#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution or a subset thereof –

#### The World Trade Organization is an international body that oversees global trade. Tarver 6/15

Evan Tarver [bachelor's in finance and economics from San Diego State University-California], 21 - ("How Best to Define the World Trade Organization (WTO)," Investopedia, 6-15-2021, accessed 7-5-2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wto.asp)//ML



Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that oversees the global trade rules among nations. It superseded the 1947 [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gatt.asp) (GATT) created in the wake of World War II.¶ The WTO is based on agreements signed by the majority of the world’s trading nations. The main function of the organization is to help producers of goods and services, as well as exporters and importers, protect and manage their businesses. As of 2021, the WTO has [164 member countries](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm), with Liberia and Afghanistan the most recent members, having joined in July 2016, and 25 “observer” countries and governments.1

#### Intellectual property includes patents, trademarks, and copyrights

Yang 19

James Yang (patent attorney). “Four types of intellectual property to protect your idea and how to use them.” OC Patent Lawyer. 2019. JDN. https://ocpatentlawyer.com/four-types-intellectual-property-protect-idea/¶

To protect your idea so that someone else cannot steal your idea, you need to secure one or more of the four different types of intellectual property (IP). Intellectual property rights are exclusionary rights given to authors, inventors, and businesses for their literary and artistic works of authorship, useful and ornamental inventions, and valuable information.¶ Every invention generally starts as an inventor’s trade secret. Before inventors market their inventions, they need to secure one or more of the other forms of intellectual property protection – patents, trademarks, and copyrights.¶ FOUR TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS¶ The four types of intellectual property include:¶ Trade Secrets¶ Trademarks¶ Copyrights, and¶ Patents.¶ The first type of intellectual property right is a trade secret. All inventions generally start as a trade secret of the inventor. Inventors have an instinctual desire to keep their ideas secret. To market your invention, you should protect your idea with one or more of the other types of intellectual property rights: patents, trademarks, and copyrights.

Reduce is to decrease in size or amount

Merriam Webster no date - ("Definition of REDUCE," Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce)//ML

to draw together or cause to converge : [CONSOLIDATE](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consolidate) ¶reduce all the questions to one b(1): to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number ¶reduce taxes ¶reduce the likelihood of war

#### Vote negative – the ballot only signifies a win or loss within debate as a game, and their aff is outside the constraints of that game

#### Not reading a topical aff creates incredible structural advantages for the aff – they get first and last speech and perms which means without a stable advocacy they get to morph their aff into whatever minimizes direct clash, and allows for a retreat to moral high ground

#### There’s two Impacts –

#### Clash – it’s a pre-requisite to debate which is an intrinsic good since we are all here for the purpose of debating – yes this may seem tautological, but so is every impact – you should use your ballot to assert that since we all took our weekend and spent it here, that clash does have meaning

#### Iterative argumentative testing – the ability to subject controversial ideas to rigorous testing allows debaters to better engage in the research process, discern what arguments are most accurate, and learn how to refine our own beliefs to become more compelling advocates – not reading a plan allows a constant spew of new content that never reaches those high levels of contestation without the constraints of the topic – Even if this topic isn’t the perfect topic, the predictability of debates under it are worth potential substantive tradeoff. Without a bridge for subjecting beliefs to a rigorous test, we are left with might-makes-right.

Cheryl MISAK Philosophy @ Toronto ‘8 “A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for Democracy” *Episteme* 5 (1) p. 100-104

