### K – Affective Security

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who produces better affective knowledge - prefer

#### 1] Affect - Politics have fundamentally changed – the basis of action is no longer dependent on hierarchical ordering and hegemonic practices but rather in relationships of affect and sub-rational influences.

Jon Beasley-Murray. Professor of French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies at the University of British Columbia. 2010. Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America. Pages 284-286. Bracketed for gendered language which we do not endorse

The fiction of hegemony is more threadbare than ever. The myth of the social contract is over. In place of coercion or consent, both of which depend upon granting transcendence to the state, post-hegemony substitutes affect, habit, and an immanent multitude. Politics is biopolitics: in fact, it always has been, but today more clearly than before neither civil society nor the state are sites of struggle or objects of negotiation. At stake is life itself. On the one hand, increasingly corrupt forces of command and control modulate and intervene directly on the bodies of ordinary [people] ~~men and women~~. On the other hand, everyday insurgencies of constituent power reveal a multitude that betrays and corrodes constituted power from the inside, overflowing and escaping its bounds. The outcome of this confrontation is uncertain: constituent power may still fold back against itself; the line of flight that escapes may become suicidal; the multitude may turn bad and become monstrous; or perhaps, just perhaps, exodus may lead to what Negri terms “the time of common freedom. “1 It is in Latin America that the failure of modernity’s social contract is most evident. And Latin America, too, is the setting for the most promising experiments in common freedom. Veteran activist and critic Tariq Ah claims that “South America is on the march again, offering hope to a world either deep in neo-liberal torpor or suffering daily from the military and economic depredations of the New Order.”2 For Ah, “Venezuela and the Bolivarian dream” are at the center of an “axis of hope.”3 He offers a rosy view of what have been called the Latin American “left turns” or “pink tide,” in which a series of left-leaning governments have been elected to power in the region: from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva in Brazil in 2002, and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, to Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2008, the left has dominated the continent’s politics over the past decade. But these electoral victories are at best a symptom, at worst a reaction. They follow an even more surprising series of social protests and multitudinous mobilizations: from the Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989, Mexico’s Zapatista insurgency since 1994, and the Argentine crisis of 2001, to the Bolivian gas protests of 2004, Latin America has been shaken by myriad struggles that have ushered in a new era of political flux. From carnivalesque revolt to neighborhood assemblies, from highway pickets to barter economies, novel forms of collective action have shattered the theater of political representation and marked the emergence of a multitude. In response, the region’s left-wing regimes usher in a “new governability,” more precarious if also more propitious than before.4 The Caracazo was the first of the social ruptures that indicated the end of the social pact and presaged the left turns. It began with an instance of what in 1970s Italy was called self-valorization or autoreduction. As sociologists Eddy Cherki and Michel Wieviorka explain, autoreduction is “the act by which consumers, in the area of consumption, and workers, in the area of production, take it upon themselves to reduce, at a collectively determined level, the price of public services, housing, electricity.”5 Cherki and Wieviorka discuss Turin workers’ refusal to pay increased bus fares in 1974. In almost identical fashion, on the morning of February 27, 1989, commuters in and around Venezuela’s capital refused to pay the higher prices that transport companies demanded of them in the wake of newly elected President Carlos Andrés Pérez’s packet of neoliberal reforms. But whereas in Turin, this fare strike was soon “organized.. . by unions which brought their active support and simultaneously imposed a coherent line of struggle,”6 in Caracas no leaders emerged, no party line was enforced.

#### 2] Epistemology - Their problem-solving approach via util assumes a rational, calculative subject that erases the affect which determines how we make decisions in the first place - fails to understand that the subject is just as implicated in decision-making as the object – perceived outcomes affect actions in the first place which impacts to epistemic bankruptcy – there is no knowledge outside of affect.

