## 1: Topicality

**Interpretation—the aff may not specify a single just government**

**A is an generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01**

**Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001** <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

**\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars**

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

**That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive**

**Violation—they specified US**

**Vote neg:**

**1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.**

**2] Limits—specifying a just government offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments in the world depending on their definition of “just government”.**

**DTD – same thing as drop the arg**

**Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for**

**No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.**

## 2: Violence PIC

**Counterplan: China ought to guarantee the right to strike except for violent strike tactics.**

**Strikes can be violent, South Africa proves. This link turns the AC by harming the affected sector and decking the economy.**

**Tenzam ’20 -** Mlungisi Tenzam LLB LLM LLD Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2020, The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1682-58532020000300004

The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike.11The Constitution grants these rights to a "worker" as an individual.12However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14¶ The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to "advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace".16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society.¶ Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike 17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally.18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful.19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers' demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows:¶ "[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike ... A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won't win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say '1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC'. You won't win a strike like that."21¶ The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers' homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour.22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families' living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer's business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26¶ These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations' sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment27, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment.

## 3: Collective Bargaining CP

#### TEXT: A just government of the People’s Republic of China ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to collectively bargain.

#### Their own solvency card says this solves virtually the entire Aff. Evaluate the CP through a lens of sufficiency. If we solve virtually the entire Aff advantage then any risk of the Econ DA or a case turn is enough to negate.

**Dongfang 11** Han Dongfang 4-6-2011 "Liberate China's Workers" <https://archive.md/7RvDG#selection-307.0-316.0> (director of China Labour Bulletin, a nongovernmental organization that defends the rights of workers in China.)//Elmer

HONG KONG — There is no legal right to strike in China, but there are strikes every day. Factory workers, hotel employees, teachers and taxi drivers regularly withdraw their labor and demand a better deal from their employer. Strikes are often successful, and these days strike leaders hardly ever get put in prison. It may seem ironic that workers in a nominally Communist country don’t have the right to strike, and that workers are apparently willing to defy the Communist Party by going out on strike. But China effectively abandoned Communism and embraced capitalism many years ago. And in a capitalist economy, strikes are a fact of life. Chinese scholars, government officials and even some businessmen have long recognized this fact and have called for the restoration of the right to strike, which was removed from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1982. Deng Xiaoping feared that the economic reforms he was introducing would lead to labor unrest. Although Deng and his successors were able to quiet labor unrest and strike action for a while, the trend over the last five years or so has been clear. As the business leader Zeng Qinghong noted recently, the number of strikes is increasing every year. Mr. Zeng, who is head of the Guangzhou Automobile Co., reported that in just two months last summer, there were more than 20 strikes in the automotive industry in the Pearl River Delta alone, and that new strikes were occurring all the time. Mr. Zeng suggested in a submission to this year’s National People’s Congress, China’s annual legislature, that the right to strike should be restored because it was a basic right of workers in a market economy and a natural adjunct to the right to work. I agree with Mr. Zeng on this point and would like to take his argument one step further. The right to strike is clearly important, but the most vital and fundamental right of workers is the right to collective bargaining. After all, why do workers go out on strike? Very simply, they go on strike for higher pay and better working conditions. The strike is not an end in itself but is part of a bargaining process. And if the collective bargaining process were more effective, in many cases, workers would not need to go out on strike at all. If you talk to factory workers, most will tell you they would rather not go on strike if they can avoid it. Indeed, most only go on strike because they have no alternative. China’s workers want and need an alternative. They want a system in which they can raise their demands for higher pay and discuss those demands in peaceful, equal and constructive negotiations with management. If workers can achieve their goals through peaceful collective bargaining, in the long run there will be fewer strikes, workers will be better paid and labor relations will be vastly improved. We also have to be aware that if the right to strike is reinstated in the Constitution in isolation — without the right to collective bargaining — there would be a danger that the right of workers to go on strike might actually be eroded. Just look at the right to stage a public demonstration. Chinese citizens do have the constitutional right to demonstrate but in reality they have to apply to the police for permission, and of course very few of those applications are granted. Likewise, if workers have to apply to the authorities before they can go on strike, the right to strike will become meaningless. Moreover, the number of strikes would not be reduced because workers would continue to go out on strike regardless and labor relations will deteriorate even further. On the other hand, if the right to strike is framed in a way that can liberate workers and encourage and empower them to engage in collective bargaining, safe in the knowledge that they have a powerful weapon that can be deployed if necessary, labor relations will be enhanced and the number of strikes might actually decrease. There is a saying in China that “you should not only focus on your head when you have headache because the real reason for the headache could be your foot.” As Mr. Zeng noted, the rapidly increasing number of strikes in China has become a major headache, not only for business but for the government as well. If the government wants to reduce the number of strikes in China, it needs to take a holistic approach and address the root cause of the problem — the absence of an effective collective bargaining system in which democratically elected workers’ representatives can negotiate better pay and conditions with their employer. If such a system can be implemented in China it would obviously benefit workers but it would also benefit employers like Mr. Zeng who are concerned about high worker turnover and the loss of production through strike action. Crucially, it is also in the interest of the Chinese government to introduce collective bargaining. The authorities may be nervous about handing power to the workers but they should bear in mind that by doing so they would aid the development of more harmonious labor relations, which could lead to the Communist Party’s goal of creating a more prosperous, stable and harmonious society.

