### FW

#### I value morality as per the evaluative term “ought” in the resolution.

#### 1 – The meta ethic is contractarianism – morality is a guide to action, so it must provide reasons that could actually obligate us, and only rules that we would willingly accept could obligate us. Gauthier 1: Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.

Moral principles are introduced as the objects of full voluntary ex ante agreement among rational persons.  Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.  But the parties to agreement are real, determinate individuals, distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns.  In so far as [Since] they would agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do. As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, they recognize a place for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

#### 2 – Burdens – the aff burden is to prove that a free press has the moral obligation to prioritize objectivity over advocacy, and the neg burden is the converse – that’s most textual since the rez is comparative.

#### 3 – Define free press from.

Cambridge Dictionary, ND, "free press," No Publication, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free-press

If a country has a [free](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free) pres[s](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/press), [its](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/its) newspapers, magazines, and [television](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/television) and [radio](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/radio) stations are [able](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/able) to express any opinions they want, even if these [criticize](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/criticize) the government and other organizations:

#### 3 – In democracies, only Public Reason can determine which rules have bindingness, since only reasonable rules that we would willingly accept could obligate us in an ostensibly free system.

Quong, Jonathan, "Public Reason", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/public-reason/>.

Public reason requires that the moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority. It is an idea with roots in the work of Hobbes, Kant, and Rousseau, and has become increasingly influential in contemporary moral and political philosophy as a result of its development in the work of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerald Gaus, among others. Proponents of public reason often present the idea as an implication of a particular conception of persons as free and equal. Each of us is free in the sense of not being naturally subject to any other person’s moral or political authority, and we are equally situated with respect to this freedom from the natural authority of others. How, then, can some moral or political rules be rightly imposed on all of us, particularly if we assume deep and permanent disagreement amongst persons about matters of value, morality, religion, and the good life? The answer, for proponents of public reason, is that such rules can rightly be imposed on persons when the rules can be justified by appeal to ideas or arguments that those persons, at some level of idealization, endorse or accept. But public reason is not only a standard by which moral or political rules can be assessed: it can also provide standards for individual behavior. Because we make moral and political demands of each other, if we are to comply with the ideal of public reason, we must refrain from advocating or supporting rules that cannot be justified to those on whom the rules would be imposed. We should instead, some insist, only support those rules we sincerely believe can be justified by appeal to suitably shared or public considerations—for example, widely endorsed political values such as freedom and equality—and abstain from appealing to religious arguments, or other controversial views over which reasonable people are assumed to disagree. In this way, public reason can be presented as a standard for assessing rules, laws, institutions, and the behavior of individual citizens and public officials.

#### 4 – The Public Reason can only be elucidated through universally non-coercive and intersubjective discourse about the factual states of affairs – any other norm risks excluding marginalized discursive practices.

Quong, Jonathan, "Public Reason", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/public-reason/>.

Some philosophers present the idea of public reason, or the public use of reason, as an essential and central part of the nature of rational discourse about moral norms. Habermas’s influential account of discourse ethics (Habermas 1990; Habermas 1996) has been presented by some as grounding a conception of public reason in this way. On this view, the validity of moral and political norms can only be established by an intersubjective and idealized practice of argumentation. Only through an inclusive and noncoercive discursive process where all participants are equally situated can genuinely intersubjectively valid norms emerge. Habermas thus proposes a dialogical principle of universalization, (U), stating that a moral norm “is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side-effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion” (Habermas 1998, 42). For Habermas, this principle follows from the presuppositions of rational moral discourse. Thus, at least on one interpretation, to engage in reasoned moral or political argument with others is to commit oneself to something like the idea of public reason—to commit oneself to finding norms that could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion. On this account, public reason is grounded in the nature of reasoned moral argument: one cannot, without contradiction, avoid the idea of public reason insofar as one wants to engage in reasoned moral or political argument with others.Although Habermas’s account of discourse ethics has been influential amongst those who favor some version of discursive or deliberative democracy (Bohman 1996; Chambers 1996; Dryzek 1990; Dryzek 2000), its capacity to serve as the basis for public reason is the subject of a number of criticisms. Perhaps most importantly, by grounding public reason in a broader account of truth, validity, and rational argument, public reason becomes tied to a specific and controversial philosophical doctrine. But some proponents of public reason believe its role is to serve as a mechanism of justification amongst persons who reasonably disagree about philosophical and other issues typically embedded in what Rawls calls comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1996, 13). If one believes the idea of public reason should stand apart from any particular comprehensive doctrine or philosophical theory of truth and rationality, the appeal to the presuppositions of rational discourse will be a problematic basis for public reason (see Rawls 1996, 376–381).

