### **1**

#### **Here is our thesis - Settlement of indigenous land by Western colonizers was not just another event in history but a structuring of a “logic of elimination” re-entrenched everyday by Western structures of law and government – the affirmative’s actions deepens the settler state and extends its biopolitical control of life**

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria Morgensen, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 2011)

Settler colonialism is exemplary of the processes of biopower theorised by Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault. However, settler colonialism remains naturalised within theories of biopower and theories of its relation to coloniality. White supremacist settler colonisation produces specific modes of biopolitics that sustain not only in settler states but also in regimes of global governance that inherit, extend, and naturalise their power. I extend Patrick Wolfe’s theory that a ‘logic of elimination’ constitutes settler colonialism in the genocide and amalgamation of Indigenous peoples, by indicating that this also indigenises and naturalises white settler nations as projections of the West. Agamben’s work illuminates how Indigenous peoples are eliminated in a state of exception to Western law, which by functioning to erase consanguinity – as the patriarch in Roman law eliminates the defiant son – explains Indigenous peoples’ seemingly contradictory incorporation within and excision from the body of white settler nations. This biopolitical process specific to settler colonialism also structures the manner in which white settler societies demonstrably universalize Western law, both within their bounds and in global arenas. My call to denaturalise settler colonialism in social theory is but a first step towards broader study of how the biopolitics of settler colonialism structure current modes of biopower and require concerted critique at the intersections of Indigenous and settler colonial studies. If, following Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism produces settler societies by pursuing the elimination of Indigenous peoples via amalgamation and replacement, then it is exemplary of biopower. Adapting Giorgio Agamben, we find that Europeans establish Western law and a new People on settled land by practicing an exception to the law that permits eliminating Indigenous peoples while defining settlers as those who replace.1 Settler colonialism performs biopower in deeply historical and fully contemporary ways. As scholars increasingly theorise biopower as definitive of our times, with many insisting that this quality of biopower is colonial, we must confront our inheritance of settler colonialism as a primary condition of biopower in the contemporary world. The work of Michael Foucault and Agamben and of their interlocutors must be resituated within a new genealogy of settler colonialism that can shift interpretations of biopower today. For more than five hundred years, Western law functioned as biopower in relation to ongoing practices of European settler colonialism. Settler colonialism has conditioned not only Indigenous peoples and their lands and the settler societies that occupy them, but all political, economic and cultural processes that those societies touch. Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonisation, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance. If settler colonialism is not theorised in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalised in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it. Settler colonialism can be denaturalised by theorising its constitution as biopower, as well as how it in turn conditions all modern modes of colonialism and biopower. My argument critically shifts recent theories of the coloniality of biopower by centreing settler colonialism in analysis. Wolfe has observed in histories of the Americas that a settler colonial ‘logic of elimination’ located Indigenous Americans relationally, yet distinctly from Africans in the transatlantic slave trade or colonised indentured labour, thereby illuminating (as Mark Rifkin notes) the ‘peculiar’ status of Indigenous peoples within the biopolitics of settler colonialism.2 Western law is troubled once European subjects are redefined as settlers in relation to the Indigenous peoples, histories, and lands incorporated by white settler nations. I argue that this tension is engaged productively by Agamben’s tracing of the state of exception to homo sacer, and notably its derivation in Roman law from a thesis of consanguinity. I adapt this quality to illuminate why and how Western law incorporates Indigenous peoples into the settler nation by simultaneously pursuing their elimination. I further argue that these deeply historical processes ultimately enact biopower as a persistent activity of settler states that were never decolonised and of the global regimes that extend and naturalise their power. By the twentieth century – amid a formal demise of colonial empires, putative decolonisation of the global South, and global capitalist recolonisation – the universalisation of Western law as liberal governance was ensured by the actions of settler states. A genealogy of the biopolitics of settler colonialism will explain that the colonial era never ended because settler colonialism remains the naturalised activity projecting Western law and its exception along global scales today. Theories of the biopolitical state, regimes of global governance, and the war on terror will be insufficient unless they critically theorise settler colonialism as a historical and present condition and method of all such power. THEORISING SETTLER COLONIAL BIOPOWER Foucault and Agamben theorised biopower as a present activity that inherits and transforms the deeply historical conditions of Western law. Foucault incited this theory by examining the modern proliferation of procedures to produce the life of the nation in relation