Ruddick in 10. Susan, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography/Program in Planning @ the Univ. of Toronto. “The Politics of Affect: Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze,” *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 27(4): 27. //DTAC

Spinoza’s investigation of affect does not simply enable us to reproduce a politics or phenomenology of the subject, a new version, as Grosz notes, of identity politics (Kontturi and Tiainen, 2007). It becomes the mechanism by which the subject itself can be undone,‘the opening up of the subject to that which is bigger than it’ (2007: 252), the co-production of something new. It confronts at its core Descartes’ conception of relationship between mind and body, reason and emotion, completely undoing a framework that places God in his heaven, man over nature (and woman), humans over animals, reason over emotion. Against this, it offers an affective politics that is deeply implicated within the process of thinking: affective in that it engages the body in a way that Descartes’ model does not, and not subordinated to mind but rather an active component in the production of thought. Against Descartes’ celebration of the cogito, the reasoned self is, for Spinoza, only a possibility among humans: what they share is the capacity to be affected – from which adequate ideas may or may not arise. The capacity to be affected remains a constant feature of the human condition and, in his Political Treatise, Spinoza apprehends this emotional register ‘not as vices of human nature but as properties pertaining to it in the same way that heat, cold, storm, thunder and such pertain to the nature of the atmosphere’ (2002: Ch4, P1). Affect is the experience of ‘affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, helped or hindered, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections’ (E III, Def. 3). But the social nature of this experience is not a guarantor of reasoned thought: a passive engagement of the emotions produces ‘inadequate ideas’ – arguably a form of thought – certainly not an error, in contrast to the view of Descartes, but one which understands the interaction with external bodies simply in terms of the effect of the trace,7 a reaction (see Macherey, 1990: 43^97). The reactive nature of this interpretation is attributable to the lack of accurate understanding of the innate cause of a thing – its cause in/of itself and the potential to become active in relation to it, or an active engagement in the creation of adequate ideas and active feelings (Deleuze, 1978: n.p.). Affect is, nevertheless, necessary to this collaborative production of knowledge and immanent production of new subjectivities. As Spinoza argues in Ethics Part II: ‘the human mind perceives no external body as actually existing except through ideas of the affections of its [own] body’ (P26), ideas which must involve ‘the nature of external bodies and of the human body itself’ (P28) experienced, in the first instance, as perceptions or hearsay arising from a casual experience or random encounter.The possibility, and it remains only a possibility, is that we may come to understand this connection positive-ly when we appreciate both our own essence and the essence of the thing encountered, and thus the basis for their agreement. For Deleuze this demonstrates Spinoza’s framework as a: frenzied reaction against Descartes, since it argues from the moment we are born we are condemned to the hazards of the encounter. . . .We cannot come to know ourselves, and we cannot come to know external bodies except through the affections that external bodies produce on our own . . . .[I]t excludes all apprehension of the thing ‘thinking by itself’ . . .all possibility of cogito. I never know anything except the commingling of bodies and I do not understand myself except by the action of other bodies upon me and by these comminglings. (Deleuze, 1978: 13^14; author’s translation) Thinking, then, is immediately implicated in the production of new ideas and new unions. But thought does not proceed outwards from the cogito, nor is it inscribed in transcendent principles: [thinking] is a social act emerging in combination. The body ‘itself’ – whether a social body or individual human being – is in a constant state of de- and re-composition in relation to other bodies, even in the most mundane acts of everyday reproduction. It becomes aware of itself in relation to the trace – the effect of other bodies upon it. Its awareness is the product of a multiplicity of encounters whose meanings themselves are deeply invested in the materiality of the social field. For example, Sarah Ahmed’s discussion (2004) of the Aryan nation shows how love and fear circulate together within that community in a complex regime which couples the love for one’s (white) children with the imagined threat from a (black) community, constituting subject positions and a sense of ‘nation’ at the same time. This: challenges any assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply belong to individuals and that they come from within and then move outwards towards others. It suggests that emotions are not simply ‘within’ or ‘without’, but that they define the contours of the multiple worlds that are inhabited by different subjects.