The charge that Rorty has had to face again and again is that he really is a relativist, holding that one belief is no better than another, and that one must “treat the epistemic standards of any and every epistemic community as on a par” (Haack 1995, 136). Rorty, that is, leaves us with no way of adjudicating claims that arise in different communities. It is argued that this is not only an unsatisfactory view, but it is incompatible with his commitment to his own set of beliefs and with his practice of arguing or giving reasons for them. Peirce would join in this charge, arguing that it is the community of inquirers or reasoners that matter, not this or that local community. One of Rorty’s responses to this clutch of objections is to say that he doesn’t have to treat the epistemic standards of every community as on a par: “I prize communities which share more background beliefs with me above those which share fewer” (Rorty 1995b, 153). There is nothing incoherent about asserting that your community has it right, for all “right” amounts to is what your community agrees upon. I have argued (2000, 12ff) that this kind of comeback puts Rorty in a very difficult position, giving him nothing to say against the likes of Carl Schmitt, the fascist legal philosopher who found it natural to join the Nazi bandwagon. Schmitt, like Rorty, argued that there is no truth and rationality in politics. Rather, politics is the arena in which groups assert themselves, with the strongest coming out on top and the weaker groups disappearing. One makes an existential choice – opts for a conception of the good – and then tries to attain “substantive homogeneity” in the population. Might ends up being right and the elimination of those who disagree with us ends up being a fine method of reaching our political decisions. A democrat or liberal like Rorty has an impossible time in giving us – and himself – reasons for opting for his view rather than his fascist opponent’s view. Once you give up aiming at truth, once you give up aiming at something that goes beyond the standards of your own community, then you give up the wherewithal to argue against the might-is-right view. The charge I am trying to answer here, on behalf of the non-Rortian pragmatist, is that mixing truth and politics is dangerous. One of the points I want to make is that, whatever the dangers are in saying morals and politics aim at the truth, the dangers of denying it are even more alarming. If we were to get rid of the notion of truth, nothing would protect us from the idea that there is nothing to get right, no better or worse action, and no better or worse way of treating others. Nothing would protect us from the Schmittian worldview. Another point is that the pragmatist view encourages something which is downright salutary, not dangerous at all. It encourages a culture of justification, a culture the importance of which grows as we face the challenges of living in a global society with worldviews struggling against each other. This thought was prominent in the debate about how the new democratic order in South Africa should be conceived. Here is how Etienne Murienik put it: If the new constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defense of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force of its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not on coercion.4 A final point rests on the nature of the kinds of answers the pragmatist envisions. Rorty and Rawls seem to think that any view of truth carries with it the idea that there is one and only one true answer to every question. It is important to see that, whatever the case might be for other views of truth, the pragmatist’s view of truth does not entail anything about the precise nature of right answers. On the Peircean view of truth, it might be true that the best solution to a problem is to compromise in a certain way. Or a question might have a number of equally right answers: it might be true that either A or B or C is an acceptable solution to a problem. That is, bringing truth into politics need not result in a view on which one theory of the good triumphs over the others. Indeed, the pragmatist account of truth does not require agreement at the end of the day (whatever that might mean) and it does not require the consent of all who are affected by a particular decision here and now. The right answer to a question might be one that only a few see is right. A right answer is the one that would be best – would stand up to the evidence and arguments – were we to inquire into the matter as far as we fruitfully could. That is, we are not primarily aiming at agreement in deliberation – we are aiming at getting a view that will stand up to reasons and evidence**.** That said, there may be cases in moral and especially political deliberation in which we do aim for agreement because we think that what will best stand up to reasons in that case is a solution that is agreed upon by all or by all who are affected. But this will be just one kind of case amongst many. Right answers aren’t necessarily answers that are acceptable by all. Nor are right answers necessarily those that resolve a conflict with a compromise, although sometimes a compromise or cooperative solution may indeed be what is required. Nor is bargaining always not conducive to truth – in some cases, that may be exactly what is required. This view of truth does not lead to zeal, oppression, closing off of discussion, or a squashing of pluralism, even if it might happen to be the case that there is only one reasonable conception of the good out there. The idea is that we are always aiming at getting the best answer – whatever that may be – and to do that we need to take into account the views of all. 6 . WHO DECIDES? One of the first questions put to those who would like to think of politics as a species of truth-oriented