generating income and consuming commodities.

Consistent [unemployment](https://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/coronavirus-plunges-canadas-economy-into-the-abyss/) and spending reductions in Canada can also produce a snowball effect that inches towards recession. Regardless of its size, a targeted attack can disrupt a nation enough to create instability and panic, which is the intent of terrorist groups that cannot compete equally with industrially backed, modern militaries.

Opportunity and expertise

The feasibility of designing and dispersing biological weapons varies in difficulty depending on the biological agent in question. For instance, [Bacillus anthracis](https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/index.html), an exceptionally deadly and versatile pathogenic bacterium that causes the disease anthrax, is naturally occurring in the environment and can infect humans and animals. Anthrax has recently emerged from [thawing permafrost due to the effects of climate change](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/09/reindeer-to-be-culled-in-russias-far-north-due-to-anthrax-outbreak), and manages to persist in harsh climates and environments demonstrating its versatility.

Acquiring anthrax is relatively easy and its highly infectious spores can enter the body through inhalation of aerosols or ingestion via contaminated water supplies. Consequently, anthrax is considered one of the leading [potential bioweapons](https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321030#Bioterrorism:-Modern-concerns). In 2001, five people in the United States died after receiving mail contaminated with anthrax — [no one was caught or charged](https://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/93170200/timeline-how-the-anthrax-terror-unfolded).

Conversely, the employment of synthetic biology to engineer novel bioweapons from pre-existing pathogens using [CRISPR or DNA synthesis](https://cen.acs.org/biological-chemistry/synthetic-biology/Synthetic-biology-enable-bioweapons-development/96/i26) is far more demanding in terms of laboratory requirements and expertise.

The manipulation and handling of these agents have been made more accessible by biotechnology companies competing aggressively for the attention of academic, corporate and [government funding](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/21/3d-printing-offer-developing-savings-replica-kit).

With strict deadlines and finite resources, researchers value methods that provide reproducible and reliable results. This has been especially encouraging for the development of new technologies like [CRISPR](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/mail-order-crispr-kits-allow-absolutely-anyone-to-hack-dna/), whose competitive market has made gene-editing accessible and cost effective.

Researchers have also supplemented their laboratories [3D-printed equipment](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07853-5), making complex instruments that were once costly and out-of-reach easily accessible to anyone interested in biotechnology. This allows the convenient development of weapons to occur anywhere from stringent, regulated laboratories to remote facilities and [even in one’s own garage](https://www.forbes.com/sites/fernandezelizabeth/2019/09/19/yes-people-can-edit-the-genome-in-their-garage-can-they-be-regulated/#7ff06edd768b).

While countries like the U.S. and [Russia](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/biological/) inherited advanced biological weapons programmes from the Cold War, rogue nations like [North Korea](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/science/north-korea-biological-weapons.html) and terrorist organisations like [al-Qaida](https://www.jstor.org/stable/26369585) are actively seeking to develop programs and infrastructure for their own use and deterrence against foreign interference. With easily obtainable and simple technologies, the ability to invest in an underground bioweapons program is widely available.

All that is necessary to bridge the gap is talent.

A common myth appears to exemplify terrorist members as being [uneducated individuals](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/islamic-state-recruits-world-bank-study-education-boko-haram). However, at its peak, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) recruited a variety of educated professionals ranging from [engineers](https://www.macleans.ca/news/world/why-do-so-many-jihadis-have-engineering-degrees/) to [medical doctors](https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/recruiting-professionals-doctors-join-the-isis-fight-1.2295241). [ISIS operated](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jan/29/bureaucracy-evil-isis-run-city-mosul) in the Middle East as any nation state would, with municipal bureaucracies, tax collection, road-building, infrastructural developments and hospitals.

Terrorist organizations tend to have the same infrastructural and scientific capabilities as modern industrial nations, allowing them to potentially develop biochemical arsenals. The infrastructure requirements for biological weapons programs are also made easier by being [comparatively cheaper and more versatile than a nuclear arsenal](https://www.wired.com/2017/03/thank-goodness-nukes-expensive-complicated/). This is largely because they can be masked by developments in medical industry, health and [agricultural research](https://cosmosmagazine.com/biology/researchers-fear-us-agricultural-research-masks-bioweapons-development).

