### 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution or a subset thereof –

#### The World Trade Organization is an international body that oversees global trade. Tarver 6/15

Evan Tarver [bachelor's in finance and economics from San Diego State University-California], 21 - ("How Best to Define the World Trade Organization (WTO)," Investopedia, 6-15-2021, accessed 7-5-2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wto.asp)//ML



Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that oversees the global trade rules among nations. It superseded the 1947 [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gatt.asp) (GATT) created in the wake of World War II.¶ The WTO is based on agreements signed by the majority of the world’s trading nations. The main function of the organization is to help producers of goods and services, as well as exporters and importers, protect and manage their businesses. As of 2021, the WTO has [164 member countries](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm), with Liberia and Afghanistan the most recent members, having joined in July 2016, and 25 “observer” countries and governments.1

#### Intellectual property includes patents, trademarks, copyrights and patents

Yang 19

James Yang (patent attorney). “Four types of intellectual property to protect your idea and how to use them.” OC Patent Lawyer. 2019. JDN. https://ocpatentlawyer.com/four-types-intellectual-property-protect-idea/¶

To protect your idea so that someone else cannot steal your idea, you need to secure one or more of the four different types of intellectual property (IP). Intellectual property rights are exclusionary rights given to authors, inventors, and businesses for their literary and artistic works of authorship, useful and ornamental inventions, and valuable information.¶ Every invention generally starts as an inventor’s trade secret. Before inventors market their inventions, they need to secure one or more of the other forms of intellectual property protection – patents, trademarks, and copyrights.¶ FOUR TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS¶ The four types of intellectual property include:¶ Trade Secrets¶ Trademarks¶ Copyrights, and¶ Patents.¶ The first type of intellectual property right is a trade secret. All inventions generally start as a trade secret of the inventor. Inventors have an instinctual desire to keep their ideas secret. To market your invention, you should protect your idea with one or more of the other types of intellectual property rights: patents, trademarks, and copyrights.

Reduce is to decrease in size or amount

Merriam Webster no date - ("Definition of REDUCE," Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce)//ML

to draw together or cause to converge : [CONSOLIDATE](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consolidate) ¶reduce all the questions to one b(1): to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number ¶reduce taxes ¶reduce the likelihood of war

#### Vote negative – there is a distinction between debate as an institution and debate as a game, and while the affs intervention may or may not be effective on an institutional level, the ballot only signifies a win or loss within debate as a game

#### We are both in this round primarily to get a win - its why we all adhere to other rules of the game like speech times and prep time, even if breaking those norms might make the debate “better” – its why you would vote neg if they read a 10 hour long AC about why speech time constraints are bad

#### Not reading a topical aff creates incredible structural advantages for the aff – they get first and last speech and perms which means without a stable advocacy they get to morph their aff into whatever minimizes direct clash, and allows for a retreat to moral high ground

#### You don’t have to disagree with the aff to vote neg. But, the ballot is fundamentally tied to the structure of the *game* of debate, not the *institution*, which means that your ballot can only ascribe who did a better job playing the game that we agreed upon before the start of the tournament.

#### There’s two Impacts –

#### Clash – Non-T affs avoid meaningful objections by preventing effective prep. This is supercharged by the Aff not being disclosed open source. That link turns all their research and subjectivity arguments. We can’t deploy new research strategies or cultivate new dispositions to power structures if we can’t effectively evaluate the arguments. Clash is a pre-requisite to debate, because we use competitive argumentation to understand and internalize attitudes and knowledge. That’s what distinguishes debate from other forms of learning.

#### Iterative argumentative testing – for example, think about how the India aff transformed over the course of the September topic. The first tournament was generic democracy and turnout arguments, but by the end of October debates centered around third level analysis of vote-banking and whether Modi’s nationalism was self-driven or a response to his voter base – the ability to subject controversial ideas to rigorous testing allows debaters to better engage in the research process, discern what arguments are most accurate, and learn how to refine our own beliefs to become more compelling advocates – not reading a plan allows a constant spew of new content that never reaches those high levels of contestation without the constraints of the topic – Even if this topic isn’t the perfect topic, the predictability of debates under it are worth potential substantive tradeoff. Limits produce a rigorous *culture of justification* instead of a culture of *assertion* or *presumption*. Without a bridge for subjecting beliefs to a rigorous test, we are left with might-makes-right. This link turns the Aff again, because our ability to develop critical subjectivities that can *strategically* challenge power structures necessitates this type of argument culture.