deliberation is this: why deliberate with the ignorant multitude? Would it not be better to expose our moral and political beliefs only to the reasons and experience of experts? Science, after all, doesn’t work by asking the person in the street what he or she thinks about quantum mechanics. The reason that the pragmatist’s epistemic justification is a justification of democratic politics, rather than of a hierarchical politics, in which an elite makes decisions, is that we do not and will not ever have an identifiable pool of moral and political experts. Dewey saw this clearly. As experts become specialized, “they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve” (Dewey 1926/1984, 364). Everyone engages in moral and political deliberation and it is not obvious that having special education makes you better at it – just look at priests, politicians, and moral philosophers/political theorists and ask yourself if they seem especially decent or especially wise when it comes to practical matters. Some people are good at examining moral and politi\cal issues, but it’s not clear that they are the ones trained to do so. Even if we could identify genuinely wise people, this kind of expertise is liable to be corrupted merely by being identified – merely by the wise person starting to think of herself as a moral expert.5 And it is far from clear that the rule of the wise would really take the views and experiences of all into account better than the democratic rule of the people. So how do we distinguish deliberating well and deliberating badly if we cannot appeal to education and training? No account of deliberative democracy can ignore the call to make the distinction. The trouble is that, in saying what good, as opposed to poor, deliberation amounts to, one finds oneself facing a justificatory problem: how can we specify what good deliberation is without simply assuming that our current standards of deliberation and inquiry are the gold standards? (This is the deep and central question of pragmatism: how do genuine norms arise out of contingent practices?) It will be unsurprising that I agree with Robert Talisse that the way forward is to focus on an epistemic justification of the whole range of deliberative virtues. Some of the virtues we think important in inquiry are open-mindedness, courage, honesty, integrity, rigor, willingness to listen to the views of others and to seriously entertain challenges to one’s own views, willingness to put oneself in another’s shoes, and the like. These virtues may well have a number of kinds of justifications – justifications, for instance, with their origins in the canons of etiquette or in this or that substantive moral or religious view. Politeness and Christianity (do unto others . . . ), for instance,may both dictate that we should listen to the views of others. But this kind of justification doesn’t break out of the circle of local practices. Talisse argues that the virtues are justified because they lead to true belief. Listening to others is not merely the polite thing to do, but it is also good because we might learn something. The epistemic argument I have presented on Peirce’s behalf gets us this far: we need to expose our beliefs to the views of others if we are to follow a method that will get us good or better or true beliefs. Talisse takes us the next step – there are other characteristics that make one an inquirer who aims at the truth. Honesty is the trait of following reasons and evidence, rather than self-interest. Modesty is the trait of taking your views to be fallible. Charity is willingness to listen to the views of others. Integrity is willingness to uphold the deliberative process, no matter the difficulties encountered. The distinction between deliberating well (having deliberative virtues) and deliberating badly (having deliberative vices), that is, is drawn in terms of whether a method promotes beliefs which are responsive to and fit with the reasons and evidence. 7 . THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY The pragmatist has offered us a compelling reason to take the views of others seriously and encourage the values associated with deliberative democratic politics. For inquirers must engage in the ongoing project of continually subjecting their beliefs to the tests of further experience and argument. The virtues inherent in a deliberative model of democratic citizenship must be cultivated if we are to come to good beliefs about how to treat others, how to resolve conflicts, and how to arrange society. The model of democratic citizenship which results is one that makes democratic citizenship part of a culture of justification. Citizens search for how best to structure our institutions and how best to live our lives. Democratic citizenship is a quest to get things right, with a genuine engagement in looking for right answers to pressing questions.We are not after mere agreement and we are not after the transformation of initial preferences into something that others can accept. We aim at getting things right – at getting beliefs that would forever stand up to scrutiny. In so aiming, citizens commit themselves to abiding by the decisions produced by the democratic procedure. For those decisions are the best we can do here and now. Here we find the justification of the coercive power of democracies. Eventually there has to be a decision in politics. The question that faces all societies is who decides and who wields the power to coerce once the decision is made? My argument is that as more people deliberate and more reasons and experience go into the mix, it will become more likely that the decisions made will account for the reasons and experience of all. The more likely, that is, that the answer will be right. Decisions produced by a democratic deliberative process are made by a rational method and so they are enforceable.

