# NC

## T

#### Interpretation – the affirmative should defend the hypothetical implementation of a governmental policy that designates appropriation of outer space by private entities as unjust.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Outer space

Lexico. Oxford Dictionary. Outer Space. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/outer\_space

The physical universe beyond the earth's atmosphere.

#### Private entities

Law Insider. Private entity definition. <https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity>

Private entity means any natural person, corporation, general partnership, limited liability company, limited partnership, joint venture, business trust, public benefit corporation, nonprofit entity, or other business entity.

#### Unjust

Lexico. Oxford Dictionary. Unjust. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/just

not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.

#### Violation: not a policy, not appropriation since space

#### Vote neg:

#### First is fairness:

#### Their interp explodes limits and allows affs to monopolize the moral high ground. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Turns the aff since the unpredictable form of the 1AC means we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it, so they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Second is clash: the process of in-depth negation produces iterative testing and refinement, where we learn to improve our arguments based on our opponents’ responses—this maximizes our ability to spur progress and persuade others to our side no matter what field we choose to pursue. Anything else breeds dogmatism and polarization, but only my model of debate allows debaters to understand the nuances of power structures which is what enables us to dismantle them.

#### Worst case their AFF is effects T – that’s bad because it still steers away from the stasis point of the resolution which links into all of our competitive equity and clash standards.

#### TVA: Defend a ban of private space colonization as resisting anti-black sentiment

#### They can’t weigh the aff—

#### 1. T is an epistemic indict since it asks whether or not the aff is a legitimate practice so it comes prior to the aff

#### Fairness is a voter—

#### It’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made

#### Theory before the aff:

#### Truth is constrained by discourse—ensuring their theories are true means they can withstand doubt, necessitating engagement as a prior question

Misak 2k (Cheryl [University Professor, Professor of Philosophy, and former Vice President and Provost at the University of Toronto. She has been a Rhodes Scholar; a Humboldt Research Fellow; a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at NYU; a Visiting Fellow at both St. John's College, Cambridge and Trinity College, Cambridge; and the recipient of a Humboldt Research Prize and a Guggenheim Fellowship, and a Visitor at the Oxford Centre for Life Writing,. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada]. “Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation” Routledge, 2000, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.739.5361&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.) //iLake AS

So moral thought is not of one uniform kind and starting our moral philosophy from the idea that we aim at truth will not force us to think that. We will not be forced to think of moral inquiry as the active testing of hypotheses. Rather, we will think of moral inquiry as part of the enterprise of giving reasons. And reason here does not have to be a cold thing – a thing which stands apart from cultural meanings, from passion, and from emotion. The core of the pragmatist conception of truth is that a true belief would be the best belief, were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. We shall see that ‘best’ here amounts to ‘best fits with all experience and argument’, not the kind of ‘best’ that other pragmatists, James and Rorty, for instance, have flirted with – consoling, best for our lives, or most comfortable. A true belief, rather, is a belief that could not be improved upon, a belief that would forever meet the challenges of reasons, argument, and evidence. Pragmatists sometimes put this idea in the following unhelpful way: a true belief is one which would be agreed upon at the hypothetical end of inquiry. But a better characterisation is that a true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that, no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument. Like the unhelpful formulation, this one captures what is important in pragmatism – the idea that a true belief is one which could not be improved upon. But the new formulation is much better.3 First, it does not run up against the possibility that inquiry might end prematurely, with, say, the destruction of life on earth. On the unhelpful formulation, it looks as if the beliefs which would be held then must be true, which is a crazy thing for a philosopher to suggest. Second, the new formulation does not require the pragmatist to attempt the doomed task of saying just what is meant by the hypothetical end of inquiry, cognitively ideal conditions, or perfect evidence, whatever these might be. Any attempt at articulating such notions will have to face the objection that it is a mere glorification of what we presently take to be good.4 And, finally, the new formulation does not mislead one into thinking that the pragmatist is a contractarian or a certain kind of deliberative democrat – someone who thinks that what is important is agreement, rather than being the best a belief could be. When the new formulation is unpacked, we shall see that there is a version of pragmatism on which truth is not as fickle as Rorty supposes. A belief is not true for one culture and false for another; and a belief is not true at one time and false at another. Beliefs do not, as William James suggested, ‘become’ true and then ‘become’ false, as the evidence for or against them comes to light.5 But truth, on the best version of pragmatism, is also not quite as objective as the correspondence theorist supposes. It is not, for instance, a property that holds regardless of the possibilities for human inquiry. Since philosophy is concerned with understanding our place in the world and with understanding the status of our beliefs, this seems to me an unobjectionable feature of pragmatism. But, of course, to properly argue for this picture of philosophy would be a large undertaking in itself. Some of the points in its favour will come out below, but the reader will have to turn to Misak (1991) and (1995) for more sustained arguments. I shall argue that when this view of truth and knowledge is brought to moral philosophy, we can see moral judgements as being candidates for truth. Truth here is as the pragmatist sees it – a property of the beliefs which would be the best beliefs for us to have. This does not, I shall argue, make such truth and knowledge second-rate. For we shall not follow Habermas in thinking that there is something higher or better with which to contrast it. If you like, the task before us is to say how objectivity and subjectivity can both be characteristic of our judgements. We are pulled to think that there is truth and objectivity, even if what is objectively true – belief – is a product of our deliberation and investigation. Thus, on the meta-ethical view of pragmatism, the semantic issue of whether ethical discourse is truth-apt becomes an epistemological issue about whether we can have knowledge in ethics. The question to be answered is whether our ethical beliefs have the same sorts of legitimate aspirations as our beliefs in science, mathematics, and discourse about ordinary, middle-sized objects. This, of course, is an old and venerable problem, a problem which seems not to go away, despite our best philosophical efforts. We have seen it hound the views of the philosophers canvassed in the last chapter. How can we resolve the tension between the facts of, on the one hand, pluralism and disagreement and, on the other, the ideal of consensus and the aim of getting the right answers to our questions? What I offer here is a position which is as much of an attempt to expose the deep and pressing difficulties as an attempt to solve them. Philosophy, practice, and correspondence The central thought of pragmatism is that our philosophical theories must be connected to experience and practice. A belief, hypothesis, or theory which pretends to be above experience, which thinks so well of itself that it pretends to be immune from recalcitrant experience, is spurious. I have tried elsewhere to elucidate both the semantic and the epistemological arguments in this thought’s favour6, and here I will briefly rehearse some of the reasons why we might think that a belief must be linked to experience. For this requirement will shape our theory of truth, objectivity, and morality. One point is about the demands of inquiry. Hypotheses, Peirce argued, ought not to block the path of inquiry. A hypothesis that had no consequences, that was severed from experience, that provided nothing on to which to latch, would be useless for inquiry. It would be, as Wittgenstein put it, a cog upon which nothing turned. Investigation into such hypotheses is bound to be barren and to direct attention away from worthwhile pursuits. Another is a point about belief, a point made nicely by David Wiggins. A belief aims at truth7 – if I believe p, I believe it to be true. But if this is right, then the belief that p must be sensitive to something – something must be able to speak for or against it. If beliefs need not be sensitive to something, then we could not interpret beliefs by asking: How do things have to be for this state of mind to succeed in its aim or be correct? What does this state of mind have, qua the belief it is, to be differentially sensitive to?8 If there was nothing a belief had to be sensitive to, then we could not individuate it; we could not tell it from another. A belief has a distinguishable content only if we can ‘envisage finding the right sort of licence to project upon subjects’ (Wiggins 1991b: 151). I can interpret or come to understand a sentence which is initially unintelligible to me only by coming to see what it is responsive to. Again, the requirement which presses itself upon the theorist is that a belief must be linked to something which we can experience.

