

Singular Government T

Interpretation—the aff may not specify a just government

A is an generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001

<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

***IS generic = Indefinite Singulars**

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true: (44) a. A banana sells for \$.49/lb. b. A banana sells for \$1.00/lb. The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts (1977) considers the following minimal pair: (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies. b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies. He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.” Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188). Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of socially accepted rules and regulations. An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a) and (46.b) do not have a generic reading: (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green thick socks. b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital earns more than \$50,000 a year. However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b), respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural: (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For example, a Norwegian student. . . b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For example, a left-handed. . . Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading: (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous! b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is square?

That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

Violation—they specified EU

Vote neg:

1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

2] Limits—specifying a just government offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of hundreds of governments in the world depending on their definition of “just government”.

DTD – same thing as drop the arg

Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for

No RVIs—it’s your burden to be topical.

No Solvency (Eu Democracy)

Either democracy is doomed no matter what or its resilient, and the courts have nothing to do with it

Freedom House 21 – Freedom House is a non-profit non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights. Freedom House was founded in October 1941, and Wendell Willkie and Eleanor Roosevelt served as its first honorary chairpersons.

Freedom House, March 3 2021, “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated,”

<https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated>

A need for reform in the United States

While still considered Free, the United States experienced further democratic decline during the final year of the Trump presidency. The US score in Freedom in the World has dropped by 11 points over the past decade, and fell by three points in 2020 alone. The changes have moved the country out of a cohort that included other leading democracies, such as France and Germany, and brought it into the company of states with weaker democratic institutions, such as Romania and Panama.

Several developments in 2020 contributed to the United States’ current score. The Trump administration undermined government transparency by dismissing inspectors general.

punishing or firing whistleblowers, and attempting to control or manipulate information on COVID-19. The year also featured mass protests that, while mostly peaceful, were accompanied by high-profile cases of violence. police brutality, and deadly confrontations with counterprotesters or armed vigilantes. There was a significant increase in the number of journalists arrested and physically assaulted, most often as they covered demonstrations. Finally, the outgoing president's shocking attempts to overturn his election loss—culminating in his incitement of rioters who stormed the Capitol as Congress met to confirm the results in January 2021—put electoral institutions under severe pressure. In addition, the crisis further damaged the United States' credibility abroad and underscored the menace of political polarization and extremism in the country.

"January 6 should be a wake-up call for many Americans about the fragility of American democracy," said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House. "Authoritarian powers, especially China, are advancing their interests around the world, while democracies have been divided and consumed by internal problems. For freedom to prevail on a global scale, the United States and its partners must band together and work harder to strengthen democracy at home and abroad. President Biden has pledged to restore America's international role as a leading supporter of democracy and human rights, but to rebuild its leadership credentials, the country must simultaneously address the weaknesses within its own political system."

"Americans should feel gratified that the courts and other important institutions held firm during the postelection crisis, and that the country escaped the worst possible outcomes," said Abramowitz. "But the Biden administration, the new Congress, and American civil society must fortify US democracy by strengthening and expanding political rights and civil liberties for all. People everywhere benefit when the United States serves as a positive model, and the country itself reaps ample returns from a more democratic world."

The effects of COVID-19

Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global democratic decline. Repressive regimes and populist leaders worked to reduce transparency, promote false or misleading information, and crack down on the sharing of unfavorable data or critical views. Many of those who voiced objections to their government's handling of the pandemic faced harassment or criminal charges. Lockdowns were sometimes excessive, politicized, or brutally enforced by security agencies. And antidemocratic leaders worldwide used the pandemic as cover to weaken the political opposition and consolidate power.

In fact, many of the year's negative developments will likely have lasting effects, meaning the eventual end of the pandemic will not necessarily trigger an immediate revitalization of democracy. In Hungary, for example, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took on emergency powers during the health crisis and misused them to withdraw financial assistance from municipalities led by opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa dissolved Parliament in early March and, with new elections repeatedly delayed due to COVID-19, ruled without a legislature for several months. Later in the year, both Hungary and Sri Lanka passed constitutional amendments that further strengthened executive power.