#### Frame procedural impacts through a lens of optimization – we don’t need to win they make the game impossible, just relatively less effective. In the same way you would vote aff to reject a bad process CP even if there are theoretically solvency deficits based on certainty and immediacy – the fact that we still have some neg ground doesn’t mean that reading the cap k for the numerous times against a survival strategy aff is a good debate to have for anyone involved

#### They have no offense

#### View T impacts as a process, not a product – any education impact about their content being important are solved by reading a book – filter impacts through what is unique to the process of debating itself

#### They get to read it on the neg – if their k of being topical is true then reading the aff as a K on the neg means they get auto-wins, we still access their education, and if forces affs to shift to better arguments

#### The TVA solves – they could have read an aff that talked about how high drug prices disproportionately hurt Black folks - this would allow a discussion of the aff in a forum that allows us to have nuanced responses – yes, it isn’t perfect, but those imperfections are neg ground – if they aren’t forced to defend a controversy, then the meaning of any wins the gets become hollow anyway which takes out solvency

# CASE

### AT: Debate Unfair Now

#### One—they don’t solve this. If you vote affirmative, all that happens is they go onto to debate in the next round.

#### Two—Moral Hazard argument—they have to answer the question why are they here? If debate is unfair because it doesn’t maintain equal access for minorities, they would be better served by lobbying a school district superintendent for more funding for debate or working at a UDL to keep under-privileged students in the activity.

