### NR – A2 Clash/Topic Edu

#### Core of the topic – the core of the topic is about what should fall under the concept of human rights, as shown by the debate in the literature and UN debate over the Declaration of Human Rights

#### We impact turn their education impact – Limits turns this standard and prove there aren’t enough functional limits– their argument that each country’s landscape is different proves that the negative would have to research each of the countries individually, which we will obviously never be able to do and causes a shift to generic K’s, theory arguments, tricks, and cheaty consult counterplans – the generics we allow for (econ) is the core of the topic and should be debated – we’re never going to use our knowledge of firefighters’ working conditions ever again, but the basis of all arguments against strikes is the economy grinding to a halt due to them, which illustrates that our knowledge on generic arguments will be useful outside of this round.

### NR – Alt

#### The alternative is Postwork which is an ideological stance that critiques the centrality of work to society and rejects job protection policies

#### Postwork manifests materially to create emancipatory transformation of industrial society through an endpoint of democratic control of the economy. This lends itself to the work of ongoing movements such as

#### The informal sector of non-industrial work in the Global South

#### Workplace absenteeism and sabotage

#### Grassroots movements fighting for shorter work hours and UBI

#### Hoffman says the goal is not the abolishing work, but ending its “relentless centrality” and fighting for a more sustainable society

#### If we lose framework, you should treat the alt as a CP that solves the aff

<insert relevant alt solves case below>

<Poverty> - The alt solves poverty – Hoffman says industrial work society creates the conditions for poverty, job vulnerability, and wage labor dependence, which also means the K turns case

<Green Jobs/Warming> - The alt solves warming – nothing is better for the environment than unproductivity. Only the alt can solve by slowing waste production to a level biological processes can facilitate

<Econ Stability> - The alt solves economic stability better – reducing reliance on wage labor reduces our reliance on jobs that get lost during economic downturns

<Death of Despair/Dignity> - The alt solves the value of work – 1) we internal link turn the standing level of VTL people can access when their well-being is dependent on work, 2) we transform society to one where people always have the option to labor, but don’t feel the need to or the existential anxiety and failure that is currently associated with unproductivity

#### If we lose the perm, you can still vote neg because Hoffman says these movements are ongoing and successful now, collapse of work-society is inevitable, and without these movements extinction is inevitable

### NC/NR – Sustainability

#### Resources are finite, extraction doesn’t assume declining energy yielded per energy invested. Ensures collapse by 2050, but the alt ensures a smooth transition before warming kills us

Kallis 18 Giorgos, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece, et al., 5/31/18, “Annual Review of Environment and Resources: Research On Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, p. 296-298

3. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE LIMITS OF GREEN GROWTH¶ Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes, growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however, argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely, even though relative decoupling is common (34). Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources.¶ Growth can become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting, for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce, environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals. But new substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time. Energy is a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar and wind power are constrained only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects.¶ Historical data corroborate ecological economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth. At the global level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence. Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to 0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42). ¶ Global resource use follows currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where water withdrawals were stabilized (40). ¶ Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although recession also played a role (34).] These declines are nowhere near the 8–10%, year-after-year reductions in carbon emissions required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2◦C (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34). ¶ Resource use or carbon emissions are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With 1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0% growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases (49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it is practically impossible to envisage viable climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without growth (50, 51). ¶ Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth, but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently “magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run, but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44).¶ Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability. ¶ Advancing a position of “a-growth,” van den Bergh (54) proposes ignoring GDP and implementing a global carbon price, indifferent to what its effect on growth turns out to be. Ignoring GDP is a normative position—but at the end, the economy will either grow or not, and if it does not, then there should be plans for managing without growth. Given how entrenched GDP growth is in existing institutional and political structures, a-growth approaches must be advanced as part of broader systemic change (55).¶ Is it possible to secure a decent standard of living for all while throughput and output degrow? Substantive evidence indicates that prosperity does not depend on high levels of production and consumption. Kubiszewski et al. (56) find that the Genuine Progress Indicator, an indicator that includes environmental and social costs alongside output, peaked in 1978, despite subsequent global growth. A similar indicator, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, has stayed at the same levels in the United States since 1950, despite a threefold growth of GDP (57). ¶ Wealthier countries on average have higher levels of life expectancy and education than poorer ones, but above a certain level of GDP, income does not make a difference in wellbeing—equality does. Satisfactory levels of wellbeing are achieved by countries such as Vietnam or Costa Rica at a fraction (one-third or less) of the output, energy, or resource use of countries such as the United States. Even the lower levels of resource use of mid-income countries, however, would not be sustainable if they were to be generalized to the planet as a whole. No country currently satisfies social wellbeing standards while staying within its share of planetary boundaries, suggesting that radical changes in provisioning systems are necessary (58). ¶ Wealthier people within a country are on average happier than others, but in the long run, overall happiness does not increase as a country’s income rises (59). Nuances of this income-happiness paradox depend on the sample of countries included and how one defines and asks about happiness. Within societies, individuals with higher incomes evaluate their lives as better than others, but do not enjoy better emotional wellbeing (60). Income determines social rank, and rank affects individuals’ assessments of their lives. Growth does not change relative rank or relative access to positional goods (those signifying position) but it does inflate expectations and prices of material goods, increasing frustration (61). Relative comparisons matter for personal wellbeing in low-income and high-income countries; for both, the more equally income is distributed, the happier people are (62). Pro-environmental behaviors and sharing are also strongly associated with personal wellbeing (63). This suggests that an economic contraction may not impact wellbeing negatively if accompanied by redistribution, sharing, and value shifts (34).

### Sustainability---Complexity

#### Complexity ensures innovation produces declining marginal benefits.

Mauro **Bonaiuti 17**. Department of Economics and Statistics. 02/2017. “Are We Entering the Age of Involuntary Degrowth? Promethean Technologies and Declining Returns of Innovation.” Journal of Cleaner Production. CrossRef, doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.02.196.

