### 1

#### Interpretation—a strike is a collective industrial action taken by laborers that entails stopping work done in exchange for a change in their working conditions. The right to strike must be a legal guarantee of a government

#### Strikers are made up of a group of industrial workers advocating for material resolving disputes about working conditions—it can’t be individual. Malebye 14

Cynthia Dithato Malebye, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria, 2014, The Right to Strike in Respect of Employment Relationships and Collective Bargaining.” Dissertation. University of Pretoria, April 2014. <https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/43163/Malebye_Right_2014.pdf?sequence=1>

The employee in the strike definition includes both current and ex-employees.76 The right to strike is a collective action. An individual employee cannot take strike action.**77 The purpose of a strike must be to remedy a grievance or to resolve a disput**e. Where employees had taken strike action demanding the dismissal or removal of a supervisor after giving an undertaking that they would report to the supervisor, following an earlier dispute over the same issue, the Court held that through such an undertaking, the employees had by implication abandoned their demand, thus rendering the strike unprotected.78 If **employees refuse to work, but are not seeking to remedy a grievance or resolve a dispute, there is no strike in terms of the definition**.79 A court must have regard to substance rather than form and “ascertain the real underlying dispute”.80 The purpose of industrial action determines whether it qualifies as a strike action. What began as a strike can change its character once the initial purpose has fallen away. The moment the strike ends so does statutory protection.81

#### The right to strike must be a legal guarantee. Malebye 14

Cynthia Dithato Malebye, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria, 2014, The Right to Strike in Respect of Employment Relationships and Collective Bargaining, Dissertation, . University of Pretoria, April 2014. <https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/43163/Malebye_Right_2014.pdf?sequence=1>

**Before the implementation of the new *Constitution* in South Africa, employees only enjoyed the freedom to strike but not the right to strike**. This past situation implied that the employees who embarked on a strike, even if it was a legal strike were not protected from dismissal as in effect they were in breach of their employment contracts in terms of common law. A fundamental right contained in the Constitution is that workers will have “the right to strike for purposes of collective bargaining.” In other words, the right must be functional to collective bargaining.

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh: it’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### topic education—All of the literature on the topic is about industrial workers engaging in collective action for material changes to their pay or working conditions, not about the production of meaning. This means that none of the neg generics link such as econ disads, politics disads, PICs out of specific industries. None of their cards even say the word “strike” which proves that it is not a part of the topic

#### Clash – it’s a pre-requisite to debate which is an intrinsic good since we are all here for the purpose of debating – yes this may seem tautological, but so is every impact – you should use your ballot to assert that since we all took our weekend and spent it here, that clash does have meaning

#### Iterative argumentative testing – the ability to subject controversial ideas to rigorous testing allows debaters to better engage in the research process, discern what arguments are most accurate, and learn how to refine our own beliefs to become more compelling advocates – not reading a plan allows a constant spew of new content that never reaches those high levels of contestation without the constraints of the topic – Even if this topic isn’t the perfect topic, the predictability of debates under it are worth potential substantive tradeoff. Without a bridge for subjecting beliefs to a rigorous test, we are left with might-makes-right.

Cheryl MISAK Philosophy @ Toronto ‘8 “A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for Democracy” *Episteme* 5 (1) p. 100-104

The charge that Rorty has had to face again and again is that he really is a relativist, holding that one belief is no better than another, and that one must “treat the epistemic standards of any and every epistemic community as on a par” (Haack 1995, 136). Rorty, that is, leaves us with no way of adjudicating claims that arise in different communities. It is argued that this is not only an unsatisfactory view, but it is incompatible with his commitment to his own set of beliefs and with his practice of arguing or giving reasons for them. Peirce would join in this charge, arguing that it is the community of inquirers or reasoners that matter, not this or that local community. One of Rorty’s responses to this clutch of objections is to say that he doesn’t have to treat the epistemic standards of every community as on a par: “I prize communities which share more background beliefs with me above those which share fewer” (Rorty 1995b, 153). There is nothing incoherent about asserting that your community has it right, for all “right” amounts to is what your community agrees upon. I have argued (2000, 12ff) that this kind of comeback puts Rorty in a very difficult position, giving him nothing to say against the likes of Carl Schmitt, the fascist legal philosopher who found it natural to join the Nazi bandwagon. Schmitt, like Rorty, argued that there is no truth and rationality in politics. Rather, politics is the arena in which groups assert themselves, with the strongest coming out on top and the weaker groups disappearing. One makes an existential choice – opts for a conception of the good – and then tries to attain “substantive homogeneity” in the population. Might ends up being right and the elimination of those who disagree with us ends up being a fine method of reaching our political decisions. A democrat or liberal like Rorty has an impossible time in giving us – and himself – reasons for opting for his view rather than his fascist opponent’s view. Once you give up aiming at truth, once you give up aiming at something that goes beyond the standards of your own community, then you give up the wherewithal to argue against the might-is-right view. The charge I am trying to answer here, on behalf of the non-Rortian pragmatist, is that mixing truth and politics is dangerous. One of the points I want to make is that, whatever the dangers are in saying morals and politics aim at the truth, the dangers of denying it are even more alarming. If we were to get rid of the notion of truth, nothing would protect us from the idea that there is nothing to get right, no better or worse action, and no better or worse way of treating others. Nothing would protect us from the Schmittian worldview. Another point is that the pragmatist view encourages something which is downright salutary, not dangerous at all. It encourages a culture of justification, a culture the importance of which grows as we face the challenges of living in a global society with worldviews struggling against each other. This thought was prominent in the debate about how the new democratic order in South Africa should be conceived. Here is how Etienne Murienik put it: If the new constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defense of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force of its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not on coercion.4 A final point rests on the nature of the kinds of answers the pragmatist envisions. Rorty and Rawls seem to think that any view of truth carries with it the idea that there is one and only one true answer to every question. It is important to see that, whatever the case might be for other views of truth, the pragmatist’s view of truth does not entail anything about the precise nature of right answers. On the Peircean view of truth, it might be true that the best solution to a problem is to compromise in a certain way. Or a question might have a number of equally right answers: it might be true that either A or B or C is an acceptable solution to a problem. That is, bringing truth into politics need not result in a view on which one theory of the good triumphs over the others. Indeed, the pragmatist account of truth does not require agreement at the end of the day (whatever that might mean) and it does not require the consent of all who are affected by a particular decision here and now. The right answer to a question might be one that only a few see is right. A right answer is the one that would be best – would stand up to the evidence and arguments – were we to inquire into the matter as far as we fruitfully could. That is, we are not primarily aiming at agreement in deliberation – we are aiming at getting a view that will stand up to reasons and evidence**.** That said, there may be cases in moral and especially political deliberation in which we do aim for agreement because we think that what will best stand up to reasons in that case is a solution that is agreed upon by all or by all who are affected. But this will be just one kind of case amongst many. Right answers aren’t necessarily answers that are acceptable by all. Nor are right answers necessarily those that resolve a conflict with a compromise, although sometimes a compromise or cooperative solution may indeed be what is required. Nor is bargaining always not conducive to truth – in some cases, that may be exactly what is required. This view of truth does not lead to zeal, oppression, closing off of discussion, or a squashing of pluralism, even if it might happen to be the case that there is only one reasonable conception of the good out there. The idea is that we are always aiming at getting the best answer – whatever that may be – and to do that we need to take into account the views of all. 6 . WHO DECIDES? One of the first questions put to those who would like to think of politics as a species of truth-oriented deliberation is this: why deliberate with the ignorant multitude? Would it not be better to expose our moral and political beliefs only to the reasons and experience of experts? Science, after all, doesn’t work by asking the person in the street what he or she thinks about quantum mechanics. The reason that the pragmatist’s epistemic justification is a justification of democratic politics, rather than of a hierarchical politics, in which an elite makes decisions, is that we do not and will not ever have an identifiable pool of moral and political experts. Dewey saw this clearly. As experts become specialized, “they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve” (Dewey 1926/1984, 364). Everyone engages in moral and political deliberation and it is not obvious that having special education makes you better at it – just look at priests, politicians, and moral philosophers/political theorists and ask yourself if they seem especially decent or especially wise when it comes to practical matters. Some people are good at examining moral and politi\cal issues, but it’s not clear that they are the ones trained to do so. Even if we could identify genuinely wise people, this kind of expertise is liable to be corrupted merely by being identified – merely by the wise person starting to think of herself as a moral expert.5 And it is far from clear that the rule of the wise would really take the views and experiences of all into account better than the democratic rule of the people. So how do we distinguish deliberating well and deliberating badly if we cannot appeal to education and training? No account of deliberative democracy can ignore the call to make the distinction. The trouble is that, in saying what good, as opposed to poor, deliberation amounts to, one finds oneself facing a justificatory problem: how can we specify what good deliberation is without simply assuming that our current standards of deliberation and inquiry are the gold standards? (This is the deep and central question of pragmatism: how do genuine norms arise out of contingent practices?) It will be unsurprising that I agree with Robert Talisse that the way forward is to focus on an epistemic justification of the whole range of deliberative virtues. Some of the virtues we think important in inquiry are open-mindedness, courage, honesty, integrity, rigor, willingness to listen to the views of others and to seriously entertain challenges to one’s own views, willingness to put oneself in another’s shoes, and the like. These virtues may well have a number of kinds of justifications – justifications, for instance, with their origins in the canons of etiquette or in this or that substantive moral or religious view. Politeness and Christianity (do unto others . . . ), for instance,may both dictate that we should listen to the views of others. But this kind of justification doesn’t break out of the circle of local practices. Talisse argues that the virtues are justified because they lead to true belief. Listening to others is not merely the polite thing to do, but it is also good because we might learn something. The epistemic argument I have presented on Peirce’s behalf gets us this far: we need to expose our beliefs to the views of others if we are to follow a method that will get us good or better or true beliefs. Talisse takes us the next step – there are other characteristics that make one an inquirer who aims at the truth. Honesty is the trait of following reasons and evidence, rather than self-interest. Modesty is the trait of taking your views to be fallible. Charity is willingness to listen to the views of others. Integrity is willingness to uphold the deliberative process, no matter the difficulties encountered. The distinction between deliberating well (having deliberative virtues) and deliberating badly (having deliberative vices), that is, is drawn in terms of whether a method promotes beliefs which are responsive to and fit with the reasons and evidence. 7 . THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY The pragmatist has offered us a compelling reason to take the views of others seriously and encourage the values associated with deliberative democratic politics. For inquirers must engage in the ongoing project of continually subjecting their beliefs to the tests of further experience and argument. The virtues inherent in a deliberative model of democratic citizenship must be cultivated if we are to come to good beliefs about how to treat others, how to resolve conflicts, and how to arrange society. The model of democratic citizenship which results is one that makes democratic citizenship part of a culture of justification. Citizens search for how best to structure our institutions and how best to live our lives. Democratic citizenship is a quest to get things right, with a genuine engagement in looking for right answers to pressing questions.We are not after mere agreement and we are not after the transformation of initial preferences into something that others can accept. We aim at getting things right – at getting beliefs that would forever stand up to scrutiny. In so aiming, citizens commit themselves to abiding by the decisions produced by the democratic procedure. For those decisions are the best we can do here and now. Here we find the justification of the coercive power of democracies. Eventually there has to be a decision in politics. The question that faces all societies is who decides and who wields the power to coerce once the decision is made? My argument is that as more people deliberate and more reasons and experience go into the mix, it will become more likely that the decisions made will account for the reasons and experience of all. The more likely, that is, that the answer will be right. Decisions produced by a democratic deliberative process are made by a rational method and so they are enforceable.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Frame procedural impacts through a lens of optimization – we don’t need to win they make the game impossible, just relatively less effective. In the same way you would vote aff to reject a bad process CP even if there are theoretically solvency deficits based on certainty and immediacy – the fact that we still have some neg ground doesn’t mean that reading the cap k for the 87th time against a survival strategy aff is a good debate to have for anyone involved