#### IPR gives patent holders complete control of solutions and forces responses to go through a deep, slow bureaucratic process creating a near-impossible obstacle course for any bioterror solutions

Oriola 7

Taiwo A. Oriola (Cardiff Law School, and the ESRC Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability, & Society, University of Cardiff, United Kingdom). “AGAINST THE PLAGUE: EXEMPTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT RIGHTS AS A BIOSECURITY STRATEGY.” JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POL‑ ICY. 2007.. [http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp‑content/uploads/2013/10/05‑05‑ 08\_Oriola\_AHW\_Formatted\_FINAL.pdf](http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/0505%2008_Oriola_AHW_Formatted_FINAL.pdf) // Phoenix weird formatting probably due to OCR

B. The Propriety of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement for Bi0terrorism- Induced Diseases

Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for derogation from patent exclusivity on grounds of "exceptional use" by imposing three distinctive, but cumulative, exceptions on Article 28(1) of the TRIPS' patents exclusivity: (1) the exceptional use must be limited; (2) the exceptional use may not unreasonably conï¬‚ict with the normal exploitation of the patent; (3) the exceptional use may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patentee, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.28Â° The pertinent question is whether Article 30 of TRIPS could be used in sourcing crucial drugs and vaccines in bioterrorism-induced public health crises. The negotiating history of Article 30 and the Canada-Patent Protection cases offer some insights into the scope and usefulness of Article 30 in this respect. The Canada patent case will be analyzed in detail due to the significant light it sheds on the prospect of Article 30 being used as a tool for the procurement of critical drugs in a public health pandemic or bioterrorism crisis.

The negotiating history of Article 30 of TRIPS indicates that it was originally designed to accommodate a wide range of specific, authorized exceptions. This included prior users' rights; private and non-commercial acts; experimental acts; manual preparation by pharmacists and medical doctors in accordance with a prescription, or acts perfonned with a medicine so prepared; acts done in reliance upon such acts not being prohibited by a valid claim as initially granted in a patent, but subsequently prohibited by a valid claim of that patent as amended; and governmental acts performed for government uses. 82 Apparently, these specific exceptions never made it to the final provisions of Article 30 as it is presently construed.283

In the Canada-Patent Protection case, the European Community challenged the consistency of Sections 55.2(l) and 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patent Act with Articles 27.1, 28, 30, and 33 of TRIPS. 284 Section 55.2(l) of Canada's Patent Act provided that a patent shall not be infringed if the patented invention is used or sold for uses that reasonably relate to the development and submission of information required under any Canadian law.28 This is otherwise known as the "regulatory review exception,"286 which is akin to the United States' Bolar exception in the Hatch-Waxman Act.287 However, Canada's patent law went beyond the Bolar exception in Section 55.2(2), by authorizing third parties to manufacture and stockpile patented pharmaceuticals during regulatory review processes, six months prior to the expiration of the patent term. 288 The WTO panel report examined the validity of the twin exceptions in Sections 55.2(1) & (2) of Canada's Patent Act vis-a-vis Article 30 of TRIPS. The panel found that Section 55.2(1), which embodied the regulatory review Bolar-type exception, was consistent with Articles 27.1 and 28.1 of TRIPS because it was authorized by Article 30 of TRIPS?"

In effect, the WTO panel sanctioned acts of manufacturers and suppliers of active pharmaceutical components, as well as producers of generic pharmaceuticals, provided such acts were reasonably related to marketing approval of a generic pharmaceutical product.29Â° The WTO panel. however, found that the stockpiling exception under section 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patent Act ran afoul of Article 28.1 of TRIPS because it was outside of the ambit of allowable exceptions under Article 30 of TRIPS.29' Therefore, Article 30 was narrowly construed.292

The WTO panel's ruling, severing the stockpiling exception from the regulatory review exception of Canada's patent law, demonstrates the narrow ambit of the limited exceptions allowable under Article 30 for the production of generic pharmaceuticals. It also unequivocally demonstrates that Article 30 of TRIPS is improper for the challenges of bioterrorism emergency situations; drug stockpiling, though of limited practical use,293 is arguably an integral logistical measure of bioterrorism preparedness.

Although the "limited exceptions" provision was narrowly construed, the precise parameters were left undefined by the WTO panel ruling, rendering it vague and vulnerable to semantic arguments.294 While any number of patent- limiting provisions could theoretically fit into its narrow confines, in practice, only those that are less threatening to patented inventions, like the experimental use exception as opined by the WTO panel in the Canada-Patent Protection case, would pass muster. 295

The inappropriateness of Article 30 for bioterrorism emergencies is further underscored by the cumulative nature of its three conditions.296 Non- compliance with any of the three provisions contravenes Article 30 as a whole.297 The following paragraphs will examine conditions two and three in an attempt to shed more light on their usefulness for securing crucial medicines in any bioterrorism context.

1. Conflict with Normal Exploitation of a Patent

The second condition of Article 30 of TRIPS requires that exceptions to the rights conferred should not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent.298 While TRIPS does not define "normal exploitation," the WTO panel in the Canada-Patent Protection case defined "normal" as "a normative standard of entitlement" and "what is common within a relevant community."299 The Panel went on to define "exploitation" as the "commercial activity by which patent owners employ their exclusive patent rights to extract economic value from their patent.” The panel summed up what it perceived as the essence of the second leg of Article 30 of TRIPS by stating that “[t]he normal practice of exploitation by patent owners, as with owners of any other intellectual property right, is to exclude all forms of competition that could detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated from a patent’s grant of market exclusivity.”

