# Meadows R1 NC

### 1 – T

#### Interp: Medicines are substances used to prevent, diagnose, or treat harms.

**MRS 20** [(MAINE REVENUE SERVICE SALES, FUEL & SPECIAL TAX DIVISION) “A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE SALES AND USE TAX LAW” <https://www.maine.gov/revenue/sites/maine.gov.revenue/files/inline-files/Reference%20Guide%202020.pdf> December 2020] SS

[Medicines](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/medicines) means antibiotics, analgesics, antipyretics, stimulants, sedatives, antitoxins, anesthetics, antipruritics, hormones, antihistamines, certain “dermal fillers” (such as BoTox®), injectable contrast agents, vitamins, oxygen, vaccines and other substances that are used in the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of disease or injury and that either (1) require a prescription in order to be purchased or administered to the retail consumer or patient; or (2) are sold in packaging.

#### Medicines solely refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### Violation: CRISPR is a platform technology, not a medicine.

Editas Medicine [(a clinical-stage biotechnology company which is developing therapies based on CRISPR–Cas9 gene editing technology)., No Date, CRISPR Gene Editing, <https://www.editasmedicine.com/crispr-gene-editing/>] Justin

CRISPR (pronounced “crisper”) is an acronym for “Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeats,” and refers to a recently developed gene editing technology that can revise, remove, and replace DNA in a highly targeted manner. CRISPR is a dynamic, versatile tool that allows us to get to and edit nearly any location in the genome, and has the potential to help us develop medicines for people with a wide variety of diseases. We view CRISPR as a “platform” technology because of its ability to target DNA in any cell or tissue.

#### Negate –

#### 1] Limits – their model explodes it to medical devices, any form of strategy for medical research, databases that are used to create medicines and more – only our definition creates a reasonable caselist for medicines while they make prep impossible and wreck engagement

#### 2] Precision – MRS is a legal definition of medicines from codified law and has intent to define which proves we’re right and consistent with topic lit

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

### 2 – DA

**COVID vaccine debate will kill the WTO, but the aff reverses that instability.**

**Meyer 6-18-21** (David, Senior Writer, https://fortune.com/2021/06/18/wto-covid-vaccines-patents-waiver-south-africa-trips/)

The World Trade Organization **knows all about crises**. Former U.S. President Donald Trump threw a wrench into its core function of resolving trade disputes—a blocker that President Joe Biden has not yet removed—and there is widespread dissatisfaction over the **fairness of the global trade rulebook**. The 164-country organization, under the fresh leadership of Nigeria's Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has a lot to fix. However, **one crisis is more pressing than the others**: **the battle over COVID-19 vaccines**, and whether the protection of their patents and other intellectual property should be temporarily lifted to boost production and end the pandemic sooner rather than later. According to some of those pushing for the waiver—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—**the WTO's future rests on what happens next.** "The credibility of the WTO will depend on its ability to find a meaningful outcome on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production," says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's ambassador to the WTO. "Final nail in the coffin" The Geneva-based WTO isn't an organization with power, as such—it's a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It's supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995. The WTO's founding agreement allows for rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members agreed in 2003 to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively made permanent in 2017.) Consensus is the key here. Although the failure to reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75% supermajority vote by the WTO's membership, this would be an **unprecedented and seismic event**. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—the U.S. recently flipped from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, as did France. It's a dispute between countries, but the result will be on the WTO as a whole, say waiver advocates. "If, in the face of one of humanity's greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally becomes an obstacle as in contrast to part of the solution, I think **it could be the final nail in the coffin**" for the organization, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements. "If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being **part of the solution**—saving lives and livelihoods—it could **create** **goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems**." Those problems are legion. Reform needs Top of the list is the WTO's Appellate Body, which hears appeals in members' trade disputes. It's a pivotal part of the international trade system, but Trump—incensed at decisions taken against the U.S. —blocked appointments to its seven-strong panel as judges retired. The body became completely paralyzed at the end of 2019, when two judges' terms ended and the panel no longer had the three-judge quorum it needs to rule on appeals. Anyone who hoped the advent of the Biden administration would change matters was disappointed earlier this year when the U.S. rejected a European proposal to fill the vacancies. "The United States continues to have systemic concerns with the appellate body," it said. "As members know, the United States has raised and explained its systemic concerns for more than 16 years and across multiple U.S. administrations." At her confirmation hearing in February, current U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reiterated those concerns—she said the appellate body had "overstepped its authority and erred in interpreting WTO agreements in a number of cases, to the detriment of the United States and other WTO members," and accused it of dragging its heels in settling disputes. "Reforms are needed to ensure that the underlying causes of such problems do not resurface," Tai said. "While the U.S. [has] been engaging [with the WTO] it hasn't indicated it would move quickly on allowing appointments to the Appellate Body," says Bryan Mercurio, an economic-law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who opposes the vaccine waiver. "This is not a good sign. In terms of WTO governance, it's a much more important step than supporting negotiations on an [intellectual property] waiver." It's not just the U.S. that wants to see reform at the WTO. In a major policy document published in February, the EU said negotiations had failed to modernize the organization's rules, the dispute-resolution system was broken, the monitoring of countries' trade policies was ineffective, and—crucially—"the trade relationship between the U.S. and China, two of the three largest WTO members, is currently largely managed outside WTO disciplines." China is one of the key problems here. It became a WTO member in 2001 but, although this entailed significant liberalization of the Chinese economy, it did not become a full market economy. As the European Commission put it in February: "The level at which China has opened its markets does not correspond to its weight in the global economy, and the state continues to exert a decisive influence on China's economic environment with consequent competitive distortions that cannot be sufficiently addressed by current WTO rules." "China is operating from what it sees as a position of strength, so it will not be bullied into agreeing to changes which it sees as not in its interests," says Mercurio. China is at loggerheads with the U.S., the EU and others over numerous trade-related issues. Its rivals don't like its policy of demanding that Chinese citizens' data is stored on Chinese soil, nor do they approve of how foreign investors often have to partner with Chinese firms to access the country's market, in a way that leads to the transfer of technological knowhow. They also oppose China's industrial subsidies. Mercurio thinks China may agree to reforms on some of these issues, particularly regarding subsidies, but "only if it is offered something in return." All these problems won't go away if the WTO manages to come up with a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies, Wallach concedes. "But," she adds, "**the will and the good faith** to tackle these challenges is **increased enormously** if the WTO has the **experience of being part of the solution, not just an obstacle."** Wallach points to a statement released earlier this month by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade ministers, which called for urgent discussions on the waiver. "The WTO must **demonstrate that global trade rules can help address the human catastrophe** of the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitate the recovery," the statement read in its section about WTO reform. Okonjo-Iweala's role The WTO's new director general, whose route to the top was unblocked in early 2021 with the demise of the Trump administration, is certainly keen to fix the problems that contributed to the early departure of her predecessor, Brazil's Robert Azevedo. "We must act now to get all our ambassadors to the table to negotiate a text" on the issue of an IP waiver for COVID vaccines, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, director general of the World Trade Organization, has said. Dursun Aydemir—Anadolu/Bloomberg/Getty Images Earlier this week, when the U.S. and EU agreed a five-year ceasefire in a long-running dispute over Boeing and Airbus aircraft subsidies, Okonjo-Iweala tweeted: "With political will, we can solve even the most intractable problems." However, Mercurio is skeptical about her stewardship having much of an effect on the WTO's reform process. "Upon taking [over she] stated it was time for delegations to speak to each other and not simply past each other, but at the recent General Counsel meeting delegations simply read prepared statements in what some have described as the worst meeting ever," he says. "On the other hand, Ngozi is very much someone who will actively seek solutions to problems, and in this way different to her predecessor. If the role of mediator is welcomed, she could have an impact not in starting discussions but in getting deals over the finish line." A spokesperson for the WTO Secretariat declined to offer comment on Mlumbi-Peter and Wallach's suggestions that the organization's credibility rests on the vaccine patent waiver issue, but pointed to a May speech in which Okonjo-Iweala said the WTO could help tackle vaccine supply chain monitoring and transparency, helping manufacturers scale up production, and creating a more geographically diversified manufacturing base. In her speech, the WTO chief also said members "must address issues related to technology transfer, knowhow and intellectual property," including the waiver proposal. "We must act now to get all our ambassadors to the table to negotiate a text," she said.