#### They have no offense

#### View T impacts as a process, not a product – any education impact about their content being important are solved by reading a book – filter impacts through what is unique to the process of debating itself

#### The TVA solves – they could have read an aff that talks about that an expansion of the right to striking causes a reorganization of working relations - this would allow a discussion of the aff in a forum that allows us to have nuanced responses – yes, it isn’t perfect, but those imperfections are neg ground – if they aren’t forced to defend a controversy, then the meaning of any wins the gets become hollow anyway which takes out solvency

### 2

#### The aff’s refusal to work is not a refusal of work – their endorsement of striking reinforces the belief that withholding labor puts people in a position of power. This reduces humans to labor capital, which causes work-dependency and inhibits alternatives.

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

The societal dependence on work

If work is associated with environmental pressures in at least four different ways, why do we have to maintain it at constant or increased levels? We hold that in industrial society four distinct levels of structural and cultural dependency on work may be discerned. These are to be understood as broad analytical categories which in reality comprise and cross individual and structural levels in various ways, and are all interdependent.

Personal dependence. A first aspect is individual or personal dependence on work: Work as regular, gainful employment constitutes one of the central social relations in modern ‘work society’ and is a central point of reference in people’s lives. As a principal source of income, waged work fulfils the existential function of providing livelihoods and social security. It is constructed to secure basic social rights, social integration, recognition, status, and personal identity (Frayne 2015b; Weeks 2011). This is probably why ‘social’ is so often equated with ‘work’.

State dependence. Secondly, dependence on work pertains to the modern welfare state: the revenues and economic growth generated through work contribute substantially to the financing of social security systems. Affording welfare is therefore a main argument for creating jobs. Wage labour is thus a dominating tool for redistribution; through wages, taxes on wages and on the consumption that production generates, almost all distribution takes place. Hence, what the job is, and what is being produced, is of secondary importance (Paulsen 2017). Work is moreover a convenient instrument of control that structures and disciplines society, and ‘renders populations at once productive and governable’ (Weeks 2011, 54; Gorz 1982; Lafargue 2014 [1883]). Specifically, the dominant neoliberal ideology, its condemnation of laziness and idealisation of ‘hardworking people’ has intensified the ‘moral fortification of work’. Accordingly, the neoliberal ‘workfare’ reforms have focused on job creation and the relentless activation for the labour market, effectively ‘enforcing work (…) as a key function of the state’ (Frayne 2015b, 16).

Economic dependence. Thirdly, besides the economic imperative for individuals to ‘earn a living’ and pay off debt, modern economies are dependent on work in terms of an industrious labour force, long working hours for increasing economic output under the imperatives of capital accumulation, growth and competition, and rising incomes for increasing purchasing power and demand. Creating or preserving jobs constitutes the standard argument for economic growth. In turn, work as one basic factor of production creates growth. However, the relation between growth and employment is conditioned, amongst other factors, primarily by constantly pursued labour productivity: for employment to rise or stay stable, the economy must grow at a sufficiently high rate to exceed productivity gains, in order to offset job losses and avoid ‘jobless growth’. Moreover, faltering expansion triggers a spiral of recession which not only affects economic stability but results in societal crises as a whole (Jackson 2009; Paech 2012). However, besides being unsustainable and insatiable, growth is also increasingly unlikely to continue at the rates required for economic stability (Kallis et al. 2018; IMF 2015). The individual and structural economic dependence on work and economic growth therefore implies profound vulnerability as livelihoods and political stability are fatefully exposed to global competition and the capitalist imperative of capital accumulation, and constrained by ‘systemically relevant’ job and growth creating companies, industries and global (financial) markets (Gronemeyer 2012; Paech 2012).

Cultural dependence. A fourth aspect concerns cultural dependence: The ‘work ethic’ is the specific morality described by Max Weber (1992[1905]) as constitutive of modern industrial culture, 2 and determining for all its subjects as shared ‘common senses’ about how work is valued and understood. It means an ingrained moral compulsion to gainful work and timesaving, manifested in the common ideals of productivity, achievement and entrepreneurship, in the feeling of guilt when time is ‘wasted’, in personal identification with one’s ‘calling’, in observations of busyness, even burnout as a ‘badge of honour’ (Paulsen 2014), and in descriptions of a culture that has lost the ‘capacity to relax in the old, uninhibited ways’ (Thompson 1967, 91). Even for those who do not share such attitudes towards work, in a work-centred culture it is normal to (seek) work. It is so commonsensical that it seems impractical to question it, and it continues to be normalised through socialisation and schooling. Consequently, people become limited in their imagination of alternatives, the prospect of losing one’s job usually causes heartfelt fear (Standing 2011). For a work society that ‘does no longer know of those other higher and more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom would deserve to be won’, there can be nothing worse than the cessation of work (Hannah Arendt, cited in Gorz 1989, 7–8).

The wage relation based on the commodity labour is, in other words, an essential functional feature of the industrial-capitalist system, and the exaltation of work remains its social ethic. For modern industrial society work is ‘both its chief means and its ultimate goal’ (Gorz 1989, 13; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2011); it is centred and structurally dependent on work, despite work’s environmentally adverse implications. This constellation constitutes the dilemma between work and the environment, and it is why we argue that work is absolutely central to present-day unsustainability and should accordingly be dealt with in sustainability research.

#### Work necessitates material throughput and waste that destroys the environment, even when the jobs are ‘green’

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

An ecological critique of work

What is the problem with modern-day work from an environmental perspective? A number of quantitative studies have researched the correlation of working hours and environmental impacts in terms of ecological footprint, carbon footprint, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy consumption, both on micro/household and on macro/cross-national levels, and for both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013; Nässén and Larsson 2015; Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007). Based on these findings, and going beyond them, we develop a qualitative classification of ecological impacts of work broadly (not working hours only), distinguishing four analytically distinct factors (Hoffmann 2017).

Fundamentally, all productive activity is based on material and energy throughputs within wider ecological conditions, which necessarily involves interference with the ecosphere. The appropriation and exploitation of non-human animals, land, soil, water, biomass, raw materials, the atmosphere and all other elements of the biosphere always to some extent causes pollution, degradation, and destruction. Thus, work is inherently both productive and destructive. However, this biophysical basis alone need not make work unsustainable, and it has not always been so (Krausmann 2017).

Contributing to its unsustainability is, firstly, the Scale factor: the greater the amount of work, the more ‘inputs’ are required and the more ‘outputs’ generated, which means more throughput of resources and energy, and resulting ecological impacts. In other words, the more work, the larger the size of the economy, the more demands on the biosphere (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013). Obviously, there are qualitative differences between different types of work and their respective environmental impacts. Moreover, besides the evident and direct impacts, indirect impacts matter also. The tertiary/service sector is therefore not exempt from this reasoning (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), not only due to its own (often ‘embodied’) materiality and energy requirements, but also because it administrates and supports industrial production processes in global supply chains (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Haberl et al. 2009; Paech 2012).

