#### FRAMEWORK (2:25)

#### I value morality as per the evaluative term ought in the resolution defined as a moral obligation.

#### [1] If we do not analyze ourselves in our relationship to the other, we foreclose the possibility of understanding the range of human behavior and render action unintelligible so ascribing moral status is impossible. By remembering the relations between the other and ourselves, we recognize our own capacity to act in a similar way. We become responsible when we suspend judgements for the other and instead work toward self-knowledge Butler 1

Butler, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003.

So, according to the kind of theory I have been pursuing here, **what will responsibility look like?** Haven’t we, by insisting on something non-narrativizable, limited the degree to which we might hold ourselves or others accountable for their actions? I want to suggest thatthe very meaning of responsibility must be rethought on the basis of this limitation; it cannot be tied to the conceit of a self fully transparent to itself.1 Indeed, **to take responsibility for oneself is to avow the limits of any self-understanding, and to establish these limits** not only as a condition for the subject but **as the predicament of the human community.** I am not altogether out of the loop of the Enlightenment if I say, as I do, that reason’s limit is the sign of our humanity. It might even be a legacy of Kant to say so. **My account of myself breaks down,** and surely for a reason, **but that does not mean that I can supply all the reasons that would make my account whole. Reasons course through me** that I cannot fully recuperate, that remain enigmatic, **that abide with me as my own familiar alterity**, my own private, or not so private, opacity. **I speak as an ‘‘I,’’ but do not** make the mistake of thinking that I **know precisely all that I am doing** when I speak in that way. I ﬁnd that **my very formation implicates the other in me,** that my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. Do I need to know myself in order to act responsibly in social relations? Surely, to a certain extent, yes. But is there an ethical valence to my unknowingness? If I am wounded, I ﬁnd that the wound testiﬁes to the fact that I am impressionable, given over to the other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control.

#### [2] This means the self only forms in relation to the Other and the norms that govern our recognition of one another. Butler 2

Butler, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003.

In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over- looked the fact that **the very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other**-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-**but also on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other** sees and listens and knows and **recognizes is** also **subject to a critical opening.** This opening calls into ques- tion the limits of established regimes of truth, where a certain risking of the self be- comes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue [see Foucault].Whether or not the Other is singular, **the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability.** So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, the norms are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they introduce a disorien- tation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition as an encounter. For if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you, for instance, then I take seri- ously that the recognition comes from me. But **in the moment that I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone**, that I did not singlehandedly make them, **then I am,** as it were, **dispossessed by the language that I offer**. In a sense, **I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use.**

#### [3] Dependence on the Other means self-understanding is always interrupted and must be reformed through the narratives we give ourselves—other ethical theories erase this fundamental incompleteness of the subject. Butler 3

Butler, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003.

In a sense, **my account of myself is never fully mine, and** is never fully **for me, and** I would like to suggest that **this "interruption" of the account always takes place through a loss of the sense of its being mine** in any exclusive way**.** This interruption and dispossession of my perspective as mine can take place in different ways. **There is the operation of a norm**, invariably social, **that conditions** what will and will not be **a recognizable account.** And there can be no account of myself that does not, to some extent, conform to norms that govern the humanly recognizable, or that negotiate these terms in some ways, with various risks following from that negotiation. But, as I will try to explain later, **it is also the case that I give an account to someone, and that the addressee** of the account, real or imaginary, also **functions to interrupt the sense of this account of myself as mine.** If it is an account of myself, and it is an accounting to someone, then I am compelled to give the account away, to send it off, to be dispossessed of it at the very moment that I establish it as my account.No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, anonymous and unspeci- fied. **If I try to give an account of myself**, if I try to make myself recognizable and understandable, then **I might begin with a narrative account of my life, but this narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine**, or what is not mine alone. And **I will**, to some degree, **have to make myself substitutable in order to make myself recognizable.** The narrative authority of the "I" must give way to the perspective and temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story. We can surely still tell our stories-and there will be many reasons to do precisely that-but we will not be able to be very authoritative when we try to give an account with a narrative structure. **The "I" cannot tell the story of its own emergence**, and the conditions of its own possibility, **without in some sense bearing witness to a state of affairs to which one could not have been present, prior to one's own becoming**, and so narrating that which one cannot know. Fictional narration requires no referent to work as narrative, and we might say that the irrecoverability of the referent, its foreclosure to us, is the very condition of possibility for an account of myself, if that account is to take narrative form. It does not destroy narrative but produces it precisely in a fictional di- rection. So to be more precise, I would have to say that I can tell the story of my origin and even tell it again and again, in several ways; but **the story of my origin I tell is not one for which I am accountable, and it cannot establish my accountability.** At least, let's hope not, since, over wine usually, I tell it in various ways, and the accounts are not always consistent with one another. Indeed, it may be that to have an origin means precisely to have several possible versions of the origin-I take it that this is part of what Nietzsche meant by the operation of genealogy. Any one of those are possible narratives, but of no single one can I say with certainty that it is true.