Cheryl MISAK Philosophy @ Toronto ‘8 “A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for Democracy” *Episteme* 5 (1) p. 100-104

The charge that Rorty has had to face again and again is that he really is a relativist, holding that one belief is no better than another, and that one must “treat the epistemic standards of any and every epistemic community as on a par” (Haack 1995, 136). Rorty, that is, leaves us with no way of adjudicating claims that arise in different communities. It is argued that this is not only an unsatisfactory view, but it is incompatible with his commitment to his own set of beliefs and with his practice of arguing or giving reasons for them. Peirce would join in this charge, arguing that it is the community of inquirers or reasoners that matter, not this or that local community. One of Rorty’s responses to this clutch of objections is to say that he doesn’t have to treat the epistemic standards of every community as on a par: “I prize communities which share more background beliefs with me above those which share fewer” (Rorty 1995b, 153). There is nothing incoherent about asserting that your community has it right, for all “right” amounts to is what your community agrees upon. I have argued (2000, 12ff) that this kind of comeback puts Rorty in a very difficult position, giving him nothing to say against the likes of Carl Schmitt, the fascist legal philosopher who found it natural to join the Nazi bandwagon. Schmitt, like Rorty, argued that there is no truth and rationality in politics. Rather, politics is the arena in which groups assert themselves, with the strongest coming out on top and the weaker groups disappearing. One makes an existential choice – opts for a conception of the good – and then tries to attain “substantive homogeneity” in the population. Might ends up being right and the elimination of those who disagree with us ends up being a fine method of reaching our political decisions. A democrat or liberal like Rorty has an impossible time in giving us – and himself – reasons for opting for his view rather than his fascist opponent’s view. Once you give up aiming at truth, once you give up aiming at something that goes beyond the standards of your own community, then you give up the wherewithal to argue against the might-is-right view. The charge I am trying to answer here, on behalf of the non-Rortian pragmatist, is that mixing truth and politics is dangerous. One of the points I want to make is that, whatever the dangers are in saying morals and politics aim at the truth, the dangers of denying it are even more alarming. If we were to get rid of the notion of truth, nothing would protect us from the idea that there is nothing to get right, no better or worse action, and no better or worse way of treating others. Nothing would protect us from the Schmittian worldview. Another point is that the pragmatist view encourages something which is downright salutary, not dangerous at all. It encourages a culture of justification, a culture the importance of which grows as we face the challenges of living in a global society with worldviews struggling against each other. This thought was prominent in the debate about how the new democratic order in South Africa should be conceived. Here is how Etienne Murienik put it: If the new constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defense of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force of its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not on coercion.4 A final point rests on the nature of the kinds of answers the pragmatist envisions. Rorty and Rawls seem to think that any view of truth carries with it the idea that there is one and only one true answer to every question. It is important to see that, whatever the case might be for other views of truth, the pragmatist’s view of truth does not entail anything about the precise nature of right answers. On the Peircean view of truth, it might be true that the best solution to a problem is to compromise in a certain way. Or a question might have a number of equally right answers: it might be true that either A or B or C is an acceptable solution to a problem. That is, bringing truth into politics need not result in a view on which one theory of the good triumphs over the others. Indeed, the pragmatist account of truth does not require agreement at the end of the day (whatever that might mean) and it does not require the consent of all who are affected by a particular decision here and now. The right answer to a question might be one that only a few see is right. A right answer is the one that would be best – would stand up to the evidence and arguments – were we to inquire into the matter as far as we fruitfully could. That is, we are not primarily aiming at agreement in deliberation – we are aiming at getting a view that will stand up to reasons and evidence**.** That said, there may be cases in moral and especially political deliberation in which we do aim for agreement because we think that what will best stand up to reasons in that case is a solution that is agreed upon by all or by all who are affected. But this will be just one kind of case amongst many. Right answers aren’t necessarily answers that are acceptable by all. Nor are right answers necessarily those that resolve a conflict with a compromise, although sometimes a compromise or cooperative solution may indeed be what is required. Nor is bargaining always not conducive to truth – in some cases, that may be exactly what is required. This view of truth does not lead to zeal, oppression, closing off of discussion, or a squashing of pluralism, even if it might happen to be the case that there is only one reasonable conception of the good out there. The idea is that we are always aiming at getting the best answer – whatever that may be – and to do that we need to take into account the views of all. 6 . WHO DECIDES? One of the first questions put to those