Additionally, modern work is subject to certain integrally connected and mutually reinforcing conditions inherent in industrial economic structures, which aggravate ecological impacts by further increasing the Scale factor. These include the systematic externalisation of costs, and the use of fossil fuels as crucial energy basis, which combined with modern industrial technology enable continuously rising labour productivity independently of physical, spatial or temporal constraints (Malm 2013). Taken together, this leads to constantly spurred economic growth with a corresponding growth in material and energetic throughputs, and the creation of massive amounts of waste. The latter is not an adverse side-effect of modern work, but part of its purpose under the imperatives of growth, profitability, and constant innovation, as evident in phenomena such as planned obsolescence or the ‘scrapping premium’, serving to stimulate growth and demand, and hence, job creation (Gronemeyer 2012). These conditions and effects tend to be neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised to resolve the ecological crisis (Paus 2018), disregarding that the systematically and continuously advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits (Haberl et al. 2009).

#### Unions are intrinsically invested in labor being good – they don’t strike to get rid of work; they strike to get people back to work. Lundström 14:

Lundström, Ragnar; Räthzel, Nora; Uzzell, David {Uzell is Professor (Emeritus) of Environmental Psychology at the University of Surrey with a BA Geography from the University of Liverpool, a PhD Psychology from the University of Surrey, and a MSc in Social Psychology from London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Lundstrom is Associate professor at [Department of Sociology](https://www.umu.se/sociologiska-institutionen/) at Umea University. Rathzel is an Affiliated as professor emerita at [Department of Sociology](https://www.umu.se/sociologiska-institutionen/) at Umea University.}, 14 - ("Disconnected spaces: introducing environmental perspectives into the trade union agenda top-down and bottom-up," Taylor & Francis, 12-11-2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212?scroll=top&amp;needAccess=true)//marlborough-wr/

Even though there was support for environmental perspectives in LO at this time – after all, the National Congress commissioned the programme, an environmental unit was established at headquarters and a majority of the congress accepted the programme – this waned significantly when the economy was threatened. This reflects the influence of the ‘jobs vs. environment’ conflict on processes of integrating environmental perspectives into the union agenda (Räthzel and Uzzell [2011](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)). Union policies are embedded in a mode of production marked by what Marx called the ‘metabolic rift’. The concept is one of the pillars upon which Foster develops ‘Marx’s Ecology’ (Foster [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212), 155 f). It argues that the capitalist industrial system exploits the earth without restoring its constituents to it. More generally, Marx defined the labour process as metabolism (Stoffwechsel) between nature (external to humans) and human nature. When humans work on and with nature to produce the means of their survival, they also develop their knowledge and their capabilities, and transform their own human nature (Marx [1998](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)). Polanyi later reduced the concept of the ‘metabolic rift’ to the commodification of land (Polanyi [1944](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)), thus paving the way for a perspective that sees the solution in the control of the market, but disregards the relations of production as they are lived by workers in the production process. But to understand why trade unions have difficulties developing and especially holding on to environmental policies it is important to recognise that since nature has become a privately owned ‘means of production’ it has become workers’ Other. Unions have been reduced and have reduced themselves to care only for one part of the inseparable relationship between nature and labour. On the everyday level of policies this means that environmental strategies lose momentum in times of economic crises and when jobs are seen to be threatened. In this respect, unions are no different from political parties and governments. In spite of numerous publications by the ILO and Union organisations, which show that a move to a ‘green economy’ can create new jobs (Poschen [2012](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212); Rivera Alejo and Martín Murillo [2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)), unions have been reluctant to exchange ‘a bird in the hand for two in the bush’ – even if the bird in the hand becomes elusive.

#### The alternative is rejecting the affirmative to embrace postwork – it questions the centrality of work and ontological attachments to productivity to enable emancipatory transformation of society to an ecologically sustainable form.

#### Your ballot symbolizes an answer to the question of whether work can be used as the solution to social ills. The plan doesn’t “happen,” and you are conditioned to valorize work – vote neg to interrogate these ideological assumptions.

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

What is postwork?

How can a ‘postwork’ approach contribute to resolving these issues? The notions critique of work (Frayne 2015a, 2015b) or postwork (Weeks 2011) have emerged in recent years in social science research and popular culture, building on a long intellectual tradition of (autonomist and neo-)Marxist, anarchist, and feminist theory (Seyferth 2019; Weeks 2011). The critique of work targets work in a fundamental sense, not only its conditions or exploitation. It is aimed at the centrality of work in modern ‘work society’ as a pivotal point for the provision of livelihoods through monetary income, the granting of social security, social inclusion, and personal identity construction, on which grounds unemployed persons and unpaid activities are excluded from recognition, welfare provision and trade union support. Moreover, the crucial role of waged work in the functioning of the welfare state and the modern industrialised economy is part of this critique (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015b; Paulsen 2017). Although commonly taken as naturally given, this kind of societal order and its institutions such as the wage relation, labour markets, unemployment, or abstract time are historically and culturally exceptional modes of human coexistence (Applebaum 1992; Graeber 2018; Gorz 1989; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Thompson 1967). This critique of the structures and social relations of work society is accompanied by the critique of its cultural foundation, the work ethic; an ideological commitment to work and productivism as ends in themselves, moral obligations, and as intrinsically good, regardless of what is done and at what cost (Gorz 1982; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2001).

Postwork, however, is not only a critical stance. Criticising work and work society, aware of their historical contingency, implies the potential for an emancipatory transformation of industrial society. The focus is thereby not necessarily on abolishing work tout-court, but rather on pointing out and questioning its relentless centrality and asking what a more desirable, free and sustainable society might look like; a society in which work is no longer the pivotal point of social organisation and ideological orientation, including all questions and debates around this objective (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015a; Weeks 2011).

As a relatively new and dynamically developing approach, postwork is, despite similar political claims, not uniform in its reasoning. Some, drawing on the classical ‘end-of-work’ argument (Frayne 2016), assume an imminent technology-induced massive rise in unemployment. This is welcomed as an opportunity to reduce and ultimately abolish work to liberate humankind (Srnicek and Williams 2015). Others emphasise the remarkable fact that throughout the past two centuries technological development has not challenged the centrality of work in modern lives, despite the prospect that technological change would allow for much shorter working hours (e.g., Keynes 1930). This has not materialised due to the requirements of a work-centred, work-dependent society. On the contrary, work has become more central to modern societies. These deeper structural and cultural aspects and dependencies seem to remain unaffected by technological trends (Paulsen 2017; Weeks 2011).

The ecological case for postwork

The perspective of postwork/critiques of work may enrich sustainability debates in many ways; here, our focus is again on ecological concerns. First, postwork offers a much needed change in focus in sustainability debates, away from narrow critiques of individual consumption and the overemphasis on ‘green jobs’, towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability. Postwork directs the focus towards crucial overlooked issues, e.g. the ways in which work is ecologically harmful, or which problems arise due to the social and cultural significance of modern-day work, including existential dependencies on it. Postwork seeks to re-politicise work, recognising that its conception and societal organisation are social constructs and therefore political, and must accordingly be open to debate (Weeks 2011). This opens conceptual space and enables open-minded debates about the meaning, value and purpose of work: what kind of work is, for individuals, society and the biosphere as a whole, meaningful, pointless, or outright harmful (Graeber 2018)?

Such debates and enhanced understanding about the means and ends of work, and the range of problems associated with it, would be important in several regards. In ecological regard it facilitates the ecologically necessary, substantial reduction of work, production and consumption (Frey 2019; Haberl et al. 2009). Reducing work/working hours is one of the key premises of postwork, aiming at de-centring and de-normalising work, and releasing time, energy and creativity for purposes other than work (Coote 2013). From an ecological perspective, reducing the amount of work would reduce the dependency on a commodity-intensive mode of living, and allow space for more sustainable practices (Frayne 2016). Reducing work would also help mitigate all other work-induced environmental pressures described above, especially the ‘Scale factor’ (Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), i.e. the amount of resources and energy consumed, and waste, including emissions, created through work. A postwork approach facilitates debate on the politics of ecological work reduction which entails difficult questions: for example, which industries and fields of employment are to be phased out? Which fields will need to be favoured and upon what grounds? Which kinds of work in which sectors are socially important and should therefore be organised differently, especially when altering the energy basis of work due to climate change mitigation which implies decentralised, locally specific, intermittent and less concentrated energy sources (Malm 2013)? These questions are decisive for future (un-)sustainability, and yet serious attempts at a solution are presently forestalled by the unquestioned sanctity that work, ‘jobs’ or ‘full employment’ enjoy (Frayne 2015b).

Postwork is also conducive to rethinking the organisation of work. There are plausible arguments in favour of new institutions of democratic control over the economy, i.e. economic democracy (Johanisova and Wolf 2012). This is urgent and necessary to distribute a very tight remaining carbon budget fairly and wisely (IPCC 2018), to keep economic power in check, and to gain public sovereignty over fundamental economic decisions that are pivotal for (un-)sustainable trajectories (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). An obstacle to this is one institution in particular which is rarely under close scrutiny: the labour market, a social construct linked to the advent of modern work in form of the commodity of labour (Applebaum 1992). It is an undemocratic mechanism, usually characterised by high levels of unfreedom and coercion (Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018; Paulsen 2015) that allocates waged work in a competitive mode as an artificially scarce, ‘fictitious’ commodity (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). 4 It does so according to availability of money and motives of gain on the part of employers, and appears therefore inappropriate for distributing labour according to sustainability criteria and related societal needs. As long as unsustainable and/or unnecessary jobs are profitable and/or (well-)paid, they will continue to exist (Gorz 1989), just as ‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria in order to be created. An ecological postwork perspective allows to question this on ecological grounds, and it links to debates on different modes of organising socially necessary work, production and provisioning in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode.

