## 1

**The AC’s method is subversivism, positing the radical alterity of queer bodies and valorizing maximal performative deviance.**

Serano ’16 - Julia Serano [American writer, spoken-word performer, trans-bi activist; Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biophysics from Columbia U.; Post-doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley (1995-2003); Research Specialist, University of California, Berkeley (2003-2012)], Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, 2nd Ed. Berkeley: Seal Press (eBook) (2016). AT

THE MAJORITY OF MY EXPERIENCES as a trans activist and spoken word artist have taken place in what is increasingly becoming known as the “queer/trans” community. It is a subgroup within the greater LGBTIQ community that is composed mostly of folks in their twenties and thirties who are more likely to refer to themselves as “dykes,” “queer,” and/or “trans” than “lesbian” or “gay.” While diverse in a number of ways, this subpopulation tends to predominantly inhabit urban and academic settings, and is skewed toward those who are white and/or from middle-class backgrounds. In many ways**, the queer/trans community is best described as a** sort of **marriage of the transgender movement’s call to “shatter the gender binary” and the lesbian community’s pro-sex, pro-kink backlash** to 1980s-era Andrea Dworkinism. **Its politics are generally antiassimilationist**, particularly **with regard to gender and sexual expression.** This apparent limitlessness and lack of boundaries lead many to believe that “queer/trans” represents the vanguard of today’s gender and sexual revolution. However, over the last four years in which I’ve been a part of this community, **I’ve become increasingly troubled by a trend that**, while not applicable to all queer/trans folks**, seems to be becoming a dominant belief in this community, one that threatens to restrict its gender and sexual diversity.** **I call this trend subversivism**. ¶ Subversivism is the practice of extolling certain gender and sexual expressions and identities simply because they are unconventional or nonconforming. **In** the parlance of **subversivism,** these **atypical genders and sexualities are “good” because they “transgress” or “subvert” oppressive binary gender norms**.1 The justification for the practice of subversivism has evolved out of a particular reading (although some would call it a misreading) of the work of various influential queer theorists over the last decade and a half. To briefly summarize this popularized account: All forms of sexism arise from the binary gender system. Since this binary gender system is everywhere—in our thoughts, language, traditions, behaviors, etc.—the only way we can overturn it is to actively undermine the system from within. Thus, **in order to challenge sexism, people must “perform” their genders in ways that bend, break, and blur all of the imaginary distinctions that exist between male and female, heterosexual and homosexual**, and **so** on, presumably **leading to a** systemwide **binary meltdown.** According to the principles of subversivism, drag is inherently “subversive,” as it reveals that our society’s binary notions of maleness and femaleness are not natural, but rather are actively “constructed” and “performed” by all of us. Another way that one can be “transgressively gendered” is by identifying as genderqueer or genderfluid—i.e., refusing to identify fully as either woman or man.

**Subversivism invalidates people whose identities are seemingly assimilationist.**

Serano ’16 - Julia Serano [American writer, spoken-word performer, trans-bi activist; Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biophysics from Columbia U.; Post-doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley (1995-2003); Research Specialist, University of California, Berkeley (2003-2012)], Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, 2nd Ed. Berkeley: Seal Press (eBook) (2016). AT

The notion that certain gender identities and expressions are inherently “subversive” or “transgressive” can be seen throughout the queer/trans community, where drag and gender-bending are routinely celebrated, where binary-confounding identities such as “boy-identified-dyke” and “pansexual trannyfag” have become rather commonplace. On the surface**, subversivism gives the appearance of accommodating a seemingly infinite array of genders and sexualities, but this is not quite the case. Subversivism does have very specific boundaries; it has an “other.”** **By glorifying identities and expressions that appear to subvert or blur gender binaries, subversivism automatically creates a reciprocal category of people whose gender and sexual identities and expressions are by default inherently conservative, even “hegemonic,” because they are seen as reinforcing or naturalizing the binary gender system.** Not surprisingly, this often-unspoken category of bad, conservative genders is predominantly made up of feminine women and masculine men who are attracted to the “opposite” sex. ¶ One routinely sees this “dark side” of subversivism rear its head in the queer/trans community, where **it is not uncommon to hear individuals critique or call into question other queers or trans folks because their gender presentation, behaviors, or sexual preferences are not deemed “subversive” enough.** Indeed, if one fails to sufficiently distinguish oneself from heterosexual feminine women and masculine men, one runs the risk of being accused of “reinforcing the gender binary,” **an indictment that is tantamount to being called a sexist.** One of the most common targets of such critiques are transsexuals, and particularly those who are heterosexual and gender-normative post-transition. Indeed, because such transsexuals (in the eyes of others) transition from a seemingly “transgressive” queer identity to a “conservative” straight one, subversivists may even claim that they have transitioned in order to purposefully “assimilate” themselves into straight culture. While these days, such accusations are often couched in the rhetoric of current queer theory, they rely on many of the same mistaken assumptions that plagued the work of cissexist feminists like Janice Raymond and sociologists like Thomas Kando decades ago.2

**And, anti-assimilationism is classist purity politics. Turns the case and guts aff solvency.**

**Operaista 12** Gayge, IWW, a former TransFix NorCal organizer, and a former Camp Trans organizer. *Queering Anarchism: Addressing and Undressing Power and Desire*, “Radical Queers and Class Struggle: A Match to Be Made,” edited by C.B. Daring, J. Rogue, Deric Shannon, and Abbey Volcano

It is often necessary for oppressed groups to engage in class struggle autonomously—i.e., to self-organize against their specific material conditions, fight against them, and bring their struggle back to the working class as a whole. While I am about as interested in arguing the precise definition of queer as I am about arguing about how many angels can have a circle jerk on the head of a pin, it’s pretty clear what queer in general is—the state of being not-heterosexual, and/or the state of being trans, genderqueer, or gender-nonconforming. This, in the main, is the definition that has been used for “queer,” as a reclaimed term of solidarity, by queer communities in struggle for decades. While “queer” is a purposefully imprecise term, we should **avoid it becoming either a hip label or something that only belongs to those we agree with politically**. Working-class queer communities have often been targeted from both sides, first by bourgeois LGBT organizations looking for numbers and legitimacy, and by radical organizations that seek to co-opt queers and queerness that they feel comfortable with. Both sides erase and silence the queers they are not comfortable with. Ultimately, working-class queers need the ability to self-organize, and to do that they need to not be controlled by either bourgeois LGBT organizations or radical organizations coming in from the outside to lead them. While of course there are radical workingclass queers in radical organizations, working-class queer community organizations need to arise out of the self-organization of all working-class queers, and **not exclude non-radicalized queers from membership,** as people are radicalized through struggle, and **excluding them from the organs of struggle is saying that we both know best and that they are beyond change**. While queer communities have often defined “queer” too narrowly— examples of excluded groups from dyke communities being bisexuals, femmes, butch/butch and femme/femme couples, butches and femmes at some points in time, and trans women—we need to not be so broad as to be meaningless; we need to retain a notion of queer that highlights the separation from traditional notions of the family, and the additional reproductive labor (in the sense of being able to reproduce one’s labor power for the next day) that comes from being a member of an oppressed group that is in constant danger from a hostile world and lacks traditional means of support. If we want queers to be able to join in the broader class struggle (not like we haven’t been there all along), we need spaces and organizations where we can approach the class struggle from working-class queer standpoints. We need spaces where we can formulate the questions about what being a working-class queer means to our material conditions, to our exploitation under capitalism. To truly be able to do that we need spaces where we can form organizations that don’t need to make every hetero radical comfortable, and spaces that aren’t controlled by bourgeois queers. If we, ourselves, bring those spaces into being, we will be able to organize our own struggles, link them up to the larger struggles of the class, and bring queer fierceness back to the class struggle. We do not need anyone from the outside to lead us; we will do things for ourselves by focusing not on academic definitions of what it is to be queer but rather the material conditions of queer lives. The Dead End of Anti-Assimilation Anti-assimilation, in-so-much as it has been a critique of the bourgeois cooptation of movements for queer liberation, has been valuable. Antiassimilation, in-so-much as it has been hostile to seeing queer struggles as part of the larger class struggle and as it has policed the identities of queers, by casting out queers who can pass, trans people who access medical transition, monogamous queers, queers who must be closeted in their working lives to retain employment, has been a hindrance. The assimilationist/anti-assimilationist dialectic is unhelpful. The proper questions we should ask ourselves about queer organizations, movements, and struggles are: What is the class composition? Are the forms of organization a benefit or a hindrance to working-class struggle? Are the goals ones that would strengthen the working class or the bourgeoisie? In which struggles will our efforts as revolutionaries be most valuable toward our ultimate goal of communism? We must also ask how we can broaden the struggle—what opportunities does each queer struggle bring to spread to the rest of the working class? These are far more important questions to me than whether the queers participating in the struggle reach an appropriate level of anti-assimilationist purity, which often at its core is just a reflection of the stratification built into the working class, twisted on the surface, but true to that stratification at its core. Another problem with anti-assimilationist purity is, as mentioned earlier, the idea that there is a need for queers to discipline themselves to adhere to a hegemonic idea of queerness that stands in opposition to a hegemonic idea of straightness. We run into the danger of cutting out far more queers that we should desire to struggle alongside than those whom we do not wish to struggle alongside, our comrades being working-class queers who may be monogamous, vanilla, or gender-conforming, for instance.