The panel's construction of the second prong of Article 30 was arguably too restrictive. Without a doubt, patent owners would love to exclude all forms of competition and breach stringent anti-competitive rules if they could do so. However, the TRIPS Agreement does not envisage an unbridled patent monopoly as evident in Article 3l(k), which enjoins against anti-competitive practice and would avail the grant of a compulsory license to loosen up any anti-competitive gridlock.3Â°2 If anything, the second condition of unreasonable conï¬‚ict with normal patent exploitation under Article 30 of TRIPS makes it nearly impossible to em loy the Article to acquire needed drugs in bioterrorism emergencies.3 3 Such a use would no doubt be an extreme measure vis-a-vis the stockpiling provision of section 55.2(2) (now repealed) of the Canadian Patent Act which the panel found invalid under Article 30 of TRIPS.

Furthermore, applying the second prong of Article 30 to the acquisition of crucial drugs for bioterrorism attacks could be complicated by a lack of a understanding of critical terms like limited exceptions, normal exploitation, or unreasonable conflict. The panel's proposition in this respect is too descriptive and very pro-patent. For instance, it is very unlikely that a WTO member could successfully parallel import crucial drugs for bioterrorism attacks via the second prong of Article 30. If Canada could fail to retain its drug stockpiling exception during the generic pharmaceuticals regulatory review process, any urgent measure aimed at securing crucial medicines for victims of bioterrorism attacks outside of the TRIPS systemic-bound provisions would be doomed to invalidity under Article 30 for unreasonably conflicting with the normal exploitation of the pharmaceutical patent in question.

#### **Biotech advancements allow for bioweapons to wipe out all of humanity by combining traits – the brink is now before the weapons are too powerful**

Millett and Snyder-Beattie 17 (Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie; 2017; Health Security, Volume 15, Number 4; *“Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”*; accessed 8/13/21; <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/hs.2017.0028>; Piers Millett, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow, and Andrew Snyder-Beattie, MS, is Director of Research; both at the University of Oxford, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford, England.; page 374) HB rc // Phoenix

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of staterun bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that ‘‘we can ensure Gaia’s survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species. we now have the specific technology for doing the job. several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released’’(quoted in ref. 29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows.31,3

### solvency [v2]

#### IPR creates barriers for access to COVID-19 Vaccine for developing countries – current measures are not enough

Sariola 2021

[Salla, BMJ Global Health, "Intellectual Property Rights Need to be Subverted to Ensure Global Vaccine Access" April. 1 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8021739/

IPRs block global vaccine access in three ways. // rc Phoenix

First, IPRs legitimate the pharmaceutical industry to make exclusive decisions to whom vaccines are sold and at what price. Under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) by WTO, companies that own the intellectual property hold exclusive rights to produce vaccines without competing generic products on the market. This way, they are able to keep a foothold of the markets and the prices high, as there is little competition over similar products. Vaccines currently on the market have been priced such that developing countries cannot afford them. Prices may also vary depending on the contract: for example, contradictory to a social justice logic, the AstraZeneca vaccine was sold to South Africa at $5.25 per dose but to EU at a lower rate of $2.16.3

The second reason follows from the first. Availability of vaccines at national level is made possible via bilateral prepurchase agreements between vaccine producers and countries or regions, such as the European Union or the African Union. The African Union, with the help of the African Export-Import Bank, has negotiated an agreement to prefinance 670 million doses of vaccines while African countries pool their funds,4 but still, very few low-income countries have contracts that would provide sufficient volumes to cover their entire populations.5 6 In short, different countries are not on an equal footing on funding and networks in the negotiations, and the African Union has been a low priority.

Third, the COVAX programme was established in April 2020 to ensure that vaccines spread globally at equal pace after their licencing approval. COVAX is often lauded as a mechanism that holds promise for just vaccine access, but its public representation is glossier than the reality. COVAX is funded by various philanthropic funders and wealthy countries; it aims to cover 20% of populations in countries that have funded it and to provide 1 billion doses across 92 non-funding lower income countries.4 In December 2020, COVAX was close to failure due to insufficient funding,7 but one of the first decisions by President Joe Biden’s new administration was to give its support to COVAX,8 which improved its chances of success. Simultaneously, rich countries such as Canada have grabbed vaccines through the COVAX programme.9 Canada has five times the number of vaccines required to cover its entire population.10 Due to the reality of manufacturing rates, the surplus of some is at the expense of others, which brings to a sharp focus the inherent inequality in how access is shaped by the purchasing power of countries where people happen to be born. While the COVAX programme has commenced vaccinations for frontline carers in several lower income countries during February and March 2021, the majority of the populations in these countries have no vaccines in sight. The dynamic underscores how COVAX is unable to remove global vaccine injustices and at worst reproduces differences between the haves and the have-nots with a seeming guise of ‘doing something about it’.

