## Case

## AT: Truth Testing

#### Counter-Interp – the ballot represents a normative endorsement or rejection of the plan

#### “Ought” means “should” – it’s not a moral obligation – policy affs implicitly define ought normatively

Merriam-Webster, 19 – (“Ought," http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/ought)

Ought is almost always followed by to and the infinitive form of a verb. The phrase ought to has the same meaning as should and is used in the same ways, but it is less common and somewhat more formal. The negative forms ought not and oughtn't are often used without a following to.

#### This is proven by “resolved” in the resolution, which takes out their “affirm” definition since that word isn’t in the rez

Parcher 1 — Jeff Parcher, Former Director of Debate at Georgetown University, 2001 ("Re: Jeff P--Is the resolution a question?," Post to the e-Debate List, February 26, Available Online at http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/ 0790.html, Accessed 09-10-2005)

> Jeff, I don't think debaters' relation to the resolution is nearly as clear as it you make it out to be in your recent posts. 1. The resolution > is not a question. It is a statement that has "resolved" on one side and a normative statement on the other separated by a colon. What > is the meaning of "resolved?" I know Bill Shanahan has made the argument that "resolved" means "reserved," in which case the > resolution doesn't require you to arrive at any certainty about the truth of the normative statement. (1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### The role of the ballot is to determine who did the best debating. Evaluate the plan relative to opportunity costs – anything else is self-serving and arbitrary. Prior questions are regressive, unpredictable, and make generating offense impossible.

#### We can still win under their ROB--Voting against them is an act of radical mimicry—you would concede that Topicality is bad and vote against them

#### They are making args in attempt to get a ballot so they are doing work

#### If we win Baudrillard bad we win the debate. They have read args for why topicality is good so if I win irony bad I win the debate

#### Vote them down for obscurantism—they are deploying their discourse ironically so I do not know what they are defending which obstructs truth. This is exactly what the alt right is doing now. You should also give me new NR responses because they are purposefully obscuring what their aff arguments are in the AC

#### Irony independent voter---Irony is the quintessential tool of the alt-right. Reject it as a vector for every form of vile ideology. Wilson 17

Jason Wilson, “Hiding in plain sight: how the 'alt-right' is weaponizing irony to spread fascism,” *Guardian*. 5/23/17. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alt-right-online-humor-as-a-weapon-facism> AT

Until recently, it would have been hard to imagine the combination of street violence meeting internet memes. But experts say that the “alt-right” have stormed mainstream consciousness by weaponizing irony, and by using humour and ambiguity as tactics to wrong-foot their opponents.¶ Last week, the Data & Society Institute released a report on the online disinformation and manipulation that is increasingly shaping US politics. The report focused on the way in which far-right actors “spread white supremacist thought, Islamophobia, and misogyny through irony and knowledge of internet culture”.¶ One the report’s authors, Dr Alice Marwick, says that fascist tropes first merged with irony in the murkier corners of the internet before being adopted by the “alt-right” as a tool. For the new far-right movement, “irony has a strategic function. It allows people to disclaim a real commitment to far-right ideas while still espousing them.”

### Debate space turn

#### Arguing about the debate space bad

1. **Insularity DA – Making debate entirely about the debate space replicates the insular logic of academia where the only relevant consideration is contributing to the discipline rather than changing material conditions. Their Aff doesn’t solve any manifestation of racism in debate they have described. Voting for the Aff strikes an anti-racist pose that effects white catharsis while requiring no commitment to actual change.**
2. **No solvency - Changing debate fails.**

**Atchison and Panetta, 09** (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)

This section will address the "debate as activism ~ perspective that argues that the appropriate site for addressing community problems in individual debates. In contrast to the "debate as innovation" perspective, which assumes that the activity is an isolated game with educational benefits, proponents of the "debate as activism" perspective argue that individual debates have the potential to create change in the debate community and society at large. If the first approach assumed that debate was completely insulated, this perspective assumes that there is no substantive insulation between individual debates and the community at large. ¶ From our perspective, using individual debates to create community change is an **insufficient strategy** for three reasons. First, individual debates are, for the most part, **insulated** from the community at large. Second, individual debates **limit the conversation** to the immediate participants and the judge, excluding many important contributors to the debate community. Third, locating the discussion within the confines of a competition diminishes the additional potential for **collaboration**, **consensus**, and **coalition building**. The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create communitywide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems **inherent** in individual debates and the **collective forgetfulness** of the debate community. The structural problems stem from the current **tournament format** that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but **the ballot is rarely seen** by anyone outside the tabulation room.¶ Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is **little documentation** of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often **external pressures** (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges' justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simultaneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems.

