# Neg

### Legal Trust CP

#### TEXT: The Outer Space Treaty ought to be amended to establish an international legal trust system governing outer space.

Finoa 21 [Ivan Finoa (Department of Law University of Turin), “Building a New Legal Model for Settlements on Mars,” A. Froehlich (ed.), Assessing a Mars Agreement Including Human Settlements, Studies in Space Policy 30, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65013-1_7>]CT

7.5 A Proposal for an International Legal Trust System

Since several legal and policy issues may arise from the actual legal framework, a new international legal regime for outer space shall: (a) Provide for property rights or a lease allocation system, both incentivising investments in the space sector. The system would be supervised and led by the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). (b) Establish the rule of law in outer space. A laissez faire system could turn into anarchy whereby countries and companies could race to grab as many resources as possible bringing considerable potential conflict. (c) Recognise outer space as common heritage of mankind, instead of res communis.24 (d) Provide a sustainable exploitation of celestial bodies, to avoid the uncontrolled production of space debris or to prevent the complete exhaustion of the celestial bodies’ masses or their natural orbits.25 The United Nations should manage the ordered and sustainable economic development in outer space for the present and future generations. (e) Prevent the militarisation of outer space and favours the international collaboration, which are the same aims of the Outer Space Treaty’ drafters. (f) Consider the weak points of the Moon Agreement which led to nations’ refusal to sign. Only a widely accepted agreement would have the power of law in the international context.

The abovementioned requirements could be met by establishing an international Legal Trust System (ILTS). A trust is an arrangement that assigns assets to one or more trustees that will manage them in the interest of one or more beneficiaries. The latter may include the trustee or the settlor.26 Translated in the ILTS, mankind would assume the role of settlor and beneficiary of the outer space resources. The UNOOSA would act as main trustee of outer space resources and trading property rights and leases to companies and countries. The rights over the celestial bodies or over its resources would depend on the nature of the celestial body itself. For example, property rights are preferable to a lease over asteroids, as they could just disappear after the exploitation. Both leases and property rights can be provided over lands and mining sites on Mars. Leases or defeasible titles are preferable for some land mass on those celestial bodies which could hypothetically be used by humankind pending an Earth disaster. In the case of lucrative activities, such as mining, companies will choose whether to get the exclusive use over the resource through payment of the lease or through annual payment linked to net proceeds or to production charges.

7.6 The Functioning of the International Legal Trust System

When a company is interested in leasing or buying an outer space resource, before starting any operations, it must send a plan of work to the United Nations. The plan of work shall include all the details of the activity that would be carried out; it shall be consistent with pre-established parameters of sustainability and shall not interfere with other space activities. If the UN approves the company plan of work, the country of the company assumes the role of co-trustee for the specific resource. Thus, as a cotrustee, countries must investigate whether all activities of their national companies are consistent with the plan of work authorised by the UN. These supervisory duties would be added to the responsibility of nations for all space objects that are launched within their territory.27 The UN, as main trustee, would oversee that countries are performing their duties. This model would be the ordinary one. There would be also an extraordinary model, in which the UN would be the only trustee. This model would be possible in two instances: when the country of the applicant for a private company is not technologically able to act as a trustee or when the applicant of the activity is a country itself. Furthermore, as stated previously, the beneficiaries of this trust are the countries of the world and their citizens; hence all mankind would take concrete profit from lease transactions and benefit sharing. The income from the sales, leases and benefit sharing can be distributed to mankind by financing international global goals, following a similar model of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015, which addressed poverty, inequality, climate change, environmental degradation, and peace and justice. Finally, the International Legal Trust System would meet acceptance because every country would obtain benefit sharing to improve its living standard and space faring nations would rely on property rights.

#### The legal trust would incentivize investment in space while preventing conflict and ensuring sustainable development and the equitable distributions of resources.