who would like to think of politics as a species of truth-oriented deliberation is this: why deliberate with the ignorant multitude? Would it not be better to expose our moral and political beliefs only to the reasons and experience of experts? Science, after all, doesn’t work by asking the person in the street what he or she thinks about quantum mechanics. The reason that the pragmatist’s epistemic justification is a justification of democratic politics, rather than of a hierarchical politics, in which an elite makes decisions, is that we do not and will not ever have an identifiable pool of moral and political experts. Dewey saw this clearly. As experts become specialized, “they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve” (Dewey 1926/1984, 364). Everyone engages in moral and political deliberation and it is not obvious that having special education makes you better at it – just look at priests, politicians, and moral philosophers/political theorists and ask yourself if they seem especially decent or especially wise when it comes to practical matters. Some people are good at examining moral and politi\cal issues, but it’s not clear that they are the ones trained to do so. Even if we could identify genuinely wise people, this kind of expertise is liable to be corrupted merely by being identified – merely by the wise person starting to think of herself as a moral expert.5 And it is far from clear that the rule of the wise would really take the views and experiences of all into account better than the democratic rule of the people. So how do we distinguish deliberating well and deliberating badly if we cannot appeal to education and training? No account of deliberative democracy can ignore the call to make the distinction. The trouble is that, in saying what good, as opposed to poor, deliberation amounts to, one finds oneself facing a justificatory problem: how can we specify what good deliberation is without simply assuming that our current standards of deliberation and inquiry are the gold standards? (This is the deep and central question of pragmatism: how do genuine norms arise out of contingent practices?) It will be unsurprising that I agree with Robert Talisse that the way forward is to focus on an epistemic justification of the whole range of deliberative virtues. Some of the virtues we think important in inquiry are open-mindedness, courage, honesty, integrity, rigor, willingness to listen to the views of others and to seriously entertain challenges to one’s own views, willingness to put oneself in another’s shoes, and the like. These virtues may well have a number of kinds of justifications – justifications, for instance, with their origins in the canons of etiquette or in this or that substantive moral or religious view. Politeness and Christianity (do unto others . . . ), for instance,may both dictate that we should listen to the views of others. But this kind of justification doesn’t break out of the circle of local practices. Talisse argues that the virtues are justified because they lead to true belief. Listening to others is not merely the polite thing to do, but it is also good because we might learn something. The epistemic argument I have presented on Peirce’s behalf gets us this far: we need to expose our beliefs to the views of others if we are to follow a method that will get us good or better or true beliefs. Talisse takes us the next step – there are other characteristics that make one an inquirer who aims at the truth. Honesty is the trait of following reasons and evidence, rather than self-interest. Modesty is the trait of taking your views to be fallible. Charity is willingness to listen to the views of others. Integrity is willingness to uphold the deliberative process, no matter the difficulties encountered. The distinction between deliberating well (having deliberative virtues) and deliberating badly (having deliberative vices), that is, is drawn in terms of whether a method promotes beliefs which are responsive to and fit with the reasons and evidence. 7 . THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY The pragmatist has offered us a compelling reason to take the views of others seriously and encourage the values associated with deliberative democratic politics. For inquirers must engage in the ongoing project of continually subjecting their beliefs to the tests of further experience and argument. The virtues inherent in a deliberative model of democratic citizenship must be cultivated if we are to come to good beliefs about how to treat others, how to resolve conflicts, and how to arrange society. The model of democratic citizenship which results is one that makes democratic citizenship part of a culture of justification. Citizens search for how best to structure our institutions and how best to live our lives. Democratic citizenship is a quest to get things right, with a genuine engagement in looking for right answers to pressing questions.We are not after mere agreement and we are not after the transformation of initial preferences into something that others can accept. We aim at getting things right – at getting beliefs that would forever stand up to scrutiny. In so aiming, citizens commit themselves to abiding by the decisions produced by the democratic procedure. For those decisions are the best we can do here and now. Here we find the justification of the coercive power of democracies. Eventually there has to be a decision in politics. The question that faces all societies is who decides and who wields the power to coerce once the decision is made? My argument is that as more people deliberate and more reasons and experience go into the mix, it will become more likely that the decisions made will account for the reasons and experience of all. The more likely, that is, that the answer will be right. Decisions produced by a democratic deliberative process are made by a rational method and so they are enforceable.