3. The “involuntary degrowth” of complex societies: the principle of diminishing returns In order to complete the presentation of the theoretical foundations on which this analysis is based, it must be pointed out that a phase of decline or collapse in any particular society is not solely the outcome of the entropy law and/or the exhaustion of the material resources on which it feeds: it may originate in processes of a predominantly social nature. This idea could already be found in classical works, such as those of Osvald Spengler (1926) and Arnold Toynbee (1947), although they were still replete with subjective, vague opinions. They frequently had recourse to terms such as the loss of ‘worth’, ‘strength’ or ‘vigour’ in order to evaluate civilisations’ “decline”. Despite the extraordinary effort applied to gathering historical evidence, even Toynbee’s monumental comparative history of civilisations leaves itself open to similar criticism since it is unable to explain civilisations’ decline in consistent, comparable, empirical terms. In his seminal work, The Collapse of Complex Societies (1988), Joseph Tainter, an anthropologist and expert on complexity, reacts to these traditional approaches which he defines as “metaphysical”, by basing his analysis of the rise and fall of a civilisation on sounder grounds. First of all, he concentrates on a clear relationship that exists, the one between the level of complexity of a social organisation and the returns that it is able to provide. In general, greater complexity means greater differentiation and specialisation of social roles, population growth, greater scale and hierarchy, increased technical abilities and an increasing flow of information. The anthropological hypothesis behind this approach is that social organisations behave as problem solving organisations. They react to any new problem by increasing differentiation and specialisation, and they evolve by moving spontaneously towards greater levels of complexity. This anthropological hypothesis may not be fully adequate to describe hunter-gatherer societies (Sahlins, 1972), but it does seem to describe well the behaviour of modern industrial societies and, in certain conditions, even agricultural societies (Tainter, 1988; Gowdy and Krall, 2014). Innovation can be interpreted in this framework as a response of a society to new problems, in particular under competitive conditions at a societal level (Gowdy and Krall, 2014). In differentiating and specialising, socio-technical organisations generally show an increase in complexity and hence also experience increasing costs associated with the management of this greater complexity. At the same time, once a certain threshold of complexity has been reached, any further increase in complexity engenders declining marginal benefits. Think, for example, of the introduction of a new medicine. The discovery of penicillin, a medicine which could be easily reproduced and whose benefits were innumerable, did not cost more than $20,000. Today, the introduction of a new antibiotic, besides involving far higher costs, presents fairly modest improvements in its therapeutic effects by comparison (Tainter, 2006). Needless to say, both processes (an increase in costs and a loss of marginal benefits) move in the same direction, feeding what Tainter (1988) defines as the principle of declining marginal returns (DMR). What has been said thus far should be sufficient to clarify two fundamental points: 1) The principle of declining marginal returns cannot be reduced to economists’ marginal productivity principle (although the latter may be considered a particular case of the former). The DMR principle generally operates on a wider temporal scale than that of the principle of marginal productivity and is multidimensional in nature. Behind expressions such as increasing “costs” or diminishing “benefits” there lies far more than what can be expressed in economic terms. The DMR principle undoubtedly includes not only all kinds of environmental and socio-psychological externalities (e.g. pollution, inequality, dissolution of social ties, etc.) but also a wide variety of negative effects, which cannot be expressed in monetary terms. Generally speaking, the introduction and maintenance of any innovation involves costs of adaptation, whether at a social level (for example, when new norms are introduced into public administrations) or at a technological one (Schumpeter’s “creative destruction”). 2) The principle of DMR describes a specific dynamic of social organisations (under biophysical/energetic constraints). This is its specific contribution: it is indeed capable of telling us something about the evolutionary dynamics of social systems which are facing increasing complexification. It is true that, theoretically, if we had infinite energy social organisations might well become more complex while avoiding, or compensating for, diminishing returns. However, besides the fact that in the present situation (in terms of population and pollution) infinite availability of energy is unlikely to be the solution to all our problems10 (Kerschner, 2010), scenarios of unlimited (or even growing) availability of energy seem today to be highly improbable (Kerschner et al., 2013). In this framework, the DMR principle can thus provide a specific contribution in all those cases when the “fall” is not caused primarily by entropic degradation within an isolated system (as in G-R’s approach) or by a reduction in the resources external to the system, as in Jared Diamond (2005) analysis of collapse. It can rather provide a contribution when negative effects are the consequences of a typical behaviour of social organisations which is one of increasing growth and complexification (where matter/energy inputs are constant or declining). 3) A process of “involuntary degrowth” (as a consequence of DMR processes) is not just a synonym for negative growth. Even though the two processes may be confounded in an initial phase, in actual fact there are some important differences. I would apply the term involuntary degrowth only if the system as a whole had passed the “first threshold of mutation” (T0) (See Fig. 1). It is a multidimensional process that is measured on a different temporal scale from recession (decades, rather than years). Moreover, the most significant difference is that DMR processes generally lead to irreversible transformations. While a phase of recession is normally followed by one of recovery, a prolonged DMR phase usually leads to the system’s collapse or to its reorganisation according to new rules. In this sense, Georgescu-Roegen’s approach, like Tainter’s, differs not only from standard economic models but also from cyclical models (such as Kondratieff11 waves or Arrighi’s model12), which do not foresee emergences or irreversible structural transformations. 4. The “great wave” hypothesis At this point we can attempt to draw some generalisations and formulate some hypotheses. The arrival of a Promethean Technique usually gives rise to a phase of expansion. This phase is the one in which the benefits of investments grow proportionally more than costs (increasing returns) (up to point C1 in Fig. 1). Once this first threshold of change has been passed, marginal benefits fall and costs rise, thus marking the organisation’s entry into a phase of declining marginal returns. Therefore, every cycle of innovation can be described using a S-shaped curve, which is generally followed, once the second threshold has been passed (C2), by a phase of decline in absolute terms. In the case in which - by integrating the succession of various cycles as in Fig. 1 e a “Great Wave13” is obtained, it may be possible to draw some interesting conclusions. The first is that, in this case, the benefits that a certain society obtains from its own investments in complexity do not increase indefinitely. Once a certain threshold has been reached (T0), the social organisation as a whole will enter a phase of declining marginal returns, that is to say, a critical phase, which, if ignored, may lead to the collapse of the whole system. In an earlier work, (using different data), I put forward the hypothesis that Europe, Japan and the United States passed this threshold at different times but most probably before the early 1970s (Bonaiuti, 2014). Needless to say, neoclassical economists do not agree with this conclusion. They assume that technological progress (exogenous growth theory, Solow, 1956) or spill-over effects of a knowledgebased economy (endogenous growth, Romer, 1986) are generally capable of compensating for the declining returns of innovation (Sala-i-Martín, 2014). In his latest book Jeremy Rifkin, despite coming from a different background,14 reaches similar conclusions. His position is interesting here because he completely overturns the great wave hypothesis, speaking explicitly of the advent of a “near to zero marginal cost society”. The Rifkin scenario is presented in Fig. 1. Clearly, in this scenario the system as a whole avoids declining returns since the boosts provided by the last cycle compensate for the slowdown resulting from the exhaustion of the preceding phase. Before discussing what the most plausible scenarios might be, it would be good to consider a few premises common to the different approaches: Since in both kinds of scenario several S-shaped cycles can be observed, it becomes essential to individuate a starting point. This is precisely where Promethean innovations come into play. As we have seen, they can be merited with generating a discontinuity (an “entropic watershed”, Rifkin, 1980) opening the door to a new “phase of expansion” (Fig. 1). Even standard economics recognises that the industrial revolution was a breakthrough. In our case, therefore, the starting point coincides with the widespread use of fossil fuels for powering machinery from around 1750. Techno-scientific innovation and its benefits on the economy are generally considered to be the core drivers of the current socioeconomic system. So, what evidence do we have concerning the returns on innovation15? There are not many studies able to provide meaningful answers to this question, particularly in the very long run. The only research that shares the interpretative framework proposed here is probably the work carried out by Strumsky et al. (2010). They used the patents issued by the United States Patents and Trademarks Office to construct an index of the level of innovation and used the number of researchers involved in each patent as a proxy for the costs involved. The results reveal declining returns on an innovation over the whole period: the average size of research teams grew inexorably (48%), while the returns (measured in patents/inventor) correspondingly decreased (by 22% overall) (Strumsky et al., 2010, p.499). As Max Planck (1949) had already clearly stated, in scientific research the effort required to obtain further progress increases implacably. Strumsky, Lobo and Tainter’s paper of 2010 was an important contribution to research into declining returns on innovation. Its limitation, however, is that the data therein only relate to the period after 1975, which is too brief to reveal the trend in the returns on innovation after the last Promethean revolution. Despite considerable limitations,16 it was decided to adopt Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (% of growth) as an indicator of (marginal) returns on innovation. TFP is generally considered a measure of disembodied technological change, which should be taken broadly. The indicator shows growth in output not attributable to growth in conventionally measured (capital and labour) inputs (Field, 2009). 5. The three cycles of the industrial revolution and the great wave Systematic measurements of TFP have been available, at least for Great Britain and the U.S.A., since the second half of the 1940s. For earlier periods I relied on Field (2009), who picked up and adjusted Kendrick’s work (1961) concerning the USA. As far as the period following the Industrial Revolution is concerned (1750e1860), I used the data published by A’Hearn et al. (2014) concerning Great Britain.17 The trend in the percentage variations in TFP growth obtained by assembling these indices (and calculating average values in order to compensate for short-term oscillations), is shown in Fig. 2: The graph shows the presence of three cycles, which describe the first, second and third Industrial Revolutions (IR1, IR2, IR3)18 respectively. IR1 began in England in about 1750 thanks above all to the much-celebrated development of the coal-powered steam engine (Watt, 1769), and then its application to the railway system, the cotton industry (Hargreaves’ Jenny, 1764) and to transportation on waterways. The construction of the railway network combined with the transcontinental telegraph network (completed in 1861), were probably the most important organisational innovations of the nineteenth century. The effects of these innovations on TFP growth would not be seen clearly until after 1830. This delay is explained by the time required for the adaptation and application of general purpose technology (like the steam engine) for specific uses, as well as by the minor role that the industries involved in the technological revolution initially played compared to the economy as a whole. Data (relative to Britain) show values increasing from 0.34 for 1800e1830, to 0.76 for the period 1830e1860. The American economy felt the effects of the industrial revolution later, after the end of the Civil War (from 1870). Field (2009, p. 181) estimated that there was a strong average annual growth rate for private non-farm TFP of 1.95% from 1869 to 1892, moderating thereafter (from 1892 to 1919) to 1.1%. To summarise, the data pertaining to the variations in TFP (in the UK and U.S.) for the first industrial revolution (IR1) seem to conform to an S-Shape Cycle of the type shown in Fig. 1. The second industrial revolution (IR2) commenced with the invention of the electric engine, electric light and internal combustion engine in about 1870. Interpreting data concerning the TFP of this period is complicated by the inevitable superimposition of the exhaustion of the effects of IR1. Productivity shows a faster growth between 1929 and 1941: it increased from an average 2.2% in 1919e1929 to a peak of 