### 1

#### Interpretation: private entities is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that the appropriation of outer space by a subset of private entities is unjust.

Nebel 19 Jake Nebel [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs.] , 8-12-2019, "Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution," Briefly, https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/ SM

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. 1.1 “Colleges and Universities” “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the upward-entailment test for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution. Fourth, it is extremely unlikely that the topic committee would have written the resolution with the existential interpretation of “colleges and universities” in mind. If they intended the existential interpretation, they would have added explicit existential quantifiers like “some.” No such addition would be necessary or expected for the generic interpretation since generics lack explicit quantifiers by default. The topic committee’s likely intentions are not decisive, but they strongly suggest that the generic interpretation is correct, since it’s prima facie unlikely that a committee charged with writing a sentence to be debated would be so badly mistaken about what their sentence means (which they would be if they intended the existential interpretation). The committee, moreover, does not write resolutions for the 0.1 percent of debaters who debate on the national circuit; they write resolutions, at least in large part, to be debated by the vast majority of students on the vast majority of circuits, who would take the resolution to be (pretty obviously, I’d imagine) generic with respect to “colleges and universities,” given its face-value meaning and standard expectations about what LD resolutions tend to mean.

#### It applies to private entities:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that one company’s appropriation is bad does not entail that all companies’ appropriation is bad

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a type of appropriation offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments, specific companies, and different sectors in the world.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps –reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Hypothetical neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse, and theory checks cheaty CPs

#### No RVIs—it’s their burden to be topical.

### 2

#### Text: People’s Republic of China (PRC) should commit to continuing research and development of the appropriation of outer space by private entities in the PRC. The PRC should give all information and developed products regarding the appropriation of outer space to the United States.

#### The CP solves the AFF – It stops China from deploying space weaponization which solves the whole advantage, BUT it solves the AFF better, even if they win a circumvention argument, because it means the US will always have their tech + its own.

#### It avoids the NB – the US getting their own tech + China’s tech means they can beat Russia

#### No perms – we mandate the appropriation of space – the plan bans the CP, so perms are mutually exclusive or sever

### 3

#### Despite resistance, the CCP regime is stable now – but challenges to legitimacy cause lashout

Ball 20

(Joshua, MA in IR, University of St. Andrews, <https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/>, April 10) BW

For decades, Western academics, policymakers, and analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains firmly in power under the increasingly autocratic leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping. While the CCP-controlled government faces a range of threats from groups within its borders, the idea of a downturn in the Chinese economy remains a very legitimate threat. The Chinese government has radically modernized its economic policies over the past three decades, completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor. These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of the Chinese middle class, which has the potential to be the most influential group in China when looked at in regards to socio-economic status. As a result, the considerably large middle class has come to perceive the CCP as being responsible for their rising levels of prosperity. China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world. However, China still faces many hurdles to overcome. Rising Debt and Escalating Unemployment for Chinese College Graduates It is becoming increasingly difficult in China for college graduates to find jobs, the volume of China’s exports is dropping, and tens of millions of workers are out of work. The possibility of a financial crisis in China could challenge Beijing’s ability to hold up its side of the deal with the population. Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs to party membership, the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being. The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and in return has its rule legitimized by its people. Arguably, while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there remains the little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state. If the CCP-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it could be perceived by members of the growing middle class as violating the social contract that has existed between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite. The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy if and when the time comes that it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent from the middle class. Beijing has a track record of effectively suppressing unrest The Chinese government has become particularly adept at maintaining or regaining control over its people via means of physical repression, censorship, and through the creation of an environment where fear of speaking out is a legitimate means of control. Indeed, the likelihood of an economic downturn eliminating the CCP’s influence is minimal. Rising social discontent isn’t likely to be enough to force the party itself from power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to take advantage of the situation to their political benefit, thus leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility. While the CCP has an extraordinary ability to suppress dissent, many argue that it can only contain such dissent for so long. However, due to the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies including surveillance, censorship, and controlled access to information, the Chinese authorities are empowered as never before, to monitor, identify, and censor those whose activities are a perceived threat to the party. Nevertheless, a sustained economic downturn poses a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. Continued civil unrest on the part of groups desiring independence from CCP rule as a result of religious suppression and ethnic inequality illustrate not-insignificant threats to the party’s ability to maintain total control over the Chinese state. Regardless, the most significant threat to the power monopoly held by the CCP is a pronounced economic downturn.