#### Debate proves that communication is possible and good- it brings awareness to issues like racism and helps people get into activism which spills over and helps the world. People like Leslie Wexler, a former college debater, authored groundbreaking coverage on the use of land-mines, Neil Katayal, an NDT semi-finalist from Dartmouth, has argued more Supreme Court cases than any other minority group lawyer in American history and successfully defended Affirmative Action, the ACA, the Voting Rights Act, and defended Guantanamo detainees vs Bush, all in front of the Supreme Court. Ryan Goodman, a former debater for UT, engineered the South African constitution and helped to dismantle apartheid, Dayvan Love, part of the first all-black team to win CEDA, and Adam Jackson, a former Towson debater, founded leaders for a beautiful struggle, a community based thinktank in Baltimore that connects residents to public policy and creates transformative political change. Joe Krakoff the most successful Baudrillard debater went into marketing.

### Selfish PTX DA

#### Their theory specifies the debate space as the crux of information overload. They create the conditions for SELFISH POLITICS – by establishing debate as the only space that matters, they are reproducing the insular logic of academia – contributions to the discipline matter more than their connections to things in the real world which means a) they will never effectively solve b) obviously not true – all of their cards are from the non-debate space and c) focus on the individual which means they forgo opportunities for coalitional mobilization strats. It is important to foster empathy and empowerment.

#### The question of this debate should be larger than debate itself. How can we create a politics that is sustaining? How can we create a politics that isn’t just a calling out or a form of resistance – but a cultivation of ideas within larger society.

Viola 13 (Michael, UCLA, "Hip - Hop and Critical Revolutionary Pedagogy: Blue Scholarship to Challenge "The Miseducation of the Filipino"," http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/04-2-08.pdf)

Hip-hop artists often speak “in active participation in practical life” revealing people’s present needs for adequate food, shelter, and security. Furthermore, hip-hop is an important musical outlet that possesses the ability to leave a lasting imprint in the hearts and minds of the struggling. For instance, the Seattle based group Blue Scholars, contributes in the development of a revolutionary critical pedagogy as they disseminate lyrical messages that demystify the exploitative nature of capitalism while at the same time sharpen the lens for social analysis, untie the tongue for cultural critique, and strengthen the heart for activism among those who listen and relate. Through their music, Blue Scholars assist in the development of a critical consciousness by naming the world and helping to uncover the material reality for many Filipinos and other oppressed communities who are “shack led in the chains of international capital gain.” 3 6 In their song Southside Revival, Blue Scholars identify how the critique of capital and the satisfaction of human needs are at the roots of their musical philosophy: “Hungry is an adjective attached to my philosophy, You got to be, progress revolves around economy. I can see the consequences of capital first hand, Monorail construction push[es] the tenants off the land.” The Word Employed to Unveil and Transform The musical duo of Blue Scholars, consisting of Filipino - American, Geologic (vocals) and Sabzi (DJ) are examples of hip - hop artists who serve as intellectuals and “permanent persuaders” whose purpose is to serve the social groups with whom they share fundamental interests. They use their music as an organizing tool to reclaim history, challenge what is viewed as “natural,” and engage with the masses in charting alternativesto capitalism. Through their various performances in mainstream concerts, community organized benefits, and anti-imperialist conferences, Blue Scholars work to build relational knowledge of and with the masses to help them develop a critical and collective reflectiveness. As Paulo Freire emphasized, critical inquiry and unveiling is not enough for social transformation. Freire asserts, If it was possible to change reality simply by our witness for example, we would have to think that reality is changed inside of our consciousness. Then it would be very easy to be a liberatory educator! All we would have to do is an intellectual exercise and society would change! No, this is not the question. To change the concrete conditions of reality mean a tremendous political practice, which demands mobilization, organization of the people...all these things, which are not organized just inside the school . 3 7 Freire’s words remind us that the transformation of the society does not take place only within the individual basis of self - reflection but through the collective actions of people. Through their connection with the pro-democratic organizations, Blue Scholars directly engage with youth, workers, and students in translating theory into concrete strategies for improving their communities. Demonstrating this commitment, Blue Scholars performed a benefit concert to financially support a national Filipino youth conference organized by the group Sandiwa. 35 The conference, in recognition of this year’s centennial of Filipino migration to the United States, brought Filipino youth from around the country to critically examine the role Filipino s have played as cheap labor in the sugar plantations of Hawaii, the agricultural fields of California's Central Valley, and the canneries of the Pacific Northwest. Sandiwa proclaims their hope “that this conference connects our history with the ongoing struggle millions of Filipinos face today in search of new homelands away from the existing conditions in the Philippines.” In a workshop organized by the youth collective, Anakbayan (whom Geo is an active member), to honor Filipino labor organizer, writer , and activist, Carlos Bulosan, Anakbayan proclaims: we hope to improve our conditions by studying and educating others about the rich culture and proud revolutionary heritage of the Filipino peoples continuing struggle. We also work towards building anti - imperialist unity among all people to expose and oppose U.S. imperialist intervention in the Philippines . Because their music is intimately connected with Seattle’s working class community of color who are politically active in reflecting and acting up on the problems that engulf their lives, Blue Scholars is not simply employing resistance (which is largely passive and individual in focus) but more significantly serving as committed agents to make possible another world.