The resilience of democracy

Despite the many losses for freedom recorded by Freedom in the World during 2020, people around the globe remained committed to fighting for their rights, and democracy continued to

demonstrate its remarkable resilience. A number of countries held successful elections, independent courts provided checks on executive overreach, journalists in even the most repressive environments investigated government transgressions, and activists persisted in calling out undemocratic practices.

Following a marred election in Malawi in mid-2019, for instance, judges withstood bribery attempts and pressure from the incumbent administration and called for new elections. Opposition presidential candidate Lazarus Chakwera then won the 2020 rerun vote by a comfortable margin. The incident represented a critical win for Malawi's democratic institutions and set a positive example of judicial independence for other African states.

In Taiwan, one of the highest-performing democracies in Asia, the government effectively suppressed the coronavirus without resorting to abusive methods, setting a sharp contrast with authoritarian China, where the regime has touted its draconian response as a model for the world. Even before the virus struck, Taiwanese voters defied a multipronged, politicized disinformation campaign from China and overwhelmingly reelected a president who opposes moves toward unification with the mainland.

“Our report concludes that democracy today is beleaguered but not defeated,” said Abramowitz. “Its adversaries have grown more powerful, making the world a more hostile environment for self-government, but its enduring appeal among ordinary people—which we’ve already seen this year in places like Russia and Myanmar—bode well for the future of freedom.”

Democratic erosion is occurring because the Supreme Court is a lawless, partisan institution, not because of a lack of strikes

Keck 20 – Thomas Keck, Michael O. Sawyer Chair of Constitutional Law and Politics and Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University, “Court-Packing and Democratic Erosion,” 12/17/20, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3476889

Scholars of democratic erosion have noticed the GOP’s partisan capture of the federal courts and flagged it as a potential warning sign, but may well have understated the severity of the danger to democratic norms and institutions. For example, remarking on the Supreme Court twenty months into Trump’s presidency, Kaufman and Haggard diagnosed “a serious threat that a constitutionally-created branch of the government—one that is already deeply divided along partisan lines—will become even more politicized and delegitimated.” On their reading, “the most direct threat to American democracy would be judicial acquiescence to restrictions on voting rights” (2019: 426). Ginsburg and Huq have likewise noted that partisan judges, like legislators, “may be willing to allow a president to dismantle democratic governance so long as their own policy preferences are furthered” (2018a: 219). Such judicial acquiescence in the face of legislative restrictions on voting rights is indeed a significant threat, but the bigger danger to American democracy is judicial evisceration of legislative expansions of voting rights. Consider David Landau and Rosalind Dixon’s account of “abusive judicial review,” by which they mean the use of judicial power to undermine the “minimum core of electoral democracy.” Drawing on comparative evidence from a range of states experiencing democratic erosion, Landau and Dixon identify two variants of the phenomenon. In its weak form, abusive judicial review involves courts “stand[ing] by passively as democracy is dismantled”; in its strong form, it involves courts actively undermining key democratic norms and institutions (2020: 1316-17). The Roberts Court has engaged in both versions of the practice.¶ In this section, I briefly review two instances in which the contemporary Court has declined to check legislative infringements on fair democratic procedures, and two others in which it has reached out to actively thwart legislative enhancements of democratic procedures. In *Crawford v. Marion County Election Board* (2008), the Court upheld Indiana’s strict voter ID law, despite clear evidence that the photo identification requirement would “impose nontrivial burdens on the voting rights of tens of thousands of the state’s citizens . . . [with] a significant percentage of those individuals . . . likely to be deterred from voting.”¹¹ The law had been enacted on a