#### Now offense -

#### 1] Anxiety - by managing and constructing terror via existential threats, the aff ignores the micropolitics of affect which drive policymaking – their model of rational governance is a punching bag to deposit anxiety created by the barrage of daily threats we encounter – this ever present affect of fabricated threats recursively affects how we solve the threats which becomes a terminal solvency deficit Beasley-Murray 2

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Terror reverberates through contemporary society now more than ever. Affect is the very matter of culture, rather than merely its “underside.” As internal borders are dismantled, such that it is hard to dìstinguìsh between factory, madhouse, hospital, and everyday life, and as the external border between reason and terror comes under attack, society’s increased porousness allows for the capillary circulation of low-intensity affect, ubiquitous and disturbing, and part of a new mechanism of universal control. This at least is what Massumi suggests with his discussion of “low-level fear. A kind of background radiation saturating existence.” Everywhere we see warnings and dangers: trans fats and second-hand smoke, street crime and AIDS. For Massumi, “fear is the inherence in the body of the ungraspable multicausal matrix of the syndrome recognizable as late capitalist human existence (its affect).”1’ Low-intensity fear and high-intensity terror alike differ from fear as it is usually understood, and so also from emotions more generally. We normally admit that there is something that makes us afraid: I am scared of spiders, heights, crowds, or whatever. These fears can be named and categorized: arachnophobia, acrophobia, agoraphobia. They invoke a subject and an object (“I,” “spiders”), and indeed help define and delimit the subfrct (“I am an arachnophobic; that is part of what I am”). They may not be rational, though they may have a rational basis (some spiders, heights, and crowds arc dangerous) and they are certainly rationalizable. Treatment strategies and risk management help us deal with such fears, which then function as input variables for a mechanism of risk and calculability. Risk with its associated statistical logic comes to precede and regulate fear: it is risky to walk across the park at night (a number of people have been mugged), so I fear crossing the park, because I fear being mugged. I alter my behavior accordingly, perhaps by walking around the park or by ensuring I start my journeys before sundown. Alternatively, faced with the relevant statistics (in fact, the park is not so risky as I imagine it to be), I can regulate my fear and so reduce the need for behavior modification. With care, I will cross the park. Risk, fear, and regulation combine to produce and manage rational choice. Rationalizable fear founds state reason and the social contract: fear of the consequences of the “war of all against all” leads, in seventeenth-century philosopher Th ornas Hobbes’s conception, to an assessment of the reduced risks in cooperation, and the surrender of natural rights to the care of the state as protector. Whereas ter ror threatens the state and the social order, self-interested fear holds that order together and constructs us as rational subjects bound by mutual contractual obligations. We should all be a little afraid, espe cially of the sanctions that could result were we to break our side of the contract. Fear is the motor of discipline, the key to subjectifica tion. “Hey, you there!” calls the police officer in Marxist theorist Louis Aithusser’s account of interpellation, and in that moment, in the recognition that it is me to whom he refers, is born also a fear of what might happen were I to ignore the call.”2 Moreover, fear categorizes social subjects: whether L turn to face the officer or whether L run away, I am equally interpellated; but if I face him, I am the model (of the) citizen, and if I flee I suggest I am a criminal with something to hide. Affect becomes personalized, and it both personalizes and regularizes. Low-intensity fear, on the other hand, differs from normative fear. like terror, low-level fear has neither subject nor object; it is ubiquitous and collective. “We” in general are faced by innumerable unspecified threats. Now we are afraid of “whatever.” In Massumi’s words, “ever-present dangers blend together, barely dis tinguishable in their sheer numbers.. . they blur into the friendly side of life rom the welfare state to the warfare state: a permanent state of emergency against a multifarious threat as much in us as outside.”3 Whereas normative fear is possessed by a subject (my fear of spiders), low-level fear possesses and envelops us. We are enfolded within affect and become one with it, as all boundaries— between inside and outside, subject and object, or subject and subject — become mutable. This affect is immanent, and we become immanent to affect. The I ¡ob L)esian social contract, premised on a distinction between the welfare of the state and the warfare of natu ral man, dissolves in favor of affective contact, proximity. A host of other low-level affects arise. A generalized fear fades into general ized pleasure or generalized boredom. Whatever! And in boredom, as in terror, we approach the condition of bare life: “We suddenly find ourselves abandoned in emptiness”114 Fluidity is all. While the self does not disappear altogether, it is decentered: “The self is a process of crossing boundaries.”115 Affect does not necessarily imply homogenization or equalization: fear differs from terror, but as a matter of degree, or intensity; similarly, fear is distinct from pleasure, but the shift between the two involves modulation rather than categorical change. It might be better to say that fear and plea sure are not so much distinct as approximate; one affect can always lead to another.