#### The plan allows for mass production – solving bioterror crises

Oriola 7

Taiwo A. Oriola (Cardiff Law School, and the ESRC Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability, & Society, University of Cardiff, United Kingdom). “AGAINST THE PLAGUE: EXEMPTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT RIGHTS AS A BIOSECURITY STRATEGY.” JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POL‑ ICY. 2007.. [http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp‑content/uploads/2013/10/05‑05‑ 08\_Oriola\_AHW\_Formatted\_FINAL.pdf](http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/0505%2008_Oriola_AHW_Formatted_FINAL.pdf) // Phoenix

Time is of the essence in getting crucial drugs to victims of bioterrorism attacks to save as many lives as possible, and authorities should be able to mass‑produce cru‑ cial drugs with minimal delay. Drug stockpiling is of limited practical value since most drugs and vaccines have limited shelf‑life,53 and no one knows for sure when terrorists would strike. Moreover, drug stockpiling is not a feasible bioterrorism policy option for resource‑poor countries that, unlike the United States and other wealthy nations,54 are already overwhelmed by HIV/AIDS, and lack functional public health infrastruc‑ tures and the resources to stockpile bioterrorism‑specific drugs for their populations.55 Nevertheless, securing crucial drugs in the shortest time possible for those infected in a bioterrorism attack is no less important than other public health preparedness mea‑ sures. It would undoubtedly minimize loss of life and effectively contain further spread of diseases and mass hysteria.56 However, the high propensity for intellectual property rights wrangling—as exemplified by the skirmishes over Bayer’s ciprofloxacin in the wake of the September 11, 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States —could stymie authorities’ efforts to mass produce or parallel import crucial patented drugs within the shortest time possible, especially in resource‑poor countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This makes an effective bioterrorism‑specific pharmaceutical patent appro‑ priation clause in international and national patent laws bereft of the bureaucratic trappings of the contemporary patent regime, and the TRIPS access to medicines paradigms.

### Uv

#### Structural representation doesn’t map onto policy outcomes – neural paths are multidimensional – scenario planning via the plan’s method allows us to isolate over identification and plausibile risks to de-escalate nuclear conflict.

Bleiker & Hutchison 18 [Roland Bleiker & Emma Hutchison 18. School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland. 2018. “Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics.” Researching Emotions in International Relations, edited by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar, Springer International Publishing, pp. 325–342. Crossref, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65575-8\_14.] rc/Pat

