# CPS R2 AC

#### Every policy that is presented in these spaces is grounded in some sort of theory – in the context of space policy, we find ourselves guided by theories such liberalism and realism, theories of privatization and supply-side economics. Obviously, most teams read these types of normative theories that uphold their imagination of the resolution without questioning these types of theories. Debate is infested with colonizing power that sets norms that only serve to uphold a format that is wildly inaccessible to many.

#### This resolution is fundamentally a question of outer v. inner space, making it important to imagine the resolution through a theorization of decolonization. Rather than focusing solely on the outer space (material implications) that make us complicit in furthering the violence “out there,” replications of how settlers eradicated natives, we need to understand how theorization is tied to the resolution’s view of space and policymaking. It is clear that: the appropriation of OUTER space by private entities in unjust.

#### **It’s the 21st century: Trump has created a new form of colonialism with the “separate, but equal” space force to explore outer space – the infinity that he coined our nation’s new “Manifest Destiny” (capital M, capital D) after the successes of SpaceX’s conquests.**

#### **The galaxy “out there” represents yet another frontier to be conquered and known by the settler colonial state, if not explicitly for the possibility of further settlement, then for the preservation of its existing spatial extent on Earth.**

#### **Colonization in the name of interplanetary exploration and scientific benefit carve out outer space as the New Final Frontier, attractive because, with seemingly no Indigenous people, settlers can occupy and become the new natives of space.**

#### **The line between distinct settler and Native identities is dismissed into the milky way in exchange for an all-encompassing innocent identity of “Indigeneity.”**

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The settler is illegitimate. He has stolen the land. This is another existential crisis. What can assuage this predicament, what can possibly supersede the Indigenous-settler relation and the questionable legitimacy that follows? In other words, as cultural scholar Mahmood Mamdani rhetorically asked, “When does a Settler Become Native”? 16 It’s not that easy, and simply waiting long enough will not fix it. As “settler” and “Indigene” are co-constitutive categories in a relational context, there are only two logical ways out of this predicament: either the Indigenous collective disappears, leaving the settler polity as the default new-Indigenous group (hence settler colonialism’s propensity for the “logic of elimination”), or the settler collective fully indigenizes, thereby acquiring a type of indigeneity that makes it indistinguishable from the old Indigenous group. Either development reconstitutes a unity as it dissolves settler colonialism as a relation. The first possibility, the forcible disappearance of the Indigenous collective, once widely practiced, has now become unfashionable. **However,** settler-indigenization**, while still fitting, is really hard work and must be done while paying constant attention to the risks of “going native.”**18 Appropriation for indigenizing purposes is typically unconvincing, and “repressive authenticity” (the claim that the actual **Indigenous person is inauthentically Indigenous**) can be used to deny the indigeneity of Indigenous collectives, and it is routinely used to that end, but is an even more destabilizing weapon when directed back at indigenizing settlers.19 **The settler is still illegitimate**. Then again, there is yet a third possibility, indeed a shortcut: a new invasion – the sudden appearance of new settlers bent on invasion – immediately turns the settler into a “native” vis-à-vis the new invaders. If settler invasion establishes the Indigenous-settler relationship in the first place, a new invasion sets up a new indigeneity in relation to a new exogeneity. The possibility of further invasion typically looms large in settler colonial public debate, and settlers are often anxious about this possibility. Recent immigrants are traditionally looked upon with suspicion and settler nativisms typically worry about “Great Replacements” because their polities are the very result of a great replacement.20 Yet again, fantasies of alien invasions also fulfil a settler craving for immediate indigenization. Cowboys and Aliens constitutes an example of this fantasy. Relying on a specifically settler colonial structure of feeling, it is also a political movie. Invasion sets up a structure, the structure is ongoing, and there is no settler-Indigenous relationship without invasion.21 The settler’s lack of legitimacy remains. But if the fantasy of further invasion unleashes settler nativism, it is because that fantasy sets up another putative relation – a related structure, a lean-to. Worrying about “illegal” or too numerous immigrants makes one feel a settler again because it satisfies a craving for indigeneity. Thus, settlers often entertain fantasies of alien invasion that will fully indigenize them. But it is a double edge sword, and even though there may be some benefits in terms of perceived legitimacy, it will all be in vain if these invasions do not ultimately fail. In other words, the invading aliens must depart at the end, while the indigenization of the settler that their temporary presence brings about must be irreversible. Dread and desire invariably mix: invasions must happen and must fail. Cowboys and Aliens provides a candid example of this type of settler wishful thinking and of the narrative structures that sustain it.

#### Colonial expansion relies on subjugation, dehumanization, and the labor of black and brown bodies, embedding antiblackness, heteropatriarchy, and imperialism into a larger settler colonial structure that necessitates violence and is the root cause of havoc on our planet (nuclear war, climate change, and disease are all produced by the chaos of coloniality).

* settler colonialism is an ongoing process not a one time event
* to have immorality on land, settler colonialism as a structure needed to happen first (it ungirds moral frameworks that determine justice)

Tuck & Yang ‘12 [https://www.academia.edu/2721597/Decolonization\_is\_not\_a\_metaphor]

Generally speaking, postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality attend to two forms of colonialism. External colonialism (also called exogenous or exploitation colonization) denotes the expropriation of fragments of Indigenous worlds, animals, plants and human beings, extracting them in order to transport them to - and build the wealth, the privilege, or feed the appetites of - the colonizers, who get marked as the first world. This includes so-thought ‘historic’ examples such as opium, spices, tea, sugar, and tobacco, the extraction of which continues to fuel colonial efforts. This form of colonialism also includes the feeding of contemporary appetites for diamonds, fish, water, oil, humans turned workers, genetic material, cadmium and other essential minerals for high tech devices. External colonialism often requires a subset of activities properly called military colonialism - the creation of war fronts/frontiers against enemies to be conquered, and the enlistment of foreign land, resources, and people into military operations. In external colonialism, all things Native become recast as ‘natural resources’ - bodies and earth for war, bodies and earth for chattel. The other form of colonialism that is attended to by postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality is internal colonialism, the biopolitical and geopolitical management of people, land, flora and fauna within the “domestic” borders of the imperial nation. This involves the use of particularized modes of control - prisons, ghettos, minoritizing, schooling, policing - to ensure the ascendancy of a nation and its white elite. These modes of control, imprisonment, and involuntary transport of the human beings across borders - ghettos, their policing, their economic divestiture, and their dislocatability - are at work to authorize the metropole and conscribe her periphery. Strategies of internal colonialism, such as segregation, divestment, surveillance, and criminalization, are both structural and interpersonal. Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts- though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern island/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible. The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural.