**Radical alterity gets co-opted by larger systems of domination, naturalizing violence and reversing liberatory politics. Turns case yet again and guts solvency.**

**Sallydarity 12** Stacy, creator and editor of anarchalibrary.blogspot.com, formerly the “resources” section of anarcha.org, which provides a vast archive of items of interest to anarcha feminists. *Queering Anarchism: Addressing and Undressing Power and Desire*, “Gender Sabotage,” edited by C.B. Daring, J. Rogue, Deric Shannon, and Abbey Volcano

That said, we need to dismantle gender stratum, to separate the power dynamics attached to gender, in that masculinity often means domination, and femininity, subordination. Since men are taught to be dominating—that this is equated with masculinity (being a “real man”)—we need to make a particular point to change this. Men are denied their emotions, and as bell hooks writes, “Patriarchy both creates the rage in boys and then contains it for later use, making it a resource to exploit later on as boys become men. As a national product, **this rage can be garnered to further imperialism, hatred, and oppression of women and men globally**.”[39] At the very least it teaches men in general to be apathetic about the plight of others. Because it is instilled in men that their nature requires them to be dominating, we must **extract the domination imperative from what it means to be a man**. Hooks distinguishes patriarchal masculinity from masculinity, and this deserves further consideration. Without the naturalization of a man/woman dichotomy, masculinity and femininity (gender inclination) and all their various meanings are either exposed as social only, and/or as more about individual tendencies of personality and affinity. It is this domination that should be opposed, no matter who is doing it or in what form. No one ought to identify domination as part of who they are, nor should women excuse their own (or other women’s) participation in domination just because they believe they cannot be oppressors. This applies to male privilege, hetero privilege, class privilege, white privilege, etc., in addition to hierarchies perhaps **inadvertently created by those judging others as not revolutionary, queer, or gender nonconforming enough**. In the past there was an expectation that the radical lesbian movement (and before that, women’s suffrage) would strongly threaten the dominant order. In fact, it has been viewed as a threat, but **as we can see, it has been defeated, recuperated or co-opted under the larger system of domination.** [40] If much of radical feminism/lesbianism was really the only real threat to the system,[41] then it served the dominant order to marginalize the particularly militant tendencies and/or those of women of color, or divert the movements to re-embrace essentialism, which reinforced the order of things. Some radical feminists were certainly on to something. According to Celestine Ware, a black woman activist (1970) who was quoted in bell hooks’ Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, “Radical feminism…postulates that the domination of one human being by another is the basic evil in society. Dominance in human relationships is the target of their opposition.” Hooks comments, “As feminist movement progressed, critiques of the notion of power as domination and control were submerged as bourgeois activists began to focus on women overcoming their fear of power (the implication being that if they wanted social equality with men, they would need to participate equally in exercising domination and control over others).”[42] **Attributing violence and abuse to** the nature or necessary political position of **men gives women the opportunity to participate in domination while insisting that they can do so in a more ethical way** (or that they are by definition incapable of participating in domination). In addition, this attitude makes male violence seem inevitable and **allows us to avoid critical thinking** about systemic/institutional oppressions, such as the likelihood that capitalism and the state promote rape.[43] If rape is natural to men, then the survivors (mostly women) can rationalize that their only recourse is through the state. Yet prisons and police are not the solution to this problem. In addition, acknowledging that being a woman, queer, or transgressing gender boxes, and/or having feminist or anarchist politics **does not make one necessarily incapable of being a perpetrator of abuse and sexual assault**, we must see this as a larger project of addressing issues of consent. Additionally, uniting around the freedom to choose what will be done or not done to or with our bodies ties together many people’s struggles. As far as identity politics go, there must be some focus on identity in the sense that there are very real effects of these unreal constructs. Yet the point is to understand the gender and race divisions not only to end gender and race oppression, but to end domination totally—to undermine these crossclass alliances created in the process of power seeking to naturalize itself, its law, and its divisions. **Certainly capitalism, with the state, made the divisions between genders and races politically significant in a way that they never had been before.** This shows that much of the racism and sexism that has existed in the last few centuries is not innate, not organic, not grassroots, but rather manufactured. Part of this struggle will be in exposing the ways in which our beliefs have been shaped in the interest of power—that many of the things we consider to be natural are in fact not just man-made, but **statemade**. Illuminating the ways that our oppression is not “natural” can be done partly through the actual demonstrations and experiences of gender fluidity and queerness, sometimes referred to with other concepts as “queer.” “Queer is…an identity that problematizes the manageable limits of identity. Queer is a territory of tension, defined against the dominant narrative of white-hetero-monogamous-patriarchy, but also by an affinity with all who are marginalized, otherized, and oppressed.”[44]

**The alternative is to reject subversivism and instead challenge all forms of gender entitlement. Solves better than the aff because it fosters coalitions that actually effect material change.**

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I worry that the dominance of cissexual voices in the queer/ trans community, and **the exclusionary practice of subversivism**, are together **foster**ing **a sense of queer/trans “oneness” that excludes trans women** such as myself. My fears stem not so much from my own concern about being excluded, or for the many other subgroups not mentioned here who also feel increasingly left out of this community. Rather, I fear that **this inward, homogenizing trend represents a lost opportunity to learn from one another and to change the minds of the public at large.** If we hope to correct this insular, exclusionary trend, then **we must begin to** (once again) **think in terms of alliances rather than monolithic communities. Alliance-based activism begins with the recognition that we are all individuals, each with a limited history and experiencing a largely unique set of privileges, expectations, assumptions, and restrictions.** Thus, none of us have “superior knowledge” when it comes to sexuality and gender. **By calling ourselves an alliance, we explicitly acknowledge that we are working toward a common goal** (how about “**making the world safe and just for people of all genders and sexualities**”?), **while simultaneously recognizing and respecting our many differences.** There can be no legitimate accusations of “divisiveness” in an alliance, as differences of opinion would be expected from the start. Thinking in terms of alliances can encourage us to move beyond the single goal of creating safe queer/trans spaces, to recognize that, in reality, there is no such thing as a “safe space.” After all, the very notion of safety is often predicated on a presumed and exclusionary sense of “sameness” and “oneness.” And unlike subversivism, which fosters a grim and belittling view of the heterosexual, gender-normative majority, alliance-based gender activism recognizes that the only way we will change society is by engaging the mainstream public and working with, rather than against, our straight allies. ¶ If we hope to build alliances that are respectful of all queer and transgender perspectives, then **we must stop talking about the gender binary system, as if there is only one**. As a trans woman, I deal with lots of gender binaries: male/female, heterosexual/homosexual, cissexual/transsexual, cisgender/transgender, and so on. As someone who is marginalized in queer/trans spaces for not being “subversive” or “transgressive” enough, I find that calls to “shatter the (male/female) gender binary” sound hollow. And **when cissexual queers try to frame all forms of gender/sexual discrimination in terms of “heterosexist gender norms,” they deny** the fact that, as a transsexual woman, I experience way more **cissexist and transmisogynistic animosity and condescension** from members of my own lesbian community than I ever have from my straight friends and acquaintances. The truth is that whenever we enter a different space, or speak with a different person, we are forced to deal with a somewhat different set of binaries and assumptions. Indeed, my experience living in the San Francisco Bay Area—where most straight people I know are very comfortable with queerness, yet many queer people I know harbor subversivist attitudes toward straightness—makes it clear that there needs to be a more general strategy to challenge all forms of sexism, not just the typical or obvious ones. ¶ Rather than focusing on “shattering the gender binary,” I believe **we should turn our attention instead to challenging all forms of gender entitlement, the privileging of one’s own perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations of other people’s genders over the way those people understand themselves.** After all, **whenever we assign values to other people’s genders and sexualities—whether we call them subversive or conservative, cool or uncool, normal or abnormal, natural or unnatural—we are automatically creating or reaffirming some kind of hierarchy**. In other words, when we critique any gender as being “good” or “bad,” we are by definition being sexist. After all, isn’t what drives many of us into feminism and queer activism in the first place our frustration that other people often place rather arbitrary meanings and values onto our sexed bodies, gender expressions, and sexualities? Is there really any difference between the schoolyard bullies who teased us for being too feminine or masculine when we were little, the arrogant employer who assumes that we aren’t cut out for the job because we’re female, the gay men who claim that we are holding back the gay rights movement because we are not straight-acting enough, and the people—whether lesbian-feminists of the 1970s and 1980s, or subversivists in the 2000s—who decry us for not being androgynous enough to be “true gender radicals”?