### Purity Politics DA

#### They create the conditions for fascism by saying that the world is comprehensively explained by Baudrillard’s theory. Their argument is that anyone who even tries to participate in activism is bad because they are a “charity cannibal” which shuts down coalitions which prevents their movement from ever spilling over or becoming larger than just them. If their movement doesn’t spread beyond themselves then it’s meaningless. Impact is backlash to the aff by isolating people from the movement – when people feel disenfranchised, they fight back and get defensive rather than broadening perspectives or learning more which turns any educational value of the aff.

### 1nc – trump turn

#### They’re a page out of Trump’s playbook – criticizing objective truth is a weapon of the alt-right

Williams 17—Ph.D. student in literature at Duke University (Casey, “Has Trump Stolen Philosophy’s Critical Tools?,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/opinion/has-trump-stolen-philosophys-critical-tools.html?_r=0>, dml)

Trump’s playbook should be familiar to any student of critical theory and philosophy. It often feels like Trump has stolen our ideas and weaponized them. For decades, critical social scientists and humanists have chipped away at the idea of truth. We’ve deconstructed facts, insisted that knowledge is situated and denied the existence of objectivity. The bedrock claim of critical philosophy, going back to Kant, is simple: We can never have certain knowledge about the world in its entirety. Claiming to know the truth is therefore a kind of assertion of power. These ideas animate the work of influential thinkers like Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida, and they’ve become axiomatic for many scholars in literary studies, cultural anthropology and sociology. From these premises, philosophers and theorists have derived a number of related insights. One is that facts are socially constructed. People who produce facts — scientists, reporters, witnesses — do so from a particular social position (maybe they’re white, male and live in America) that influences how they perceive, interpret and judge the world. They rely on non-neutral methods (microscopes, cameras, eyeballs) and use non-neutral symbols (words, numbers, images) to communicate facts to people who receive, interpret and deploy them from their own social positions. Call it what you want: relativism, constructivism, deconstruction, postmodernism, critique. The idea is the same: Truth is not found, but made, and making truth means exercising power. The reductive version is simpler and easier to abuse: Fact is fiction, and anything goes. It’s this version of critical social theory that the populist right has seized on and that Trump has made into a powerful weapon. One might object that Trump’s disregard for the truth is nothing new. American presidents have always twisted facts to fit their agenda and have always dismissed truths that threatened to sink them. Even George Washington’s great claim to honesty — that he ’fessed up to felling a cherry tree — was a deception. One could also argue that Trump is more Machiavellian than Foucauldian and that he doesn’t actually believe what he says: He propagates misinformation strategically, to excite his base and smear his opponents. There’s no question that past presidents have lied. And Trump is nothing if not a cynical manipulator. But Trump’s relationship to the truth seems novel, if only because he doesn’t try to hide his relativism. Mexican immigration, Islamic terrorism, free trade: For Trump, truth is always more about how people feel than what may be empirically verifiable. Trump admits as much in “The Art of the Deal,” where he describes his sales strategy as “truthful hyperbole.” For Trump, facts are fragile, and truth is flexible. Trump and Stephen K. Bannon probably don’t spend evenings poring over Jean Baudrillard’s “Simulacra and Simulation” or Michel Foucault’s “The Archaeology of Knowledge” (although Bannon’s adviser, Julia Hahn, did write her undergraduate thesis on the psychoanalytic theorist Leo Bersani). But the parallels between Trump’s attacks on accepted knowledge and critical philosophy’s insistence that we interrogate truth claims suggest that not all assaults on the authority of facts are revolutionary. Indeed, the social theorist Bruno Latour saw Trump coming back in 2004. In his essay “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Latour observed that conservatives had begun using methods similar to those of critical theory to muddy debates around issues, like climate change, that required immediate and decisive action. Conservatives were casting doubt on the reality of planetary warming by pointing to “the lack of scientific certainty” around the issue. Latour had made a career questioning “scientific certainty” and worried that his critical “weapons” had been “smuggled” to the other side: Entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives.