#### The dispossession of Native bodies on stolen land is the basis for immorality, what is ultimately unjust in our societies can be discovered in the ongoing structure of settler colonialism dictating society. 200+ years of broken treaty promises, court cases overturning indigenous rights to land, policies of termination and relocation of indigenous populations prove historical ties.

#### **Interplanetary harm & settler colonial violence are forever neglected as the settlers that made themselves foundational in our systems that necessitate these sorts of harm fly off in shuttles to outer space because their weaponizations and imaginations of an OUTER SPACE have freed them of accountability.**

**Veracini ’20** [Lorenzo, Associate Professor in history and politics at Swinburne’s Institute for Social Research. His research focuses on the comparative history of colonial systems and settler colonialism. “Settler Evasions in Interstellar and Cowboys and Aliens: Thinking the End of the World is Still Easier Than Thinking the End of Settler Colonialism.” Published in Cinematic Settlers: Taylor & Francis Group. 2020. Accessible Online at: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003057277-16/settler-evasions-interstellar-cowboys-aliens-thinking-end-world-still-easier-thinking-end-settler-colonialism-lorenzo-veracini] /mlk-jo/

Astro ship Endurance leaves Earth and the narrative can now move forward. Future Cooper communicates with present-day Cooper and gives him clues – a settler from the future sanctions the project of a settler of the present. And forward it moves, literally, like all settler colonial stories, as the protagonists travel back in time towards “who we are,” and as they move forward in space to a place they have never been to. It is a space wormhole and its gravitational time dilation that allow the protagonists to simultaneously travel back in time and forward through space like the settler wagons had enabled the settlers on the Oregon trail to move back to a putative “original beginning” as they crossed the plains and the mountains. Later in the movie, we see farmers moving through blackened plains with all their belongings and columns of black smoke – they are reenacting the rural exodus of the 1930s. The writers do not need to make this connection explicit and safely expect their viewers to know what they are referring to. The resilience of the Dust Bowl as trauma in the public imagination should not be surprising – if we dwell in a settler society, settlement’s prospected end must be profoundly traumatic. The movie is pivoting back to its opening, but this time there is no California at the end of the grapes of wrath, or better, California this time is up, not forward. In one of the movie’s twists, the gravitational equation is finally resolved, and NASA’s space station will now save humanity from immediate danger. The NASA bunker itself is then shot up from its secret location to form not a “city on the hill,” but a city in the sky. It will now sustain human life until plan B works out. Meanwhile, a suitable planet is also found. Cooper then returns to the now fully functioning space station after incredible adventures. After his travels, however, Cooper is transformed and he cannot adapt to life in the space station. Like a true explorer and pioneer, an interstellar Daniel Boone, he cannot permanently remain in what is left of the “Old World.” This is also a well-rehearsed narrative – the frontier and its freedom call. He needs to keep moving, and decides to return to “who he is,” that is, Settler Evasions 207 to return to the new planet and contribute to the colonization effort there. That’s where his love interest has also gone. It is a tough environment, but a bracing climate makes betters humans; this is what frontiers are supposed to do. The settler, now intent on a reproductive mission, can continue being true to himself. He never forgot “who we are”: settlers. Plan A has worked out, and Plan B will eventually too. Humanity, that is, a settler colonial humanity – Indigenous peoples in this context do not belong to it by definition – has lost Earth, a planet it probably did not really like much anyway, but has found again who it really is. This, we are led to believe, is no small thing, and is fair trade for what used to be an excellent piece of interplanetary real estate but is now depleted beyond repair. In the process of claiming a future elsewhere, this humanity has already redeemed itself – this is what settlers typically do. A settler humanity has found itself and another planet. It will “improve” it, and build a new land there for itself. Luckily this time there will be no Indigenous peoples to spoil a nice prospect, or to remind the new settlers of everyone’s stewardship duties and the advisability of sustainable practices. None of them will come over for the American Thanksgiving holiday because “we” will not need to even temporarily share. There is no more settler colonial story than this one, and no more settler colonial response to environmental degradation. Against global warming, no adaptation – displacement (even though the nature of the crisis is only implied and climate destruction is never mentioned in the movie, we are led to believe it contributed to the crisis). Against Earth’s exhaustion, no restorative action – displacement. Interstellar is not denying the crisis, it is embracing it – bring it on. Who needs wormholes in the soil when you have wormholes in the sky, thousands of frozen embryos, and a brand-new planet?

#### **These logics necessitate the usage of space to be weaponized - an empty canvas where we can project images of warfare or peaceful alternatives to bolster settler narratives.**

Bormann ‘6 (Natalie, Visiting Assistant Professor in The Global Security Program at the Watson Institute at Brown University, 2006, “The Lost Dimension? A Spatial Reading Of Outer Space Weaponization,” Paper Presented At The Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association, March 22nd-25th, Available Online via All Academic at <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/6/7/p98677_index.html>) / recut