## 2

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Prefer it:

#### No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen.

#### Extinction comes first – it’s the worst of all evils

Baum and Barrett 18 - Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

## 3

#### The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust except for space-based solar power projects.

#### SSP is viable and requires privatization.

Oberhaus 21 [DANIEL OBERHAUS, “Space Solar Power: An Extraterrestrial Energy Resource For The U.S.,” Innovation Frontier Project, August 18, 2021. <https://innovationfrontier.org/space-solar-power-an-extraterrestrial-energy-resource-for-the-u-s/>] CT

FUTURE OF SSP

The United States’ reluctance to pursue SSP can be attributed to a number of causes. In the 1970s and 80s, the exorbitant projected costs of an SSP station guaranteed that the project would not be pursued by NASA, the DOE, or the DOD. At the same time, the agency’s emphasis on developing nuclear space technologies — a trend that continues to this day — undermined enthusiasm for other ambitious energy projects like SSP. Finally, the fact that SSP is a space project meant to provide commercial levels of electrical power on Earth meant that it wasn’t obvious whether it fell within the purview of NASA or the DOE, and so both agencies were reluctant to allocate a substantial portion of their budget for its development. Today, the low cost of natural gas and renewables like wind and solar makes it seem challenging to justify a space energy project of this scale. But SSP offers several unique benefits as an energy resource, including its resiliency, its ability to provide flexible baseload power to geographically distant locations, its capacity to accelerate decarbonization directly by providing clean energy and indirectly by expediting the transition to off-world heavy industry, and its strategic benefits as a tool for diplomacy and national security. Given SSP’s benefits and the interest in the technology from most other space agencies, it’s puzzling that policymakers in the United States have not prioritized SSP R&D. The development of key technologies such as reusable rockets and thin film solar panels has finally made SSP economically and technically viable. But there is still a lot of fundamental research on SSP that needs to be done and it is in the United States’ national interest to begin this research program as soon as possible. So far, the only glimmer of hope for an American SSP program has come from the DOD’s efforts. In 2019, the Air Force Research Lab awarded a $100 million contract to Northrop Grumman as part of the new Space Solar Power Incremental Demonstrations and Research (SSPIDR) Project, which aims to develop hardware for in-orbit SSP experiments based on the design developed at Caltech.105 This is by far the United States’ largest federal expenditure on SSP R&D, but it is only a fraction of what will be required to build a large-scale SSP station and the specific technologies included in the SSPIDR program will not result in a system that could ever provide commercial power to civilians. SSP is a key tool for ensuring the prosperity and security of the United States in the latter half of the 21st century. It is imperative that NASA and the DOE prioritize the development of SSP. We believe the federal government should earmark approximately $1 billion for SSP research over the next five years with a special emphasis on advancing emerging technologies and in-space hardware demonstrations. Congress must take the first step in establishing a civilian SSP platform by directing NASA and the DOE to collaborate on a public-private initiative similar to NASA’s commercial crew program or its more recent commercial lunar payload services program. The directive must clearly delineate responsibilities between the agencies in order to avoid leadership paralysis that has stymied domestic SSP research in the past. Furthermore, a public-private program must be structured so that there is competition among multiple private companies, which must hit key milestones in order to continue receiving contracts. These contracts should be awarded with a fixed-price structure to avoid the massive cost overruns and delays that are typical of cost-plus contracts in the aerospace and defense sector. This is also an approach likely to find support among new launch providers and spacecraft manufacturers that have demonstrated the innovation that occurs when operating within the relative constraints of fixed price contracts. In fact, the main trade group for the aerospace sector has advocated for the increased use of fixed-price contracts in the past.106 Alternatively, it may be more efficient to establish a focused research organization (FRO) dedicated to SSP technologies to avoid delays associated with collaboration between two federal agencies on multi-year—and perhaps multi-decade—projects. FROs are independent entities that exist outside of national laboratories and universities. They are effectively a startup for basic research and deep technological development that requires large-scale engineering collaboration on technologies that may not yet have a market or are not readily monetizable.107 Recently, the U.S. Congress created five FRO-like centers in the DOE’s national labs as part of the National Quantum Initiative Act, which can serve as a framework for the creation of similar FROs dedicated to space solar power.108 While there are several approaches to a large-scale SSP system, we believe the most fruitful pathway is to focus on cost reduction over energy efficiency. This would prioritize highly modular systems similar to ALPHA, which benefit from the substantially reduced costs of mass manufacturing standardized components. We believe that it is possible to conduct a civilian SSP demonstration in low-Earth orbit within three years of the program’s start with less than $250 million in funding. The first phase of this program would involve conducting a series of ground tests with prototype systems over the course of about 18 months. Based on the results of this program, a system could be selected for an in-space demonstration capable of generating up to 300kw of power in low-Earth orbit. After a successful LEO demonstration mission, the next step would be to build a larger SSP system in mid-Earth orbit capable of producing commercial amounts of power (e.g., 1-10 MW). While this orbital altitude is not sufficient for maintaining the SSP system over a fixed spot on the Earth, it would stay on a fixed path so that it always passed over the same spots on the Earth. While the power from this MEO demonstrator would not be competitive with terrestrial electricity prices — we expect a cost of about $1/kwh — it would be a critical step toward proving the system’s ability to provide commercial power. We expect that the MEO demonstrator could be built and launched for approximately $1 billion. The success of the MEO demonstrator would lay the foundation for an SSP system in geostationary orbit that would be large enough to provide meaningful amounts of baseload power. We expect the initial version of this SSP system to be capable of delivering around 2 GW of solar energy to the surface. We expect that a 2 GW SSP system in geostationary orbit could be built for about $10 billion. Here we start to see the cost savings of mass manufacturing modular SSP components. This system would be capable of delivering more than 200 times more power than the MEO demonstrator for only 10 times the cost. We believe that a public-private SSP program jointly led by NASA and the DOE could result in a commercially viable SSP platform in geostationary orbit by the end of the decade. In addition to providing a critical pathway for SSP, it also has the potential to lead to substantial advancements in solar power and wireless power transmission technologies that would be useful on Earth. If policymakers do not take action on advancing domestic SSP capabilities soon, the United States will find itself losing its leadership position in space and increasingly vulnerable to natural and human-made disasters on the ground.

#### SSP solves warming. In the short term provides cheap, renewable, and flexible baseload power for on and off-world applications. It’s also key to transition heavy industry to space.

Oberhaus 21 [DANIEL OBERHAUS, “Space Solar Power: An Extraterrestrial Energy Resource For The U.S.,” Innovation Frontier Project, August 18, 2021. <https://innovationfrontier.org/space-solar-power-an-extraterrestrial-energy-resource-for-the-u-s/>] CT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What is often left unsaid in discussions about extraterrestrial industrialization and deep space settlement is how to supply the energy needed for large scale infrastructure projects. Nuclear energy has long been the power source of choice for deep space missions.2 This is largely because nuclear power systems can operate for decades without intervention and in locations where there is limited or non-existent sunlight. But nuclear energy is limited in its ability to scale and also creates serious health hazards for near-Earth operation.3 In this paper, we make the case for space-based solar power (SSP) megaprojects as relatively low-cost, scalable, renewable, and always-on power source for on-and-off world applications. Although SSP is a space-based energy asset, it has the potential to rapidly accelerate decarbonization on Earth while also fulfilling space exploration priorities. SSP is a decades-old idea that has only recently become economically viable due to the rapidly falling costs of space access and technological advancements such as higher efficiency electronics, low-cost mass-production of modular space systems like satellites, robotic in-space construction, and wireless power transmission. NASA, the Department of Energy, and several other research agencies have conducted in-depth studies and limited experiments on SSP, but the development of this energy resource was hindered by unfavorable economics. Things have changed and it is time to reconsider SSP as a valuable tool in the nation’s decarbonization strategy. This paper shows how the development of SSP can serve several national imperatives at once. In space, it can provide a renewable and cost-effective source of energy for moon bases and deep space missions. SSP can also provide a valuable source of energy — both electric and thermal — for industrial processes in cislunar space.