#### WTO collapse solves extinction

Hilary 15 John Hilary 2015 “Want to know how to really tackle climate change? Pull the plug on the World Trade Organisation” <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/want-to-know-how-to-really-tackle-climate-change-pull-the-plug-on-the-world-trade-organisation-a6774391.html> (Executive Director, War on Want)//Elmer

Yet this grandiose plan soon fell victim to its own ambition. The WTO’s first summit after the launch of the Doha Round collapsed in acrimonious failure. The next was marked by pitched battles in the streets of Hong Kong as riot police fought Asian farmers desperately trying to save their livelihoods from the WTO’s free trade agenda. The WTO slipped into a coma. Government ministers must decide this week whether to turn off its life support. The answer is surely yes. It was the WTO’s poisonous cocktail of trade expansion and market deregulation that led to the economic crisis of 2008. Years of export-led growth resulted in a crisis of overproduction that could only be sustained with mountains of debt. The parallel deregulation of financial services meant that this debt soon turned out to be toxic, and the world’s banking system went into freefall. Nor is the WTO fit for purpose on ecological grounds. If last week’s climate talks in Paris taught us anything, it is that we must rethink the model of ever-expanding production and consumption in order to avoid planetary meltdown. Global capitalism may need limitless expansion in order to survive, but the planet is already at the very limits of what it can take. The choice is ours. Worst of all, it is the WTO’s ideology of unrestricted trade and corporate domination that lies behind all the bilateral trade deals that are proliferating at the moment, including the infamous Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). We need a radically different model of regulated trade and controlled investment if we are to have any chance of breaking the cycle of economic and ecological crisis. For the planet to survive, the WTO must die.

### 3 – K

#### The 1AC is a graveyard of failed policies and a failed system – we are here to haunt it. Our institutions are dead. Every policy “reform” is haunted by ghosts of neoliberal ideologies.

#### Checks and balances no longer exist – our policymakers hide their intentions to uphold the system under veils of progressivism, making conflict inevitable.

Atticus 20 (Atticus – Member of International Communist Tendency. January, 24th 2020. “Against Pacifism” <http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020>, DOA: 6/3/20, kbb)