To begin with, the concept of space does not lie in space; but space is constituted ‘from the outside’. It is ‘what we (can) know about space’ and how a space is understood and framed at any given time which provides us with one reality of that space. In this sense, Outer Space as a space does never pre-exist independently and is never explored nor innovated; it is always constituted through that which it precedes (and through that which always-already exists). Henry Lefebvre, for instance, speaks of the production of space, whereby space becomes a location of a certain type through its association with certain practices, rituals, and representations. He uses the example of a church which gains meaning through its invention as a place of faith (space is thus at once a precondition as much as a result of society and its practices). While Virilio may not necessarily speak of a production of space along these lines, he would certainly agree that information and data about something matters more than that which composes something. Virilio goes as far as to claim that information about a space will matter exclusively leading to a disappearance of matter and physicality all together. As such, space will stop having a ‘location’ on its own. Michel de Certeau makes a vital point in this regard: The importance of abstract (non-fixed, non-static) space is not only that it cannot be inhabited in any permanent way but moreover that it makes possible a certain kind of action, and embodies a certain kind of practice. It is in this sense and at this juncture that I suggest we must begin when contemplating about Outer Space and its weaponization. Outer Space must be seen, and to use Virilio’s term, as a ‘disembodied space’ with no fixed and static coordinates. It follows from here, then, that two questions emerge; first, what dominant information about Outer Space can we read, and second, how has this information become dominant? What will become clear in the process of addressing these questions is that what we get to know about the space of Outer Space – our conception - is dominated by information provided through the possibilities of military technology. A Spatiality of Outer Space ‘I think it’s there that things change. In other words, one realizes at what point, in Space, the view reveals what is most essential. Other than the view, there is no physical or physiological contact. No hearing, no feeling in the sense of touching materials, with the exception of an actual Moon landing. Thus, the conquest of space, of Outer Space – isn’t it more the conquest of the image of Space? ‘space is accidental. Roger Handberg once wrote that ‘Space is first of all a place or location’ and hence, to contemplate Space simply in strategic and military terms would be disingenuous. 18 And clearly, there is no denying the centrality of spatiality and spatial narratives in the forging of a weaponization of Outer Space. The articulation of certain boundary-producing imageries in the construction of legitimacy for deploying weapons in orbit has served to create a particular understanding of that which purports a response: a perpetuate crisis and the possibility of permanent war in Outer Space. Space has become an opportunity, a new frontier of competition, a canvas whereupon the imaginary of confrontation and its corresponding strategy of deploying Space weapons can be projected. Former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it aptly in his reaction to US and Soviet nuclear weapons tests in Space when he warned that ‘there is an increasing danger that outer space will become man’s newest battlefield’. 19 The representation of a ‘battlefield’ in Space is contingent in our reading of key documents; 20 for instance, in 2001, the US Space Commission evoked the powerful image that the US is an ‘attractive candidate for another Pearl Harbor’ in Space, making the case that weapons in Space were needed to counter perceived US vulnerabilities in form of an attack on a virtual US territory and habitat in orbit. Further examples for the ways in which claims to spatiality are deeply implicated in the forging of US Space weaponization abound; they range from mapping Outer Space as a ‘final frontier’, the ‘ultimate high ground’, or a space that follows ‘the rules of the road’. One finds these discourses generally embedded within the logic of the our/their space nexus coupled with the attributes of defending our space versus an offending other that allow for the drawing of the boundaries around space: • In 2004, US Strategic Command contemplated that ‘the first step in Space control is identifying exactly what’s in orbit around the Earth, who it belongs to, and its mission. 21 • It further claims that Space control involves the ability to ‘ensure our use of space while denying the use to our adversaries’ 22 • The National Space Policy of 1996 proposes the need to assure that ‘hostile forces cannot prevent our use of space 23 [...] How does this matter? I want to argue that the task of uncovering these constructions of spatiality, the meaning-giving of the ‘material’ as reality, is vital for the direction Space policies have taken (and will continue to take). The construction of a space of a certain kind is what precedes its weaponization; it is what makes it commonsensical. If we assume the construction of space, as opposed to the exploration of space, then we need to ask: what has informed this process?

#### **Settler fantasies that tell us that we will discover another world to reside in free of the harms we’ve caused to this one.**

#### Then, the colonizing discourse surrounding space allows us to become complicit in furthering impositions of geographical & material violence through the building of paranoia about the “Other” – other worlds and peoples threatening our new one, perfectly modeled after settler ideals.

Springer ‘11 (Simon, “Violence sits in places? Cultural practice, neoliberal rationalism, and virulent imaginative geographies” *Political Geography 30*, pp. 90-98) / recut

The idea that violence might be integral to cultural practice is difficult to accept. In concert with the abuse that the concept of culture has been subjected to as of late, where in keeping with geopolitical hegemony (see Harrison & Huntington, 2000), or perhaps more surprisingly in an attempt to argue against such hegemonic might (see Roberts, 2001), some cultures, particularly ‘Asian’, ‘African’, or ‘Islamic’ cultures, are conferred with a supposedly inherent predilection towards violence. Yet the relationship between culture and violence is also axiomatic, since violence is part of human activity. Thus, it is not the call for violence to be understood as a social process informed by culture that is problematic; rather it is the potential to colonize this observation with imaginative geographies that distort it in such a fashion that deliberately or inadvertently enable particular geostrategic aims to gain validity. The principal method of distortion is Orientalism, which as ‘a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts’, is ‘an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction’ but a whole series of ‘interests’ which create, maintain, and have the intention to understand, control, manipulate, and incorporate that which is manifestly different through a discourse that is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power: political, intellectual, cultural, and moral (Said, 2003: 12). At base, Orientalism is a form of paranoia that feeds on cartographies of fear by producing ‘our’ world negatively through the construction of a perverse ‘Other’. This is precisely the discourse colonialism mobilized to construct its exploitative authority in the past. In the current context, a relatively new geostrategic aim appeals to the same discursive principles for valorization in its quest to impose an econometric version of global sovereignty (Hart, 2006; Pieterse, 2004; Sparke, 2004). Neoliberalism is on the move, and in the context of the global south, Orientalism is its latitude inasmuch as it affords neoliberalism a powerful discursive space to manuver. This paper has two interrelated central aims. First, building on the work of Arturo Escobar (2001) and Doreen Massey (2005), I contribute to re-theorizations of place as a relational assemblage, rather than as an isolated container, by calling into question the relationship between place and violence. Second, informed by an understanding of Orientalism as performative (Said, 2003), and power/knowledge as productive (Foucault, 1977), I set out to challenge how neoliberalism discursively assigns violence to particular peoples and cultures through its employment of the problematic notions of place that I dispute. I argue that Orientalism maintains an underlying assumption that violence sits in places, and as an affect and effect of discourse, this Orientalist view is enabled because the production of space and place is largely a discursive enterprise (Bachelard, 1964; Lefebvre, 1991). But while violence can bind itself to our somatic geographies and lived experiences of place, in the same way that culture is not confined to any particular place, so too do violent geographies stretch inwards and outwards to reveal the inherent dynamism of space as multiple sites are repeatedly entwined by violence. Thus, following Michel Foucault’s (1977, 1980) insights on power, I am not interested in the why of violence, but rather the how and where of violence. A culturally sensitive critical political economy approach alerts us to the power/knowledge-geometries at play (Hart, 2002; Peet, 2000; Sayer, 2001), so that while violence is clearly mediated through and informed by local cultural norms, it is equally enmeshed in the logic of globalized capital. In the setting of the global south, where and upon which the global north’s caricatural vision of violence repeatedly turns, authoritarian leaders may appropriate neoliberal concerns for market security as a rationale for their violent and repressive actions (Canterbury, 2005; Springer, 2009c). At the same time, because of the performative nature of Orientalism, an exasperated populace may follow their ‘scripted’ roles and resort to violent means in their attempts to cope with the festering poverty and mounting inequality wrought by their state’s deepening neoliberalization (Uvin, 2003). Far from being a symptom of an innate cultural proclivity for violence, state-sponsored violence and systemic social strife can be seen as outcomes of both a state made ‘differently powerful’ via the ongoing ‘roll-out’ of neoliberal reforms (Peck, 2001: 447), and the discourses that support this process (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001; Springer, 2010b). Thus, when applied to the context of ‘the Other’, neoliberalism maintains e in the double sense of both incessant reproduction and the construction of alterity e a ‘Self’-perpetuating logic. Through the circulation of a discourse that posits violence as an exclusive cultural preserve, and by inextricably linking itself to democracy, neoliberalism presents itself as the harbinger of rationality and the only guarantor of peace.