Finally, postwork is helpful for ecological reasons because it criticises the cultural glorification of ‘hard work’, merit and productivism, and the moral assumption that laziness and inaction are intrinsically bad, regardless the circumstances. Postwork is about a different mindset which problematises prevailing productivist attitudes and allows the idea that being lazy or unproductive can be something inherently valuable. Idleness is conducive to an ecological agenda as nothing is evidently more carbon-neutral and environment-sparing than being absolutely unproductive. As time-use studies indicate, leisure, recreation and socialising have very low ecological impacts, with rest and sleep having virtually none (Druckman et al. 2012). Apart from humans, the biosphere also needs idle time for regeneration. In this sense, laziness or ‘ecological leisure’, ideally sleep, can be regarded as supremely ecofriendly states of being that would help mitigate ecological pressures. Moreover, as postwork traces which changes in attitudes towards time, efficiency and laziness have brought modern work culture and modern time regimes into being in the first place and have dominated ever since (Thompson 1967; Weber 1992 [1905]), it provides crucial knowledge for understanding and potentially changing this historically peculiar construction. It can thereby take inspiration from longstanding traditions throughout human history, where leisure has usually been a high social ideal and regarded as vital for realising genuine freedom and quality of life (Applebaum 1992; Gorz 1989).

Conclusions: postwork politics and practices

We argued that modern-day work is a central cause for unsustainability, and should therefore be transformed to advance towards sustainability. We have contributed to this field of research, firstly, by developing a systematisation of the ecological harms associated with work – comprising the factors Scale, Time, Income, and Work-induced Mobility, Infrastructure, and Consumption – taking those studies one step further which investigate the ecological impacts of working hours quantitatively. One of the analytical advantages of this approach is that it avoids the mystification of work through indirect measures of economic activity (such as per capita GDP), as in the numerous analyses of the conflict between sustainability and economic growth in general. Our second substantial contribution consists in combining these ecological impacts of work with an analysis of the various structural dependencies on work in modern society, which spells out clearly what the recurring jobs-environment-dilemma actually implies, and why it is so difficult to overcome. While this dilemma is often vaguely referred to, this has been the first more detailed analysis of the different dimensions that essentially constitute it. Reviewing the literature in environmental sociology and sustainability research more generally, we also found the work-environment-dilemma and the role of work itself are not sufficiently addressed and remain major unresolved issues.

We proposed the field would benefit from taking up the long intellectual tradition of problematising modern-day work, through the approach of postwork or critiques of work. While the described problems of unsustainability and entrenched dependencies cannot easily be resolved, we discussed how postwork arguments can contribute to pointing out and understanding them, and to opening up new perspectives to advance sustainability debates. A third contribution is therefore to have introduced the concept of postwork/critiques of work into sustainability research and the work-environment debate, and to have conducted an initial analysis of the ways in which postwork may be helpful for tackling ecological problems. Besides being ecologically beneficial, it may also serve emancipatory purposes to ‘raise broader questions about the place of work in our lives and spark the imagination of a life no longer so subordinate to it’ (Weeks 2011, 33). In order to inspire such ‘postwork imagination’ (Weeks 2011, 35, 110) and show that postwork ideas are not as detached from reality as they may sound, in this last section we briefly outline examples of existing postwork politics and practices.

The most obvious example is the reduction of working hours during the 19th and 20th centuries. These reforms were essential to the early labour movement, and the notion that increasing productivity entails shorter working hours has never been nearly as ‘radical’ as today (Paulsen 2017). As concerns about climate change are rising, there is also renewed awareness about the ecological benefits of worktime reduction, besides a whole range of other social and economic advantages (Coote 2013; Frey 2019).

Worktime reduction is usually taken up positively in public debate. Carlsson (2015, 184) sees a ‘growing minority of people’ who engage in practices other than waged work to support themselves and make meaningful contributions to society. Frayne (2015b) describes the practical refusal of work by average people who wish to live more independently of the treadmill of work. Across society, the disaffection with work is no marginal phenomenon (Graeber 2018; Cederström and Fleming 2012; Paulsen 2014, 2015; Weeks 2011); many start to realise the ‘dissonance between the mythical sanctity of work on the one hand, and the troubling realities of people’s actual experiences on the other’ (Frayne 2015b, 228). Public debates are therefore increasingly receptive to issues such as industries’ responsibility for climate change, coercive ‘workfare’ policies, meaningless ‘bullshit jobs’, or ‘work-life-balance’, shorter hours, overwork and burnout; topics ‘that will not go away’ (Coote 2013, xix) and question the organisation of work society more fundamentally. 5

The debate about an unconditional basic income (UBI) will also remain. UBI would break the existential dependency of livelihoods on paid work and serve as a new kind of social contract to entitle people to social security regardless of paid economic activity. In addition to countless models in theory, examples of UBI schemes exist in practice, either currently implemented or planned as ‘experiments’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015).

The critique and refusal of work also takes place both within the sphere of wage labour and outside it. Within, the notions of absenteeism, tardiness, shirking, theft, or sabotage (Pouget 1913 [1898]; Seyferth 2019) have a long tradition, dating back to early struggles against work and industrialisation (Thompson 1967), and common until today (Paulsen 2014). The idea of such deliberate ‘workplace resistance’ is that the ability to resist meaningless work and the internalised norms of work society, and be idle and useless while at work, can be recognised and successfully practised (Campagna 2013; Scott 2012). Similarly, there is a growing interest in productive practices, social relations, and the commons outside the sphere of wage labour and market relations, for example in community-supported agriculture. This initiates ways of organising work and the economy to satisfy material needs otherwise than by means of commodity consumption (Chamberlain 2018; Helfrich and Bollier 2015).

For such modes of organising productive social relations in more varied ways, inspiration could be drawn from the forms of ‘work’ that are prevalent in the global South in the so-called informal sector and in non-industrial crafts and peasantry, neither of which resemble the cultural phenomenon of modern-day work with its origins in the colonial North (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; Thompson 1967). This, however, contradicts the global development paradigm, under which industrialisation, ‘economic upgrading’, global (labour) market integration and ‘structural transformation’ are pursued. Modern work, especially industrial factory jobs and ideally in cities, is supposed to help ‘the poor’ to escape their misery (Banerjee and Duflo 2012; UNDP 2015). Many of these other forms of livelihood provisioning and associated ways of life are thus disregarded, denigrated or destroyed as underdeveloped, backward, poor, and lazy (Thompson 1967), and drawn into the formal system of waged work as cheap labour in capitalist markets and global supply chains – ‘improved living conditions’ as measured in formal pecuniary income (Rosling 2018; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987). There are indications that these transformations create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour

(while few viable wage labour structures exist) (Hickel 2017; Srnicek and Williams 2015). There is also clear evidence of numerous struggles against capitalist development and for traditional livelihood protection and environmental justice (Anguelovski 2015). These are aspects where a postwork orientation is relevant beyond the industrialised societies of the global North, as it puts a focus on the modern phenomenon ‘work’ itself and the conditions that led to its predominance, as it questions the common narrative that ‘jobs’ are an end in themselves and justify all kinds of problematic development, and as it allows to ask which alternative, postcolonial critiques and conceptualisations of ‘work’ exist and should be preserved.

To conclude, we clearly find traces of postwork organisation and politics in the present. However, these ideas are contested; they concern the roots of modern culture, society and industrial-capitalist economies. Waged work continues to be normalised, alternatives beyond niches appear quite impractical for generalisation. Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo (Lundström, Räthzel, and Uzzell 2015). Job creation and (global) labour market integration (regardless of what kind) are central policy goals of all political parties, and presently popular progressive debates on a Green New Deal tend to exhibit a rather productivist stance.

There is one particular aspect that appears hopeful: the present socio-economic system is unsustainable in the literal sense that it is physically impossible to be sustained in the long run. It was Weber (1992[1905]) who predicted that the powerful cosmos of the modern economic order will be determining with overwhelming force until the last bit of fossil fuel is burnt – and exactly this needs to happen soon to avert catastrophic climate change. 6 This is the battlefield of sustainability, and lately there has been renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change, where it might be realised that a different societal trajectory beyond work and productivism for their own sake is more sustainable and desirable for the future.

### 3

#### Plan text: Firms should be transformed into worker self-directed enterprises.

Wolff ND - Richard D. Wolff [professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and a visiting professor at the New School in New York City. He has also taught economics at Yale University, the City University of New York, and the University of Paris I (Sorbonne)], “Start with Worker Self-Directed Enterprises,” *The Next System Project*. <https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/RickWolff.pdf> AT

We therefore propose reorganizing enterprises such that workers become their own bosses. Specifically, that means placing the workers in the position of their own collective board of directors, rather than having directors be nonworkers selected by major shareholders. This is not primarily a matter of workers as owners of these enterprises (fine, but not required), nor primarily as managers (likewise fine, but not required). It is the tasks of direction—the decision making now assigned usually and primarily to corporate boards of directors and only secondarily to the major shareholders who choose them—that must be transferred to the workers collectively. We call such enterprises worker self-directed enterprises (WSDEs). They embody and concretize what we mean by economic democracy by locating it first and foremost inside the enterprises producing the goods and services upon which society depends. WSDEs represent the goal and their growth and proliferation represent the mechanism to transition from the present capitalist system to a far better next system. The strategic focus, then, is not upon the government, as in traditional liberal and socialist thinking; it is rather more microeconomic than macroeconomic. Of course, winning government support of WSDEs and their proliferation would be helpful and sought after—perhaps by political parties rooted in and funded by an emerging WSDE sector within otherwise private or state capitalist economies. But the main emphasis would be on working people who either convert existing enterprises into WSDEs or start new enterprises as WSDEs. Core Goals Briefly, what are the principal, core goals your model or system seeks to realize? Our core goal is the development of a major—and, if possible, prevailing—sector of the economy that is comprised of enterprises (offices, factories, farms, and stores) in which the employees democratically perform the following key enterprise activities: (a) divide all the labors to be performed, (b) determine what is to be produced, how it is to be produced, and where it is to be produced, and (c) decide on the use and distribution of the output or revenues (if output is monetized) therefrom. Major Changes What are the principal changes you envision in the current system—the major differences between what you envision and what we have today? A large portion of existing capitalistically organized enterprises would have to transition out of structures in which owners, top managers, or boards of directors perform the key enterprise activities mentioned above. Principal Means What are the principal means (policies, institutions, behaviors, whatever) through which each of your core goals is pursued? The means to achieve the transition would need to be several. Laws would need to be enacted or changed to facilitate the conversion of capitalistically organized enterprises into WSDEs, the formation of new WSDEs, and the functioning of WSDEs. School curriculums would need to be changed and teachers be trained to explain, explore, and study WSDEs systematically as alternative-enterprise organizations alongside their traditional capitalist counterparts (corporations, partnerships, and family enterprises). Political parties and platforms need to emerge to represent the interests of WSDEs—the WSDE sector—in terms of state policies, much as now the Democrats and Republicans represent the interests of the capitalist sector.