Finoa ’20 – Ivan Finoa [Department of Law, University of Turin], “An international legal trust system to deal with the new space era,” 71st International Astronautical Congress (IAC) – The CyberSpace Edition, (12-14 October 2020). <<https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/66728932/_IAC_20_E7.VP.8.x58518_An_international_legal_trust_system_to_deal_with_the_new_space_era_BY_IVAN_FINO-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1642044926&Signature=asvt6StaK5n9UnpXuJIlo4ziI839WzFYjDZy37bm70ObGy3vFJyHwWNGxhn2beze4QzYDPPX0pVEXAwYvDaINVNxN01Ify8YwG5loNRddlat-grf3iawic7KvwqPowxFe2GuemVvbB-KW8ZVBxigwS-gelSKIVy4KYR9UgiDrM6e6deEBnUTcULSwmsH-JdHNg13ytZ3vNVMMlxZW2MPOCRuB2WlOHdCLoC86VqafSoMwuec-d~Aisbgyt5F2vO-GjvI60bR7h2MSp0iT6P7apIDUUpHUsDGbvcdxp22HSxXdlvr7lSqtLnL5rKxujGDYq~R9B~WuGiorVL2hn74UQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA>>CT

Considering the worsening climate change, in the future outer space might be our last Noah’s Ark. Now, humans must look to space as an opportunity to support growing resource requirements. Asteroids are rich in metals, which could be transported back to Earth. Unfortunately, the existing international legal framework discourages investments in the space economy. Once an enterprise invests billions of dollars in discovering and developing a mining site, it cannot claim any ownership because of the non-appropriation principle stipulated in Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Thus, other entities could legally access and exploit the same resource without any participation in the initial financial investment, increasing the risk of potential conflict. Bearing this in mind, the question arises, which legal regime could ensure effective allocation of resources, avoiding a chaotic space race to acquire valuable assets? The aim of this research is to argue that the first two articles of OST should be amended, to set up an international legal trust system which would guarantee different kinds of rights, dependently on the nature of the celestial body. E.g., property rights could be preferable to a lease over asteroids, as they could be exploited to their disappearance. This proposed system would be led by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), as the main trustee. The co-trustees would be the nations of the world. Prior to initiating any space activity, every entity would send a request to their national government. If all the legal parameters are respected, the nation would forward the operational request to the UNOOSA. In the case of acceptance, UNOOSA would record the permit on an international public registry. The country in which the company has been registered would investigate whether the activities of its national company are consistent with the permit. This would be the ordinary model. The extraordinary model would be when the applicant for the space activity is a state, then the trustee would be the UN. All lucrative activities would be subject to benefit-sharing. Finally, this research will demonstrate the valuable outcome of the International Legal Trust System and its advantages for all humankind. Private companies would rely on property rights, while the benefit-sharing could be used to finance the 17 Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN in 2015, which address peace, climate change, inequalities and poverty.

#### CP solves because companies will not have to solve over leases. Prefer to the aff because property rights will be guaranteed.

# On Case

### T-Subsets

#### Interpretation—the aff may not defend a subset of appropriation.

#### Appropriation is a generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

#### Their plan violates. Rules readings are always generalized – specific instances are not consistent. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

In general, as, again, already noted by Aristotle, rules and definitions are not relativized to particular individuals; it is rarely the case that a specific individual¶ forms part of the description of a general rule.¶ Even DPs of the form a certain X or a particular X, which usually receive¶ a wide scope interpretation, cannot, in general, receive such an interpretation in the context of a rule or a definition. This holds of definitions in general, not¶ only of definitions with an IS subject. The following examples from the Cobuild¶ dictionary illustrate this point:¶ (74) a. A fanatic is a person who is very enthusiastic about a particular¶ activity, sport, or way of life.¶ b. Something that is record-breaking is better than the previous¶ record for a particular performance or achievement.¶ c. When a computer outputs something it sorts and produces information as the result of a particular program or operation.¶ d. If something sheers in a particular direction, it suddenly changes¶ direction, for example to avoid hitting something.

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a type of appropriation offers huge explosion in the topic since space is, quite literally, infinite.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps –reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Hypothetical neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse, and theory checks cheaty CPs

No RVIs—it’s their burden to be topical.