to deadly regulation of its others, a process that he argued displaces the power of the sovereign ‘to take life or let live’ with a governmentality that enacts ‘the power to “make” live or “let” die’.3 Judith Butler emphasises that, for Foucault, governmentality in the modern state or in global regimes acts as an ‘extra-legal sphere’ – ‘an art of managing things and persons, concerned with tactics, not laws’ – that then ‘depends upon “the question of sovereignty” no longer predominating over the field of power’.4 Hence, governmentality acts in the name of the very sovereignty that it exceeds, producing ‘a lawless sovereignty as part of its own operation of power’.5 Agamben adapts Foucault’s account of modern biopower as governmentality when he claims that its extra-legal appearance is a recent adaptation of qualities intrinsic to Western law; as he says, ‘it can even be argued that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power’.6 Citing the Roman legal origins of Western law, Agamben links sovereignty to a power to designate subjects of the law as homo sacer, the sacred man who may be killed without being sacrificed or made subject to homicide. The placement of homo sacer in a zone of ‘bare life’ establishes Western law precisely by placing it in abeyance in this case. The sacred man enters a ‘state of exception’ to the law that simultaneously reinforces its rule. Agamben notably defines the exception by reference to the camp as ‘in a decisive way the political space itself of modernity’, which by forming a permanent ‘space for (bare) life’ creates a ‘materialization of the state of exception’ as ‘the rule’.7 Agamben thus reinterprets the biopolitics of the modern state as an effect of Western law’s constitution by the state of exception. In this reading, the function of governmentality to ‘make life’ is compatible with the state of exception remaining intrinsic to law, as consigning certain subjects to a state of bare life (‘let die’) reestablishes a power to produce and defend life among those who remain. Yet significant tensions appear in the work of Foucault and Agamben – and, hence, also in Agamben’s revision of Foucault – in that neither scholar directly theorises colonialism as a context for biopower. Scholars of colonialism respond by arguing that colonialism is intrinsic to processes of biopower in the past and present. Reading Foucault’s account of the modern biopolitical state in relation to colonial situations, Ann Laura Stoler definitively demonstrated that its racial, sexual and national power arise at colonial sites or relationally among colonies and metropoles, not as projections from a European source.8 Following Stoler, modern biopower is the product and process of a colonial world. Achille Mbembe extended such reinterpretations of Foucault in conversation with Agamben by reading the colony as exception, which defines Western law amid the globalisation of European capital and empire.9 Sherene Razack and Sunera Thobani engage all such theories to explain that in contemporary modes of biopower, the colonial returns or never left; and, notably, both centre settler colonialism as a condition of the power they examine.10 Mark Rifkin signally engages Agamben’s theses with settler colonialism by arguing that the ‘geopolitics’ of conquest place Indigenous peoples in a state of exception that simultaneously troubles the territorial and national integrity of settlers as representatives of Western law.11 Together, these scholars respond to colonialism’s elision in theories of biopower by demonstrating that it conditions biopower and critical theory – an intervention deepened by Rifkin’s and my work centreing settler colonialism for study. Addressing these critiques requires adjusting the very advance of Agamben’s argument that biopower is intrinsic to Western law. Michael Dillon identifies a lingering ahistoricity in Agamben’s ‘ontologization’ of Western law that he argues would benefit from a return to Foucault’s genealogical method, which for Katia Genel will result in ‘revisiting and complicating Agamben’s formulations and more complexly applying them’.12 Theorising biopower from within a genealogy of settler colonialism will trace how deeply historical procedures in Western law confronted the specificities of the era of European settlement and shifted in response. In such a genealogy Agamben remains crucial, given that scholars of settler colonialism may trace biopower to situations that existed prior to the eighteenth and nineteenth century era that Foucault linked to the rise of the modern biopolitical state. Already in the sixteenth century and across the Americas, settler colonialism grew to condition colonialism and biopower in settler and other societies worldwide. The continuity of settler colonialism at these sites up to the present then demonstrates that this periodisation meaningfully explains biopower today. Patrick Wolfe’s theorisation of settler colonialism already incites a genealogy of its biopolitical form. Arguing that ‘settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure, not an event’, Wolfe explains that assertions of sovereignty by settlers ground Western law in ‘a logic of elimination’.13 Noting that scholars after Raphael Lemkin tend to correlate genocide with extermination, Wolfe argues that settler colonialism performs genocide alongside a variety of practices that converge on a purposed elimination of Indigenous peoples.14 While the erasure and replacement of Indigenous peoples may transpire through deadly violence, Wolfe emphasises that elimination may follow efforts not to destroy but to produce life, as in methods to amalgamate Indigenous peoples, cultures and lands into the body of the settler nation. As Wolfe and Katherine Ellinghaus explain, this amalgamation precisely narrows or erases the possibility of distinctive Indigenous nationalities challenging the prerogative of the settler nation that means to replace them on, now, ‘its own’ lands.15