#### Three—lack of limits is worse—it means large, well-funded schools could monopolize research to lock people out of the discussion. It also means that people who can’t afford to spend 90% of their time on debate will be forced to exit the activity because it becomes uncompetitive to do so. Some people have to work to eat, and eat to live—it’s not cost effective for them to debate in this world and those students are primarily the under-privileged ones.

#### Four—decision-making skills outweigh—inculcation of advocacy skills allows people to argue for reform in debate better in external forums which are suited to hear challenges for changes in debate, they have to learn to defend their advocacies against well prepared opponents so that when they arrive at these forums they will be able to defend specific implementations for change—i.e. the forum for race discussions held at NU.

### AT: Afro-Pess Offense

#### 1. Fatalism DA. Their arguments are reductionist. Ontology and transhistorical racism don’t pre-determine institutional victories. Segregation, Jim Crow and slavery are all historically specific moments. Yes, racism exists today but paying attention to the way it’s changed and previous political successes are critical to preventing fatalism.

**Reed 18** Adolph Reed -- professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. *The Baffler*, The Trouble With Uplift. How black politics succumbed to the siren song of the racial voice, No. 41

The politics thus advanced is **profoundly race-reductionist**, discounting the value of both political agency and the broad pursuit of political alliances within a polity **held to be intractably and irredeemably devoted to white supremacy**. **This fatalistic outlook** works seamlessly to reinforce the status of racial voices who emphasize the interests and concerns of a **singular** racial collectivity. Central to these pundits’ message is the assertion that blacks have it worse, **in every socio-cultural context** that might be adduced. This refrain is also consistent in two important ways with the reigning ideology of neoliberal equality. First, the insistence that disparities of racial access to power are the most meaningful forms of inequality strongly reinforces the neoliberal view that inequalities generated by capitalist market forces are **natural and lie beyond the scope of intervention.** And second, **if American racism is an intractable, transhistorical force**—indeed, **an ontological one**, as Ta-Nehisi Coates has characterized it—**then it lies beyond structural political intervention**. In other words, Coates and other race-firsters diminish the significance of the **legislative and other institutional victories** won since Emancipation, leaving us with only **exhortations to individual conversion** and repentance as a program. This is why, for example, Coates and other proponents of reparations seem **unconcerned** with the **strategic** problem of piecing together the kind of **interracial popular support necessary to actually prevail** on the issue. Such problems do not exist for them because the role of the representative black leader or **voice is precisely to function as an alternative to political action**. Instead, the order of the day is typically to perform racial authenticity in a way that doubles as an appeal for moral recognition from those with the power to bestow it. **Winning anything politically—policies or changes in power relations—is not the point.** That is why the jeremiads offered by contemporary racial voices so commonly boil down to calls for “conversations about race” or equally vapid abstractions like “**racial reckoning” or “coming to terms with” a history defined by racism.** The black leadership role was always at best an accommodation to disfranchisement, going back to its first modern incarnation with Booker T. Washington and his cohort of racial advocates. It is a politics of elite transaction. That is not in itself necessarily a bad thing—President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “black cabinet,” or Federal Council of Negro Affairs, advised him on matters related to black Americans. But unlike today’s freelance racial voices, they were administration functionaries, and most had standing in racial advocacy, education, labor, and government institutions prior to joining the “cabinet.” The backdoor dealings between King and Johnson during the Selma campaign that DuVernay found too messy to include in her portrait of King’s heroic persona were also part of mundane political maneuvering, the inside-outside game of institutional politics. King and the SCLC, like FDR’s black cabinet, had constituencies that underwrote their standing as representatives of racial interest—which in turn **gave them leverage to make political demands and pursue policy agendas.** A. Philip Randolph used the March on Washington Movement to pressure President Roosevelt in 1941 to issue “Executive Order 8802,” prohibiting racial discrimination in the national defense industry. Randolph, Bayard Rustin, the Negro American Labor Council, and others organized the 1963 March on Washington as part of an **inside-outside strategy** to build support for a jobs program and passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. All this painstaking political effort could not be farther from the careerist pursuits of contemporary racial voices, whose standing depends entirely on the favor of powerful opinion-shaping elites in corporate media and elsewhere. Thus, for example, Touré Neblett and others in MSNBC’s stable were unceremoniously expunged from the lineup of talking heads when the network reconfigured its marketing priorities. More dramatically, Melissa Harris-Perry, apparently believing that her viewing audience gave her leverage, openly rebuffed the network’s demand to reorient her program to fit in with its election coverage. In short order, she and her program vanished without a trace from its schedule. Such incidents, and scores of others like them, make it indelibly clear where the lines of authority run when it comes to winning elite-media recognition as a black voice. For Their Own Good The race voices I’ve discussed express a particular class perspective among black Americans, one that harmonizes with left-neoliberal notions of justice and equality. That harmony may help explain why those racial voices—like the black political class in general—are so intent on disparaging the social-democratic politics associated with Bernie Sanders, even though a 2017 Harvard-Harris survey found that Sanders was far more popular with African Americans than with any other demographic category except declared Democrats. He boasted a 73 percent favorable rating among black voters—higher than his approval numbers among Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and considerably higher than those for whites or even 18-34 year-olds. This disjunction between popular opinion and the priorities of the black chattering class underscores the extent to which the racial programs and priorities advanced by those recognized black voices remain much as they were in the Age of Washington. Now as then, we have a leadership stratum dedicated to the class-skewed pursuit of “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” And the net effect of this top-down model of black discourse is to tether a politics of racial representation to the ruling-class agendas that generate and intensify inequality and insecurity for working people across American society, including among the ranks of black Americans. Black Clintonites, like Congressmen John Lewis (D-GA), James Clyburn (D-SC) and Cedric Richmond (D-LA), all clearly displayed this commitment during the 2016 Democratic primaries when they attacked Sanders as “irresponsible” in calling for non-commodified public goods in education, health care, and other areas. Richmond’s rebuke was especially telling in that he couched it in terms of his role as chair of the Congressional Black Caucus and the group’s “responsibility to make sure to know that young people know that” a social-democratic agenda is “too good to be true.” Richmond’s invocation of civic instruction for the young may be revealing in another way. Lurking beneath that piety