### T

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution or a subset thereof –

#### Appropriation includes making space unusable.

Stephen **Gorove, 69** - ("Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty" 1969, 12-10-2021 https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr)//AW

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes "appropriation," as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation. By the same token, any use involving consumption or taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation

#### Outer space begins at one hundred kilometers above sea level.

Pershing 19

Abigail Pershing (J.D. Candidate @ Yale, B.A. UChicago). “Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty’s Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today.” Yale Journal of International Law 44, no. 1. 2019. JDN. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1697&context=yjil

A. An Introduction to the Outer Space Treaty ¶ Even defining “space” is itself a legally fraught exercise—where does the Earth’s atmosphere end and space begin? Various legal theories have been advanced to demarcate this limit.11 There is no universally accepted boundary, but the Kármán line, at an altitude of one hundred kilometers (sixty-two miles) above sea level, is the most widely recognized.12

#### Private entities mean commercial groups. Cornell Law:

https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def\_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term\_occur=999&term\_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501

(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Unjust is the opposite of right or in violation of somebody else’s rights. Black Laws No Date "What is Unjust?" <https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/> //Elmer

Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws.

#### Vote negative – there is a distinction between debate as an institution and debate as a game, and while the affs intervention may or may not be effective on an institutional level, the ballot only signifies a win or loss within debate as a game

#### We are both in this round primarily to get a win - its why we all adhere to other rules of the game like speech times and prep time, even if breaking those norms might make the debate “better” – its why you would vote neg if they read a 10 hour long AC about why speech time constraints are bad

#### Not reading a topical aff creates incredible structural advantages for the aff – they get first and last speech and perms which means without a stable advocacy they get to morph their aff into whatever minimizes direct clash, and allows for a retreat to moral high ground

#### You don’t have to disagree with the aff to vote neg. But, the ballot is fundamentally tied to the structure of the *game* of debate, not the *institution*, which means that your ballot can only ascribe who did a better job playing the game that we agreed upon before the start of the tournament.

#### There’s two Impacts –

#### Clash – Non-T affs avoid meaningful objections by preventing effective prep. This is supercharged by the Aff not being disclosed open source. That link turns all their research and subjectivity arguments. We can’t deploy new research strategies or cultivate new dispositions to power structures if we can’t effectively evaluate the arguments. Clash is a pre-requisite to debate, because we use competitive argumentation to understand and internalize attitudes and knowledge. That’s what distinguishes debate from other forms of learning.

#### Iterative argumentative testing – for example, think about how the India aff transformed over the course of the Compulsory Voting topic. The first tournament was generic democracy and turnout arguments, but by the end of October debates centered around third level analysis of vote-banking and whether Modi’s nationalism was self-driven or a response to his voter base – the ability to subject controversial ideas to rigorous testing allows debaters to better engage in the research process, discern what arguments are most accurate, and learn how to refine our own beliefs to become more compelling advocates – not reading a plan allows a constant spew of new content that never reaches those high levels of contestation without the constraints of the topic – Even if this topic isn’t the perfect topic, the predictability of debates under it are worth potential substantive tradeoff. Limits produce a rigorous *culture of justification* instead of a culture of *assertion* or *presumption*. Without a bridge for subjecting beliefs to a rigorous test, we are left with might-makes-right. This link turns the Aff again, because our ability to develop critical subjectivities that can *strategically* challenge power structures necessitates this type of argument culture.

Cheryl MISAK Philosophy @ Toronto ‘8 “A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for Democracy” *Episteme* 5 (1) p. 100-104