#### Empirics prove prove that self-directed firms are more democratic and successful.

Jerry **Ashton, 13** - ("The Worker Self-Directed Enterprise: A "Cure" for Capitalism, or a Slippery Slope to Socialism?," HuffPost, 1-2-2013, accessed 11-16-2021, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/worker-self-directed-enterprise\_b\_2385334)//MS

Decidedly so, Wolff responds, providing two financially successful examples of **the workplace being a social activity governed by the norms of community**, one in Spain and one in California. ¶ Wolff offers as his first example, **the Mondragon Cooperative** in the North of Spain. ¶ This co-op took its name from the Mondragan University founded by a local Catholic priest by the name of "Father Arizmendi" as a mechanism to enable the poor in that community to learn how to cooperatively run their own business. ¶ Beginning with six workers producing agrarian goods, some 55 years later **it now employs 120,000** people employed **in some 100 worker-owned enterprises** and affiliated organizations. It is the **10th largest cooperative in Spain** and a bulwark against that country's steep (elsewhere) unemployment rate of 22 percent. ¶ "This is a 'a family of cooperatives' in which the first commitment is to preserve jobs -- not satisfy stockholders." Wolff points out. ¶ That same philosophy infuses **the Arizmendi Bakery** comprising five "sister cooperatives" in the San Francisco Bay Area. Proudly assuming the name of the famous Basque Priest, this group **gets rave reviews** for its pastries and thin-crust pizza **and handily outperforms** its more traditional bakery competitors **in both revenue and employee satisfaction**. ¶ As their website [proudly states](http://arizmendi.coop/), "We are a cooperative -- a worker-owned and operated business. We make decisions democratically, sharing all of the tasks, responsibilities, benefits and risks." ¶

### 4

#### CP Text: A just government should recognize an unconditional right of non-police workers’ souls to strike by abolishing police unions.

#### The aff makes police collective bargaining worse and gives more power to police unions.

Andrew **Grim, 20** Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, is at work on a dissertation on anti-police brutality activism in post-WWII Newark

- ("What is The Blue Flue and How Has It Increased Police Power," Washington Post, 7-1-2020, 11-2-2021https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/)//AW

This weekend, officers from the New York City Police Department are rumored to be planning a walkout to protest calls to defund the police. This builds on a similar tactic used by police in Atlanta less than a month ago. On June 16, Fulton County District Attorney, Paul L. Howard Jr. announced that Garrett Rolfe, the Atlanta police officer who fatally shot Rayshard Brooks, would face charges of felony murder and aggravated assault. That night, scores of Atlanta Police Department officers caught the “blue flu,” calling out sick en masse to protest the charges against Rolfe. Such walkouts constitute, in effect, illegal strikes — laws in all 50 states prohibit police strikes. Yet, there is nothing new about the blue flu. It is a strategy long employed by police unions and rank-and-file officers during contract negotiations, disputes over reforms and, like in Atlanta, in response to disciplinary action against individual officers. The intent is to dramatize police disputes with municipal government and rally the citizenry to their side. But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police. They allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities.

#### Police unions use collective bargaining to reinforce systems of racism and violence. Clark ‘19

Paul F. Clark [School Director and Professor of Labor and Employment Relations, Penn State], 10-10-2019, "Why police unions are not part of the American labor movement," Conversation, [https://theconversation.com/why-police-unions-are-not-part-of-the-american-labor-movement-142538 //accessed 10/20/2021](https://theconversation.com/why-police-unions-are-not-part-of-the-american-labor-movement-142538%20//accessed%2010/20/2021) //marlborough jh

In the wake of George Floyd’s death at the hands of a Minneapolis police officer, news reports have suggested that [police unions bear some of the responsibility](https://www.salon.com/2020/06/27/police-unions-blamed-for-rise-in-fatal-shootings-even-as-crime-plummeted/) for the [violence perpetrated against African Americans](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html). ¶Critics have assailed these unions for [protecting officers who have abused their authority](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/09/limits-when-police-can-use-force-is-better-solution-than-banning-police-unions/). Derek Chauvin, the former police officer facing [second-degree murder charges for Floyd’s death](https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868910542/chauvin-and-3-former-officers-face-new-charges-over-george-floyds-death), had nearly [20 complaints filed against him during his career](https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/05/30/minneapolis-officers-work-personal-background-detailed-2/) but only received two letters of reprimand. ¶Many people who support labor unions in principle, who view them as a countervailing force against the power of employers, have only recently [come to view police unions as problematic](https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-15/police-unions-george-floyd-reform) – as entities that [perpetuate a culture of racism and violence](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses). ¶But this sentiment reverberates through the history of the U.S. labor movement. As a [labor scholar](https://ler.la.psu.edu/people/pfc2) who has [written about unions](https://theconversation.com/essential-us-workers-often-lack-sick-leave-and-health-care-benefits-taken-for-granted-in-most-other-countries-136802) for [decades](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjir.12526), I think this viewpoint can be explained by the fact that police unions differ fundamentally from almost all trade unions in America. **¶**Foot soldiers for the status quo **¶**For many veterans of the labor movement, [police have been on the wrong side](https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-3) of the centuries-old struggle between workers and employers. [Rather than side with other members of the working class](https://www.businessinsider.com/mayhem-in-madison-police-remove-protesters-lockdown-capitol-2011-3), police have used their legal authority to protect businesses and private property, enforcing laws viewed by many as anti-union. **¶**The strain between law enforcement and labor goes back to the origins of [American unions in the mid 19th century](https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-3). Workers formed unions to fight for wage increases, reduced working hours and humane working conditions. **¶**For employers, this was an attack on the existing societal power structure. They enlisted the government as the defender of capital and property rights, and [police officers were the foot soldiers](http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/22/police-unions-havealwaysbeenalabormovementapart.html) who defended the status quo. **¶**When workers managed to form unions, companies called on local police to disperse union gatherings, marches and picket lines, using [violence and mass arrests to break the will of strikers](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-1897-massacre-pennsylvania-coal-miners-morphed-galvanizing-crisis-forgotten-history-180971695/). **¶**A narrow focus **¶**Police work is a fundamentally conservative act. And police officers tend to be politically conservative and Republican. **¶**A poll of police [conducted in September 2016 by POLICE Magazine](https://www.policemag.com/342098/the-2016-police-presidential-poll) found that 84% of officers intended to vote for Donald Trump that November. And law enforcement unions like the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Union of Police Associations and the National Border Patrol Council [all endorsed Trump’s candidacy in 2016](https://theintercept.com/2016/10/09/police-unions-reject-charges-of-bias-find-a-hero-in-donald-trump/). **¶**This contrasts sharply with the 39% share of all [union voters who voted for Trump](https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-labor-to-stem-flow-of-union-voters-to-trump-11567422002) and the fact that every other union which made an [endorsement supported Hillary Clinton](https://justfacts.votesmart.org/candidate/evaluations/55463/hillary-clinton). **¶**Exclusively protecting the interests of their members, without consideration for other workers, also sets police unions apart from other labor groups. Yes, the first priority of any union is to fight for their members, but most other unions see that fight in the context of a [larger movement that fights for all workers](https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/social-economic-justice). ¶Police unions do not see themselves as [part of this movement](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-to-know-police-unions-labor-movement). With one exception – the [International Union of Police Associations](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/11/police-unions-american-labor-movement-protest), which represents just [2.7% of American police](https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ftelea9716.pdf) – law enforcement unions are not affiliated with the AFL-CIO, the U.S. labor body that unites all unions. ¶Alternative justice system ¶A central concern with police unions is that they use collective bargaining to negotiate contracts that reduce police transparency and accountability. This allows officers who engage in excessive violence to [avoid the consequences of their actions](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/) and remain on the job. ¶In a way, some police unions have created an [alternative justice system](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/restorative-justice-police-violence/489221/) that prevents police departments and municipalities from disciplining or discharging officers who have committed crimes against the people they are sworn to serve. ¶In Minneapolis, residents filed more than [2,600 misconduct complaints](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-police-unions-11591830984) against police officers between 2012 and 2020. But only 12 of those grievances resulted in discipline. The most significant [punishment any officer received was a 40-hour suspension](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html). **¶**Besides collective bargaining, police have used the political process – including [candidate endorsements and lobbying](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/23/police-unions-spending-policy-reform-chicago-new-york-la) – to secure local and state legislation that protects their members and quells efforts to provide greater police accountability. ¶Police officers are a formidable political force because they represent [the principle of law and order](https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-gop-and-police-unions-a-love-story). Candidates endorsed by the police unions can claim they are the law and order candidate. Once these candidates win office, police unions have [significant leverage to lobby for policies](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/george-floyd-protests-police-abuse-reform-qualified-immunity-polls.html) they support or block those they oppose. ¶Because of this power, critics claim that police unions don’t feel accountable to the citizens they serve. An attorney who sued the Minneapolis Police Department on behalf of a Black resident who was [severely beaten by police officers](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html) said that he is convinced that Minneapolis “officers think they don’t have to abide by their own training and rules when dealing with the public.” ¶George Floyd’s death has raised serious concerns about the current role of police and police unions in our society. Several unions have demanded that the International Union of Police Associations be expelled from the U.S. labor federation. Other [unions oppose expulsion](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/national-labor-groups-mostly-close-ranks-defend-police-unions-n1231573). They argue that the labor movement can have a greater impact on a police union that is inside the “House of Labor.” ¶In any case, there is a growing recognition that police unions differ significantly from other unions. And there is a growing acceptance that they are not part of the larger American labor movement but rather a narrowly focused group pursuing their own self-interests, often to the detriment of the nation at large.