is the deeply sedimented common sense of underclass ideology, which posits a population mired in pathologies and hemmed in by an overwhelming racism, and the corollary of interventions aiming to enhance capabilities for individual mobility. (It is, indeed, this same tacit rhetoric of permanent crisis that fuels the notion that black young people must be raised on a diet of inspirational movies.) This vision of unyielding black pathology is yet another testament to the harmony of antiracist and neoliberal ideologies—and it, too, harks directly back to the origins of the black leadership caste at the dawn of the last century. Washington and Du Bois, together with Garvey and other prominent racial nationalists, envisioned their core constituency as a politically mute black population in need of tutelage from their ruling-class-backed leaders. Touré F. Reed persuasively argues that the mildly updated version of this vision now serves as an essential cornerstone of the new black professional-managerial class politics. Underclass mythology grounds professional-class claims to race leadership, while providing the **normative foundation of uplift programs directed toward enhancing self-esteem** rather than the material redistribution of wealth and income. Exhortations to celebrate and demand accolades, career opportunities, and material accumulation for black celebrities and rich people—e.g., box office receipts for black filmmakers or contracts and prestigious appointments for other well-positioned black people—as a racial politics are consistent with the sporadic eruptions of “Buy Black” campaigns since the 1920s and 1930s. Such efforts stood out in stark contrast to more working-class based “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns that demanded employment opportunities in establishments serving black neighborhoods. Like “Buy Black” campaigns, which seem to have risen again from the tomb of petit-bourgeois wishful thinking, projections of successes for the rich and famous as generic racial victories depend on a sleight-of-hand that treats benefits for any black person as benefits for all black people. This brings to mind comedian Chris Rock’s quip that he went to his mailbox every day for two weeks after the not guilty verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial looking for his “O. J. prize,” only to be disappointed. At times, this tendency to absorb the plural into the singular can be strikingly crude and transparently self-interested. The torrent of hostility directed at Rachel Dolezal for having represented herself as black rested on groundless—sometimes entirely made up—claims that she had appropriated jobs, awards, and other honorifics intended for blacks. In addition to the annual contretemps over whether blacks win enough of the most prestigious Oscars, recent racial controversies in the art world illustrate how easily the narrowest guild concerns can masquerade as burning matters of racial justice. The Brooklyn Museum’s hiring of a white person as consulting curator of African art sparked objections that the hire perpetuated “pervasive structures of white supremacy in the art field.” The 2017 furor over the Whitney Biennial’s display of Dana Schutz’s “Open Casket”—inspired by the infamous 1955 photograph of Emmett Till’s brutalized body—reduced to a question of ownership of “black suffering,” or more accurately, of the right to represent and materially benefit from the representation of black suffering. The protesters’ objection, as Walter Benn Michaels put it succinctly, was that “black pain belongs to black artists.” It’s worth noting that one of the leading critics of the painting and its display was Hannah Black, who contended that “non-black people must accept that they will never embody and cannot understand” the gesture Till’s mother, Mamie, made in insisting on an open-casket funeral. Black, who not only called for the painting to be removed from display, but also offered an “urgent recommendation” that it be destroyed, is a Briton who lives in Berlin. From a different standard of cultural proprietorship, one might argue that Schutz, as an American, has a stronger claim than Black to interpret the Till story. After all, the segregationist Southern order and the struggle against that order, which gave Till’s fate its broader social and political significance, **were historically specific moments** of a distinctively American experience. In fact, most claims of cultural ownership and charges of appropriation are bogus. While sometimes they provide an instrumental basis for tortious claims, as in pursuit of restitution for Nazi and other imperialists’ looting of artifacts, more often they posit a dead-end conflation of **fixed and impermeable racial identity** with cultural expression. As Michaels has argued for more than twenty-five years, the discourse of cultural ownership stems from the pluralist mindset that treats “culture” as a key marker of social groups and thereby inscribes it as racial essentialism.¶ In order to legitimate what Michaels describes as “racial rent-seeking,” a curiously inflexible brand of race-first neoliberalism has taken root in American political discourse, proposing a trickle-down model of racial progress, anchored in the mysticism of organic black community. Against this exoticized backdrop, neoliberal race leaders stage the beguiling fantasy that individual “entrepreneurialism” is the key path to rising above one’s circumstances—i.e., the standard American social myth that obscures the deeper need to combat systemic inequalities. The most tragic, and pathetic, expressions of this faith are the versions of the “gospel of prosperity,” which fuse pop **self-realization psychology** and a barely recognizable Christianity to exploit desperation and the desire for life with dignity and respect among their black-majority congregations. The false hopes of the prosperity gospel encourage already vulnerable people to fall prey to all sorts of destructive get-rich-quick schemes; they are the “sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions” channeled through a market-idolatrous Protestant psychobabble. Black ministers and other proponents of entrepreneurialist ideology as racial uplift also played a largely unrecognized role in pushing subprime mortgages, and even payday loans, in black communities. The racial trickle-down success myth is partly a vestige of an earlier era, during which individual black attainments could be seen as testaments to the race’s capacities—and a refutation of the white-sanctioned view of black people as generally inferior. Even then, however, this model of black uplift was enmeshed in the race theory of the time—notably the belief that a race’s capacities were indicated by the accomplishments of its “best” individuals—and it was always inflected with the class perspectives of those who saw themselves as such individuals. The class legacies of this foundational moment in modern black politics may well contribute to the firm insistence among today’s “black voices” **that slavery and Jim Crow mark the transcendent truth of black Americans’ experience** in the United States—and that **an irreducible racism is the source of all manifest racial inequality**. That diagnosis certainly masks class asymmetries among black Americans’ circumstances as well as in the remedies proposed to improve them. Nevertheless, we continue to indulge the politically wrong-headed, **counterproductive**, and even reactionary features of the “**representative black voice” industry** in whatever remains of our contemporary public sphere. And we never reckon with the truly disturbing presumption that any black person who can gain access to the public microphone and performs familiar rituals of “blackness” should be recognized as expressing significant racial truths and deserves our attention. This presumption rests on the unexamined premise that blacks share a common, singular mind that is at once **radically unknowable to non-blacks** and readily downloaded by any random individual setting up shop as a racial voice. And despite what all of our age’s many heroic narratives of individualist race-first triumph may suggest to the casual viewer, **that premise is the essence of racism**.