**Strikes cause widespread economic harm - GM strikes prove. This turns the Aff econ scenarios and controls the internal link to Chinese soft-power.**

John McElroy, 2019, Strikes Hurt Everybody.Wards Auto Industry News, October 25, https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody

But **strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They hurt suppliers, car dealers and the communities located near the plants.** The Anderson Economic Group estimates that **75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike**. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, **most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them.**  **Suppliers also lost a lot of money.** **So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy.** According to CAR**, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue**. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – into a recession. That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible.

**Strikes now trigger food shortages, undermine health care and threaten the economy.**

Shannon Pettypiece, 10-24, 21, Biden on the sidelines of 'Striketober,' with economy in the balance, NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-sidelines-striketober-economy-balance-n1282094

But President Biden faces a different dynamic from candidate Biden, because s**trikes risk adding to labor shortages and supply chain disruptions that are already driving up prices as the global economy reels from pandemic strains.** While the strikes could benefit workers by driving up wages in the long term, **the near-term impact of persistent or growing work stoppages could include worst-case scenarios like food shortages or lack of access to hospitals. "This will come at an economic cost to employers and therefore the economy,** and I think that may be why Biden has gone a little silent," said Ariel Avgar, an associate professor of labor relations, law and history at Cornell University. "It is tricky for him. On the one hand, he is on the record supporting unions and their ability to use collective action. On the other hand, the point of strikes is to extract an economic price for employers unwilling to negotiate in a way the union feels is appropriate."

## Case

#### No impact to China war – reaffirmation of NFU proves

**Axe 12/10** – serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad. This first appeared in July 2019. (David, “Why Does China Say It Won't Use Nuclear Weapons First in War?” National Interest, December 10, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-does-china-say-it-wont-use-nuclear-weapons-first-war-103542>)//RP