### Plan:

* 1. Plan flaw: Their card doesn’t say that approbation of outer space for asteroid mining is unjust. Implies all asteroid mining is approbation. Cannot defend leasing system because the grammar of there plan text bans all asteroid mining. Don’t look at their cards evaluate To determine their advocacy, look at their plan in a vacuum

#### Turn: Taking away property rights scares investors away and spills over to other space activities.

Steven Freeland (BCom, LLB, LLM, University of New South Wales; Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Western Sydney, Australia; and a member of the Paris-based International Institute of Space Law). “Up, Up and … Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the International Law of Outer Space.” Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 6: No. 1, Article 4. 2005. JDN. <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=cjil>

V. THE NEED FOR CELESTIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS? ¶ The fundamental principle of "non-appropriation" upon which the international law of outer space is based stems from the desire of the international community to ensure that outer space remains an area beyond the jurisdiction of any state(s). Similar ideals emerge from UNCLOS (in relation to the High Seas) as well as the Antarctic Treaty, 42 although in the case of the latter treaty, it was finalised after a number of claims of sovereignty had already been made by various States and therefore was structured to "postpone" rather than prejudice or renounce those previously asserted claims.43 In the case of outer space, its exploitation and use is expressed in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty to be "the province of all mankind," a term whose meaning is not entirely clear but has been interpreted by most commentators as evincing the desire to ensure that any State is free to engage in space activities without reference to any sovereign claims of other States. This freedom is reinforced by other parts of the same Article and is repeated in the Moon Agreement (which also applies to "other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth")." Even though both the scope for space activities and the number of private participants have expanded significantly since these treaties were finalised, it has still been suggested that the nonappropriation principle constitutes "an absolute barrier in the realization of every kind of space activity., 4 ' The amount of capital expenditure required to research, scope, trial, and implement a new space activity is significant. To bring this activity to the point where it can represent a viable "stand alone" commercial venture takes many years and almost limitless funding. From the perspective of a private enterprise contemplating such an activity, it would quite obviously be an important element in its decision to devote resources to this activity that it is able to secure the highest degree of legal rights in order to protect its investment. Security of patent and other intellectual property rights, for example, are vital prerequisites for private enterprise research activity on the ISS, and these rights are specifically addressed by the ISS Agreement between the partners to the project and were applicable to the experiments undertaken by Mark Shuttleworth when he was onboard the ISS.46

#### Takes out their renewable + war impact beucase there is no link.

### Circumvention

#### Russia and China will circumvent

**Bahney and Pearl 19** [Benjamin Bahney and Jonathan Pearl, 3-26-2019, "Why Creating a Space Force Changes Nothing," BENJAMIN BAHNEY and JONATHAN PEARL are Senior Fellows at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research and contributing authors to [Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity](https://archive.md/o/Hlbi1/https:/www.amazon.com/Cross-Domain-Deterrence-Strategy-Era-Complexity/dp/0190908653). Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/space/2019-03-26/why-creating-space-force-changes-nothing accessed 12/10/21](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/space/2019-03-26/why-creating-space-force-changes-nothing%20accessed%2012/10/21)] Adam

As Russia and China continue to push forward, U.S. policymakers may be tempted to use treaties and diplomacy to head off their efforts entirely. This option, although alluring on paper, is simply not feasible. Existing treaties designed to limit military competition in space have had little success in actually doing so. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans parties from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space, on the moon, or on other celestial bodies, but it has no formal mechanism for verifying compliance, and places no restrictions on the development or deployment in space of conventional antisatellite weapons. Even if it were possible to convince Moscow and Beijing of the benefits of comprehensive space arms control, existing technology makes it extremely difficult to verify compliance with the necessary treaty provisions—and without comprehensive and reliable verification, treaties are toothless. Moreover, regulating the development and deployment of antisatellite weapons is extremely difficult, both because they include such a broad and diverse range of technologies and because many types of antisatellite weapons can be concealed or explained away as having some other use. Unsurprisingly, Russia and China’s draft Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Space, which they have been pushing for several years now, has an unenforceable definition of what constitutes a “weapon” and does nothing at all to address ground-based antisatellite weapons development.