2.78% in 1929e1941 (Field, 2009). About 80% of the growth in TFP during the 1920s was due to increases in manufacturing productivity. Field, 2006 paper reveals how in the 1930s the increases in productivity span various sectors, not only manufacturing but also transportation and public utilities. In any case, the increases in TFP in the period 1929e41 were the highest of the whole of the twentieth century. It may seem strange that the greatest acceleration in productivity occurred at a time of an economic contraction, the 1930s. However, one must bear in mind that times of crisis are frequently periods of a sweeping transformation and productive reorganisation. It is not merely by chance that total employment in Research and Development in US manufacturing rose from 6274 in 1927 to 27,777 in 1940 (Field, 2006, p. 214). In particular, it is precisely in those very years that what is defined as Modern Business Enterprise reached maturity in the US, which availed itself of new, more efficient methods of the organisation of labour besides the widespread electrification of factories, with its extraordinarily beneficial effects on productivity. In addition to the remarkable pervasiveness of this type of innovation throughout the whole productive system, its consequences on consumption and quality of life were equally relevant. According to Robert Gordon (2012), two innovations merit particular attention: first, the ability to pump water through a system of pipes (indoor plumbing) and, second, the advent of domestic electricity and lighting, which radically transformed urban life, with long-lasting effects on expenses in several sectors. Once the peak of IR2 had been reached in the late 30s, the TFP of the American economy declined to about 2% in the years 1948e73. This relatively high value was upheld mainly by increases in the transport sector: the U.S. built its first interstate highway system in the 1930s, and the road network was largely completed from 1956 to 1973, leading to a five-fold increase in the quantity of goods transported by interstate trucking. Although average values remained high, the trend from 1948 to 1973 declined, following the decline in manufacturing. This negative trend then continued in the years 1973e1989 to reach a scanty 0.34% per annum, a datum that clearly shows that the long wave linked to the second industrial revolution was coming to an end. However, before coming to any firm conclusions about the Great Wave hypothesis, it is necessary to consider the debate on the third industrial revolution and its capacity to compensate for the downswing we have seen. 6. The rise and fall of the ICT revolution As we have seen, in his latest book, Rifkin (2014) supports the argument that we are moving toward a near-to-zero marginal costs society. Moving towards near-to-zero marginal costs implies, in actual fact, increasing returns. To Rifkin’s mind, this new phase of expansion is assumed to pivot on a “single operating system” formed from two innovations: the ICT revolution and the new “smart energy grid” based on renewable energies. First of all, it should be clarified that when Rifkin foresees a scenario characterised by a “near-to-zero marginal cost”, he is not denying the decline in productivity linked to the exhaustion of the second industrial revolution. But he believes in the advent of a new, stronger and more pervasive revolution, which will make it possible to re-launch the productivity of the whole system. By the term ‘ICT revolution’, we generally mean the body of innovation related to the diffusion of the Internet in the mid-1990s. However, if we look at it more closely, the elaboration of information by means of computers, with their capacity for replacing human labour, actually started much earlier. Mainframe computers were already being used to undertake routine, repetitive administrative work as early as the 1960s. Many electronic innovations, such as automatic telephone switchboards, punch cards, electronic storage systems, typewriters, etc., which were particularly useful in managing information in various sectors (banking, insurance, accounts and so on), were already widely employed before 1995. Therefore, we also have in this case a long period when IR2’s cycle of declining returns overlaps the emergent cycle of the third industrial revolution. Yet, if we examine the data pertaining to the productivity of labour in the United States in that period, we can find no clear traces of any increase in productivity associated with the fledgling ICT revolution. This incongruence was noticed by Robert Solow who pointed out: “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow, 1987). However, at that time, ICT applications were benefiting only a very small part of the overall American economy. The effects of the ICT revolution became, on the other hand, very marked after 1995. The increasing returns implicit in Moore’s Law19 made processors and their relative software more and more powerful and economicallyinviting to an ever-expanding market. This was accompanied by the extraordinary development of Internet and e-commerce, a process largely completed in the U.S. by 2005. This expansion, and the huge investments that sustained it, raised the TFP of the U.S. economy to 1.52% (average from 2000 to 2005). The ‘New Economy’ boom was welcomed enthusiastically by a whole army of commentators (Toffler, 1991; Negroponte, 1995; Rifkin, 2000) who already saw in this technological change a transformation that was more important than the one that had been brought about by the development of electricity or the internal combustion engine. Ten years later, however, the picture seems to have changed radically: from 2005 to 2014, the rate of growth in TFP returned to pre-boom levels, to a mere 0.5%. Robert Gordon, who had already stated his reservations about the influence of the ICT revolution, concluded that “the productivity impact of IR3 evaporated after only eight years” (Gordon, 2012, 2015). This is indeed a very brief period if we compare it with over eighty years (1891e1972) when innovations made at the start of the second industrial revolution produced their effects, and consistently maintained productivity at over 2% per annum. The detailed trend of TFP of IR3 is presented in Fig. 3. Here, too, data show the classic bell-shaped curve that we observed for IR1 and IR2, but the overall effect of IR3, both in peak values and even more in the total duration, is in no way comparable to that of IR2. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). Private Non-Farm Business Sector. Data on the vertical axes are averages of TFP % change per year, calculated for the following periods: 1973e1989; 1989e2000; 2000e2005; 2005e2014. There are also theoretical reasons for doubting IR3’s ability to experience the effects of expansion of the size and duration comparable to those of IR2. Unlike what happened in the First Industrial Revolution, the development of ICT has not seen an accompanying discovery of a new Promethean technology, i.e. a new qualitative transformation of energy (or a variation in the former one, as in the case of IR2). Moreover, the use of ICT is subject to (strict) limitations of time. There can be no doubt that the extraordinary variety of applications that is already available, and potentially will continue to be created, is in contrast to the fixed amount of time human beings can allocate to interacting with them. From the economic point of view this time limitation means that, in actual fact, every individual merely substitutes one application for another. Moreover, as far as ICT’s ability to generate increases in demand is concerned, it is clear that many activities offered on the web, such as the chance to download information, books, music, videos, etc., are frequently substitutes for economic activities that were previously carried out in traditional ways. The same logic applies to e-commerce and to “business-tobusiness” activities. In the end, it all tends to be a zero-sum game (Gordon, 2000a). There are also good reasons for thinking that the increases in productivity shown by IR2 were linked to the improvement in the average level of education which rose over a few decades from primary school level to secondary level, with the education system providing learning suited to the further development of the manufacturing system. It is difficult to imagine improvements as significant today, in a context of rising debt and declining marginal returns in the educational system (Tainter, 2006; Cowen, 2011; Gordon, 2015). The speed and capacity with which computers and smart phones have penetrated the market are undoubtedly extraordinary, but the author agrees with Robert Gordon, who states that they cannot withstand comparison with the arrival of electric light in homes, the automation of factories, the freedom to travel offered by the car or aeroplane, the use of plastic and, in general, of new chemically-produced materials, and last but not least, the huge improvement in quality of life achieved by urban sanitation and indoor plumbing (Gordon, 2000a, p.72). In the last few years the economic slowdown has been noted even by standard economists who have started to speak openly of “secular stagnation” 20. The basic idea is that, after the financial crisis, despite years of zero interest rate there are no signs of a satisfying recovery of the global economy. Recognising, as did Larry Summers (2014, 2015) and Paul Krugman (2014), that what we are experiencing is something quite different from an ordinary crisis, it is an important step that in some way legitimize the debate on postgrowth society. However, the discussion on secular stagnation is rooted in standard macroeconomic theory. Even if from different perspectives, all these authors21 advocate economic interventions aimed at stimulating a return to growth. Above all these analyses do not offer any indication of the length or magnitude of future cycles of innovation. As Georgescu-Roegen has already pointed out (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 2011) standard economics lacks an evolutionary theory and, consequently does not even take into consideration the possible irreversible changes in the system (as degrowth supporters do). From this perspective the bioeconomic approach seems more promising: it does not only ascertain the slowing down of innovation processes, but offers an explanation of it, making it part of a more general hypothesis on the evolutionary trend of the system (the Great Wave), open to various possible future scenarios. 7. Conclusions The concept of Promethean Technologies is one of GeorgescuRoegen’s fundamental contributions to bioeconomic theory. It reveals how the process of innovation is not only the outcome of small incremental variations but is also the result of discontinuous, epoch-making innovation. Since greater complexity requires more accessible energy, Promethean technologies are the only ones capable of producing a leap in the scale of complexity of human societies. Tainter’s principle of Diminishing Marginal Returns, on the other hand, offers a basic understanding of societal dynamics as a consequence of increasing complexity. Increasing complexity leads, in fact, to diminishing returns. By integrating G-R’s bio-economic view with Tainter’s principle of diminishing returns, the author has formulated the hypothesis that, after the Promethean/Industrial Revolution returns on investment in complexity follow a “Great Wave” trend. The second part of the paper offers an initial enquiry into the Great Wave hypothesis, using Total Factor Productivity as an indicator of returns on innovation. The analysis of data shows that the period after the Industrial Revolution can be divided into three large cycles (IR1, IR2, IR3), and that each cycle presents a S-shaped trend, albeit of a different magnitude and duration. In the US the application of coal/steam-engine/telegraph technology stimulated a rapid increase in productivity, reaching a peak between 1869 and 1892 (at almost 2%). Yet it was to be the great innovations of the second industrial revolution (the electric engine and the internal combustion engine) with their momentous potential both for manufacturing and domestic consumption (electric light, indoor plumbing) that took TFP values to their peak (2.78%) and, more than that, kept them high (at around 2%) for at least another 25 years, thanks in particular to innovations in the transport system. However, after the peak in the 1930s productivity decreased until it reached a modest 0.34% in the period 1973e95. Although the use of computers and ICT has led to a significant revival of productivity, both the empirical evidence and theoretical reasons lead one to conclude that the innovations introduced by IR3 are not powerful enough to compensate for the declining returns of IR2. This of course does not exclude the possibility that a new expansive cycle may follow the decline of IR3. What the Great Wave hypothesis suggests, however, is that - without the intervention of a new Promethean technology - it is likely to be less influential, and briefer, than the previous one: a conclusion that it would be impossible to draw by applying the instruments of standard macroeconomic theory (Summers, 2014, 2015; Krugman, 2014; but also Gordon, 2015). This is the reason for emphasis having been placed here on a few bio-economic concepts and on complex system theory. In short, an analysis of TFP data for the three cycles after the Industrial Revolution seems to be consistent with the hypothesis of a Great Wave. This means that the U.S. economy seems to have reached its first threshold of mutation - and hence entered a phase of diminishing returns on innovation -in the thirties. This conclusion, moreover, thus appears to be consistent with evidence from research in other fields, i.e. energy (Hall et al., 2008), mineral resources (Bardi, 2014), agriculture (Coelli and Prasada Rao, 2005), health, education and scientific research, (Tainter, 2006; Strumsky et al., 2010), demonstrating that advanced capitalist societies (the U.S., Europe and Japan) have entered a phase of declining marginal returns or involuntary degrowth in many key sectors (Bonaiuti, 2014), with possible major detrimental effects on the system’s capacity to maintain its present institutional framework.