#### Police backed by unions are more violent than non-unionized police. Ingraham ’20.

Christopher Ingraham [Reporter] 20. ("Police Unions and Police Misconduct: What the Research Says About the Connection," Washington Post, 6-10-2020, 10-27-2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/)//AW

Some of the most shocking images to emerge from the demonstrations that have dominated recent headlines stem from violent interactions between law enforcement officers and peaceful protesters. They’ve also escalated calls for police reform. But police unions tend to be resistant to such efforts, as their mandate is to protect the interests of their members — even in cases when those interests may be counter to democratic norms and values. Though an understudied topic of criminology, what research that does exist is unequivocal: “Virtually **all** of the **published items** that express an opinion **on the impact of police unions regard them as having a negative effect**, particularly **on innovation, accountability, and police — community relations**,” as a review in the journal Police Practice and Research put it. Researchers say unionized officers draw more excessive-force complaints and are more likely to kill civilians, particularly nonwhite ones. Here are some key findings: Unionization emboldens violent officers A recent University of Chicago working paper found violent misconduct among sheriff’s officers increased about 40 percent after a state supreme court ruling allowing the officers to unionize.

The incidents examined in this paper are among the most serious types of violent misconduct, including sexual assault and excessive force. It’s worth noting the baseline numbers of these types of incidents are very low, such that the 40 percent increase translates into roughly one additional violent incident per sheriff’s office every five years. Certain union-negotiated contract provisions — including time limits on misconduct investigations, expungement of misconduct records, and mechanisms allowing officers to challenge disciplinary findings — make it more difficult to detect and punish officers who abuse their position, the researchers say. Additionally, the authors write, unionization “may increase solidarity among officers and thereby strengthen a code of silence that impedes the detection of misconduct.” Use-of-force complaints more likely among unionized officers A 2006 report from the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics found unionized police agencies garnered 9.9 use-of-force complaints for every 100 officers, compared with 7.3 for non-unionized agencies. During the disciplinary process, about 7 percent of those complaints were sustained, or found to have merit, in unionized agencies. In nonunion agencies, the sustain rate was more than double, at 15 percent. In effect, officers in unionized police forces are more likely to be the subjects of an excessive-force complaint, but more likely to beat the allegations in disciplinary hearings. Lengthy appeals processes make it more difficult to fire ‘bad apples’ Writing in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Stephen Rushin analyzed 656 police union contracts to examine the role of the disciplinary appeals process in misconduct cases. “The median police department in the data set offers police officers as many as four layers of appellate review in disciplinary cases,” he found. Some provided six or seven layers of review. After those levels are exhausted, most departments then allow officers accused of misconduct to appeal to a third-party arbitrator. More than half gave the offending officers some control over the selection of the arbitrator. The result, as detailed in a 2017 Washington Post investigation, is that a stunningly high percentage of officers fired for misconduct are eventually rehired after a lengthy appeals process. In Washington, D.C., for instance, 45 percent of the officers fired for misconduct from 2006 to 2017 were rehired on appeal. In Philadelphia, the share is 62 percent. In San Antonio, it’s 70 percent. Other contract provisions also shield police from accountability In a separate paper in the Duke Law Journal, Rushin analyzed 178 police union contracts and found a number of provisions that played a role in shielding police from the consequences of misconduct, including provisions that “limit officer interrogations after alleged misconduct, mandate the destruction of disciplinary records, ban civilian oversight, prevent anonymous civilian complaints, indemnify officers in the event of civil suits, and limit the length of internal investigations.” He found that “overall, 156 of the 178 police union contracts examined in this study — around 88 percent — contained at least one provision that could thwart legitimate disciplinary actions against officers engaged in misconduct.” Police unions advocate shielding disciplinary records from public view Writing in the Stanford Law & Policy Review, Katherine Bies notes that “police disciplinary records are public in only 12 states,” due in no small part to lobbying efforts by police unions. The article deals specifically with the efforts of police unions to pass laws in two states — New York’s notorious Section 50-a and a similar law in California — that shield disciplinary records from public scrutiny. “Police unions often strategically frame any opposition to their agenda of secrecy as endangering public safety and harming the public interest,” Bies writes. “However, police unions often conflate ‘the public interest’ with the private interests of police officers.” Unionized police may be more likely to kill civilians, particularly nonwhite ones Economist Rob Gillezeau recently previewed his research examining the relationship between unionization and police killings of U.S. citizens. While provisional, his initial results suggest the police unionization happening in the 1950s through the 1980s led to “about 60 to 70″ additional civilians killed by police each year. The “overwhelming majority” of those civilians were nonwhite. “With the caveat that this is very early work, it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the nonwhite population,” he recently said on Twitter.

# CASE

#### Petrossiants doesn’t matter – working for the common good is not the same as striking, which means not working. This is proved empirically – people in Communist societies can still work and be exploited; eg people in the Gulag

#### TURN: The telos of the 1ac’s politics is the strike – that naturalizes capital’s control and is parasitic on political organizing.

Eidlin 20 Barry Eidlin (assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada), 1-6-2020, “Why Unions Are Good – But Not Good Enough,” Jacobin, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing

Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them almost by definition reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it. Many unions have adapted to this conservative, managerial role. Others have played key roles in challenging capital’s power. Some have even played insurgent roles at one moment and managerial roles at others. When unions have organized workplace insurgencies, this has sometimes translated into political pressure that expanded democracy and led to large-scale policy reforms. In the few revolutionary historical moments that we can identify, worker organization, whether called unions or something else, has been essential. Thus, labor unions and movements have long been a central focus of Marxist debate. At its core, the debate centers around the role of unions in class formation, the creation of the revolutionary working-class agent. The debate focuses on four key questions. First, to what degree do unions simply reflect existing relations of production and class struggle, or actively shape those relations? Second, if unions actively shape class struggle, why and under what conditions do they enhance or inhibit it? Third, how do unions shape class identities, and how does this affect unions’ scope of action? Fourth, what is the relation between unions and politics? This question is comprised of two sub-questions: to what degree do unions help or hinder struggles in the workplace becoming broader political struggles? And how should unions relate to political parties, the more conventional vehicle for advancing political demands? The following is a chapter from [The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695545.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190695545) (Oxford University Press, 2019). It assesses Marxist debates surrounding trade unions, oriented by the four questions mentioned previously. It proceeds historically, first examining how Marx and Engels conceived of the roles and limitations of trade unions, then tracing how others within Marxism have pursued these debates as class relations and politics have changed over time. While the chapter includes some history of labor unions and movements themselves, the central focus is on how Marxist theorists thought of and related to those movements. Marx and Engels wrote extensively about the unions of their time, although never systematically. The majority of their writings on unions responded to concrete labor struggles of their time. From their earliest works, they grasped unions’ necessity and limitations in creating a working-class agent capable of advancing class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This [departed](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/wusa.12021) from previous variants of socialism, often based in idealized views of rebuilding a rapidly eroding community of artisanal producers, which did not emphasize class organization or class struggle. Writing in The Condition of the Working Class in England about emerging forms of unionism, Engels observed that even though workers’ primary struggles were over material issues such as wages, they pointed to a deeper social and political conflict: What gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They im­ ply the recognition of the fact that the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves; i.e., upon their want of cohesion. And precisely because the Unions direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. At the same time, Engels saw that, even as union struggles “[kept alive] the opposition of the workers to the … omnipotence of the bourgeoisie,” so too did they “[compel] the admission that something more is needed than Trades Unions and strikes to break the power of the ruling class.” Here Engels articulates the crux of the problem. First, unions are essential for working-class formation, creating a collective actor both opposed to the bourgeoisie and capable of challenging it for power. Second, they are an insufficient vehicle for creating and mobilizing that collective actor. Marx and Engels understood that unions are essential to working-class formation because, under capitalism, the system of “free labor,” where individual workers sell their labor power to an employer for a wage, fragments relations between workers and makes them compete with each other. As described in the Communist Manifesto, the bourgeoisie “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment,’” leaving workers “exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.” While workers organized based on other collective identities, such as race, ethnicity, or religion, only unions could unite them as workers against the source of their exploitation — the bourgeoisie. Unions serve “as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wage labor and capital rule.” But just as unions could allow the proletariat to take shape and challenge the bourgeoisie for power, Marx and Engels also saw that they were a partial, imperfect vehicle for doing so for two reasons. First, unions’ fundamentally defensive role, protecting workers against employers’ efforts to drive a competitive race to the bottom, meant that they [limited themselves](https://www.amazon.com/Wage-Labour-Capital-Value-Price-Profit/dp/0717804704) “to a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it.” Thus, even militant trade unions found themselves struggling for “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage” without challenging the bourgeoisie’s fundamental power, particularly the wage labor system. And some layers of the trade union officialdom were content to fight for privileges for their small segment of the working class, leaving most workers behind. Second, unions’ focus on wages and workplace issues tended to reinforce a division between economic and political struggles. This division was explicit with the more conservative “old” unions in Britain, which “bar[red] all political action on principle and in their charters.” But even with more progressive formations, such as the early nineteenth century’s Chartists, or the late nineteenth century’s “new” unions, Marx and Engels saw that the transition from workplace struggles to politics was not automatic. For one, it varied across national contexts. Engels observed that French workers were much more likely to mobilize politically, while English workers “fight, not against the Government, but directly against the bourgeoisie.” But beyond national variation, they saw a recurring pattern of division, separating economic and political struggles by organization. Reflecting on the early to mid-nineteenth century English working-class movement, Engels noted a threefold divide between “socially-based” Chartists, “politically-based” Socialists, and conservative, craft-based trade unions. While the Chartists were “purely a working-men’s [sic] cause freed from all bourgeois elements,” they remained “theoretically the more backward, the less developed.” Socialists may have been more theoretically sophisticated, but their bourgeois origins made it difficult to “amalgamate completely with the working class.” Although young Engels thought an alliance of Chartism and socialism was underway, the alliance proved elusive. By the 1870s, Marx opined that politically, the English working class was “nothing more than the tail of the great Liberal Party, i.e., henchmen of the capitalists.” Likewise, Engels had soured on the English working class. Both saw promise in the militant worker protest in the United States at the time, seeing the seeds of a nascent labor party. But that too fell short. Thus, unions failed in Marx and Engels’s central task: the formation of “a political organization of the working class as a whole.”