#### 5 – Objectivity is a process, not an ends.

Brian Winston & is the Lincoln Professor at the University of Lincoln (UK). He is the author of A Right to Offend, The Rushdie Fatwa and After and also writes on documentary film and media technology. He was the founding director of the Glasgow University Media Group. Matthew Winston is the author of Gonzo Text: Disentangling Meaning in Hunter S. Thompson’s Journalism. He teaches in the School of Media, Communication and Sociology at the University of Leicester, THE ROOTS OF FAKE NEWS: Obecting to Objective Journalism, September 2020- Book – pdf available upon request – mavsdebate@gmail.com

To do this, as a consequence of their allergic reaction to epistemology and their need to be, in some way, useful, ‘truth’ – a truth, ‘journalistic truth’ – becomes glossed as ‘objectivity’. The term first appears in connection with journalism in 1911, in the same year as the trade’s arrival on the US college campus as a degreeworthy subject.19 Being objective was a central factor in the drive towards professionalism, constructing the journalist ‘as an impartial mass-informer’.20 For Jay Rosen, objectivity is a ‘public philosophy’ which is ‘one of the identifying features of journalism in the United States and perhaps the major contribution American journalism has made to the rest of the world’.21 But, beware (perhaps) of Americans bearing gifts: objectivity is just another philosophical can of worms and journalists are just as confused about it as they are about truth. For the lexicographers, objectivity is a journey while truth is a state, meaning that the former is defined as the process of reaching a state of truth (whatever that is) through a process independent of individual subjectivity arising from perception, emotions, or imagination. And in philosophy too, it stands in a binary opposition with subjectivity, and is seen to be most achieved in the case of ‘knowledge which bears no sense of the knowers’, as, ideally, with science.

#### The standard is consistency with the intersubjective norms governed by the Public Reason.

#### Prefer –

#### Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Framework is functionally a topicality debate about how to define the terms of the resolution. Prefer this definition:

#### [A] Resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes small schools without a lot of prep. The 1ac burden structures the debate such that the each debater has access to the ballot using solely analytical arguments. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### [B] Performativity: The existence of the Public Reason is a prerequisite to the process of justifying any argument – the existence of debate’s time and speech structure show that intersubjective norms are empirically valid. Willing that we should abide by any other ethical theory presupposes that we could be convinced of it which implies the existence of a public reason. That implies denying the 1ac standard loses you the ballot because you’re inadvertently denying that an intersubjective reason to vote for the neg could exist under the current norms of debate.

#### 

### Offense

#### I affirm – In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy by adhering to journalistic practices mandated by principles of Public Reason.

Fox, Carl. “Public Reason, Objectivity, And Journalism In Liberal Democratic Societies.” Res Publica 19 (3). 2013. <https://philpapers.org/rec/FOXPRO>.