#### Solving warming is not all-or-nothing – every additional fraction of a degree is irreversible and costs millions of lives—prefer IPCC assessments that are the gold standard for warming consensus.

David Wallace-Wells 19 [National Fellow at New America. He is deputy editor of New York Magazine, where he also writes frequently about climate and the near future of science and technology, including his widely read and debated 2017 cover story on worst-case scenarios for global warming], *The Uninhabitable Earth: A Story of the Future* (Kindle Edition: Allen Lane, 2019), pg. 8-30, beckert

* Every degree key – each bit 🡪 hundreds of millions of lives
* IPCC🡪best ev b/c conservative estimate + still really big impact
* Now key – not reversible, feedback loops 🡪 speeds up later

There is almost no chance we will avoid that scenario. The Kyoto Protocol achieved, practically, nothing; in the twenty years since, despite all of our climate advocacy and legislation and progress on green energy, we have produced more emissions than in the twenty years before. In 2016, the Paris accords established two degrees as a global goal, and, to read our newspapers, that level of warming remains something like the scariest scenario it is responsible to consider; just a few years later, with no single industrial nation on track to meet its Paris commitments, two degrees looks more like a best-case outcome, at present hard to credit, with an entire bell curve of more horrific possibilities extending beyond it and yet shrouded, delicately, from public view.28 For those telling stories about climate, such horrific possibilities—and the fact that we had squandered our chance of landing anywhere on the better half of that curve—had become somehow unseemly to consider. The reasons are almost too many to count, and so half-formed they might better be called impulses. We chose not to discuss a world warmed beyond two degrees out of decency, perhaps; or simple fear; or fear of fearmongering; or technocratic faith, which is really market faith; or deference to partisan debates or even partisan priorities; or skepticism about the environmental Left of the kind I’d always had; or disinterest in the fates of distant ecosystems like I’d also always had. We felt confusion about the science and its many technical terms and hard-to-parse numbers, or at least an intuition that others would be easily confused about the science and its many technical terms and hard-to-parse numbers. We suffered from slowness apprehending the speed of change, or semi-conspiratorial confidence in the responsibility of global elites and their institutions, or obeisance toward those elites and their institutions, whatever we thought of them. Perhaps we felt unable to really trust scarier projections because we’d only just heard about warming, we thought, and things couldn’t possibly have gotten that much worse just since the first Inconvenient Truth; or because we liked driving our cars and eating our beef and living as we did in every other way and didn’t want to think too hard about that; or because we felt so “postindustrial” we couldn’t believe we were still drawing material breaths from fossil fuel furnaces. Perhaps it was because we were so sociopathically good at collating bad news into a sickening evolving sense of what constituted “normal,” or because we looked outside and things seemed still okay. Because we were bored with writing, or reading, the same story again and again, because climate was so global and therefore nontribal it suggested only the corniest politics, because we didn’t yet appreciate how fully it would ravage our lives, and because, selfishly, we didn’t mind destroying the planet for others living elsewhere on it or those not yet born who would inherit it from us, outraged. Because we had too much faith in the teleological shape of history and the arrow of human progress to countenance the idea that the arc of history would bend toward anything but environmental justice, too. Because when we were being really honest with ourselves we already thought of the world as a zero-sum resource competition and believed that whatever happened we were probably going to continue to be the victors, relatively speaking anyway, advantages of class being what they are and our own luck in the natalist lottery being what it was. Perhaps we were too panicked about our own jobs and industries to fret about the future of jobs and industry; or perhaps we were also really afraid of robots or were too busy looking at our new phones; or perhaps, however easy we found the apocalypse reflex in our culture and the path of panic in our politics, we truly had a good-news bias when it came to the big picture; or, really, who knows why—there are so many aspects to the climate kaleidoscope that transforms our intuitions about environmental devastation into an uncanny complacency that it can be hard to pull the whole picture of climate distortion into focus. But we simply wouldn’t, or couldn’t, or anyway didn’t look squarely in the face ﻿of the science. This is not a book about the science of warming; it is about what warming means to the way we live on this planet. But what does that science say? It is complicated research, because it is built on two layers of uncertainty: what humans will do, mostly in terms of emitting greenhouse gases, and how the climate will respond, both through straightforward heating and a variety of more complicated, and sometimes contradictory, feedback loops. But even shaded by those uncertainty bars it is also very clear research, in fact terrifyingly clear. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offers the gold-standard assessments of the state of the planet and the likely trajectory for climate change—gold-standard, in part, because it is conservative, integrating only new research that passes the threshold of inarguability. A new report is expected in 2022, but the most recent one says that if we take action on emissions soon, instituting immediately all of the commitments made in the Paris accords but nowhere yet actually implemented, we are likely to get about 3.2 degrees of warming, or about three times as much warming as the planet has seen since the beginning of industrialization—bringing the unthinkable collapse of the planet’s ice sheets not just into the realm of the real but into the present.29, 30 That would eventually flood not just Miami and Dhaka but Shanghai and Hong Kong and a hundred other cities around the world.31 The tipping point for that collapse is said to be around two degrees; according to several recent studies, even a rapid cessation of carbon emissions could bring us that amount of warming by the end of the century.32 The assaults of climate change do not end at 2100 just because most modeling, by convention, sunsets at that point. This is why some studying global warming call the hundred years to follow the “century of hell.”33 Climate change is fast, much faster than it seems we have the capacity to recognize and acknowledge; but it is also long, almost longer than we can truly imagine. In reading about warming, you will often come across analogies from the planetary record: the last time the planet was this much warmer, the logic runs, sea levels were here. These conditions are not coincidences. The sea level was there largely because the planet was that much warmer, and the geologic record is the best model we have for understanding the very complicated climate system and gauging just how much damage will come from turning up the temperature by two or four or six degrees. Which is why it is especially concerning that recent research into the deep history of the planet suggests that our current climate models may be underestimating the amount of warming we are due for in 2100 by as much as half.34 In other words, temperatures could rise, ultimately, by as much as double what the IPCC predicts. Hit our Paris emissions targets and we may still get four degrees of warming, meaning a green Sahara and the planet’s tropical forests transformed into fire-dominated savanna.35 The authors of one recent paper suggested the warming could be more dramatic still—slashing our emissions could still bring us to four or five degrees Celsius, a scenario they said would pose severe risks to the habitability of the entire planet. “Hothouse Earth,” they called it.36 Because these numbers are so small, we tend to trivialize the differences between them—one, two, four, five. Human experience and memory offer no good analogy for how we should think of those thresholds, but, as with world wars or recurrences of cancer, you don’t want to see even one. At two degrees, the ice sheets will begin their collapse, 400 million more people will suffer from water scarcity, major cities in the equatorial band of the planet will become unlivable, and even in the northern latitudes heat waves will kill thousands each summer.37, 38 There would be thirty-two times as many extreme heat waves in India, and each would last five times as long, exposing ninety-three times more people.39 This is our best-case scenario. At three degrees, southern Europe would be in permanent drought

## 4

#### TEXT: The Outer Space Treaty ought to be amended to establish an international legal trust system governing outer space.

Finoa 21 [Ivan Finoa (Department of Law University of Turin), “Building a New Legal Model for Settlements on Mars,” A. Froehlich (ed.), Assessing a Mars Agreement Including Human Settlements, Studies in Space Policy 30, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65013-1_7>]CT

7.5 A Proposal for an International Legal Trust System

Since several legal and policy issues may arise from the actual legal framework, a new international legal regime for outer space shall: (a) Provide for property rights or a lease allocation system, both incentivising investments in the space sector. The system would be supervised and led by the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). (b) Establish the rule of law in outer space. A laissez faire system could turn into anarchy whereby countries and companies could race to grab as many resources as possible bringing considerable potential conflict. (c) Recognise outer space as common heritage of mankind, instead of res communis.24 (d) Provide a sustainable exploitation of celestial bodies, to avoid the uncontrolled production of space debris or to prevent the complete exhaustion of the celestial bodies.