#### TURN: Recognizing a right to strike reduces revolutionary potential and fractures class organizing

Crépon 19 Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­ tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­ tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis­à­vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles.

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We might consider this to be the per­ fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques­ tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con­ tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus­ tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow­ ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ­ ation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

1. **Performance of the aff is an invitation for therapeutic capture. Fighting for subjectivity and self-actualization locates politics on the terrain of psychological modalities. This process leads our attention away from the material realities that have created suffering in the first place. Their relationship to the ballot is therapeutic – Individual and social problems are viewed as stemming from improper thoughts and that only by correcting our views of ourselves can produce more fulfilled lives.**

**Stewart 9** Tyrone Anthony Stewart, Ph. D., Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, WHAT IS A BLACK MAN WITHOUT HIS¶ PARANOIA? : CLINICAL DEPRESSION AND THE POLITICS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS’ ANXIETIES TOWARDS EMOTIONAL VULNERABILITY

On the first front, I will address the pervasive tendency in our culture¶ toward the therapeutic and the ways in which “acknowledging our weaknesses” and¶ “sharing our feelings” may ultimately **lead our attention away from the social¶ inequalities that may have caused our suffering in the first place.** And on the second¶ front, I will explore a confluence of circumstances (i.e., government, business, and¶ science) with have made the dominant paradigms of depression as an illness seem so¶ normal in dealing with prolonged or persistent sadness.8¶ In performing this deconstruction, I must make it clear that in dismantling¶ clinical depression as discursive construct my goal is not to construct another term to¶ take its place, for to fill the space left by its absence would invariably be only another¶ name for another pathology of affect. Rather, I am interested in disarming the¶ indisputability of the diagnosis and how it has led us to view the bodies of individuals¶ as detached from society and culture. It is my belief that the pervasive sadness and¶ despondency that is called “depression” in our society is in large part circumstantial¶ rather than biological and that by exploring matters of the social expectancies and¶ cultural values the frame emotional experience we can create a new understanding of¶ depression. Thus, my primary goal in leaving the concept of depression “in pieces” is¶ to bring social circumstance and cultural values (i.e. story) back into our¶ understanding of depression and to free-up the concept so that I can explore it in¶ different dimension in later chapters.¶ I began this dissertation with the example of Dave Chappelle on Oprah’s¶ couch because I am interested in the ways in which his story becomes a public story,¶ and the ways in which the meaning and value of that story changes in the process of¶ its retelling. On its surface, the Oprah Winfrey show is perhaps the most revered¶ daytime talk show in the present moment; however, the show is also part of a cultural¶ phenomenon that is much larger than its parts. The Oprah Winfrey Show is an¶ example of Americans’ investment in the therapeutic ethos, an investment which is¶ **girded by the belief that personal healing can best be accomplished through**¶ **fellowship and open confessions of suffering**; however, this investment is problematic¶ because it **restructures the relationship of the subject** to their social context, through¶ the re-interpretation of individual experiences and their repackaging as shared and¶ universal human experiences. As a democratic and equalizing ritual of sharing, the¶ therapeutic ethos creates a milieu in which individual differences can become¶ **depoliticized and intersections of race and gender become less salient** in¶ understanding the political nature and material realities of suffering.¶ The therapeutic ethos has been addressed in many different ways. It has been¶ seen as a “culture” and “gospel”; however, the historian Christopher P. Wilson views¶ it as “an ethos characterized by an almost obsessive concern with psychic and¶ physical health.”10 “Ethos” is perhaps a better term than “culture” as ethos signifies¶ the ways in which therapeutic language has permeated not only the precincts of¶ American society and culture which are charged with matters of health and wellbeing¶ (i.e., medicine) but also those realms not traditionally associated with those matters¶ (i.e., religion, education, government, advertising).11 Furthermore, in using the term¶ “ethos” we can also better approximate the way the power of its claims are often¶ unquestioningly **regarded as conventional wisdom**, as the term “depression,” as a¶ signifier of illness and pathology, can be taken up by anyone in our society regardless¶ of their authority or knowledge of psychology or psychiatry.¶ In commenting upon the therapeutic ethos, I must make it clear that I am not¶ addressing the clinical technique of psychotherapy or other means of counseling, nor¶ am I addressing its practitioners or patients. The assumption that the practice of¶ therapy is the same as the therapeutic ethos is a connection that I strongly wish to¶ dismantle. Unlike therapy itself (e.g., psychoanalysis or cognitive behavioral¶ therapy) the therapeutic ethos is not a structured practice, but rather it is a more¶ pervasive and paradigmatic way of viewing the **quest for selfhood and selfactualization**¶ **as a libratory process of reinvention.**12 The therapeutic ethos is a¶ commoner’s or lay viewpoint of psychic wellbeing, however it does influence expert¶ opinion and vice-versa. For the purposes of this dissertation, I am more so interested¶ in the phenomenon of employing therapeutic models in our understanding self,¶ suffering, and subjectivity in public discussions of emotional experience. 13 I am¶ interested in the therapeutic ethos and its more casual relationship with science and¶ the way in which the therapeutic is made into ‘common sense’ through this¶ relationship.¶ Furthermore, in my interest in the therapeutic ethos and its relation to black¶ men, I will not be pursuing an argument that black men resist the therapeutic out of¶ gender anxiety for to do so would be overly simplistic. Such writing has already been¶ done, and it has focused on white men to the exclusion of race.14 “Macho” (read:¶ white hegemonic masculinity) and “Cool” (read: black hegemonic masculinity) have¶ divergent histories and to look at gender to the occlusion of race would neglect black¶ men’s different emotional politics, although gender is an important factor. I will be¶ primarily be addressing the therapeutic in terms of the ways it erases the significance¶ of matters of race and gender, which will enable me to talk of its implications for¶ African American’s in general and African American men, in specific, in later¶ chapters.¶ Lastly, it has been argued elsewhere, and in varying ways, that the therapeutic¶ ethos has helped to create an “illness identity” within the phenomenon of depression,¶ ¶ wherein the effect (the “disorder” or “disease” of depression) becomes a **more** salient¶ and **visible than structural encounters** within the individual’s biography.15 In regards¶ to people in actual therapeutic situation (i.e., therapy with a trained professional) this¶ viewpoint has lead to the omission of more institutional forces of racism and¶ economic inequality, such as Euro-American physicians’ misinterpretation of African¶ Americans’ idioms of distress16 and the systemic lack of access to affective health¶ care among less affluent communities. The question that I want to answer in this¶ section is what are the political consequences of acquiescing to therapeutic models of¶ understanding subjective experiences which are, in part, caused by identity specific¶ encounters with such structural inequality? The short answer to that question is the¶ erasure of the structural factors of racism and classism that may have contributed to¶ the individual’s feelings of depression in the first place.¶ America’s Relationship with Therapeutic Cultures¶ American’s fascination with the therapeutic extends from what Eva¶ Moskowitz calls the “therapeutic gospel.”17 In her examination of America’s¶ relationship with therapy, she describes our reflex dependence on psychological cures¶ and hunger for personal fulfillment as having a “long and strange history.” According¶ to Moskowitz, the drive toward therapy began out of a desire for guidance and life direction¶ at a time when the influence of traditional religion (i.e. Protestantism) was¶ waning in the nineteenth century. Due to a convergence of factors, such as the rising¶ belief in science and the meta-physical, changing notions of individualism, and the¶ rise of consumer-based culture, Americans in the nineteenth century, increasingly¶ sought out strategies and products rather than parables and prayer to become better¶ people.18¶ Through this “therapeutic gospel,” Moskowitz argues, individual and social¶ problems began to be viewed as stemming from improper thoughts and poor self esteem,¶ **and that only by correcting our views of ourselves as individuals and as a¶ nation, would we may be able to live** happier and more fulfilled lives. Key to the¶ operation of the Moskowitz’s “therapeutic gospel” was the idea of the malleable¶ inner-self or “the mind,” which created another dimension of social identity that did¶ not exist prior to the professionalization and growing authority of medicine in the¶ late 19th century. Previous conceptualizations of the individual had dealt with the¶ notion of a “soul”; however, as the baggage of morality and guilt associated with this¶ concept and the authority of the religious officials charged with this work began to¶ lose favor the rational belief in science and self-improvement began to encroach upon¶ the religious perspective, but the belief in the malleable “inner-self” never fully¶ displaced religion. Rather, “ministers and other moralist began increasingly to¶ conform to medical models in making judgments and dispensing advice.”19 20 In this¶ way, the “mind” as the seat of rationality and enlightenment, in turn, established a¶ new locus of moral authority in the construction of the individual will. Ultimately, the¶ “therapeutic gospel” **helped to create a terrain** in which the problems of anxiety and¶ phobias as well as desire for social status could be fixed by the right attitude and the¶ right advice.21¶ Our reliance on such a conception of ‘the self’ is so prevalent in today’s¶ society that it is almost invisible. From talk shows to twelve-step programs to selfhelp¶ bestsellers, we are continually bombarded with solutions that suggest that we can¶ **transcend our troubles and angst by talking about them openly** and honestly; however,¶ it is through this same process of “sharing our feelings” that we may, in fact, **be**¶ **erasing the very matters of our social and cultural experience** that created our¶ discomfort in the first place. In a strange set of circumstances, the individualistic¶ ethos that permeates our common culture and inspires us to view ourselves as unique¶ and autonomous beings, may in the end generalize our experiences and identities.