Another potential objection to my proposal is that it would effectively declaw journalists. If there are ways of presenting facts, or even facts themselves, that are utterly unpalatable to an otherwise reasonable comprehensive doctrine then they must be considered inappropriate and off limits. Will journalists, therefore, find themselves rendered toothless, struggling to find neutral facts and neutral ways of presenting them? This criticism, while natural, is based on a misunderstanding of how public reason works. It is not concerned with narrowing the available scope of arguments or modes of presentation to only the select few that every reasonable person accepts and agrees with. Rather, it mandates journalists to proceed in a manner that we can reasonably expect others to accept as reasonable. The criticism misunderstands public reason as setting the bar far too high. For journalists, controversial material is perfectly appropriate subject matter so long as it is researched, selected, and presented in accordance with principles that can be satisfactorily justified. While there may be many who vehemently disagree with the content or conclusions of a journalistic article or report, it is legitimate in so far as it is insulated by the method of its production. Indeed, this is intended to be one of the strengths of recasting journalistic objectivity as an exercise in public reason. At this point we should also note that journalism as public reason will not inevitably lead to sterile uniformity in the reporting of stories or the communication of opinion. Indeed, Rawls (2005, p. 240) defends public reason from the objection that when used in decision making it will not guarantee a single, unanimous outcome. It does place strict limits on the methodology that journalists should apply, but in practice these will serve as ideal goals, goals which journalists will strive to realise asymptotically, ever nearing an ideal which will serve as an ultimate standard.



#### We’ll defend the method of the veil of ignorance – journalists ought to assume a position in which they are blind to their own initial position, and remove arbitrary advocacy based in social contingencies.

Freeman, Samuel. 2012 "Original Position." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/#ArgForDifPri

“The remedy for such biased judgments is to redefine the initial situation. Rather than a state of nature Rawls situates the parties to his social contract so that they do not have access to knowledge that can distort their judgments and result in unfair principles. Rawls's original position is an initial situation wherein the parties are without information that enables them to tailor principles of justice favorable to their personal circumstances. Rawls says, “Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows [their] place in society, [their]class position or social status, nor does any one know [their] fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, [their] intelligence, strength and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance” (TJ, 12/11). This veil of ignorance deprives the parties of all knowledge of particular facts about themselves, about one another, and even about their society and its history. The parties are not however completely ignorant of facts. They know all kinds of general facts about persons and societies, including knowledge of the relatively uncontroversial laws and generalizations derivable from economics, psychology, political science, and biology and other natural sciences. They know then about the general tendencies of human behavior and psychological development, about biological evolution, and about how economic markets work, including neo-classical price theory of supply and demand. As discussed below, they also know about the circumstances of justice—moderate scarcity and limited altruism—as well as the desirability of the “primary social goods” that are needed to live a good life and to develop their “moral powers.” What they lack however is knowledge of any particular facts about their own lives or other persons' lives, as well as knowledge of any historical facts about their society and its population, level of wealth and resources, etc.. Rawls thinks that since the parties are required to come to an agreement on objective principles that supply universal standards of justice applying across all societies, knowledge of particular and historical facts about any person or society is morally irrelevant and potentially prejudicial to their decision. Another reason for Rawls's “thick” The veil of ignorance is that it is designed to be a “position of equality” (TJ, 12/11) that represents persons purely in their capacity as free and equal moral persons. The parties in the original position do not know any particular facts about themselves or society; they all have the same general information made available to them. They are then situated equally in a very strong way, “symmetrically” (JF 18$) and purely as free and equal moral persons. They know only characteristics and interests of themselves in their capacity as moral persons—their interests in developing the moral powers of justice and rationality, their need for the primary social goods, and so on.”

#### That affirms – it requires journalists prioritize objectivity and necessitates a transparent and democratic process by which information is sourced and disseminated.

Fox, Carl. “Public Reason, Objectivity, And Journalism In Liberal Democratic Societies.” Res Publica 19 (3). 2013. <https://philpapers.org/rec/FOXPRO>.