#### 2 links:

#### First, the labor movement is built on the exploitation of indigenous populations. The aff’s “right to strike” only seeks to benefit the settler labor movement. Settler labor movements fight for higher wages and living standards while simultaneously exploiting indigenous labor and excluding indigenous workers from the labor market. The collective dispossession of the indigenous population ties the settler community together through settler quietism. The aff’s foundational assumptions are complicit in the destructive of Native life and governance.

Englert 20 [Englert, S. Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands (2020), Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession. Antipode, 52: 1647-1666. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12659>]

Dispossession – deprive of land

In order to reflect on the particular nature of accumulation by dispossession within a settler colonial context, another issue should be raised: that of the internal social relations within settler colonial societies. Indeed, **the most striking aspect of settler colonial societies is the development of a colonial polity in which settlers live, produce, and reproduce themselves socially**. They do so on the back of the dispossession of indigenous populations **through which they acquire land, resources, and, depending on the context, labour. This—perhaps obvious—characteristic leads to the development of internal class relations and conflicts, alongside confrontations between settlers and indigenous peoples.** **The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession**.3 In fact, more often than not, **settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars,** boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, **bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter [and] attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.**4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. **If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources.** For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. **Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty.** In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. ([2012](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0014):83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society … **In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies.** If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. **It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers**. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. **The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession.** **This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.**[5](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-note-1005_77) **This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot.** Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon ([2001](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0011)) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. **This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards.** Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that**, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations.** This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine. The specificity of Zionism in the history of settler colonialism, its lack of a colonial metropolis, had real consequences for the Zionists in Palestine. Firstly, it could not impose—at first—its control over the land through military force. Secondly it could not organise the transfer of populations to the colony in the same way a state could. In the words of Shafir ([1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0041):155): “Zionism, then, was a colonisation movement which simultaneously had to secure land for its settlers and settlers for its land”. The dual need for land and labour was at the heart of many political developments in the Yishuv. If the question of land was resolved first through acquisition from largely absentee land owners and then (and most extensively) through military violence, the question of immigration came close several times to bringing the whole colonial project to its knees, as the European Jewish population tended to reject Zionism as a political response to the poverty and discrimination they faced. Two distinct political responses emerged within the early settler population. On the one hand, the Jewish farmers and their sponsors hoped to develop a cash crop producing agricultural sector focused on export to Europe and the exploitation of cheap Palestinian workers. This vision was based, as demonstrated by Shafir ([1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0041)), on the model of other European projects—especially the French settler colonies of North Africa. On the other hand, the nascent Labour Zionist movement demanded better wages and working conditions for Jewish workers in Palestine, which they argued would be the only way to attract and retain new settlers. This, they claimed, necessitated full separation between the Jewish and Palestinian sectors, removing thereby the “unfair competition” of the cheaper indigenous labour force. This led to the development of a series of new Labour Zionist institutions to organise this “Conquest of Hebrew Labour”, by organising strikes, pickets, and boycotts of Jewish owned businesses that employed Palestinian workers or sold products made by them. The Kibbutzim, the Histadrut,[6](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-note-1006_81) and the early Zionist militias were all born out of the process of organising this campaign (Lockman [1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0024)). For example, the Histadrut’s constitution, passed at its founding congress, made clear that it was a Zionist body committed to the project of settlement through the development of an exclusively Jewish society. It stated that the Histadrut’s goal was to: … unite all the workers and labourers in the country who live by their own labour without exploiting the labour of others, in order to arrange for all settlement, economic and also cultural affairs of all the workers in the country, so as to build a society of Jewish labour in Eretz Yisra’el. (quoted in Lockman 1996:68) The similarity between the logic of this statement and that of the white South African strikers mentioned above is remarkable. This struggle—waged against Palestinian workers and Jewish farmers—led to a partial victory for the Labour Zionist movement (Lockman [2012](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0025)). Key industries, such as construction and agriculture, were taken over by Labour Zionist institutions such as Solal Boneh and the Kibbutzim. At the same time, Jewish representation in colonial institutions was increased through collaboration with the British Mandate authorities especially in the context of crushing the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The Labour Zionists took over the Yishuv’s political leadership and created a dominant Jewish sector, without however being able to establish a fully segregated one. It did set in motion the logic of separation as well as laying the infrastructure for a Jewish state, which would be made a reality by its militias’ military violence and mass expulsion of Palestinians during the Nakba. This case study shows that the Labour Zionist movement developed on the basis of opposing Jewish farmers as well as Palestinian workers, a political focus that also shaped its key institutions. The campaign for Hebrew Labour also demonstrates that the “elimination of the native” in the settler colonial context is not a given, as in the Wolfe-an framework, but the outcome of a specific set of struggles that pit both the indigenous population against the settlers, as well as different settler classes against one another.