#### Frame procedural impacts through a lens of optimization – we don’t need to win that they make the game impossible, just relatively less effective. In the same way you would vote aff to reject a bad process CP even if there are theoretically solvency deficits based on certainty and immediacy – the fact that we still have some neg ground doesn’t mean that reading the cap k for the 87th time against a survival strategy aff is a good debate to have for anyone involved

#### They have no offense

#### View T impacts as a process, not a product – any education impact about their content being important are solved by reading a book – filter impacts through what is unique to the process of debating itself

#### They get to read it on the neg – if their k of being topical is true then reading the aff as a K on the neg means they get auto-wins, we still access their education

#### The TVA solves – they could have read an aff that talks about how vaccine imperialism hurts Black folks - this would allow a discussion of the aff in a forum that allows us to have nuanced responses – yes, it isn’t perfect, but those imperfections are neg ground – if they aren’t forced to defend a controversy, then the meaning of any wins they get become hollow anyway which takes out solvency

**Adopt a hybridizing strategy - exploiting contradictions in hegemonic discourse maintains critical distance while effectively challenging the state. Kapoor ‘08**

Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 138-139)

There are perhaps several other social movement campaigns that could be cited as examples of **a ‘hybridizing strategy’**.5 But what emerges as important from the Chipko and NBA campaigns is the way in which they **treat** laws and **policies**, institutional practices, **and ideological apparatuses as deconstructible**. That is, they refuse to take dominant authority at face value, and proceed to reveal its contingencies. Sometimes, they expose what the hegemon is trying to disavow or hide (exclusion of affected communities in project design and implementation, faulty information gathering and dissemination). Sometimes, they problematize dominant or naturalized truths (‘development = unlimited economic growth = capitalism’, ‘big is better’, ‘technology can save the environment’). In either case, by contesting, publicizing, and politicizing accepted or hidden truths, they hybridize power, challenging its smugness and triumphalism, revealing its impurities. They show power to be, literally and figuratively, a bastard. While speaking truth to power, a **hybridizing** strategy also **exploits the instabilities of power**. In part, this involves showing up and taking advantage of the equivocations of power — conflicting laws, contradictory policies, unfulfilled promises. A lot has to do here with **publicly shaming the hegemon, forcing it to** remedy injustices and **live up to stated commitments** in a more accountable and transparent manner. And, in part, **this involves** nurturing or **manipulating the splits and strains within institutions. Such maneuvering can take the form of cultivating allies**, forging alliances, or throwing doubt on prevailing orthodoxy. Note, lastly, the way in which a **hybridizing** strategy **works with the dominant discourse**. This reflects the negotiative aspect of Bhabha’s performativity. The strategy may outwit the hegemon, but it does so from the interstices of the hegemony. The master may be paralyzed, but his paralysis is induced using his own poison/medicine. It is for this reason that cultivating allies in the adversarial camp is possible: **when you speak their language and appeal to their own ethical horizons,** you are building a modicum of common ground. It is for this reason also that **the master cannot easily dismiss or crush you.** Observing his rules and **playing his game** **makes it difficult for him not to** take you seriously or **grant** you **a certain legitimacy**. The use of non-violent tactics may be crucial in this regard: state repression is easily justified against violent adversaries, but it is vulnerable to public criticism when used against non-violence. Thus, the fact that Chipko and the NBA deployed civil disobedience — pioneered, it must be pointed out, by the ‘father of the nation’ (i.e. Gandhi) — made it difficult for the state to quash them or deflect their claims.