It is not enough to present the extreme sides of an argument, or to approach both the government and the opposition for quotes. The vital role of journalism in a liberal democracy necessitates a transparent process and an ethos that is hostile to bias. With the intention of recasting the journalistic commitment to objectivity as a definite methodology, I turn now to a discussion of Rawls’s conception of public reason. Public Reason Rawls (1999, 2005) came to be deeply concerned with the implications of what he thought of as the brute fact of reasonable pluralism.5 Reasonable and rational people, intelligent and thoughtful in their attempts to understand and solve fundamental common problems seem inevitably to differ and disagree. Indeed, Rawls described several ‘burdens of judgment’, such as complex and conflicting evidence, the inherent difficulty involved in the weighting of various considerations, and the subtle and shifting subjective biases that arise of the experience of living life itself,6 so as to demonstrate the inevitability of conflict in the generation and application of foundational values and beliefs.7 These factors lead ultimately to a myriad of substantially different worldviews or comprehensive doctrines and, following Mill, he thought that it can be perfectly reasonable for people to disagree so deeply. However, while we have no option but to come to terms with reasonable pluralism, the difficulties it presents are enormous. Indeed, one of the chief tasks of political philosophy is the project of reconciling these doctrines in order to make a legitimate and stable political association a possibility. The idea of public reason is Rawls’s answer to a vital question posed by reasonable pluralism, namely; how can a political community containing many comprehensive doctrines collectively decide fundamental political questions in spite of the apparently irreconcilable conflicts generated by these doctrines? Resolving this problem provides a template for a public sphere robust enough to withstand the difficulties that trouble, for example, Habermas. For Habermas (1996, 2008), the public sphere and the ability of private people to engage in rational public communication was a purely historical development that owes its origin to the radical effect of emerging capitalist values and strategies on the feudal hierarchy of the thirteenth century. It existed only briefly and soon flickered out, extinguished by the march of the very same political, social, and economic forces which gave rise to it. What remains for autonomous individuals is to commit to his ideal discourse theory, which espouses the creation of ideal conditions where ‘everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of the self and the world of others’ (Habermas 1995, p. 117). Ideal role-taking, he argues, can produce a common ‘we-perspective’ which will eventually allow for undistorted communication. This is how we can (objectively) share the information we need to participate in political institutions and hold public authorities to account. The problem with using ideal discourse theory to model journalistic objectivity is that, unlike public reason, it requires a profound shift in our collective moral thinking when, if I am correct, we can follow Rawls in more pragmatically demanding that particular institutions conform to the rules of public reason.8

### U/V

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution. Prefer:

#### Truth testing’s best for predictability since debaters only know the rez before the round so it’s the best starting point. Best for clash since our interp is most predictable both on the theory and substantive flows.

#### Truth Testing allows for the more ground than any other ROB since it allows for a literal infinite amount of arguments on a range of argumentation style giving the most breadth and depth of topic and phil ed

#### All debates are questions of truth or falsity, which means you should default to our ROB.

#### The framework debate is bidirectional which means both aff and neg have equal access to the ballot on that level – prefer truth testing over a K ROB or util since only our ROB isn’t self-serving.

#### Presume aff – public reason’s key to democracy – reasonable pluralism is necessary to maintain the deliberative processes which constitute democracies. That means you should affirm by virtue of the clause “in a democracy” in the resolution – without the plan, the rez isn’t possible.

Rawls, John. “The Idea Of Public Reason Revisited.” The University of Chicago Law Review 64:3. 1997. <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5633&context=uclr ev>.

The idea of public reason, as I understand it,' belongs to a conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this reason-the way it is understood by citizens and how it interprets their political relationship-is part of the idea of democracy itself. This is because a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism-the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines,' religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.' Citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of reasons they may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake. I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.4 Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. The basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law. While democratic societies will differ in the specific doctrines that are influential and active within the

#### All neg interps are counter interps since reading the affirmative necessitates an interp of the topic’s words.

#### An acausal driver must exist. [1] Infinite regress – all sound arguments have bounded premises and conclusions, which means a sound argument justifying the existence of the first substance implies the existence of a factor which caused that first substance to come into being. The fact that we can posit such a sound argument implies the existence of the acausal driver. [2] Ontological argument – an acausal factor must contain every non-contradictory attribute, and existence is an attribute, which means the acausal factor has the attribute of existence. [3] Natural law – every natural relationship must have been brought about some factor, and we know that natural relationships exist (gravity, particle physics, strong and weak atomic forces) which means a factor must have brought it about. Since laws of nature cannot be reduced further that means only the acausal factor could have brought it about. [4] The best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical proves that an acausal factor must exist.

Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, 2016, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

All these experiments seem to indicate that free will is an illusion. Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many ways. A possible view is that, in some way, determinism can be observed directly within ourselves. This interpretation might lead to the conclusion that free will is just an illusion. In fact, if one considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains), such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually defined. For it, in fact, all events are linked by casual relations in the form of natural laws, which started long before we were born and which we cannot escape. However, determinism has generally been regarded as a metaphysical claim, not refutable by empirical findings. One could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case, endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior as the causal product of choices that every time produce different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned; cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, another feature of freedom seems to be a pure illusion, namely the role of consciousness. The experiments considered thus far heavily question the claim that consciousness actually causes voluntary behavior. Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating in the movement, while consciousness “comes after”, when “things are done”. Therefore, [and] consciousness cannot trigger our voluntary decisions. But the role of consciousness in voluntary choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers, 1996). Empirical research in psychology also shows that our mind works and makes choices without our conscious control. As proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and Aarts et al. (2004), we are “built” to have the impression to consciously control our actions or to have the power to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive illusion. Many priming experiments show that people act “mechanically” (even when their behavior might appear suited to the environment and even refined). Automatic cognitive processes, of which we aren’t always aware, originate our decisions, and they were only discovered thanks to the most advanced scientific research. Ultimately, consciousness, which should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice, is thus allegedly causally ineffective: a mere epiphenomenon, to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This is what has been called Zombie Challenge, “based on an amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that demonstrate the surprising ways in which our everyday behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold in the complete absence of consciousness” (Vierkant et al., 2013).

#### The existence of an acausal factor implies advocacy is impossible – advocacy is defined as support for a cause (Merriam Webster) but the existence of an acausal factor denies the existence of free will which means individuals cannot rationally choose to support one cause over another. That means you auto affirm – determinism implies unilateral stasis meaning empirical objectivity is necessarily true which means you must prioritize it over advocacy.

#### Interp – negatives must only the defend the converse of the resolution. Violation – it’s preemptive. [1] Textuality – rez is innately comparative as per the word “prioritize” which means neg should defend the converse since the negation of a comparative is the contrapositive. Logic is a voter since it’s the only way arguments can be evaluated to be valid or sound. [2] Predictability – converse is the most predictable since it’s tied to the rez which is the only stasis point in debate before the round – that incentivizes better research since affs can prep topic literature and write frontlines which compare warrants which is most educational. [3] Strat skew – defending the converse makes the debate 1:1 which is most fair – fairness is a voter since it’s key to evaluating who’s the better debater. It’s best for clash since it prevents uplayering and incentivizes comparative analysis of the warrants. Comparative analysis of the warrants incentivizes topic research – especially important since there’s only one tournament on the topic. Running positions not converse to the resolution take more time to argue against than the alternative and remove the affirmatives ability to extend evidence from the AC as defense or turns on the NC requiring the aff to either take extended time for extensions or rebuttals making the already short 1ar excessively difficult. Skew is irreversible and the highest impact since it’s always actual abuse and can’t be resolved without dropping the debater for violating the interp. [4] Ground – Neg intrinsically has more strategy since there’s always more reasons why something is wrong than why it’s right – forcing them to defend the converse equalizes ground which equalizes access to the ballot. Also it’s impossible to turn an argument which denies an assumption of the rez without double turning yourself but defending the converse solves this.