#### Thus discursive engagement is the best method for reaching consensus and solving ethical problems by allowing us to revise and consider opposing viewpoints. This should frame your evaluation of the T flow:

#### [1] If your aff is true, then that means my method is key to reaching consensus about it—for example, the debate community has collectively decided that things like racism or sexism are unacceptable through clash over time. Clashing with stable points of prep allows us to have nuanced discussions of your scholarship, which means that through iterative testing we eventually reach a consensus of your aff being true.

#### [2] Any reason I win why they prevent me from engaging with the aff is a reason why their model of debate is bad—it forecloses self-reflexivity in favor of dogmatism.

#### [3] Prior question. My theory argument calls into question the ability to run the argument in the first place. They can’t say the same even if they criticize theory because theory makes rules of the game not just normative statements about what debaters should say.

#### [4] Fair testing. Judge their arguments knowing I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer them. Prefer theory takes out K because they could answer my arguments, but I couldn’t answer theirs. Without testing their args, we don’t know if they’re valid, so you prefer fairness impacts on strength of link. Impact turns any critical education since a marketplace of ideas where we innovate, and test ideas presumes equal access.

#### 1] No RVIs:

#### a. Chills theory – If people know they might lose for reading theory, it will disincentivize them

#### b. You don’t get to win by being fair

#### c. Theory Baiting – good theory debaters will bait people into reading theory against certain cases

#### 2] Use competing interpretations:

#### a. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom with testing the limit of it

#### b. Finding the best possible interp makes debate have higher quality arguments c. Judge intervention shouldn’t be allowed bc it produces bias

#### 3] Drop the debater: Drop the debater for being abusive – we can’t restart the round from the 1AC and I’m skewed for the rest of the debate.

## K

#### We’ve reached the end of art and history – capitalism is running out of supplies and must turn to recycling the waste of modernity as the only means to sustain growth. The 1ac’s transgression and symbolic rupture aren’t radical but simply a deregulation of debate’s sign economy. Their performance is absorbed and recycled as raw material for neoliberal culture industries – the impact is semiotic feedback loops which cause nihilism and ressentiment

James 16 (Robin James is Associate Professor of Philosophy at UNC Charlotte, FORTHCOMING- Incandescence, Melancholy, and Feminist Bad Vibes: A Response to Ziarek’s Feminist Aesthetics and the Politics of Modernism, Differences 25 (2), p. 120-123, philpapers- [http://philpapers.org/rec/JAMIMA)](http://philpapers.org/rec/JAMIMA)//TR)