## 1: Topicality

**Interpretation—the aff may not specify a just government**

**A is an generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01**

**Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001** <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

**\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars**

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

**That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive**

**Violation—they specified US**

**Vote neg:**

**1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.**

**2] Limits—specifying a just government offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments in the world depending on their definition of “just government”.**

**DTD – same thing as drop the arg**

**Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for**

**No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.**

## 2: Violence PIC

**Counterplan: India ought to guarantee the right to strike except for violent strike tactics.**

**Strikes can be violent, South Africa proves. This link turns the AC by harming the affected sector and decking the economy.**

**Tenzam ’20 -** Mlungisi Tenzam LLB LLM LLD Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2020, The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1682-58532020000300004

The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike.11The Constitution grants these rights to a "worker" as an individual.12However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14¶ The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to "advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace".16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society.¶ Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike 17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally.18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful.19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers' demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows:¶ "[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike ... A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won't win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say '1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC'. You won't win a strike like that."21¶ The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers' homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour.22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families' living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer's business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26¶ These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations' sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment27, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment.

## 3: Post-Work K

**The aff’s refusal to work is not a refusal of work – their endorsement of striking reinforces the belief that withholding labor puts people in a position of power. This reduces humans to labor capital, which causes work-dependency and inhibits alternatives.**

**Hoffmann, 20** (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

The societal dependence on work

If work is associated with environmental pressures in at least four different ways, why do we have to maintain it at constant or increased levels? We hold that in industrial society four distinct levels of structural and cultural dependency on work may be discerned. These are to be understood as broad analytical categories which in reality comprise and cross individual and structural levels in various ways, and are all interdependent.

Personal dependence. A first aspect is individual or personal dependence on work: Work as regular, gainful employment constitutes one of the central social relations in modern ‘work society’ and is a central point of reference in people’s lives. As a principal source of income, waged work fulfils the existential function of providing livelihoods and social security. It is constructed to secure basic social rights, social integration, recognition, status, and personal identity (Frayne 2015b; Weeks 2011). This is probably why ‘social’ is so often equated with ‘work’.

State dependence. Secondly, dependence on work pertains to the modern welfare state: the revenues and economic growth generated through work contribute substantially to the financing of social security systems. Affording welfare is therefore a main argument for creating jobs. **Wage labour is thus a dominating tool for redistribution;** through wages, taxes on wages and on the consumption that production generates, almost all distribution takes place. Hence, what the job is, and what is being produced, is of secondary importance (Paulsen 2017). **Work is moreover a convenient instrument of control** that structures and disciplines society, and ‘renders populations at once **productive and governable’** (Weeks 2011, 54; Gorz 1982; Lafargue 2014 [1883]). Specifically, the dominant neoliberal ideology, its condemnation of laziness and idealisation of ‘hardworking people’ has intensified the ‘moral fortification of work’. Accordingly, **the neoliberal ‘workfare’ reforms have focused on job creation** and the relentless activation for the labour market, effectively ‘**enforcing work** (…) **as a key function of the state’** (Frayne 2015b, 16).

Economic dependence. Thirdly, besides the economic imperative for individuals to ‘earn a living’ and pay off debt, modern economies are dependent on work in terms of an industrious labour force, long working hours for increasing economic output under the imperatives of capital accumulation, growth and competition, and rising incomes for increasing purchasing power and demand. Creating or preserving jobs constitutes the standard argument for economic growth. In turn, work as one basic factor of production creates growth. However, the relation between growth and employment is conditioned, amongst other factors, primarily by constantly pursued labour productivity: for employment to rise or stay stable, the economy must grow at a sufficiently high rate to exceed productivity gains, in order to offset job losses and avoid ‘jobless growth’. Moreover, faltering expansion triggers a spiral of recession which not only affects economic stability but results in societal crises as a whole (Jackson 2009; Paech 2012). However, besides being unsustainable and insatiable, growth is also increasingly unlikely to continue at the rates required for economic stability (Kallis et al. 2018; IMF 2015). The individual and structural economic dependence on work and economic growth therefore implies profound vulnerability as livelihoods and political stability are fatefully exposed to global competition and the capitalist imperative of capital accumulation, and constrained by ‘systemically relevant’ job and growth creating companies, industries and global (financial) markets (Gronemeyer 2012; Paech 2012).

Cultural dependence. A fourth aspect concerns cultural dependence: The ‘work ethic’ is the specific morality described by Max Weber (1992[1905]) as constitutive of modern industrial culture, 2 and determining for all its subjects as shared ‘common senses’ about how work is valued and understood. It means an ingrained **moral compulsion to gainful work and timesaving**, manifested in the common ideals of productivity, achievement and entrepreneurship**, in the feeling of guilt when time is ‘wasted**’, in personal identification with one’s ‘calling’, in observations of busyness, even **burnout as a ‘badge of honour’** (Paulsen 2014), and in descriptions of a culture that has lost the ‘capacity to relax in the old, uninhibited ways’ (Thompson 1967, 91). Even for those who do not share such attitudes towards work, in a work-centred culture it is normal to (seek) work. It is so commonsensical that it seems **impractical to question it,** and it continues to be **normalised through socialisation** and schooling. Consequently, people become **limited in their imagination of alternatives**, the prospect of losing one’s job usually causes heartfelt fear (Standing 2011). For a work society that ‘does no longer know of those other higher and more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom would deserve to be won’, **there can be nothing worse than the cessation of work** (Hannah Arendt, cited in Gorz 1989, 7–8).

The wage relation based on the commodity labour is, in other words, an essential functional feature of the industrial-capitalist system, and the exaltation of work remains its social ethic. For modern industrial society work is ‘both its chief means and its ultimate goal’ (Gorz 1989, 13; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2011); it is centred and structurally dependent on work, despite work’s environmentally adverse implications. This constellation constitutes the dilemma between work and the environment, and it is why we argue that work is absolutely central to present-day unsustainability and should accordingly be dealt with in sustainability research.