party-line vote in Indiana's Republican-controlled legislature, and Seventh Circuit Judge Terence Evans characterized it as "a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage electionday turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic."¹² In subsequent litigation regarding an even stricter law from Wisconsin, Circuit Judge Richard Posner noted that roughly nine percent of registered voters in the state lacked the required state-issued identification. Posner also reviewed sworn testimony from multiple registered voters who had attempted to obtain such identification, but had been unable to do so.¹³ Relying on Crawford, Posner's colleagues nonetheless upheld the Wisconsin law as well. ¶ A decade after Crawford, the Court held in *Rucho v. Common Cause* (2019) that claims of intentional and excessive partisan gerrymandering are not subject to judicial resolution under the U.S. Constitution. The case featured uncontroverted evidence that following the 2010 census, the Republican-controlled North Carolina legislature had "instructed their mapmaker to use political data to draw a map that would produce a congressional delegation of ten Republicans and three Democrats." In all recent election cycles, votes for statewide offices and aggregate votes for House candidates have evinced a state split nearly 50-50, with Democrats winning the aggregate House vote in 2012 and the Governor's race in 2016. But the Republican gerrymander successfully maintained a 10-3 GOP majority in the House delegation across three consecutive election cycles. Despite this context, Chief Justice Roberts declined to impose any constitutional limits on the drawing of district lines to "subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power," even where that desire represents the "predominant purpose" of the line-drawing.¹⁴ ¶ The central premise of Roberts's argument for allowing such partisan gerrymandering is that the Constitution grants such authority to state legislatures in the first instance (and to Congress secondarily), and hence that the American people should bring their complaints about existing districting practices to their elected representatives, not to the Court. But relying on selfinterested legislators to reform the procedures under which they themselves have been elected has the same shortcomings that it had in *Baker v. Carr* (1962), which authorized courts to weigh in when district maps featured massive departures from the principle of "one person, one vote." With the Court declining to serve as democratic guardrail, Crawford and *Rucho* are paradigmatic examples of weak-form abusive judicial review. ¶ Contrast the Court's broad posture of judicial restraint in those cases with its aggressive interference with the 2002 McCain-Feingold Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), the Court held that for-profit corporations have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited sums advocating the election or defeat of political candidates, thereby invalidating a central provision of the most significant federal campaign finance law since the Watergate era. *Citizens United* is the most notable in a long string of Roberts Court decisions invalidating campaign finance regulations, with the Court's most conservative justices repeatedly holding that state and federal legislative institutions lack authority to limit election spending.¹⁵ In *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013), the Court gutted a central provision of the Voting Rights Act, holding that Congress had unconstitutionally required certain state and local jurisdictions to get federal approval for all changes to their election laws. Technically, Roberts's opinion for the Court only invalidated the formula that determined which state and local jurisdictions were required to seek such federal "pre-clearance," but both his majority opinion and a concurrence from Justice Thomas suggested that even with a revised coverage formula, the Court's conservative majority would view such a requirement as an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty. The decision unleashed a wave of new state restrictions on voting rights—with Republican legislatures and executives enacting voter ID laws, purging voter rolls, and closing polling sites—that previously would have required federal pre-clearance (Rocco in this volume). ¶ As these examples make clear, the current Court's relevance for democratic erosion is twofold. First, it has significantly scaled back its role as an institutional check against partisan attempts to undermine fair democratic procedures. It is not yet clear that it has abandoned this role altogether, but it is fair to say that its performance is not currently reliable. Indeed, early reports from the Bright Lines Project have shown that "Judiciary can limit executive" and "Judicial independence" are among the democratic norms and institutions on which both expert and mass public confidence dropped most sharply during the Trump era (Carey, et al. 2019). Consider the Court's response to legal disputes regarding vote counting in the 2020 presidential election. Once it was clear that Joe Biden had won a decisive victory, the Court dismissed multiple frivolous lawsuits seeking to reverse the results.¹⁶ But in the weeks leading up to the election, four conservative justices had signaled that they were prepared to give a sympathetic ear to Trump campaign arguments that could have reversed an election defeat if the outcome were close.¹⁷ Justice Barrett was not yet on the Court when those disputes were heard, and there is good reason to worry that she would have provided a fifth vote in such a scenario.¹⁸ ¶ Second, the Court has proven willing on key occasions to thwart legislative attempts to enhance fair democratic procedures.¹⁹ A variety of signs indicate that this latter effort has not yet run its course. In the campaign finance context, for example, Justices Thomas and Alito have set their sights on disclosure requirements, and Senate Majority Leader McConnell echoed their arguments in a January 2019 op-ed.²⁰ On the gerrymandering front, reform advocates have used the ballot initiative process in several states to transfer redistricting authority from partisan state legislatures to non-partisan commissions. The Supreme Court upheld such an initiative from Arizona in 2015, but it did so by a vote of 5-4, with Roberts, Thomas, and Alito (along with Scalia) in dissent.²¹ If any two of Trump's three nominees agree with them, they now have the votes to hold that neither judges nor voters may take districting authority away from partisan legislators. Roberts's dissenting opinion in the Arizona case suggests that this same judicial coalition may invalidate any congressional attempt to mandate non-partisan redistricting as well (Keck 2019b). ¶ In sum, even before the Trump era, the Roberts Court was sometimes willing to actively deploy judicial power to undermine core features of