A method for overcoming melancholia (97), potentiality is a way of bouncing back from the damage wrought by modern white supremacist patriarchy. For white men, this damage manifests as what Robert Gooding Williams calls “skeptical melancholy” (54), or alienation from embodied receptivity; for women and nonwhites, it manifests as melancholic muteness, immanence rather than alienation.8 The women writers Ziarek studies rework this damaging immanence into ecstatic incandescence, effecting “an aesthetic transformation of loss into art’s own shining possibilities” (115). This incandescence is a two-step process: the artist first performs her damage (sparking a fire) so that she can then be seen to overcome it (radiating beyond her past inertia). Neoliberalism co-opts this incandescence (or at least the most visible, legible part of its spectrum), domesticating its critical force into the means of producing aesthetic pleasure and reproducing social normativity. Potentiality has been “upgraded” into resilience.9 In resilient art, formal experimentation cultivates, or incites (to use a more Foucaultian term), shocks and feeds the resultant shockwaves back into the system.10 This feedback supports rather than destabilizes hegemonic institutions. The aesthetic damage through which modernist art established its heteronomous/ autonomous position of critique—stuttering, fragmented, degraded, aleatory, dissonant—is now the very medium of normalization.11 Neoliberal resilience, in other words, is a method or process of recycling modernist damage. For example, if modernist art invested aesthetic pleasure in the objectification of women (what Laura Mulvey famously calls scopophilia), neoliberal art invests aesthetic pleasure in women’s spectacular assumption of subjectivity—what Ziarek calls incandescence. If in modernity we liked doing damage to women, we now like to see women overcome that damage.12 This means that we expect women to perform their damage as a baseline from which “good” women then progress. That damage is the fuel for incandescent fires, so it must be constantly incited and invoked so that there’s something for incandescent women to ignite. In this way, resilience discourse normalizes traditional patriarchal damage (e.g., the damage of exclusion and objectification) as a systemic or background condition that individual women are then responsible for overcoming. “Undoing [. . .] feminism while simultaneously appearing to be engaging in a wellinformed and even well-intended response to feminism” (McRobbie 1), resilient incandescence is quintessentially postfeminist. We, the audience, use our identification with the resilient heroine as a way to disidentify with and (supposedly) transgress the imperatives of modernist patriarchy. This is why, as Ziarek explains, audiences have a “sympathetic identification with subversive femininity, with the mother avenging the murderous sacrifice of her daughter for political ends, rather than with the murderous father/king” (104). We enjoy women’s spectacular subjectivization (i.e., their overcoming of scopophilic objectification) because this distances us from unfashionable patriarchal formations and tastes (i.e., this latter scopophilia). In postfeminist neoliberalism, “bearing witness to both the destruction of women’s artistic capacities and women’s revolutionary aspirations” (5) becomes a source of aesthetic pleasure not because it’s revolutionary, but because it’s normative. To use Jack Halberstam’s term, we like our women to “go gaga” because this incandescence, this “unpredictable feminine” (114) methodology allows us to eke even more light out of otherwise exhausted enlightenment modernity. If we’ve reached, as Ziarek discusses, the so-called end of art and the end of history (and the end of tonality and the end of representation and, well, the end of modernity), then the only way to find more resources is, like Pixar’s wall-e, by sifting through our vast piles of waste. And in that waste heap is abject femininity (what musicologist Susan Cook calls the feminized “abject popular”). Femininity is abject because its exclusion from patriarchy is what constitutes patriarchy as a coherent system. In both Ziarek’s aesthetics of potentiality and in resilience discourse, women artists do the cultural work of remaking abjection or constitutive exclusion into ecstatic radiance.13 In the former case, that work is revolutionary; in the latter case, that work normalizes. Resilience discourse transposes feminist revolution into a nationalist, patriarchal, white supremacist practice. Take, for example, Katy Perry’s “Firework,” in which the lyrics trace the affective journey from dejection to radiant exceptionality. The song begins by asking listeners to identify with feelings of irrelevance, weakness, loneliness, and hopelessness; it posits and affirms damage, suffering, and pain. But then Perry’s narrator argues that in spite and perhaps because of this damage, the listener has precisely the means to connect to others, to make a difference, to have hope: “[T]here’s a spark in you / You just gotta ignite the light and let it shine.” She uses the metaphor of fireworks (and their association with u.s. Independence Day celebrations) to describe the listener’s self-transformation from black dust to shining light: you may feel like trash, but if you can just light yourself on fire, that trash will burn with a dazzling radiance that lights up the sky, just as it lights up audiences’ faces. Here, Perry transforms abjection—feeling like trash, unmoored, socially dead—into incandescent triumph. In the song, the addressee’s personal triumph evokes u.s. nationalist narratives of overcoming colonization (i.e., the Declaration of Independence, celebrated on the Fourth of July). Feminine incandescence—the transformation of waste and melancholy into glowing potential—is no longer revolutionary. Not only parallel to u.s. nationalism, it is the very means for reproducing normativity. In resilience discourse, wild and crazy femmes—like, say, Ke$ha— reproduce normativity in the same way that deregulatory economic practices do (see Cardenas). Unlike Kant’s genius, who gives laws and generates order (i.e., regulation, giving a law) out of unruly materiality, the incandescent, “gaga” femme amplifies what feels like disorder by “resignif[ying] damaged bodies and objects previously expelled from the realm of meaning” (6). And to do this, incandescent femme geniuses use a specific type of experimentation, what Ziarek calls “a dynamic model of interrelation between literary form and material elements of the work of art” (6). This “dynamic interaction” between large-scale form and material details produces “effects” that are “unpredictable and unforeseeable” (Adorno qtd. in Ziarek 114). Experimental methods produce aleatory results.14 Neoliberalism, however, has systematized the aleatory; deregulatory practices are designed to control background conditions so that “dynamic interactions” between form and material produce a range of superficially random outcomes.15 Deregulation turns experimentation into the means of capitalist/hegemonic production. Brilliant gaga ecstasy is what fuels economic and social reproduction.16 So even though incandescent potentiality might be “the very opposite of the traffic in women” (Ziarek 119) figured as the exchange of commodities (e.g., in Irigaray and Rubin), it is quite consistent with neoliberal political and aesthetic economies. Who radiates with potentiality more than the resilient, entrepreneurial postfeminist woman? In the same way that feminized, blackened receptivity was the solution to modernist anxieties about alienation (e.g., the aforementioned Gooding-Williams), feminized, racially nonwhite resilience is taken as a solution to the problem of the “end of art.” Having transgressed all limits and prohibitions—for example, emancipating dissonance, making music out of noise—modernist art had no means of establishing its opposition to society/social normativity. Similarly, capitalism had colonized the globe, exhausting its ability to profit through simple expansion; with no new markets, with nothing else new to conquer, it needed a new method for generating surplus value. As Jeffery Nealon and others argue, capitalism has become a logic of investment and intensity. Instead of expanding and assimilating, it recycles waste and increases efficiencies. Thus, traditionally non- or devalued “women’s work” becomes the fastest growing sector of the service-and-care-work economy. And women’s art-making practices become the hottest new thing in the artworld: think of all the “feminist art” retrospectives and exhibits that have taken place in the past five or so years. Modernism’s constitutive outside becomes neoliberalism’s bread and butter; or, the abject is now central to the means of capital, political, and aesthetic production.17

