### 1

#### Their scholarship is repugnant reason to lose the round—their author Moen endorsed pedophilia and advocated for a removal on restrictions on pedophilic content.

Moen 15 [Moen, O. M. (Professor of Ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University). “The ethics of pedophilia”. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 9(1), 111-124. 2015-05-09. Accessed 2/2/2022. <https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/1718> //CHO]

If my arguments in this article are sound, then being a pedophile—in the sense of having a sexual preference for children—is neither moral nor immoral. Engagement in adult-child sex is immoralbecause it exposes children to a significant risk of serious harm, butit is perhaps not always blameworthy to the extent that we intuitively assume. Finally, the enjoyment of fictional stories and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content is, in and of itself, morally acceptable. If these conclusions are correct, what practical implications follow? A central implication is that in dealing with pedophilia, our aim should not be to find outlets for our disgust and outrage, but rather, to minimize what is the real problem: harm to children. On the least revisionist side, the aim of reducing harm provides us with a good justification for upholding current bans on adult-child sex and child pornography. There are, however, also a number of more revisionist implications. One revisionist implication is that we should stop the outright condemnation of pedophiles. Condemning pedophiles for being pedophiles is unjust, and non-offending pedophiles, rather than deserving condemnation for their pedophilia, deserve praise for their admirablewillpower.4 Possibly, today’s condemnation also prevents pedophiles from telling health professionals about their attraction to children, and insofar as detection and counseling can help prevent abuse, this is very unfortunate. To prevent harm to future children, we would also be well advised to start teaching high school students not just what to do in case they are victims of sexual abuse (which, thankfully, we have started telling them over the last few decades), but also what to do in case they themselves are pedophiles. A certain percentage of high school students either are or will become pedophiles, and currently they are not given any advice on how to handle their sexuality. The production, distribution, and enjoyment of texts and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content should almost certainly be made legal. Until or unless it can be shown that such texts and graphics lead to more adult-child sex, the justification for today’s widespread ban is weak.

#### Drop the debater for their reading – sympathizers ignore violence against children and are too prevalent in academia – voting them up reinforces a trend of rationalizing such behavior.

Grant 18 [Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the Uiversity of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ //WWDH]

Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact. In 1978, Foucault took part in a France-Culture broadcast with two other gay theorists, Hocquengham and Danet, to discuss the legal aspects of sex between adults and children. They wanted a repeal of the law preventing this because they took the view that in a liberal (they really meant libertarian) society, sexual preferences generally should not be the business of the law. Foucault, Hocquengham and Danet made the following assertions: that children can, and have the capacity to, consent to such relations without being coerced into doing so; that abuse and post-abuse trauma isn’t real; that the law is part of an oppressive and repressive heteronormative social control discourse which unfairly targets sexual minorities; that children don’t constitute a vulnerable population; that children can and are capable of making the first move in seducing adults (they introduced here the category of ‘the seducing child’); that the laws against sexual relations between children and adults actually function to protect children from their own desires, making them an oppressed and repressed group; that – in the language of the sociologist Stanley Cohen – international public horror about sexual relations between adults and children is a form of moral panic which feeds into constructing the ‘paedophile’ as a folk devil, in turn provoking public vigilantism; that sex between adults and children is actually a trivial matter when compared with ‘real crimes’ such as the murder of old ladies; that many members of the judiciary and other authority figures and groups don’t actually believe paedophilia to be a crime; and that consent should be a private contractual matter between the adult and the child. Fast forward to 1981. The Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) has been active for seven years. This was a pro-paedophile activist group, founded in the UK in 1974 and officially disbanded in 1984. The group, an international organisation of people who traded in obscene material, campaigned for the abolition of the age of consent. Dr Brian Taylor, the research director and member of PIE, and sociology lecturer at the University of Sussex produced the controversial book Perspectives on Paedophilia, which had the aim of enlightening social workers and youth workers about the benefits of paedophilia. Taylor, who identified as gay, advocated ‘guilt-free pederasty’ (sexual relations between two males, one of whom is a minor). He argued that people generally are hostile to paedophilia only because they don’t understand it, and If they did wouldn’t be so against it. So it was simply a matter of clearing up prejudice and ignorance.

### 2

#### Link Story

#### It is the claim of objectivity which enhances and legitimize the warriors for fake news and perversion

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To put it in simple terms, this is how things used to be done – and not just in the US – and it functioned, there and elsewhere, arguably, at least in some respects, better than our current journalistic ideology of objectivity embedded in professionalism. That front page of The Pennsylvania Journal is an historical example of an alternative approach which might prompt the question (if further prompting is required): What if we determined we did not need a balanced, neutral, impartial, unbiased, objective (etc.) press – nor even, say it softly, a truthful press? None of that can [n]ever be guaranteed, after all (and, as we’ve argued, in the context of journalism that last term – ‘truthful’ – can’t even really be defined), but what if journalism’s functions were seen as achievable without making these ambitions essential? We do not accept the implication that Tom Paine should have included the views of the British (‘King George III was contacted but declined to comment …’), in the name of making his journalism more ‘balanced’ and ‘professional’. On the contrary, our assertion here is that what we need, in order to sustain journalism’s positive social functions, is a press that ceases to aim at the impossible, but instead unashamedly nails its colours to the mast. After all, it was during this period that, according to Thomas Carlyle, Edmund Burke, speaking in the British Parliament, characterised the press as being, in addition to the three Estates (the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons), ‘a Fourth Estate more important far than they all’. Carlyle adds: ‘It is not a figure of speech, or witty saying; it is a literal fact – very momentous to us in these times’.5 This is still received opinion.

The ideology of objective journalism reinforces this vision and now it is so entrenched, naturalised, and hegemonic, as to make this seem an extremely radical proposal, and perhaps it is. But we do live, supposedly, in a post-truth world where facts are not what they used to be and neither is authority – a world where fiction is easily presented as news by any digitally literate fantasist, empowered by the billion dollar platforms that are the engines of Web 2.0. But more than that: it is a world where the implicit claim of truth enhances the strength of lies, when those lies ape news presentational norms, disguising and downplaying bias, aka subjectivity. The dwindling credibility of the mainstream press is damaged, just a little more, each and every time another example of the news’s failures to meet its own high standards becomes visible to the public. The initial, foundational claim of truth, therefore, does more for InfoWars than it does for The New York Times, for without it the mendacities of the former lose force, while the trustworthiness of the latter might well – however paradoxically – be enhanced.

#### Journalists don't have consistent standards for verification---this makes using the “neutral voice” in reporting deceptive, and undermines the credibility of journalism.

Dean 14 Dean, Walter. “The Lost Meaning Of 'objectivity'.” American Press Institute. March 30, 2014. <https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>.

This point has some important implications. One is that the impartial voice employed by many news organizations – that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting – is not a fundamental principle of journalism. Rather, it is an often helpful device news organizations use to highlight that they are trying to produce something obtained by objective methods. The second implication is that this neutral voice, without a discipline of verification, creates a veneer covering something hollow. Journalists who select sources to express what is really their own point of view, and then use the neutral voice to make it seem objective, are engaged in a form of deception. This damages the credibility of the craft by making it seem unprincipled, dishonest, and biased. Reporters have gone on to refine the concept Lippmann had in mind, but usually only privately, and in the name of technique or reporting routines rather than journalism’s larger purpose. The notion of an objective method of reporting exists in pieces, handed down by word of mouth from reporter to reporter. Developmental psychologist William Damon at Stanford, for instance, has identified various “strategies” journalists have developed to verify reporting. Damon asked his interviewees where they learned these concepts. Overwhelmingly the answer was: by trial and error and on my own or from a friend. Rarely did journalists report learning them in journalism school or from their editors. Many useful books have been written. IRE (Investigative Reporters and Editors) for instance, has tried to develop a methodology for how to use public records, read documents, and produce Freedom of Information Act requests. By and large, however, these informal strategies have not been pulled together into the widely understood discipline that Lippmann and others imagined. There is nothing approaching standard rules of evidence, as in the law, or an agreed-upon method of observation, as in the conduct of scientific experiments. Nor have older conventions of verification been expanded to match the new forms of journalism. Although journalism may have developed various techniques and conventions for determining facts, it has done less to develop a system for testing the reliability of journalistic interpretation.

#### Impact Story

#### That causes exclusionary nationalism and populism

Fuchs 18 “Democracies Everywhere Are Backsliding. To Survive We Must Unite | Michael H Fuchs.” *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 9 Nov. 2018, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/09/us-democracy-countries-global-authoritarian.

The United States is fighting for the soul of its democracy. While the hateful agenda of [Donald Trump](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/donaldtrump) was dealt a rebuke in the midterm elections, in a deeply polarized country, the struggle for democracy will only intensify as Trump and his allies attempt to pull America down a dangerous path.

The president spouts racist conspiracy theories – which have been used as [justification](https://www.vox.com/2018/10/29/18037580/pittsburgh-shooter-anti-semitism-racist-jewish-caravan) for the mass slaughter of Jews in a synagogue and which appear to have [inspired](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/25/trump-insults-bombs-targets-democrats) the attempted assassination of Democratic party leaders – with impunity. The president said the US military should shoot at asylum-seeking refugees at the southern border. He attacks the media as the “enemy of the people”. And all this was just in the past month.

But the United States isn’t alone – democracies across the world are struggling for their survival. Hungarian president Viktor Orban has launched systematic attacks on his country’s democratic institutions. President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines has led a campaign of extrajudicial killings of drug users and sellers. Brazil elected as president Jair Bolsonaro, who has [defended](https://www.npr.org/2018/07/30/631952886/dictatorship-was-a-very-good-period-says-brazil-s-aspiring-president) Brazil’s former dictatorship and espouses hate against women, the LGBTQ community, and others. Whether driven by nationalism, racism, fear of immigration, or other forces, populist movements can be contagious.

This should not be surprising, as political transitions can happen in waves. The “third wave” of democratization swept across Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and in 2011 a rapid succession of popular rebellions erupted across the Middle East.

Democracies and autocracies learn from one another. In the wake of the murders at a Pittsburgh synagogue, China’s state-run media [suggested](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/28/asia-pacific/chinese-state-media-claims-pittsburgh-mass-shooting-highlights-need-anti-extremism-education-similar-xinjiang-camps/#.W93lXdhKjBI) that the United States employ “anti-extremism education” like that China is using in Xinjiang, where it imprisons roughly a million Uighurs just because of their religion. When Nigeria’s military recently killed protesters who had been accused of throwing rocks, the Nigerian military [cited](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/africa/nigeria-trump-rocks.html) Trump’s comments that the US military could shoot refugees at the southern US border if they threw rocks.

#### And the impact is Extinction – we’re on the brink

**Posner 17** (Eric A Posner is the Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. “Liberal Internationalism And The Populist Backlash” https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2071&context=public\_law\_and\_legal\_theory//TU-SG)

**An upswing in populist sentiment** around the world **poses the greatest threat to liberal international legal institutions** since the Cold War.2 In **Russia**, Vladimir Putin has drawn on Russian nationalism to consolidate his control, allowing him to **engage in violent foreign adventures** in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. The **E**uropean **U**nion has been **shaken by** a **debt** crisis **and** a **migration** crisis, which have **accelerated** trends **toward disintegration**. In Hungary and Poland, **nationalist governments with authoritarian aspirations** have **come to power**. In the Netherlands, France, Germany, and other European countries, **nationalist political parties** have **achieve**d **high levels of popularity and political influence**, while British voters have voted to exit the European Union. In Turkey, the government has launched a **ferocious crackdown on the press and the political opposition**. In the United States, Donald Trump has criticized numerous international organizations, including NATO, NAFTA, and the United Nations. His election reflects increasing isolationist sentiment among Americans. Trump, like populists in Europe and other countries, has criticized international institutions and norms, and seems likely to repudiate certain international norms and possibly treaties in the areas of trade, security, **climate change**, and the laws of **war**. In the Philippines, populist President Rodrigo Duterte has embarked on a scheme of **extrajudicial killings** in order to combat crime and consolidate his power. In China, President Xi Jinping’s grip on government has strengthened, symbolized by the Central Committee’s recent decision to name him “core leader” of the Party. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi preaches Hindu **nationalism at the expense of the** country’s vast **Muslim minority**. Specific causes and circumstances vary across countries but **the common theme is a challenge to the “establishment” or “elites” by outsiders on behalf of the common people** or, in some cases, by insiders who claim a mandate from the common people.3 The establishment is portrayed as some combination of the following institutions and individuals: the traditional parties and their leadership; the government bureaucracy; business and labor leaders; and international bodies and their memberships. The **populist leader argues that the establishment is “corrupt,” meaning that it either enriches itself at the expense of the people, or shows greater concern for foreigners or minorities than for the common citizen**. In the most virulent cases, **where populism verges on authoritarianism, the populist leader claims the mandate of the nation and denies that a legitimate political opposition exists or can exist**. Not all of the populist leaders have attacked international law. Xi and Modi, for example, have pursued conventional foreign policies—though China’s expansion in the South China Sea, which has involved numerous violations of international law, has sparked tensions with its neighbors and the United States. But this has less to do with populism than with traditional notions of state interest. **Populism poses a threat to international** law and **order** **because international law is rule by technocracy, and relies on trust and mutual goodwill, while populists see corruption and advantage-taking all around them, and direct their ire at the experts**. We see this in the rhetoric of populists, who frequently blame foreign influences and international institutions for the nation’s problems. In recent years, populists have targeted the European institutions, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Criminal Court, and they have mocked and belittled international legal norms, including human rights law and the laws of war, and the quasi-legal principle of humanitarian intervention. **It is too soon to tell whether this populist reaction will demolish the current international order**, erode it, or flame out without causing any damage to international institutions. It is also possible that institutions will be strengthened and improved as a result of this trial by fire. The purpose of this paper is not to make predictions but to investigate causes, focusing on the failures of international law. I argue that **the international law community has seriously misunderstood the evolution of international law, with the result that it is unprepared to comment on the populist backlash**. Specifically, I argue that a common view held by these elites—that further international legal integration of the world is inevitable and beneficial, and that it enjoys the support of most ordinary people—has been refuted by events. Moreover, **the populist reaction to international law may be traced to two essential features of international law—that it is technocratic and has been advanced by the establishment. Even if international law recovers, these features will remain a source of vulnerability**.