electoral democracy. President Trump's three appointments have shifted the Court's median justice substantially to the right—both in general and on voting rights in particular. As such, Democratic advocates of democracy reform have reason for concern that when they next recapture Congress and the White House, their Republican opponents will have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold. In this context, any comprehensive program of democratic preservation and renewal in the 2020s will need to grapple with the issue of court reform (Jones 2020). ¶ Conclusion: Reestablishing the Court's Role as Democratic Guardrail ¶ Calls for Court reform are a recurring feature of U.S. history. They have repeatedly been prompted by controversial actions taken by the justices themselves and by the partisan coalitions with which they are allied. Remarkably, contemporary Republican elites—acting across all three branches of the federal government—seem poised to provoke such calls in nearly every way that they have been provoked in the past. When **Biden** is sworn in as President in

January 2021, he will find himself facing a Court that has been illegitimately packed by the opposition party on its way out of power; that stands opposed to majoritarian, multi-racial democracy; and that is committed to a constitutional vision under which much of the platform on which Biden was elected is constitutionally suspect. If history is any guide, Court reform will remain on the table until President Biden's political coalition collapses or Chief Justice Roberts steers a non-obstructionist path. If neither of those paths unfold, serious discussion of Court reform is virtually inevitable. ¶ In this concluding section, then, I highlight some key lessons from our constitutional history regarding how to pursue such reforms in ways that are most beneficial for—and least risky to—democratic health. On my reading of the relevant history, some instances of attempted Court-packing contributed to democratic erosion in the United States, while others operated, on balance, to promote democratic preservation and renewal. Indeed, it seems to me incontrovertible that court-packing can be undertaken in ways that both hinder and foster democratic governance. If and when small-d democrats regain control of Hungary, Turkey, or Venezuela, would any decisions on their part to alter the size or structure of their judicial institutions be best understood as undue assaults on democratic norms? Surely we would need to know additional contextual details before reaching that judgment. As Joseph Fishkin and David Pozen have noted, “all acts of constitutional hardball create systemic risks, . . . [but] specific acts may be justified for a variety of contextual normative reasons; sound political judgment might even require that certain types of hardball be played in certain situations” (2018: 925; see also Bateman in this volume; Tushnet 2020). ¶ In the ongoing debates about how best to respond to processes of democratic erosion once they have been diagnosed, Levitsky and Ziblatt have famously called on opposition party elites to exercise forbearance, resisting the urge to respond to the authoritarian leader's normbreaking with more norm-breaking of their own. But such forbearance strategies may not be viable when facing incumbents—including judicial incumbents—who are deliberately tilting the playing field. In such circumstances, some sort of hardball opposition may be more effective at protecting and renewing democracy, particularly if small-d democracy advocates deploy such tactics in pursuit not just of their own narrow partisan interests but also pro-democratic reforms that promise to break the cycle of tit-for-tat escalation (Bateman in this volume; Pozen 2019). ¶ If systemic threats sometimes justify constitutional hardball, then scholars of democratic erosion and resilience are in good position to help policymakers reflect on how such tactics can be deployed in maximally legitimate fashion. One issue here is timing—i.e., how to know when we have reached the point where hardball tactics are merited. With regard to Court expansion, both its normative legitimacy and its political viability are likely to increase if and when the Roberts Court acts as a partisan roadblock to a Democratic administration. If the conservative justices refrain from doing so, they may be able to forestall Court reform. But the historical pattern suggests that emergence of an obstructionist Court is likely, at which point Democratic Court reformers will be emboldened. I have argued that judicial obstruction of legislative expansions of voting rights (and related democracy reforms) would provide particularly weighty justification for Court reform. In theory, the threat of such judicial contributions to democratic erosion might justify preemptive action—e.g., expanding the Court before it eviscerates a new voting rights act—but in practice, such preemptive action would require substantially greater political investment. Convincing the American public that Court packing is called for would be a tall order on any occasion, but it is more likely to succeed once the Court has begun actively obstructing a broadly popular policy agenda. ¶ In addition to the question of when to resort to hardball tactics, reformers should reflect on how to do so in ways that minimize the threat of tit-for-tat escalation. Here, one's prescription for reform is likely to depend on one's diagnosis of the systemic democratic defects in which the Court plays a role. If the chief threat to U.S. democracy is partisan polarization, then the cure is likely to involve institutional changes designed to empower centrists of both parties and to weaken their extremist flanks. If the diagnosis is partisan degradation rather than polarization—i.e., if the key defects facing American democracy are rooted not in a bipartisan refusal to compromise, but in one party's abandonment of the rules of the game—then the prescription would be different. Rather than promoting bipartisanship, the cure would involve institutional changes that weaken the structural pro-GOP biases in our electoral and policy-making systems, thereby disrupting the party's playbook for maintaining its hold on power without offering a platform that appeals to popular majorities (Bateman in this volume). ¶ To the extent possible, the goal of Court reform should be reestablishing the Court's role as democratic guardrail, not reestablishing its role as Democratic agent. Given that the reforms would be enacted by partisan legislators, some consideration of partisan payoffs is inevitable, but scholars of democratic erosion and resilience can help call attention to particular reforms that are most beneficial for (or least risky to) democratic health. On this front, Pozen (2019) has called for greater consideration of “anti-hardball” reforms, by which he means institutional changes that reduce the likelihood of constitutional hardball being played by either side moving forward. For example, when a new state legislative majority comes to power, they could respond to a prior pattern of partisan gerrymandering by creating a non-partisan redistricting commission rather than deploying a new partisan gerrymander of their own. The dilemma is that the existing gerrymandered districts may prevent a new state legislative majority from coming to power, or that a captured court might prevent the new majority from altering the redistricting procedures. ¶ With regard to Court reform, anti-hardball measures might include reducing the length of Supreme Court terms and regularizing the occurrence of Supreme Court vacancies, changes that would lower the stakes of any given nomination fight. Scholars were calling for such reforms long before Trump's election, and good government reformers have continued to advocate them (Cramton and Carrington 2005; Cramton 2007; Galston, et al. 2019). The dilemma is that most such reforms would have to survive judicial review by the existing Court. ¶ If the key defect ailing American democracy is partisan degradation rather than polarization, then even anti-hardball reforms that have in the past drawn