#### Space threat representations *lock in* state power and militarism. The aff is the talking point for why the US government will need to expand their space program as a “defense mechanism” which is a ruse to justify eternal expansion.

Klinger 19 (Julie Michelle Klinger, PhD, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, (2019), “Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space,” Geopolitics, 1–38. doi:10.1080/14650045.2019.1590340)

Classical geopolitical approaches foreground national interests and competition, often legitimizing extraterritorial empire-building (Haushofer 1925; Machiavelli 1961; MacKinder 1904), but perspectives vary with respect to outer space. Some maintain that whichever nation gains greatest control over outer space would gain the greatest strategic advantage through its conquest of the “ultimate high ground” (Dolman 2002). The effects of this view have been the steady militarization of space by major powers such as the US, China, India, and others (Burke 2018; Stares 1985). Other state-centric approaches observe that “those who can reap the benefits of space are much more likely to succeed in our interdependent and interconnected world” (Al-Rodhan 2016, 123), and so champion international space cooperation as a means of alliance-building to protect strategic interests (JohnsonFreese and Erickson 2006; Wang 2009), or to advance international agreements among partner states (Klinger 2018; Soares, Epiphânio, and Gilberto 2009). Both share a concern with how outer space should be used to enhance geopolitical power of nation states across terrestrial space. In this view, the environments of outer space are recast as strategic assets that must be instrumentalized to increase state power and authority.

Using outer space as a source of state or imperial power is nothing new. Elites have used the cosmos as a material and meaningful source of authority for millennia. Emperors and monarchs claimed that “divine mandates” installed them in their thrones (Marshall 2001; Monod 1999; Spence 1988). Religious figures backed these claims to territorial control by anthropomorphizing the evolution of the cosmos to claim privilege vested in them by a “God” or “gods” that “resided” in “the heavens” (Brown 2003; Crone and Hinds 1986; Gordis 2003; McAnany 2001; Stopler 2008). Religious figures aligned with state or imperial power positioned themselves as indispensible to appeasing heavenly powers in exchange for subordination and material wealth transfers from other people. Powerful actors past and present used claims of exclusive access to the ultimate high ground, even if only imagined, to organize regimes of territorial control on Earth, lending classical geopolitics a deep historical resonance with respect to outer space.

Whether from a military, royal, or religious standpoint, these classical views define the outer space environment as a source of natural, spiritual, or military threat (Olson 2012; Peoples 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan 2011). The invocation of these threats is politically and economically expedient for mobiliz-ing capital and labor power in the form of tithes, tributes, or defense appropriations. By the same token, such discourses characterize outer space as replete with riches to be enjoyed only by the spiritually worthy (Schwaller 2006; Smart 1968) or capitalized on for strategic advantage by the most technologically advanced (Klinger 2017; Lewis 1996). In the latter case, outer space and its earthly infrastructures can be misconstrued as a “depoliticized environment” (Swyngedouw 2011), shaped by technological development policy instead of politics. This view naturalizes a state-centric realpolitik approach to the cosmos. This view strips the cosmos of any environmental significance beyond its potential to be instrumentalized to serve national strategic interests, and has been deployed with renewed vigor under the Trump administration in the United States.