#### Critique of publicizing the truth reinforces authoritarianism

Hardt and Negri 00

(Michael, Prof. of Romance Languages @ Duke U., and Antonio, Marxist theorist, Empire)

The postmodernist epistemological challenge to ‘‘the Enlightenment’’—its attack on master narratives and its critique of truth— also loses its liberatory aura when transposed outside the elite intellectual strata of Europe and North America. Consider, for example, the mandate of the Truth Commission formed at the end of the civil war in El Salvador, or the similar institutions that have been established in the post-dictatorial and post-authoritarian regimes of Latin America and South Africa. In the context of state terror and mystification, clinging to the primacy of the concept of truth can be a powerful and necessary form of resistance. Establishing and making public the truth of the recent past—attributing responsibility to state officials for specific acts and in some cases exacting retribution—appears here as the ineluctable precondition for any democratic future. The master narratives of the Enlightenment do not seem particularly repressive here, and the concept of truth is not fluid or unstable—on the contrary! The truth is that this general ordered the torture and assassination of that union leader, and this colonel led the massacre of that village. Making public such truths is an exemplary Enlightenment project of modernist politics, and the critique of it in these contexts could serve only to aid the mystificatory and repressive powers of the regime under attack. In our present imperial world, the liberatory potential of the postmodernist and postcolonial discourses that we have described only resonates with the situation of an elite population that enjoys certain rights, a certain level of wealth, and a certain position in the global hierarchy. One should not take this recognition, however, as a complete refutation. It is not really a matter of either/or. Difference, hybridity, and mobility are not liberatory in themselves, but neither are truth, purity, and stasis. The real revolutionary practice refers to the level of production. Truth will not make us free, but taking control of the production of truth will. Mobility and hybridity are not liberatory, but taking control of the production of mobility and stasis, purities and mixtures is. The real truth com- missions of Empire will be constituent assemblies of the multitude, social factories for the production of truth. (155-6)

### presumption

vote negative on presumption –

1. the aff hasn’t demonstrated they result in a change from the status quo, nor that their scholarship warrants the ballot – Baudrillard affs have existed since before they were born and they’ve picked up tons of ballots, yet debate still thrives.
2. they also don’t solve their own offense – voting aff doesn’t stop the media from controlling the symbolic means of production.

### double turn

The aff is a double turn – if they’re right that anything with linguistic intelligibility gets copied and redeployed to reinforce oppression, so does the 1ac – just because they ironically know they’re being commodified doesn’t stop that process

### commodification turn

#### The affirmative thinks they are a cool act of discursive resistance, in reality they are consumers of capitalisms newest product – dissent

Frank 97– prof of American History at Univ of Chicago [Thomas The Business of Culture in the new Gilded Age Commodify Your Dissent: Salvos from The Baffler ed. By Frank and Weiland; “Why Johnny Can’t Dissent”; Pages 31-32)