bipartisan support may require hardball tactics to enact (Pozen 2019). In other words, successful Court reform may require combining good government improvements to judicial selection and tenure rules with hardball efforts to wrest judicial institutions away from the anti-system party's control. The institutional design choices are complex, and I close with one recent proposal that illustrates the challenges. ¶ In September 2020, less than two weeks after Justice Ginsburg's death, Representative Ro Khanna introduced legislation that would authorize the president to nominate a Supreme Court justice every two years, during the first and third years of each four-year presidential term. Once confirmed by the Senate, each justice would serve an 18-year, non-renewable term, after which she would rotate off of active duty on the Supreme Court. The bill would eventually produce a stable Court membership of nine, but the justices sitting at the time of enactment would be grandfathered, retaining their life terms, thereby producing the possibility of a Court larger than nine until all of those sitting justices have concluded their service. 22 When the basic structure of Rep. Khanna's reform bill was first floated by advocates in 2019, conservatives held a five-to-four majority on the Court (Schwartz 2019). In that context, the combination of temporary Court expansion with permanent improvements to judicial selection and tenure rules may have seemed a workable marriage of hardball and anti-hardball reforms. With Justice Barrett having expanded the conservative majority to six justices, the horns of the dilemma have sharpened. The Khanna bill is one of a variety of anti-hardball reforms that would ameliorate the partisan degradation of the federal courts, but if those reforms cannot survive judicial review by the current Court, then it will take some form of hardball tactics to achieve them. That this dilemma faces Court reform advocates should not be surprising, as it is the same dilemma facing democracy reform more broadly. Solving it will be the central challenge of the post-Trump era in U.S. politics. ¶