Third, we stress that such an approach to analysing political emotions requires creativity and methodological pluralism. Emotions work in exceptionally complex ways. No single method could possibly account for their political significance and influence. The chapters in this volume emphasize the need to draw on a range of different methods, from semi-structured interviews to discourse analysis, autoethnography, content analysis and semiotics, among others. To validate such a broad and diverse range of methods, we need an epistemological framework that eschews the need to arrive at overarching models and, instead, appreciates the pluralism and creativity and perhaps even elusiveness that resides in each particular approach. Such a framework requires reflections on both method and methodological issues: that is, we need to discuss not only the tools needed to investigate the political roles of emotions but also the epistemological status attributed to these tools. Defining Feelings, Emotions and Affect: Political and Methodological Implications Several chapters in this volume highlight the difficulties involved with defining emotions. Clément and Sangar (Chap. 1) mention how efforts to pinpoint the nature of emotions are “highly contested and at times par-ticularly fuzzy.” Ringmar laments that the “vocabulary of affect is hopelessly confused” and there is little agreement on how related terms are used or, indeed, how they should be employed. We engage these discussions here by highlighting how scholars differentiate phenomenologically between feelings, emotions and affect. We do so not to settle definitional disputes but to highlight how the struggle to understand what emotions are goes to their very political core: it highlights that emotions in all their guises, as distinguishable emotions as well as more non-conscious feelings and affects, work at different levels—from the individual to the collective—and that they are always more than just personal reactions or expressions. Most international relations scholars use the term “emotion” loosely, as a broad umbrella term to denote a range of different phenomena. We do so too in this chapter. But some scholars also draw a clear distinction between emotions and feelings. Mercer (2014) refers to feelings as “a conscious awareness that one is experiencing an emotion.” Crawford (2000, p. 125) sees emotions as “inner states that individuals describe to others as feeling.” But both Mercer and Crawford go further and stress the need to capture the social dimensions at stake. This is why Crawford (2014) highlights how emotions—individual and subjective as they might be—are also always intertwined with pre-existing social, cultural and political contexts. Mercer’s very notion of “social emotion” underlines this point too, for it captures how emotions become intersubjective when they relate to something social that people care about, whether it is power, status or justice. Reflecting on the distinction between emotions and feelings might therefore help us appreciate the connections between bodily based phenomena and the processes through which emotions are communicated to others. While feelings may emerge from within the body, they are at the same time central to the politics of emotions. Feelings are internal in that they are felt within bodies, yet they are in a sense external as well. Mercer (2014) put it this way: bodies cause emotions but emotions cannot be ontologically reduced to the body. Even though we experience emotion emerging from our bodies, feelings are formed and structured within particular social and cultural environments (Lutz, 1988). They are constituted in relation to culturally specific traditions, such as language, habits and memories. This is why Sangar, Clément and Lindemann (Chap. 8) stress the need to “conceive emotions as social phenomena” that can shape political attitude to a range of phenomena, including war. Likewise, this is why Wolf (Chap. 10) believes that “emotions are intrinsically public and therefore can be well established by analysing social discourse.” Karin Fierke (2014) goes one step further, stressing that individual expressions of emotions “should not ultimately be the focus of social and political analysis at the international level.” This is the case, she argues, because individual emotions are less significant for understanding global politics than the emotions that surround political phenomena. The distinction between emotions and affect brings out socio-political issues in an even more pertinent way. In some disciplines, such as geography, this distinction is so intensely debated that scholars differentiate between “emotional geography” and “affective geography” (see Thien, 2005; Thrift, 2004). Emotions are seen as personal and often conscious feelings that have social meaning and political consequences. Related phenomena can in this way be identified and assessed. Affective dynamics, by contrast, are viewed as much broader phenomena that exist both before and beyond consciousness: they are a wide range of nonreflective and subconscious bodily sensations, such as mood, intuition, temperament, attachment, disposition and even memory. In an investigation of the politics and potentials of museums to illuminate the human costs of war, Audrey Reeves (Chap. 5) insightfully outlines the consequences of these emotions-affect distinctions for international relations scholarship (see also Eznack, 2011, 2013; Holmes, 2013; Ross, 2006, p. 199; Sasley, 2010). The difference between emotion and affect pivots around the issue of representation (see Pile, 2010, pp. 6–10; Reeves, Chap. 5; Eroukhmanoff and Teles Fazendeiro, Chap. 11). Those who theorize affect consider the phenomena as inexpressible: it cannot be analysed through representations. The study of affect thus opposes attempts to understand specific, seemingly individualized emotions and moves towards an approach that studies how particular feelings, sentiments and emotions together act as a type of collective social force (Thrift, 2004, p. 60; see also Protevi, 2009). Affect in this sense is “performative”: it enables understandings of how emotional flows both act upon individuals and in doing so enact particular socio-political norms and behaviours. Emotional geographers disagree with many of the charges made against them. They argue that since emotions can only be understood through representations, it is crucial to understand the respective practices (see also Bondi, 2005; Eroukhmanoff and Teles Fazendeiro, Chap. 11; Reeves, Chap. 5; Thien, 2005; for a useful critical discussion of the affect/emotion discussion, see Leys, 2011). To use the term “affect” is thus to make a shift from isolating specific emotions to the more general recognition that emotion, feeling and sensations combined generate often unconscious and unreflective affective dispositions that connect and transcend individuals (Massumi, 2002, pp. 27–28, 217; Thrift, 2004, p. 60). As Ringmar (Chap. 2) puts it: “everything is couched in terms of affect.” In this sense, affect is always social and