#### Secondly, the idea of a “just government” is rooted in settler futurity – governments are and will always be intrinsically settler colonialist because settler colonialism is a structure, not an event

Wolfe 06 Patrick Wolfe is an Australian anthropologist and ethnographer whose work sparked a surge in studies of settler colonial societies,12-21-2006 “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240

As practised by Europeans, **both genocide and settler colonialism have typically employed the organizing grammar of race.** European xenophobic traditions such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, or Negrophobia are considerably older than race, which, as many have shown, became discursively consolidated fairly late in the eighteenth century.2 But the mere fact that race is a social construct does not of itself tell us very much. As I have argued, **different racial regimes encode and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans coerced the populations concerned. For instance, Indians and Black people in the US have been racialized in opposing ways that reflect their antithetical roles in the formation of US society.** Black people's enslavement produced an inclusive taxonomy that automatically enslaved the offspring of a slave and any other parent. In the wake of slavery, this taxonomy became fully racialized in the “one-drop rule,” whereby any amount of African ancestry, no matter how remote, and regardless of phenotypical appearance, makes a person Black. **For Indians, in stark contrast, non-Indian ancestry compromised their indigeneity, producing “half-breeds,” a regime that persists in the form of blood quantum regulations. As opposed to enslaved people, whose reproduction augmented their owners' wealth, Indigenous people obstructed settlers' access to land, so their increase was counterproductive. In this way, the restrictive racial classification of Indians straightforwardly furthered the logic of elimination. Thus we cannot simply say that settler colonialism or genocide have been targeted at particular races, since a race cannot be taken as given. It is made in the targeting.3 Black people were racialized as slaves; slavery constituted their blackness. Correspondingly, Indigenous North Americans were not killed, driven away, romanticized, assimilated, fenced in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the original owners of the land but as Indians.** Roger Smith has missed this point in seeking to distinguish between victims murdered for where they are and victims murdered for who they are.4 **So far as Indigenous people are concerned, where they are is who they are, and not only by their own reckoning. As Deborah Bird Rose has pointed out, to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home.5 Whatever settlers may say—and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element.** **The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that.** In common with genocide as Raphaël Lemkin characterized it,6 settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. **Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base—as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.**7 In its positive aspect, elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence. **The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism.** Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others. Settler colonialism destroys to replace. As Theodor Herzl, founding father of Zionism, observed in his allegorical manifesto/novel, “If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct.”8 In a kind of realization that took place half a century later, one-time deputy-mayor of West Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti recalled, “As a member of a pioneering youth movement, I myself ‘made the desert bloom’ by uprooting the ancient olive trees of al-Bassa to clear the ground for a banana grove, as required by the ‘planned farming’ principles of my kibbutz, Rosh Haniqra.”9 Renaming is central to the cadastral effacement/replacement of the Palestinian Arab presence that Benvenisti poignantly recounts.10 Comparably, though with reference to Australia, Tony Birch has charted the contradictory process whereby White residents sought to frustrate the (re-) renaming of Gariwerd back from the derivative “Grampians” that these hills had become in the wake of their original owners' forcible dispossession in the nineteenth century.11 Ideologically, however, there is a major difference between the Australian and Israeli cases. The prospect of Israeli authorities changing the Hebrew place-names whose invention Benvenisti has described back to their Arabic counterparts is almost unimaginable**. In Australia, by contrast (as in many other settler societies), the erasure of indigeneity conflicts with the assertion of settler nationalism. On the one hand, settler society required the practical elimination of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory.** On the symbolic level, however, settler society subsequently sought to recuperate indigeneity in order to express its difference—and, accordingly, its independence—from the mother country. **Hence it is not surprising that a progressive Australian state government should wish to attach an indigenous aura to a geographical feature that bore the second-hand name of a British mountain range. Australian public buildings and official symbolism, along with the national airlines, film industry, sports teams and the like, are distinguished by the ostentatious borrowing of Aboriginal motifs. For nationalist purposes, it is hard to see an alternative to this contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed Aboriginality.** The ideological justification for the dispossession of Aborigines was that “we” could use the land better than they could, not that we had been on the land primordially and were merely returning home. One cannot imagine the Al-Quds/Jerusalem suburb of Kfar Sha'ul being renamed Deir Yasin. Despite this major ideological difference, however, Zionism still betrays a need to distance itself from its European origins that recalls the settler anxieties that characterize Australian national discourse. Yiddish, for instance, was decisively rejected in favour of Hebrew—a Hebrew inflected, what is more, with the accents of the otherwise derided Yemeni mizrachim. Analogously, as Mark LeVine has noted, though the Zionist modernization of the Arab city of Jaffa was intended to have a certain site specificity, “in fact Jaffa has had to be emptied of its Arab past and Arab inhabitants in order for architects to be able to reenvision the region as a ‘typical Middle Eastern city’.”12