**Work necessitates material throughput and waste that destroys the environment, even when the jobs are ‘green’**

**Hoffmann, 20** (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

An ecological critique of work

What is the problem with modern-day work from an environmental perspective? A number of quantitative studies have researched the correlation of working hours and environmental impacts in terms of ecological footprint, carbon footprint, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy consumption, both on micro/household and on macro/cross-national levels, and for both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013; Nässén and Larsson 2015; Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007). Based on these findings, and going beyond them, we develop a qualitative classification of ecological impacts of work broadly (not working hours only), distinguishing four analytically distinct factors (Hoffmann 2017).

Fundamentally, **all productive activity is based on material and energy throughputs** within wider ecological conditions, which necessarily involves **interference with the ecosphere**. The appropriation and exploitation of non-human animals, land, soil, water, biomass, raw materials, the atmosphere and all other elements of the biosphere always to some extent causes pollution, degradation, and destruction. Thus, work is **inherently** both productive and **destructive**. However, this biophysical basis alone need not make work unsustainable, and it has not always been so (Krausmann 2017).

Contributing to its unsustainability is, firstly, the Scale factor: the greater the amount of work, the more ‘inputs’ are required and the more ‘outputs’ generated, which means more throughput of resources and energy, and resulting ecological impacts. In other words, the more work, **the larger the size of the economy, the more demands on the biosphere** (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013). Obviously, there are qualitative differences between different types of work and their respective environmental impacts. Moreover, besides the evident and direct impacts, indirect impacts matter also. The tertiary/service sector is therefore not exempt from this reasoning (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), not only due to its own (often ‘embodied’) materiality and energy requirements, but also because it administrates and supports industrial production processes in global supply chains (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Haberl et al. 2009; Paech 2012).

Additionally, modern work is subject to certain integrally connected and mutually reinforcing conditions inherent in industrial economic structures, which aggravate ecological impacts by further increasing the Scale factor. These include the systematic externalisation of costs, and the use of **fossil fuels as crucial energy basis**, which combined with modern industrial technology enable continuously rising **labour productivity independently of physical, spatial or temporal constraints** (Malm 2013). Taken together, this leads to constantly spurred economic growth with a corresponding growth in material and energetic throughputs, **and the creation of massive amounts of waste**. The latter is **not an adverse side-effect** of modern work, but part of its **purpose under the imperatives of growth, profitability, and constant innovation**, as evident in phenomena such as planned obsolescence or the ‘scrapping premium’, serving to stimulate growth and demand, and hence, job creation (Gronemeyer 2012). These conditions and effects tend to be **neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised to resolve the ecological crisis** (Paus 2018), disregarding that the **systematically and continuously advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits** (Haberl et al. 2009).

**Unions are intrinsically invested in labor being good – they don’t strike to get rid of work; they strike to get people back to work. Lundström 14:**

Lundström, Ragnar; Räthzel, Nora; Uzzell, David {Uzell is Professor (Emeritus) of Environmental Psychology at the University of Surrey with a BA Geography from the University of Liverpool, a PhD Psychology from the University of Surrey, and a MSc in Social Psychology from London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Lundstrom is Associate professor at [Department of Sociology](https://www.umu.se/sociologiska-institutionen/) at Umea University. Rathzel is an Affiliated as professor emerita at [Department of Sociology](https://www.umu.se/sociologiska-institutionen/) at Umea University.}, 14 - ("Disconnected spaces: introducing environmental perspectives into the trade union agenda top-down and bottom-up," Taylor & Francis, 12-11-2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212?scroll=top&amp;needAccess=true)//marlborough-wr/

Even though there was support for environmental perspectives in LO at this time – after all, the National Congress commissioned the programme, an environmental unit was established at headquarters and a majority of the congress accepted the programme – this waned significantly when the economy was threatened. This reflects the influence of the **‘jobs vs. environment’ conflict** on processes of integrating environmental perspectives into the union agenda (Räthzel and Uzzell [2011](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)). Union policies are embedded in a mode of production marked by what Marx called the ‘metabolic rift’. The concept is one of the pillars upon which Foster develops ‘Marx’s Ecology’ (Foster [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212), 155 f). It argues that the capitalist industrial system exploits the earth without restoring its constituents to it. More generally, Marx defined the labour process as metabolism (Stoffwechsel) between nature (external to humans) and human nature. When humans work on and with nature to produce the means of their survival, they also develop their knowledge and their capabilities, and transform their own human nature (Marx [1998](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)). Polanyi later reduced the concept of the ‘metabolic rift’ to the commodification of land (Polanyi [1944](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)), thus paving the way for a perspective that sees the solution in the control of the market, but disregards the relations of production as they are lived by workers in the production process. But to understand why trade unions have difficulties developing and especially holding on to environmental policies it is important to recognise that **since nature has become a privately owned ‘means of production’ it has become workers’ Other.** Unions have been reduced and have reduced themselves to care only for one part of the inseparable relationship between nature and labour. On the everyday level of policies **this means that environmental strategies lose momentum in times of economic crises and when jobs are seen to be threatened.** In this respect, **unions are no different from political parties and governments.** In spite of numerous publications by the ILO and Union organisations, which show that a move to a ‘green economy’ can create new jobs (Poschen [2012](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212); Rivera Alejo and Martín Murillo [2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)), unions have been reluctant to exchange ‘a bird in the hand for two in the bush’ – even if the bird in the hand becomes elusive.

**The alternative is rejecting the affirmative to embrace postwork – it questions the centrality of work and ontological attachments to productivity to enable emancipatory transformation of society to an ecologically sustainable form.**

**Your ballot symbolizes an answer to the question of whether work can be used as the solution to social ills. The plan doesn’t “happen,” and you are conditioned to valorize work – vote neg to interrogate these ideological assumptions.**

**Hoffmann, 20** (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

**What is postwork?**

How can a ‘postwork’ approach contribute to resolving these issues? The notions critique of work (Frayne 2015a, 2015b) or postwork (Weeks 2011) have emerged in recent years in social science research and popular culture, building on a long intellectual tradition of (autonomist and neo-)Marxist, anarchist, and feminist theory (Seyferth 2019; Weeks 2011). The critique of work targets **work in a fundamental sense,** not only its conditions or exploitation. It is aimed at the centrality of work in modern ‘work society’ as a pivotal point for the provision of livelihoods through **monetary income,** the granting of social security, social inclusion, and personal identity construction, on which grounds unemployed persons and unpaid activities are **excluded from recognition**, welfare provision and trade union support. Moreover, the crucial role of waged work in the functioning of the welfare state and the modern industrialised economy is part of this critique (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015b; Paulsen 2017). Although commonly taken as naturally given, this kind of societal order and its institutions such as the wage relation, labour markets, unemployment, or abstract time are historically and culturally exceptional modes of human coexistence (Applebaum 1992; Graeber 2018; Gorz 1989; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Thompson 1967). This critique of the structures and social relations of work society is accompanied by the critique of its **cultural foundation**, **the work ethic**; an ideological commitment to work and productivism as ends in themselves, moral obligations, and as intrinsically good, regardless of what is done and at what cost (Gorz 1982; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2001).

Postwork, however, is not only a critical stance. Criticising work and work society, aware of their historical contingency, implies the potential for an **emancipatory transformation of industrial society**. The focus is thereby **not necessarily on abolishing work** tout-court, but rather on pointing out and **questioning its relentless centrality** and asking what a more desirable, free and **sustainable society might look like**; a society in which work is **no longer the pivotal point of social organisation and ideological orientation,** including all questions and debates around this objective (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015a; Weeks 2011).

As a relatively new and dynamically developing approach, postwork is, despite similar political claims, not uniform in its reasoning. Some, drawing on the classical ‘end-of-work’ argument (Frayne 2016), assume an imminent technology-induced massive rise in unemployment. This is welcomed as an opportunity to reduce and ultimately abolish work to liberate humankind (Srnicek and Williams 2015). Others emphasise the remarkable fact that throughout the past two centuries technological development has not challenged the centrality of work in modern lives, despite the prospect that technological change would allow for much shorter working hours (e.g., Keynes 1930). This has not materialised due to the requirements of a work-centred, work-dependent society. On the contrary, work has become more central to modern societies. These deeper structural and cultural aspects and dependencies seem to remain unaffected by technological trends (Paulsen 2017; Weeks 2011).