always “intertwined across time” (Eroukhmanoff and Teles Fazendeiro, Chap. 11). This position also resonates with international relations research. For Janice Bially-Mattern (2014), the task of singling out certain emotions, such as anger (see Heller, Chap. 4) becomes problematic as soon as one recognizes, as most scholars meanwhile do, that emotions and cognition are intrinsically interwoven and thus, by extension, hard to keep conceptually separate. For Ross (2014, pp. 2, 17–19) too, anger, fear or other emotions are socially constructed and somewhat arbitrary categories that are not really able to capture the rich complexities of how affective energies work and circulate between political actors and communities. Affect can then provide the conceptual tools to understand how a broad range of psycho-social predispositions produce or mediate political emotions. Recent research by Lucile Eznack (2013) illustrates the issues at stake. She shows how historically cultivated affective dispositions—both positive and negative—can temper or exacerbate hostilities between nation-states and in doing so influence the nature of ensuing state behaviour. Juxtaposing US anger towards Britain in the 1956 Suez Crisis with that focused towards the Soviet Union during the 1979–1980 Afghanistan intervention, Eznack shows how anger at an ally/friend and an adversary/ enemy alters according to the pre-existing affective dimensions of their relations. Definitional disputes can never be settled. Nor can concepts ever capture the far more elusive realities they seek to define. This is why we consciously use the broad term “emotion.” But conceptual disputes provide a way into understanding the substantive issues at stake, particularly the processes through which feelings, emotions and affect are both individual and collective. There is fairly widespread agreement that emotions are not only shaped by historical and socio-cultural factors but also, and in turn, play a key role in constituting collective identities and the type of political values and practices associated with them. But figuring out suitable methodological approaches for studying these collective emotions is, of course, a far more difficult and contestable task. Understanding the Politics of Emotions Beyond Social Scientific Models Most methodological approaches to the study of emotions in international relations are social science driven and, while useful, not enough to understand the collective dimension of emotions. Some of most systematic methodological debates so far have been carried out in political psychology and focus on quantitative approaches. They deal, for instance, with the emotional predispositions of leaders and samples of the population (Marcus, 2002, pp. 235–236; Small, Learner & Fischhoff, 2006). Neuroscientific inquiries have also generated important methodological advances, particularly with regard to the use of experiments, be they laboratory, survey or field based. These studies can make more reliable statements on issues of cause and effect that qualitative emotions methods may be hard-pressed to do (see Jeffery, 2014b; McDermott, 2011). While experiments and other quantitatively measurable methods can yield important insights, there are nonetheless limits to how much they can assess. Two such methodological limits stand out. First, scholars can only measure how people physiologically or behaviourally react or what they say they feel. In addition, the respective methods often focus on individuals and small groups, which do not operate at the same level and in the same way as larger collectives. Indeed, if the methodological challenges are significant when investigating individual or interpersonal emotional dynamics they are far greater when it comes to analysing emotions at the level of large collectives, such as in national and transnational spheres. States, for instance, have no biological mechanisms and thus cannot experience emotions directly. How, then, can the behaviour of states be shaped by emotions? Second, traditional social scientific notions of causality are limited in their ability to capture the political impact of collective emotions. Take an example from the topic that Sybille Reinke de Buitrago (Chap. 13) and Gabi Schlag (Chap. 9) engage: the links between images, emotions and politics. The emotional dimensions of images rarely cause political events, at least not in a linear way. This is the case even in instances where impact is obvious. Consider the debates on the use of torture in the war against terror. As early as the summer of 2003, it was publicly known—in part through reports from Amnesty International—that US troops were using torture techniques when interrogating prisoners in Iraq. There was, how- ever, little public interest or discussion about the issue. Domestic and international outrage only emerged in the spring of 2004, in direct response to graphic photographs of US torture at the Abu Ghraib prison facilities. The intensely emotional images of torture managed to trigger major public discussions in a way that “mere” words could not. But to attribute causality here is far from straightforward. This is even more the case with instances where impact is more diffuse, though equally clear. No method can, for instance, retrace the causal or even the constitutive links between the highly emotional visual representations of 9/11, the emergence of a discourse of evil and the ensuing war on terror. And yet, hardly anybody would question that images and emotions were key parts of the nature and impact of 9/11. Indeed, the very attack was designed for maximum visual and emotional impact. It was meant to do much more than kill physical bodies: the idea was to create a spectacle that can circulate visually and instil fear. Rather than speaking of linear causality here, one might use terms like “discursive causality” (Hansen, 2006, p. 26) or “discursive agency” (Bleiker, 2000, p. 208). Doing so illuminates how emotions often work inaudibly but powerfully; over time and across space, by slowly entrenching— or gradually challenging—how we feel, view, think of the socio-political worked around us. Ringmar (Chap. 2) speaks of the “felt sense,” of how feelings influence both cognitive thoughts and broader political phenomena. Understanding how emotions work in such indirect ways poses inevitable methodological challenges. But they can be addressed and overcome. One of the most useful ways of doing so has been advanced by Jacques Rancière. He speaks of the “distribution of the sensible,” that is, of how in any given society and at any given time, there are boundaries between what can be felt and not, thought and not and, as a result, between what is politically possible and not. These boundaries are arbitrarily but often accepted self-evidently as common sense (Rancière, 2004, p. 13; see also Rockhill, 2009, pp. 199–200). Collective emotions are, in this sense, highly political insofar as they can either entrench existing configurations of sensing, seeing and thinking, or indeed, they can challenge them. The boundaries