#### The plan erodes CCP legitimacy. Xi and CCP leadership have made the privatization of space their top priority for military and economic superiority. Marlborough reads yellow:

Patel 21 [(Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/] BC

How did China get here—and why?

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

#### Diversionary conflict – it escalates.

Hassid, PhD, 19

(Jonathan, PoliSci@Berkeley, AssistProfPoliSci@IowaState, A Poor China Might Be More Dangerous Than a Rich China, in Foreign Policy Issues for America, ed. Richard Mansbach DPhil and James McCormick PhD, Routledge)

China has a number of political differences and potential conflicts with the United States, some of which are summarized in Chapter 4. From China’s vast maritime territorial claims, the anomalous status of Taiwan to America’s alliances with Japan and South Korea, its treatment of Tibetans and Islamic minorities like the Uighurs, and its reluctance to implement UN-sponsored sanctions to force North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons, there are many potential flash points in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Many analysts noted that at the 19th Party Congress Xi Jinping promoted a more aggressive and muscular foreign policy, promising that China would become a world superpower by 2050. This fact alone could presage eventual conflict with the current reigning superpower, the United States. Indeed, many in China and across Asia feel that President Trump’s pullout from the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have already signaled US retreat from the region, opening the way for a more assertive Chinese foreign policy. Some analysts go further, arguing that China is even now trying to build its own world order and muscle out U.S. trade influence by signing new bilateral trade agreements with historical U.S. allies like Canada. These signs may point to potential conflict in the future. However there is also reason to be hopeful; relations between the two giants were normalized in the 1970s, and thus far China and the United States have avoided serious conflict. In part this has been a result of U.S. policies in the region and because China has been able to increase its global status peacefully. But perhaps the most important reason conflict has been avoided is because Beijing has looked inwardly, concentrating on generating economic growth within its borders rather than making trouble beyond them. President Donald Trump has repeatedly argued that the United States must be more assertive in foreign affairs and in realizing its national interest regardless of the impact on others. His rhetoric has been highly combative. From vowing to declare China a “currency manipulator” on his first day in office – a claim he has since abandoned – to arguing that China has been cheating America in trade deals and denouncing the U.S. trade deficit with China, Trump has appeared to prefer confronting Beijing rather in engaging and cooperating with China. But this appearance of confrontation may belie a different reality. Many have noted that Trump and his family have personal business ties with China, including large investments and numerous pending trademark applications. Actions like Trump’s 2018 public support for state-owned Chinese tech company ZTE – coming just two days after the Chinese government announced a US $500m investment in a Trump-branded property in Indonesiaiii – further suggest to some that Beijing might be directly manipulating the US president to benefit Chinese foreign policy. Combined with the perception, common in Chinese official circles, that the United States under Trump is actually retreating from its commitments in Asia, the result might be additional areas of potential conflict with China and misperception and misunderstanding between the two. What might happen if there were an unintended Sino-American military confrontation in the South China Sea or the Sea of Japan, just as the Chinese economy slumps and triggers spreading labor unrest and disturbances at home? What might happen if Xi Jinping’s goal of having “no poverty in China by 2020” proves impossible, and China’s middle class becomes alienated from the regime and political dissent spreads owing to acute economic and/or environmental distress? Under such circumstances, China’s history suggests that Xi and other leaders might decide a “minor” foreign conflict would be a way to divert the attention of Chinese citizens from their domestic concerns. In China’s past, as we have seen, such “domestically-influenced” conflicts have been contained, but the very success of these previously limited conflicts might make Chinese leaders overconfident about their ability to avoid military escalation. Mistakes are easy to make, especially if the potential foe has a leader who tweets militant threats. If Beijing sought to distract an unhappy population by stirring up Chinese nationalism toward the United States, Taiwan, or Japan regarding maritime territorial claims, for example, and believes the Trump administration will not intervene, the two might careen toward a war that neither wants. An incident caused by a trigger-happy U.S. pilot or Chinese naval officer might escalate into a war that neither Washington nor Beijing sought. In the end, then, it may arguably better for the Trump administration that China continues to flourish economically. A prosperous China means that the United States has a valuable trading partner and – in certain issues – even a strategic partner. An impoverished China, however, might be bad news for everyone.