The first and principal error of the pacifist supporters of the capitalist order lies in the notion that parliamentary politicians have the ability to meaningfully combat capitalist militarism. As is well-known, however, parliamentary bodies comprise only a small fraction of the true extent of the state, and are really only a shallow veneer. True capitalist power lies not in the hands of elected politicians but instead in a complex, bureaucratic, and intertwined web of unaccountable civil servants, shadowy intelligence bodies, and international alliances and collectives. Indeed, televised debates within grand palaces and marble buildings are often merely a distraction from the real functions and decisions of governance, many of which take place behind closed doors. In Pannekoek’s words: "One could no longer manage against imperialism with the old means. In parliament, one could criticize its manifestations (such as armaments, taxes, reaction, the standstill of social legislation), but one could not influence its policy because it was not made by the parliaments but by small groups of people (in Germany, the Kaiser along with some nobles, generals, ministers and bankers; in England, three or four aristocrats and politicians; in France, a few bankers and ministers). The unions could hardly ward off the powerful business associations; all the skill of their officers broke apart against the granite-power of the cartel-magnates. The reactionary election laws could not be shaken through elections alone. New means of struggle were necessary. The proletarian masses themselves had to enter the stage with active methods of struggle." Consider as an example the political bodies of the United States. Even a cursory examination reveals the inherent unaccountability of the American war machine; though the US Constitution prescribes that only Congress has the power to declare war, the last time such a declaration was made was December 8, 1941. This of course hasn’t stopped the American military from engaging in countless imperialist exploits over the past eighty years, establishing military bases in every corner of the world and funding proxy militias when unwilling to intervene directly. Arms sales do not even have the honor of being voted on in Congress, and are instead approved by unelected State Department officials; for a recent example see the US sale of three and a half billion dollars worth of missiles to Turkey as aid in its genocidal cleansing of the Kurds.[2](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote2_ajpie92) In many cases, courses of military action are decided on by deeply unaccountable international alliances, with NATO and the UN Security Council two of the most prominent (the military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, for instance, was strictly a NATO operation, and did not involve official declarations of war from any of its constituent powers despite employing military forces from over a dozen countries). Even when bills and resolutions appear claiming to guarantee the end of this or that US military operation, they are often either vetoed or else ignored. As two recent examples, Trump has claimed repeatedly in the past year that he is withdrawing American troops from Syria, and yet a majority of American troops remain.[3](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote3_q4ynbxp) Conversely, Congress last year passed a resolution to end American military involvement in Yemen; this was immediately vetoed and subsequently ignored by Trump.[4](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote4_xgfw3bs) Even if Trump had supported the bill, there’s little guarantee it would have meant an end to American military presence in the region: NATO still officially supports the Saudi blockade, and independent intelligence agencies like the CIA are able to conduct military operations without the knowledge or approval of US Central Command.[5](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote5_wq34nwu) And most recently, the assassination of Soleimani was carried out without Congressional approval, under the pretext of "self-defense" against an "imminent" attack from Iran.[6](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote6_1531ei9) The point here is that the bourgeoisie will not bow to the whims of elected officials, and that the supposed “checks and balances” of the US government are a complete fabrication that, if anything, serve only to cement capital’s hold on the political functioning of a nation. This kind of pattern is repeated in liberal democracies the world over, and the notion that some benevolent social democrat can with a wave of their hands overcome the immense bureaucratic structures that lurk behind the capitalist state is entirely utopian. This state of affairs is part of a much larger trend – the degeneration of bourgeois democracy from a progressive force to a reactionary one – and today Lenin’s description of parliamentary bodies as “hollow talking shops” rings more true than ever. Marxists must have no faith in the capitalist state, and support for bourgeois parliamentarians – far from obstructing the forces of capital – instead strengthens their grip by sowing illusions of the reformability of un-reformable institutions. The Bourgeois Party Form Hence, insofar as they cannot offer any solutions to imperialist war, parliamentary parties are today obsolete, and participation within them must instead be superseded by militant action of the working class. Some, however, might protest that the latter can be supplemented or enhanced by the former – that there is still merit in participation in bourgeois parties as a platform by which to spread Marxist ideas. This is, on the one hand, a tactic that reeks of opportunism – how else can one describe lining up behind capitalist factions for the sake of selling a few extra papers? On the other, it is a fantasy; to see why, it is important to understand the fundamental nature of the bourgeois party. Pannekoek describes this eloquently: "[T]he whole nature of a large, fully developed party, of which German Social Democracy is the model, … is an entrenched gigantic organization, functioning almost as a state within the state, with its own officers, finances, press, intellectual world and ideology. The general character of this organization is adapted to the peaceful pre-imperialist period; the mainstays of this character are the officials, secretaries, agitators, parliamentarians, theorists and writers, numbering several thousand individuals who already constitute a distinct caste, a group with their own interests who thereby totally dominate the organization spiritually and materially. It is no coincidence that they all, with Kautsky at their head, want to know nothing about a real and fierce struggle against imperialism. All their vital interests are opposed to the new tactic, which threatens their existence as officials. Their peaceful work in offices and editorial departments, in congresses and committee meetings, in writing learned and unlearned articles against the bourgeoisie and against each other – this whole peaceful hustle and bustle is threatened by the storms of the imperialist era. Kautsky’s theory and tactics are an attempt to secure this whole bureaucratic-learned apparatus against injury in the coming social revolutions." In other words, the very existence and livelihood of the parliamentarian rests on their ability to quell proletarian militancy. So, when the pacifist politician argues that parliament and legislative bills alone are enough to combat imperialism, it is not that they are the friends of imperialist war, or consciously lying – on the contrary, no one can doubt their sincerity in denouncing mass slaughter, carpet bombings, and famine – but instead that their political program is one that inherently requires capitalism for its existence, and so can only argue for tactics that preserve capitalist relations. In short, they have been duped into acting as capital’s unwilling lapdogs, promising change that they are unable to deliver and hence diverting the revolutionary proletariat from its necessary tasks. As soon as liberal democracy lost its progressive and revolutionary character, so then emerged its fundamental and inexorable opposition to industrial action, and to think that the careerist parliamentarian will promote the mass action of the working class – a tactic that renders their existence obsolete and against which their very being is opposed – is folly. Expecting bourgeois parties to vitalize or enable industrial militancy is therefore a significant mistake; their interests lie inherently in dissuading the proletariat from revolutionary action. Only a clean break from capitalist functionaries can promote revolutionary politics. Anti-Imperialism or Anti-Capitalism? There is a further and equally fundamental error in these bourgeois pacifist tendencies: an understanding of imperialism that centers analysis on the atrocities of imperialist wars rather than their causes. Let us recall the role that war plays for capital; initially, in capitalism’s early stages, war most often took the form of direct colonialism and capitalist expansion. As Rosa Luxemburg wrote in 1900, “as long as there were countries marked by internal political division or economic isolation that had to be destroyed, militarism played a revolutionary role […] the opening of new countries to capitalism.”[7](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote7_jh11bne) This was the underpinning of the “New Imperialism” of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, marked by rapid militaristic expansion into Africa and Asia, brutal subjugation of native peoples, and investment in extraction industries for an industrial capitalism that demanded greater quantities of cheap raw materials. By the time of World War I, however, capitalism had effectively expanded to fill the entire globe, and so the role served by war here was not just about the continued ability of imperialist powers to leech surplus value and natural resources from their colonies, and, on the other, to devalue vast quantities of constant capital and hence maintain a rate of profit against the mounting crises and contradictions of the world market but was also intended to deny other imperialists access to their spheres of influence. (For a more detailed explanation of this understanding of imperialism and world economy, see footnote[8](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote8_cbu1h1l).) There are two important lessons to understand here: first, that modern capitalism demands war – and indeed cannot survive without it. The second is that imperialism is not merely a military relationship, but, at a more fundamental level, an economic one; war is simply the symptom of crisis in a world economy that demands constant expansion in finite space. Imperialism is therefore not defined by carpet bombings and invasions, but by the international trade relationships that demands them. In particular, when we speak of imperialism, we do not mean only NATO’s or Russia’s bombings in the Middle East to shore up oil contracts, but the actual oil contracts themselves. Thus emphasis on imperialist barbarism, though again understandable, therefore gets things the wrong way round, and centers effect over cause. An example of this lies in China’s extensive investments in sub-Saharan Africa; these have not been arranged by military force, and indeed do not involve bombs or troops. (See footnote[9](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote9_a36xjxp) for an analysis of Chinese investments in the continent.) Yet does this preclude them from making China one of the dominant imperialist powers in the world today? Of course not, though certainly some “tankies” would argue otherwise. Marxists recognize that a crisis of accumulation to which capitalism has no economic answer is bound to drive other major imperialist powers to take a closer interest in investment in African resources. This will inevitably lead to further military conflict than exists, raining fire and devastation down on the local population. In other words, war is the inevitable consequence of capitalist development, and so a fight against the former that does not also fight for an alternative to the latter is doomed to fail. The relationship between the two is in fact even tighter today than it was in 1916. Capitalism has developed significantly over the last century, and the contemporary world market is more interconnected and intertwined than ever before in history. Large capitalist banks, cartels, and quasi-monopolies span every inch of the map, and a slew of overlapping trade and investment bodies – the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, European Union, North American Free Trade Association, and others – draw together the bourgeoisie of nearly every nation in the world. Taken all in all, it is a staggering and overwhelming network of bourgeois power. Far from reducing imperialist tensions or promoting peaceful coexistence of the capitalist classes, however, as Kautsky predicted it would do, this interconnectedness and entanglement has instead proved a potent catalyst for imperialist aggression. There is a simple reason for this; as each sector of international industry depends more crucially on the others, even the slightest perturbation or disturbance in one is enough to cause catastrophe in the rest. So, for instance, when Islamist militias take control of Basra, Iraq – a central hub for dozens of oil pipelines and refineries – the disruptions ripple across the globe, shaking international capital and forcing an acute military response from imperialist powers. Another clear example of this lies in the United States’ relations with Venezuela through the turn of the century. Chávez’s rise to power in 1999 barely altered Venezuelan oil exports to the United States by barrel, which remained steady up through Venezuela’s crisis in late 2009.[10](http://libcom.org/blog/against-pacifism-24012020#footnote10_yjand4d) Even so, this comparatively minuscule obstruction was enough to provoke a drastic response from the American bourgeoisie, who’ve poured significant funds and energy into removing the Chavista regime for nearly two decades now. Today the nation faces the prospect of a direct military invasion from American forces. Why were such minor changes in oil exports so jarring to American capital? Precisely because the world market is more intricately interlocked than ever before, and thus more sensitive than ever to the smallest of changes. There is therefore a direct relationship between the financial entanglement of the global market and its fragility. Today, with the world capitalism monstrously gargantuan and unwieldy, this makes the peaceful coexistence of capitalist states entirely impossible, and the international bourgeoisie at every turn faces the choice of either war or crisis, and often both. Crucially, however, this renders entirely utopian a struggle against imperialism that fails to orient against capitalism, and razes in a single fell swoop the hope that even the most benevolent of capitalist politicians can prevent capital’s demand for endless war. Today it is often no longer even the individual capitalist – merely a glorified and entirely replaceable administrator – who seeks out imperialist wars, but instead the far more insatiable appetite of international capital itself.