between what is sensible and not sometimes shift rapidly, as in the case of torture debates, but mostly they evolve gradually as the visual world—and other representational stimuli—around us evolves. Multidisciplinary Methods for the Study of Political Emotions Broadening our understanding of how emotions work politically inevitably also entails broadening the methodological framework we use to study emotions. Rather than relying on social science methods alone, we should complement them with modes of inquiry stemming from the sciences and the humanities. The latter, for instance, consist of methods applied in, say, ethnography, architecture, art history, musicology and media studies. Only a multitude of methods can attempt to stitch together the intricate and non-linear processes through which emotions shape the political. Different methods illuminate different dimensions of the links between emotion and politics. An adequate appreciation of the political issues at stake is thus likely to emerge only from combining a broad range of methods. The chapters in this volume offer an impressive illustration of such an approach. The tools employed here include phenomenology and psychoanalysis (Ringmar), content analysis (Heller; de Buitrago), semi-structured interviews (Delori), autoethnography (Reeves), discourse analysis (Wolf; Koschut), narrative analysis (Sangar, Clément and Lindemann), audience observation (Schlag); hermeneutics (Eroukhmanoff and Teles Fazendeiro). Relying on such a broad set of methods for the study of political emotions seems commonsensical. In fact, many method scholars acknowledge the need for pluralism and recognize that, by extension, their own approach is a “necessary but not sufficient methodology” (Van Leeuwen & Jewitt, 2004, p. 5). A content analysis, for instance, can identify important patterns but say nothing about the political impact of emotions, just as a survey experiment can gauge relative impact but offer no knowledge of the origin or nature of links between emotions and politics. This is why critical methods scholars argue against analytically separating sensory domains (Mason & Davies, 2009, pp. 600–601). While commonsensical in principle, the actual application of a multidisciplinary approach to the study of emotions in world politics is far more complex and difficult. Only very few researchers possess the methodological skills to navigate across the wide range of methods necessary to assess the complexity of the links between emotions and politics. Scholars who employ, say, discourse analysis rarely have the skills to conduct large-scale quantitative surveys. Likewise, researchers who do lab experiments are not usually equipped to conduct a semiology. These practical challenges to multidisciplinary research are significant but can be overcome. Extra training can provide scholars with the skills needed to employ a wider range of methods. Some of the chapters in this volume offer fantastic examples of how this can be done successfully. Take the two chapters that deal with the links between emotions, images and politics. Schlag (Chap. 9) flags how a multitude of methods, from discourse analysis to iconology, can be applied across multiple visual sites and modalities: from the construction of an image to its content to its political receptions (see Rose, 2008). Buitrago (Chap. 13), likewise, employs content and visual analysis to great effect, arguing that zigzagging between them better captures “the complex nature of emotions and their various expressions and channels.” A further challenge to interdisciplinary work on emotions is linked to a deeply entrenched antagonistic dualism that continues to separate those advocating qualitative and quantitative methods. The divide between these traditions is enforced not only by different methodological trainings, but also by a range of epistemological assumptions that seem to make genuine cross-method inquiries difficult. Quantitative methods tend to be associated with positivist epistemologies while qualitative approaches are meant to be post-positivist in nature. This is neither accurate nor useful but, instead, and as Clément and Sangar (Chap. 1) point out, leads to a “path dependency” that boxes them into “specific ways of collecting and analysing.” There is no reason why, for instance, discourse analysis could not be combined with quantitative survey experiments. Only through such unusual methodological combinations can we hope to understand the politics of emotions across their origin, history, meaning and causality. Towards a Pluralist Epistemological Framework The biggest challenge to a truly pluralist approach to the study emotions and politics is not of a practical but of an epistemological nature. To use methods as diverse as discourse analysis and quantitative surveys can only be done if each of these methods is given the chance to work according to its own logic. A genuinely interdisciplinary and pluralistic approach needs to abandon the idea that all methods have to operate according to the same rules and standards of evidence. To advance such a proposition is to go against the grain of much of the philosophy of knowledge that drives the social sciences. Manuel De Landa (2006, pp. 10–11) refers here to totalizing forms of knowledge. In such systems, each component has to behave according to an overall logic that structures the movement of parts. To make sense and fit in, each methodological component of this system has to operate according to the same principles: those of testable hypotheses. Methods that do not fit these criteria are seen as unscientific and illegitimate. This is the logic of aiming for “generalizable” findings that test “causal relationships” (Heller, Chap. 4). The aim here is to avoid “arbitrary and unsystematic” methods, such as discourse analysis, and, instead, aim for studies of emotions that can deliver a “more systematic comparative picture of time and space, with systematic comparative elements and a more longitudinal perspective that can show what ‘constitute’ really entails” (Heller, Chap. 4). Our suggestions fundamentally depart from such propositions. We argue for a heterogeneous combination of seemingly incompatible methods. Expressed in other words, multiple methods should be used even if, or precisely because, they are not compatible with each other. We draw on assemblage theory and the concept of rhizomes (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996) to defend an approach that we believe is both necessary and controversial: necessary because it is the most convincing way to understand the complex links between emotions and politics; controversial because doing so breaks with deeply entrenched social scientific conventions that require each methodological component to behave according to the same coherent overall logic (De Landa, 2006, pp. 10–11). Assemblages are an alternative to totalities. They offer a conceptual base for multidisciplinary and methodologically reflective research. This is the case because assemblages, according to De Landa (2006, pp. 