China has reaffirmed its policy of never being the first in a conflict to use nuclear weapons. Experts refer to this policy as “no first use,” or NFU. The NFU policy reaffirmation, contained in Beijing’s July 2019 strategic white paper, surprised some observers who expected a more expansive and aggressive nuclear posture from the rising power. Notably, the United States does not have a no-first-use policy. “Retaining a degree of ambiguity and refraining from a no first use policy creates uncertainty in the mind of potential adversaries and reinforces deterrence of aggression by ensuring adversaries cannot predict what specific actions will lead to a U.S. nuclear response,” the Pentagon stated. Chinese state media posted the government’s white paper in its entirety. "Nuclear capability is the strategic cornerstone to safeguarding national sovereignty and security," the paper asserts. “This is standard language,” explained David Santoro, a nuclear expert with the nonprofit Pacific Forum. “China's nukes serve to prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attack.” Then the surprise. “China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally,” the white paper adds. This NFU clause surprised Gregory Kulacki, a nuclear expert with the nonprofit Union of Concerned Scientists. “Ever since I took this job 17 years ago, U.S. colleagues of all political and intellectual persuasions have been telling me that sooner or later China would alter, adjust, amend or qualify the policy that China will never, under any circumstances, use nuclear weapons first,” Kulacki wrote. It would be difficult to compose a more emphatic rejection of claims that China’s no-first-use policy is changing. The statement also indicates it is not Chinese policy to use nuclear weapons first to forestall defeat in a conventional military conflict with the United States. China does not have an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear strategy. China is not preparing to fight a nuclear war with the United States. It does not have “battlefield” or “tactical” or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons. Chinese nuclear strategists don’t think a nuclear war with the United States is likely to happen. And they seem sure it won’t happen as long as the U.S. president believes China can retaliate if the United States strikes first. That’s not a high bar to meet, which is why China’s nuclear arsenal remains small and, for the time being, off alert. China sees its comparatively modest nuclear modernization program as a means to convince U.S. leaders that a few Chinese ICBMs can survive a U.S. first strike and that these survivors can penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Chinese nuclear planners might be willing to slow or scale back their nuclear modernization efforts if the United States were willing to assure China’s leaders it would never use nuclear weapons first in a military conflict with China. Chinese experts and officials have been asking the United States to offer that assurance for decades. U.S. experts and officials consistently refuse. While China has not adopted a more aggressive nuclear policy, it does continue to upgrade its small nuclear arsenal and its command systems. Kulacki explained that modernization in the context of America’s own refusal to commit to no-first-use. “In the absence of a no-first-use commitment from the United States, Chinese nuclear strategists believe continued improvements to their nuclear arsenal are needed to assure China’s leaders their U.S. counterparts won’t take the risk of attacking China with nuclear weapons,” Kulacki wrote.

#### There is zero impact to china war – Chinese nuclear strategists reaffirmed their no first use policy which means even if they win conventional escalation, that doesn’t matter because nuclear weapons won’t get used – prefer our evidence, it’s most recent – theirs is speculative that doesn’t assume recent declarations

#### No US-China war

**Yoder, 19 -** Ph.D. in political science from the University of Virginia, is currently a research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore specializing in international security and politics of China and East Asia (Brandon, “Uncertainty, Shifting Power and Credible Signals in US-China Relations: Why the “Thucydides Trap” Is Real, but Limited”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-019-09606-1