#### No U.S.-Russian war – they’ll never risk it

Galen, 18 – senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest (Ted, "Russia Is Not the Soviet Union," *National Interest*, 7-28-2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-not-soviet-union-27041?page=0%2C1)

The problem with citing such examples is that they applied to a different country: the Soviet Union. Too many Americans act as though there is no meaningful difference between that entity and Russia. Worse still, U.S. leaders have embraced the same kind of uncompromising, hostile policies that Washington pursued to contain Soviet power. It is a major blunder that has increasingly poisoned relations with Moscow since the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the end of 1991. One obvious difference between the Soviet Union and Russia is that the Soviet governing elite embraced Marxism-Leninism and its objective of world revolution. Today’s Russia is not a messianic power. Its economic system is a rather mundane variety of corrupt crony capitalism, not rigid state socialism. The political system is a conservative autocracy with aspects of a rigged democracy, not a one-party dictatorship that brooks no dissent whatsoever. Russia is hardly a Western-style democracy, but neither is it a continuation of the Soviet Union’s horrifically brutal totalitarianism. Indeed, the country’s political and social philosophy is quite different from that of its predecessor. For example, the Orthodox Church had no meaningful influence during the Soviet era—something that was unsurprising, given communism’s official policy of atheism. But today, the Orthodox Church has a considerable influence in Putin’s Russia, especially on social issues. The bottom line is that Russia is a conventional, somewhat conservative, power, whereas the Soviet Union was a messianic, totalitarian power. That’s a rather large and significant difference, and U.S. policy needs to reflect that realization. An equally crucial difference is that the Soviet Union was a global power (and, for a time, arguably a superpower) with global ambitions and capabilities to match. It controlled an empire in Eastern Europe and cultivated allies and clients around the world, including in such far-flung places as Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola. The USSR also intensely contested the United States for influence in all of those areas. Conversely, Russia is merely a regional power with very limited extra-regional reach. The Kremlin’s ambitions are focused heavily on the near abroad, aimed at trying to block the eastward creep of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-led intrusion into Russia’s core security zone. The orientation seems far more defensive than offensive. It would be difficult for Russia to execute anything more than a very geographically limited expansionist agenda, even if it has one. The Soviet Union was the world’s number two economic power, second only to the United States. Russia has an economy roughly the size of Canada’s and is no longer ranked even in the global top ten . It also has only three-quarters of the Soviet Union’s territory (much of which is nearly-empty Siberia) and barely half the population of the old USSR. If that were not enough, that population is shrinking and is afflicted with an assortment of public health problems (especially rampant alcoholism). All of these factors should make it evident that Russia is not a credible rival, much less an existential threat, to the United States and its democratic system . Russia's power is a pale shadow of the Soviet Union's. The only undiminished source of clout is the country's sizeable nuclear arsenal. But while nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, they are not very useful for power projection or warfighting, unless the political leadership wants to risk national suicide. And there is no evidence whatsoever that Putin and his oligarch backers are suicidal. Quite the contrary, they seem wedded to accumulating ever greater wealth and perks.

#### No war escalation

Fettweis 17 — (Christopher J, \*Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26:3, 423-451)//cmr

Competing Explanations The publication of Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature in 2011 brought the New Peace into popular consciousness to some degree, but general recognition remains rather low. The data might suggest that the world is much safer, but Americans know better: a 2009 poll found that nearly 60 percent of the public—and fully half of the membership of the elite Council on Foreign Relations—actually considered the world more dangerous than it was during the Cold War.20 Among academic and policy experts, however, the phenomenon is well known, if controversial, and a debate over potential explanations has been raging for some time. A number of major and minor factors have been cited over the years that might help account for **the** New Peace. First, nuclear weapons came into existence about the same time that the great powers stopped fighting one another, which a number of scholars suggest is no coincidence.21 Faith in the pacifying effect of nuclear weapons led a few prominent realists to suggest that an efficient way to spread stability would be to encourage controlled proliferation to non-nuclear states.22 This idea found little purchase. Instead, proliferation momentum slowed considerably after the end of the Cold War: the world has the same number of nuclear states in 2016 that it did in 1991 (eight), having lost one (South Africa) and gained another (North Korea). Perhaps that number is sufficient to generate widespread fear of generalized war and overall systemic stability. Second, modern integrated markets contain powerful incentives for peace. While economic considerations are not the only ones that states must weigh when war looms, to the extent that they affect decisions, in this postmercantilist age they do so in a uniformly pacific direction. In the 1970s, neoliberal institutionalists argued that modern levels of economic interdependence provide strong incentives for states to resolve disputes peacefully.23 It is almost always in the interest of states today, if they are rational and self-interested, to cooperate rather than run the risk of ruining their economies, and those of their main trading partners, with war. The globalization of production, as Stephen G. Brooks has argued, is a powerful force for stability among those countries that benefit from the actions of multinational corporations.24 Furthermore, today’s highly mobile investment dollars flee instability, providing strong incentives for states to settle both external and internal disputes peacefully. As Secretary of State Colin Powell once told a Ugandan audience, “money is a coward.”25 Overall, globalization has been accompanied by an evolution in the way national wealth is accumulated. The major industrial powers, and perhaps many of their less developed neighbors, seem to have reached the rather revolutionary conclusion that territory is not directly related to national power and prestige.26 Third, the new peace has risen alongside the number of democracies in the world. While the widely tested and debated democratic peace theory is not universally accepted in the field, the hundreds of books and articles that have been written on the subject over the past thirty years have been sufficient to convince many that democracies rarely fight one another.27 Since most of today’s great powers practice some form of democracy, perhaps it should be unsurprising that conflict has been absent in the global north. Fourth, a number of scholars have suggested that regimes, law, and institutions shape state behavior, and can serve to inhibit aggression.28 Some major theorists of the New Peace, including both Andrew Mack and Joshua S. Goldstein, give UN peacekeeping primary credit for the decline in warfare.29 At the very least, there is convincing evidence that wars do not recur with the same frequency as in the past, a phenomenon for which the UN can certainly take a degree of credit. These potential explanations suffer from the same general weakness: stability exists where the influence of their independent variable is weak or absent. There are no nuclear states in Central or South America, for example, but those regions have been virtually free of interstate war for many decades. The relative decline of civil wars and ethnic conflict around the globe since the end of the Cold War also is not a product of nuclear deterrence. The democratic peace theory might help explain why there have been no intra-West wars, but it cannot account for the pacific trends among and within nondemocratic states. Africa and other areas of the Global South are also experiencing historically low levels of armed conflict, which suggests that economic growth and interdependence might not be the sole determinants of peaceful choices by leaders.30 With many of these potential explanations, there is another problem: the direction of causality is not clear. It is just as plausible to suggest that peace preceded, and then abetted, the rise of the other factors.31 Democracy and economic growth might be the results of stability, rather than the other way around. The rise in peacekeeping has only been possible because of increased great power cooperation. These phenomena may well be related, but just not in the way that their proponents suggest. A number of other explanations have been proposed. Pinker discussed a series of “rights revolutions,” especially including those of children and women that, in addition to several other factors, may well have contributed to the decline of war.32 Others have suggested that demographics may be playing a decisive role, either through aging populations or declining birthrates in the Global North.33 Finally, perhaps the most prominent explanation for the decline of war integrates all of the above, suggesting that they contribute to a change in the way people view conflict itself. Together these factors may have combined to alter the way people think about warfare, removing the romance and glory and replacing it with revulsion and dishonor. Ideas, when widely held, can become norms that shape and limit state behavior.34 There is yet another potential explanation, one that is far more common in the policy community than in scholarship. The possibility that the United States is essentially responsible for the New Peace, either through its military power or the institutional order it created, is the subject of the rest of this paper.