#### [4] Since value is grounded in social norms, certain lives are recognized as grievable and thus valuable. However, other lives are cast aside by social structures and rendered ungrievable. This is the ultimate misrecognition because it means that their life was not one even considered in moral calculations.  Butler 4

Butler, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003.

**Conditions** have to be sustained, which means that they exist not as static entities, but **as reproducible social institutions and relations.** We would not have a responsibility to maintain conditions of life if those conditions did not require renewal. Similarly,frames are subject to an iterable structure-they can only circulate by virtue of their reproducibility, and that very reproducibility introduces a structural risk for the identity of the frame itself.The frame breaks with itself in order to reproduce itself, and its reproduction becomes the site where a politically consequential break is possible. Thus, the frame functions normatively, but it can, depending on the specific mode of circulation, call certain fields of normativity into question. Such **frames structure modes of recognition**, especially during times of war, **but their limits** and their contingency **become subject to** exposure and **critical intervention as well.** Such frames are operative in imprisonment and torture, but also in the politics of immigration, **according to which certain lives are perceived as lives while others**, though apparently living, **fail to assume perceptual form as such. Forms of racism** instituted and active at the level of perception tend to **produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable.** The differential distribution of grievability across populations has implications for why and when we feel politically consequential affective dispositions such as horror, guilt, righteous sadism, loss, and indifference. Why, in particular, has there been within the US a righteous response to certain forms of violence inflicted at the same time that violence suffered by the US is either loudly mourned (the iconography of the dead from 9/11) or considered inassimilable (the assertion of masculine impermeability within state rhetoric)? **If we take the precariousness of life as a point of departure, then there is** no life without the need for shelter and food, no life without dependency on wider networks of sociality and labor, **no life that transcends injurability and mortality.** 10 We might then analyze some of **the cultural tributaries** of military power during these times as **attempt**ing **to maximize precariousness for others** while minimizing precariousness for the power in question. This differential distribution of precarity is at once a material and a perceptual issue, since **those whose lives are not "regarded" as potentially grievable, and hence valuable, are made to bear the burden of starvation, underemployment, legal disenfranchisement, and differential exposure to violence and death**Y It would be difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether the "regard"-or the failure of "regard"-leads to the "material reality" or whether the material reality leads to the failure of regard, since it would seem that both happen at once and that such perceptual categories are essential to the crafting of material reality (which does not mean that all materiality is reducible to perception, but only that perception carries its material effects).

#### The standard is recognizing the grievability of life.

#### Prefer my standard- agency is intersubjective- this means ethics based on a presupposed notion of self fail- any notion of ethics that grounded in the identity of humans as moral beings requires the recognition that others are also moral beings, which means denying intersubjectivity implicitly denies even self- based ethical systems- Butler literally is drawing upon Kant.

#### Several implications-

#### Aggregation fails- My framework evaluates whether or not actions are consistent with the recognition of lives as grievable, not whether they produce results consistent with grievability. This means the aff doesn’t evaluate the consequences of the right to protect confidential sources, it simply says that recognizing the right is consistent with recognizing the grievability of those lives. And, misrecognition is a subjective experience that creates violence through a lack of ontological subjectivity- this means aggregation is incoherent because there is no way to assign a value to recognition of subjectivity.