#### **Step away from hegemonic, settler interpretations of space. Indigenous people have been exploring the stars and visiting the moon for thousands of years – why do we need to spend billions of dollars to do the same?**

#### A decolonial understanding of outer space (as not just somewhere not to be conquered) refocuses our understanding of space to a critical interrogation of our inner spaces.

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Another potential avenue of engagement with Indigenous methodologies and epistemologies related to space comes with engaging with Indigenous thinkers who are already deeply immersed into explorations of Indigenous ‘space’ here on Earth—the recent works of Indigenous thinkers such as Waziyatawin (2008) Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), Natchee Blu Barnd (2018) and others provide a unique viewpoint into the ways that Indigenous peoples make and remake space—perhaps this can provide another blueprint for how we might engage with space beyond Earth. And that is just the work that exists within the academic canon. Indigenous people have always been engaged with the worlds beyond the Earth, in ways that often stood counter to accepted ‘settler’ conventions of space exploration (Young, 1987). In one example, when asked about the Moon landings, several Inuit said, "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time...We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go (Young, 1987: 272).” In another example, turning to my own people, the Ojibwe, we have long standing cultural connections to the stars that influence storytelling, governance, and religious tenets (CHIN, 2003). This engagement continues through to the present day, and points to a promising future. A new generation of Indigenous artists, filmmakers, and writers are beginning to create works that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity, unsettling existing settler notions of what our future in space might look like. As Leo Cornum (2015) writes, “Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze.” These previous examples should serve as a reminder that the historical underpinnings of our great national myth are built upon shaky intellectual ground—we need to be honest about this. America did not just spring forth out of nothing; it came from the brutal occupation and control of Native lands. Despite the best efforts of the settler state, Native people are still here, we still exist and make vital contributions to both our tribal communities and science. We cannot expect Donald Trump to turn his back on the national myth of what made the United States the United States—in his mind, this is the glorious history of what made America great in the past. And it should serve as no surprise that Trump and others wish to extend this history into outer space. Even when Trump’s days in the White House are over, the settler colonial logics that underpin our engagement with land on Earth will still loom large over the ways that we may potentially engage with outer space. But for those of us who do work in Indigenous geographies and Indigenous studies, it becomes even more vital that we heed the calls of Indigenous thinkers inside and outside formal academic structures, validate Indigenous histories, and push to deconstruct the American settler myth and to provide a new way of looking at the stars, especially at a crucial moment where the settler state turns its gaze towards the same.

#### **This can help progress our counter-hegemonic movement of decolonization. Decol is crucial to creating post-colonial ethics under the relationship framework where we recognize the Earth and each other’s inherent values.**

**Walia 12** (Harsha Walia, “Colours of Resistance Archive.” Home - Colours of Resistance Archive. 2012. <http://www.coloursofresistance.org/769/moving-beyond-a-politics-of-solidarity-towards-a-practice-of-decolonization/>)