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best opens up spaces for indigenous future making – Western rationalism within education spaces like debate are part of a colonial power matrix – a traditional policymaking paradigm outsources agency to a supposedly-neutral “zero point” that perpetuates epistemological detachment and colonization

#### Therefore, an alternative that relinquishes all settler futurity and gives all of the land back is the only ethical action – embrace the ethic of incommensurability and refuse reconciliation

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

*when you take away the punctuation*

*he says of*

*lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land*

*its acreage and location*

*you take away its finality*

*opening the possibility of other futures*

-Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

### 2

#### Uniqueness

#### Innovation is high now and it’s imperative to keep it up

Mercury News et al Mercury News & East Bay Times Editorial Boards, 6/4/21, "Editorial: How America can win the global tech war," Mercury News, <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/04/editorial-why-silicon-valley-needs-endless-frontier-bill/>

The nation that wins the global tech race will dominate the 21st century. This has been true since the 1800s. Given the rapid pace of innovation and tech’s impact on our economy and defense capabilities in the last decade, there is ample evidence to suggest that the need for investment in tech research and development has never been greater. China has been closing the tech gap in recent years by making bold investments in tech with the intent of overtaking the United States. This is a tech war we cannot afford to lose. It’s imperative that Congress pass the Endless Frontier Act and authorize the biggest R&D tech investment in the United States since the Apollo years. Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Santa Clara, made a massive increase in science and technology investment a major part of his platform while campaigning for a seat in Congress in 2016. Now the co-author of the 600-page legislation is on the cusp of pushing through a bipartisan effort that has been years in the making. Khanna and his co-authors, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., are shepherding the bill through the Senate, which is expected to approve it sometime later this month. That would set up a reconciliation debate between the House and Senate that would determine the bill’s final language. The ultimate size of the investment is still very much up in the air. Khanna would like Congress to authorize $100 billion over a five-year period for critical advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and other cutting-edge technologies. The Senate is talking of knocking that number down to $50 billion or $75 billion. They should be reminded of China Premier Li Keqiang’s March announcement that China would increase its research and development spending by an additional 7% per year between 2021 and 2025. The United States still outspends China in R&D, spending $612 billion on research and development in 2019, compared to China’s $514 billion. But the gap is narrowing. At the turn of the century, China was only spending $33 billion a year on R&D, while the United States was spending nearly 10 times that amount.

