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### DA: Russian Appeasement

#### Link and Uniqueness

#### US-Russia space coop is ending, preventing Russian space ventures and *great power status* --- new coop legitimizes Russia and authoritarianism

Luzin 18 (Pavel Luzin – PhD in Political Science, Faculty in Political Science @ Perm U. <KEN> "Existential Problems Threaten U.S.-Russia Space Cooperation (Op-ed)," Moscow Times. October 12, 2018. DOA: 1/13/2020. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/10/12/Existential-problems-threaten-US-Russia-Space-Cooperation-a63157)

The reported hole the Soyuz MS-09 spacecraft that caused an outcry last month and the emergency launch of Soyuz MS-10 this week should urge us to reconsider the state of Russia–U.S. space relations. Although this cooperation has weathered many existential crises, including the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the unpleasant truth is that space cooperation between Russia and the United States has been deteriorating for years now.

The lack of new joints projects since the late 2000s in combination with deepening mutual mistrust between the countries has thrown a shadow over cooperation. At the same time, Russia faces a crisis in its own space industry.

Russia is still the only U.S. partner capable of bringing its astronauts to the International Space Station, and Russian rocket engines enable the operation of the American Atlas V and Antares launch systems. Both countries, however, deal in interdependence, and Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, is also heavily dependent on contracts from the United States.

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For example, the fees from American, European and Japanese astronauts that use Soyuz spacecrafts account for almost 25 percent of the annual Roscosmos budget (the remaining 75 percent comes from the Russian government).

Nevertheless, this interdependence is not going to last forever. The ISS, which currently operates as something of an international institution, will eventually go commercial or will end operation after 2025. In the meantime, NASA will go further into space with its own Gateway lunar orbital station and other projects.

Here, Russia faces an existential dilemma. It is crucial for Moscow to continue its space partnership with the United States. After all, aside from its nuclear arsenal, this space cooperation is what allows Russia to maintain its status as a great world power.

#### Impact

#### Expanded authoritarianism leads to great power war and goes nuclear

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In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of “democratic erosion.” We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy “is where the world was, not where it is going.” 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the global implosion of democracy led to a catastrophic world war, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of selfdoubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a crucial foundation for world peace and security. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are perched on a global precipice. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the erosion continues, we may well reach a tipping point where democracy goes bankrupt suddenly—plunging the world into depths of oppression and aggression that we have not seen since the end of World War II. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.

#### Great power status causes Russian expansionism and war

Rodríguez 15 (Joaquín Ferro Rodríguez – Strategic Studies and International Security Masters from the University of Granada. “Realism vs Realism. The Change of Approach in The Eastern Border,” June 30, 2015. http://www.seguridadinternacional.es/?q=es/content/realism-vs-realism-change-approach-eastern-border)