AT Democracy causes Extinction

Democracy has been strong since the 1970s, turns extinction and collapse impacts

Desilver 19 – (Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic, “Pew Research Center, 5-4-2019, accessed 11-15-2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/>)

Concern has been growing for the past several years about the future of democracy, and there is considerable dissatisfaction in many countries with how democracy is working in practice. But public support for democratic ideals remains strong, and by one measure, global democracy is at or near a modern-day high. As of the end of 2017, 96 out of 167 countries with populations of at least 500,000 (57%) were democracies of some kind, and only 21 (13%) were autocracies. Nearly four dozen other countries – 46, or 28% – exhibited elements of both democracy and autocracy. Broadly speaking, the share of democracies among the world's governments has been on an upward trend since the mid-1970s, and now sits just shy of its post-World War II record (58% in 2016). To track the spread of democracy around the globe, we used the ratings contained in the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV dataset. Polity is a widely used resource in political science that analyzes and codes how political authority is gained and used in every fully independent state with a population of 500,000 or more (167 of the world's 200 or so sovereign states in the current version). Polity assesses six key factors, from openness of political participation to constraints on the chief executive, to place each country on a 21-point scale ranging from +10 (“consolidated democracy”) to –10 (“hereditary monarchy”). It doesn't rate countries whose central government has collapsed or those subject to foreign intervention or occupation. In 2017, there were three countries in the former group (Libya, Yemen and South Sudan) and one in the latter (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Following the Polity guidelines, we categorized all countries scoring from +6 to +10 as democracies, those from –6 to –10 as autocracies and everything in between as “mixed.” We then tracked the changing prevalence of democracy and autocracy over the seven decades since the end of the Second World War. In 2017, 33 countries were considered fully consolidated democracies, with a Polity rating of +10. The peak postwar year for consolidated democracies was 2006, when there were 35; since then, two (Belgium and the United States) have slipped from the top tier. Belgium fell 2 points, to +8, following its June 2007 parliamentary election, which deepened divisions between the country's French- and Flemish-speaking communities and sparked a long-running political crisis that at times threatened to split the country. The United States was docked 2 points in 2016 due to an increase in “factional competition,” and now also sits at +8. The Polity researchers noted that “political discourse in the United States had become increasingly partisan” during Barack Obama's administration, and that Donald Trump “used combative rhetoric to excite ‘populist’ support and seize the Republican Party nomination.” Trump's “surprise” Electoral College victory, they added, “polarized political competition into ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘anti-Trump’ factions.” In 1977, only 35 of the 143 countries rated by Polity (24%) qualified as democracies, while 89 (62%) were classified as autocracies of one stripe or another (including nine absolute hereditary monarchies). Although the number of democracies began edging higher in subsequent years and the number of autocracies gradually fell, half of the Polity-rated countries were still considered autocracies as recently as 1988. But democracy spread rapidly as the Cold War ended and the Soviet-led bloc – and eventually the Soviet Union itself – crumbled between 1989 and 1991. Of the 75 countries rated as autocracies in 1987, only 15 (20%) were still rated that way three decades later. More than a third (27) had become democracies, and most of the rest had mixed ratings. (One, Libya, was not rated in 2017 because of regime instability, and five other states had ceased to exist.) Among 30 new nations formed since 1987, 17 were rated as democracies in 2017, six were autocracies, four were mixed and three were not rated due to instability or foreign intervention. Polity's democracy ratings are

by no means the only ones out there, though because of differing methodologies they tell somewhat different stories. [Freedom House](#), for instance, rates 86 out of 195 countries (44%) as “free,” using criteria that include both political and civil rights. And though nearly half of the 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s [Democracy Index](#) are considered to be some form of democracy, only 12% (20) are rated as “full democracies”; nearly a third (55 countries) are counted as “flawed democracies” – including the U.S. Although our analysis of the Polity data indicates that more countries are democratic than not, at least formally, that doesn’t mean people are happy with democracy in action. In a Pew Research Center survey of 27 countries conducted last year, a global median of [51% said they were dissatisfied](#) with how democracy is working in their country, while 45% said they were satisfied. (All but one of the 27 countries in the Center’s survey are considered democratic by the Polity IV methodology; the exception is Russia, which is in the “mixed” category.) Of the countries surveyed, Sweden and the Philippines were among those with the highest levels of popular satisfaction with democracy: 69% in each nation said they were satisfied. (Indonesia, South Korea and the Netherlands weren’t far behind.) At the other end, people in Mexico, Greece, Brazil and Spain expressed the most dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in their countries.