#### Links

#### Aff increases violent union strikes which kill productivity in tech companies

Chaithra Hanasoge, No Date, "The Union Strikes: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," Supply Wisdom, <https://www.supplywisdom.com/resources/the-union-strikes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/>

The strike witnessed several instances of social disorder, violence and clashes, ultimately calling for third party intervention (Secretary of Labor – Thomas Perez) to initiate negotiations between the parties. Also, as a result of the strike, Verizon reported lower than expected revenues in the second quarter of 2016. Trade unions/ labor unions aren’t just this millennia’s product and has been in vogue since times immemorial. Unions, to ensure fairness to the working class, have gone on strike for better working conditions and employee benefits since the industrial revolution and are as strong today as they were last century. With the advent of technology and advancement in artificial intelligence, machines are grabbing the jobs which were once the bastion of the humans. So, questions that arise here are, what relevance do unions have in today’s work scenario? And, are the strikes organized by them avoidable? As long as the concept of labor exists and employees feel that they are not receiving their fair share of dues, unions will exist and thrive. Union protests in most cases cause work stoppages, and in certain cases, disruption of law and order. Like in March 2016, public servants at Federal Government departments across Australia went on a series of strikes over failed pay negotiations, disrupting operations of many government departments for a few days. Besides such direct effects, there are many indirect effects as well such as strained employee relations, slower work processes, lesser productivity and unnecessary legal hassles. Also, union strikes can never be taken too lightly as they have prompted major overturn of decisions, on a few occasions. Besides the Verizon incident that was a crucial example of this, nationwide strikes were witnessed in India in March and April this year when the national government introduced reforms related to the withdrawal regulations and interest rate of employee provident fund, terming it as ‘anti-working class’. This compelled the government to withhold the reform for further review. In France, strike against labor law reforms in May turned violent, resulting in riots and significant damage to property. The incident prompted the government to consider modifications to the proposed reforms.

#### And, I.T. unions are unnecessary, but kill tech companies innovation

Vynck etal Gerrit De Vynck, Nitasha Tiku and Jay Greene , 4-30-2021, "Six things to know about the latest efforts to bring unions to Big Tech," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/tech-unions-explainer/> Gerrit De Vynck is a tech reporter for The Washington Post. He writes about Google and the algorithms that increasingly shape society. De Vynck also helps lead The Post's coverage of ransomware and misinformation. He previously covered tech for seven years at Bloomberg News.

Well before the digital era, the area now known as Silicon Valley was the largest fruit-producing region in the world and a hotbed of labor activity. That changed when tech took over in the 1960s. Robert Noyce, the founder of Intel, laid out the industry’s union-skeptical position early on. “Remaining nonunion is essential for survival for most of our companies. If we had the work rules of union companies, we’d all go out of business,” Noyce once said, according to “[Silicon Valley Fever](https://books.google.com/books/about/Silicon_Valley_Fever.html?id=frYrAAAAYAAJ),” a 1984 book chronicling the tech industry’s early years. Noyce’s position has remained an article of faith ever since. For tech founders, the ability to shift their businesses quickly, hiring and firing as needed and paying workers with stock options instead of offering traditional salaries and benefits, is key to success. In his book “Temp,” Cornell University history professor Louis Hyman argues that the use of contractors in Silicon Valley is an extension of that mind-set, allowing companies to downsize quickly without looking as though they were laying off hundreds of employees. Most Silicon Valley leaders still see their industry as a true meritocracy, where employees are generously compensated, can easily switch jobs and don’t need a union to advocate for them. But a growing number of activists both inside and outside the companies don’t agree. Union advocates say discrimination faced by women and people of color at the tech companies proves the need for stronger worker protections. Unions can also be a way for workers to have their voices heard about the issues they have with decisions executives are making, such as which politicians to give money to or whether to sell software to the military and police.

#### Impact

#### Tech innovation key to solve every existential threat – outweighs on probability and magnitude

Dylan Matthews; dylan@Vox.com, 10-26-2018, "How to help people millions of years from now," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good>

But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X