## 5

#### The private sector is essential for asteroid mining – competition is key and government development is not effective, efficient, or cheap enough. Thiessen 21:

Marc Thiessen, 6-1, 21, Washington Post, Opinion: SpaceX’s success is one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/01/spacexs-success-is-one-small-step-man-one-giant-leap-capitalism/

It was one small step for man, one giant leap for capitalism. Only three countries have ever launched human beings into orbit. This past weekend, SpaceX became the first private company ever to do so, when it sent its Crew Dragon capsule into space aboard its Falcon 9 rocket and docked with the International Space Station. This was accomplished by a company Elon Musk started in 2002 in a California strip mall warehouse with just a dozen employees and a mariachi band. At a time when our nation is debating the merits of socialism, SpaceX has given us an **incredible testament to the power of American free enterprise.** While the left is advocating unprecedented government intervention in almost every sector of the U.S. economy, from health care to energy, **today Americans are celebrating the successful privatization of space travel.** If you want to see the difference between what government and private enterprise can do, consider: It took a private company to give us the first space vehicle with touch-screen controls instead of antiquated knobs and buttons. It took a private company to give us a capsule that can fly entirely autonomously from launch to landing — including docking — without any participation by its human crew. It also took a private company to invent a reusable rocket that can not only take off but land as well. When the Apollo 11 crew reached the moon on July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong declared “the Eagle has landed.” On Saturday, SpaceX was able to declare that the Falcon had landed when its rocket settled down on a barge in the Atlantic Ocean — ready to be used again. That last development will save the taxpayers incredible amounts of money. The cost to NASA for launching a man into space on the space shuttle orbiter was $170 million per seat, compared with just $60 million to $67 million on the Dragon capsule. The cost for the space shuttle to send a kilogram of cargo into to space was $54,500; with the Falcon rocket, the cost is just $2,720 — a decrease of 95 percent. And while the space shuttle cost $27.4 billion to develop, the Crew Dragon was designed and built for just $1.7 billion — making it the lowest-cost spacecraft developed in six decades. SpaceX did it in six years — far faster than the time it took to develop the space shuttle. ***The private sector does it better, cheaper, faster and more efficiently than government***. Why? Competition. Today, SpaceX has to compete with a constellation of private companies — including legacy aerospace firms such as Orbital ATK and United Launch Alliance and innovative start-ups such as Blue Origin (which is designing a Mars lander and whose owner, Jeff Bezos, also owns The Post) and Virgin Orbit (which is developing rockets than can launch satellites into space from the underside of a 747, avoiding the kinds of weather that delayed the Dragon launch). In the race to put the first privately launched man into orbit, upstart SpaceX had to beat aerospace behemoth Boeing and its Starliner capsule to the punch. It did so — for more than $1 billion less than its competitor. **That spirit of competition and innovation will revolutionize space travel in the years ahead.** Indeed, Musk has his sights set far beyond Earth orbit. Already, SpaceX is working on a much larger version of the Falcon 9 reusable rocket called Super Heavy that will carry a deep-space capsule named Starship capable of carrying up to 100 people to the moon and eventually to Mars. Musk’s goal — the reason he founded SpaceX — is to colonize Mars and make humanity a multiplanetary species. He has set a goal of founding a million-person city on Mars by 2050 complete with iron foundries and pizza joints. Can it be done? Who knows. But this much is certain: **Private-sector innovation is opening the door to a new era of space exploration**. Wouldn’t it be ironic if, just as capitalism is allowing us to explore the farthest reaches of our solar system, Americans decided to embrace socialism back here on Earth?

#### Space regulation scares investors away and spills over to other space activities. Freeland 05

Steven Freeland (BCom, LLB, LLM, University of New South Wales; Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Western Sydney, Australia; and a member of the Paris-based International Institute of Space Law). “Up, Up and … Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the International Law of Outer Space.” Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 6: No. 1, Article 4. 2005. JDN. <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=cjil>

V. THE NEED FOR CELESTIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS? ¶ The fundamental principle of "non-appropriation" upon which the international law of outer space is based stems from the desire of the international community to ensure that outer space remains an area beyond the jurisdiction of any state(s). Similar ideals emerge from UNCLOS (in relation to the High Seas) as well as the Antarctic Treaty, 42 although in the case of the latter treaty, it was finalised after a number of claims of sovereignty had already been made by various States and therefore was structured to "postpone" rather than prejudice or renounce those previously asserted claims.43 In the case of outer space, its exploitation and use is expressed in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty to be "the province of all mankind," a term whose meaning is not entirely clear but has been interpreted by most commentators as evincing the desire to ensure that any State is free to engage in space activities without reference to any sovereign claims of other States. This freedom is reinforced by other parts of the same Article and is repeated in the Moon Agreement (which also applies to "other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth")." Even though both the scope for space activities and the number of private participants have expanded significantly since these treaties were finalised, it has still been suggested that the nonappropriation principle constitutes "an absolute barrier in the realization of every kind of space activity., 4 ' The amount of capital expenditure required to research, scope, trial, and implement a new space activity is significant. To bring this activity to the point where it can represent a viable "stand alone" commercial venture takes many years and almost limitless funding. From the perspective of a private enterprise contemplating such an activity, it would quite obviously be an important element in its decision when he was onboard the ISS.46

#### Asteroid mining can happen with private sector innovation and is key to solve a laundry list of impacts--climate change, economic decline and asteroid collisions. Taylor 19

Chris Taylor [journalist], 19 - ("How asteroid mining will save the Earth — and mint trillionaires," Mashable, 2019, accessed 12-13-2021, https://mashable.com/feature/asteroid-mining-space-economy)//ML

How much, exactly? We’re only just beginning to guess. [Asterank](http://www.asterank.com/), a service that keeps track of some 6,000 asteroids in NASA’s database, prices out the estimated mineral content in each one in the current world market. More than 500 are listed as “>$100 trillion.” The estimated profit on just the top 10 asteroids judged “most cost effective” — that is, the easiest to reach and to mine, subtracting rocket fuel and other operating costs, is around $1.5 trillion.¶ Is it ours for the taking? Well, here’s the thing — we’re taking it already, and have been doing so since we started mining metals thousands of years ago. Asteroid strikes are the only reason rare metals exist in the Earth’s crust; the native ones were all sucked into our planet’s merciless iron core millions of years ago. Why not go to the source?¶ As a side project, space mining can grab water from the rocks and comets — water which, with a little processing makes rocket fuel. Which in turn makes even more currently unimaginable space operations possible, including ones that could give the planet all the energy it needs to avert climate catastrophe. Cislunar space — the bit around us and the moon, the local neighborhood, basically — is about to get very interesting.¶ It’s hard, even for the most asteroid-minded visionaries, to truly believe the full scope of this future space economy right now. Just as hard as it would have been in 1945, when an engineer named Vannevar Bush first proposed [a vast library of shared knowledge that people the world over would access via personal computers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memex), to see that mushroom into a global network of streaming movies and grandmas posting photos and trolls and spies who move the needle on presidential elections. ¶ No technology’s pioneer can predict its second-order effects.¶ The space vision thing is particularly difficult in 2019. Not only do we have plenty of urgent problems with democracy and justice to keep us occupied, but the only two companies on the planet to have gone public with asteroid-mining business plans, startups that seemed to be going strong and had launched satellites already, were just bought by larger companies that are, shall we say, less comfortable executing on long-term visions.¶ Planetary Resources was founded in 2012 in a blaze of publicity. Its funding came from, among others, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, Ross Perot, and the country of Luxembourg. It had inked an orbital launch deal with Virgin Galactic. And it was sold last October to a blockchain software company. (To 21st century readers, this paragraph would look like I’m playing tech world mad libs.)¶ In January, the other company, Deep Space Industries, also partly funded by Luxembourg (way to get in the space race, Luxembourg!), was sold to Bradford Space, owned by a U.S. investment group called the American Industrial Acquisition Corporation. Maybe these new overlords plan on continuing their acquisitions' asteroid mining endeavors rather than stripping the companies for parts. Both companies have been notably silent on the subject. “The asteroid mining bubble has burst,” [declared The Space Review](http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3633/1), one of the few online publications to even pay attention.¶ That’s also to be expected. After all, anyone trying to build Google in 1945 would go bankrupt. Just as the internet needed a half-dozen major leaps forward in computing before it could even exist, space industry needs its launch infrastructure.¶ Currently, the world’s richest person and its most well-known entrepreneur, Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk, respectively, are working on the relatively cheap reusable rockets asteroid pioneers will need. (As I was writing this, Bezos announced in an email blast that one of his New Shepherd rockets had flown to space and back five times like it was nothing, delivering 38 payloads for various customers while remaining entirely intact.) ¶ Meanwhile, quietly, Earth’s scientists are laying the groundwork of research the space economy needs. Japan’s Hayabusa 2 spacecraft has been in orbit around asteroid Ryugu for the last year and a half, learning everything it can. (Ryugu, worth $30 billion according to Asterank, is the website's #1 most cost-effective target.) The craft dropped [tiny hopping robot rovers](https://www.space.com/41941-hayabusa2-asteroid-rovers-hopping-tech.html) and a [small bomb](https://www.space.com/japan-hayabusa2-asteroid-bomb-video.html) on its target; pictures of the small crater that resulted were released afterwards.¶ Officially, the mission is to help us figure out how the solar system formed. Unofficially, it will help us understand whether all those useful metals clump together at the heart of an asteroid, as some theorize. If so, it’s game on for asteroid prospectors. If not, we can still get at the metals with other techniques, such as optical mining (which basically involves sticking an asteroid in a bag and drilling with sunlight; sounds nuts to us, but [NASA has proved it in the lab](https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/niac/2017_Phase_I_Phase_II/Sustainable_Human_Exploration/)). It’ll just take more time.¶ Effectively, we’ve just made our first mark at the base of the first space mineshaft. And there’s more to come in 2020 when Hayabusa 2 returns to Earth bearing samples. If its buckets of sand contain a modicum of gold dust, tiny chunks of platinum or pebbles of compressed carbon — aka diamonds — then the Duchy of Luxembourg won’t be the only deep-pocketed investor to sit up and take notice.¶ The possibility of private missions to asteroids, with or without a human crew, is almost here. The next step in the process that takes us from here to where you are? Tell us an inspiring story about it, one that makes people believe, and start to imagine themselves mining in space. How would you explain the world-changing nature of the internet to 1945? How would you persuade them that there was gold to be mined in Vannevar Bush’s idea? You’d let the new economy and its benefits play out in the form of a novel.¶ As Hayabusa dropped a bomb on Ryugu, Daniel Suarez was making the exact same asteroid the target of his fiction. Suarez is a tech consultant and developer turned New York Times bestselling author. His novels thus far have been techno-thrillers: his debut, [Daemon](https://www.amazon.com/dp/B003QP4NPE/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1), a novel of Silicon Valley’s worst nightmare, AI run rampant, made more than a million dollars.¶ So it was a telling shift in cultural mood that Suarez’s latest thriller is also a very in-depth description of — and thinly-disguised advocacy for — asteroid mining. In [Delta-v](https://www.amazon.com/Delta-v-Daniel-Suarez-ebook/dp/B07FLX8V84/ref=sr_1_1?crid=UMNUUSR3NCBX&keywords=delta-v&qid=1556930756&s=digital-text&sprefix=delta-v%2Cdigital-text%2C204&sr=1-1), published in April, a billionaire in the 2030s named Nathan Joyce recruits a team of adventurers who know nothing about space — a world-renowned cave-diver, a world-renowned mountaineer — for the first crewed asteroid mission.¶ Elon Musk fans might expect this to be Joyce’s tale, but he soon fades into the background. The asteroid-nauts are the true heroes of Delta-v. Not only are they offered a massive payday — $6 million each for four years’ work — they also have agency in key decisions in the distant enterprise. Suarez deliberately based them on present-day heroes. The mission is essential, Joyce declares, to save Earth from its major problems. First of all, the fictional billionaire wheels in a fictional Nobel economist to demonstrate the actual truth that the entire global economy is sitting on a [mountain of debt](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-247-trillion-global-debt-bomb/2018/07/15/64c5bbaa-86c2-11e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5fb3ff1155d9). It has to keep growing or it will implode, so we might as well take the majority of the industrial growth off-world where it can’t do any more harm to the biosphere.¶ Secondly, there’s the climate change fix. Suarez sees asteroid mining as the only way we’re going to build [solar power satellites](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space-based_solar_power). Which, as you probably know, is a form of uninterrupted solar power collection that is theoretically more effective, inch for inch, than any solar panels on Earth at high noon, but operating 24/7. (In space, basically, it’s always double high noon). ¶ The power collected is beamed back to large receptors on Earth with large, low-power microwaves, which researchers think will be harmless enough to let humans and animals pass through the beam. A space solar power array like [the one China is said to be working on](https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottsnowden/2019/03/12/solar-power-stations-in-space-could-supply-the-world-with-limitless-energy/#2d3f78a54386) could reliably supply 2,000 gigawatts — or over 1,000 times more power than the largest solar farm currently in existence. ¶ “We're looking at a 20-year window to completely replace human civilization's power infrastructure,” Suarez told me, citing the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the coming catastrophe. Solar satellite technology “has existed since the 1970s. What we were missing is millions of tons of construction materials in orbit. Asteroid mining can place it there.”¶ The Earth-centric early 21st century can’t really wrap its brain around this, but the idea is not to bring all that building material and precious metals down into our gravity well. Far better to create a whole new commodities exchange in space. You mine the useful stuff of asteroids both near to Earth and far, thousands of them taking less energy to reach than the moon. That’s something else we’re still grasping, how relatively easy it is to ship stuff in zero-G environments. ¶ Robot craft can move 10-meter boulders like they’re nothing. You bring it all back to sell to companies that will refine and synthesize it in orbit for a myriad of purposes. Big pharma, to take one controversial industry, would [benefit by taking its manufacturing off-world](https://medium.com/fitch-blog/why-is-big-pharma-interested-in-the-space-economy-c078ac1bf67c). The molecular structure of many chemicals grows better in microgravity.¶ The expectation is that a lot of these space businesses — and all the orbital infrastructure designed to support them — will be automated, controlled remotely via telepresence, and monitored by AI. But Suarez is adamant that thousands if not millions of actual human workers will thrive in the space economy, even as robots take their jobs in old industries back on Earth.¶ “Our initial expansion into space will most likely be unsettled and experimental. Human beings excel in such environments,” he says. “Humans can improvise and figure things out as we go. Robots must be purpose-built, and it's going to take time and experience for us to design and build them.”¶ Which is another way startups back on Earth will get rich in the new economy: designing and building those robots, the nearest thing to selling picks and shovels to prospectors in the space gold rush. Thousands of humans in space at any one time will also require the design and construction of stations that spin to create artificial gravity. Again, this isn’t a great stretch: Using centrifugal force to simulate gravity in space was first proposed by scientists in the 19th century. NASA has had workable designs for spinning cislunar habitats called [O’Neill cylinders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder) since the 1970s. We just haven’t funded them. ¶ But the trillionaires clearly will.¶ In short, Suarez has carefully laid out a vision of the orbital economy that offers something for everyone in our divided society. For Green New Deal Millennials, there’s the prospect of removing our reliance on fossil fuels at a stroke and literally lifting dirty industries off the face of the planet. For libertarians and other rugged individualists, there’s a whole new frontier to be developed, largely beyond the reach of government. ¶ For those who worry about asteroids that could wipe out civilization — though luckily, [this isn't likely to happen any time soon](https://mashable.com/article/armageddon-asteroid-threat) — here is a way for humanity to get proficient in moving them out of the way, fast. Indeed, the National Space Society has offered [a proposal](https://space.nss.org/technologies-for-asteroid-capture-into-earth-orbit/) to capture the asteroid Aphosis (which is set to miss Earth in the year 2029, but [not by a very comfortable margin](https://www.space.com/asteroid-apophis-2029-flyby-planetary-defense.html)), keep it in orbit, and turn it into 150 small solar-power satellites, as a proof of concept. ¶ For the woke folks who care about the bloody history of diamond production, there’s the likelihood that space mining would wipe out Earth’s entire diamond industry. “They will be found in quantities unattainable on Earth,” claims Suarez, with good reason. We are starting to discover that there is more crystalized carbon in the cosmos than we ever suspected. Astronomers have identified one [distant planet made entirely of diamond](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2014/06/24/diamond-the-size-of-earth/); there may be more, but they are, ironically, hard to see. ¶ We don’t have diamond planets in our solar system (and we can’t do interstellar missions), but we do have diamond-studded asteroids. Mine them for long enough and you will wear diamonds on the soles of your shoes.¶ For investors and entrepreneurs, there is the thrill of racing to be the first member of the four-comma club. ([Neil deGrasse Tyson believes that the first trillionaire will be an asteroid mining mogul](https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/neil-degrasse-tyson-says-space-ventures-will-spawn-first-trillionaire-n352271); Suarez isn’t sure whether they’ll be the first, but he suspects that asteroid mining “will mint more trillionaires than any industry in history.”) ¶ For the regular guy or gal with a 401K, there’ll be a fast-rising stock market — inflated not by financial shenanigans this time, but an actual increase in what the world counts as wealth.¶ For workers, there is the promise of sharing in the untold riches, both legally and otherwise. It would be hard to stop miners attaining mineral wealth beyond their paycheck, under the table, when your bosses are millions of miles away. Then there’s the likelihood of rapid advancement in this new economy, where the miners fast gain the knowledge necessary to become moguls.¶ “After several tours in space working for others, perhaps on six-month or year-long contracts, it's likely that some workers will partner to set up their own businesses there,” says Suarez. “Either serving the needs of increasing numbers of workers and businesses in space, marketing services to Earth, or launching asteroid mining startups themselves.” All in all, it’s starting to sound a damn sight more beneficial to the human race than the internet economy is. Not a moment too soon. I’ve written encouragingly about asteroid mining several times before, each time touting the massive potential wealth that seems likely to be made. And each time there’s been a sense of disquiet among my readers, a sense that we’re taking our rapacious capitalist ways and exploiting space.¶ Whereas the truth is, this is exactly the version of capitalism humanity has needed all along: the kind where there is no ecosystem to destroy, no marginalized group to make miserable. A safe, dead space where capitalism’s most enthusiastic pioneers can go nuts to their hearts’ content, so long as they clean up their space junk. ¶ ([Space junk](https://mashable.com/category/space-junk) is a real problem in orbital space because it has thousands of vulnerable satellites clustered closely together around our little blue rock. The vast emptiness of cislunar space, not so much.)¶ And because they’re up there making all the wealth on their commodities market, we down here on Earth can certainly afford to focus less on growing our stock market. Maybe even, whisper it low, we can afford a fully functioning social safety net, plus free healthcare and free education for everyone on the planet.¶ It’s also clearly the area where we should have focused space exploration all along. If we settle on Mars, we may disturb as-yet-undiscovered native bacteria — and as the character Nathan Joyce shouts at a group of “Mars-obsessed” entrepreneurs in Delta-V, Mars is basically filled with toxic sand and is thus looking increasingly impossible to colonize. (Sorry, Mark Watney from The Martian, those potatoes would probably kill you.)

## 6

**Interp: “Unjust” is defined by Oxford Languages:**

“Unjust” (n.d.) Retrieved Jan. 22, 2022. *Google.com* – Definitions from Oxford Langauges

not based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.

"resistance to unjust laws"

**This entails that the affirmative must advocate a topical change in the status quo.**

**Violation: They don’t defend a course of action.**

**1. Justice is normative. To say that something is unjust entails that it ought to be stopped or redressed. The aff advocacy is a meaningless abstraction unless it defends a course of action.**

**2. Truth testing is awful.**

**A) It turns an urgent public policy question into an esoteric question of philosophical labels, which kills real world decision-making skills – i.e. without a plan there is no counterplan or disad ground;**

**B) It turns negating into an endless quest for counterwarrants, which make the debate irresolvable because we don’t know how many counterwarrants justify a neg ballot, and kills clash because the discussion is about assessing the salience of extreme examples rather than engaging with a competing advocacies.**

**C) It kills precision by forcing both sides to defend sweeping generalizations that no responsible scholar would ever defend without qualification. Plans require more rigorous scholarship.**

**Don’t let them say that the resolution has no actor or verb. Their advocacy only needs to entail the resolution to be topical. Proving that a plan baring the private appropriation of outer space by private entities produces the most just world proves the resolution true. They get to choose which actor would best accomplish this objective because a plan with any actor might entail the resolution.**

**Don’t let them say the interp is unpredictable – the Aff read a plan in virtually every round at College Prep and Harvard-Westlake.**

## Case

#### The ROB is to determine the desirability of the aff. Anything else is a self-serving and arbitrary way to gut NC generics and ensure we can’t catch up, justifying infinite unpredictable affs and destroying fairness and clash. Weigh the aff against a competitive alt – there is no argument free of ideology which means going for prefiat impacts leaves material oppression in place. Reps first is nonsense – if our positions are a good idea, then the reps advocating it are valuable.

#### The aff doesn’t reject normativity – they establish a rule that all private appropriation is objectively bad. Legal normativity is good and objective morality good – the Holocaust is always bad

1. Turn - preventing private space appropriation means the status quo of currently or formerly anti-queer governments being the strongest space powers.
2. If their plan entails more than the decolonization of space by private entities, it’s extra-T and you should vote them down – they prevent us from garnering solvency from the second turn and from making critical distinctions between actors, which is a) unfair because they are at a competitive advantage and b) not educational because they aren’t forced into defending the implications of the resolution so
3. Decolonizing space has zero impact because nobody lives in space

### Space col

### **Reproductive futurism**

#### Queer pessimism has a totalizing view of queer optimism and leads to inaction against queer oppression. Snediker ‘09

Snediker, Michael D. [poet and a scholar of American literature and disability theory. He was a Queens National Scholar and Associate Professor of American Literature at Queen’s University], Queer Optimism: Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions. University of Minnesota Press, 2009.

Edelman's queer pessimism, by contrast, insistent on its own absolute non-enigmatic unequivocality, might suggest the draconian bravura of a superego were Edelman's project not so pitted against the superego, pitted against all forms of stable identity except the "irreducible" (No Future 6) identity of the death drive. Though moving beyond the strictures of psychoanalysis, it is difficult for me not to hear in the sheer absoluteness of Edelman's dicta something like a superego's militancy. Edelman insists that "the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive we're called on to figure" (30). Edelman, as the passage I've cited suggests, doesn't seem to leave queers a lot of options, even as the option he adjures hardly seems self-evident. The egregious militancy of No Future presents an apogee of what I've been calling queer pessimism. Or if not an apogee, then a sort of pessimism-drag. My own thinking differs from Edelman's in many ways, and might often go without saying.18 How, for instance, could a project attached to queer optimism not bristle at a book that insists unilaterally that "the only oppositional status" available to queers demands fealty to the death drive? Edelman's book certainly trounces optimism, but the optimism he trounces is not the optimism for which my own project lobbies. Edelman writes thus: The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law . . . that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines us and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. (5) As I've made clear, and as this essay's final section will make clearer, queer optimism is no more attached to "the logic of political hope" than No Future is. Even as I think there are some forms of hope worth defending, I'm not interested, for present purposes, in demarcating good and bad hopes, hegemonic and nonhegemonic attachments to futurity. To the extent that my own project seeks to recuperate optimism's potential critical interest by arguing for its separability from the promissory, I'm here insisting that there are ways of resisting a pernicious logic of "reproductive futurism" besides embodying the death drive. If Edelman opines that all forms of optimism eventually lead to Little Orphan Annie singing "Tomorrow," and therefore that all forms of optimism must be met with queer death-driven irony's "always explosive force" (31), I oppositely insist that optimism's limited cultural and theoretical intelligibility might not call for optimism's grandiose excoriation, but for optimism to be rethought along non-futural lines. Edelman's hypostasization of optimism accepts optimism as at best simplistic and at worst fascistic. This hypostasization leaves unthinkable queer optimism's own proposition that the reduction of optimism to a diachronic, futurally bound axis is itself the outcome of a machinery that spits out optimism as junk, and renders suspicious any form of "enjoyment" that isn't a (mis)translation of jouissance, "a violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, meaning, and law" (25), the production of "identity as mortification." Enjoyment, anyone?19

#### **Preventing conflicts and preserving rights is not inherently anti-queer, and the aff maintains queer abjection**

Powers, Prof @ Roehampton University, 9

(Nina, “Non-Reproductive Futurism,” borderlands, vol.8 No.2, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no2_2009/power_futurism.pdf>)