AT: Democracy Stops War

Democracy doesn’t solve war---best models.

Campbell et al. 18, *Doctoral Candidate in Political Science, Ohio State University. **Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at the Ohio State University. ***Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. (*Benjamin W., **Skyler J. Cranmer, ***Bruce A. Desmarais, September 13, 2018, “Triangulating War: Network Structure and the Democratic Peace”, *Cornell University*, Accessible at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04141.pdf>)

Conclusion

The [dyadic understanding of the democratic peace has become ubiquitous](#) in International Relations. [By looking beyond simple dyadic analysis, accounting for the embeddedness of states in a much more complex network](#), we found the democratic peace may not be as **robust** as previously thought. Our results demonstrate that [after accounting for the tendency for like-regime states with common enemies not to fight one another](#), the effect of [the democratic peace not only vanishes, but](#) jointly [democratic dyads seem](#) to be [more conflict prone](#) than mixed dyads. [These results are consistent across operationalizations of the outcome variable, our triadic closure predictor, measurements of joint democracy, and a variety of other factors](#). We believe this explanation for the democratic peace is not a mechanism for understanding the democratic peace, but instead, an alternative. What we have shown here is that [conflict between democracies indeed exists and the peaceful relations occasionally found are not necessarily a function of the affinity of democratic states, or intrinsic attributes of democratic states, but instead, a function of the strategic inefficiencies of fighting a state with a shared enemy](#). While regime type may influence the interests of states, we find that it does not directly influence the probability that any two states fight one another.

There are three major implications to our research. First, [scholars should be hesitant to consider dyadic conflict in isolation](#), as [there are network dependencies](#) informing whether a state [engages or joins a MID](#). Second, [preferences operating in addition to network interdependencies and collaboration explain much of the democratic peace](#). Third, when studying conflict, scholars and practitioners should consider the cost structure of collaboration, and how these dynamics inform not only conflict initiation, but conflict escalation. Particularly interesting is that the theoretical mechanism at work here is dramatically simpler than any of the established justifications for the democratic peace. We do not rely on arguments about institutions or norms, but just the simple and intuitive proposition that it does not make much sense for two states fighting a third to also fight each other. What the existing literature seems to have **missed**, usually theoretically and almost always empirically, is that [dyadic conflicts do not occur in isolation, but in](#) the context of [a complex network of relations](#).

Democracy can't resolve violence

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Clearly this democratic exclusion of violence is an ideal, not a reality. It rests on various presuppositions that are unlikely to be fulfilled in the real world. First, it relies on the assumption that all interests and perspectives are in fact taken into account in the political system in question, and that therefore no person or group will feel the need to have recourse to violence outside established constitutional channels in order to make their voice heard. Second, the implication is that all political actors accept the premises that violence degrades the status of the human actor and that it is possible and desirable to resolve conflict through democracy, and that this is ethically superior to means of violent conflict. If someone believes that there is something inherently ennobling about violence, or that their own goal is an 'all or nothing' one on which there can be no compromise, or that the possible interlocutors in the democratic dialogue are not worthy of respect or of being listened to, then these considerations will make the democratic aspiration to exclude violence an impossible one to realise in practice. Finally, the presentation here of the opposition between democracy as rational and violence as irrational is open to the objection that the recourse to violence can be a perfectly rational strategy, designed to achieve political goals (including democratic ones) by means of violence: 'they (terrorists) tend often to act according to thinking which is no less strategic or rational than that of other actors in various conflicts'.¹¹ This is certainly true, since violence can be exercised in rational and strategic ways in order to achieve the inclusion offered, but not realized, by the democratic state. Yet the ultimate goal of a properly inclusive democratic society remains, so it is argued here, one of substituting the processes of debate and compromise for the physical confrontation of force between groups and individuals who see no possibility of democratic dialogue.