#### Their attempt at controlling disease is a neoliberal pipedream that is used by our institutions to distract away from the fact that they are the root cause.

Giroux, Henry. "The COVID-19 Pandemic Is Exposing The Plague Of Neoliberalism." Socialist Project. April 08, 2020. Web. August 20, 2021. https://socialistproject.ca/2020/04/covid19-pandemic-exposing-plague-ofneoliberalism).

The current coronavirus pandemic is more than a medical crisis, it is also a political and ideological crisis. It is a crisis deeply rooted in years of neglect by neoliberal governments that denied the importance of public health and the public good while defunding the institutions that made them possible**. At the sa**me time, this crisis cannot be separated from the crisis of massive inequalities in wealth, income and power. Nor can it be separated from a crisis of democratic values, education and environmental destruction. The coronavirus pandemic is deeply interconnected with the politicization of the natural order through its destructive assaults waged by neoliberal globalization on the ecosystem. In addition, it cannot be disconnected from the spectacle of racism, ultranationalism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and bigotry that has dominated the national zeitgeist as a means of promoting shared fears rather than shared responsibilities. The plague has as one of its roots a politics of depoliticization, which makes clear that education is a central feature of politics and it always plays a central role – whether in a visible or a veiled way – in any ideological project. For instance, it has been a central pedagogical principle of neoliberalism that individual responsibility is the only way to address social problems, and consequently, there is no need to address broader systemic issues, hold power accountable or embrace matters of collective responsibility. As a politics of containment, neoliberalism privatizes and individualizes social problems, i.e., wash your hands as a way to contain the pandemic. In doing so, cultural critics Bram Ieven and Jan Overwijk argue, “it seeks to contain any real democratic politics; that is to say, a politics based on collective solidarity and equality [because] democratic politics is a threat to the primacy of the market.”

#### The plan is a colonialist revision that re-packages the WTO as a legitimate organization that can overcome its insidious past towards a future of equal free trade—that decks class consciousness.

Gilbert 19 [Geoff Gilbert is a Professor of Law in the School of Law and Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex. He was Head of Department between 2000-2003 and 2011-13. In 2012, he was appointed a Professorial Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. He was Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Refugee Law from 2002-15 and is co-Editor-in-Chief as of September 2019; he also sits on the Advisory Board., “Free trade” is today’s imperialism by the 1 percent, 1-13-2019,No Publication,https://www.bilaterals.org/?free-trade-is-today-s-imperialism, 8-21-2021 amrita]

Free Trade Imperialism: **Continuing the Unequal Trade of Colonialism With mass global South resistance to colonialism increasing in the early 1900s and intensifying in the aftermath of the world wars, global North corporations and governments no longer needed colonialism.** From their perspective, moving toward the international economic model that would become free trade was much more cost-effective. As the US sociologist Johanna Bockman writes of US government and business elites in the aftermath of the second world war, **“[They] supported neither free trade nor globalization imagined as a level playing field with flows moving evenly around the globe. Instead, they supported the international neocolonial system through the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)], while using the rhetoric of free trade and modernization to support US national interests.”** Roughly 70 years after the global North created the post-second world war international order, global North corporations continue to own and control a disproportionate amount of the most profitable industries in the global economy. Though many US commentators warn of the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China, US corporations, in 2013, still had leading positions in 18 of the 25 most profitable industries. Moreover**, US corporations are dominant in the most profitable advanced industries, including banking and financial services, aerospace and defense, chemicals, computer hardware and software, insurance, pharmaceuticals, heavy machinery, and oil and gas.** While the US has roughly 5 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of the global share of gross domestic product, US corporations likely control far more than 25 percent of the profit-producing capital in the world. **These profits are concentrated among the shareholders of multinationals incorporated in the US, which, according to one estimate, are at least 85 percent owned by US citizens. These profits are not being shared with vast majority of people in the world, most of whom do not own any wealth, let alone shares in corporations.** Global North and US multinational dominance of the world economy is not an accident, as global North governments and multinationals have used the international institutions they created following the second world war to continue to dominate the world economy. **These institutions include the United Nations; the GATT, which has since become the World Trade Organization (WTO); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the World Bank. The WTO is the main international institution that makes and enforces trade policies. The core GATT/WTO principles are “non-discrimination” and “national treatment.**” Non-discrimination means that countries will not use their trade policies to discriminate between goods that are produced in different foreign countries. National treatment means that countries will not use their trade policies to favor products produced in their own country over products produced in any other country. As described above, global North countries used their trade policies to promote the products of the corporations based in their countries for centuries. **The free trade principles of non-discrimination and national treatment deny the ability of any country to use those same policies today. This allows global North corporations to ensure that global South governments will not create policies that can help their own corporations develop the wealth they need to compete**. **Additionally, since the GATT/WTO free trade framework facilitates continued global North corporate control over advanced industries, global North corporations are far more likely to develop the high-tech industries of the future, as they own the profits from today’s advanced industries which they can invest in research and development.**

#### The Aff is an investment into disaster capitalism – their emphasis on threats are the necessary fabric for the survival of capitalism, the shock created by the aff gives capitalism the needed time to implement neoliberal policies and continue privatization

Klein 07 [Naomi Klein is the senior correspondent of The Intercept, she is a Canadian author, social activist, and filmmaker known for her political analyses, support of ecofeminism, organized labour, left-wing politics and criticism of corporate globalization, fascism and capitalism.|The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism |library.lol/main/889E346734D1349A84C07A77A379DFC7| P6 – 10 |Accessed 1 Sept. 2021.] Comrade PW