10–11), are structured by relations of exteriority: the properties and behaviour of its components neither have to explain the whole nor fit into its overall logic. Heterogeneity is a key feature here, for each component is both linked and autonomous. De Buitrago (Chap. 13) appropriately speaks of completing a “mosaic” of knowledge. Even Heller (Chap. 4), who pushes for more generalizable proportions, recognizes that “the influence of emotions is filled with spontaneous expressions of strong emotional subjectivity.” When we pursue such inquiries into the politics of emotions we could speak of “messy methods” (Aradau & Huysmans, 2014, p. 607; Law & Urry, 2004, p. 390). But messy here does not mean that individual inquiries cannot be, at the same time, meticulous, thorough and systematic. Discourse analysis, for instance, does not necessarily need to be “arbitrary and unsys- tematic” (Heller, Chap. 4), but can be carried out in as precise a manner as any other method (see Koschut, Chap. 12; Dunne & Neumann, 2016; Hansen, 2006). The key is to recognize that the criteria by which methodologies operate are not seen as being independent of their specific purpose. Once we recognize these issues, methods cannot be employed or understood without a proper engagement with methodologies. This point has already been underlined by scholars working on critical approaches to methods in politics and international relations. John Law and John Urry (2004, p. 397), Lene Hansen (2006, p. ixi), Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012, p. ix), Patrick Jackson (2011, p. 25), Michael Shapiro (2003, 2013) as well as Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans (2014, p. 598) all stress that methods—that is, the tools we use to embark on research— are inevitably intertwined with the strategies that these methods employ and the context within which they are carried out. The task of methodologies is to challenge the idea of methods as neutral techniques and to reflect upon the choices and implications that they embody (see Clément and Sangar, Chap. 1). Implied—and at time explicitly articulated—in these positions is the idea that one can embark on systematic and rigorous research even while one accepts that there are several and at times even incompatible models of doing so. Although still fairly controversial in international relations, such critical positions on methodology are not new. They have long been debated in the philosophy of science or in quantum and complexity theory. Consider, just as an example, how Paul Feyerabend (2002, pp. 1, 18, 160) argued decades ago that the numerous procedures that make up the sciences have no common structure and that, as a result, “successful research does not obey general standards; it relies now on one trick, now on another.” He presents the violation of existing basic rules as the very process through which science progresses— not towards a new and better paradigm, but towards recognition that science, and the methods it applies, is always incomplete and bound by its social context. Conclusion Drawing on the chapters in this volume, we have tried to outline a multidisciplinary and pluralist framework for the study of emotions in world politics. To do so requires combining work on methods (techniques, practices) with reflections on methodologies (epistemological reflections on the potentials and limits of these techniques and practices). We argued that what is needed is not a systematic theory of emotions, an attempt to fix the parameters of knowledge once and for all, but a more open-ended search for the type of scholarly and political sensibility that could conceptualize the influence of emotions even where and when it is not immediately apparent. Numerous intangible but nevertheless important political dimensions of emotions can be appreciated only if scholars accept that insight cannot necessarily produce certainty, or at least not the type of knowledge that is objective, measurable and falsifiable. Accepting that knowledge about emotions is inevitably partial and contingent does not mean we cannot evaluate interdisciplinary and pluralist research. The key is to recognize that insights into the politics of emotions should not be evaluated by some a priori standard of reference, but by their ability to generate new and valuable perspectives on political puzzles. This process is neither radical nor unique to the task of assessing ephemeral phenomena, such as emotions. It applies just as much to the domain of reason. Quentin Skinner is one of numerous scholars who stress how our judgement of what is reasonable depends not on some prior set of objective criteria, but on the concepts we employ to describe what we see or experience as rational (Skinner, 2002, pp. 4, 44). For instance, if examinations of fear can provide us with explanations of political behaviour that would not have been possible through other forms of inquiry, then they have made a contribution to knowledge, even though the so-generated insight may remain contestable and, ultimately, un-provable. Once the logic of totality is forgone, the possibilities for investigating the significance of emotions in world politics open up. It becomes possible to combine seemingly incompatible methods, from ethnographies to semiologies, surveys and interviews to discourse and content analyses. The logics according to which they operate do not necessarily have to be the same, nor do they have to add up to one coherent whole, for it is precisely through such creative openness that we can hope to capture the complex ways emotions are intertwined with world politics.

#### 2. Aff gets 1AC/1AR theory and these paradigm issues

#### a. They can be infinitely abusive without a check in the 1N –

#### b. 1AR Theory is drop the debater to deter abuse

#### c. No RVIs because they could collapse to it in the 2N and win on a brute force 6v3 skew

#### d. Use Competing interps because reasonability is forcing the judge to intervene to determine what is and what isn’t reasonable

#### e. 1AR theory should be the highest layer – anything else would allow them to win every round since they would have a 13v7 advantage on theory with both the 1N and 2N when we only get the 1AR and 2AR.

#### f. no 2NR paradigm issues or recontextualizations to 1ar theory if paradigm issues were read in the 1ac – it’s equal to reading a new case turn in the 2n – you had the chance in the 1n to answer it.

#### g. Education is a voter because it controls the internal link to debate existing the first place – schools don’t fund uneducational games

#### h. Fairness is a voter because Debate is a competition which requires competitive equity – hence why we have equal speech times.

#### 3. No NC theory

#### a. 6-3 time skew means I could never win because they literally have double my time

#### b. Shiftiness – They can restart in the 2n and dodge all of my clash from the 1ar, controls the internal link to education because we won’t learn if we cant debate and controls the internal link to fairness because If I can’t engage it’s unfair.