To begin with, I will explain why Russia can be considered as an offensive realist actor. It is not the aim of this paper to focus excessively on theoretical classifications or philosophical debates. However, due to its explicative power and its usefulness to better comprehend the Russian behaviour, it is worth mentioning three points belonging to the offensive realist theory: 1) great powers are rational actors whose main goal is to survive[1]; 2) all great powers are revisionist until the moment they become hegemonic[2]; and 3) for a great power, the only way to guarantee its security is to accumulate a bigger power quota than the rest[3]. Bearing in mind these characteristics, Russian position finds a coherent explanation. As Pierre Hassner puts it, “Russia’s foreign policy cannot be fully understood without taking into account the postimperial humiliation and resentment of the Russian people and the neoimperial ambition of its leaders”[4]. When the Cold War came to an end, Russian leaders regarded the presence of the United States (U.S.) and NATO in Europe positively as a way to keep a reunified Germany pacified. Nevertheless, they did not expect the subsequent NATO and EU enlargement, which included the ex-soviet Baltic countries in 2004[5]. This fact, added to the ‘colour revolutions’ taking place at the same time in Ukraine and Georgia, triggered a feeling of dissatisfaction within Russia and the desire of recovering its position as a great power[6]. The result is that, since 2004, Russia switched its - until that date - collaborative approach towards the West for a tougher one. Behaving as the offensive realist great power it wanted to become, Russia considers NATO/EU enlargements and their further relations with countries belonging to its ‘backyard’, especially Ukraine and Georgia, as a threat[7] to its survival. In order to face this threat, Moscow needs to accumulate more power and influence, above all in its direct neighbourhood, which explains why “Putin’s highest priority is to oppose ‘colour revolutions’”[8] as well as to avoid the promotion of the EU’s normative power in those countries. Consequently, he did not hesitate to show the Russian revisionist nature when he felt that national interests were at stake in Georgia and Ukraine. In the summer of 2008, after President Mikheil Saakashvili’s attempt to bring the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia back under Georgia’s control, Putin decided to send the army to maintain the Russian influence in those regions[9]. However, his goal was not uniquely to preserve the status quo, but rather to revise it. In that conflict, Putin showed for the first time his true intentions to seize any opportunity at his disposal to broaden his influence and to keep his neighbour countries weak and out of the West’s reach. In order to do so, Putin chose direct means, namely military intervention and war, to tackle the problem. On the other hand, indirect means have been used in the Ukraine crisis for the same purpose. After Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia and a new pro-European government reached the power in Kiev in February 2014, Russia has promoted uprisings, funded separatist groups and militias in the eastern part of the country, annexed Crimea and sent arms and unidentified military staff to support the pro-Russian groups. These two different responses - direct and indirect - are the Russian tools to achieve its revisionist goals and not merely to defend the status quo, as demonstrated with the annexation of Crimea. These revisionist movements have not only benefited Putin abroad, but also within Russia, as his popularity has soared. This is a consequence of the powerful propaganda machinery of the Kremlin, which has been able to convince citizens of why Russia should be considered as a great power and, thus, to justify its international behaviour. The following points summarise Putin’s foreign policy and account for the theoretical base of the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine: Russia is a great power which shall preserve the sovereignty of the nation by all means. This has been translated into an increase of the military budget by 100% in the last 10 years, as well as in the presence of Russia in the most important international forums to enable them to participate in the decisions regarding other zones of the world[10]. “Russia and the Russian world constitute a ‘singular civilization’, neither Occidental nor Asian, which rests on the Christian values and a ‘historical mission’: to defend the traditional values against a materialist and decadent Occident”[11] (author’s translation). The Russian Diaspora, meaning that “the Russian people have become the largest people disperse worldwide”[12] (author’s translation). This situation implies an obligation for Russia to protect and defend Russian minorities wherever they are[13].

### DA: Japanese Rearm

#### Link

#### The plan is a space shock that causes Japanese re-arm and space mil

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For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids it from using war as an instrument of state policy, the United States is an essential guarantor of its security. Any move by the US that might undermine this view raises not only the prospect of weakening US-Japanese ties, but also potentially affecting Japan’s security policies. In this regard, then, it is essential not to engage in activities that would undercut perceptions of American reliability. Such moves, it should be noted, are not limited to those in the security realm. For example, the Nixon administration undertook several initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s that rocked Tokyo-Washington relations, and are still remembered as the “Nixon shocks.” While some of these were in the realm of security (including Nixon’s opening to China and the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine), the others were in the trade area. These included a ten percent surcharge on all imports entering the US and suspended the convertibility of the dollar (i.e., removed the US from the gold standard).36 Part of the “shock” was the fundamental nature of these shifts. Even more damaging, however, was the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult their Japanese counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard. It took several years for the effects of these shocks to wear off. If the United States is intent upon expanding space relations with the PRC, then it would behoove it to consult Japan, in order to minimize the prospect of a “space shock.” Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese reaction. The decision on the part of Japan to build an explicitly intelligence-focused satellite was in response to the North Korean missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is fully capable of undertaking space-oriented responses when it is concerned.37 That, in turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China. The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations continues to cast a baleful influence upon current interactions between the two states. If there is not a “space race” currently underway between Beijing and Tokyo, it would be most unfortunate if American actions were to precipitate one.