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For more than three decades, Friedman and his powerful followers had been perfecting this very strategy: waiting for a major crisis, then selling off pieces of the state to private players while citizens were still reeling from the shock, then quickly making the "reforms" permanent. In one of his most influential essays, Friedman articulated contemporary capitalism's core tactical nostrum, what I have come to understand as the shock doctrine. He observed that "only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable." Some people stockpile canned goods and water in preparation for major disasters; Friedmanites stockpile free-market ideas. And once a crisis has struck, the University of Chicago professor was convinced that it was crucial to act swiftly, to impose rapid and irreversible change before the crisis-racked society slipped back into the "tyranny of the status quo." He estimated that "a new administration has some six to nine months in which to achieve major changes; if it does not seize the opportunity to act decisively during that period, it will not have another such opportunity." A variation on Machiavelli's advice that injuries should be inflicted "all at once," this proved to be one of Friedman's most lasting strategic legacies. Friedman first learned how to exploit a large-scale shock or crisis in the midseventies, when he acted as adviser to the Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet. Not only were Chileans in a state of shock following Pinochet's violent coup, but the country was also traumatized by severe hyperinflation. Friedman advised Pinochet to impose a rapid-fire transformation of the economy—tax cuts, free trade, privatized services, cuts to social spending and deregulation. Eventually, Chileans even saw their public schools replaced with voucher-funded private ones. It was the most extreme capitalist makeover ever attempted anywhere, and it became known as a " Chicago School" revolution, since so many of Pinochet's economists had studied under Friedman at the University of Chicago. Friedman predicted that the speed, suddenness and scope of the economic shifts would provoke psychological reactions in the public that "facilitate the adjustment." He coined a phrase for this painful tactic: economic "shock treatment." In the decades since, whenever governments have imposed sweeping free-market programs, the all-at-once shock treatment, or "shock therapy," has been the method of choice. Pinochet also facilitated the adjustment with his own shock treatments; these were performed in the regime's many torture cells, inflicted on the writhing bodies of those deemed most likely to stand in the way of the capitalist transformation. Many in Latin America saw a direct connection between the economic shocks that impoverished millions and the epidemic of torture that punished hundreds of thousands of people who believed in a different kind of society. As the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano asked, "How can this inequality be maintained if not through jolts of electric shock? " Exactly thirty years after these three distinct forms of shock descended on Chile, the formula reemerged, with far greater violence, in Iraq. First came the war, designed, according to the authors of the Shock and Awe military doctrine, to "control the adversary's will, perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary impotent to act or react." Next came the radical economic shock therapy, imposed, while the country was still in flames, by the U.S. chief envoy L. Paul Bremer—mass privatization, complete free trade, a 15 percent flat tax, a dramatically downsized government. Iraq's interim trade minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, said at the time that his countrymen were "sick and tired of being the subjects of experiments. There have been enough shocks to the system, so we don't need this shock therapy in the economy." ' When Iraqis resisted, they were rounded up and taken to jails where bodies and minds were met with more shocks, these ones distinctly less metaphorical. I started researching the free market's dependence on the power of shock four years ago, during the early days of the occupation of Iraq. After reporting from Baghdad on Washington's failed attempts to follow Shock and Awe with shock therapy, I traveled to Sri Lanka, several months after the devastating 2004 tsunami, and witnessed another version of the same maneuver: foreign investors and international lenders had teamed up to use the atmosphere of panic to hand the entire beautiful coastline over to entrepreneurs who quickly built large resorts, blocking hundreds of thousands of fishing people from rebuilding their villages near the water. "In a cruel twist of fate, nature has presented Sri Lanka with a unique opportunity, and out of this great tragedy will come a world class tourism destination," the Sri Lankan government announced. 1 8 By the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, and the nexus of Republican politicians, think tanks and land developers started talking about " clean sheets" and exciting opportunities, it was clear that this was now the preferred method of advancing corporate goals: using moments of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic engineering. Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. " When I rebuild the city I feel like I'm rebuilding myself," said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans' heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after the storm. 1 9 But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called " reconstruction" began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem —all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: "For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise." The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in postinvasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. 21 His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward. When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to "liberate" markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999,1 was accustomed to seeing similar businessfriendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most baldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of "free trade and democracy" and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force. As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of Milton Friedman's movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine. Seen through the lens of this doctrine, the past thirty-five years look very different. Some of the most infamous human rights violations of this era, which have tended to be viewed as sadistic acts carried out by antidemocratic regimes, were in fact either committed with the deliberate intent of terrorizing the public or actively harnessed to prepare the ground for the introduction of radical free-market "reforms." In Argentina in the seventies, the junta's "disappearance" of thirty thousand people, most of them leftist activists, was integral to the imposition of the country's Chicago School policies, just as terror had been a partner for the same kind of economic metamorphosis in Chile. In China in 1989, it was the shock of the Tiananmen Square massacre and the subsequent arrests of tens of thousands that freed the hand of the Communist Party to convert much of the country into a sprawling export zone, staffed with workers too terrified to demand their rights. In Russia in 1993, it was Boris Yeltsin's decision to send in tanks to set fire to the parliament building and lock up the opposition leaders that cleared the way for the fire-sale privatization that created the country's notorious oligarchs. The Falklands War in 1982 served a similar purpose for Margaret Thatcher in the U.K.: the disorder and nationalist excitement resulting from the war allowed her to use tremendous force to crush the striking coal miners and to launch the first privatization frenzy in a Western democracy. The NATO attack on Belgrade in 1999 created the conditions for rapid privatizations in the former Yugoslavia—a goal that predated the war. Economics was by no means the sole motivator for these wars, but in each case a major collective shock was exploited to prepare the ground for economic shock therapy.

#### The alternative is to haunt the political imaginary of the 1AC with the specter of Marx – the political project of the 1AC is dead, but the fundamental tensions that give it weight are not; by preserving the possibility of proletarian revolution as a specter, we keep its radical and unforeseen potential alive

Hitchcock, ‘13 [Peter Hitchcock, Professor, Baruch College, English, CUNY; “from ( ) of Ghosts” in The Spectralities Reader, Maria del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren, eds., London: Bloomsbury, 2013]