### 4

#### Russian space program powerless without a Sino-Russian space alliance right now, but in order to circumvent the plan, China helps Russia fill in as the US’s space leader. Harding 21

Luke Harding {Guardian foreign correspondent. His book [Shadow State](https://guardianbookshop.com/shadow-state-9781783352050.html) is published by Guardian Faber.}, 21 - ("The space race is back on – but who will win?," Guardian, 7-16-2021, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/jul/16/the-space-race-is-back-on-but-who-will-win)//marlborough-wr/

The biggest challenge to US space supremacy comes not from [Russia](https://www.theguardian.com/world/russia) – heir to the Soviet Union’s pioneering space programme, which launched the Sputnik satellite and got the first human into space in the form of Yuri Gagarin – but from China. In 2011 Congress prohibited US scientists from cooperating with Beijing. Its fear: scientific espionage. Taikonauts are banned from visiting the ISS, which has hosted astronauts from 19 countries over the past 20 years. The station’s future beyond 2028 is uncertain. Its operations may yet be extended in the face of increasing Chinese competition. In its annual threat assessment this April, the office of the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) described China as a “near-peer competitor” pushing for global power. It warns: “Beijing is working to match or exceed US capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that Washington has accrued from space leadership.” The Biden administration suspects Chinese satellites are being used for non-civilian purposes. The People’s Liberation Army integrates reconnaissance and navigation data in military command and control systems, the DNI says. “Satellites are inherently dual use. It’s not like the difference between an F15 fighter jet and a 737 passenger plane,” Hilborne says. Once China completes the Tiangong space station next year, it is likely to invite foreign astronauts to take part in missions. One goal: to build new soft-power alliances. Beijing says interest from other countries is enormous. The low Earth orbit station is part of an ambitious development strategy in the heavens rather than on land – a sort of belt and rocket initiative. According to Alanna Krolikowski, an assistant professor at the Missouri University of Science and Technology, a “bifurcation” of space exploration is under way. In one emerging camp are states led by China and Russia, many of them authoritarian; in the other are democracies and “like-minded” countries aligned with the US. Russia has traditionally worked closely with the Americans, even when terrestrial relations were bad. Now it is moving closer to Beijing. In March, China and Russia [announced plans to co-build an international lunar research station](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/mar/10/china-and-russia-unveil-joint-plan-for-lunar-space-station). The agreement comes at a time when Vladimir Putin’s government has been increasingly isolated and subject to western sanctions. In June, Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping renewed a friendship treaty. Moscow is cosying up to Beijing out of necessity, at a time of rising US-China bipolarity. These rival geopolitical factions are fighting over a familiar mountainous surface: the moon. In 2019 a Chinese rover landed on its far side – a first. China is now planning a mission to the moon’s south pole, to establish a robotic research station and an eventual lunar base, which would be intermittently crewed. Nasa, meanwhile, has said it intends to put a woman and a person of colour on the moon by 2024. SpaceX has been hired [to develop a lander](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/apr/17/nasa-spacex-moon-spacecraft-elon-musk). The return to the moon – after the last astronaut, commander Eugene Cernan, said goodbye in December 1972 – would be a staging post for the ultimate “giant leap”, Nasa says: sending astronauts to Mars. Krolikowski is sceptical that China will quickly overtake the US to become the world’s leading spacefaring country. “A lot of what China is doing is a reprisal of what the cold war space programmes did in the 1960s and 1970s,” she said. Beijing’s recent feats of exploration have as much to do with national pride as scientific discovery, she says. But there is no doubting Beijing’s desire to catch up, she adds. “The Chinese government has established, or has plans for, programmes or missions in every major area, whether it’s [Mars](https://www.theguardian.com/science/mars) missions, building mega constellations of telecommunications satellites, or exploring asteroids. There is no single area of space activity they are not involved in.” “We see a tightening of the Russia-China relationship,” Krolikowski says. “In the 1950s the Soviet Union provided a wide range of technical assistance to Beijing. Since the 1990s, however, the Russian space establishment has experienced long stretches of underfunding and stagnation. China now presents it with new opportunities.” Russia is poised to benefit from cost sharing, while China gets deep-rooted Russian technical expertise. At least, that’s the theory. “I’m sceptical this joint space project will materialise anytime soon,” says Alexander​ Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Gabuev says both countries are “techno-nationalist”. Previous agreements to develop helicopters and wide-bodied aircraft saw nothing actually made, he says.

