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#### Russia and China are in a space arms race- the plan causes China to bow out and Russia wins. This independently turns case because their Bowman and Thompson + Rogin cards are not about a Russian-Sino alliance, but about an arms race between the countries. Bowman and Thompson 20:

Bradley Bowman, Jared Thompson {Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, }, 20 - ("Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space," Foreign Policy, 11-12-2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/)//marlborough-wr/

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have [sprinted](https://thedispatch.com/p/we-must-work-to-prevent-a-space-pearl) to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons. To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring. The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and [Moscow](https://undocs.org/en/CD/2181) have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories [commit](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/CD/1985) “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty. On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space? The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, [said](https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2483340/commander-lists-5-tasks-to-ensuring-continued-space-superiority/) in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.” Beijing already has an [operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf#page=3). People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department [believes](https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF#page=90) Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional [anti-satellite] weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch. Similarly, Moscow [tested](https://www.spacecom.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2448334/russia-tests-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile/) a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin [heralded](https://tass.com/defense/1034344) in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.” To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “[on-orbit](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf#page=3)”—capabilities to attack satellites.

#### Unchecked Russian influence in space will inevitably lead to war – the asymmetric advantage given to them by the plan is key for Russian space heg. They are uniquely more aggressive than China, and the CP is the only way to limit them. Don’t let them say Russia needs China – Stent only says that Russia supports Chinese aggression, not that they’re dependent on it, which means Russia heg independently turns case. Boulègue and Unal 20:

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Russia’s use of outer space Russia is not the only state investigating anti-satellite weaponry capabilities. There is a wider trend (e.g. China, India, US) to demonstrate advanced space capabilities with nefarious, if not directly offensive, intent. But, for the past few years, Russia in particular, has been provocative in testing its space weapon capabilities. For example, in April 2020, Russia [launched and tested into low orbit](https://www.space.com/russia-anti-satellite-missile-test-2020.html) the PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile system from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome demonstrating its space assets with potential offensive capabilities, in particular, Russia’s capacity to destroy satellites in Low Earth Orbit. In addition, the satellites, Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536, launched in [July 2019](http://www.russianspaceweb.com/Cosmos-2535-2536-2537-2538.html), are also suspected to be operating beyond their official mission of studying Russian orbital assets. It is [reported that](https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/us-should-start-space-security-talks-with-russia-china/) these satellites conducted a close proximity activity, coming within one kilometre from each other, which led to the creation of orbital debris. Russia’s space strategy By exploiting asymmetric advantages in space, Russia seeks to leverage its capabilities against competitors in space and in other domains, falling in line with its wider military strategy as well as its current [Federal Space Programme](https://www.planetary.org/blogs/guest-blogs/2016/0323-russia-space-budget.html) for 2016 to 2025. Russian space activities also have a cyber and electronic warfare angle. With the help of remote-sensing capabilities, Russian spy satellites potentially seek to disrupt military and civilian satellite communications and navigation systems. Indeed, in 2018, French authorities [publicly accused](https://www.rferl.org/a/france-accuses-russia-spying-military-communications-satellite-in-space/29478427.html) Russia of seeking to intercept communication satellites for French and Italian armed forces putting data transmission through Western civilian and military satellites at risk of interception. Furthermore, earlier this year, both Kosmos-2542 and 2543 came within 160 kilometres of a US spy satellite, US KH-11, similarly to Russia ‘[buzzing’](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/08/russian-jets-heading-to-uk-airspace-intercepted-by-raf-typhoons) around the British Isles or submarine surveillance that Norway and Sweden have been subjected to recently. [Shadowing and tailing](https://time.com/5779315/russian-spacecraft-spy-satellite-space-force/) in space is regarded as spying and this recent anti-satellite weapon test is part of a trend which demonstrates Russia’s persistent space strategy for close-proximity operations with foreign countries. Orbital hypocrisy Despite Russia’s calls for a treaty to [prevent the placement of weapons in outer space,](https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/) there remains little international trust in Russia’s behaviour in space so far with a US-Russia Space Security Exchange meeting scheduled to [take place](https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-assistant-secretary-for-international-security-and-nonproliferation-dr-christopher-a-ford-on-the-u-s-russia-space-security-exchange/) in Vienna on 27 July to discuss outer space stability and security. This is amid a backdrop of bilateral nuclear arms control talks on the extension of the extant nuclear weapons reduction treaty, New START, which is scheduled to expire in February 2021. There is no guarantee, however, that the talks will achieve anything especially since the future of outer space requires a wider multilateral dialogue with all parties involved – including China. Anti-satellite tests (ASATs) are a particularly dangerous form of weapon. Not only do they create major vulnerabilities in a domain where so much of humanity depends on for navigation, communications and environmental monitoring, they are also primarily a target for destabilization and undermining global positioning information in times of crisis. And, perhaps most significantly, they possess the highly destructive potential to create even more space debris in Earth’s orbits that endanger the peaceful use of satellites and could do serious damage to large parts of the economies of developed and developing countries. Avoiding space warfare Space is for all but there is a risk that it is being hijacked by a few. It is time to re-assert and reinforce the rules, principles and norms of responsible state behaviour in outer space enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its associated international agreements. And, because the treaty specifically prohibits stationing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, it is necessary to build on it to ban other types of weapons in space. Space has been militarized since 1957 with the launch of Soviet satellite Sputnik. But the increasing weaponization of space adds more uncertainty, and unveils more vulnerabilities, that states need to address before space warfare becomes a reality.