But the last word of ghosts is not just philosophical, despite these incarnations. What the ghost (revenant) always also comes back to is the status of science. Here Marxism has strengths that oscillation does not. Oscillation is a concept for materialism, but Marxism does not devolve, ultimately, into its constituent concepts. Yet here one faces a sharp dilemma that even “whither’s” palimpsest cannot significantly displace. If, as Deleuze and Guattari propose, “A scientific notion is defined not by concepts but by functions or propositions” (117), then can one separate the wheat of Marxist propositions from the chaff of its concepts? Historically, there have been moments where this has appeared more possible (the Second International remains a crucial example), but if one accepts the conjunctural reading of Marxist theoretical formations, the process if not the actuality of those differences may now be more difficult to discern. This does not mean that such attempts are idealist or illusionist. On the contrary, work like Roy Bhaskar’s identifies how materialist principles themselves can become mired in “epistemic fallacies” (the reduction of ontology to epistemology) that only a sustained critical (and in Bhaskar’s terminology, realist) investigation can disarticulate as a science in the social.26 But the ghost is neither a simple categorical error nor the reincarnation of some Hegelian absolute spirit (although, given the predilections of French philosophy, the “appearance” would be understandable). The ghost remains for science, just as a ghost of science haunts the Marxist dialectic. Here is not the place to adjudicate the truth claims of Marxism as science; I do, however, wish to counter the impression that any focus on Marx’s deployment of spectral metaphors is to abjure the rational kernel for its mystical shell. If history has taught us anything in recent years, it is that the de facto rejection of the spectral in Marxism is partly what allowed utopia to congeal, then disappear, in dogma. On the one hand, Deleuze and Guattari claim that science “slows down” variability by the use of constants or limits. A measure, or a principle of measurement, can pull reality from chaos and “suspend,” however briefly, the process of the infinite. The examples they provide (the speed of light, absolute zero, the quantum of action, the Big Bang) all attempt to coordinate, to provide a scale, to provide a reference for what must always exceed them. And, not surprisingly, the sheer variability of constants produces a determinate disciplinary fear: “science is haunted not by its own unity but by the plane of reference constituted by all the limits or borders through which it confronts chaos” (119). Philosophy, on the other hand, is less troubled by the infinite as long as it can be thought consistently (philosophy, they claim, gives “the virtual a consistency specific to it” [118]). In this, science and philosophy can be linked to art: they all “cast planes over the chaos” (202). But this, of course, is an intellectual, political, and social challenge. Artists, philosophers, and scientists confront chaos not just to impose an order on it (for this alone would amount to hubris), but because a certain affinity with chaos is necessary for the crises we call change. Again, the image of this confrontation is striking: “The philosopher, the scientist, and the artist seem to return from the land of the dead” (202). And which one of these ghosts is the real Marxist? Marxism is a science to the extent that it has developed forms of measurement (laws of motion) for the infinite chaos of socialization (in this respect, the charge of “totalization” is often a nonscientist’s reaction to scientificity). These measurements (ideology, class, value, commodity, etc.) are not fictions to the degree that they have often elaborated the real contradictions that stand within and between the social and forms of socialization. But philosophy (and indeed art) is not to blame for the distortion of these measurements, at least according to Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation: it is a function of the plethora of methodologies vis-à-vis chaos. Chaosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari call it, is not for me only because I still tend to think in terms of the collective rather than the nomads who wander off into the infinite. I do believe, however, that it provides a strong antidote to knee-jerk reactions about the status of science and philosophy for Marxism at a time when “post-ality” is all too quick to dig a grave for it. Ghosts do not make history, people do, but not under conditions of their own choosing (a point where Marx and the Shakespeare of Hamlet most assuredly agree). This little history of ghosts is not about the agency of the specter, but about materialism’s accountability to and for specters. Derrida’s bold declaration that there will be “no future without Marx” (“Pas sans Marx, pas d’avenir sans Marx” [SDM 36]) only makes sense within a spectral economy of materialism, a materialism that is not beholden to monologic causality but one that seeks an understanding of a material reality caught between the calculable and the incalculable, the undecidability of “determinate oscillations.” Marx is dead; only the spectral can critically explain how Marxism comes back from the future. Not content with the naming of an undecidable, I have sought to interpellate Marx within his own Gespenstergeschichte: that is, to trace the function of the ghost, and thinking the ghost, for his materialist methodology. Millennial materialism must use this heritage not to reincarnate Marx (in the manner of a quaint religious observance) but to resist an inclination to resolve conceptual aporias merely by dogmatic statements to the contrary. The science of materialism includes its respect for the criteria of judgment, not the assumption of a universal truth in the judgment. The vacillations of class and class struggle in Marx’s formulations are examples of determinate instability within the concepts and their application. What spectrality does is keep this instability “alive” at a moment when “actual existence” cannot possibly confirm or deny it. In 1883 Engels stood by Marx’s grave and predicted that “the gap that has been left by this mighty spirit will soon enough make itself felt” (an absence as agency indeed!). Yet barely a hundred years later Hobsbawm could opine that “the shadow of Karl Marx presides over a third of the human race.”27 The shade of Marx is still here, but not in the form that either Engels or Hobsbawm suggests. It exists now as a condition of possibility in a sense of the world radically different from the specters of the past, however answerable it must be to them. The ambivalence of the specter is not its virtue, only its dependence on concrete determination. And that is why the experience of freedom before us is also the space of ghosts.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who best identifies the specters. Hauntology is critical in academic spaces like debate. Prior to considering instrumental approaches to the resolution, pedagogy must prioritize encounters with spectral moments in order to contest hegemonic forms of knowledge and being that systemically cause violence—both in and out of the classroom.

Zembylas, ’13 [Michalinos Zembylas, assistant professor of education at the Open University of Cyprus; “PEDAGOGIES OF HAUNTOLOGY IN HISTORY EDUCATION: LEARNING TO LIVE WITH THE GHOSTS OF DISAPPEARED VICTIMS OF WAR AND DICTATORSHIP”; EDUCATIONAL THEORY, Volume 63, Number 1, 2013; Wiley]