#### Antiracism and identity politics is part and parcel of strengthening neoliberal hegemony and market-based economic exploitation—their ahistorical understanding of racial subordination mystifies class antagonism

Warren et al., 16—\*specializes in African-American literature and 19th- and 20th-century American literature and critical theory; \*\*professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in race and American politics; \*\*\*associate professor of African American Studies and Political Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago; \*\*\*\*associate professor of 20th Century US and African American History at Illinois State University; \*\*\*\*\*specializes in postwar black politics with an emphasis on housing and class; \*\*\*\*\*\*Professor Emeritus in political science at South Carolina State University (\*Kenneth Warren, \*\*Adolph Reed, \*\*\*Cedric Johnson, \*\*\*\*Touré F. Reed, \*\*\*\*\*Preston Smith II, \*\*\*\*\*\*Willie Legette; 9/16/16, “On the End(s) of Black Politics,” <http://nonsite.org/editorial/on-the-ends-of-black-politics>, Accessed 4/27/17, HWilson)

In its commitment to making visible and less pervasive the various forms of theoretical neoliberalism that define the present moment, nonsite.org has illustrated on multiple occasions that the broad acceptance of antiracism and identity politics, in whatever guise, as a fundamentally left politics has been part and parcel of securing neoliberal hegemony. This is not because a socialist vision countenances racism or other forms of discrimination, but rather because antiracists—as demonstrated this past spring when Ta-Nehisi Coates faulted the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign for refusing to embrace a call for reparations for black Americans—remain attuned to a vision of justice defined by ensuring equal access to hierarchically distributed social goods such as family wealth (and redressing historical impediments to the accumulation of wealth rooted in discrimination). Indeed in making frequent recourse to the adjective “narrow” in chastising a politics that roots inequality in economic exploitation, antiracists and identitarians have positioned the idea of racial justice as a critique of, rather than an expected consequence of, socialism. It is largely for this reason, as Walter Benn Michaels has noted on these pages, “the commitment to identity politics has been more an expression of…enthusiasm for the free market than a form of resistance to it.”

It is also because many “left” identitarians, in particular those associated with #BlackLivesMatter, have, at least nominally, placed neoliberalism in their crosshairs that we thought it necessary to establish this new section of nonsite.org to draw attention to the ways in which contemporary black political projects exemplify the “left in form, right in essence” character that so often plagues progressive politics in the US. Black antiracists have rightly decried the assault on the public sector and the pursuit of privatization that defines that project, but their account of neoliberalism rests on an inaccurate and essentially ahistorical understanding of the relation of black racial subordination to the development and ongoing legitimation of the capitalist order—and it is this ahistoricism, so pithily captured in the epigraph by Willie Legette that heads up this section, that we seek to counter. That capitalist domination has continually sought to locate the sources of inequality outside the domain of economic relations (thereby naturalizing them) through establishing what Adolph Reed has termed ascriptive hierarchies of worth, has, in the analyses put forward by black antiracists, ossified into a claim that neoliberalism requires the specific subordination of black people and, correspondingly, that any project promoting black solidarity and the social worth of black people is inherently radical. As an example one can point to Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor’s proclamation in a recent book, From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, that “When the Black movement goes into motion, it throws the entire mythology of the United States—freedom, democracy, and endless opportunity—into chaos.” Taylor’s hyperbolic celebration of a politics whose point of departure requires harmonizing the interests of the black poor and working class with those of the black professional-managerial class indicates the conceptual and political confusion that underwrites the very idea of a Black Freedom Movement. The prevalence of such confusion is lamentable; that it go unchecked and without criticism is unacceptable. The essays that appear in this section will critique this tendency and offer in its stead a vision of what we think ought to be.

#### Class analysis has the best explanatory power for modern day racialized violence—their starting point of racial emancipation obscures class struggle and prevents effective anti-capitalist resistance

Reed 16—professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, specializing in race and American politics (Adolph, 9/16/16, “How Racial Disparity Does Not Help Make Sense of Patterns of Police Violence,” <http://nonsite.org/editorial/how-racial-disparity-does-not-help-make-sense-of-patterns-of-police-violence>, Accessed 4/27/17, HWilson)

Some readers will know that I’ve contended that, despite its proponents’ assertions, antiracism is not a different sort of egalitarian alternative to a class politics but is a class politics itself: the politics of a strain of the professional-managerial class whose worldview and material interests are rooted within a political economy of race and ascriptive identity-group relations. Moreover, although it often comes with a garnish of disparaging but empty references to neoliberalism as a generic sign of bad things, antiracist politics is in fact the left wing of neoliberalism in that its sole metric of social justice is opposition to disparity in the distribution of goods and bads in the society, an ideal that naturalizes the outcomes of capitalist market forces so long as they are equitable along racial (and other identitarian) lines. As I and my colleague Walter Benn Michaels have insisted repeatedly over the last decade, the burden of that ideal of social justice is that the society would be fair if 1% of the population controlled 90% of the resources so long as the dominant 1% were 13% black, 17% Latino, 50% female, 4% or whatever LGBTQ, etc. That is the neoliberal gospel of economic justice, articulated more than a half-century ago by Chicago neoclassical economist Gary Becker, as nondiscriminatory markets that reward individual “human capital” without regard to race or other invidious distinctions. We intend to make a longer and more elaborate statement of this argument and its implications, which antiracist ideologues have consistently either ignored or attempted to dismiss through mischaracterization of the argument or ad hominem attack.1 For now, however, I want simply to draw attention to how insistence on reducing discussion of killings of civilians by police to a matter of racism clouds understanding of and possibilities for effective response to the deep sources of the phenomenon. Available data (see https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/?tid=a\_inl) indicate, to the surprise of no one who isn’t in willful denial, that in this country black people make up a percentage of those killed by police that is nearly double their share of the general American population. Latinos are killed by police, apparently, at a rate roughly equivalent to their incidence in the general population. Whites are killed by police at a rate between just under three-fourths (through the first half of 2016) and just under four-fifths (2015) of their share of the general population. That picture is a bit ambiguous because seven percent of those killed in 2015 and fourteen percent of those killed through June of 2016 were classified racially as either other or unknown. Nevertheless, the evidence of gross racial disparity is clear: among victims of homicide by police blacks are represented at twice their rate of the population; whites are killed at somewhat less than theirs. This disparity is the founding rationale for the branding exercise2 called #Black Lives Matter and endless contentions that imminent danger of death at the hands of arbitrary white authority has been a fundamental, definitive condition of blacks’ status in the United States since slavery or, for those who, like the Nation’s Kai Wright, prefer their derivative patter laced with the seeming heft of obscure dates, since 1793. In Wright’s assessment “From passage of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act forward, public-safety officers have been empowered to harass black bodies [sic] in the defense of private capital and the pursuit of public revenue.”3 This line of argument and complaint, as well as the demand for ritual declarations that “black lives matter,” rest on insistence that “racism”—structural, systemic, institutional, post-racial or however modified—must be understood as the cause and name of the injustice manifest in that disparity, which is thus by implication the singular or paramount injustice of the pattern of police killings. But, when we step away from focus on racial disproportions, the glaring fact is that whites are roughly half or nearly half of all those killed annually by police. And the demand that we focus on the racial disparity is simultaneously a demand that we disattend from other possibly causal disparities. Zaid Jilani found, for example, that ninety-five percent of police killings occurred in neighborhoods with median family income of less than $100,00 and that the median family income in neighborhoods where police killed was $52,907.4 And, according to the Washington Post data, the states with the highest rates of police homicide per million of population are among the whitest in the country: New Mexico averages 6.71 police killings per million; Alaska 5.3 per million; South Dakota 4.69; Arizona and Wyoming 4.2, and Colorado 3.36. It could be possible that the high rates of police killings in those states are concentrated among their very small black populations—New Mexico 2.5%; Alaska 3.9%; South Dakota 1.9%; Arizona 4.6%, Wyoming 1.7%, and Colorado 4.5%. However, with the exception of Colorado—where blacks were 17% of the 29 people killed by police—that does not seem to be the case. Granted, in several of those states the total numbers of people killed by police were very small, in the low single digits. Still, no black people were among those killed by police in South Dakota, Wyoming, or Alaska. In New Mexico, there were no blacks among the 20 people killed by police in 2015, and in Arizona blacks made up just over 2% of the 42 victims of police killing. What is clear in those states, however, is that the great disproportion of those killed by police have been Latinos, Native Americans, and poor whites. So someone should tell Kai Wright et al to find another iconic date to pontificate about; that 1793 yarn has nothing to do with anything except feeding the narrative of endless collective racial suffering and triumphalist individual overcoming—“resilience”—popular among the black professional-managerial strata and their white friends (or are they just allies?) these days. What the pattern in those states with high rates of police killings suggests is what might have been the focal point of critical discussion of police violence all along, that it is the product of an approach to policing that emerges from an imperative to contain and suppress the pockets of economically marginal and sub-employed working class populations produced by revanchist capitalism. There is no need here to go into the evolution of this dangerous regime of policing—from bogus “broken windows” and “zero tolerance” theories of the sort that academics always seem to have at the ready to rationalize intensified application of bourgeois class power, to anti-terrorism hysteria and finally assertion of a common sense understanding that any cop has unassailable authority to override constitutional protections and to turn an expired inspection sticker or a refusal to respond to an arbitrary order or warrantless search into a capital offense. And the shrill insistence that we begin and end with the claim that blacks are victimized worst of all and give ritual obeisance to the liturgy of empty slogans is—for all the militant posturing by McKesson, Garza, Tometi, Cullors et al.