### 2

#### We advocate doing the entirety of the aff except for the use of the phrase and the analysis of a “race war”

#### “Race War” is a racist phrase that assumes that equal force is used by both sides.

John Stoehr, 12 - ("'Race war': A trick of political rhetoric,"Al Jazeera, 4-1-2012, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241264514867938.html)//ML

New Haven, CT - Last weekend, two white men went on a shooting rampage in Tulsa, Oklahoma, killing three African Americans and wounding two others. One of the men, Jake England, has suggested the slaughter was meant to [avenge the death of his father at the hands of a black man](http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/explanation-for-tulsa-shootings-may-lie-in-2010-confrontation-that-killed-suspects-father/2012/04/09/gIQAzYow6S_story.html) who was not among the killed or wounded. Four days prior to this, one of my students, in a class presentation on American journalism that touched on the civil rights movement of the tumultuous 1960s, innocently used the phrase "race war". ¶ I say "innocently", because he didn't possess a full understanding of that phrase's racist pedigree. He merely tried to capture the tensions and frequent pangs of violence that sprang from that historic uprising. Black Americans mobilised in great numbers to demand that the United States live up to its values and grant the blessings of liberty, equality and justice to all, even Americans whose ancestors embodied the diametric opposite of freedom.¶ What my student, a self-identified liberal, couldn't have known is that "race war" is a trick of political rhetoric that at the time was meant to mask the dynamics of racism - who was on the receiving end, who on the giving end. Political spin takes on the weight of history if it's repeated enough, and journalists are great at repeating political spin, especially when that spin helps satisfy an item on the checklist of journalistic writing: balance. Balance requires presenting both sides of the story as if they are equal even if they are unequal. Balance, at least in theory, gives the appearance of impartiality but in practice it can [distort more than it reveals](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/10/ta_102011.html).¶ I touched on this recently when [I wrote about the media's use of the word "clash"](http://www.newdeal20.org/2011/11/22/the-real-media-bias-the-police-forces-disproportionate-power-65437/) to describe conflicts between law enforcement and protesters of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Last fall, cops in cities around the United States were dressed in body armour, face shields and helmets while wielding various and sundry forms on "non-lethal" weaponry like pepper spray, rubber bullets and sonic grenades. Protesters possessed nothing of the sort. "Clash" implied equal forces, but protesters were targets of police violence. "Clash" not only concealed this reality, but gave credence to the movement's opponents who claimed Occupy Wall Street was merely a carnival of thugs whose calls for justice were illegitimate. ¶ "Race war" similarly distorts reality when used to describe, say, conflict between black protesters and Alabama state troopers in 1965. Protesters marched from Selma to Montgomery during the peak of the civil rights movement and [police deployed the "non-lethal" weaponry of the day](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/11/19/1038170/-Pepper-Spray-is-the-New-Fire-Hose): fire hoses, batons and dogs. ¶ "Race war" was often brandished as a threat to civil libertarians. Demands to end to apartheid laws in the South, they were told, would spark a race war. Translated: They'd unleash more white violence. Of course, that was half true. White violence had been part of the African-American experience since Europeans brought slaves to the colonies. The only thing new would be a resurgence of white violence. A threat certainly, but hardly a new one.¶

### 3

#### CP Text: Embrace “combat breath” and refuse racism through *peaceful* rebellion and acts of protest.

#### The CP solves better. Violent acts of rebellion backfire particularly in racial protest scenarios. They strengthen the stereotypes of race in relation to violence and are easily crushed because they are such a minority.

Tyler Cowen, 18 - ("Are peaceful or violent protests more effective?," Marginal REVOLUTION, 11-2-2018, 3-5-2020https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/11/peaceful-violent-protests-effective.html)//AW

Are peaceful or violent protests more effective at achieving policy change? I study the effect of protests during the Civil Rights Era on legislator votes in the US House. Using a fixed-effects specification, my identifying variation is changes within the congressional district over time. I find that peaceful protests made legislators vote more liberally, consistent with the goals of the Civil Rights Movement. By contrast, violent protests backfired and made legislators vote more conservatively. The effect of peaceful protests was limited to civil rights-related votes. The effect of violent protests extended to welfare-related votes. I explore alternative explanations for these results and show that the results are robust to them. Congressional districts where incumbents were replaced responded more strongly. Furthermore, congressional districts with a larger population share of whites responded more strongly. This is consistent with a signaling model of protests where protests transmitted new information to white voters but not to black voters.