#### 2] Second is Discourse. The point isn’t that threats don’t actually exist – their fearmongering framing turns the matter *into* a security threat *in the first place*

Van Munster in 05 Rens van Munster (PhD, Political Science; Senior Researcher, research unit on Defence and security at the Danish Institute for International Studies), “Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror,” Political Science Publications from the University of Southern Denmark, October 2005. //DTAC

Spurred by socio-political events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of ethnic and intrastate conflicts, a debate emerged within security studies as to whether the neorealist conceptualisation of security was sufficiently broad to cover the wide range of threats to and human survival. On the one hand, the field was challenged by those who argued to include, besides military threats, a wide variety of other dangers to human well-being on the security agenda. On the other hand, neorealists were challenged by those who argued in favour of human security. In their view, the privilege given to the state was inadequate to address problems of human security who would need consideration on the level of the individual, sub-state groups or on the level of humanity as a whole. While the ‘early’ Copenhagen school has contributed to this debate (Wæver et al., 1993), their ‘later’ writings demonstrate an increased dissatisfaction with the terms of the wide versus narrow debate (see Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998). For the later Copenhagen school, the attitude of both neorealists and wideners towards security is troublesome because both take the security environment as pre-given and predetermined. Arguing that both camps treat threats and their referent objects as ‘brute facts’ that can be known outside the social context in which they emerge, proposes instead to study the processes through which specific issues become illocutionary constructed as security issues: ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat…The process of security is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship) (Buzan et al., 1998: 24, 26). What counts as a security issue depends up-on how social actors frame the issue: “In this approach, the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something we can define analytically or philosophically according to what would be ‘best’” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24).5 Obviously, not all speech acts share the grammar of securitising acts. According to the Copenhagen school, the rhetorical structure of a securitising act needs to contain three necessary building blocks: (a) existential threats to the survival of some kind of referent object that (b) require exceptional measures to protect the threatened referent object, which (c) justify and legitimise the breaking free of normal democratic procedures. Thus, through a securitising act an actor tries to elevate an issue from the realm of low politics (bounded by democratic rules and decision-making procedures) to the realm of high politics (characterised by urgency, priority and a matter of life and death) (see Buzan et al., 1998: 21-26). It is important to note that securitisation is not a subjective process at the level of individual conscience (in the head of the securitiser, so to speak). To the contrary, the Copenhagen school considers the construction of a security problem as a social or inter-subjective phenomenon. Apart from the fact that a securitising act needs to combine the three building blocks in its grammar, the chance for a securitising act to succeed also depends up-on the fact whether or not the targeted audience accepts the securitising act: “A successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech” (Buzan et al., 1998: 32).6 Ergo, much depends upon the social position and authority of the securitising actor. For example, while no single authority has a monopoly on securitisation, it seems that in general security experts (military, police, secret service) and political actors such as government leaders are in a better position to convince an audience of the need for security than other actors. Nevertheless, while a speech act can be socially conditioned by the position of the speaker and so on, Wæver argues explicitly that a speech act is indeterminate and radically open: “A speech act is interesting exactly because it holds the insurrecting potential to break the ordinary, to establish meaning that is not already in the context” (Wæver, 2000: 286, fn7).

#### Vote neg to reject the aff’s negative affect in favor of socialist fundamentalism. We construct social relations and politics against the fear-production of the 1ac and move towards collectivised politics with an ethic of care-production. Only a rejection of the aff’s attempt to rationalize politics can produce true revolutionary transformation.