While centring and honouring Indigenous voices and leadership, the obligation for decolonization does rest on all of us. As written by Nora Burke in Building a Canadian Decolonization Movement: Fighting the Occupation at Home, “**A decolonisation movement cannot be comprised solely of solidarity** and support **for Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty** and self-determination. If we are in support of self-determination, **we too need to be self-determining**. It is time to cut the state out of this relationship, **and** to **replace it with a new relationship**, one which is mutually negotiated, and **premised** on a core **respect for autonomy and freedom.**” **Being responsible for decolonization** often **requires us to locate ourselves within the context of colonization** in complicated ways – often as simultaneously oppressed and complicit. This is true, for example, for racialized migrants in Canada. Within the anti-colonial migrant justice movement of No One Is Illegal, **we go beyond demanding** citizenship **rights for racialized migrants as that would lend false legitimacy to a settler state.** We challenge the official state discourse of multiculturalism that undermines the autonomy of Indigenous communities by granting and mediating rights through the imposed structures of the state and seeks to assimilate diversities into a singular Canadian identity. Indigenous feminist Andrea Smith reminds us that “**All non-Native peoples are promised the ability to join in the** colonial **project of settling indigenous lands…** In all of these cases, we would **check our aspirations against** the aspirations of **other communities to ensure** that **our model of liberation does not become the model of oppression for others.”** In B.C., immigrants and refugees have participated in several delegations to Indigenous blockades, while Indigenous communities have offered protection and refuge for migrants facing deportation. Decolonization is the process whereby we intend the conditions we want to live and the social relations we wish to have. **We have to supplant the colonial logic of the state itself.** German philosopher Gustav Landauer wrote almost a hundred years ago that “**the State is a condition, a** certain **relationship between human beings**, a mode of behaviour; **we destroy it by contracting other relationships.**” **Decolonization requires us to exercise our sovereignties** differently and **to reconfigure** our **communities based on shared experiences,** ideals, **and visions.** Almost all **Indigenous formulations of sovereignty** – such as the Two Row Wampum agreement of peace, friendship, and respect between the Haudenosaunee nations and settlers – **are premised on** revolutionary **notions of respectful coexistence and stewardship of the land, which goes far beyond any Western liberal democratic ideal.** I have been encouraged to think of human interconnectedness and kinship in building alliances with Indigenous communities. Black/Cherokee writer Zainab Amadahy uses the term “Relationship Framework” to describe how **our activism should be grounded**: “Understanding the world **through a Relationship Framework, where we don’t see** ourselves, **our communities, or** our **species as** inherently **superior to any other, but rather see our roles and responsibilities** to each other **as inherent to enjoying** our **life** experiences.” Striving toward **decolonization** and walking together toward transformation **requires us to challenge a dehumanizing social organization that perpetuates** our **isolation** from each other **and normalizes a lack of responsibility to one another and the Earth.**

#### Prefer our analysis -

#### Geographical and material violence because of the weaponization of space extends to the activity of debate. The debate space is colonized through the theorizations that undergirds the discussion and by creating “policies” that are determined by settler frameworks to validate the current structure in the Tuck & Yang card above.

#### Specifically, the point of LD is to engage in a values or theory debate but every time someone reads a different value the space is so opposed. We tend to focus on extinction scenarios (violence OUT there) without realizing the effects on Native bodies and ignoring rooted claims of settler futurity.

Mitchell 17 (Audra Mitchell, CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics, Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, former Senior Lecturer in International Relations, department of Politics, University of York, Ph.D. Queen’s University of Belfast, “Decolonizing against extinction part II: Extinction is not a metaphor – it is literally genocide,” Worldly, 9-27-2017, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2017/09/27/decolonizing-against-extinction-part-ii-extinction-is-not-a-metaphor-it-is-literally-genocide/>)

