### Framework

#### I affirm.

#### The meta-ethic is internalism – moral prescriptions lack bindingness absent consideration of individual self-interest.

David Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?,” from Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice

To proceed, I must offer a minimal characterization of the morality that faces a foundational crisis. And this is the morality of justified constraint. From the standpoint of the agent, moral considerations present themselves as constraining his choices and actions, in ways independent of his desires, aims, and interests. Later, I shall add to this characterization, but for the moment it will suffice. For it reveals clearly what is in question – the ground of constraint. This ground seems absent from our present world view. And so we ask, what reason can a person have for recognizing and accepting a constraint that is independent of his desires and interests? He may agree that such a constraint would be morally justified; he would have a reason for accepting it if he had a reason for accepting morality. But what justifies paying attention to morality, rather than dismissing it as an appendage of outworn beliefs? We ask, and seem to find no answer. But before proceeding, we should consider three objections.

#### Prefer:

#### A – disagreement – reasonable minds can disagree on whether an action is moral or not which means there’s no universal moral good. Occam’s razor tells us that this is more likely than the more complicated accounts of moral disagreement such as error theory or fictionalism.

#### B – scope – any universal moral precept would require a justification that is universal in scope, which would itself require another universal justification – that’s an infinite regress that can only be stopped arbitrarily. This implies only accounts of morality which require only conditional moral goods can be logically consistent – only internalism satisfies that constraint.

#### Internalism implies preference maximization.

David Gauthier 2 “Why Contractarianism?,” from Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice JS

Fortunately, I do not have to defend normative foundationalism. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, we no longer accept the world view on which it depends. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that we have, ready to hand, an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that choices and actions maximize the agent’s expected utility, where utility is a measure of considered preference. In its less austere version, this is to show that choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent’s objective interests. Since I do not believe that we have objective interests, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations. 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, deliberative justification. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – our choices and actions. What if they conflict? And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? We can say, of course, that his behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise, in relation to choice and action, does not perish with it. Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that deliberative justification is more clearly basic, that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and provides the basis for rationality, is the capacity for semantic representation. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification. There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For an extramoral mode of justification is already present, existing not side by side with moral justification, but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self.

#### Mutual constraints solve contradictions caused by self-interested preference maximization.

David Gauthier (3), “Why Contractarianism?,” from Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice

I turn then to the third way of resolving morality ’ s foundational crisis. The first step is to embrace deliberative justification, and recognize that morality’s place must be found within, and not outside, its framework. Now this will immediately raise two problems. First of all, it will seem that the attempt to establish any constraint on choice and action, within the framework of a deliberation that aims at the maximal fulfillment of the agent ’ s considered preferences, must prove impossible. But even if this be doubted, it will seem that the attempt to establish a constraint independent of the agent ’ s preferences, within such a framework, verges on lunacy. Nevertheless, this is precisely the task accepted by my third way. And, unlike its predecessors, I believe that it can be successful; indeed, I believe that my recent book, Morals by Agreement , shows how it can succeed. 13 I shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person’s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations, each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one, of course, can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may represent such a practice as capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreement is the basis of morality. Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable. Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others. We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone. This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone’s preferences. The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person’s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else. Thus, each person’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one. Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents.

#### The standard is consistency with mutually agreed upon contracts. Prefer -

#### A – actor spec– states are definitionally contracts of mutual restraints between individuals to prevent wrongdoing – that means engaging in state action concedes my framing.

#### B – burdens – the 1ac burden is to demonstrate that the resolution is true and coherent. Aff offense is valid under two conditions – we win the framework + we demonstrate at least one example that shows a current contractual prohibition on the appropriation of space resources by private entities exists. Violations of contractual prohibitions are unjust (therefore the rez is true), which means each example of a prohibition is an independent reason to vote aff.

### Offense

#### OST affirms – “national appropriation” in Article 2 applies to both state and private entities under a national sovereign – that’s the best legal meaning and most coherent.

Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 653 2019 <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6>

The broad text in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides an ordinary and unambiguous meaning free from absurdity.90 The language of Article II is short: “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”91 At first glance, the language clearly intends to bar ownership over all aspects of outer space, with the only wrinkle of confusion being the meaning of “national appropriation.” Stephen Gorove, a space law expert, has suggested it is better to first define appropriation before determining how “national” modifies the term.92 Broadly, appropriation is “the taking of property for one’s own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence.”93 In this regard, appropriation is of a “national” character when it is by an entity under the sovereignty of the state from which they come or represent.94 Even though Article II uses the “national” language, its ordinary meaning is most closely linked to all sovereignties and the individuals and entities that attain property rights under the authority of a sovereign. A separate insight of classic legal realism logically lends itself to the same conclusion. For an individual to hold property rights in something, the government must legally recognize the property rights.95 The language of Article II bars governments from recognizing property interests in outer space for themselves. Because individuals and private entities cannot hold property rights in something without recognition from a sovereign that it will protect their rights, a correct interpretation of the language of Article II should bar the ability of private entities and individuals to appropriate rights over celestial resources as well. If a state recognizes a property right held by an individual over a celestial body or resource, such recognition would constitute a form of national appropriation because it is essentially “a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals” to that body or resource.96 The text of Article II naturally leads to the conclusion that its non-appropriation language is binding on all actors— state and private.There exists a direct counter-argument that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty does not apply to private actors at all, only to state actors.150 This argument rests primarily on the idea that a treaty is a kind of contract between states that benefits their citizens but does not directly bind their citizens to international obligations.151 However, the purpose behind the drafting of the Treaty in the first place most logically stands for the conclusion that ensuring safety and ecological standards in outer space has always been important.152 Allowing a loophole for private actors to essentially do whatever they want with celestial resources and planetary bodies goes directly against the core purpose of having such a treaty in the first place.

#### The legal canon affirms – the OST’s omission of specific bans on private action proves there’s an intention to exclude those actors from appropriation.

Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States SPACE Act of 2015 Is Illegal, 33 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 653 2019 (2) <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6> JS

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius is a widely accepted international canon of interpretation.127 It states that when interpreting international materials, one should presume things not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.128 Defined as “[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative,”129 the canon can theoretically be applied to support the conclusion that the Outer Space Treaty does indeed prohibit the appropriation of celestial resources by both state and private actors. At the time of the Treaty’s drafting, in the 1960s, only state actors were interested in outer space endeavors; it was far beyond the realm of possibility for the drafters to even imagine the technological advancements and privatization of space interests that have since occurred. Through the treaty, the drafters were speaking only to the audience to whom it would apply: sovereigns. If the drafters intended for private actors to be governed differently, expressio unius could be applied negatively to support that they would have explicitly addressed this in the Treaty.130 Because Article II of the Treaty addresses a specific issue (non-appropriation of celestial resources and bodies) within the context of every actor to which it applied at the time of its drafting (state actors only), the canon should apply to say if the drafters wanted any interested entity to be excluded from the Treaty’s non-appropriation effect, they would have expressly stated so in the text, thus drastically altering its literal interpretation.

### Underview

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution. Prefer:

#### “is” means the resolution is a statement of fact – that means each debater’s role is to find evidence to prove that the resolution is either true or false. Best for predictability since debaters only know the rez before the round so it’s the best starting point. Best for clash since our interp is most predictable.

#### Truth Testing allows for the more ground than any other ROB since it allows for a literal infinite amount of arguments on a range of argumentation style giving the most breadth and depth of topic and phil ed

#### All debates are questions of truth or falsity, which means you should default to our ROB.

#### The framework debate is bidirectional which means both aff and neg have equal access to the ballot on that level – prefer truth testing over a K ROB or util since only our ROB isn’t self-serving

### Advantage 1 – Sustainable Space

#### Plan Text – Member nations of the Outer Space Treaty ought to rule that appropriation of outer space by private actors is unjust by explicitly applying Article II of the Outer Space Treaty to private actors.

#### Privatization of space where states actors must defend appropriations of space heightens the probability of space conflict

[VERONICA DELGADO-PEREZ](https://www.theintlscholar.com/periodical?author=5fd7de174214c1322c3fb161), Inernational Scholar, Staff Writer, DEC 14 2021 Argument | The Commercialization of Space Risks Launching a Militarized Space Race, https://www.theintlscholar.com/periodical/12/14/2020/analysis-commercialization-space-risk-international-law-military-space-race