This confident pessimism has two sources, neither of which is well-founded. The first is categorical assumptions about the behavior of rising states or authoritarian states in general. Many realist scholars assume that China’s intentions are hostile to US interests because the anarchic nature of the international system engenders inexorable zero-sum competition for power [40, 46], a logically-untenable claim that has been roundly refuted.12 Others assume that divergences in American and Chinese political values and regime types necessarily imply incompatible preferences for the international order at the systemic level [1, 17, 48, 52]. Yet as has been widely recognized, these particular variables are themselves indeterminate, and interact with many other domestic-level factors to determine China’s aggregate national preferences for the international order ([12, 41]:521; [60]:44). Indeed, China may very well (though not necessarily) prefer to maintain the status quo order from which it has so overwhelmingly benefitted ([7, 8]:xix; [26, 55, 56]). Secondly, other observers have extrapolated from China’s increased “assertiveness” on regional territorial issues since 2009 to conclude that China’s intentions are broadly revisionist across all issue areas [5, 63]. The apparent rationale is that because China had previously exhibited cooperative behavior regarding the SCS and restraint toward Taiwan that its cooperation with the international economic order must similarly be misrepresenting its true goals [18, 43, 50]. As such, an increasingly common conclusion is that China’s initiation of new regional institutions such as the AIIB and BRI and its state-led industrial policies, large current-account surplus, sovereign lending, and expanding FDI are evidence of its preference for a less liberalized international economic order.13 This conclusion is unwarranted, however. Although the scholarly consensus now holds that China was previously misrepresenting its true goals on narrow regional territorial issues, China has yet to exhibit clearly revisionist behavior regarding the rules and norms of the liberal international order more generally, even as it has become more powerful [8, 47, 55, 57, 60, 62]. As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly argued, China’s “assertive turn” is almost entirely limited to the South China Sea, and does not extend to the broader international order: “one should be cautious about generalizing from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large...it is possible for a state to be newly assertive on some limited range of issues while leaving other major policies unchanged” ([31]:46). Furthermore, Christensen points out that even when China’s actions are noncooperative – e.g., by gaining advantageous financing from Chinese state-owned banks for foreign energy deals, stealing intellectual property, computer hacking, or “dumping” exports to gain market share – this does not constitute rewriting the existing rules of the international order. “It simply constitutes free-riding on existing rules, an entirely different kettle of fish” ([8]:57). In short, in some issue areas – human rights policy and specific regional territorial issues in East Asia – the US and China clearly have real conflicts of interests. Yet this does not give us insights into the compatibility of US and Chinese interests on other issues, e.g., the global economic order and governing structure. On the latter issues, the goals of two countries might very well be more compatible. The likelihood of this depends on the credibility of China’s cooperative signals in these issue areas, which, in turn, depends in part on the degree of US hedging toward China. Particularly in the economic realm, China has sustained and even increased its support for the rules and institutions that define the status quo order, continuing to champion economic liberalization even as American leadership has wavered under President Donald Trump. China’s institutional initiatives, such as the AIIB and BRI, as well as its increased influence in existing institutions, have so far served to augment the existing rules and norms of the U.S.-led order rather than challenge them. Furthermore, China has continued to pursue domestic economic reforms that would increase its cooperation regarding trade imbalances, intellectual property and cybersecurity [10, 11, 24, 49]. Again, this cooperation certainly does not imply that China’s long-term intentions are unambiguously benign on these issues – strong incentives to misrepresent have still obtained, particularly in the absence of US hedging – but in contrast to the territorial issues that are the subject of China’s “assertive turn”, China’s intentions on economic and institutional issues remain significantly uncertain. Disturbingly, the Trump administration has overtly drawn on the flawed assumptions characterized above and expressed confident beliefs that China’s intentions are hostile. According to the 2017 US National Security Strategy, China is a “revisionist power” that “want[s] to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests...seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor” and is “attempting to erode American security and prosperity” [64].14 Several of Trump’s most prominent foreign policy and economic advisers have written extensively on China’s hostility, cast China as the primary threat to US national security and economic wellbeing, and characterized war with China as inevitable and perhaps even desirable [39, 48, 51]. Correspondingly, the administration has begun to implement policies of economic containment toward China, levelling over 200 billion dollars of tariffs on Chinese imports (and counting), blocking Chinese FDI in the United States, and demanding that China increase imports of US goods to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance to specific thresholds. Ironically, the Trump administration’s hedging strategy now lends considerable (though incomplete) credibility to China’s sustained economic and institutional cooperation. Yet that very hedging strategy is likely driven by unjustified and inflexible pessimism about China’s intentions, making it unlikely that the current leadership will draw appropriate lessons from China’s subsequent behavioral signals. To the extent that China continues to defend and advocate a rules-based liberal economic order in the face of Trump’s economic hedging, this constitutes a more credible signal of China’s benign intentions than did its previous cooperation under unconditional US accommodation. Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s apparent confidence about China’s hostility, based on seriously flawed assumptions, does not portend that the current leadership is likely to positively update its beliefs should China continue its general cooperation within the existing international order. Nor does Trump’s narcissistic psychological profile or the track record of his administration, which has consistently twisted evidence to support preconceived beliefs and suppressed contrary opinions [44]. Thus, current US foreign policy turns the logic of hedging on its head: rather than hedging due to uncertainty, policymakers have assumed China’s hostility and adopted policies of containment in response. This implies that if the Thucydides trap produces preventive war between the US and a hypothetically benign China, it will not be due to rational uncertainty, but rather because American leaders fail to rationally update their beliefs in response to China’s cooperative signals and instead falsely assume China’s intentions to be hostile.