Beasley-Murray 3

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Sendero combines affect and reason with peculiar intensity. From the outside it always appeared bloodthirsty, mysterious, and irrational. Sendero militants seemed to be motivated perhaps by archaic prejudice, perhaps by sheer hatred and ressentiment. Everything about the movement was excessive and disturbing. But political scientist David Apter comments that “just as there are reasons of state, so there are reasons of the anti-state,” however much the latter appear to be antireasons.132Indeed, as Degregori explains, Sendero is better understood as what, taking the phrase from nineteenth-century poet Manuel González Prada, he calls a “divine cult to reason.”133 Its ecstatic rationality slides easily into rational ecstasy and back again. Hence Degregori argues that to understand Sendero, we should “invert Pascal’s phrase, ‘the heart has reasons of which reason is unaware,’ ” and say of Sendero’s leading group that “reason has passions of which the heart is unaware.” Sendero is a “hyperrationalist movement” that “develops and draws out” extraordinary passions.134 It amplified the passions of its adherents, but it also drew out unsuspected passions from society at large. At the peak of the insurgency, nobody could be sure of the line between reason and affect, rationality and madness. Sendero encouraged its followers to embark on a paranoid search for order, but at the same time it revealed the paranoid structure of civil society as a whole. The modern, developmentalist state inadvertently spawned and nurtured the passions that drove those who would become its most tireless enemies. Sendero’s cradle was Ayacucho’s University of Huamanga, reopened in the late 1950s. In particular, the movement was always strongest in the university’s Faculty of Education. The state held out education as the vehicle of progress and raised enormous expectations about the transformations that lay ahead. The university would bring modernity to this rural backwater in the Andes. Education offered a form of salvation, a means to escape; if there was any millenarianism or messianism in Sendero, this was its source. As Degregori puts it, “Andean peasants...ﬂung themselves into the conquest of ‘progress.’ ” They searched for the knowledge and truth that would set them free; and “those who made it to university would have to go further and search out, by dint of great effort, something beyond truth: coherence.” For Degregori, Sendero militants, especially its leadership in the early stages, were driven by this state sanctioned love of truth and coherence: “And when they think they have found them, they are capable of the great-est violence in order to defend and impose them.”135 Their violence provoked consternation and horror in Peruvian civil society; but it merely reﬂected the structural (and often enough also actual) violence that had long patrolled the boundary between center and periphery, civilization and presumed barbarism. Again, Sendero held up a mirror to civil society, revealing its translations between affect and reason, and unveiling the terror that secures its simulacrum of a social pact. Sendero “affected” civil society, reintroducing affect into its rationalizations. It provides the limit of civil society theory, the unaccountable distortion at its horizon. And precisely because its hyperrationality is illegible to the state, Sendero is also a brick wall, a screen, an empty signiﬁer upon which others project fearful and shadowy images (not least, of Peru’s indigenous majority) in an inverted reﬂection of Sendero’s rational purity, its all-consuming joy. Sendero tipped reason over into madness. Like the paranoid whose obsession with interpretation and connection soon constructs a hyperreal edifice that no longer bears much relation to the real itself, Sendero passed through rationality to delirium but also demonstrated the delirium that underlies rationality. With Sendero, ideological reason was cultivated and transformed such that it no longer had a communicative function. In its abstract rigor and autonomy, an ideology that lays claim to the scientiﬁc tradition came close to a surreal poetry that is both horrifying and sublime: “[The people’s] blood will rise like pulsing wings, and that bruised ﬂesh will turn into the powerful whips of vengeance, and muscles and action will turn into a steel battering ram to destroy the oppressors, who will be irretrievably smashed.”136 Language becomes pure affect. Sendero’s language is the expression and sign of purity, foretelling the joy of those who share in that spotless clarity and instilling fear into those it deﬁnes as radically other. It never attempted to convince or persuade. The passions of reason mimic the reasons of the heart in a reciprocal reinforcement that requires no justiﬁcation. This is barbarous indeed, but Sendero equally shows up the barbarity of the constituted, ofﬁcial state and its mechanisms of subalternization. Sendero seeks no negotiation because it poses only one question: Are you loyal to this vision of revolution? Or as its militants put it to María Elena Moyano: step aside or be eliminated. While the neoliberal state has a panoply of polls and calls for managerial support, Sendero, which managed only the revolution, reduced this discourse to the single question: yes or no? Increasingly, however, the same is true also of the contemporary state, affected by a war against terror that is now global. It, too, asks little more than that we