—in substance a demand that we not pay attention to the deeper roots of the pattern of police violence in enforcement of the neoliberal regime of sharply regressive upward redistribution and its social entailments. It is also a demand that, in insisting that for all intents and purposes police violence must be seen as mainly, if not exclusively, a black thing, we cut ourselves off from the only basis for forging a political alliance that could effectively challenge it. All that could be possible as political intervention, therefore, is tinkering around with administration of neoliberal stress policing in the interest of pursuing racial parity in victimization and providing consultancies for experts in how much black lives matter.5 Another revealing datum regarding the imagery of an unbroken history of racist denigration of black “bodies” stretching back at least to 1619 as explanation of the current racial disparity in police killings is that, as Mike Males has shown, police killings of black men under 25 years of age declined 79% between 1968 and 2011, and 61% for men over 25 during that same period.6 Nor is that quite surprising. The victories won by the civil rights movement were real, as were the entailments of the Voting Rights Act. Things were generally worse with respect to everyday police terror in inner-city black neighborhoods than they are now. One of the few of the Black Panthers’ slogans that wasn’t simply empty hyperbole was their characterization of the role of police as an “occupying army” in black communities. (When I first saw The Battle of Algiers in the late 1960s, I felt an instant shock of recognition, a sense that I’d lived some of the film.) Racial transition in local government and deepening incorporation of minority political interests into local governing coalitions had a moderating effect on police brutality in black communities.7 My point is not in any way to make light of the gravity of the injustice or to diminish outrage about police violence. (I realize, however, that some will impute that intention to me; for them and all who would take the charge seriously, see note 1 below.) However, noting a decline—or substantial change in either direction for that matter—in the rate of police killings does underscore the inadequacy of reified, transhistorical abstractions like “racism” or “white supremacy” for making sense of the nature and sources of police abuse of black Americans. Racism and white supremacy don’t really explain how anything happens. They’re at best shorthand characterizations of more complex, or at least discrete, actions taken by people in social contexts; at worst, and, alas, more often in our political moment, they’re invoked as alternatives to explanation. In that sense they function, like the Nation of Islam’s Yacub story, as a devil theory: racism and white supremacy are represented as capable of making things happen in the world independently, i.e. magically. This is the fantasy expressed in formulations like racism is America’s “national disease” or “Original Sin”—which, incidentally, are elements of the liberal race relations ideology that took shape in postwar American political discourse precisely as articulations of a notion of racial equality that was separated from political economy and anchored in psychology and individualist notions of prejudice and intolerance.8 Nevertheless, putting to the side for a moment those ways in which causal invocations of racism and white supremacy are wrongheaded and inadequate and accepting for the sake of argument that the reified forces can do things in the world, if their manifest power can vary so significantly with social, political, and historical context, wouldn’t the objective of combating the injustice be better served by giving priority to examining the shifting and evolving contexts under which racism and white supremacy are more or less powerful or that condition the forms in which they appear rather than to demonstrating that those forces that purportedly cause inequality must be called racism or white supremacy in particular? One problem with the latter objective is that it is ultimately unrealizable. There is no definitive standard of what qualifies as racism; like terrorism or any other such abstraction, it is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, an illustration of the great cultural victory of the postwar civil rights struffle is that “racism” is negatively sanctioned in American society. No one with any hope of claim to political respectability—not even Maine governor Paul LePage, who leaves one struggling to imagine what he assumes would thus qualify as racist, (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/profane-phone-message-has-gov-paul-lepage-of-maine-in-hot-water-again.html?\_r=0)—embraces it. In addition, advocates of antiracist politics argue that debate over the name that should be attached to the injustice is important because acknowledging the existence of racism/white supremacy as a causal agent is a necessary first step to overcoming its power. But that claim rests on shaky political ground. It is at bottom a call for expiation and moral rehabilitation as political action. In that sense Black Lives Matter is like its rhetorical grandparent, Black Power; it is a slogan that has condensed significant affective resonance but is without programmatic or strategic content. Also like Black Power, in response to criticisms of its lack of concrete content, BLM activists generated a 10 Point Plan—http://www.puckermob.com/lifestyle/black-lives-matter-just-delivered-their-10-point-manifesto-and-this-is-what-they-want, in part clearly to address criticisms that they had no affirmative agenda beyond demands that the slogan be validated and the names of selected victims of police killing be invoked. This was followed more recently by an expanded document featuring roughly sixty items called “A Vision for Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and Justice”—https://policy.m4bl.org. Some, perhaps many, of the items propounded in the initial 10 Point Plan are fine as a statement of reforms that could make things better in the area of criminal justice policy and practice. Many, if not most, of those assembled under the rubric “Vision for Black Lives” are empty sloganeering and politically wrongheaded and/or unattainable and counterproductive. However, the problem is not a shortage of potentially effective reforms that could be implemented. The problem is much more a political and strategic one. And the focus on racial disparity both obscures the nature and extent of the political and strategic challenges we face and in two ways undercuts our ability to mount a potentially effective challenge: 1) As my colleague, Marie Gottschalk, has demonstrated in her most important book, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 2016),9 the carceral apparatus in its many manifestations, including stress policing as well as the many discrete nodes that constitute the regime of mass incarceration, has emerged from and is reproduced by quite diverse, bipartisan, and evolving complexes of interests, some of which form only in response to the arrangements generated and institutionalized by other interests. Constituencies for different elements of the carceral state do not necessarily overlap, and their interests in maintaining it, or their favored components of it, can be material, ideological, political, or alternating or simultaneous combinations of the three. Challenging that immensely fortified and self-reproducing institutional and industrial structure will require a deep political strategy, one that must eventually rise to a challenge of the foundational premises of the regime of market-driven public policy and increasing direction of the state’s functions at every level toward supporting accelerating regressive transfer and managing its social consequences through policing. 2) It should be clear by now that the focus on racial disparity accepts the premise of neoliberal social justice that the problem of inequality is not its magnitude or intensity in general but whether or not it is distributed in a racially equitable way. To the extent that that is the animating principle of a left politics, it is a politics that lies entirely within neoliberalism’s logic.