The charge that Rorty has had to face again and again is that he really is a relativist, holding that one belief is no better than another, and that one must “treat the epistemic standards of any and every epistemic community as on a par” (Haack 1995, 136). Rorty, that is, leaves us with no way of adjudicating claims that arise in different communities. It is argued that this is not only an unsatisfactory view, but it is incompatible with his commitment to his own set of beliefs and with his practice of arguing or giving reasons for them. Peirce would join in this charge, arguing that it is the community of inquirers or reasoners that matter, not this or that local community. One of Rorty’s responses to this clutch of objections is to say that he doesn’t have to treat the epistemic standards of every community as on a par: “I prize communities which share more background beliefs with me above those which share fewer” (Rorty 1995b, 153). There is nothing incoherent about asserting that your community has it right, for all “right” amounts to is what your community agrees upon. I have argued (2000, 12ff) that this kind of comeback puts Rorty in a very difficult position, giving him nothing to say against the likes of Carl Schmitt, the fascist legal philosopher who found it natural to join the Nazi bandwagon. Schmitt, like Rorty, argued that there is no truth and rationality in politics. Rather, politics is the arena in which groups assert themselves, with the strongest coming out on top and the weaker groups disappearing. One makes an existential choice – opts for a conception of the good – and then tries to attain “substantive homogeneity” in the population. Might ends up being right and the elimination of those who disagree with us ends up being a fine method of reaching our political decisions. A democrat or liberal like Rorty has an impossible time in giving us – and himself – reasons for opting for his view rather than his fascist opponent’s view. Once you give up aiming at truth, once you give up aiming at something that goes beyond the standards of your own community, then you give up the wherewithal to argue against the might-is-right view. The charge I am trying to answer here, on behalf of the non-Rortian pragmatist, is that mixing truth and politics is dangerous. One of the points I want to make is that, whatever the dangers are in saying morals and politics aim at the truth, the dangers of denying it are even more alarming. If we were to get rid of the notion of truth, nothing would protect us from the idea that there is nothing to get right, no better or worse action, and no better or worse way of treating others. Nothing would protect us from the Schmittian worldview. Another point is that the pragmatist view encourages something which is downright salutary, not dangerous at all. It encourages a culture of justification, a culture the importance of which grows as we face the challenges of living in a global society with worldviews struggling against each other. This thought was prominent in the debate about how the new democratic order in South Africa should be conceived. Here is how Etienne Murienik put it: If the new constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defense of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force of its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not on coercion.4 A final point rests on the nature of the kinds of answers the pragmatist envisions. Rorty and Rawls seem to think that any view of truth carries with it the idea that there is one and only one true answer to every question. It is important to see that, whatever the case might be for other views of truth, the pragmatist’s view of truth does not entail anything about the precise nature of right answers. On the Peircean view of truth, it might be true that the best solution to a problem is to compromise in a certain way. Or a question might have a number of equally right answers: it might be true that either A or B or C is an acceptable solution to a problem. That is, bringing truth into politics need not result in a view on which one theory of the good triumphs over the others. Indeed, the pragmatist account of truth does not require agreement at the end of the day (whatever that might mean) and it does not require the consent of all who are affected by a particular decision here and now. The right answer to a question might be one that only a few see is right. A right answer is the one that would be best – would stand up to the evidence and arguments – were we to inquire into the matter as far as we fruitfully could. That is, we are not primarily aiming at agreement in deliberation – we are aiming at getting a view that will stand up to reasons and evidence**.** That said, there may be cases in moral and especially political deliberation in which we do aim for agreement because we think that what will best stand up to reasons in that case is a solution that is agreed upon by all or by all who are affected. But this will be just one kind of case amongst many. Right answers aren’t necessarily answers that are acceptable by all. Nor are right answers necessarily those that resolve a conflict with a compromise, although sometimes a compromise or cooperative solution may indeed be what is required. Nor is bargaining always not conducive to truth – in some cases, that may be exactly what is required. This view of truth does not lead to zeal, oppression, closing off of discussion, or a squashing of pluralism, even if it might happen to be the case that there is only one reasonable conception of the good out there. The idea is that we are always aiming at getting the best answer – whatever that may be – and to do that we need to take into account the views of all. 6 . WHO DECIDES? One of the first questions put to those who would like to think of politics as a species of truth-oriented deliberation is this: why deliberate with the ignorant multitude? Would it not be better to expose our moral and political beliefs only to the reasons and experience of experts? Science, after all, doesn’t work by asking the person in the street what he or she thinks about quantum mechanics. The reason that the pragmatist’s epistemic justification is a justification of democratic politics, rather than of a hierarchical politics, in which an elite makes decisions, is that we do not and will not ever have an identifiable pool of moral and political experts. Dewey saw this clearly. As experts become specialized, “they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve” (Dewey 1926/1984, 364). Everyone engages in moral and political deliberation and it is not obvious that having special education makes you better at it – just look at priests, politicians, and moral philosophers/political theorists and ask yourself if they seem especially decent or especially wise when it comes to practical matters. Some people are good at examining moral and politi\cal issues, but it’s not clear that they are the ones trained to do so. Even if we could identify genuinely wise people, this kind of expertise is liable to be corrupted merely by being identified – merely by the wise person starting to think of herself as a moral expert.5 And it is far from clear that the rule of the wise would really take the views and experiences of all into account better than the democratic rule of the people. So how do we distinguish deliberating well and deliberating badly if we cannot appeal to education and training? No account of deliberative democracy can ignore the call to make the distinction. The trouble is that, in saying what good, as opposed to poor, deliberation amounts to, one finds oneself facing a justificatory problem: how can we specify what good deliberation is without simply assuming that our current standards of deliberation and inquiry are the gold standards? (This is the deep and central question of pragmatism: how do genuine norms arise out of contingent practices?) It will be unsurprising that I agree with Robert Talisse that the way forward is to focus on an epistemic justification of the whole range of deliberative virtues. Some of the virtues we think important in inquiry are open-mindedness, courage, honesty, integrity, rigor, willingness to listen to the views of others and to seriously entertain challenges to one’s own views, willingness to put oneself in another’s shoes, and the like. These virtues may well have a number of kinds of justifications – justifications, for instance, with their origins in the canons of etiquette or in this or that substantive moral or religious view. Politeness and Christianity (do unto others . . . ), for instance,may both dictate that we should listen to the views of others. But this kind of justification doesn’t break out of the circle of local practices. Talisse argues that the virtues are justified because they lead to true belief. Listening to others is not merely the polite thing to do, but it is also good because we might learn something. The epistemic argument I have presented on Peirce’s behalf gets us this far: we need to expose our beliefs to the views of others if we are to follow a method that will get us good or better or true beliefs. Talisse takes us the next step – there are other characteristics that make one an inquirer who aims at the truth. Honesty is the trait of following reasons and evidence, rather than self-interest. Modesty is the trait of taking your views to be fallible. Charity is willingness to listen to the views of others. Integrity is willingness to uphold the deliberative process, no matter the difficulties encountered. The distinction between deliberating well (having deliberative virtues) and deliberating badly (having deliberative vices), that is, is drawn in terms of whether a method promotes beliefs which are responsive to and fit with the reasons and evidence. 7 . THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY The pragmatist has offered us a compelling reason to take the views of others seriously and encourage the values associated with deliberative democratic politics. For inquirers must engage in the ongoing project of continually subjecting their beliefs to the tests of further experience and argument. The virtues inherent in a deliberative model of democratic citizenship must be cultivated if we are to come to good beliefs about how to treat others, how to resolve conflicts, and how to arrange society. The model of democratic citizenship which results is one that makes democratic citizenship part of a culture of justification. Citizens search for how best to structure our institutions and how best to live our lives. Democratic citizenship is a quest to get things right, with a genuine engagement in looking for right answers to pressing questions.We are not after mere agreement and we are not after the transformation of initial preferences into something that others can accept. We aim at getting things right – at getting beliefs that would forever stand up to scrutiny. In so aiming, citizens commit themselves to abiding by the decisions produced by the democratic procedure. For those decisions are the best we can do here and now. Here we find the justification of the coercive power of democracies. Eventually there has to be a decision in politics. The question that faces all societies is who decides and who wields the power to coerce once the decision is made? My argument is that as more people deliberate and more reasons and experience go into the mix, it will become more likely that the decisions made will account for the reasons and experience of all. The more likely, that is, that the answer will be right. Decisions produced by a democratic deliberative process are made by a rational method and so they are enforceable.

#### Frame procedural impacts through a lens of optimization – we don’t need to win that they make the game impossible, just relatively less effective. In the same way you would vote aff to reject a bad process CP even if there are theoretically solvency deficits based on certainty and immediacy – the fact that we still have some neg ground doesn’t mean that reading the cap k for the 87th time against a survival strategy aff is a good debate to have for anyone involved

#### They have no offense

#### View T impacts as a process, not a product – any education impact about their content being important are solved by reading a book – filter impacts through what is unique to the process of debating itself

#### They get to read it on the neg – if their k of being topical is true then reading the aff as a K on the neg means they get auto-wins, we still access their education

#### The TVA solves – they could have read an aff that has a plantext and discusses how the focus on space is a form of ableist futurity--this would allow a discussion of the aff in a forum that allows us to have nuanced responses – yes, it isn’t perfect, but those imperfections are neg ground – if they aren’t forced to defend a controversy, then the meaning of any wins they get become hollow anyway which takes out solvency

# CASE

#### The ROTB is to weigh the aff versus the status quo or a competitive alternative – anything else is self serving, arbitrary, and guts neg generics.

#### Their pessimism is self defeating

#### They claim to reject productivity and effectiveness,,but then why would their AC change anything

#### If pessimism is true, then their AC should have no result— if there Aff results in a world where its better for people w disabilities, thats proof that we should reject the pessimism of the CA

#### TRYING TO CHANGE DEBATE IS BAD

#### They violate their arg abt debate being structurally bad: they spread

**No solvency - Changing debate fails.**

**Atchison and Panetta, 09** (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)

This section will address the "debate as activism ~ perspective that argues that the appropriate site for addressing community problems in individual debates. In contrast to the "debate as innovation" perspective, which assumes that the activity is an isolated game with educational benefits, proponents of the "debate as activism" perspective argue that individual debates have the potential to create change in the debate community and society at large. If the first approach assumed that debate was completely insulated, this perspective assumes that there is no substantive insulation between individual debates and the community at large. ¶ From our perspective, using individual debates to create community change is an **insufficient strategy** for three reasons. First, individual debates are, for the most part, **insulated** from the community at large. Second, individual debates **limit the conversation** to the immediate participants and the judge, excluding many important contributors to the debate community. Third, locating the discussion within the confines of a competition diminishes the additional potential for **collaboration**, **consensus**, and **coalition building**. The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create communitywide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems **inherent** in individual debates and the **collective forgetfulness** of the debate community. The structural problems stem from the current **tournament format** that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but **the ballot is rarely seen** by anyone outside the tabulation room.¶ Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is **little documentation** of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often **external pressures** (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges' justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems.

#### Focus on changing debate is bad bc it means that people don’t engage in an attempt to change policies and practices that would actually improve people’s lives- proved by their aff bc they say we shouldn’t try

#### IF THEIR AFF DOESNT SOLVE ANYTHING- THEN THAT’S A REASON TO VOTE NEG

#### On presumption

#### They’re just striking a pose. they ADOPT radical sounding rhetoric w/o an actual plan to change anything which just allows privileged debaters to affect a catharsis rather than having to take concrete action that addresses the material oppression of the people we’re talking about.

#### ~~Their ROTB assumes that everyone can just be like them – ignoring the strength of structural forces – teaching people to resist in ways that sustain the structures which oppress us~~

~~Ebert 95, Pf Critical and Cultural Theory, University at Albany, (Teresa, (Untimely) Critiques for a Red Feminism, Post-Ality, Marxism and Postmodernism, edited by Mas'ud Zavarzadeh)~~

~~However, contrary to ludic claims, this diverse deployment of deregulating invention by Butler, as well as by Cornell, Lyotard, Derrida and others (whether as performativity, citationality, resignification, remetaphorisation, refiguring, the differend, differance ... )~~ **~~is not a progressive move beyond (free of) the bounds of existing systems and their material conditions~~**~~. Rather invention is a way of avoiding the consequences of the structural forces in society-the social relations of production. The logic of invention is a double move that attempts to displace exploitation. Again, it does so by first construing material structural forces either as discourse or as so heavily mediated by discourses as to be "indissociable" from them, as Butler does. Then it reinterprets these structures in terms of the trope of invention and a differential logic (differance/differend/difference-within), thereby defining them as, in themselves, heterogeneous, indeterminate, self-deconstructing processes. In other words, within this ludic logic, structures are always already being undone by their own destabilising processes, their own differences-within. This means, in effect, that, for ludic theorists, there are no exploitative or determining structures or systematic relations, including production, because such structures would always already be in the process of undoing themselves and their effects. Of course, ludic critics do not deny oppression (that is, domination as opposed to exploitation), but they~~ **~~largely confine both their recognition and explanations of the occurrences of oppression to particular, local events~~** ~~and gestures of power that are, by definition, reversible, that generate their own resistances. What this means is that there is no need for revolution or class struggle since any oppressive "structure" is itself a deconstituting process that undoes its own effects (oppression).~~

#### ~~AT: THEORY FORCES PEOPLE TO JUMP THROUGH HOOPS OF DISCUSSION~~

#### ~~Our method is not abstraction THEIRS IS- THEYRE talking about a theory untethered to the res and has no burden of solvency THEY NEED TO BE MORE CONCRETE~~

#### AT: Reid-Brinkley

#### Our args link turn this— shows engagement is key to liberatory projects- what about that is white- privileged debaters arguing about abstract theories that don’t change anything in the real world is the real privilege

#### ~~AT: CULP/MEEKOSHA~~

#### ~~Their method is affective (relating) to emotion pessimism— how is that the same as conspiratorial communism?~~

#### ~~a. Card links them back into their own claims of futurism- nothing is more futurism that communism —inspiring to create a society where ppl shares means of privation~~

#### ~~b. Their aff is pessimism- it doesn’t not believe in effecting social change~~

#### ~~AT: disability controls inequality~~

#### ~~DA TO METHOD --totalizing logic is a horrible way to approach the world- bc it causes us to backward engineer our understanding of phenomena such as the transatlantic trade of enslaved people, holocaust, all assaults rather than trying to look at the best explanations for each one~~

**Psychoanalytic critique causes passivity and destroys political struggle and coalitions.**

**Gordon 01** - Paul Gordon (Ph.D., professor of humanities at the University of Colorado Boulder), Race & Class, v. 42, n. 4, p. 30-31, April 2001 CL

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with disappointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation -- the evils of Stalinism in particular -- are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'.58 To justify their flight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human- kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax.59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-sufficient combination'.60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together

~~as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the first place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.'61 Now, this is not only nonsense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other firm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understanding' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis.62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psychoanalysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.~~

**~~Epistemology DA - Psychoanalytic concepts have been thoroughly debunked. They are either non-falsifiable or patently false. Libinal economy cannot be our best theory of race. Mootz ‘00~~**

~~Mootz III, Francis J. [Dean of McGeorge School of Law, Professor of Law, J.D., Duke University School of Law A.M., Philosophy, Duke University Graduate School B.A., History, University of Notre Dame ]"Psychotherapeutic practice as a model for postmodern legal theory." Yale JL & Human. 12 (2000): 299. [ellipses in original] MC~~

~~Freudian psychoanalysis increasingly is the target of blistering criticism from a wide variety of commentators." In a recent review, Frederick Crews reports that ¶~~~~independent studies have begun to converge toward a verdict~~ **~~...~~** ~~that~~~~there is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas.~~ **~~...~~** ~~[A]nalysis~~~~as a whole~~~~remains powerless.., and understandably so,~~~~because a thoroughgoing epistemological critique, based on commonly acknowledged standards of evidence and logic decertifies every distinctively psychoanalytic proposition.~~~~¶ 5 The most telling criticism of Freud's psychoanalytic theory is that it has proven no more effective in producing therapeutic benefits than have other forms of psychotherapy. Critics draw the obvious conclusion that the benefits (if any) of psychotherapy are neither explained nor facilitated by psychoanalytic theories. Although Freudian psychoanalytic theory purports to provide a truthful account of the operations of the psyche and the causes for mental disturbances, critics argue that psychoanalytic theory may~~~~prove in the end to~~~~be nothing more than fancy verbiage that tends to obscure whatever healing effects psychotherapeutic dialogue may have.~~~~¶ Freudian psychoanalysis failed because it could not make good on its claim to be a rigorous and empirical science. Although Freud's mystique is premised on a widespread belief that psychoanalysis was a profound innovation made possible by his genius, Freud claimed only that he was extending the scientific research of his day within the organizing context of a biological model of the human mind. Freud's adherents created the embarrassing cult of personality and the myth of a self-validating psychoanalytic method only after Freud's empirical claims could not withstand critical scrutiny in accordance with the scientific methodology demanded by his metapsychology 9 The record is clear that Freud believed that psychoanalysis would take its place among the sciences and that his clinical work provided empirical confirmation of his theories. This belief now appears to be completely unfounded and indefensible. ¶ Freud's quest for a scientifically grounded psychotherapy was not amateurish or naive. Although Freud viewed his "metapsychology as a set of directives for constructing a scientific psychology," ' Patricia Kitcher makes a persuasive case that he was not a blind dogmatist who refused to adjust his metapsychology in the face of contradictory evidence." Freud's commitment to the scientific method, coupled with his creative vision, led him to construct a comprehensive and integrative metapsychology that drew from a number of scientific disciplines in an impressive and persuasive manner. 62 However, the natural and social sciences upon which he built his derivative and interdisciplinary approach developed too rapidly and unpredictably for him to respond. 63 As developments in biology quickly undermined Freud's theory, he "began to look to linguistics and especially to anthropology as more hopeful sources of support," ' but this strategy later in his career proved equally nsuccessful. 65 The scientific justification claimed by Freud~~~~literally~~~~eroded when the knowledge base underlying his theory collapsed, leaving his disciples with the impossible task of defending a theory whose presuppositions no longer were plausible according to their own criteria of validation.'~~

**~~Psychoanalysis harms the political – it enables the destruction of existing ideologies but can’t explain society or offer alternatives.~~**

**~~Luxon 16~~** ~~– Nancy Luxon (professor of political science at University of Minnesota), “Beyond mourning and melancholia: Nostalgia, anger and the challenges of political action”, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/cpt.2015.49 SD~~

~~This article takes up the charge to~~ **~~disaggregate~~** ~~the dynamics of~~ **~~mourning practices~~** ~~rooted in~~ **~~psychoanalysis~~** ~~and to analyze the aptness for politics implied above. At this juncture, political theorists need to clarify the dynamics and structures that~~ **~~bind~~** ~~the psychological and the political; like Freud, we political theorists succumb to the tendency to~~ **~~collapse~~** ~~the structural~~ **~~into the psychological~~**~~, and so miss the ways in which political change draws on dynamics~~ **~~different~~** ~~from the psychoanalytic couch. Three problematics lie at the~~ **~~intersection~~** ~~of psychoanalysis and~~ **~~politics~~**~~. First, the transferential relationship between patient and analyst that enables the work of psychic change, or what analysts term ‘therapeutic action’. Second, the narrative enframing offered by mourning, and the concomitant ability to link experiences to broader narratives. And third, the~~ **~~mediating practices~~** ~~that govern whether such frames may be reworked, rejected or transmuted. Political theorists have thus far given most attention to the first problematic, and have largely assumed that the others will follow in due course. Although it is tempting to argue that these three problematics unfold along the same temporal horizon, psychoanalysts have long argued that~~ **~~therapeutic action~~**~~, narrative and the framing of~~ **~~external worlds~~** ~~unfold~~ **~~distinct~~** ~~and~~ **~~disjointed~~** ~~from one another. Disjunctively from psychic change, the ability to narrate a new relation to the past, and to chart the practices that sustain this new relationship, requires revisiting the repetitions and internalizations that prompt persons to oscillate between grief and anger, and that give rise to the need for mourning in the first place. While psychoanalysis offers a ready~~ **~~snapshot~~** ~~for the~~ **~~undoing~~** ~~or~~ **~~destruction~~** ~~of attachments rooted in cultural habit,~~ **~~this destruction is not the same as – and~~** ~~indeed~~ **~~may be at odds with~~** ~~– the anger associated with~~ **~~political mobilization.~~**

#### ~~Turn: The only thing we have to fear is fear itself -- lack of a strong sense of collective self-efficacy is the biggest obstacle to mobilizing efforts and marshaling resources necessary to solve pressing global problems. Bandura ‘98~~

~~Bandura, Albert, “Personal and collective efficacy in human adaptation and change”, Advances in Psychological Science: Social, personal, and cultural aspects, 1998.~~

~~The psychological barriers created by beliefs of collective powerlessness are more demoralizing, and debilitating than are external impediments. The less people bring their influence to bear on conditions that affect their lives the more control they relinquish to others. People who have high collective efficacy will mobilize their efforts and resources to surmount the obstacles to the changes they seek. But those convinced of their collective powerlessness will cease trying, even though changes are attainable through perseverant collective effort. As a society, we enjoy the benefits left by those before us who collectively fought inhumanities and worked for social reforms that permit a better life. Our own collective efficacy will, in turn, shape how future generations will live their lives. The times call for social initiative that build people’s sense of collective efficacy to influence conditions that shape their lives and that of future generations.~~