#### Russia and China are in a space arms race- the plan causes China to bow out and Russia wins. Bowman and Thompson 20

Bradley Bowman, Jared Thompson {Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, }, 20 - ("Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space," Foreign Policy, 11-12-2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/)//marlborough-wr/

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have [sprinted](https://thedispatch.com/p/we-must-work-to-prevent-a-space-pearl) to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons. To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring. The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and [Moscow](https://undocs.org/en/CD/2181) have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories [commit](https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/CD/1985) “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty. On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space? The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, [said](https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2483340/commander-lists-5-tasks-to-ensuring-continued-space-superiority/) in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.” Beijing already has an [operational ground-based anti-satellite missile capability](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf#page=3). People’s Liberation Army units are training with the missiles, and the U.S. Defense Department [believes](https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF#page=90) Beijing “probably intends to pursue additional [anti-satellite] weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.” That is where America’s most sensitive nuclear communication and missile defense satellites orbit and keep watch. Similarly, Moscow [tested](https://www.spacecom.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2448334/russia-tests-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile/) a ground-based anti-satellite weapon in December that could destroy U.S. or allied satellites in orbit. That attack capability augments a ground-based laser weapon that Russian President Vladimir Putin [heralded](https://tass.com/defense/1034344) in 2018. In a moment of candor, Russia’s defense ministry admitted the system was designed to “fight satellites.” To make matters worse, both countries are also working to deploy space-based—or so-called “[on-orbit](https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf#page=3)”—capabilities to attack satellites.

#### This link turns their first scenario, and unchecked Russian influence risks extinction

Fisher ‘15 (Max, Foreign affairs columnist @ VOX, "How World War III became possible," 6/29, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)

That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order. Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I, and more similar to those of the Cold War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. Russia, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use, particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It’s not just a difference in rhetoric. It’s a whole different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. "There’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a "limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

### Case

#### No solvency - They cannot solve Chinese hegemony because a) the Chinese government can appropriate space, and b) public-private partnerships will still continue because no appropriation is required

#### Vote neg on presumption---all of their ev is in the context of private-public partnerships being bad, not appropriation. The only time their AC says appropriation is in the plan text

#### China will circumvent

**Bahney and Pearl 19** [Benjamin Bahney and Jonathan Pearl, 3-26-2019, "Why Creating a Space Force Changes Nothing," BENJAMIN BAHNEY and JONATHAN PEARL are Senior Fellows at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research and contributing authors to [Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity](https://archive.md/o/Hlbi1/https:/www.amazon.com/Cross-Domain-Deterrence-Strategy-Era-Complexity/dp/0190908653). Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/space/2019-03-26/why-creating-space-force-changes-nothing accessed 12/10/21](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/space/2019-03-26/why-creating-space-force-changes-nothing%20accessed%2012/10/21)] Adam

As Russia and China continue to push forward, U.S. policymakers may be tempted to use treaties and diplomacy to head off their efforts entirely. This option, although alluring on paper, is simply not feasible. Existing treaties designed to limit military competition in space have had little success in actually doing so. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans parties from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space, on the moon, or on other celestial bodies, but it has no formal mechanism for verifying compliance, and places no restrictions on the development or deployment in space of conventional antisatellite weapons. Even if it were possible to convince Moscow and Beijing of the benefits of comprehensive space arms control, existing technology makes it extremely difficult to verify compliance with the necessary treaty provisions—and without comprehensive and reliable verification, treaties are toothless. Moreover, regulating the development and deployment of antisatellite weapons is extremely difficult, both because they include such a broad and diverse range of technologies and because many types of antisatellite weapons can be concealed or explained away as having some other use. Unsurprisingly, Russia and China’s draft Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Space, which they have been pushing for several years now, has an unenforceable definition of what constitutes a “weapon” and does nothing at all to address ground-based antisatellite weapons development.

### Militarization

#### Bowman and Thompson says that Chinese and Russian space militarization is bad, not private military appropriation causes militarization

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

#### Space commercialization is a strong constraint on conflict – solves space war

Wendy N. Whitman **Cobb 20**, is currently an associate professor of strategy and security studies at the US Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 7-21-2020, "Privatizing Peace: How Commerce Can Reduce Conflict in Space," Routledge & CRC Press, <https://www.routledge.com/Privatizing-Peace-How-Commerce-Can-Reduce-Conflict-in-Space/Cobb/p/book/9780367337834> // AAli