Fundamentals of the Final Frontier It is a geopolitical imperative to determine what, if any, commercial activities and use of extraterrestrial resources are permitted within the confines of international law. Without clear-cut agreements on what activity is recognized by international law, the world will undoubtedly see states push the boundaries ever further in an attempt to gain the edge over geopolitical competitors — even more-so in an era of renewed great power competition. Yet to date, there exists no comprehensive treaty or legal reference to commercial activity in space. However, this should come as no surprise. It has only been since the turn of the century that technology and markets have progressed to the point where commercial space exploration and exploitation has become possible. Only recently have experts and analysts of geopolitics and international law begun to seriously examine questions surrounding the legal framework that would govern extraterrestrial resource-mining and other commercial activities. In the last decade, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) dealt with commercial aspects in outer space. In one of their last reports, the Committee expressed that the era of the commercial utilization of outer space’s resources is intrinsically linked to the escalation of international competition over resources, which could threaten international peace and security. By encouraging the international community to engage in outer space’s activities for the benefit of humankind as a whole, “some delegations” have expressed that states should avoid the promotion of laws and regulations related to the commercialization of outer space, arguing that it should be considered the heritage of all humanity. In that regard, states must then ensure that domestic law on the use of outer space complies with international space law, which means that states should respect the principles outlined in the Outer Space Treaty and ensure that national regulations do not contravene international provisions. Even though the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (which entered into force in 1967), refers to the exploration and use of outer space, it does not address questions of a commercial nature, which compromises the ability of states and international actors to address new challenges to extraterrestrial activities. In several provisions, the treaty highlights that these activities may be carried out for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all people, reaffirming that outer space is not subject to national appropriation. Were outer space not considered a global commons, that would imply that the resources and results of commercial exploration may fall within the jurisdiction of a country. It is thus incumbent upon Washington — and its commercial enterprises — to demonstrate how American commercial exploration of space benefits other countries and complies with international space law, or otherwise to adhere to the spirit of past treaties which emphasize the impartiality of outer space until such time as the law is clarified. International Law is Adrift in Space The potential benefits of commercial space exploration cannot be ignored. From an economic standpoint, the space industry would generate a significant economic boon for both states and private companies, due to the abundance and variety of resources — particularly scarce minerals that are difficult to extract on Earth. As one example of the vastness of resources held in outer space, one asteroid has the potential to contain more than the total supply of platinum extracted throughout the history of mankind. It may very well open the door to an advanced era of space navigation, building extraterrestrial infrastructure that facilitates the exploration and use of space’s resources, and extra-planetary human habitation. Inevitably, there are significant drawbacks to the commercialization of space exploration. These can vary, for instance, from the commercial dominance of space’s natural resources only by those states with the technical and financial capital to support space missions, to geopolitical competition over extraterrestrial resources that threatens world peace and security, to the potential for the monopolization of extraterrestrial resources by states and private companies. As was the case during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States began a Space Race in which they struggled to achieve supremacy in space exploration and domination of science. Today, the number of space powers has increased thanks to continual advancements in flight, combustion, and fueling technologies. In the three decades since the end of the Cold War, technologically advanced countries like China, Japan, and France which previously had no space program have successfully navigated to the top tier of space-faring agencies and programs. In 2018, the U.S. allocated $41 billion to space programs, followed by China at $5.8 billion, and Russia at $3.1 billion. Collectively, the three major space powers control almost 65% of the global industry, showing space powers are monopolizing space and reinforcing the inequality gap between states that do not have sufficient economic and technological capacity to invest. With new actors on the game stage, conflicts of interest may arise. There is a risk that each actor adopts a kind of short-term Realist approach to space policy — one which is driven by self-interest in reaping the greatest benefits of extraterrestrial exploration and commercialization while controlling access to others. If unmitigated, states may choose to militarize outer space to gain a strategic edge over competitors and adversaries. This process has already begun. Under the Trump administration, the Pentagon established the U.S. Space Force as a new branch of the Armed Forces to protect the country and allied interests in space. Already, Delta 4 — one of the U.S. Space Force’s missions — conducts strategic and theater missile warnings, manages weapon systems, and provides information to missile defense forces. The measure shows that for the U.S., outer space is not only a domain of scientific exploration but has the potential to become increasingly securitized. With the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and Russia on February 5, 2021, a number of security dilemmas could arise. If the world’s two largest nuclear powers do not edge toward extending the treaty, Washington and Moscow risk returning to the era of unrestricted expansion of launch platforms and strategically-deployed nuclear warheads — potentially with the aid of military infrastructure in space. Although President-elect Biden has expressed his interest in negotiating an extension of New START, how Moscow and Washington might proceed remains an open question. Bilateral progress towards a new arms-control regime would require establishing limits on the number and range of long- and mid-range missiles, establishing measures to limit the expansion of traditional missile deployment to space, and banning the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space. More than the risk of the securitization of space, state, and private actors could begin to claim exclusive legal rights over the resources they discover. Indeed, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, which came into force in 2015, expressly recognizes the right of U.S. Citizens to possess, own, transport, use, and sell space resources. By this means, domestic law already acknowledges the legal claim to property by individuals, which is prohibited by international law. Under the Outer Space Treaty, states renounced any traditional form of acquisition of territories and agreed not to foray unilaterally into space to extend their national policies on Earth or to exercise any kind of sovereignty over celestial bodies or resources. The absence of a modern international treaty that addresses these issues should be received with grave concern, as there is significant potential for risk to become reality. Existing UN treaties lack the technological context and foresight to address legal questions regarding the potential for commercial exploration and exploitation of outer space or its resources. During the sixties and seventies, when international instruments like the Outer Space treaty were conceived, the principal aim of states was to support and expand the scale of the state’s national capacity for operation in space and the development of legal instruments to guide state’s international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. These instruments were never designed to respond to commercial questions over mining or tourism in space, private investment in space activities, or the emergence of non-state private enterprises operating in space. As a result, private enterprises operating in the vacuum of space also float in an unstable legal vacuum which threatens to implode in geopolitical competition. Beyond Stars and States In an increasingly commercial outer space in which there are no set limits to the exploitation of resources or claim to property, states and private companies will inevitably pursue the development of new extraterrestrial industries to suit their geoeconomic interests. If unchecked, the legal protection of outer space as a domain of exploration for the benefit of all humanity would functionally fail. To protect investments and profit from national space industries, states would likely resort to military force to protect and secure private assets. Over time, space would ultimately become a fourth border domain over which states claim, exercise, and defend sovereignty — including through the use of force. The challenge is thus to prevent the circumstances that could lead to space-borne conflict before it is made possible. Notwithstanding, commercial exploration and the use of natural resources need not lead to predation among actors involved in space. The potential rewards — both technological and environmental — that could come from investment in the harvesting of resources in space are immense. International law cannot afford to wait for the security dilemma posed by commercial activity in space to manifest before addressing it but must anticipate and proactively adopt measures to address future issues that govern extraterrestrial human activity. The only remedy for the lack of legal governance over commercial activity in space is the creation of new international laws through a comprehensive international treaty on commercial operations in space. The new treaty must expressly regulate commercial activities by states and private companies, enshrine an international liability and compensation regime covering damages caused with workable sanction provisions, and reinforce norms that restrict any militarization of outer space. The international community should focus its efforts on establishing a legal regime, with mandatory provisions (rather than non-binding resolutions, observations, commentaries, and conclusions) which generate both international responsibility and provide enforceable sanctions in the event of violations. The effort should be borne out by expanding the scope and strengthening the oversight powers of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), rather than creating a new organ with redundant bureaucracy. Beyond the tasks of encouraging space research programs, studying space activities, and addressing legal questions, COPUOS should be granted the necessary powers to perform control and oversight monitoring functions. Experience has taught the international community that cooperative arrangements between states and international organizations can prevent competition for resources from escalating to kinetic conflict. Through cooperation, there is a chance to preserve extraterrestrial resources for future generations, secure an equitable allocation of resources and benefits with a mind to each country’s specific needs, and prevent the expansion of geopolitical conflict to the domain of space. Space powers must recognize the value in partnering with other states to advance the development of space programs more efficiently. It should be clear now that all nations could reap the benefits of collective action, exploration, and commercialization of resources from beyond Earth’s atmosphere while preventing a drawn-out international conflict to the final frontier. The will of states not to jeopardize the fundamental basis of international law must be reflected in coordination and surveillance efforts to ensure that the advantages derived from space exploration allow humanity to continue evolving.