be either for it or against it. Though Sendero’s discourse becomes sublime and sublimely horrifying, we should avoid describing Latin American reality as abject difference. This is neither the “noche obscura” of novelist Joan Didion’s Salvador, nor the revolution from the Incan South of journalist Simon Strong’s Shining Path.137 Sendero incarnates the apotheosis of reason, plucked straight from the ﬁnest Western philosophical tradition of Kant (subject of Guzmán’s thesis) and Marx. More generally, all civil societies are “affected.” Neither the Peruvian nor more generally the Latin American experiences are aberrant. As I will suggest in chapter 3, all social formations are structured through affect, by the reasons of the heart and the passions of reason. Sendero shows how affect is a constituent element of any social formation, that necessarily disrupts the working of any civil society. Any attempt to set limits to this constituent power is doomed to failure, not least in an era of biopolitics in which neoliberal Empire has already pulverized the carefully constructed barriers of liberal modernity. Sovereignty is more precarious than ever, and rightly so. Which is not to say that we should support all its adversaries: Sendero’s line of ﬂight soon became suicidal as well as homicidal; it became entranced by death rather than life. As historian Alberto Flores Galindo tersely comments, in reaction to a 1988 Sendero killing: “Socialism is a wager on the side of life, not that of death. Its objective is not simply the destruction of a state and the liquidation of class domination but also and above all the construction of new social relations that should and can be developing in the present.”138 The problem posed by Sendero, and other similar movements, is why such constituent power turns back on itself and how hope and expectation become death and conﬂagration. With the crisis of the state, and the dissolution of any boundary between state and civil society, affect comes to the fore. Paranoia ﬂourishes in the face of constant surveillance, but equally the tides of policy ebb and ﬂow with changes in popular sentiment. The extent to which social relations are structured in terms of affect rather than (or on another level from) discourse becomes clearer. Other social logics begin to emerge in eddies and whorls, and fundamentalisms thrive as the mechanism of representation passes its sell-by date. Civil society theory aims to restore order, and at the same time holds out the hope of reform by returning a sense of rationality and agency to subaltern subjects. If traditional left politics had assumed a vanguard role for intellectuals, who are to awaken and educate the masses, a focus on new social movements emphasizes rather the myriad negotiations and initiatives performed by subaltern subjects. No doubt this has been a progressive move to counter the view that peasants, the indigenous, and others are formed by premodern communities bound by atavistic tradition and superstition. An emphasis on subjectivity is a welcome corrective. Yet it is as though subalterns were presented as perfect rational choice actors, conforming to the most ideal of Western liberal paradigms of reason. Presenting them as rational actors of this type deculturates and depoliticizes such agents by presenting them “as if they were outside culture and ideology.”139 The price subalterns pay is that their activities are recognized only so long as they accord to a notion of reason imposed upon them; only, that is, so long as efﬁciency and modernization continue to be the ground of civil society. Such actors are to be ascribed agency, but on the terms of the social theorist. Anything outside that framework becomes invisible, and the democratic task becomes to substitute a rational civil society for affective and cultural relations seen as distorting its managerial transparency. But an insistence on transparency heralds a massive expansion of the state, a politics futilely focused on the wholesale elimination of culture and corruption. Neoliberalism takes over where civil society theory leaves off, only to founder on the terror that lurks at its margins and haunts society as a whole. Civil society is enlivened by the fundamentalism that civil society theory subsequently seeks to curtail. But in the context of a global war on terror, fundamentalism has the upper hand: whether that be the fanaticism that is pledged to bring down the state, or the state’s own brand of now decentered sovereignty. A multitude confronts Empire and yet, as I argue in my concluding chapter, there is less than ever to choose between them. But surely there is some alternative to the fundamentalisms of a Sendero Luminoso or an al-Qaida on the one hand, or of neoliberalism’s diffuse forms of command and control on the other. There is no point returning to the deadening restrictions and careful regulations of the liberal contract. And populist hegemony is also but an illusion, a misleading sleight of hand. Could there then be a fundamentalism driven by vitality, afﬁrmation, and life, rather than the death drive of mutual immolation? Refusing the constrictions and antidemocratic democracy of civil society theory, we might reconsider the immediacy of social movements in their excessive and passionate demands. Encore un effort. Néstor García Canclini asks how to be radical, without being fundamentalist. We might do better to look for a good fundamentalism, a good multitude. With that in mind, I turn now from critique to constitution.