The ecological case for postwork

The perspective of postwork/critiques of work may enrich sustainability debates in many ways; here, our focus is again on ecological concerns. First, postwork offers a much needed **change in focus in sustainability debates**, away from narrow critiques of individual consumption **and the overemphasis on ‘green jobs’,** towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability. Postwork directs the focus towards **crucial overlooked issues**, e.g. the ways in which work is ecologically harmful, or which problems arise due to the social and cultural significance of modern-day work, **including existential dependencies on it.** Postwork seeks to **re-politicise work**, recognising that its conception and societal organisation are social constructs and therefore political, and must accordingly be open to debate (Weeks 2011). This opens conceptual space and enables open-minded debates about the meaning, value and purpose of work: what kind of work is, for individuals, society and the biosphere as a whole, meaningful, pointless, or outright harmful (Graeber 2018)?

Such debates and enhanced understanding about the means and ends of work, and the range of problems associated with it, would be important in several regards. In ecological regard it facilitates the ecologically necessary, substantial reduction of work, production and consumption (Frey 2019; Haberl et al. 2009). Reducing work/working hours is one of the key premises of postwork, aiming at de-centring and de-normalising work, and releasing time, energy and creativity for purposes other than work (Coote 2013). From an ecological perspective, reducing the amount of work would reduce the dependency on a commodity-intensive mode of living, and allow space for more sustainable practices (Frayne 2016). Reducing work would also help mitigate all other work-induced environmental pressures described above, especially the ‘Scale factor’ (Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), i.e. the amount of resources and energy consumed, and waste, including emissions, created through work. A postwork approach facilitates debate on the politics of ecological work reduction which entails difficult questions: for example, which industries and fields of employment are to be phased out? Which fields will need to be favoured and upon what grounds? Which kinds of work in which sectors are socially important and should therefore be organised differently, especially when altering the energy basis of work due to climate change mitigation which implies decentralised, locally specific, intermittent and less concentrated energy sources (Malm 2013)? These questions are decisive for future (un-)sustainability, and yet serious attempts at a solution are presently forestalled by the **unquestioned sanctity that work, ‘jobs’ or ‘full employment’ enjoy** (Frayne 2015b).

Postwork is also conducive to rethinking the organisation of work. There are plausible arguments in favour of new institutions of **democratic control over the economy**, i.e. economic democracy (Johanisova and Wolf 2012). This is urgent and necessary to distribute a very tight remaining carbon budget fairly and wisely (IPCC 2018), to keep economic power in check, and to gain public sovereignty over fundamental economic decisions that are pivotal for (un-)sustainable trajectories (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). An obstacle to this is one institution in particular which is **rarely under close scrutiny**: the labour market, a social construct linked to the advent of modern work in form of the commodity of labour (Applebaum 1992). It is an **undemocratic mechanism**, usually characterised by high levels of **unfreedom and coercion** (Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018; Paulsen 2015) that allocates waged work in a **competitive mode as an artificially scarce, ‘fictitious’ commodity** (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). 4 It does so according to availability of money and motives of gain on the part of employers, and appears therefore inappropriate for distributing labour according to **sustainability criteria and related societal needs**. As long as **unsustainable and/or unnecessary jobs are profitable** and/or (well-)paid, **they will continue to exist** (Gorz 1989), **just as ‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria in order to be created.** An **ecological postwork** perspective allows to **question this on ecological grounds**, and it links to **debates** on **different modes of organising socially necessary work**, production and **provisioning in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode.**

Finally, postwork is helpful for ecological reasons because it **criticises the cultural glorification of ‘hard work’,** merit and productivism, and the moral assumption that laziness and inaction are intrinsically bad, regardless the circumstances. Postwork is about a different mindset which **problematises prevailing productivist attitudes** and allows the idea that being lazy or unproductive can be something inherently valuable. Idleness is conducive to an ecological agenda as **nothing is evidently more carbon-neutral and environment-sparing than being absolutely unproductive**. As time-use studies indicate, leisure, recreation and socialising have very low ecological impacts, with rest and sleep having virtually none (Druckman et al. 2012). Apart from humans, the biosphere also needs idle time for regeneration. In this sense, laziness or ‘ecological leisure’, ideally sleep, can be regarded as supremely ecofriendly states of being that would help mitigate ecological pressures. Moreover, as postwork traces which changes in attitudes towards time, efficiency and laziness have brought modern work culture and modern time regimes into being in the first place and have dominated ever since (Thompson 1967; Weber 1992 [1905]), it provides crucial knowledge for understanding and potentially changing this historically peculiar construction. It can thereby take inspiration from longstanding traditions throughout human history, where leisure has usually been a high social ideal and regarded as vital for realising genuine freedom and quality of life (Applebaum 1992; Gorz 1989).

Conclusions: postwork politics and practices

We argued that modern-day work is a central cause for unsustainability, and should therefore be transformed to advance towards sustainability. We have contributed to this field of research, firstly, by developing a systematisation of the ecological harms associated with work – comprising the factors Scale, Time, Income, and Work-induced Mobility, Infrastructure, and Consumption – taking those studies one step further which investigate the ecological impacts of working hours quantitatively. One of the analytical advantages of this approach is that it avoids the mystification of work through indirect measures of economic activity (such as per capita GDP), as in the numerous analyses of the conflict between sustainability and economic growth in general. Our second substantial contribution consists in combining these ecological impacts of work with an analysis of the various structural dependencies on work in modern society, which spells out clearly what the recurring jobs-environment-dilemma actually implies, and why it is so difficult to overcome. While this dilemma is often vaguely referred to, this has been the first more detailed analysis of the different dimensions that essentially constitute it. Reviewing the literature in environmental sociology and sustainability research more generally, we also found the work-environment-dilemma and the role of work itself are not sufficiently addressed and remain major unresolved issues.

We proposed the field would benefit from taking up the long intellectual tradition of problematising modern-day work, through the approach of postwork or critiques of work. While the described problems of unsustainability and entrenched dependencies cannot easily be resolved, we discussed how postwork arguments can contribute to pointing out and understanding them, and to opening up new perspectives to advance sustainability debates. A third contribution is therefore to have introduced the concept of postwork/critiques of work into sustainability research and the work-environment debate, and to have conducted an initial analysis of the ways in which postwork may be helpful for tackling ecological problems. Besides being ecologically beneficial, it may also serve **emancipatory purposes to ‘raise broader questions about the place of work in our lives and spark the imagination of a life no longer so subordinate to it’** (Weeks 2011, 33). In order to inspire such ‘postwork imagination’ (Weeks 2011, 35, 110) and show that postwork ideas are not as detached from reality as they may sound, in this last section we briefly outline examples of existing postwork politics and practices.

The most obvious example is the reduction of working hours during the 19th and 20th centuries. These reforms were essential to the early labour movement, and the notion that increasing productivity entails shorter working hours has never been nearly as ‘radical’ as today (Paulsen 2017). As concerns about **climate change are rising**, there is also renewed awareness about the **ecological benefits of worktime reduction,** besides a whole range of other social and economic advantages (Coote 2013; Frey 2019).

Worktime reduction is usually taken up positively in public debate. Carlsson (2015, 184) sees a ‘growing minority of people’ who engage in practices other than waged work to support themselves and make meaningful contributions to society. Frayne (2015b) describes the practical refusal of work by average people who wish to live more independently of the treadmill of work. Across society, the disaffection with work is no marginal phenomenon (Graeber 2018; Cederström and Fleming 2012; Paulsen 2014, 2015; Weeks 2011); many start to realise the ‘dissonance between the mythical sanctity of work on the one hand, and the troubling realities of people’s actual experiences on the other’ (Frayne 2015b, 228). Public debates are therefore increasingly receptive to issues such as industries’ responsibility for climate change, coercive ‘workfare’ policies, meaningless ‘**b**ull**s**hit jobs’, or ‘work-life-balance’, shorter hours, overwork and burnout; topics ‘that will not go away’ (Coote 2013, xix) and question the organisation of work society more fundamentally. 5

The debate about an unconditional basic income (UBI) will also remain. UBI would break the existential dependency of livelihoods on paid work and serve as a new kind of social contract to entitle people to social security regardless of paid economic activity. In addition to countless models in theory, examples of UBI schemes exist in practice, either currently implemented or planned as ‘experiments’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015).