**2. Insularity DA – Making debate entirely about the debate space replicates the insular logic of academia where the only relevant consideration is contributing to the discipline rather than changing material conditions. Their Aff doesn’t solve any manifestation of racism in debate they have described. Voting for the Aff strikes an anti-racist pose that effects white catharsis while requiring no commitment to actual change.**

**3. No solvency - Changing debate fails.**

**Atchison and Panetta, 09** (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)

This section will address the "debate as activism ~ perspective that argues that the appropriate site for addressing community problems in individual debates. In contrast to the "debate as innovation" perspective, which assumes that the activity is an isolated game with educational benefits, proponents of the "debate as activism" perspective argue that individual debates have the potential to create change in the debate community and society at large. If the first approach assumed that debate was completely insulated, this perspective assumes that there is no substantive insulation between individual debates and the community at large. ¶ From our perspective, using individual debates to create community change is an **insufficient strategy** for three reasons. First, individual debates are, for the most part, **insulated** from the community at large. Second, individual debates **limit the conversation** to the immediate participants and the judge, excluding many important contributors to the debate community. Third, locating the discussion within the confines of a competition diminishes the additional potential for **collaboration**, **consensus**, and **coalition building**. The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create communitywide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems **inherent** in individual debates and the **collective forgetfulness** of the debate community. The structural problems stem from the current **tournament format** that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but **the ballot is rarely seen** by anyone outside the tabulation room.¶ Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is **little documentation** of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often **external pressures** (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges' justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems.

#### 4. Agency DA – Treating antiblackness as an ontological fact denies Black agency to render the meanings of their lives and envisions a world without particularly. Antiblackness is diverse, evolving, and people experience it differently. The monolithic conception denies the value of resistance and reifies racial hierarchy.

**Gordon, ‘17** – (Lewis, Professor @ UConn, “Afro pessimism,” Critical Exchange, Contemporary Political Theory, 12-7, pp 1–33, Springer)

‘‘Afropessimism’’ came out of ‘‘Afro-pessimism.’’ The elimination of the hyphen is an important development, since it dispels ambiguity and in effect announces a specific mode of thought. Should the hyphen remain, the ambiguity would be between pessimistic people of African descent and theoretical pessimism. The conjoined, theoretical term is what proponents often have in mind in their diagnosis of what I shall call ‘‘the black condition.’’ The appeal to a black condition is peculiarly existential. Existentialists **reject notions of human ‘‘nature’’** on the grounds that human beings live in worlds they also construct; they produce their socalled essence. That does not mean, however, human beings lack anchorage. Everyone has to start from somewhere. Existentialists call that somewhere a condition or conditions for these reasons, and the world human beings produce or through which we live is sometimes called ‘‘human reality.’’ Critics of existentialism often reject its human formulation. Heidegger, for instance, in his ‘‘Letter on Humanism,’’ lambasted Sartre for supposedly in effect subordinating Being to a philosophical anthropology with dangers of anthropocentrism (Heidegger, 1971). Yet a philosophical understanding of culture raises the problem of the conditions through which philosophical reflections could emerge as meaningful. Although a human activity, a more radical understanding of culture raises the question of the human being as the producer of an open reality. If the human being is in the making, then ‘‘**human reality’’ is never complete** and is more the relations in which such thought takes place than a claim about the thought. The etymology of existence already points to these elements. From the Latin ex sistere, ‘‘to stand out,’’ it also means to appear; against invisibility in the stream of effects through which the human world appears, much appears through the creative and at times alchemic force of human thought and deed. Quarrels with and against existential thought are many. In more recent times, they’ve emerged primarily from Marxists, structuralists, and poststructuralists, even though there were, and continue to be, many existential Marxists and even existentialists with structuralist and poststructuralist leanings. I begin with this tale of philosophical abstraction to contextualize Afropessimism. Its main exemplars, such as Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson III, emerged from academic literary theory, an area dominated by poststructuralism even in many cases that avow ‘‘Marxism.’’ Sexton (2010) and Wilderson (2007) divert from a reductive poststructuralism, however, through examining important existential moves inaugurated, as Daniel McNeil (2011, 2012) observed, by Fanon and his intellectual heirs. The critical question that Afropessimism addresses in this fusion is the viability of posed strategies of Black liberation. (I’m using the capital ‘‘B’’ here to point not only to the racial designation ‘‘black’’ but also to the nationalist one ‘‘Black.’’ Afropessimists often mean both, since blacks and Blacks have a central and centered role in their thought.) The world that produced blacks and in consequence Blacks is, for Afropessimists, a crushing, historical one whose Manichaean divide is sustained contraries best kept segregated. Worse, **any** effort of mediation leads to **confirmed** black subordination. Overcoming this requires purging the world of antiblackness. Where cleansing the world is unachievable, an alternative is to disarm the force of antiblack racism. Where whites lack power over blacks, they lose relevance – at least politically and at levels of cultural and racial capital or hegemony. Wilderson (2008), for instance, explores my concept of ‘‘an antiblack world’’ to build similar arguments. Sexton (2011) makes similar moves in his discussions of ‘‘social death.’’ As this forum doesn’t afford space for a long critique, I’ll offer several, non-exhaustive criticisms. The first is that ‘‘an antiblack world’’ is **not identical with ‘‘the world is antiblack.’**’ My argument is that such a world is an antiblack racist project. It is not the historical achievement. Its limitations emerge from a basic fact: Black people and other opponents of such a project fought, and continue to fight, as we see today in the #BlackLivesMatter movement and many others, against it. The same argument applies to the argument about social death. Such an achievement would have rendered even **these reflections stillborn**. The basic premises of the Afropessimistic argument are, then, locked in performative contradictions. Yet, they have rhetorical force. This is evident through the continued growth of its proponents and forums (such as this one) devoted to it. In Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, I argued that there are forms of antiblack racism offered under the guise of love, though I was writing about whites who exoticize blacks while offering themselves as white sources of black value. Analyzed in terms of bad faith, where one lies to oneself in an attempt to flee displeasing truths for pleasing falsehoods, exoticists romanticize blacks while **affirming white normativity**, and thus themselves, as principals of reality. These ironic, performative contradictions are **features of all forms of racism**, where one group is elevated to godlike status and another is pushed below that of human despite both claiming to be human.