#### Oppression-My framework controls the internal link to any oppression impacts- the aff sets up the ontological explanation for what creates systems of oppression and how to avoid them so only adhering to the aff framework can account for discrimination and violence.

#### Weighability-It is incoherent to say that one instance of misrecognition comes before another because there is no way to ascribe a numerical value to ontological violence- A) impacts to identity politics reproduce frames of violence by failing to interrupt the static nature of group identity and B) identity politics only reinscribes the notions of “otherization” that allows dominant groups to maintain power

#### Butler is resolutionally justified because the resolution itself asks us to recognize an unconditional right of workers meaning it’s the only fw that defines recognizability

#### Advocacy (:30)

#### A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. Parameters are explained by

**Findlaw**, 5-2-**2017**, Labor Strike FAQs, <https://www.findlaw.com/employment/wages-and-benefits/labor-strike-faqs.html>

Definition of worker and strike, explains process: For **a strike** to occur, **a** [union or **group of workers**](https://www.findlaw.com/smallbusiness/employment-law-and-human-resources/unions-basics.html) **begins negotiations with an employer**. A threat of strike action is the main weapon that the workers has—**essentially the workers will walk off the job if their collective demands are not met**. For a strike to occur, **union leadership must call for a strike, which can only occur if enough union members have voted for the strike**. Each individual union has rules dictating what percentage of workers must vote for a strike in order for it to occur. Once the workers strike and stop coming to work, the business might shut down and feel financial strain, **which puts pressure on the employer and gives the workers leverage in the negotiations.**

#### And, strikes are the omission of action

Walter **Benjamin**, On Violence, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, **1986**, Walter Benjamin is recognized as one of the most acute analysts of literary and sociological phenomenon of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He died in 1940

This is above all the case in the class struggle, in the form of the workers' guaranteed right to strike. **Organized labor is, apart from the state, probably today the only legal subject en­titled to exercise violence. Against this view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction, which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence**. Such a consideration doubtless made it easier for a state power to conceive the right to strike, once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an action, or service, where it amounts simply to a "severing of relations," can be an entirely nonviolent, pure means. **And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right to strike conceded to labor is certainly not a right to exercise violence but, rather, to escape from a violence indirectly exercised by the employer**, **strikes conforming to this may undoubtedly occur from time to time and involve only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer.** The mo­ment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or only superficially modify it. Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its bitterness in face of a revolu­tionary general strike. In this, labor will always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse, since the right to strike was not "so intended," and take emer­gency measures.

#### I also accept procedural recognition by states that are considered full democracies as a standard for determining just governments, their recognition is explain by Longman

https://www.ldoceonline.com/Government-topic/recognitionDictionary in the context of governments

**the**[**act**](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/act)**of**[**realizing**](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/realize)**and**[**accepting**](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/accept)**that something is**[**true**](https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/true)**or important**

#### Here’s a list of full democracies as defined by The Economist – we have charts 😊!!

https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/democracy-index-2020.pdf

Norway, Iceland, Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, Australia, Netherlands, Taiwan, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Germany, Uruguay, United Kingdom, Chile, Austria, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Japan, Spain, South Korea

Table

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#### Offense (:46)

#### Limitations on strikes hinder the discussions of domestic labor and discrimination that happened within the household.

Howard, ‘21 [Sally Howard is a journalist specializing in gender and human rights. Published: 3/14/21, “How can women get equality? Strike!”, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2021/mar/14/how-can-women-get-equality-strike> ]

On 24 October 1975, 75,000 women in Iceland left their jobs, children and homes and took to the streets for a general strike that was billed “Women’s Day Off”. In Reykjavik, 30,000 women marched up the Laugavegur (wash road), as a women’s brass band played the marching tune from Shoulder to Shoulder, a British TV series about the suffragettes which had recently aired in this small Nordic nation. Flyers fluttered against clear autumn skies: “We march because it is commonly said about a housewife: ‘She is not working, she is just keeping house’,” they read. “We march because the work experience of a housewife is not considered of any value in the labour market.” For Icelandic men, this day became known as the “Long Friday”. With no women to staff desks and tills, banks, factories and many shops were forced to close, as were schools and nurseries – leaving many fathers with no choice but to take their children to work. There were reports of men arming themselves with sweets and colouring crayons to entertain the swarms of children in their workplaces, or bribing older children to look after their siblings. Sausages (easy to cook, of course, and a hit with children the world over) were in such demand that shops sold out; children could be heard giggling in the background while male newsreaders reported the day’s events on the radio. Many of the greatest successes of feminism have come in moments when boots were on the ground; and our bodies elsewhere to the posts ascribed to women by patriarchal capitalism. In the UK, public reaction to the sexual violence meted out against the 300 women who marched to parliament demanding women’s suffrage on 18 November 1910, Black Friday, was instrumental in gaining the vote for women. The 1968 strike by [Ford’s women sewing machinists at Dagenham](https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/06/made-in-dagenham-yes-but-women-went-on-strike-in-halewood-too), which was followed by 1970 strikes by women clothing workers in Leeds, were landmark labour-relations dispute that triggered the passing of the [Equal Pay Act 1970](https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2020/may/25/29000-annual-claims-50-years-equal-pay-act). Yet domestic labour has always been a tricky injustice to protest against. It takes place in the privacy of the home, making it difficult for women to see each other doing this work and to collectively acknowledge that men do not share equally in its burden (and they don’t: the average British woman still contributes 60% more washing, wiping and childcare a week than the average British man, even as the pandemic has increased this work to around nine hours per day). And there can also be dire consequences if we withdraw this labour: children uncared for and vulnerable relatives unfed. “A women’s strike is impossible; that is why it is necessary,” claims Women’s Strike Assembly (WSA), an activist alliance that, to mark last week’s [International Women’s Day](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/08/international-womens-day-equality-pandemic), called for a series of banner memorials to be erected around the UK to declare why #westrike as women (or, just as importantly, why we can’t). In a manifesto published in November, WSA wrote: “We strike because we are tired of our labour being taken for granted. We strike because we now have to do a triple shift: our paid work, our unpaid domestic labour and educating our children during the pandemic.”

#### Black womxn have been historically excluded from work place protections. In order to provide them with what they need, we must increase the availability of such protections to create through giving them grievability.

Banks, ‘19 [Nina Banks is an associate professor of economics and member of the Department of Women’s & Gender Studies and Africana studies at Bucknell University, Published: 2/19/2019, “Black women’s labor market history reveals deep-seated race and gender discrimination”, Economic Policy Institute, <https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/> ]

The black woman’s experience in America provides arguably the most overwhelming evidence of the persistent and ongoing drag from gender and race discrimination on the economic fate of workers and families. Black women’s labor market position is the result of employer practices and government policies that disadvantaged black women relative to white women and men. Negative representations of black womanhood have reinforced these discriminatory practices and policies. Since the era of slavery, the dominant view of black women has been that they should be workers, a view that contributed to their devaluation as mothers with caregiving needs at home. African-American women’s unique labor market history and current occupational status reflects these beliefs and practices. Compared with other women in the United States, black women have always had the highest levels of labor market participation regardless of age, marital status, or presence of children at home. [In 1880](https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/2643657/Goldin_FemaleLabor.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y), 35.4 percent of married black women and 73.3 percent of single black women were in the labor force compared with only 7.3 percent of married white women and 23.8 percent of single white women. Black women’s higher participation rates extended over their lifetimes, even after marriage, while white women typically left the labor force after marriage. Differences in black and white women’s labor participation were due not only to the societal expectation of black women’s gainful employment but also to labor market discrimination against black men which resulted in lower wages and less stable employment compared to white men. Consequently, married black women have a long history of being financial contributors—even co-breadwinners—to two-parent households because of black men’s precarious labor market position. Black women’s main jobs historically have been in low-wage agriculture and domestic service.[1](https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/#_note1) Even after migration to the north during the 20th century, most employers would only hire black women in domestic service work.[2](https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/#_note2) Revealingly, although whites have devalued black women as mothers to their own children, black women have been the most likely of all women to be employed in the low-wage women’s jobs that involve cooking, cleaning, and caregiving even though this work is associated with mothering more broadly. Until the 1970s, employers’ exclusion of black women from better-paying, higher-status jobs with mobility meant that they had little choice but to perform private domestic service work for white families. The 1970s was also the era when large numbers of married white women began to enter into the labor force and this led to a marketization of services previously performed within the household, including care and food services. Black women continue to be overrepresented in service jobs. Nearly a [third (28 percent) of black women](https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat10.htm) are employed in service jobs compared with just one-fifth of white women. Discriminatory public policies have reinforced the view of black women as workers rather than as mothers and contributed to black women’s economic precarity. This has been most evident with protective welfare policies that enabled poor lone white mothers to stay at home and provide care for their children since the early 20th century. These policies were first implemented at the state level with Mother’s Pensions and then at the national level with the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Up until the 1960s, caseworkers excluded most poor black women from receiving cash assistance because they expected black women to be employed moms and not stay-at-home moms like white women.[3](https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/#_note3) This exclusion meant that for most of the history of welfare, the state actively undermined the well-being of black families by ensuring that black women would be in the labor force as low-wage caregivers for white families. This helped to secure the well-being of white families and alleviated white women of having to do this work. The state simultaneously undermined the well-being of black families by denying black mothers the cash assistance that they needed to support their children and leaving black women with no other option but to work for very low wages. Indeed, the backlash against poor black moms receiving cash assistance eventually culminated in the dismantling of the AFDC program and the enactment of TANF—a program with strict work requirements.[4](https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/#_note4) Because of discriminatory employer and government policies against black men and women, black mothers with school-age children have always been more likely to be in the labor force compared with other moms. Today, 78 percent of black moms with children are employed compared with an average of just 66 percent of white, Asian American, and Latinx moms.[5](https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/#_note5) Although black women have a longer history of sustained employment compared with other women, in 2017, the median annual earnings for full-time year-round black women workers was [just over $36,000](https://www.epi.org/blog/10-years-after-the-start-of-the-great-recession-black-and-asian-households-have-yet-to-recover-lost-income/)—an amount 21 percent lower than that of white women, reflecting black women’s disproportionate employment in low-wage service and minimum and sub-minimum wage jobs. Black families, however, are more reliant on women’s incomes than other families are since [80 percent of black mothers](http://www.nationalpartnership.org/our-work/resources/workplace/fair-pay/african-american-women-wage-gap.pdf) are breadwinners in their families. Despite black women’s importance as breadwinners, the state has compounded the lack of protections afforded black mothers by failing to protect black women as workers.[6](https://www.epi.org/blog/black-womens-labor-market-history-reveals-deep-seated-race-and-gender-discrimination/#_note6) In fact, state policies have often left black women vulnerable to workplace exploitation by excluding them from various worker protections. New Deal minimum wage, overtime pay, and collective bargaining legislation excluded the main sectors where black women worked—domestic service and farming. Although there have been inclusions since then, these sectors still lack full access to worker protections. The legacy of black women’s employment in industries that lack worker protections has continued today since black women are concentrated in low-paying, inflexible service occupations that [lack employer-provided](http://www.globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Wealth-Gap-for-Women-of-Color.pdf) retirement plans, health insurance, paid sick and maternity leave, and paid vacations. Over a third (36 percent) of black women workers lack [paid sick leave](https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/iwpr-export/publications/B356.pdf). All workers—especially the most vulnerable—need workplace protections, including minimum wages that are livable wages. Universally available family-friendly workplace policies would be especially beneficial to women given their care responsibilities: paid sick and parental leave, subsidized child and elder care, and flexible work options.

#### Solvency (:44)

**History proves – strikes are method of grievability that disrupt patriarchal power structures.  
SocialistWorker 19** ["When Women Workers Lead the Way,” 3-5-2019, <https://socialistworker.org/2019/03/05/when-women-workers-lead-the-way>]//GirlsDebate

In 1911, more than 1 million working men and women marked International Working Women’s Day in Germany, Austria, Denmark and Switzerland. As the Russian revolutionary Alexandra Kollantai later recounted: Its success succeeded all expectation. Germany and Austria on Working Women’s Day was one seething, trembling sea of women. Meetings were organized everywhere — in the small towns and even in the villages, halls were packed so full that they had to ask male workers to give up their places for the women. This was certainly the first show of militancy by the working woman. Men stayed at home with their children for a change, and their wives, the captive housewives, went to meetings. During the largest street demonstrations, in which 30,000 were taking part, the police decided to remove the demonstrators’ banners: the women workers made a stand. In the scuffle that followed, bloodshed was averted only with the help of the socialist deputies in parliament.

**Strikes give a voice to the most marginalized womxn – the grievability of sex workers prove**

Grant 17 [Melissa Gira Grant, covers sexual politics, technology, and human rights as a Pacific Standard contributing writer. "Women’s Right to Refuse," 3-7-2017, Pacific Standard, <https://psmag.com/news/womens-right-to-refuse>]//GirlsDebate

The call went out just weeks ago for a women’s strike in the United States. March 8th, International Women’s Day, would be marked by “striking, marching, blocking roads, bridges, and squares, abstaining from domestic, care, and sex work, boycotting, calling out misogynistic politicians and companies, striking in educational institutions,” as Linda Martín Alcoff, Cinzia Arruzza, Tithi Bhattacharya, Nancy Fraser, Barbara Ransby, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Rasmea Yousef Odeh, and Angela Davis called for in a collective statement published by the Guardian. To many American women, this kind of action may have appeared out of reach. But their vision, a next step in escalating women’s demands for a “feminism of the 99%,” is a necessary refusal, and one that women across the country have already set into motion. Women have been striking for a long time, even if the American women’s movement has not been at the lead. Social change tactics like strikes or other forms of direct action have fallen out of mainstream feminist use, in favor of awareness-raising, calls to Congress, and the casting of a ballot every four years. “Our present situation is in some ways closer to the situation in 1908, when the first women’s strikes were led by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union,” wrote Magally A. Miranda Alcazar and Kate D. Griffiths, two of the strike organizers, in The Nation. “Was it a privilege for garment workers to strike then? Would it be a privilege for us to strike now?” As organizers met last month to plan actions for the March 8th strike, some American women writers, like Sady Doyle and Meghan Daum, claimed the strike would have relevance to only the most privileged of women. But such cautions, framed as gestures of inclusion, disregard the women who are already at the forefront of direct actions to demand dignity and rights: As part of the Fight for 15, as water protectors in North Dakota, in “Day Without an Immigrant” strikes, in the Movement for Black Lives. There is nothing new in demands for women to strike; it’s just that when women interrupt business as usual in support of labor rights — and to challenge xenophobia and white supremacy, at that — the women’s movement has not always considered those actions as taken in the name of “women’s rights.” Striking is about breaking with routine and stopping everyday time. Such a break can also turn our attention to the past, to what women have risked before us. Out of a series of strikes and occupations, the international sex workers’ rights movement was born in the 1970s and ’80s, led by a group of women in Lyon, France. “We were at our wits end,” one said (in testimony available now in the radio documentary, La Revolte des Prostituees). “We were sick of going to jail, of being abused.” So they stopped work on June 2nd, 1975, and 150 of them — “the women prostitutes of Lyon,” they called themselves in a letter to the French president — occupied a church to demand police stop arresting them, fining them, jailing them, and separating them from their families and children. Their strike and occupation lasted 10 days, and they were joined by hundreds more sex workers across France, striking and occupying churches in solidarity. Though it has largely been forgotten as a landmark moment for women’s rights, that strike at the time made international headlines and sparked a movement of sex workers around the world. On March 8th, sex workers will strike again. “Women sex workers have been part of the ‘feminism of the 99%’ since the very beginning of time,” declared the sex workers’ rights organizations Empower Foundation (Thailand) and English Collective of Prostitutes (United Kingdom). Sex workers are explicitly acknowledged as workers in the U.S. Women’s Strike platform (as they were, despite attempts to remove them, by the U.S. Women’s March). “For sex workers to strike recognizes sex work as work but our call goes further,” says Laura Watson from the English Collective of Prostitutes. “We are striking for the freedom to work and to not work in sex work. So we are striking against poverty, discrimination, and criminalization that institutionalizes us in sex work. We are striking against the low wages and exploitation in other jobs that means sex work is our best option. We are striking alongside other women because we are the same women — mothers, domestic workers, farm workers, factory workers — our struggles are the same.” Like other women workers in the service sector, particularly in the informal and criminalized economy, sex workers who will strike are far from “privileged.” As Watson explains, “sex work is often irregular and precarious with no sick pay, strike pay, or other benefits, which is why the strike call takes into consideration women’s circumstances. Some women will go on strike, others will charge double, others will take action for however long they can and in different ways — putting a broom outside their premises [a symbol adopted by the U.K. women’s strike href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/03/wear-red-down-tools-and-buy-local-for-international-womens-day"]; or joining the international call to wear black clothes, ribbon, a hat.” In the U.S., sex workers have answered the call in that spirit. The US PROS Collective and the Sex Workers’ Outreach Project announced plans to join women’s strike actions in San Francisco and Oakland. “I’m striking from my straight job, turning off Niteflirt, and not booking sessions,” says Red, an organizer with Support Ho(s)e in Chicago, “and I will be speaking at a rally that evening about the criminalization of sex work, stolen prison labor, and why this shit has to stop.” For Red, the strike is essential because “femme labor is often made invisible, sex worker’s labor is made criminal; something’s got to give.” Jacq, a stripper in New York, says that, on March 8th, “I intend to masturbate, have lunch with my former work wives at a women-owned restaurant, and march in Central Park. I plan to spend the evening finishing Redefining Realness by Janet Mock. I won’t be humoring any men.” Storm, an escort in Atlanta, wrote to me on Twitter she’s “just taking a day to love me, my kids and to be free with no responsibility for one day!” It’s not Wednesday yet. But it is clear that many of the women workers already committed to the March 8th women’s strike are precisely the ones who have much to lose. Domestic workers will strike by wearing red, writes Ai-jen Poo of the National Domestic Workers’ Alliance, if they have to work. If they can strike from work, they will also be joining events like the Women Workers’ Rising rally in Washington, alongside striking women health-care workers, restaurant workers, and other service workers. Already two school districts — in Alexandria City in Virginia and Chapel Hill-Carrboro in North Carolina — have announced they will close for the day due to the number of teachers expected to participate in the women’s strike. Only a few weeks ago, did any of this seem likely? Maybe it wasn’t meant to. “First,” organizers Cinzia Arruzza and Tithi Bhattacharya wrote on February 21st, “we want to bring back the idea of the impossible.”