Extinction is not a metaphor… Extinction has become an emblem of Western, and white-dominated, fears about ‘the end of the(ir) world’. This scientific term is saturated with emotional potency, stretched and contorted to embody almost any nightmare, from climate change to asteroid strikes. In academic and public contexts alike, it is regularly interchanged with other terms and concepts – for instance, ‘species death’, global warming or ecological collapse. Diffused into sublime scales – mass extinctions measured in millions of (Gregorian calendar) years, a planet totalized by the threat of nuclear destruction – ‘extinction’ has become an empty superlative, one that that gestures to an abstract form of unthinkability. It teases Western subjects with images of generalized demise that might, if it gets bad enough, even threaten us, or the figure of ‘humanity’ that we enshrine as a universal. This figure of ‘humanity’, derived from Western European enlightenment ideals, emphasizes individual, autonomous actors who are fully integrated into the global market system; who are responsible citizens of nation-states; who conform to Western ideas of health and well-being; who partake of ‘culture’; who participate in democratic state-based politics; who refrain from physical violence; and who manage their ‘resources’ responsibly (Mitchell 2014). Oddly, exposure to the fear of extinction contributes to the formation and bolstering of contemporary Western subjects. Contemplating the sublime destruction of ‘humanity’ offers the thrill of abjection: the perverse pleasure derived from exposure to something by which one is revolted. Claire Colebrook detects this thrill-seeking impulse in the profusion of Western blockbuster films and TV shows that imagine and envision the destruction of earth, or at least of ‘humanity’. It also throbs through a flurry of recent best-selling books – both fiction and speculative non-fiction (see Oreskes and Conway 2014; Newitz 2013; Weisman 2008). In a forthcoming intervention, Noah Theriault and I (2018) argue that these imaginaries are a form of porn that normalizes the profound violences driving extinction, while cocooning its viewers in the secure space of the voyeur. Certainly, there are many Western scientists, conservationists and policy-makers who are genuinely committed to stopping the extinction of others, perhaps out of fear for their own futures. Yet extinction is not quite real for Western, and especially white, subjects; it is a fantasy of negation that evokes thrill, melancholy, anger and existential purpose. It is a metaphor that expresses the destructive desires of these beings, and the negativity against which we define our subjectivity. But extinction is not a metaphor: it is a very real expression of violence that systematically destroys particular beings, worlds, life forms and the relations that enable them to flourish. These are real, unique beings, worlds and relations – as well as somebody’s family, Ancestors, siblings, future generations – who are violently destroyed. Extinction can only be used unironically as a metaphor by people who have never been threatened with it, told it is their inevitable fate, or lost their relatives and Ancestors to it – and who assume that they probably never will. This argument is directly inspired by the call to arms issued in 2012 by Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang and more recently by Cutcha Risling-Baldy. The first, seminal piece demonstrates how settler cultures use the violence of metaphorical abstraction to excuse themselves from the real work of decolonization: ensuring that land and power is in Indigenous hands. Risling-Baldy’s brilliant follow-up extends this logic to explain how First People like Coyote have been reduced to metaphors through settler appropriation. In both cases, engagement with Indigenous peoples and their relations masks moves to innocence: acts that make it appear as if settlers are engaging in decolonization, while in fact we are consolidating the power structures that privilege us. In this series, want to show how Western, and white-dominated, discourses on ‘extinction’ appear to address the systematic destruction of peoples and other beings while enacting moves to innocence that mask their culpability and perpetuate structures of violence. As I argued in Part I of this series, extinction is an expression of colonial violence. As such, it needs to be addressed through direct decolonization, including the dismantling of settler colonial structures of violence, and the resurgence of Indigenous worlds. Following Tuck, Yang and Risling-Baldy’s lead, I want to show how and why the violences that drive extinction have come to be invisible within mainstream discourses. Salient amongst these is the practice of genocide against Indigenous peoples other than humans. …it is literally genocide. What Western science calls ‘extinction’ is not an unfortunate, unintended consequence of desirable ‘human’ activities. It is an embodiment of particular patterns of structural violence that disproportionately affect specific racialized groups. In some cases, ‘extinction’ is directly, deliberately and systematically inflicted in order to create space for aggressors, including settler states. For this reason, it has rightly been framed as an aspect or tool of colonial genocides against Indigenous human peoples. Indeed, many theorists have shown that the ‘extirpation’ of life forms (their total removal from a particular place) is an instrument for enacting genocide upon Indigenous humans (see Mazis 2008; Laduke 1999; Stannard 1994). Specifically, the removal of key sources of food, clothing and other basic materials makes survival on the land impossible for the people targeted. Nehiyaw thinker Tasha Hubbard (2014) makes a qualitatively distinct argument. She points out that the Buffalo are First People, the elder brothers of the Nehiyaw people (and other Indigenous nations – see Benton-Banai 2010). Starting in the mid-1800s, the tens of millions of buffalo that ranged across Turtle Island were nearly eliminated through strategic patterns of killing carried out by settler-state-sponsored military and commercial forces. Their killing was linked to governmental imperatives to clear and territorially annex the Great Plains by removing its Indigenous peoples. As Hubbard points out, methods of destroying buffalo herds included large-scale killing, but also the disruption of their social structures, the destruction of the ecosystems on which they rely, and the removal of calves. These acts involve each of the components of the definition of genocide enshrined in the UN Genocide Convention: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. From Hubbard’s viewpoint, rooted in Nehiyaw philosophy and ethical-legal principles, the systematic destruction of the buffalo is not like genocide, nor is it exclusively a tool for carrying out genocide against human peoples. It is genocide in its own right: an attempt to destroy a particular First People and the possibilities of its continuity. In other words, the deliberate and systematic attempt to eliminate the buffalo, enacted by settler states, simultaneously enacted genocide against Indigenous peoples and their nonhuman relatives. Genocides of Indigenous peoples (human and otherwise) continue apace in contemporary settler states, transformed into multiple manifestations. For instance, they are integral to ‘biosecurity’ strategies designed to police the biological boundaries of these states and their citizens. Laced with racializing and xenophobic rhetoric (Subramaniam 2001), strategies such as culling or planned eradications are intended to remove ‘invasive’ or ‘foreign’ life forms in order to protect ‘Native’ ones. Many of the ‘invasive’ life forms targeted for destruction were transported to unfamiliar lands through colonial patterns of settlement and global trade flows. However, this logic of elimination (Wolfe 2006) is often perverted, turned against Indigenous\* beings whose flourishing impedes the expansion or consolidation of the colonial state. For instance, Deborah Bird Rose (2011 a, 2011 b) shows how this form of violence is continually waged against flying foxes, who are framed by the settler state as “pest[s] whose extinction is [deliberately] sought”. This act of elimination involves explicit genocidal ideation, or the imagination of the destruction of a people. Rose characterizes it as a “matter of imagining a world without [dingoes or flying foxes], then setting out to create it” (Rose 2011a). The Australian settler state has used multiple tactics to induce terror and preclude flourishing amongst flying foxes, from the emission of high-pitched electronic signals to smearing trees with python excrement (Rose 2011b). Indeed, in 2014, I lived near to the roosting site of a group of flying foxes in Turrbal and Jagera Country (suburban Brisbane to settlers). Such nesting places are called ‘colonies’ , reflecting a Western scientific rhetoric that frames Indigenous peoples as ‘invaders’ of the settler state. The trees that housed the nesting site backed onto a municipal facility, whose fence had been covered with barbed wire, in which many of the bats snared their wings and starved to death. This ‘security’ measure – designed to protect the facilities relied upon by urban settlers from the intrusion of flying foxes – is a powerful weapon for precluding ongoing flourishing of Indigenous other-than-human peoples. I learned from neighbours that this ‘colony’ had previously been ‘moved’ from several other sites around the city, suffering significant declines in population each time. Indeed, despite reported declines of 95% in flying fox communities in Queensland and neighbouring New South Wales, the Queensland settler state legalized the shooting of the bats in 2012 by fruitgrowers. Of course, in some cases, the elimination of life forms is not as targeted or intentional – it may take the form of land-based extractive violence, the creep of ocean acidification, the decimation of rainforests by climate change. Proponents of a Eurocentric definition of genocide could argue that these events lack intention. Indeed, within international law, intention to commit genocide is a necessary criteria for conviction. However, theorists of critical genocide studies have long argued that this definition is inadequate: it brackets out a great many of the acts, logics and structures that produce the destruction of unique peoples. According to Tony Barta, definitions of genocide that focus on ‘purposeful annihilation’, and in particular on physical killing, have “devalu[ed] all other concepts of less planned destruction, even if the effects are the same” (Barta 2000, 238). For this reason, he shifts the focus from ‘genocidal intention’ to ‘genocidal outcome’ – that is, from the abstract assignation of genocidal agency to the felt and embodied effects of eliminative violence. It is the focus on intent, he contends, that allows white Australians to imagine that their relationship with Aboriginal people is non-genocidal despite overwhelming evidence of systematic and deliberate racialized destruction over several centuries. In contrast, an approach based on ‘genocidal outcomes’ makes it possible to account for complex causality and weak intentionality – that is, for myriad acts mediated by subtle, normalized structures that, together, work to eliminate a people. I want to argue that the same logic applies to nonhuman peoples: the destruction of a life form, its relations with other beings and its possible futures is a genocidal outcome, whether or not intention can be identified. Similarly, Christopher Powell (2007) argues that, since a ‘genos’ is a “network of practical social relations, destruction of a genos means the forcible breaking down of those relationships…these effects could be produced without a coherent intent to destroy. They could result from sporadic and uncoordinated actions whose underlying connection is the production of a new society in which there is simply no room for the genos in question to exist. They might even result from well-meaning attempts to do good” (Powell 2007, 538) As I have argued elsewhere, extinction is defined by the breaking of relations and the systematic destruction of the conditions of plurality that nurture co-flourishing worlds. Whether inflicted out as a deliberate act of extirpation, or as the convergent effect of eliminative logics expressed over centuries and enormous spatial scales, extinction is the destruction of relations and the heterogenous societies they nurture. Understood in this way, ‘extinction’ is not a metaphor for genocide or other forms of large-scale violence: it is a distinct manifestation of genocide. Masking the genocidal logics that drive extinction involves several moves to innocence (Tuck and Yang 2012). Treating extinction as something short of genocide entrenches Eurocentric understandings of personhood that are limited to homo sapiens, which is itself an act of violence against these peoples. Ironically, the entrenchment of this dichotomy also enables the logic of ‘dehumanization’, in which human communities are likened to reviled nonhumans (for instance, cockroaches) in order to motivate violence against them. As I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell 2014), the logic of generalised ‘dehumanisation’ is uniquely effective in Western frameworks in which the lack of ethical status for beings other than humans removes obstacles to their mass destruction. Within worlds in which human and nonhuman persons are linked through complex systems of law, treaties, protocols and long-standing relations, this claim is illogical. Within Western settler states, however, it functions as a means of justifying ongoing violence against Indigenous peoples and their relations. In addition, by framing extinction as a problem for a universal figure of ‘humanity’ (more on this to follow…) mainstream discourses of extinction obscure its profound entwinement with race and racializing structures. These examples make it clear that eliminative violence is targeted on specific groups of people and their other-than-human relations, as defined by the aggressors. Indeed, patterns of genocidal violence extend racializing categories, hierarchies and eliminative impulses to other-than-human peoples. Just as approaching gender violence separately from race effaces their intersection, understanding extinction as distinct from race is deeply misleading. This is not only because racialized people are more likely to suffer from the effects of ‘extinction’ and other forms of environmental racism (which they are). It is also because the eliminative violence that drives extinction extend and enact race beyond the category of homo sapiens by defining particular groups against white settler norms and as threats to the settler society. To approach extinction separately from issues of race is, therefore, to miss one of its most defining features. Extinction is not a metaphor – in many cases, it is quite literally genocide enacted against Indigenous peoples and their other-than-human relations. To treat it as a metaphor is to obscure and participate in the structures of violence that drive it. From this perspective, in addition to active decolonisation efforts, and the resurgence of Indigenous peoples, addressing extinction also requires attacking the genocidal, racializing, eliminative logics that are diffused throughout settler.