CAPITALISM IS CHANGING, obviously and drastically. From the moneyed pages of the Wall Street journal to TV commercials for airlines and photocopiers we hear every day about the new order’s globe spanning, cyber-accumulating ways. But our notion about what’s wrong with American life and how the figures responsible are to be confronted haven't changed much in thirty years. Call it, for convenience, the “countercultural idea.” It holds that the paramount ailment of our society is conformity, a malady that has variously been described as over-organization, bureaucracy, homogeneity, hierarchy, logocentrism, technocracy, the Combine, the Apollonian. We all know what it is and what it does. It transforms humanity into “organization man,” into “the man in the gray flannel suit.” It is “Moloch whose mind is pure machinery, ”the “incomprehensible prison” that consumes “brains and imagination.” It is artifice, starched shirts, tailfins, carefully mowed lawns, and always, always, the consciousness of impending nuclear destruction. It is a stiff, militaristic order that seeks to suppress instinct, to forbid sex and pleasure, to deny basic human impulses and individuality, to enforce through a rigid uniformity a meaningless plastic consumerism. As this half of the countercultural idea originated during the 1990s, it is appropriate that the evils of conformity are most conveniently summarized with images of 1950s suburban correctness. You know, that land of sedate music, sexual repression, deference to authority, Red Scares, and smiling white people standing politely in line to go to church. Constantly appearing as a symbol of arch backwardness in advertising and movies, it is an image we find easy to evoke. The ways in which this system are to be resisted are equally Well understood and agreed-upon. The Establishment demands homogeneity; we revolt by embracing diverse, individual lifestyles. It demands self-denial and rigid adherence to convention; we revolt through immediate gratification, instinct uninhibited, and liberation of the libido and the appetites. Few have put it more bluntly than jerry Rubin did in 1970: “America says: Don’t! The hippies say: Do lt!" The countercultural idea is hostile to any law and every establishment. “Whenever we see a rule, we must break it,” Rubin continued. “Only by breaking rules do we discover who we are. ”Above all rebellion consists of a sort of Nietzschean antinomianism, an automatic questioning of rules, a rejection of whatever social prescriptions we 've happened to inherit. Just Do It is the whole of the law. But one hardly has to go to a poetry reading to see the countercultural idea acted out. Its frenzied ecstasies have long since become an official aesthetic of consumer society, a monotheme of mass as well as adversarial culture. Turn on the TV and there it is instantly: the unending drama of consumer unbound and in search of an ever-heightened good time, the inescapable rock 'n' roll soundtrack, dreadlocks and ponytails bounding into Taco Bells, a drunken, swinging-camera epiphany of tennis shoes, outlaw soda pops, and mind-bending dandruff shampoos. Corporate America, it turns out, no longer speaks in the voice of oppressive order that it did when Ginsberg moaned in 1956 that Time magazine was “always telling me about responsibility. Businessmen are serious. Movie producers are serious. Everybody 's serious but me.” Nobody wants you to think they’re serious today, least of all Time Warner. On the contrary: the Culture Trust is now our leader in the Ginsbergian search for kicks upon kicks. Corporate America is not an oppressor but a sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accouterments, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for that ever-more apocalyptic orgasm. The countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new; its taste for self-fulfillment and its intolerance f1or the confines of tradition now permitting vast latitude in consuming practices and lifestyle experimentation. Consumerism is no longer about “conformity” but about “difference.” Advertising teaches us not in the ways of puritanical self-denial (a bizarre notion on the face of it), but in orgiastic, never-ending self'-fulfillment. It counsels not rigid adherence to the tastes of the herd but vigilant and constantly updated individualism. We consume not to fit in, but to prove, on the surface at least, that we are rock 'n' roll rebels, each one of us as rule-breaking and hierarchy-defying as our heroes of the 60s, who now pitch cars, shoes, and beer. This imperative of endless difference is today the genius at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeing from “sameness” that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colors and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-Eleven. As existential rebellion has become a more or less official style of Information Age capitalism, so has the countercultural notion of a static, repressive Establishment grown hopelessly obsolete. However the basic impulses of the countercultural idea may have disturbed a nation lost in Cold War darkness, they are today in fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of Information Age business theory. So close are they, in fact, that it has become difficult to understand the countercultural idea as anything more than the self justifying ideology of the new bourgeoisie that has arisen since the 1960s, the cultural means by which this group has proven itself ever so much better skilled than its slow-moving, security-minded forebears at adapting to the accelerated, always-changing consumerism of today. The anointed cultural opponents of capitalism are now capitalism’s ideologues. The two come together in perfect synchronization in a figure like Camille Paglia, whose ravings are grounded in the absolutely noncontroversial ideas of the golden sixties. According to Paglia, American business is still exactly what it was believed to have been in that beloved decade, that is, “puritanical and desensualized.” Its great opponents are, of course, liberated figures like “the beatniks,” Bob Dylan, and the Beatles. Culture is, quite simply, a binary battle between the repressive Apollonian order of capitalism and the Dionysian impulses of the counterculture. Rebellion makes no sense without repression; we must remain forever convinced of capitalism's fundamental hostility to pleasure in order to consume capitalism’s rebel products as avidly as we do. It comes as little surprise when, after criticizing the “Apollonian capitalist machine” (in her book, Kamp.: 6' Tramps), Paglia applauds American mass culture (in Utne Reader), the preeminent product of that “capitalist machine,” as a “third great eruption” of a Dionysian “paganism.” For her, as for most other designated dissidents, there is no contradiction between replaying the standard critique of capitalist conformity and repressiveness and then endorsing its rebel products—for Paglia the car culture and Madonna—as the obvious solution: the Culture Trust offers both Establishment and Resistance in one convenient package. The only question that remains is why Paglia has not yet landed an endorsement contract from a soda pop or automobile manufacturer.