#### Capitalism generates a present of differentially distributed mass violence, environmental destruction and extinction.

**Robinson 14** (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises ¶ Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. ¶ Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. ¶ Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 ¶ This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: ¶ 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. ¶ 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;* ¶ 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? ¶ 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; ¶ 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. ¶ Global Police State ¶ How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. ¶ One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. ¶ Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

#### The alternative is a refusal to perform the aff’s method in spaces like debate. Rather, we believe that other spaces ie in private homes, collective organizations, are better as they do not reveal the strategy to recycle semiocapitalism.

### Case

#### Negate on presumption:

1 – Vote negative on presumption –

A) No warrant for the ballot – they’ve read the 1AC but voting for them doesn’t solve anything.

B) Voting aff doesn’t access social change but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (Michael J; JD from U Texas Law; 2013; “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?”; National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1) [Hari added a period at the end]

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### C) your authors aren’t specific to debate – creates cruel optimism since movements solely in debate can’t solve

#### D) Movements don’t spill up---competition means you ally yourself with people who vote for you and alienate those who are forced to debate you ensuring the failure of the movement.

#### E) there’s nothing radical about voting aff its already happened multiple times this tournament.

#### the space and don’t have a net benefit to affirming the 1ac.

#### On the advocacy: aff doesn’t solve – they can’t fiat a revolt which means at best the aff is revolutionary base building but that fails A] theres nothing to differentiate them from the already existing movements that haven’t disrupted space appropriation B] inevitable government crackdown on alternative organizing means the alt can never solve we need to work from within C] individual processes of re-worlding don’t actually turn into revolutionary movements – they imagine things but don’t result in action

#### Progress from policy:

#### Pragmatism is key to challenge anti-blackness, only state reform brings change

Kline 17 (David Kline is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Religion at Rice University. Critical Philosophy of Race, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2017

This is where I suggest the decentering of political ontology and the inclusion of the Black aleatory body as the site of struggle, evasion, and creation becomes a pragmatic mode of framing the problem and thinking a purely practical politics of both spontaneous creation and a calculated movement against the political ontological regime of anti-Blackness. Although Moten would certainly object to describing this turn by way of a “pragmatic politics,” I suggest that his “Black optimism” and Chandler’s paraontology find congruence with a kind of Foucaultian-Deleuzian pragmatics which, as Paul Patton describes Deleuze’s philosophy, “[enables] a form of description which is immediately practical” and an “ethico-political conception of philosophy as oriented towards the possibility of change” (Patton 2003, 16, 17). From this angle, the accurate representation of an ontological reality, while certainly necessary and crucial to the task of naming the full scope of the problem and thinking a way forward, does not take precedence over the task of creating new concepts and lines of flight that should be judged on their effectiveness not in terms of properly representing an ontological problem, but in terms of their concrete effects within a wide field of contexts, specific socio-political problems, and conjunctures. As Deleuze and Guattari describe how pragmatics marks a study attuned to the complexity, contingency, and potential danger that defines the micropolitical, “the study of the dangers of each line is the object of pragmatics or schizoanalysis, to the extent that it undertakes not to represent, interpret, or symbolize, but only to make maps and draw lines, marking their mixtures as well as their distinctions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 227). Pragmatics, in this way, is all about drawing lines and making maps against macropolitical sedimentations that lead somewhere, that create something new. Such pragmatic orientation is especially pertinent in the contemporary biopolitical frame as Foucault understands it. As I’ve already described, Foucault’s biopolitics is premised on the idea that when politics takes the biological body as its primary aim and object, as opposed to sovereign power’s object of the legal subject and its constitutive negative, then there is introduced into politics the possibility, as Cary Wolfe notes, “for life to burst through power’s systematic operations in ways that are more and more difficult to anticipate” (Wolfe 2014, 158). The increasing complexity of bodily knowledge and the power that takes this knowledge as its operating principle means that both risk and possibility increase in terms of what the body can do and what can be done to the body. The pragmatic thrust of this emerges when situating it at the level of micropolitics, where, as I’ve been describing, Deleuze and Guattari locate the conditions for lines of flight and where “there is always something that flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding machine” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 216). Out of any sedimentation there will always be deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The pragmatic possibility or potential, then, is that there is always a simultaneity of the micropolitical and the macropolitical that provides the conditions for an ongoing search for new tactics, orientations, assemblages, vocabularies, and processes of becoming that are aimed practically towards change: “What matters is to break through the wall, even if one has to become-black like John Brown. George Jackson. ‘I may take flight, but all the while I am fleeing, I will be looking for a weapon!” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, 277). This emphasis on pragmatics and lines of flight—both in potentially negative and positive terms (i.e. in terms of pure contingency)—provides a much more expansive level for framing the problem of anti-Blackness that is not reducible to fixed political ontological positions and the macropolitical plane. Finally, I suggest this kind of pragmatics is what Moten and Harney describe as “fugitive planning and Black study,” what Jack Halberstam [End Page 65] characterizes simply as “reaching out to find connection” (Moten and Harney 2013, 5). Pragmatics finds a footing in the highly dynamic and shifting terrain of power relations and its multiplicity of conjunctures that signal the condition of movement and connection. It finds its enactment in sites such as “the little Negro’s church and logos and gathering, this gathering in and against the word, alongside and through the word and the world as hold, manger, wilderness, tomb, upper room, and cell” (Moten 2014, 775). Within these and other sites of micropolitical connection and the practices that take place in them, there is flight, resistance, and the creation of something new and productive. The inclusion of these sites and practices within the analytical frame and critique of anti-Blackness provide a much wider set of resources for thinking the complexity of the full scope of the political field that exists in excess to the political ontological frame, and, in the same way, orients the fight against anti-Blackness in practical (though potentially no less revolutionary), rather than apocalyptic, terms. This, I argue, does not have to mitigate or pass over Sexton’s call that “slavery must be theorized maximally if its abolition is to reach the proper level” (Sexton 2011, 33). The maximum theorization of slavery and anti-Blackness does not need be completely hedged in by a political ontological frame. However, analytical expansion beyond the political ontological frame does mean locating a positive emphasis on what Sexton disparagingly identifies as a tendency towards “forces of mitigation that would transform the world through a coalition of a thousand tiny causes” (ibid.). Taking Sexton’s (and Wilderson’s) call of a maximum theorization of slavery/anti-Blackness with full seriousness, I wonder what the proper level of abolition could possibly mean other than a pragmatic coalition—or a micropolitics—of a thousand tiny causes. As I’ve argued, thinking what this might mean would certainly necessitate an expansive analytics of power relations flowing over a highly complex field of forces, intensities, technologies, and dispositifs that together form a micropolitical field far in excess of sovereign power and the political ontological frame. Out of such an analytics, a pragmatics that finds its possibility in the micropolitical field of movement and flight emerges as the condition for an ongoing life of resistance, connection, and a movement toward freedom.