The critique and refusal of work also takes place both within the sphere of wage labour and outside it. Within, the notions of absenteeism, tardiness, shirking, theft, or sabotage (Pouget 1913 [1898]; Seyferth 2019) have a long tradition, dating back to early struggles against work and industrialisation (Thompson 1967), and common until today (Paulsen 2014). The idea of such **deliberate ‘workplace resistance’** is that the ability to resist meaningless work and the internalised norms of work society, and be idle and useless while at work, can be **recognised** and **successfully practised** (Campagna 2013; Scott 2012). Similarly, there is a growing interest in productive practices, social relations, and the commons outside the sphere of wage labour and market relations, for example in community-supported agriculture. **This initiates ways of organising work and the economy to satisfy material needs otherwise than by means of commodity consumption** (Chamberlain 2018; Helfrich and Bollier 2015).

For such modes of organising productive social relations in more varied ways, inspiration could be drawn from the forms of ‘work’ that are **prevalent in the global South** in the so-called **informal sector** and in non-industrial crafts and peasantry, neither of which resemble the cultural phenomenon of modern-day work with its origins in the colonial North (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; Thompson 1967). This, however, contradicts the global development paradigm, under which industrialisation, ‘economic upgrading’, global (labour) market integration and ‘structural transformation’ are pursued. Modern work, especially industrial factory jobs and ideally in cities, is supposed to help ‘the poor’ to escape their misery (Banerjee and Duflo 2012; UNDP 2015). Many of these other forms of **livelihood provisioning** and **associated ways of life are thus disregarded**, **denigrated** or **destroyed** as **underdeveloped**, **backward, poor, and lazy** (Thompson 1967), and drawn into the formal system of waged work as cheap labour in capitalist markets and global supply chains – ‘improved living conditions’ as measured in formal pecuniary income (Rosling 2018; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987). There are indications that these transformations **create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour** (while few viable wage labour structures exist) (Hickel 2017; Srnicek and Williams 2015). There is also clear evidence of numerous struggles against capitalist development and for traditional livelihood protection and environmental justice (Anguelovski 2015). These are aspects where **a postwork orientation is relevant** beyond the industrialised societies of the global North, as it puts a focus on the modern phenomenon ‘work’ itself and the conditions that led to its predominance, as it questions the common narrative that ‘jobs’ are an end in themselves and justify all kinds of problematic development, and as it allows to ask which alternative, postcolonial critiques and conceptualisations of ‘work’ exist and should be preserved.

To conclude, we clearly find traces of postwork organisation and politics in the present. However, these ideas are contested; they concern the roots of modern culture, society and industrial-capitalist economies. Waged work continues to be normalised, alternatives beyond niches appear quite impractical for generalisation**. Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo** (Lundström, Räthzel, and Uzzell 2015). **Job creation** and (global) labour market integration (regardless of what kind) are central policy goals of all political parties, and presently **popular progressive debates on a Green New Deal tend to exhibit a rather productivist stance.**

There is one particular aspect that appears hopeful: **the present socio-economic system is unsustainable in the literal sense that it is physically impossible to be sustained in the long run**. It was Weber (1992[1905]) who predicted that the powerful cosmos of the modern economic order will be determining with overwhelming force **until the last bit of fossil fuel is burnt** – and exactly this needs to happen **soon to avert catastrophic climate change**. 6 This is the **battlefield of sustainability**, and lately there has been **renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change**, where it might be realised that a **different societal trajectory beyond work and productivism for their own sake is more sustainable and desirable for the future.**

### Case

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---best models.

Campbell et al. 18, \*Doctoral Candidate in Political Science, Ohio State University. \*\*Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at the Ohio State University. \*\*\*Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. (\*Benjamin W., \*\*Skyler J. Cranmer, \*\*\*Bruce A. Desmarais, September 13, 2018, “Triangulating War: Network Structure and the Democratic Peace”, *Cornell University*, Accessible at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04141.pdf>)

Conclusion

The dyadic understanding of the democratic peace has become ubiquitous in International Relations. By looking beyond simple dyadic analysis, accounting for the embededness of states in a much more complex network, we found the democratic peace may not be as robust as previously thought. Our results demonstrate that after accounting for the tendency for like-regime states with common enemies not to fight one another, the effect of the democratic peace not only vanishes, but jointly democratic dyads seem to be *more* conflict prone than mixed dyads. These results are consistent across operationalizations of the outcome variable, our triadic closure predictor, measurements of joint democracy, and a variety of other factors. We believe this explanation for the democratic peace is not a mechanism for understanding the democratic peace, but instead, an alternative. What we have shown here is that conflict between democracies indeed exists and the peaceful relations occasionally found are not necessarily a function of the affinity of democratic states, or intrinsic attributes of democratic states, but instead, a function of the strategic inefficiencies of fighting a state with a shared enemy. While regime type may influence the interests of states, we find that it does not directly influence the probability that any two states fight one another.

There are three major implications to our research. First, scholars should be hesitant to consider dyadic conflict in isolation, as there are network dependencies informing whether a state engages or joins a MID. Second, preferences operating in addition to network interdependencies and collaboration explain much of the democratic peace. Third, when studying conflict, scholars and practitioners should consider the cost structure of collaboration, and how these dynamics inform not only conflict initiation, but conflict escalation. Particularly interesting is that the theoretical mechanism at work here is dramatically simpler than any of the established justifications for the democratic peace. We do not rely on arguments about institutions or norms, but just the simple and intuitive proposition that it does not make much sense for two states fighting a third to also fight each other. What the existing literature seems to have missed, usually theoretically and almost always empirically, is that dyadic conflicts do not occur in isolation, but in the context of a complex network of relations.

#### Democracy can’t resolve violence

John Schwarzmantel (Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Leeds, Programme Director of the MA in Democratic Studies and, at the moment, Director of the Centre for Democratisation Studies) April 2010 “Democracy and violence: a theoretical overview” Democratization Vol. 17, No. 2 EBSCO

Clearly this democratic exclusion of violence is an ideal, not a reality. It rests on various presuppositions that are unlikely to be fulfilled in the real world. First, it relies on the assumption that all interests and perspectives are in fact taken into account in the political system in question, and that therefore no person or group will feel the need to have recourse to violence outside established constitutional channels in order to make their voice heard. Second, the implication is that all political actors accept the premises that violence degrades the status of the human actor and that it is possible and desirable to resolve conflict through democracy, and that this is ethically superior to means of violent conflict. If someone believes that there is something inherently ennobling about violence, or that their own goal is an ‘all or nothing’ one on which there can be no compromise, or that the possible interlocutors in the democratic dialogue are not worthy of respect or of being listened to, then these considerations will make the democratic aspiration to exclude violence an impossible one to realise in practice. Finally, the presentation here of the opposition between democracy as rational and violence as irrational is open to the objection that the recourse to violence can be a perfectly rational strategy, designed to achieve political goals (including democratic ones) by means of violence: ‘they (terrorists) tend often to act according to thinking which is no less strategic or rational than that of other actors in various conflicts’.11 This is certainly true, since violence can be exercised in rational and strategic ways in order to achieve the inclusion offered, but not realized, by the democratic state. Yet the ultimate goal of a properly inclusive democratic society remains, so it is argued here, one of substituting the processes of debate and compromise for the physical confrontation of force between groups and individuals who see no possibility of democratic dialogue.

#### Past precedent means that an India-Pakistan conflict does not turn nuclear – prefer our evidence because it has historical and empirical grounding.

Rajaraman 17 - Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics at Jawaharlal Nehru University [interview by Rashme Sehgal - Ramamurti Rajaraman, 'India-Pakistan nuke war not a realistic possibilty', says leading nuclear expert Ramamurti Rajaraman, Aug 01, 2017, <https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-pakistan-nuke-war-not-a-realistic-possibilty-says-leading-nuclear-expert-ramamurti-rajaraman-3880145.html>]

The conflict between India and Pakistan has intensified in the last three years. If the situation worsens, is there a likelihood that India could launch a pre-emptive first strike against Pakistan if it feared an imminent nuclear strike? Of course, this could mean a marked reversal of our no-first use (NFU) policy. On the other hand, if India goes in for more surgical strikes, can Pakistan use a conventional attack as a pretext to attack India?

The conflict between India and Pakistan during the past three years has been limited to Jammu and Kashmir. These conflicts may continue and may also occasionally intensify. There may also be a lot of heated rhetoric from both sides. But I don’t think there is any realistic possibility of those conflicts developing into a full-scale war, let alone one with any serious chances of a nuclear strike by Pakistan. Notice that there has been no mainland attack by Pakistan based terrorists since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. I feel that this is because Pakistan military and its Inter-Services Intelligence do appreciate the fact that the next time there is an attack of that magnitude, India would have to retaliate in a serious manner. It is true that the Pakistan Army maintains a hostile posture towards India as a matter of policy. But that is done largely for domestic consumption and for maintaining its pre-eminence in the Pakistani power structure. If push comes to shove, the leadership in both countries are too responsible to let matters go anywhere near a nuclear threshold. So, there is no question of India conducting a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan in anticipation of a nuclear attack from them. I don’t think India will reverse its NFU policy, even though some analysts, for the want of anything better to write about, keep harping on it. That would be a very unwise thing to do diplomatically.