#### They have no reason why specifically violent rebellion is needed. The net benefit is building strength in the image of black citizens.

#### Nonviolent protests are effective without rebuilding the worlds of racial inequality they help to destroy.

#### Nonviolent protest have become increasingly successful. Their evidence is outdated and understates effectiveness. We will insert these charts and quote from the article. Fisher 13


Max Fisher, 13 - ("Peaceful protest is much more effective than violence for toppling dictators," Washington Post, 11-5-2013, 3-5-2020https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/11/05/peaceful-protest-is-much-more-effective-than-violence-in-toppling-dictators/)//AW

Political scientist Erica Chenoweth used to believe, as many do, that violence is the most reliable way to get rid of a dictator. History is filled, after all, with coups, rebellions and civil wars. She didn't take public protests or other forms of peaceful resistance very seriously; how could they possible upend a powerful, authoritarian regime? Then, as Chenoweth recounts in a Ted Talk posted online Monday, she put together some data and was surprised by what she found. "I collected data on all major nonviolent and violent campaigns for the overthrow of a government or a territorial liberation since 1900," she says -- hundreds of cases. "The data blew me away." Here's her chart, which pretty clearly suggests that nonviolent movements are much likelier to work:



(Erica Chenoweth/YouTube)

And that trend is actually "increasing over time," Chenoweth adds. "Nonviolent campaigns are becoming increasingly successful." Below is a chart of the successful campaigns from 1940 to 2006.



(Erica Chenoweth/YouTube)

### 4

#### The AC must have a solvency advocate which endorses each component of the plan—they don’t.

#### Vote neg for competitive equity and presumption, they explode the topic beyond the lit base which is the only way to preserve limits and predictability and lack of solvency advocate means you vote on presumption and have a low threshold for the CP because nobody thinks the plan can solve. If they cannot say how they are actually solving, the AC is just striking a pose. No specified mechanism, no actual advocacy. Presume neg if the aff does not do anything.

# CASE

### Case

#### No solvency spillover – obviously once this debate is over nuclear weapons will still be in use – make them explain why voting for a sophomore in a preliminary high school debate is enough to tear down racism

### A2 ROB

#### Their role of the debate arguments repeat oppression. Asserting that there is ONLY ONE way for liberation is destined to create tactics which repeat the oppression it opposes.

Magnet 6 Shoshana, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, *Qualitative Inquiry*, Protesting Privilege, Volume 12 Number 4 August 2006 736-749

Chela Sandoval (2000) has called the “apparatus of love” one way of working together as it is a strategy of resistance that allows us to develop an oppositional consciousness in which we understand love “as a technology for social transformation” (p. 2). Sandoval advocated for a radical Third World feminism—what Ella Shohat (1998) has referred to as “multicultural feminism”—as a strategy or “science of oppositional ideology” (Sandoval, 2000, p. 144). All of these tactics of resistance necessitate building coalitions to work together (McIntyre, 2006). To participate in this struggle with integrity and the ability to listen, we must think about our place within it. We have to not only move beyond “white ignorance, white denial, white fear, white apathy, white lies, white power” (Brand, 1994, p. 119) but also think through the ways in which we are privileged to do the hard work of casting aside our own internalized “isms.” How can we develop Sandoval’s oppositional consciousness if we are concerned by only our own subordination? It is too easy, therefore, to forget the ways in which we participate in the selfsame structural inequalities that we are fighting. In that moment, struggle is undone. Resistance work is possible only when we consider our own impulse to “race to innocence” and acknowledge our contested places within these hierarchies. Without this acknowledgment, it is difficult to move from theory to practice. All of these strategies for resistance break down as they assert that there is only one ideology that is liberating— the one in which I am positioned as marginalized. Any movement that refers to itself as the one “becomes destined to repeat the oppressive authoritarianism from which it is attempting to free itself ” (Sandoval, 2000, p. 59).

#### Your role of the ballot causes debate to become more conservative. We must encourage what is white in debate to participate in anti-racism.

Subotnik 98, Professor of Law, Touro College, (Daniel, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring)

If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, 80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected. In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications [\*698] for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

#### You can’t argue that one impact should be prioritized above all others UNLESS YOUR ALT SOLVES THAT IMPACT. Otherwise, there’s no reason to prefer the ROB.