#### Scholarly discourse and engagement with politics is key to effective structural reform - critique is insufficient.

**Purdy ’20 -** Jedediah S. Britton-Purdy et al, 20 - ("Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis by Jedediah S. Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, K. Sabeel Rahman :: SSRN," 3-2-2020, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3547312)//ey/>

To embrace the possibility of democratic renewal requires rejecting the terms of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. We believe that the legal realists—and thinkers in a much longer history of political thought—were right in believing that "the economy" is neither self-defining nor self-justifying. The emphasis in these traditions has been the right one: on power, distribution, and the need for legitimacy as the central themes in the organization of economic life. Moreover, precisely because economic ordering is a political and legal artifact, the idea of an "autonomous" economic domain has always been obscurantist and ideological, even when accepted in good faith.' Law does not and never could simply defer to such a realm. Rather, **law is perennially involved in creating and enforcing the terms of economic ordering,** most particularly through the creation and maintenance of markets. One of its most important roles, indeed, is determining who is subject to market ordering and on what terms, and who is exempted in favor of other kinds of protection or provision.' Thus the program of law, politics, and institution building often called "neoliberalism" is, and can only be, a specific theory of how to use state power, to what ends, and for whose benefit.'The **ideological work** of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis has been **to** naturalize and **embed in legal institutions from the Supreme Court to the** Antitrust Office and **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization a specific disposition of power**.** This power represents a deployment of market ordering that produces intense and cross-cutting forms of inequality and democratic erosion. However, Twentieth-Century Synthesis theorists tend not to see this, precisely because the Synthesis makes it so hard to see (or at least so easy to overlook). If it is to succeed, **law and political economy** will also **require something beyond mere critique. It will require a positive agenda.** Many **new** and energized **voices**, from the legal academy to political candidates to movement activists, are already building in this direction,' **calling for** and giving shape to **programs for more genuine democracy that also takes seriously questions of economic** power **and racial subordination;**171 more equal distribution of resources and life chances;172 more public and shared resources and infrastructues;173 the displacement of concentrated corporate power and rooting of new forms of worker power;174 the end of mass incarceration **and broader contestation of** the long history of the criminalization and **control of poor people and people of color in building capitalism;**175 the recognition of finance and money as public infrastructures;176 the challenges posed by emerging forms of power and control arising from new technologies;177 and the need for a radical new emphasis on ecology.178 These are the materials from which a positive agenda, over time, will be built. **Political fights interact generatively with scholarly and policy debates in pointing** the way **toward a more democratic political economy.** The emergence of new grassroots movements, campaigns, and proposals seeking to deepen our democracy is no guarantee of success. But their prevalence and influence make clear the dangers and opportunities of this moment of upheaval—and highlight the stakes of building a new legal imaginary. 179 Neoliberal political economy, with its underlying commitments to efficiency, neutrality, and anti-politics, helped animate, shape, and legitimate a twentieth-century consensus that erased power, encased the market, and reinscribed racialized, economic, and gendered inequities. By contrast, **a legal imaginary of democratic political economy**, that takes seriously underlying concepts of power, equality, and democracy, **can inform a wave of** legal **thought whose critique and policy imagination can amplify and accelerate these movements for structural reform** and, if we are lucky, help remake our polity in more deeply democratic ways.