#### Prioritizing materiality confines indigenous being to the western domain of physicality where being indigenous is always understood as being the irrational savage at an anatomical level – this legitimizes Indigenous erasure.

**Hokowhitu 09** (Brendan Hokowhitu, The University of Waikato Te Pua Wānanga ki te Ao, The Faculty of Māori & Indigenous StudiesHamilton, New Zealand Position Dean and Professor, The University of Waikato, Indigenous Existentialism and the Body Page 108 – 111, January 2009, RLA)

Exhuming ghosts: A genealogy of the Indigenous body Indigenous studies, as with feminist cultural studies, is best to position itself outside the Western, white masculine intellectual tradition of mind/body dualism: ‘an approach which refuses to privilege mind over body … and which assumes that the body cannot be transcended, is one which … emphasises contingency, locatedness, the irreducibility of difference, the passage of emotions and desire, and the worldliness of being’.13 Such a positioning is double-edged, however, as **the colonial project ‘limited the identity of the colonised to the materiality of their bodies’14 and thus the analysis must be at once deconstructory and existential.** Meaning, it is dangerous ground not to firstly problematise Indigenous theorisation stemming from the body, prior to foregrounding the body as a realm of study from where Indigenous existentialism can develop. Hence, this sub-section entitled ‘exhuming ghosts’. In part, white colonial patriarchy effected colonisation because it claimed to embody the power of reason and, consequently, universal interests. Key to enlightenment rationalism and its reliance on reason to know and to authenticate the objective world was its faith in the mind/body dichotomy orated by Plato and canonised by Descartes. In his 1871 book, The Descent of Man, 15 Charles Darwin emphasises the key differences in intellectual development (that is to say language, observation, curiosity, memory, imagination and reason) between primitive and civilised peoples.16 Darwin and other evolution theorists played an indirect but nonetheless highly significant role in the tainting of European accounts of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous cultures as unenlightened were, from an occipital logic, inherently more ‘physical’, ruled by their passions, and less intelligent than their civilised brethren**. The apparent lack of division between the indigene’s mind, body, spirit and the external world only served to augment the belief of European colonisers that they were indeed encountering savage races. Moreover, Enlightenment philosophers avoided questions of inconsistency in equality and autonomy arising from colonial subjugation by locating the Indigenous being in the realm of the physical and irrational, a site that denied full humanity itself.**17 **If savagery is understood from the perspective of Enlightenment rationalism, then it is apparent that it portends a state of unenlightenment, where reason is ruled by physical impulses and/or superstition.** What Foucault refers to as the invisible ‘breath’ that inhabits discontinuous discourses, even as they mutate,18 I conceive of as ‘physicality’ with reference to the colonised Indigenous savage. **As a sub-theme of the primitive/modern dialectic, physicality describes a complex of interconnecting discourses that enables unitary discursive knowledge to develop around the colonised Indigenous subject.** The thematic of Indigenous 108 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 physicality in the colonial state was ‘capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses, like an organism with its own needs, its own internal force and its own capacity for survival’.19 Darwin’s evolutionary theory, for instance, ‘directed research from afar’ acting as ‘a preposition rather than named, regrouped, and explained … a theme that always presupposed more than one was aware of … forcibly transformed into discursive knowledge’.20 Such discursive knowledge underpinned Indigenous ‘savagery’ and was transcribed into physical terms, onto the Indigenous body and about Indigenous bodily practices. For this essay, it is important to establish that the collision of supposedly embodied Indigenous epistemologies with disembodied Enlightenment rationalism left an inauthentic void that the Europeans, at least, desired to chart through authenticating disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology**. Enlightenment reason, as the determinant of truth and falsehood, was applied to the untranslatable—the epistemologies of other cultures.** The process involved, firstly, authenticating Indigenous knowledge by translating the untranslatable. That is, by encompassing and reconfiguring the incomprehensible into comprehensible forms. The authentication element in this equation is crucial because from the premise of the Enlightenment reason, knowledge was only authentic if it was known to the mind. That is, the embodied cultural concepts from ‘other’ epistemologies were only authentic if they were comprehensible to Western cognition**. The first principle of colonising the Indigenous body, then, was to bring the philosophical underpinnings of the savage under the logic of the coloniser, to authenticate the inauthentic.**21 In the universe of disembodied Enlightenment rationalism, it was assumed that reason (that is, European reason) could differentiate between truth and falsehood and, thus, the physical world was inherently translatable. The embodied practices of Indigenous epistemologies challenged that knowable world and, as a result, the reason of Enlightenment rationalism. The embodied holistic epistemologies of Indigenous societies determined the non-compartmentalisation of the ‘physical’. As opposed to the rational European subject, Indigenous subjectivity was not divorced from the body, nor the rationale from the passions, and so forth.22 **It is also important to recognise Indigenous subjectivities and their consequent bodily practices were often communally defined. Here the distinction can be made with the Western individual subject (who has prevailed in Western thought since the Enlightenment), whose person is comprised of a central and unique core, which determines their distinct identity.** The dissimilarity is important because, as opposed to a singular self, it indicates an Indigenous existentialism that incorporates multiple identities across time, including genealogical and spiritual associations, and communally defined bodily practices. The importance of the visible appearance of indigeneity and its genealogical tithing to moral deficiencies cannot be underestimated to the conception of the Indigenous body today. The Western conception of what it means to be Indigenous is in great part a visual BRENDAN HOKOWHITU—INDIGENOUS EXISTENTIALISM 109 phenomenon, ‘with all the political and ideological force that the seemingly naturalness of the body as the locus of difference can claim … [a] cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not only how but what to see’.23 Allegorically, it is crucial to make the connection of the rationality of the European with the body of the colonised Other, underscored by: the eighteenth century resurrection of classical values of beauty and their similitude with the criteria of value in the classical economic tradition. Equilibrium and utility functioned in classical economic theory in ways analogous to proportion, symmetry, and refinement for classical aesthetics. Both sets of criteria determined an order of balance and harmony established on the basis of the geometric model ... By the late eighteenth century, beauty was established in terms of racial properties: fair skin, straight hair, organthous jaw, skull shape and size, well composed bodily proportions, and so on. To fail to possess these traits was considered a fault inheritance … Aesthetic value solidified into natural law, which in the eighteenth century was considered as compelling as the laws of nature, economics and morality precisely because they were all deemed to derive from the same rational basis.24 **The corporeal ‘reality’ of the asymmetrical Indigenous body undoubtedly naturalised colonial endeavour and Indigenous subjugation, allowing colonialist claims to moral superiority dependent upon what Robyn Wiegman refers to as ‘bodily fictions’ that ‘unproblematically reflect the natural meaning of flesh**’.25 Here, Bourdieu is useful as he conceives of the body metaphorically: ‘the bearer of symbolic meaning and values and a key site through which social differences are created, perpetuated and reinforced’.26 Bourdieu is also useful in thinking of the Indigenous body in terms of ‘physical capital’,27 especially in relation to mind/body duality in that symbolic meaning inscribed onto the Indigenous body determined inferior mental capacity and thus only contained capital in the inverse sense. The Indigenous body symbolised the physical realm and, thus, was employed for its physical labour, observed for its performativity, and humanised through the physical pursuits of sport.28 For many of the Indigenous parents of my generation, Bourdieu’s analysis becomes important because of its concern with the body in relation to the working class who, through bodily cognition as a necessary effect of a physically intensive life, developed different relations to their bodies than the white middle or dominant classes.29 Moreover, for Indigenous communities, sub-cultures developed throughout much of the twentieth century based on a relationship with a physically labouring body that, in turn, has come to symbolise traditional Indigenous cultures. For instance, the relationship between physical labour and sport with the Mäori male body has determined a traditional Mäori masculinity symbolically reified within the physical realm.30 As a consequence, many Indigenous communities remain predominantly working class.

#### To have debates about the material implications of the appropriations by private entities, we first must understand how the strategic weaponization of space throughout the season impacts our ability to have those debates about outer space, in this space.

Grondin ‘06 (David, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of Quebec at Montreal. Assistant Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa. “THE (POWER) POLITICS OF SPACE: THE US ASTROPOLITICAL DISCOURSE OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR” March 25th, 2006 p. 13-14)

From the outset, many may ask why is there, looming over our head, literally and figuratively, a possibility of seeing war and violence spreading to the cosmos? Outer Space, the “endless frontier”, the “last frontier”, John F. Kennedy’s “New Frontier”, is still largely seen as the “pristine frontier”. Who writes and produces Outer Space? The social construction and production of Outer Space means that it is people with agential power that enact and produce Outer Space, that invest it with meanings and produce it with power relations. If we wish to understand US strategy regarding Space and especially how its strategic analysts produce Outer Space as a (soon-to-be)-“weaponized space”, we must go back to Lacoste’s understanding of geography and that of state and military decisionmakers: Geography is first and foremost a strategic knowledge which is closely linked to a set of political and military practices; these practices demand that extremely different, at first sight heterogeneous pieces of information should be brought together. You cannot understand the grounds for existence nor the importance of such information if you confine yourself to the validity of knowledge for knowledge’s sake. These strategic practices make geography necessary, primarily for those who control the machinery of the state. Is this really a science? It does not really matter; the question is not fundamental insofar as one is aware that geography, being the structuring of knowledge relating to 13 space, is a strategic knowledge, a power (Lacoste 1982 [1976]: 7; quoted in Ó Tuathail 1996: 162). We therein need to reflect critically on spatialities of US space power and the discourse of US space power as space weaponization.