Yet, the educational demands for memory, justice, or even (re)conciliation in societies traumatized by disappearances are always already caught up in some pedagogical limits and risks in both an individual and a collective sense — demands that are linked to ideological ‘‘truths’’ or obligations that grow out of coherent-realist or pedagogically redemptive forms of representation of the past.5 These risks ultimately threaten to deaden the encounter with the unsettled past and its ghosts and to instrumentalize memory and justice in both public and school spheres.6 But what if history learning is understood not solely in terms of revealing and mastering unknown facts and stories about the past and its victims, but as openness for the not yet formulated possibilities of the future? In other words, what if ghosts become a pedagogical means by which critical learning practices in history education create possibilities for moving toward a still unformulated future that extends normative notions of identity, memory, and justice? On such terms, wouldn’t ‘‘living with ghosts’’ enact the potential for a new ethical learning that ‘‘welcomes’’ the ghosts of the past rather than exorcizing them or wishing that they would just go away? The purpose of this essay is to examine the possibilities for history education reconceived in terms of Derrida’s notion of hauntology (SM, 10), that is, as an ongoing conversation with the ghosts of disappeared victims of war and dictatorship through pedagogies that invent the future rather than fixing the past. Hauntology is used in this essay as both metaphor and pedagogical methodology for deconstructing the orthodoxies of academic history thinking and learning. As metaphor, hauntology evokes the figure of the ghost to trouble the hegemonic status of representational modes of knowledge in remembrance practices and to undermine their ontological frames and ideological histories. As pedagogical methodology, hauntology reframes histories of loss and absence and uses them as points of departure to acknowledge the complexities and contradictions that emerge from haunting. In other words, I invoke what Sande Cohen has coined as ‘‘historiospectography’’ — to describe Derrida’s advocacy of the unlimited ‘‘being-with specters’’ — and highlight the openings for renewed pedagogical engagements with notions of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in history education. In the first part of the essay, I unravel some of the politics of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation that are relevant to the issue of disappeared victims of war and dictatorship. This analysis highlights possible dangers for a ‘‘spectacle pedagogy’’ in teaching about the disappeared, that is, a ubiquitous form of representation that manifests the ghosts in a sensationalized and ideological manner.7 Then, drawing on Derrida’s Specters of Marx, I take up the notion of ‘‘hauntology’’ — particularly the figure of the ‘‘ghost’’ — to interrogate how the spectral constitutes an object of analysis that enables us to see history education as a promise for radical openness in the future rather than as a remembrance practice that ontologizes the ghosts of the past. The essay ends with a discussion about the pedagogical implications of history education as hauntological in educators’ and learners’ engagement with issues of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in societies traumatized by the experience of disappearances. Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory, Justice, and (Re)conciliation In various parts of the world over the past fifty years, numerous societies have struggled to come to terms with many ghosts of the past; wars, dictatorships, and genocides have caused innumerable deaths and much material destruction. However, there are some ghosts that differ from those of the dead and that seem persistently to ‘‘return’’ to haunt social and political life. These are the ghosts of disappeared victims of war and dictatorship, and they return through remembrance practices and rituals that serve as constant reminders of the disappeared victims’ unresolved ontological status. Neither alive nor (officially) dead, ‘‘the disappeared’’ are not ‘‘embodied’’ in any literal sense, but rather they ‘‘exist’’ as apparitions and ‘‘visit’’ a society to shatter its boundaries of life and death and to disrupt its social, ethical, and political imaginaries. It is not surprising, then, that societies struggling to come to terms with the unresolved issue of the disappeared are often deeply divided when it comes to what the disappeared represent in collective memory, what constitutes justice in this case, and how a society can achieve (re)conciliation after such a traumatic experience. Before analyzing the politics of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in further detail, I briefly discuss two examples of societies that have experienced this trauma and highlight their differences and similarities in terms of how the disappeared are perceived: the first example comes from a society that suffered a dictatorship, and the other example comes from a society that suffered a war. Argentina is perhaps the best known example of a society that has suffered from extensive campaigns of forced disappearances perpetrated by a dictatorship. During the ‘‘dirty war’’ of the 1970s and 1980s, many individuals in Argentina were abducted, tortured, and eventually disappeared.8 These individuals, usually political dissidents, became known as ‘‘the disappeared’’ (los desaparecidos). Some have estimated that up to 30,000 people disappeared between 1976 and 1983 — of which there are 9,000 verified cases, according to the official report by the Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP). Some bodies have been found in mass graves, but the whereabouts of most of the disappeared remain unknown because their dead bodies have not been located. Metaphorically speaking, the ghosts of the disappeared never cease to ‘‘return’’ through remembrance practices and social movements. One of the most widely known social movements involved in the struggle for truth and justice in Argentina has been the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Madres de Plaza de Mayo), an activist group formed by mothers of the disappeared victims of the dictatorship. This group demanded that their loved ones be returned alive by those who had abducted them. Over the years, the Madres movement expanded beyond their demands for truth and justice and became active in the struggle for human, civil, and political rights in Argentina.9 In general, the mobilization of the Madres poses a challenge to Argentina’s collective identity and memory through calling into question whether there can be conciliation without seeking truth and justice for the disappeared and their relatives.10 A crucial but unresolved issue in postdictatorial Argentina, then, is whether the society can form a notion of collective identity that moves toward national conciliation while also attending to demands for justice. Another example of disappeared persons — situated in the context of a war this time — comes from my home country, Cyprus, in which more than 2,000 persons from the two conflicting communities (the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots) disappeared between 1963 and 1974.11 Some of these individuals, who became known in the Greek-Cypriot community as ‘‘the missing’’ (agnooumenoi), were innocent bystanders caught up in the ethnic violence that erupted in the country; others were soldiers or paramilitary operatives abducted by the other side and whose whereabouts are unknown.12 For a long time, the relatives of Greek-Cypriot missing persons have lived with the assumption that the disappeared are either living prisoners or, in the worst case scenario, have been killed, their bodies concealed, and require proper burials. Some remains of the missing from both communities have been recovered in mass graves during the last few years, but it is uncertain whether the whereabouts of all the missing will ever be discovered. As in the case of Argentina, the highly emotional moments of recovering and burying the remains of missing persons have produced conflicting discourses in both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish- Cypriot communities regarding whether there are realistic prospects for justice and reconciliation.13 Both of these examples demonstrate the ethical and political challenges associated with considering the disappeared as a pedagogical means of coming to terms with the past. All societies are engaged in some sort of mourning for past traumas through commemorative practices and public rituals that are often ideologically driven. These commemorative practices and rituals may be official or unofficial; they may seek redemption and self-vindication or promote certain forms of ‘‘remembering’’ and ‘‘forgetting.’’ What seems to be a real concern in societies that have experienced disappearances, though, is how to reconsider the ethics and politics of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in spaces of spectrality, that is, in contexts in which ‘‘the work of mourning is hauntingly displaced.’’14 Mourning is ‘‘displaced’’ because there is no body to mourn; to mourn the disappeared, in other words, ‘‘might be read (symbolically) as a kind of murder,’’ and therefore mourning ‘‘is arrested in a state of fear and guilt.’’15 A society that has experienced disappearances may need to formulate different conceptualizations of memory, justice, and (re)conciliation in order to ‘‘respond’’ to the spectrality of the disappeared. The belief, for example, that ‘‘the disappeared’’ in Argentina or the ‘‘missing persons’’ in Cyprus were propagated by ‘‘a few extremists’’ is not ideologically neutral; on the contrary, it promotes a redemptive conception of the society’s collective identity that also constitutes a form of exorcizing the ghosts of the disappeared. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine what this position implies for the relatives of the disappeared and the ethical responsibility of the rest of the society to remember and to struggle for justice and (re)conciliation. What would it mean for a society that is haunted by disappearances, in other words, to invite the ‘‘spectral moment’’ and come to terms with the ghosts of the disappeared rather than wishing to banish them? It is important to define first what is meant by a ‘‘spectral moment.’’ A spectral moment, according to Derrida, is ‘‘a moment that no longer belongs to time, . . . that is not docile to time, at least to what we call time’’ (SM, xx). This implies that a spectral moment invokes conceptions — for example, memory, justice, (re)conciliation — that are not defined by being completely absorbed into fact-laden or redemptive representations (for example, of ‘‘the disappeared’’); rather, it opens the present to a different interpretive system, one that overturns hegemonic ontological grounds and points to future prospects for social relations. For example, honoring the disappeared victims through remembrance practices that rely too much on a liturgy of facts fuels the mass themes of history and works to contain trauma into a fact-laden learning environment.16 This ‘‘uncovering’’ of knowledge through a ‘‘factual liturgy,’’ however, expels the ghosts of the disappeared because it is assumed that knowledge of the past needs to work toward a redeemed collective identity.17 Yet the singularity of each disappeared victim is lost because it is absorbed into the typicality of a historical theme that is legitimated through its narrativization. That is to say, ‘‘demystifying’’ the ghosts of the disappeared makes them simple objects of and for knowledge. Inviting the spectral moment, however, does exactly the opposite: it seeks to create openness to the not yet formulated possibilities of the future, urging the society to come to terms with what is beyond our capacity to comprehend (the disappeared) in accepted ideological, epistemological, and ethical terms. Nevertheless, invoking Derrida once again, it is important to keep in mind that this openness to the not yet formulated possibilities of the future may not necessarily be a good thing because something worse might be coming. As Derrida explained: Let me clarify. We are talking about a trauma, and thus an event, whose temporality proceeds neither from the now that is present nor from the present that is past but from an impresentable to come (a` venir). . . . There is traumatism with no possible work of mourning when the evil comes from the possibility to come of the worst, from the repetition to come — though worse. Traumatism is produced by the future, by the to come, by the threat of the worst to come, rather than by an aggression that is ‘‘over and done with.’’18 The possibility that Derrida described here is the fear of being wounded again. Although one might be open and willing to turn the page and move on after grieving the losses, the traumatic scars of the past haunt the future.19 Hence something worse is always expected as yet to come, as a possibility, because there is no guarantee that the evil will not be repeated. To make a connection with the implications of these dangers for history education, we need to examine how learning about and from the past and the disappeared victims can be repositioned to gain a new sensibility regarding memory and justice — one that is neither redemptive nor melancholic.20 This is why the goal of history education, for example, should not be to make the past more understandable by narrativizing it in myriad ways, but rather to invoke another historicity that ‘‘open[s] up access to an affirmative thinking of the messianic and emancipatory promise as promise’’ (SM, 74–75). This promise is what constitutes a radical openness to the future. However, if the goal is to shift from knowledge-based stories to unanticipated spaces and moments of spectrality in both public and school pedagogies, we need to examine further some of the possible dangers that might be encountered in the process. It is to the discussion of these dangers that I now wish to turn.