### debate inevitable

#### Debate is effective at discerning contingent truths – their framework is the style of argumentation that enables post-truth by mooting the burden of rejoinder – voting against them has unique value as a form of deontic scorekeeping that bolsters collective faith in debate’s process

Quirk 17 (The New School, Information Technology Manager (Michael, “The Resuscitation of Truth,” <http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/05/the-resuscitation-of-truth/#.WWK-7xMrK8U>, dml)

Being indignant about a “post-truth” world is entirely justifiable. But I am not sure that grumbling about a widely distributed oblivion toward the true, the factual, and the objective accomplishes anything other than frustration and anxiety. Railing about facts rarely convinces anyone predisposed toward ignoring them, and this is not exactly news. As Upton Sinclair put it: “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” What goes for salaries goes double for worldviews and triple for satisfying pipedreams. While there may seem to be something quixotic about persuading the stubborn, it is timid to avoid that task, however fruitless it might turn out to be. Maybe, as the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre once quipped, the only thing that works with persistent skeptics or relativists is to tell them “go away.” But that reply is understandable only as a last resort, because I think a solid, pragmatic case can be made that objectivity, fact, and truth are live, forced, and momentous options that can be given a successful defense. Because the defense is pragmatic, rather than theoretical, it is an argument that works because it can be defended on the same grounds as the nihilist’s, even if they are armed with “alternative facts” tailored to their worldview. Thus if this defense fails to persuade them, it is no fault of yours. Rather, skeptics, relativists, and nihilists don’t and can’t really believe what they say they believe, because what they do puts the lie to it. They fail to practice what they preach, and they cannot but fail given the constraints of human discursive conduct. Pragmatists are often caricatured as being indifferent toward objectivity and relativistic about truth, but unlike their postmodernist cousins they are supposedly “cheerful nihilists.” Most pragmatists are widely thought to affirm Richard Rorty’s offhand (and incautious) remarks like “truth is what our peers will let us get away with saying”, or that we would do well to “reduce objectivity to solidarity.” Rorty seemed at times to place everything in the hands of the local, cultural beliefs of a given epistemic community, which is the first and final court of appeal for what counts as “fact.” If this is what Rorty believes (I think there is ample textual evidence that it is not) then all facts are “alternative facts,” indexed to the actual assertions of a given community. It is therefore inevitable that Trump’s base and his fiercest critics will simply talk past each other. Persuasion implies enough common ground to agree on certain key premises of argument, and since this is precisely what is lacking, quibbling about truth and objectivity is pointless. Does this torpedo any conception of truth and objectivity that is not, in Swain’s words, “rhetorical or rooted in perspective”? Robert Brandom, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and was a student of Rorty’s at Princeton. He shares Rorty’s antifoundationalism and also self-identifies as a pragmatist. Nevertheless, he believes that Rorty’s views do not support the sort of “post-truth” philosophy he is often accused of having, and which he unwittingly supports when he tries to shock rather than patiently construct persuasive arguments. Brandom’s philosophical project, in his magnum opus Making It Explicit and other works, can be seen as an attempt to knock off the rough edges of Rorty’s pragmatism and to refashion it as a systematic philosophy of language that makes sense of truth and objectivity, and not just an “edifying” philosophy that provides groundless epistemic hope without “metaphysical comfort.” Any post-truth regime would be over before it starts. Making It Explicit contains over 700 pages of dense, complex prose written in an intensely technical analytic style. (If you can imagine the late modal logician David Lewis rewriting Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, you might have some idea of how Making It Explicit reads.) But there are two strands that can be teased out of Brandom’s reflections on language that are directly relevant to contemporary Trumpian politics and its oblivion of truth and objectivity. First, Brandom follows C.S. Peirce and Donald Davidson in drawing a sharp distinction between truth and justification. This distinction is rooted in our practices of making claims, defending them with reasons, and withdrawing those claims when evidence or argument shows them to be baseless. To use the most common example: I would be justified, if I were an 11th century cloistered monk, in believing that the earth was at the center of the universe. I could cite many reasons for this belief that could support this belief and command assent: the best available astronomical science of the day, scriptural testimony, and the ordinary experience of watching the sun, stars, and planets rise in the east and set in the west. The belief is held to be true, and the monk is justified in believing it true, but as a matter of fact, it is false. The relationship between justification and truth is a complicated and important one, but neither concept can be reduced to the other. I could be justified in believing X which turns out not to be true, and for that matter I can believe Y, which is true, without being justified in believing it — my facts could be wrong, my reasoning could be off. What Brandom is drawing our attention to is the sound linguistic practice involved in the giving and assessing of reasons. What we call “rational discourse” will involve weighing and evaluating our own reasons and that of others, responding to challenges and revising or even dropping our own convictions. There is no foggy metaphysical speculation or transcendental deduction behind Brandom’s truth/justification distinction. It is simply an unavoidable part of human sapience as expressed in our discursive practices. Second, sapient human discourse invariably involves norms, elements of discursive practice that distinguish valid from invalid “moves”, and that enable participants in the practice to both track and evaluate those moves as better or worse. “Moves” in discursive practices are usually inferences: I draw conclusions from premises to which I am committed, and therefore are committed to the conclusions as well; I track the claims and inferences of other participants in the dialogue, and gauge whether (or to what extent) they too are entitled to their own commitments. So rational discourse centers around the inferences we draw, inferences that emerge from the sapient social practice of making claims and engaging in what Brandom calls “deontic scorekeeping”, employing shared practical norms to assess entitlements and commitments of fellow participants, and ourselves. Meaningful human discourse, then, is a) constrained by shared norms that b) guide inferences articulating one’s commitments that c) one may or may not be entitled to hold. Our judgment of how well we, and our conversation partners, avoid error or get things right is what Brandom