By the end of the twentieth century, scholars zeroed in on the democratic peace theory which attempts to explain why democracies do not go to war with other democracies and why, in some analyses, they seem to be more prone to peace in general than non-democracies. Similar to the golden arches, what is it about democracy that seems to induce such peacefulness? Academics have proposed everything from the nature of mediating institutions to the restraint of public opinion, to trade relations. While these variations will be explored further in Chapter 3, of interest here are the versions that focus explicitly on trade, commercial ties, and capitalism. Along these lines, Erik Gartzke argues, "peace ensues when states lack differences worthy of costly conflict."31 If the costs of conflict are too high, then states should be more unlikely to engage in it. To this end, economic globalization can provide the means through which costs are raised. “The integration of world markets not only facilitates commerce, but also creates new interests inimical to war. Financial interdependence ensures that damage inflicted on one economy travels through the global system, afflicting even aggressors."32 Focusing his analysis primarily on the influence of capitalism, Gartzke's findings suggest that states with markets more closely tied to the global economy are far less likely to experience a militarized dispute.

In thinking about the space environment today, there are obvious principles of capitalism at work. However, China, a major spacefaring state that has been making capitalist reforms, arguably remains far from a true capitalist country. This is especially true in their space industry which is heavily subsidized by the state and almost wholly integrated with China's military.34 Many other states continue to subsidize space activities heavily as well. A better approach through which to examine conflict in space is presented by an offshoot of the capitalist peace which is termed the commercial peace. The commercial peace thesis emphasizes the role of trade and the connections made through it to explain a lack of conflict. Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward write:

Trade is important not only because it creates an economic interest in peace but also because trade generates 'connections' between people that promote communication and understanding.... Based on these ideas, the flow of goods between countries creates a network of ties and communication links. If two countries are more embedded in this network, their relations should be more

peaceful 35

Given the interconnectedness of the global economy to space-based assets, a version of the commercial peace thesis can be used to argue that the chance of conflict in space is less than is commonly understood or recognized precisely because of the extent to which the global economy has become dependent on space-based assets.

To understand this argument, consider a scenario in which Russia, in preparation for a new assault on Eastern Europe, attacks a key US military satellite with the purpose of disrupting and disabling military communications in Europe. This action would conceivably enable the Russians to undertake their attack under more favorable conditions and prevent a quicker response from America and its allies. However, if the satellite was attacked via an ASAT that kinetically destroyed the US satellite, the debris cloud created from the attack could have disastrous consequences beyond military communications Much like the movie Gravity, the debris cloud could cause a chain reaction, hitting and disabling dismantling other satellites that would in turn disrupt civilian communications, business transactions,

and perhaps even Russian military satellites. The economic effects of lost satellites would not be restricted to one country alone; the global economic consequences in terms of lost property (satellites), lost transactions, and financial havoc would echo throughout the world, including in Russia itself. Finally, the attack on one satellite could even ultimately endanger the ISS and its inhabitants, several of which are Russians. Destruction of the ISS would negate billions of dollars in investment from not just Russia, but other countries that have participated in it including Japan, Italy, and Canada. Therefore, an attack on a US military satellite would not just be an attack on one but an attack on all.

While the previous scenario highlights several reasons why it would not be in Russia's best interest to attack a US satellite, this book argues that the economic argument is both the strongest and the most restraining especially as space becomes more congested, competitive, contested, and commercialized. The emergence of private space companies enhances this argument. "In the commercial sector, companies need reliability and legal enforcement mechanisms if they are going to operate profitably in a shared environment."36 In order to foster the growing area of space commercialization, companies must be assured that the activities they undertake in space will be protected in some way or, at a minimum, allowed to proceed to the extent where they can reap the profit. This could be done through international organizations that would provide some sort of space traffic control, but the likelihood of a major international breakthrough on rules regarding space is unlikely in the near term. Therefore, actors must rely on the protections afforded them by an increasingly globalized economy that is ever more dependent on space-based assets.

### Heg

#### No solvency—China can still put ASATs in space post plan because the government can still appropriate space

#### Government sector will inevitably militarize space

**Shamas & Holden, 2019**, Victor Shamas &, Oslo Metropolitan University, Work Research Institute (AFI), Oslo, Norway; Thomas Holden, Independent scholar, Oslo, Norway, 2019, Palgrave Communications, One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9

On the other hand**, outer space still remains firmly within the domain of the state and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future, with the likely continued importance of military uses of satellite technology and the weaponization of Earth’s orbit**—crucially, the Outer Space Treaty only prohibits nuclear arms and other ‘weapons of mass destruction' in space, not conventional weapons, such as ballistic missiles.