### AT: State Bad

#### Scholarly discourse and engagement with politics is key to effective structural reform - critique is insufficient. This proves the TVA

Purdy ’20 - Jedediah S. Britton-Purdy et al, 20 - ("Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis by Jedediah S. Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, K. Sabeel Rahman :: SSRN," 3-2-2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3547312)//ey/

To embrace the possibility of democratic renewal requires rejecting the terms of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis. We believe that the legal realists—and thinkers in a much longer history of political thought—were right in believing that "the economy" is neither self-defining nor self-justifying. The emphasis in these traditions has been the right one: on power, distribution, and the need for legitimacy as the central themes in the organization of economic life. Moreover, precisely because economic ordering is a political and legal artifact, the idea of an "autonomous" economic domain has always been obscurantist and ideological, even when accepted in good faith.' Law does not and never could simply defer to such a realm. Rather, **law is perennially involved in creating and enforcing the terms of economic ordering,** most particularly through the creation and maintenance of markets. One of its most important roles, indeed, is determining who is subject to market ordering and on what terms, and who is exempted in favor of other kinds of protection or provision.' Thus the program of law, politics, and institution building often called "neoliberalism" is, and can only be, a specific theory of how to use state power, to what ends, and for whose benefit.'The **ideological work** of the Twentieth-Century Synthesis has been **to** naturalize and **embed in legal institutions from the Supreme Court to the** Antitrust Office and **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization a specific disposition of power**.** This power represents a deployment of market ordering that produces intense and cross-cutting forms of inequality and democratic erosion. However, Twentieth-Century Synthesis theorists tend not to see this, precisely because the Synthesis makes it so hard to see (or at least so easy to overlook). If it is to succeed, **law and political economy** will also **require something beyond mere critique. It will require a positive agenda.** Many **new** and energized **voices**, from the legal academy to political candidates to movement activists, are already building in this direction,' **calling for** and giving shape to **programs for more genuine democracy that also takes seriously questions of economic** power **and racial subordination;**171 more equal distribution of resources and life chances;172 more public and shared resources and infrastructues;173 the displacement of concentrated corporate power and rooting of new forms of worker power;174 the end of mass incarceration **and broader contestation of** the long history of the criminalization and **control of poor people and people of color in building capitalism;**175 the recognition of finance and money as public infrastructures;176 the challenges posed by emerging forms of power and control arising from new technologies;177 and the need for a radical new emphasis on ecology.178 These are the materials from which a positive agenda, over time, will be built. **Political fights interact generatively with scholarly and policy debates in pointing** the way **toward a more democratic political economy.** The emergence of new grassroots movements, campaigns, and proposals seeking to deepen our democracy is no guarantee of success. But their prevalence and influence make clear the dangers and opportunities of this moment of upheaval—and highlight the stakes of building a new legal imaginary. 179 Neoliberal political economy, with its underlying commitments to efficiency, neutrality, and anti-politics, helped animate, shape, and legitimate a twentieth-century consensus that erased power, encased the market, and reinscribed racialized, economic, and gendered inequities. By contrast, **a legal imaginary of democratic political economy**, that takes seriously underlying concepts of power, equality, and democracy, **can inform a wave of** legal **thought whose critique and policy imagination can amplify and accelerate these movements for structural reform** and, if we are lucky, help remake our polity in more deeply democratic ways.