calls a “normative status” — a judgment that someone is entitled to believe or assert something. Those beliefs to which one is committed one takes to be true (what sense does it make to say “I believe X but it’s false”?), but I am entitled to those beliefs only to the extent that I can justify them. In discursive practices, we hold ourselves and others responsible for the commitments we hold by determining whether we are entitled to them, whether the inferential moves made in the linguistic social practice pass muster with the norms that make the social practice what it is. There is, of course, something going on in discourse besides inference: there are also what Brandom dubs “discursive entry” and “discursive departure” moves. We are causally affected by non-linguistic beings, which cause not just sensations but perceptions, which give non-inferential access to the world but are possible only for sapient beings that are capable of drawing inferences from them and engaging in deontic scorekeeping. “Discursive entry/departure” moves anchor us to a world external to language, but it is the normative activity of holding ourselves responsible to the inferences drawn from these moves that constitutes “objectivity.” Brandom was deeply influenced by many other philosophers in developing this “social practice” conception of objectivity: Wittgenstein’s “meaning-as-use” trope, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as “Being-in-the-world,” Sellars’s rejection of “the Myth of the Given” and his epistemology of “the logical space of reasons.” Brandom leverages this account of the primacy of social practice into a comprehensive theory of meaning, where pragmatic ideas like “inference”, “commitment” and “entitlement” are primary, and semantic notions like “truth” and “reference” are derived from them, rather than the other way around, where meaning depends on a general theory of representation. For Brandom, we do not start out with a distinction between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” and then proceed to show how the objective world is correctly (and incorrectly) represented in subjective knowers, a path that has generated all manner of aporiae since Descartes and Locke. Rather, we establish the ebb and flow of human, sapient social practices, of assertion and reason-giving, and articulate “objectivity”, “fact”, and “truth” from there. This is obviously just a thumbnail sketch of a few main ideas in Making It Explicit. It is a book of many virtues: clarity and ease of expression is not one of them, however. Brandom is a philosopher’s philosopher: his work is crammed with philosophical “shop talk”, and it is difficult to show how this might be relevant to what another pragmatist, John Dewey, called “the problems of men” [sic] that philosophy must address if it is to remain a worthwhile endeavor. But I do not think the connection between Brandom’s musings and constructing an escape-route past “post-truth politics” is farfetched, and I do think there are several political lessons to be teased out of Brandom’s “inferentialism.” One of Brandom’s obsessive points about inference is the inescapable normativity of human discourse, and that such norms, like “holding oneself and others responsible for commitments made” are built-into discourse and shared in common. Put in the vernacular: if you want to talk politics and make sense, you have to recognize and honor these shared norms. You can’t just do or say whatever you want. You can’t just make shit up. The first political lesson to learn is: don’t let them gaslight you. By “them” I mean Trump and his base, their right-wing media enablers, and those critics like Barton Swain who give the former far too much credit for ushering in a supposedly postmodern “post-truth” regime. This is no time to get all wobbly about “truth”, “fact”, and “objectivity.” They are still meaningful, because discourse does not get off the ground without them. The post-truth regime is a mirage. The emperor has no clothes, so do not give him more power by fearing that the concept of truth has lost its resonance. The second lesson is to view objectivity not as something given, as something obvious, but as something one must achieve in social practices that involve the giving and taking of reasons. One of the many shortcomings of Hillary Clinton’s hapless campaign was her assumption that facts speak for themselves and that truth follows on their heels. This would be fine if this were a campaign like any other, where everybody is on the same page when it comes to holding both others in the dialogue and oneself responsible for commitments by appealing to shared norms. There has to be an attunement to the context of discussion. No attunement, no background norms, and no compelling appeals to facts. Dropping facts as if they were truth-bombs will not work if your adversaries are unwilling to recognize their force. Decontextualized facts convince no one, certainly not anyone spoon-fed by Fox and Breitbart and the right-wing echo chamber. Little truths are no match for “the big lie”. Third, what needs to be cultivated is not appeal to “the obvious”, but the disposition to take normative scorekeeping seriously — to hold every foot to the fire of showing one is entitled to the beliefs one claims to be true — and to make this manifest to others who might have lost their way. I think this is the most important lesson to be learned from Brandom’s magnum opus: that ultimately discourse is guided by a kind of ethical constraint, the need for both inferential consistency and inferential relevance, and a sort of guilt or shame when one deliberately fails to honor that constraint. So when Trump claims that he would have won the vote had there not been “millions of cases of voter fraud” in California, he needs to be able to back that commitment up in order to be entitled to it, and not just any reason will suffice given the nature of the norms guiding that kind of public discourse. Appealing to “alternative facts” as if they were givens, or insinuating “Lots of people said they witnessed voter fraud,” without saying who or citing sources, don’t cut the mustard, not so much because they “fly in the face of the facts” as that they betray a mammoth irresponsibility toward the norm-governed practice of justifying whatever one claims to be true in a manner consistent with shared standards of evidence and inference. There is something worthy of guilt and shame to fail to follow these norms. If Trump has no shame, which I think clearly is the case, one cannot assume that everyone in his base lacks it as well. It is thus wrong and counterproductive to accuse avid Trump supporters of stupidity. Partly because “Trump supporters” are a heterogeneous lot, and no one should assume that they all have the same axe to grind or the same sociopolitical agenda, and therefore can be dismissed in the manner of, say, a Bill Maher as a collection of Yahoos. But stupidity is not what is at stake here. A kind of irresponsibility is, though. For to talk of “alternative facts,” as Kellyanne Conway did, or to unthinkingly accept them as gospel, without acknowledging the social requirement of putting up good public reasons or shutting up, is to admit that either one does not mean what one says, or does not care one way or the other. It is not to play the game of political discourse by different rules. It is to refuse to play it at all. Some Trumpians fall into that category, I think. And that is a kind of ethical failure.