#### No Indo-Pak war – their evidence is alarmism and crises have not escalated.

MacDonald 19 [Myra, South Asian specialist, journalist and author of two books on India and Pakistan.] "India and Pakistan enter a new, dangerous era," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/india-and-pakistan-enter-a-new-dangerous-era-conflict-kashmir/ 2-28-2019 AG

That does not mean that everyone needs to dig nuclear fallout shelters. India and Pakistan **have faced crises before** in their post-nuclear history and come back from the brink. Moreover, the highly charged emotional public rhetoric can often be misinterpreted by Westerners and sometimes — but not infallibly so — disguises more sober reflection behind the scenes. Pakistan also has a tendency to boast loudly about its nuclear weapons — a message that is mainly designed to deter further military action by India, the larger power in terms of conventional forces — which can add to **alarmism** in the outside world.

#### Growth is surging.

Halloran ’9-14 [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we remain encouraged by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are historically healthy and still have pent-up demand. Business confidence has rebounded with strong corporate profits that should support further capital spending and hiring (there are now more job openings than there are unemployed people by a record amount).

We expect to see further improvement in the international backdrop, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus and accelerating rates of vaccination. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, recent evidence confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from financial markets themselves remain positive. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain near record highs while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the lows of earlier this summer when concerns about Delta first emerged.

#### These factors support our view of a durable economic recovery from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains

#### COVID creates an economic brink---recovery is strong now because of effective monetary policy, but we’ve hit the zero-lower bound.

Christopher Rugaber 21. Associated Press. “Federal Reserve keeps key interest rate near zero, signals COVID-19 economic risks receding.” https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-fed-interest-rates-economy-20210428-bumyc3ynpza6ri4ygsntmdsmya-story.html.

WASHINGTON — The Federal Reserve is keeping its ultra-low interest rate policies in place, a sign that it wants to see more evidence of a strengthening economic recovery before it would consider easing its support.

In a statement Wednesday, the Fed expressed a brighter outlook, saying the economy has improved along with the job market. And while the policymakers noted that inflation has risen, they ascribed the increase to temporary factors.

The Fed also signaled its belief that the pandemic’s threat to the economy has diminished, a significant point given Chair Jerome Powell’s long-stated view that the recovery depends on the virus being brought under control. Last month, the Fed had cautioned that the virus posed “considerable risks to the economic outlook.” On Wednesday, it said only that “risks to the economic outlook remain” because of the pandemic.

The central bank left its benchmark short-term rate near zero, where it’s been since the pandemic erupted nearly a year ago, to help keep loan rates down to encourage borrowing and spending. It also said in a statement after its latest policy meeting that it would keep buying $120 billion in bonds each month to try to keep longer-term borrowing rates low.

The U.S. economy has been posting unexpectedly strong gains in recent weeks, with barometers of hiring, spending and manufacturing all surging. Most economists say they detect the early stages of what could be a robust and sustained recovery, with coronavirus case counts declining, vaccinations rising and Americans spending their stimulus-boosted savings.

#### Strikes hurt critical core industries that is necessary for economic growth

John McElroy, 2019, Strikes Hurt Everybody.Wards Auto Industry News, October 25, https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody

This creates a **poisonous relationship** between the company and its workforce. Many GM hourly workers don’t identify as GM employees. They identify as UAW members. And they see the union as the source of their jobs, not the company. It’s an unhealthy dynamic that puts GM at a disadvantage to non-union automakers in the U.S. like Honda and Toyota, where workers take pride in the company they work for and the products they make. Attacking the company in the media also **drives away customers**. Who wants to buy a shiny new car from a company that’s accused of underpaying its workers and treating them unfairly? Data from the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) in Ann Arbor, MI, show that **GM loses market share during strikes and never gets it back**. GM lost two percentage points during the 1998 strike, which in today’s market would represent **a loss of 340,000 sales**. Because GM reports sales on a quarterly basis we’ll only find out at the end of December if it lost market share from this strike. UAW members say one of their greatest concerns is job security. But causing a company to lose market share is a sure-fire path to **more plant closings and layoffs**. Even so, unions are incredibly important for boosting wages and benefits for working-class people. GM’s UAW-represented workers earn considerably more than their non-union counterparts, about $26,000 more per worker, per year, in total compensation. Without a union they never would have achieved that. Strikes are a powerful weapon for unions. They usually are the only way they can get management to accede to their demands. If not for the power of collective bargaining and the threat of a strike, management would largely ignore union demands. If you took away that threat, management would pay its workers peanuts. Just ask the Mexican line workers who are paid $1.50 an hour to make $50,000 BMWs. But strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against. They hurt **suppliers, car dealers and the communities located near the plants.** The Anderson Economic Group estimates that 75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t get any strike pay or an $11,000 contract signing bonus. No, most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them. GM’s suppliers also lost a lot of money. So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy. According to CAR, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – **into a recession.** That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike left a path of destruction in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost. John McElroyI’m not sure how this will ever be resolved. I understand the need for collective bargaining and the threat of a strike. But there’s got to be a better way to get workers a raise without torching the countryside.

#### Strikes create a stigmatization effect over labor and consumption that devastates the economy

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal)

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about **R6.1 billion** according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but **take long to resolve.** Generally, a lengthy strike has a **negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation**. In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment **is not fertile** for such investments as a result of, for example, unstable labour relations. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26 These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations’ sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27 Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment. 3 1 Effects of violent and long strikes on the economy Generally, South Africa’s economy is on a downward scale. First, it fails to create employment opportunities for its people. The recent statistics on unemployment levels indicate that unemployment has increased from 26.5% to 27.2%. 28 The most prominent strike which nearly brought the platinum industries to its knees was the strike convened by AMCU in 2014. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 24 June 2014. It affected the three big platinum producers in the Republic, which are the Anglo American Platinum, Lonmin Plc and Impala Platinum. It was the longest strike since the dawn of democracy in 1994. As a result of this strike, the platinum industries lost billions of rands.29 According to the report by Economic Research Southern Africa, the platinum group metals industry is South Africa’s second-largest export earner behind gold and contributes just over 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30 The overall metal ores in the mining industry which include platinum sells about 70% of its output to the export market while sales to local manufacturers of basic metals, fabricated metal products and various other metal equipment and machinery make up to 20%. 31 The research indicates that the overall impact of the strike in 2014 was driven by a reduction in productive capital in the mining sector, accompanied by a decrease in labour available to the economy. This resulted in a sharp increase in the price of the output by 5.8% with a **GDP declined by 0.72 and 0.78%**.32

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war – collapses faith in deterrence

Tønnesson, 15—Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University (Stein, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, dml)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

The best way to enhance global peace is no doubt to multiply the factors protecting it: build a Pacific security community by topping up economic interdependence with political rapprochement and trust, institutionalized cooperation, and shared international norms. Yet even without such accomplishments, the combination of deterrence and economic interdependence may be enough to prevent war among the major powers. Because the leaders of nuclear armed nations are fearful of getting into a situation where peace relies uniquely on nuclear deterrence, and because they know that their adversaries have the same fear, they may accept the risks entailed by depending economically on others. And then there will be neither trade wars nor shooting wars, just disputes and diplomacy.

### Framing

#### Don’t buy that any risk of extinction comes first.

**(A) Compound Probability - Multiplied probabilities of long link chains have negligible net probabilities. This is the slippery slope fallacy.**

**(B) Causal Direction - They say the fractional probability of a huge impact still has a large expected value, but it’s impossible to determine the direction of low-probability links. Does the butterfly flapping its wings cause the hurricane or prevent it? Disregard tiny-probability links because they don’t guide decision-making.**

**(C) Complexity – the Aff presents a simplistic and deterministic narrative that fails to account for the myriad confounding factors that can disrupt or reverse the link chain of the AC. The most important is the probability that people will recognize the dangerous path they’re on and change course, e.g. the Cuban Missile Crisis.**

**(D) Decision Gridlock – Every course of action or inaction has a negligible possibility of causing extinction. This makes it impossible to prioritize averting existential risk over all else because such risk is unavoidable. We are reading a link turn, so extinction first is irrelevant. We have no choice but to prioritize REALISTIC probabilities.**