Edelman’s desire to conflate all politics with reproductive futurism does an injustice to the politics behind some of the historical shifts in the way abortion, for example, has been conceived. Even in the examples Edelman himself gives of anti-reproductive movements, he is quick to state that these campaigns for abortion rights frame the argument in terms of a ‘fight for our future – for our daughters and sons’ (Edelman, 2004: 3). But, whilst it is true that the anti-abortion debate (especially in America) is often played out on the territory of the right (where the rhetoric of pro-life reigns), it is certainly not the case in other parts of the world that abortion is defended in the name of those children already born, i.e. trapped in the framework of reproductive futurity. Elsewhere, it is the rationality of the woman, her ability to make economic and pragmatic decisions that feature foremost in any debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion. Historically, too, discussions about abortion took place in broader contexts that stressed abortion alongside questions of the equal right to work, progressive notions of family structure and so on. Before Stalin repealed the laws, the Soviet Union under Lenin was the first to provide free and on demand abortions. These laws were couched not in terms of ‘life,’ but in terms of pragmatism predicated on a notion of political equality. As Wendy Z. Goldman puts it: Soviet theorists held that the transition to capitalism had transformed the family by undermining its social and economic functions. Under socialism, it would wither away and under communism, it would cease to exist entirely. (Goldman, 1993: 11) Unless the family is considered in its social and economic function, it makes no sense to speak of its power as an image, however powerful this image might be. Edelman ultimately concedes far too much to a very narrow ideological image of the family that, whilst pernicious, is easier to undo with reference to history and practice than he seems to think. As Tim Dean puts it: ‘the polemical ire that permeates No Future seems to have been appropriated wholesale from the rightwing rants to which he recommends we hearken’ (Dean, 2008: 126). In the first section I tried to identify some of the contradictions between the contemporary family and the demands of capitalism, while above I gave examples of politics not based on reproduction and reproduction not based on futurity: what follows from this is that there are important historical shifts in the way in which the family and the image of the child comes to shift in and out of focus. Take the discussions surrounding in vitro fertilisation. First viable as a reproductive practice in the late 1970s, early artificial insemination was regarded as a ‘paganistic and atheistic’ practice (Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 11). Now, however, despite the wastage of potential viable embryos in the process, it is generally regarded as a practical option for infertile couples. Here the contradictions of contemporary social feeling towards children is exposed once again: reproductive futurism turns out not to be invested in all children, but only those it chooses to keep out of a pragmatism enabled by technology. Edelman talks about the ‘morbidity inherent in fetishization as such’ when opponents of abortion use photos of foetuses to highlight the proximity of the foetus to the ‘fully-formed child’ (Edelman, 2004: 41). He is right that morbidity and the politics of life seem to go hand-inhand, but then proceeds to argue that it is the queer alone that has a duty to remain true to this morbidity, to expose the ‘misrecognised’ investments of ‘sentimental futurism’: The subject … must accept its sinthome, its particular pathway to jouissance … This, I suggest, is the ethical burden to which queerness must accede in a social order intent on misrecognising its own investment in morbidity, fetishisation, and repetition: to inhabit the place of meaninglessness associated with the sinthome; to figure an unregenerate, and unregenerating, sexuality whose singular insistence on jouissance, rejecting every constraint imposed by sentimental futurism, exposes aesthetic culture – the culture of forms and their reproduction, the culture of Imaginary forms – as always already a “culture of death” intent on abjecting the force of a death drive that shatters the tomb we call life. (Edelman, 2004: 47-8) This does not exactly seem like a revelation. We live for the most part in pragmatic acceptance of this culture of death. It hardly shocks us when, for example, statistics reveal that, in 2004, 60% of women who had abortions had already given birth to at least one child (Sharples, 2008). Those people most identified with children – mothers – turn out, quite often, to deal with ‘life’ rather more pragmatically than we might otherwise believe. Edelman has to ignore historical and current examples of abortion rights campaigns, and other attitudes towards the family, in order to shoehorn all politics into a single vision to which he then opposes his notion of the queer. As Brenkman puts it: ‘To grant the Right the status of exemplary articulators of “the” social order strikes me as politically self-destructive and theoretically just plain wrong’ (Brenkman, 2002: 177). There are genuine moments of historical and political importance in terms of thinking about the family that seem to escape Edelman’s dismissal of politics as inevitably futural. We do not need to give up on politics altogether, whilst still accepting that the image of the child is a massive ideological obstacle. Rancière’s notion of political equality (‘Politics … is that activity which turns on equality as its principle’ (Rancière, 1999: ix)) neither concedes ground to politics as it appears (the ordering of the state, the police, a supposed consensus) nor does it think that politics is impossible or nondesirable, as Edelman does. We must ask: is all politics conservative by definition? Does negativity or resistance to existing power structures always translate back into some stable and positive form? The examples of the kibbutzim and the various contradictions in the ideology and practices of contemporary reproduction make it clear that Edelman, whilst having a strong argument about the shape that the ideology of the child takes, has to ignore the unstable compromises that the contemporary world has already made with itself regarding life and death in reproduction. Alan Sinfield has questioned whether we should really conflate all political aspirations with Edelman’s conception of reproductive futurism: ‘perhaps reproductive futurism is capturing and abusing other political aspirations and they should be reasserted’ (Sinfield, 2005: 50). It is not, then, that all politics is reproductively futural, but that this image has come to pervert other political desires, which may have a more complex relationship to children and a progressive conception of humanity. Edelman polemically dismisses the ‘left’ attitude to the queer, as ‘nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification’ (Edelman, 2004: 28). Whilst a certain strain of leftist thinking does pursue this demystificatory line (arguing, for example, that many forms of sexual expression are ‘natural’), Edelman reduces the left position on sexuality to a simple question of acceptance, as a way of arguing that the queer can mean nothing to the left. But there are, as indicated above, quite different ways of thinking about the family (in a non-futural, non-ideological way) and about politics, and the two together. When Rancière discusses the ‘subject of politics’, he makes it clear that: The subject of politics can precisely be identified neither with “humanity” and the gatherings of a population, nor with the identities defined by constitutional texts. They are always defined by an interval between identities, be these identities determined by social relations or juridical categories. (Rancière, 2006a: 59) Could this ‘interval between identities’ be the jouissance that Edelman aligns with the queer? Whilst Edelman’s psychoanalytic subject could in no way be understood as a similar (non)entity to Rancière’s ‘subject of politics,’ this idea of the interval seems to indicate a site of noncapture that could be described in a certain sense as ‘queer.’ In Edelman’s response to John Brenkman he states that: ‘Sexuality refuses demystification as society refuses queerness’ (Edelman, 2002: 181-5). By reifying sexuality as something that ‘refuses’ meaning, Edelman oddly substantialises it; Rancière’s way out of the identities determined by social relations or juridical categories is much less dependent on any pre-existing identity, even though he retains the very concept of politics that Edelman rejects. There seems to be no reason why the subject of politics for Rancière couldn’t be a ‘queer’ subject in Edelman’s sense, at the same time as reclaiming a notion of rationality away from the categories of the state. Before turning to a brief summary of this tentative queer rationalism, one more structural element of Edelman’s argument will be addressed: that of the death drive.

#### AFF glosses over key nodes of cultural hegemony and their project gets side-lined

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(Daniel, “WHAT MAKES AN EFFECTIVE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT? THEME-ISSUE INTRODUCTION,” International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 13, Number 1, <https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol13_1/IJPS13n1%20Intro%20-%20Lieberfeld.pdf>)

Important definitional considerations concern the temporal and issue dimensions of antiwar protest. Opposition to a particular war motivates some movements. These ad hoc movements seek to change government policy regarding a specific, ongoing war. While this goal may be linked to other political agendas—be they anti-militarist, feminist, anti-imperialist, pro-democracy, and so forth—these are secondary to the primary focus on bringing a particular war to an end. The time-horizon of such movements is limited and they typically dissolve or become inactive after the war ends. A different type of antiwar activism transcends protest against specific wars. It has a more extensive temporal dimension and greater prominence of ideologically based motives and goals—such as pacifism, or liberal internationalism that seeks to institutionalize world order through the United Nations or a federation of countries. Ongoing protests by secular pacifist groups or by peace churches against armaments and militarism can have much more diffuse goals than do ad hoc antiwar movements. In addition to disarmament, these goals may include strengthening of international disputeresolution processes, promoting international understanding, and peace education. One can designate ad hoc protests “antiwar movements” and more ideologically motivated and long-running protests “peace movements”—although these categories are not mutually exclusive and protesters against particular wars may also have transcendent ideological motives. Open-ended, more ideologically motivated movements may have less potential, at least in the near term, to influence public opinion and change public policy.

#### Reform makes revolution more likely. Rejecting it condescendingly asserts the possibility of radical change is better than the certainty of real improvement.

**Delgado ’87 -** Delgado, Richard [teaches civil rights and critical race theory at University of Alabama School of Law. He has written and co-authored numerous articles and books], “The Ethereal Scholar:  Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?”, Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 1987

Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society.38 Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. 39 Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just.40 In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.41 To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. 42

**The** CLS **critique of piecemeal reform is** familiar, **imperialistic and wrong.** **Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand.**43 **The critique** is imperialistic in that it **tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them.**4

### Impact Turns

#### Every delay kills trillions of humans

Bostrom 3 – Department of Philosophy, Yale University, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, 2002 (Nick, “Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” Preprint, Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 308-314, http://www.nickbostrom.com/astronomical/waste.html)

As I write these words, suns are illuminating and heating empty rooms, unused energy is being flushed down black holes, and our great common endowment of negentropy is being irreversibly degraded into entropy on a cosmic scale. These are resources that an advanced civilization could have used to create value-structures, such as sentient beings living worthwhile lives. The rate of this loss boggles the mind. One recent paper speculates, using loose theoretical considerations based on the rate of increase of entropy, that the loss of potential human lives in our own galactic supercluster is at least ~10^46 per century of delayed colonization