#### No impact to heg decline

**Fettweis 17** { Christopher J. Fettweis is an American [political scientist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_scientist) and the Associate Professor of Political Science at [Tulane University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulane_University). He is known for his expertise on [American foreign relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_foreign_relations)., May, 08, 2017, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace”, pg 448-451 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?needAccess=true}

Both strains of the hegemonic-stability explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules. Relatively small police forces require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version. Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102 In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position.105 The Russians did not seem to believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent. Once again, the culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception. The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence. Americans are more likely to feel good if they re unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for US observers to project their perceptions onto others. The United States almost certainly frightens others more than its leaders perceive. A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,” which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.” 108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed; it is not just petulant resentment, but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic beliefs and behavior. To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe. In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict

around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history. The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it.

No solvency—Marlborugh reads yelow

Chow and Kelley 8/21 [(Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan,and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Interest, 8/21/2021] JL

If current trends hold, then China’s[Strategic Support Force](https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf) will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. [Chinese military doctrine](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/nowhere-earth-will-be-safe-us-china-war-172523), statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold.

This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new [American way of war](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/secrets-and-lies-role-truth-great-power-information-warfare-170579): reliance on vulnerable space systems.

This project came to fruition with a direct ascent[ASAT weapons test](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf) in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense[international ire](https://spacenews.com/u-s-official-china-turned-to-debris-free-asat-tests-following-2007-outcry/). This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs).

Such spacecraft are[inevitable](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-2/Chow.pdf#page=22) and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the[new space economy](https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/space-economy-themes-2021), such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris.

This is [a serious threat](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-lose-china-189020), primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once.

China has conducted at least[half a dozen tests of RPO](https://swfound.org/media/207179/swf_chinese_rpo_fact_sheet_apr2021.pdf#page=3) capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use.

There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in[February 2020](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-successfully-completes-historic-first-docking-of-mission-extension-vehicle-with-intelsat-901-satellite).)

At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The[Global Times](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213345.shtml) reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April,[Andrew Jones](https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/#:~:text=China%20is%20developing%20plans%20for%20a%2013%2C000%2Dsatellite%20megaconstellation,-by%20Andrew%20Jones&text=HELSINKI%20%E2%80%94%20China%20is%20to%20oversee,the%20country's%20major%20space%20actors.) at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more.

If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president.

Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use.

#### China won’t go to war with Taiwan

Greer 18 – Tanner; (“Taiwan Can Win a War With China” Foreign Policy. September 25, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/>)//GK

When Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke to the 19th Party Congress about the future of Taiwan last year, his message was ominous and unequivocal: “We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot. We will never allow any person, any organization, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time or in any form.” This remark drew the longest applause of his entire three-hour speech—but it’s not a new message. The invincibility of Chinese arms in the face of Taiwanese “separatists” and the inevitability of reunification are constant Chinese Communist Party themes. At its base, the threat made by Xi is that the People’s Liberation Army has the power to defeat the Taiwanese military and destroy its democracy by force, if need be. **Xi understands the consequences of failure** here. “We have the determination, the ability and the preparedness to deal with Taiwanese independence,” he stated in 2016, “and if we do not deal with it, we will be overthrown.” China has already ratcheted up economic and diplomatic pressure on the island since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen and the independence-friendly Democratic Progressive Party. Saber-rattling around the Taiwan Strait has been common. But **China might not be able to deliver on its repeated threats.** Despite the vast discrepancy in size between the two countries, there’s a real possibility that **Taiwan could fight off a Chinese attack—even without direct aid from the United States.** Two recent studies, one by Michael Beckley, a political scientist at Tufts University, and the other by Ian Easton, a fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, in his book The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia, provide us with a clearer picture of what a war between Taiwan and the mainland might look like. Grounded in statistics, training manuals, and planning documents from the PLA itself, and informed by simulations and studies conducted by both the U.S. Defense Department and the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, this research presents a very different picture of a cross-strait conflict **than that hawked by the party’s official announcements.** Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is **better trained, better motivated, and better prepared** for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA could throw against them. Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is better trained, better motivated, and better prepared for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA could throw against them. A cross-strait war looks far less like an inevitable victory for China than it does a staggeringly risky gamble.