**Strikes are part and parcel of feminist movements. The International Women's Day proves that strikes galvanize millions of womxn.  
SocialistWorker 19** ["When Women Workers Lead the Way,” 3-5-2019, <https://socialistworker.org/2019/03/05/when-women-workers-lead-the-way>]//GirlsDebate

FOR YEARS, International Women’s Day on March 8 would pass by without notice in the U.S. beyond a small number of leftists. Most people who noticed on their calendar probably assumed it had something to do with women’s history, but didn’t think much more. But the radical holiday has been revived in recent years, especially in the era of Trump. In 2017 and 2018, the historic outpouring of the Women’s Marches was followed up with an international call to strike and protest on March 8. The highlight last year came in the Spanish state, where an incredible 5.2 million women took part in what was called a two-hour “feminist strike.” This year, the celebration of working women will be more fitting than ever right here in the U.S., the country where the left-wing holiday was born out of workers’ struggles. The teacher strike wave that began in West Virginia last winter is now over one year old, and it shows no sign of breaking yet. Educators, unionists and socialists were still digesting the lessons of the victorious Los Angeles teachers’ strike in January and unprecedented wins at — count ’em — three charter schools in four months. The long-awaited teachers’ strike in Oakland is over after shaking the Bay Area city with big mobilizations — though the debate over whether the union could have won more is more intense than previous battles in this strike wave. One of prime lesson stands out everywhere: women workers have led the way, just as they did in many early battles of the U.S. labor movement. These teachers’ strikes are about saving public education from the privatizers and reversing decades of austerity policies that have starved our schools and so much else in the neoliberal period. But they also show us that women’s demands and rights must be taken up as part and parcel of the class struggle, just as the class struggle must be connected to achieving women’s rights and equality.

#### Method (1:21)

#### The resolution asks a normative question, It does not ask if there are multiple methods to resolution, only if the principle of the resolution is moral.

#### The rez denotes situational action but situations inform our norm.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution – 5 warrants

#### 1] Definitions – five dictionaries define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true – three implications

#### A] Predictability - Debating about the truth is semantically grounded and is therefore the most predictable and fair – fairness is good bc debate is a competitive activity, which necessitates an equal and fair playing field for all competitors

#### B] Jurisdiction – the only thing the judge can do definitionally when the judge affirms or negates the resolution is looking to truth and falsity as per the definitions of affirm or negate

#### C] it’s intrinsic to the nature of debate

#### 2] Inclusivity - Truth testing is the most inclusive as almost any argument can prove a resolution true or false – inclusivity is good bc it encourages people to stay in debate, meaning that the activity wouldn’t exist without it

#### 3] Binary Objectivity – truth and falsity are clear objectives for both debaters and is therefore the most objective – subjective ideas like weighing mean the judge is forced to intervene to decide what impact is larger

#### 4] Logic – any other paradigm collapses to truth testing – to say that “x is best” is to say that “it is true that x is best”, meaning that truth is logically intrinsic to communication

#### 5] Purpose – the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolution-al focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity – presupposes a prescriptive interp of the res and debate because we’re saying debate excludes prescriptions

#### Prefer this method for several reasons:

#### a) A priori truths true in all possible worlds by the laws of definition and non-contradiction and are preferable to a posteriori truths which are contingent upon circumstances and not true in all possible circumstances. Thus, arguments about contingent faults of particular programs are irrelevant.

**Muhit 2011**, Md. Abdul Muhit (Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Dhaka), “Leibniz on Necessary and Contingent Truths,” The Arts Faculty Journal, July 2010-June 2011, file:///C:/Users/richa/Downloads/12936-47243-1-PB.pdf

However, it is to be mentioned here that Leibniz does recognize the existence of negative necessary truths, and he attempts to fit them into his “identity” theory of necessity by introducing in the New Essays, the expression “negative identities”. Examples of negative identities are the following: “What is A cannot be not-A”; “An equilateral rectangle cannot be a nonrectangle”; “It is true that every man is an animal, therefore, it is false that there is a man who is not an animal.” These, Leibniz says, are true by the principle of contradiction or identity. Thus it appears that Leibniz’s “identity criterion” is not in fact so restrictive as to exclude negative necessary truths, and that these do not constitute a real difficulty for this doctrine (Ibid, 92). According to Leibniz, **necessary truths, being analytic in character, are true under all conditions or circumstances. They are true of “all possible worlds”,** depending on God’s intellect and not on His will. **God could not create a world in which the ;shortest distance between two points in a plane was not a straight line**, but this is not a limitation to His freedom, but simply recognition of the nature of His intellect. Now to say that all truths of reason are concerned with the sphere of possibility is to say that they are not existential propositions. **Truths of reason state what would be true of any case, whereas true existential propositions depend on** God’s choice of **one particular possible world**. The exception to the rule that truths of reason are not existential propositions is the proposition that God is a possible being. For to state that God is possible is to state that God exists. Apart from this exception no truths of reason affirm existence of any subject. Leibniz writes: “That God exists, **that all right angles are equal to one another, etc., are necessary truths, but that I exist and that there are bodies in nature that actually appear to have right angles are contingent truths**” (Ariew and Garber 193).

#### Underview (:12)

#### No omissions: violations and K links must come from the text of the AC, not the absence of doing something i.e. not spec-ing – A] I have a limited time to speak so it’s an infinite aff burden especially since neg can read bidirectional T or spec, B] Incentivizes friv uplayering which kills substantive ed