#### China’s zero-sum pursuit of power makes space cooperation impossible – cheating is inevitable, despite formal agreements

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For China, investing in the incremental development of its space program is connected to its long term ambitions to utilize space for its vast resource potential. This is consistent with its objectives to develop China into a country that benefits from the most advanced indigenously built space technology, especially tied to its national development goal of overall rejuvenation. The advantage China has over countries like the United States, India, Australia, or New Zealand (NZ) is that the CPC does not submit itself to democratic elections every four or five years. This aspect augments the Chinese regime’s capacity for long term planning and resource commitments. After President Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, China has engaged in visible demonstrations of its power by asserting its stake on disputed territory to include the South China Sea (SCS) islands, disputed territories with India and Bhutan as well as the East China Seas (ECS). Significantly, while China **asserts** that it will share its space technology with other countries, framing outer space as a “global common,” and abide by international and bilateral agreements, China’s past behavior of staking claims to territory based on “first presence” and historical revisions, to include the SCS islands, Tibet, and Taiwan, offers us **little assurance that it will follow through on its commitments** to recognize other stakes on shared territory in outer space, to include the moon, especially if those areas are rich with resources. Tibet (an area rich in water and mineral resources) and the South China Sea offer evidence of China committing to non-escalation of conflict **on paper** with countries like India (with regard to Tibet) and fellow signatory countries of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, **while engaging in escalatory behavior** of taking over territory by force. This aspect was most evident when Xi assured former U.S. President Barack Obama in the White House in September 2015 that there were zero plans to build a military base on artificial islands in the SCS. Yet we know from subsequent evidence that China had plans to do the **exact opposite** and went ahead and built military facilities on disputed islands. China’s militarization of the SCS has been a **gradual process**, where alternative actions by the United States, as well as other countries, could have changed the course of history.

#### Impact

#### Causes ECS conflict, draws in the US to Sino-US War – destabilizing leads to large scale conflict which would go nuclear

**Fatton 18** (Lionel P. Fatton – Webster University Geneva; Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University. <KEN> “A new spear in Asia: why is Japan moving toward autonomous defense?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. Volume 0, (2018). DOA: 12/30/19. 1–29 doi: 10.1093/irap/lcy006)

The evolutions of Japan’s defense posture could have destabilizing consequences for the Asia-Paciﬁc region as well. The high level of distrust, if not hostility, between China and Japan since the end of the Second World War has portended spiraling tensions caused by action–reaction dynamics between competitive defensive measures (Samuels, 2007). The US–Japan alliance has mitigated this security dilemma by guaranteeing Japan’s survival and acting as a ‘bottle cap’ on the resurgence of Japanese militarism (Christensen, 2011, 236). A militarily more autonomous and powerful Japan would alarm China. The ‘egg shell’ perception, which has gained momentum in Beijing since the mid-1990s and posits that the alliance is an incubator of Japanese rearmament, would strengthen (Christensen, 2011, 236). Not only would Sino Japanese relations deteriorate due to the prospect of Japan’s revival as a great power, US–China relations would also be undermined by Beijing’s recognition of the alliance as a destabilizing factor. The United States and China, the world’s two largest economic and military powers, are widely regarded as holding the faith of the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Japan is often dropped out of the equation despite its disruptive potential. A more autonomous Japan does not only raise the prospect of a military clash with China in the East China Sea, it also increases the likelihood of a Sino-American war. The US–Japan alliance could become the thread between an emotionally-charged territorial dispute and what would be a cataclysmic great power conﬂict (Miller, 2015). Deng Xiaoping said in the late 1970s that half of heaven would fall if Japan and China were to ﬁght each other. Today, the whole heaven would collapse if the United States were embroiled.