### passavant turn

#### Their affirmation of linguistic indeterminacy and sovereignty challenges to the state feed the conservative playbook – their supposed transgressiveness gives neo-cons justification for unrestrained executive warmaking

Passavant 10 - Associate Professor of Political Science Habart and William Smith College (Paul, “Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever,” Constellations, 17 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8675.2010.00614.x)

For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not cultivate, pluralism, whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has also become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.” Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben exemplifies these tendencies within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.∂ In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.∂ Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.∂ Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? The most conservative United States Supreme Court justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations, as this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy.∂ In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, contrary to Agamben's expectations, actually facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.∂ Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of John Yoo, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?∂ In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.∂ Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.∂ In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, Congress amended FISA in the summer of 2008 to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration Department of Justice lawyer Bruce Fein has decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates.”5 Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests.∂ Both Agamben's and Fein's observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would call disciplinary power – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 They also indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8∂ In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.

### 10. Charity Cannibalism

#### Charity cannibalism isn’t true – we don’t have to be attached to our impact to say that something is bad – they can’t have an impact without believing that meaning causes symbolic violence. This is no different than any of the aff arguments. Every time they say that charity cannibalism is an impact they are contradicting themselves because they believe that their meaning can be understood – (the arguments from death drive apply here as well)

#### Images of suffering are good because they create motivation for action – everyday suffering is inevitable but it’s never talked about in politics right now so images help the public understand situations of abuse and exploitation and try to make changes to solve them – we all hate watching the UNICEF starving children commercials, but we still donate money to them to try to help out. Obviously, people care about more than just themselves which is why they care about the government and social movements etc. don’t buy their shenanigans, the reason we’re here is not charity cannibalism but to learn from others and gain advocacy skills to apply to the real world