#### No risk of war

* Chinese military inferiority
* Economic interdependence
* American alliance system

Artyom 14, Professor @ Far Eastern Federal University (Russia), “Imagining World War III -- In 2034,” 8/4/2014, The World Post (partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/world-war-iii\_b\_5646641.html

There are three reasons war is unlikely anytime soon. First, despite the double-digit annual growth in its defense budgets, China's military still significantly lags behind the U.S.' It will take China 15 to 20 years to attain parity or near-parity with the U.S.-Japan allied forces in the East Asian littoral. Second, for all the talk of mutual interdependence, China depends on America much more than the other way round. China is still critically reliant on the U.S and its allies, the EU and Japan, as its principal export markets and sources of advanced technologies and know-how. Overall, China's dependence on international markets is very high, with the trade to GDP ratio standing at 53 percent. China imports many vital raw materials, such as oil and iron ore. As most of its commodity imports are shipped by the sea, China would be extremely vulnerable to a naval blockade, which is likely to be mounted by the U.S. in case of a major conflict. Both for economic and strategic reasons, the Chinese government pursues policies to reduce the country's reliance on foreign markets, trying to shift from an export-oriented model to domestic sources of growth. It is also making efforts to secure raw materials in the countries and regions contiguous to China, like Central Asia, Russia or Burma, so as to reduce dependence on sea-born shipments. However, at least for the next 15 to 20 years China's dependency on the West-dominated global economic system is going to stay very significant. Third, China would have to confront not the U.S. alone but also America's Asian allies, including Japan, Australia and perhaps India. Thus China needs at least one major power ally and some lesser allies. Whether China dares to pose a serious challenge to the U.S. will, to a large extent, hinge upon Beijing and Moscow forming a Eurasian geopolitical bloc. This is already happening now, but it is going to take some more time. The bottom line: over the next 15 to 20 years a major war in Asia is highly unlikely because Beijing will be playing a cautious game. Even if a military clash does occur, it will be short, with China being quickly routed by the preponderant American force. However, around 2030 the balance is bound to undergo considerable changes, if China is successful in: 1) closing military gap with the U.S.; 2) making its economy less reliant on the Western markets and overseas raw resources; and 3) forming its own alliance structure.’

#### Empirics and military experts prove war won’t happen

Sputnik 18 — (Sputnik, 5-3-2018, "China Unlikely to Match India Strength in Indian Ocean in Near Future," Published by Sputnik, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201803051062243930-china-india-indian-ocean/, Accessed 6-5-2018, JWS)

No Military Conflict in Near Future

Following almost three months of military standoff over a disputed border area, China and India finally decided to withdraw their troops to end the conflict peacefully in August 2017. Rising rivalry between the two nations in the Indian Ocean raised questions about a possible future China-India warfare at sea. Military experts argued that such warfare in the Indian Ocean is unlikely to take place in the near future. "I do not foresee an armed conflict in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future, until China consolidates its economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, China has only one aircraft carrier for training purposes. When China finally builds up its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, perhaps we can see more powerful Chinese forces going into the Indian Ocean. Right now, any Chinese forces sent to the Indian Ocean would be weak. I do not think they try to create a conflict with India," Ben Ho, a naval analyst with the Military Studies Program at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told Sputnik.