#### Space conflicts go nuclear---both fast and probable

Laura Grego July 7, 2015 Sr. Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, "Preventing Space War", https://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/preventing-space-war

So says a very good New York Times editorial “Preventing a Space War” this week. Sounds right, if X-Wing fighters come to mind when you think space conflict. But in reality conflict in space is both more likely than one would think and less likely to be so photogenic. Space as a locus of conflict The Pentagon has known that space could be a flash point at least since the late 1990s when it began including satellites and space weapons in earnest as part of its wargames. The early games revealed some surprises. For example, attacking an adversary’s ground-based anti-satellite weapons before they were used could be the “trip wire” that starts a war: in the one of the first war games, an attack on an enemy’s ground-based lasers was meant to defuse a potential conflict and protect space assets, but instead was interpreted as an act of war and initiated hostilities. The games also revealed that disrupting space-based communication and information flow or “~~blinding~~” could rapidly escalate a war, eventually leading to nuclear weapon exchange. The war games have continued over the years with increased sophistication, but continue to find that conflicts can rapidly escalate and become global when space weapons are involved, and that even minor opponents can create big problems. The report back from the 2012 game, which included NATO partners, said these insights have become “virtually axiomatic.” Participants in the most recent Schriever war games found that when space weapons were introduced in a regional crisis, it escalated quickly and was difficult to stop from spreading. The compressed timelines, the global as well as dual-use nature of space assets, the difficulty of attribution and seeing what is happening, and the inherent vulnerability of satellites all contribute to this problem. Satellite vulnerability & solutions Satellites are valuable but, at least on an individual basis, physically vulnerable. Vulnerable in that they are relatively fragile, as launch mass is at a premium and so protective armor is too expensive, and a large number of low-earth-orbiting satellites are no farther from the earth’s surface than the distance from Boston to Washington, DC.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.