¶ Frank Füredi, in his examination of the therapeutic impulse, argues that¶ “despite its individualistic orientation, therapeutic intervention…often leads to the¶ pursuit of the standardization of people rather than to encourage a self-determined¶ individuality.”22 **Instead of creating individuals who have social agency**, Füredi¶ argues, the therapeutic ethos creates identities which rely upon various “publics” for¶ affirmation or recognition, be they ten alcoholics in a church basement or a national¶ television audience. The success of such a process of affirmation depends upon an¶ individual’s willingness to **defer the meaning of their experiences to the authority of**¶ **the group** and to relinquish any claims to difference which may threaten the cohesion¶ of the group;23 however, belonging has its benefits. Acquiescence to the therapeutic¶ ethos allows the individual a sense of identity and helps them to “make sense of their¶ predicament and gain moral sympathy.”24¶ The concept of “moral sympathy” is important in the construction of a “public¶ of the depressed,” because, as a disease of the mind – a mental illness – its lesions are¶ invisible. Moral sympathy is thus needed to assuage the beliefs that individuals can¶ “feel better” and “do better” for themselves out of will and discipline. Other mental¶ illnesses, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, do not fare as well as depression¶ in terms of gaining moral sympathy, since they can sometimes be associated with¶ violent crime, particularly in news media.25 But arguably, perceptions of the mentally¶ ill have changed dramatically over the past twenty years, amounting to a virtual¶ reshaping of lay understandings and public attitudes toward various mental illnesses.¶ This change has not been the result of a single influence, but rather it has been the¶ result of a confluence of factors, from anti-stigma groups to cultural representations.¶ No longer are the mentally largely portrayed as violent or disturbed one-dimensional¶ characters, rather they are presents as characters who are “ill but talented, impaired¶ but not stupid, troubled but attractive.”26 Take for example, popular films such as¶ Rain Man (1988), Sling Blade (1996), A Beautiful Mind (2001), I Am Sam (2001),¶ Radio (2003), the Aviator (2004), the Soloist (2009) which have helped to create the¶ sentiment of understanding mental illnesses as a result of defective or damaged brain¶ processes and not the result of the moral faults of the individual.27 However the¶ absence of ‘fault’ or ‘blame’ does not preclude questions of responsibility or the need¶ for an explanation.¶ Within the therapeutic ethos, the “public of the depressed” are able to account¶ for their despondent moodiness, and ultimately their difference, through the general¶ belief that the human mind is fragile and can “break” just like a bone can fracture. It¶ is through this process, which Charles Barber calls the “physicalizing of behavior,”¶ that depression becomes a normalized;28 however, it is a process of normalization that¶ leans heavily upon a recent shift in common understandings of the **mind as a fallible body part.** The therapeutic ethos borrows from **scientific authority** the belief that the¶ body is knowable, generalizable, and universal, but in the end **replaces lived social**¶ **experiences with scripted ones** based upon medical authorities and the “physicalizing¶ of behavior.”¶ It is the lure that there is something “out there,” authenticated by¶ medical knowledge, that can describe people’s “indescribable” encounter with¶ depression **which makes the therapeutic ethos both attractive and limiting**; as much as¶ they may **gain in the articulation of their experiences, they may lose in regard to**¶ **context.**¶ Hostile Homogenization in the Therapeutic Encounter¶ At the core of the therapeutic ethos is the idea that our minds and our¶ thoughts are the essence our being and that by aligning our thinking with accepted¶ definitions of “illness” and practices of “healing” we can change our perceptions as¶ well as our circumstances. Viewing the mind in such a way is attractive because it¶ mobilizes the idea that we are ultimately in control of our health, our well-being, and¶ our material existence, but in the exchange we lean upon the wisdom and expertise of¶ medical institutions and the belief that such wisdom is neutral. It is the casual bridge¶ that is formed between the therapeutic ethos of “sharing feelings” and “self realization”¶ and the practice of therapy that **lends the therapeutic ethos its¶ normativity.** Thus, having access to medical discourses of self, suffering, and¶ **subjectivity** **enables** the depressed to make meaning of their experience; however, the¶ costs of that acquiescence are seldom considered. Take for example Andrew¶ Solomon, the author of the Noonday Demon: an Atlas of Depression and proponent of¶ the medicalization of depression, who argues:¶ To be given the idea of depression is to master a socially¶ powerful linguistic tool that segregates and empowers the¶ better self to which suffering people aspire. Though the¶ problem of articulation is a universal, it is particularly acute¶ for the indigent, who are starved for this vocabulary – which¶ is why basic tools such as group therapy can be so utterly¶ transforming for them.29¶ The ideas of a “transforming” vocabulary and a “socially powerful linguistic tool” are¶ noble concepts in Solomon’s crusading for the depressed, but what is downplayed in¶ this statement are the power dynamics involved in the therapeutic encounter and how¶ the simple adoption of such a “vocabulary” cannot change an individual’s¶ relationship to power and privilege.30¶ Absent from Solomon’s view are the ways in which the therapeutic encounter,¶ and the language and values that gird its appeals, are ordered by a particular¶ relationship to the culture of therapy, a relationship which black men and other¶ marginalized groups do not share in equally. This is not meant to imply that group¶ therapy cannot work in more culturally attuned settings among black men, as such¶ groups and their varied methods have been written about in work on minority¶ counseling.31 Nor is it meant to imply that African Americans are in any way not¶ participatory in the viewpoint expressed by Solomon. Rather, what is at issue is how¶ such a process dangerously simplifies healing as a matter of adopting the¶ “vocabulary” of depression and the therapeutic ethos of a “better self.” Viewing¶ **healing as a matter of “education”** ultimately dismisses any skepticism as an¶ individual act of resistance and unmoors it from the milieu of its occurrence. What¶ must be considered are how racism, environment, and self-esteem issues affect black¶ men in ways that are culturally political as well as personal.¶ The literature on African American’s experiences of “stress” does a much¶ better job of discussing the political nature of the depressive experience than does the¶ writing from within a therapeutic framework. This is because the therapeutic¶ discussion of depression often assumes the individual as a self-contained and¶ autonomous being, while the literature on stress takes into consideration the social¶ milieu of the individual. The literature on African American stress has examined the¶ way in which structural racism (i.e., institutional policies of inequality, cultural¶ messages of black inferiority, and unhealthy and/or toxic physical environments) has¶ had a negative impact on African American’s health and quality of life.32 Chappelle’s¶ use of the term “stress” in reference to his emotional state instead of “depression,”¶ perhaps, owes its rationale to this difference. Therefore, the factors that contribute to¶ stress must be considered when thinking of the etiology and experience of depression¶ and black men’s participation in therapy.¶ It is known that African American men underutilize formalized therapy and¶ counseling.33 African American men’s resistances to the practice of therapy are¶ conditioned by several factors, such as African American’s suspicions of therapists,¶ past negative experiences with public agencies and institutions, and the often¶ superficial relationships that black men must form with therapist: things that exist in¶ addition to the possible issue of gender.34 Furthermore, in many cases, black men in¶ therapy or counseling do not attend out of their own volition, as third party entities¶ (e.g., employers, clergy, or the judicial system) are often the primary reasons for¶ black men to begin to participate in therapy.35 Other researchers have called this¶ phenomenon a “forced process,” by which the process of “help,” reinforced across¶ many of society’s institutions, is viewed as a matter of coercion to the status quo.36¶ These factors make the therapeutic encounter not only foreign, but also possibly¶ hostile to black men. In these ways, the democratic appeal of such therapeutic¶ thinking on depression can erase matters of gendered and racial experience which are¶ part of the story and obstruct the individual’s authority to come to less mainstream¶ interpretations of the sadness of depression and its larger meaning, **for themselves.**

1. **Psychoanalytic critique causes passivity and destroys political struggle and coalitions.**

**Gordon 01** - Paul Gordon (Ph.D., professor of humanities at the University of Colorado Boulder), Race & Class, v. 42, n. 4, p. 30-31, April 2001 CL

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation -- the evils of Stalinism in particular -- are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understanding' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psychoanalysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.