### a/t: case

#### The WTO can’t enforce the aff – causes circumvention.

Lamp 19 [Nicholas; Assistant Professor of Law at Queen’s University; “What Just Happened at the WTO? Everything You Need to Know, Brink News,” 12/16/19; <https://www.brinknews.com/what-just-happened-at-the-wto-everything-you-need-to-know/>] Justin

Nicolas Lamp: For the first time since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the Appellate Body cannot accept any new appeals, and that has knock-on effects on the whole global trade dispute settlement system. When a member appeals a WTO panel report, it goes to the Appellate Body, but if there is no Appellate Body, it means that that panel report will not become binding and will not attain legal force.

The absence of the Appellate Body means that members can now effectively block the dispute settlement proceedings by what has been called appealing panel reports “into the void.”

The WTO panels will continue to function as normal. When a panel issues a report, it will normally be automatically adopted — unless it is appealed. And so, even though the panel is working, the respondent in a dispute now has the option of blocking the adoption of the panel’s report. It can, thereby, shield itself from the legal consequences of a report that finds that the member has acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations.

#### Recent evidence confirms

Hillman and Tippett 21 [Jennifer A; Senior fellow for trade and international political economy; Alex; Research associate for international economics, at the Council on Foreign Relations; “Europe and the Prospects for WTO Reform,” CFR; 3/10/21; <https://www.cfr.org/blog/europe-and-prospects-wto-reform>] Justin

The WTO has been in the clutches of a slow-moving crisis for years. At its heart are a series of disputes about the role of the WTO’s Appellate Body, the final arbiter in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System. Today, the Appellate Body sits empty, severely undermining the capacity of the WTO to resolve trade disputes.

Since the start of the Trump administration, the United States has refused to appoint any new members to the body, effectively allowing countries to avoid compliance with WTO rulings. The primary driver of this drastic action has been American frustration at perceived judicial overreach. U.S. policymakers, starting with the George W. Bush administration, have repeatedly voiced their displeasure with Appellate Body decisions, contending that certain decisions have reached beyond the text of existing WTO agreements

#### 1] They don't solve their advantage—CRISPR tech is so much more than medicine – it can also be used for cosmetic gene editing or warfare. Only reducing patents on genomic medicine can't stop fights over other uses of genomics or threats of lawsuits that trigger all their internal links – read their ev – it doesn’t even reference genomic medicine specifically, which means non-medicinal genomics are a huge alt cause they can’t solve.

#### 2] CRISPR fails.

CUMC 17, Columbia University Medical Center, 5-30-2017, "CRISPR Gene Editing Can Cause Hundreds of Unintended Mutations," http://newsroom.cumc.columbia.edu/blog/2017/05/30/crispr-gene-editing-can-cause-hundreds-of-unintended-mutations/

As CRISPR-Cas9 starts to move into clinical trials, a new study published in Nature Methods has found that the gene-editing technology can introduce hundreds of unintended mutations into the genome. “We feel it’s critical that the scientific community consider the potential hazards of all off-target mutations caused by CRISPR, including single nucleotide mutations and mutations in non-coding regions of the genome,” says co-author Stephen Tsang, MD, PhD, the Laszlo T. Bito Associate Professor of Ophthalmology and associate professor of pathology & cell biology in the Institute of Genomic Medicine and the Institute of Human Nutrition at Columbia University Medical Center. CRISPR-Cas9 editing technology—by virtue of its speed and unprecedented precision—has been a boon for scientists trying to understand the role of genes in disease. The technique also has raised hope for more powerful gene therapies that can delete or repair flawed genes, not just add new genes. The first clinical trial to deploy CRISPR is now underway in China, and a U.S. trial is slated to start next year. But even though CRISPR can precisely target specific stretches of DNA, it sometimes hits other parts of the genome. Most studies that search for these off-target mutations use computer algorithms to identify areas most likely to be affected and then examine those areas for deletions and insertions. “These predictive algorithms seem to do a good job when CRISPR is performed in cells or tissues in a dish, but whole genome sequencing has not been employed to look for all off-target effects in living animals,” says co-author Alexander Bassuk, MD, PhD, professor of pediatrics at the University of Iowa. In the new study, the researchers sequenced the entire genome of mice that had undergone CRISPR gene editing in the team’s previous study and looked for all mutations, including those that only altered a single nucleotide. The researchers determined that CRISPR had successfully corrected a gene that causes blindness, but Kellie Schaefer, a PhD student in the lab of Vinit Mahajan, MD, PhD, associate professor of ophthalmology at Stanford University, and co-author of the study, found that the genomes of two independent gene therapy recipients had sustained more than 1,500 single-nucleotide mutations and more than 100 larger deletions and insertions. None of these DNA mutations were predicted by computer algorithms that are widely used by researchers to look for off-target effects. “Researchers who aren’t using whole genome sequencing to find off-target effects may be missing potentially important mutations,” Dr. Tsang says. “Even a single nucleotide change can have a huge impact.”

#### Disease won’t cause extinction—

#### Burnout and empirics.

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

#### Resilience and countermeasures prevent spread – distinct from burnout

Adalja 16

Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh, The Atlantic, June 17, 2016, “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?”, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the

#### Economic growth guarantees civilizational collapse by 2050 – decoupling is impossible and tech is a pipeline dream

**Kallis et al 18** Giorgos Kallis [ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece], Vasilis Ragnar [Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology], Steffen Lange [Institute for Ecological Economy Research, Berlin, Germany], Barbara Muraca [College of Liberal Arts, Oregon State University], Susan Paulson [Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida], and Matthias Schmelzer [DFG Research Group, University of Jena], 5-31-2018, "Research On Degrowth," Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43:291-316,  [https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-environ-102017-025941 //](https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-environ-102017-025941%20//) ash

Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes, growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however, argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely, even though relative decoupling is common (34). Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources.

Growth can become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting, for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce, environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals. But new substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time. Energy is a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar and wind power are constrained only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects.

Historical data corroborate ecological economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth. At the global level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence. Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to 0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42).

Global resource use follows currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where water withdrawals were stabilized (40).

Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although recession also played a role (34).] These declines are nowhere near the 8–10%, year-afteryear reductions in carbon emissions required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2◦C (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34).

Resource use or carbon emissions are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With 1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0% growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases (49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it is practically impossible to envisage viable climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without growth (50, 51).

Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth, but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently “magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run, but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44).

Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability.