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## Top Level

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#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution or a subset thereof –

#### The World Trade Organization is an international body that oversees global trade. Tarver 6/15

Evan Tarver [bachelor's in finance and economics from San Diego State University-California], 21 - ("How Best to Define the World Trade Organization (WTO)," Investopedia, 6-15-2021, accessed 7-5-2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wto.asp)//ML



Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international institution that oversees the global trade rules among nations. It superseded the 1947 [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gatt.asp) (GATT) created in the wake of World War II.¶ The WTO is based on agreements signed by the majority of the world’s trading nations. The main function of the organization is to help producers of goods and services, as well as exporters and importers, protect and manage their businesses. As of 2021, the WTO has [164 member countries](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm), with Liberia and Afghanistan the most recent members, having joined in July 2016, and 25 “observer” countries and governments.1

#### Member nations of the WTO are the states that are part of the WTO and its agreements. A chart in the doc shows these nations. WTO ND.

WTO "WTO Members and Observers," No Publication, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org6\_e.htm

#### Map Description automatically generated

Reduce is to decrease in size or amount

Merriam Webster no date - ("Definition of REDUCE," Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce)//ML

to draw together or cause to converge : [CONSOLIDATE](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consolidate) ¶reduce all the questions to one b(1): to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number ¶reduce taxes ¶reduce the likelihood of war

#### Vote negative – the ballot only signifies a win or loss within debate as a game, and their aff is outside the constraints of that game

#### Not reading a topical aff creates incredible structural advantages for the aff – they get first and last speech and perms which means without a stable advocacy they get to morph their aff into whatever minimizes direct clash, and allows for a retreat to moral high ground

#### There’s two Impacts –

#### Clash – it’s a pre-requisite to debate which is an intrinsic good since we are all here for the purpose of debating – yes this may seem tautological, but so is every impact – you should use your ballot to assert that since we all took our weekend and spent it here, that clash does have meaning

#### Iterative argumentative testing – the ability to subject controversial ideas to rigorous testing allows debaters to better engage in the research process, discern what arguments are most accurate, and learn how to refine our own beliefs to become more compelling advocates – not reading a plan allows a constant spew of new content that never reaches those high levels of contestation without the constraints of the topic – Even if this topic isn’t the perfect topic, the predictability of debates under it are worth potential substantive tradeoff. Without a bridge for subjecting beliefs to a rigorous test, we are left with might-makes-right.

Cheryl MISAK Philosophy @ Toronto ‘8 “A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for Democracy” *Episteme* 5 (1) p. 100-104

The charge that Rorty has had to face again and again is that he really is a relativist, holding that one belief is no better than another, and that one must “treat the epistemic standards of any and every epistemic community as on a par” (Haack 1995, 136). Rorty, that is, leaves us with no way of adjudicating claims that arise in different communities. It is argued that this is not only an unsatisfactory view, but it is incompatible with his commitment to his own set of beliefs and with his practice of arguing or giving reasons for them. Peirce would join in this charge, arguing that it is the community of inquirers or reasoners that matter, not this or that local community. One of Rorty’s responses to this clutch of objections is to say that he doesn’t have to treat the epistemic standards of every community as on a par: “I prize communities which share more background beliefs with me above those which share fewer” (Rorty 1995b, 153). There is nothing incoherent about asserting that your community has it right, for all “right” amounts to is what your community agrees upon. I have argued (2000, 12ff) that this kind of comeback puts Rorty in a very difficult position, giving him nothing to say against the likes of Carl Schmitt, the fascist legal philosopher who found it natural to join the Nazi bandwagon. Schmitt, like Rorty, argued that there is no truth and rationality in politics. Rather, politics is the arena in which groups assert themselves, with the strongest coming out on top and the weaker groups disappearing. One makes an existential choice – opts for a conception of the good – and then tries to attain “substantive homogeneity” in the population. Might ends up being right and the elimination of those who disagree with us ends up being a fine method of reaching our political decisions. A democrat or liberal like Rorty has an impossible time in giving us – and himself – reasons for opting for his view rather than his fascist opponent’s view. Once you give up aiming at truth, once you give up aiming at something that goes beyond the standards of your own community, then you give up the wherewithal to argue against the might-is-right view. The charge I am trying to answer here, on behalf of the non-Rortian pragmatist, is that mixing truth and politics is dangerous. One of the points I want to make is that, whatever the dangers are in saying morals and politics aim at the truth, the dangers of denying it are even more alarming. If we were to get rid of the notion of truth, nothing would protect us from the idea that there is nothing to get right, no better or worse action, and no better or worse way of treating others. Nothing would protect us from the Schmittian worldview. Another point is that the pragmatist view encourages something which is downright salutary, not dangerous at all. It encourages a culture of justification, a culture the importance of which grows as we face the challenges of living in a global society with worldviews struggling against each other. This thought was prominent in the debate about how the new democratic order in South Africa should be conceived. Here is how Etienne Murienik put it: If the new constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defense of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force of its command. The new order must be a community built on persuasion, not on coercion.4 A final point rests on the nature of the kinds of answers the pragmatist envisions. Rorty and Rawls seem to think that any view of truth carries with it the idea that there is one and only one true answer to every question. It is important to see that, whatever the case might be for other views of truth, the pragmatist’s view of truth does not entail anything about the precise nature of right answers. On the Peircean view of truth, it might be true that the best solution to a problem is to compromise in a certain way. Or a question might have a number of equally right answers: it might be true that either A or B or C is an acceptable solution to a problem. That is, bringing truth into politics need not result in a view on which one theory of the good triumphs over the others. Indeed, the pragmatist account of truth does not require agreement at the end of the day (whatever that might mean) and it does not require the consent of all who are affected by a particular decision here and now. The right answer to a question might be one that only a few see is right. A right answer is the one that would be best – would stand up to the evidence and arguments – were we to inquire into the matter as far as we fruitfully could. That is, we are not primarily aiming at agreement in deliberation – we are aiming at getting a view that will stand up to reasons and evidence**.** That said, there may be cases in moral and especially political deliberation in which we do aim for agreement because we think that what will best stand up to reasons in that case is a solution that is agreed upon by all or by all who are affected. But this will be just one kind of case amongst many. Right answers aren’t necessarily answers that are acceptable by all. Nor are right answers necessarily those that resolve a conflict with a compromise, although sometimes a compromise or cooperative solution may indeed be what is required. Nor is bargaining always not conducive to truth – in some cases, that may be exactly what is required. This view of truth does not lead to zeal, oppression, closing off of discussion, or a squashing of pluralism, even if it might happen to be the case that there is only one reasonable conception of the good out there. The idea is that we are always aiming at getting the best answer – whatever that may be – and to do that we need to take into account the views of all. 6 . WHO DECIDES? One of the first questions put to those who would like to think of politics as a species of truth-oriented deliberation is this: why deliberate with the ignorant multitude? Would it not be better to expose our moral and political beliefs only to the reasons and experience of experts? Science, after all, doesn’t work by asking the person in the street what he or she thinks about quantum mechanics. The reason that the pragmatist’s epistemic justification is a justification of democratic politics, rather than of a hierarchical politics, in which an elite makes decisions, is that we do not and will not ever have an identifiable pool of moral and political experts. Dewey saw this clearly. As experts become specialized, “they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve” (Dewey 1926/1984, 364). Everyone engages in moral and political deliberation and it is not obvious that having special education makes you better at it – just look at priests, politicians, and moral philosophers/political theorists and ask yourself if they seem especially decent or especially wise when it comes to practical matters. Some people are good at examining moral and politi\cal issues, but it’s not clear that they are the ones trained to do so. Even if we could identify genuinely wise people, this kind of expertise is liable to be corrupted merely by being identified – merely by the wise person starting to think of herself as a moral expert.5 And it is far from clear that the rule of the wise would really take the views and experiences of all into account better than the democratic rule of the people. So how do we distinguish deliberating well and deliberating badly if we cannot appeal to education and training? No account of deliberative democracy can ignore the call to make the distinction. The trouble is that, in saying what good, as opposed to poor, deliberation amounts to, one finds oneself facing a justificatory problem: how can we specify what good deliberation is without simply assuming that our current standards of deliberation and inquiry are the gold standards? (This is the deep and central question of pragmatism: how do genuine norms arise out of contingent practices?) It will be unsurprising that I agree with Robert Talisse that the way forward is to focus on an epistemic justification of the whole range of deliberative virtues. Some of the virtues we think important in inquiry are open-mindedness, courage, honesty, integrity, rigor, willingness to listen to the views of others and to seriously entertain challenges to one’s own views, willingness to put oneself in another’s shoes, and the like. These virtues may well have a number of kinds of justifications – justifications, for instance, with their origins in the canons of etiquette or in this or that substantive moral or religious view. Politeness and Christianity (do unto others . . . ), for instance,may both dictate that we should listen to the views of others. But this kind of justification doesn’t break out of the circle of local practices. Talisse argues that the virtues are justified because they lead to true belief. Listening to others is not merely the polite thing to do, but it is also good because we might learn something. The epistemic argument I have presented on Peirce’s behalf gets us this far: we need to expose our beliefs to the views of others if we are to follow a method that will get us good or better or true beliefs. Talisse takes us the next step – there are other characteristics that make one an inquirer who aims at the truth. Honesty is the trait of following reasons and evidence, rather than self-interest. Modesty is the trait of taking your views to be fallible. Charity is willingness to listen to the views of others. Integrity is willingness to uphold the deliberative process, no matter the difficulties encountered. The distinction between deliberating well (having deliberative virtues) and deliberating badly (having deliberative vices), that is, is drawn in terms of whether a method promotes beliefs which are responsive to and fit with the reasons and evidence. 7 . THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY The pragmatist has offered us a compelling reason to take the views of others seriously and encourage the values associated with deliberative democratic politics. For inquirers must engage in the ongoing project of continually subjecting their beliefs to the tests of further experience and argument. The virtues inherent in a deliberative model of democratic citizenship must be cultivated if we are to come to good beliefs about how to treat others, how to resolve conflicts, and how to arrange society. The model of democratic citizenship which results is one that makes democratic citizenship part of a culture of justification. Citizens search for how best to structure our institutions and how best to live our lives. Democratic citizenship is a quest to get things right, with a genuine engagement in looking for right answers to pressing questions.We are not after mere agreement and we are not after the transformation of initial preferences into something that others can accept. We aim at getting things right – at getting beliefs that would forever stand up to scrutiny. In so aiming, citizens commit themselves to abiding by the decisions produced by the democratic procedure. For those decisions are the best we can do here and now. Here we find the justification of the coercive power of democracies. Eventually there has to be a decision in politics. The question that faces all societies is who decides and who wields the power to coerce once the decision is made? My argument is that as more people deliberate and more reasons and experience go into the mix, it will become more likely that the decisions made will account for the reasons and experience of all. The more likely, that is, that the answer will be right. Decisions produced by a democratic deliberative process are made by a rational method and so they are enforceable.

#### Frame procedural impacts through a lens of optimization – we don’t need to win they make the game impossible, just relatively less effective. In the same way you would vote aff to reject a bad process CP even if there are theoretically solvency deficits based on certainty and immediacy – the fact that we still have some neg ground doesn’t mean that reading the cap k for the 87th time against a survival strategy aff is a good debate to have for anyone involved

#### They have no offense

#### View T impacts as a process, not a product – any education impact about their content being important are solved by reading a book – filter impacts through what is unique to the process of debating itself

#### They get to read it on the neg – if their k of being topical is true then reading the aff as a K on the neg means they get auto-wins, we still access their education, and if forces affs to shift to better arguments

#### The TVA solves – they could have read an aff that has the member - this would allow a discussion of the aff in a forum that allows us to have nuanced responses – yes, it isn’t perfect, but those imperfections are neg ground – if they aren’t forced to defend a controversy, then the meaning of any wins the gets become hollow anyway which takes out solvency

# Subversivism K

#### The role of the ballot is to weigh the aff versus a the status quo or a competitive alternative – anything else is self serving and arbitrary and guts fairness and education.

#### We want trans folks to have access to medical care, the aff is anti-assimilationist.

#### Radical amateurism is using bodies as experimentation, which represents anti-assimilationism. The aff says it’s wrong to engage strategies that fight for equitable access to the medical system for trans folks.

**The AC’s method is subversivism, positing the radical alterity of queer bodies and valorizing maximal performative deviance.**

Serano ’16 - Julia Serano [American writer, spoken-word performer, trans-bi activist; Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biophysics from Columbia U.; Post-doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley (1995-2003); Research Specialist, University of California, Berkeley (2003-2012)], Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, 2nd Ed. Berkeley: Seal Press (eBook) (2016). AT

THE MAJORITY OF MY EXPERIENCES as a trans activist and spoken word artist have taken place in what is increasingly becoming known as the “queer/trans” community. It is a subgroup within the greater LGBTIQ community that is composed mostly of folks in their twenties and thirties who are more likely to refer to themselves as “dykes,” “queer,” and/or “trans” than “lesbian” or “gay.” While diverse in a number of ways, this subpopulation tends to predominantly inhabit urban and academic settings, and is skewed toward those who are white and/or from middle-class backgrounds. In many ways**, the queer/trans community is best described as a** sort of **marriage of the transgender movement’s call to “shatter the gender binary” and the lesbian community’s pro-sex, pro-kink backlash** to 1980s-era Andrea Dworkinism. **Its politics are generally antiassimilationist**, particularly **with regard to gender and sexual expression.** This apparent limitlessness and lack of boundaries lead many to believe that “queer/trans” represents the vanguard of today’s gender and sexual revolution. However, over the last four years in which I’ve been a part of this community, **I’ve become increasingly troubled by a trend that**, while not applicable to all queer/trans folks**, seems to be becoming a dominant belief in this community, one that threatens to restrict its gender and sexual diversity.** **I call this trend subversivism**. ¶ Subversivism is the practice of extolling certain gender and sexual expressions and identities simply because they are unconventional or nonconforming. **In** the parlance of **subversivism,** these **atypical genders and sexualities are “good” because they “transgress” or “subvert” oppressive binary gender norms**.1 The justification for the practice of subversivism has evolved out of a particular reading (although some would call it a misreading) of the work of various influential queer theorists over the last decade and a half. To briefly summarize this popularized account: All forms of sexism arise from the binary gender system. Since this binary gender system is everywhere—in our thoughts, language, traditions, behaviors, etc.—the only way we can overturn it is to actively undermine the system from within. Thus, **in order to challenge sexism, people must “perform” their genders in ways that bend, break, and blur all of the imaginary distinctions that exist between male and female, heterosexual and homosexual**, and **so** on, presumably **leading to a** systemwide **binary meltdown.** According to the principles of subversivism, drag is inherently “subversive,” as it reveals that our society’s binary notions of maleness and femaleness are not natural, but rather are actively “constructed” and “performed” by all of us. Another way that one can be “transgressively gendered” is by identifying as genderqueer or genderfluid—i.e., refusing to identify fully as either woman or man.

**Subversivism invalidates people whose identities are seemingly assimilationist.**

Serano ’16 - Julia Serano [American writer, spoken-word performer, trans-bi activist; Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biophysics from Columbia U.; Post-doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley (1995-2003); Research Specialist, University of California, Berkeley (2003-2012)], Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, 2nd Ed. Berkeley: Seal Press (eBook) (2016). AT

The notion that certain gender identities and expressions are inherently “subversive” or “transgressive” can be seen throughout the queer/trans community, where drag and gender-bending are routinely celebrated, where binary-confounding identities such as “boy-identified-dyke” and “pansexual trannyfag” have become rather commonplace. On the surface**, subversivism gives the appearance of accommodating a seemingly infinite array of genders and sexualities, but this is not quite the case. Subversivism does have very specific boundaries; it has an “other.”** **By glorifying identities and expressions that appear to subvert or blur gender binaries, subversivism automatically creates a reciprocal category of people whose gender and sexual identities and expressions are by default inherently conservative, even “hegemonic,” because they are seen as reinforcing or naturalizing the binary gender system.** Not surprisingly, this often-unspoken category of bad, conservative genders is predominantly made up of feminine women and masculine men who are attracted to the “opposite” sex. ¶ One routinely sees this “dark side” of subversivism rear its head in the queer/trans community, where **it is not uncommon to hear individuals critique or call into question other queers or trans folks because their gender presentation, behaviors, or sexual preferences are not deemed “subversive” enough.** Indeed, if one fails to sufficiently distinguish oneself from heterosexual feminine women and masculine men, one runs the risk of being accused of “reinforcing the gender binary,” **an indictment that is tantamount to being called a sexist.** One of the most common targets of such critiques are transsexuals, and particularly those who are heterosexual and gender-normative post-transition. Indeed, because such transsexuals (in the eyes of others) transition from a seemingly “transgressive” queer identity to a “conservative” straight one, subversivists may even claim that they have transitioned in order to purposefully “assimilate” themselves into straight culture. While these days, such accusations are often couched in the rhetoric of current queer theory, they rely on many of the same mistaken assumptions that plagued the work of cissexist feminists like Janice Raymond and sociologists like Thomas Kando decades ago.2

**And, anti-assimilationism is classist purity politics. Turns the case and guts aff solvency.**

**Operaista 12** Gayge, IWW, a former TransFix NorCal organizer, and a former Camp Trans organizer. *Queering Anarchism: Addressing and Undressing Power and Desire*, “Radical Queers and Class Struggle: A Match to Be Made,” edited by C.B. Daring, J. Rogue, Deric Shannon, and Abbey Volcano

It is often necessary for oppressed groups to engage in class struggle autonomously—i.e., to self-organize against their specific material conditions, fight against them, and bring their struggle back to the working class as a whole. While I am about as interested in arguing the precise definition of queer as I am about arguing about how many angels can have a circle jerk on the head of a pin, it’s pretty clear what queer in general is—the state of being not-heterosexual, and/or the state of being trans, genderqueer, or gender-nonconforming. This, in the main, is the definition that has been used for “queer,” as a reclaimed term of solidarity, by queer communities in struggle for decades. While “queer” is a purposefully imprecise term, we should **avoid it becoming either a hip label or something that only belongs to those we agree with politically**. Working-class queer communities have often been targeted from both sides, first by bourgeois LGBT organizations looking for numbers and legitimacy, and by radical organizations that seek to co-opt queers and queerness that they feel comfortable with. Both sides erase and silence the queers they are not comfortable with. Ultimately, working-class queers need the ability to self-organize, and to do that they need to not be controlled by either bourgeois LGBT organizations or radical organizations coming in from the outside to lead them. While of course there are radical workingclass queers in radical organizations, working-class queer community organizations need to arise out of the self-organization of all working-class queers, and **not exclude non-radicalized queers from membership,** as people are radicalized through struggle, and **excluding them from the organs of struggle is saying that we both know best and that they are beyond change**. While queer communities have often defined “queer” too narrowly— examples of excluded groups from dyke communities being bisexuals, femmes, butch/butch and femme/femme couples, butches and femmes at some points in time, and trans women—we need to not be so broad as to be meaningless; we need to retain a notion of queer that highlights the separation from traditional notions of the family, and the additional reproductive labor (in the sense of being able to reproduce one’s labor power for the next day) that comes from being a member of an oppressed group that is in constant danger from a hostile world and lacks traditional means of support. If we want queers to be able to join in the broader class struggle (not like we haven’t been there all along), we need spaces and organizations where we can approach the class struggle from working-class queer standpoints. We need spaces where we can formulate the questions about what being a working-class queer means to our material conditions, to our exploitation under capitalism. To truly be able to do that we need spaces where we can form organizations that don’t need to make every hetero radical comfortable, and spaces that aren’t controlled by bourgeois queers. If we, ourselves, bring those spaces into being, we will be able to organize our own struggles, link them up to the larger struggles of the class, and bring queer fierceness back to the class struggle. We do not need anyone from the outside to lead us; we will do things for ourselves by focusing not on academic definitions of what it is to be queer but rather the material conditions of queer lives. The Dead End of Anti-Assimilation Anti-assimilation, in-so-much as it has been a critique of the bourgeois cooptation of movements for queer liberation, has been valuable. Antiassimilation, in-so-much as it has been hostile to seeing queer struggles as part of the larger class struggle and as it has policed the identities of queers, by casting out queers who can pass, trans people who access medical transition, monogamous queers, queers who must be closeted in their working lives to retain employment, has been a hindrance. The assimilationist/anti-assimilationist dialectic is unhelpful. The proper questions we should ask ourselves about queer organizations, movements, and struggles are: What is the class composition? Are the forms of organization a benefit or a hindrance to working-class struggle? Are the goals ones that would strengthen the working class or the bourgeoisie? In which struggles will our efforts as revolutionaries be most valuable toward our ultimate goal of communism? We must also ask how we can broaden the struggle—what opportunities does each queer struggle bring to spread to the rest of the working class? These are far more important questions to me than whether the queers participating in the struggle reach an appropriate level of anti-assimilationist purity, which often at its core is just a reflection of the stratification built into the working class, twisted on the surface, but true to that stratification at its core. Another problem with anti-assimilationist purity is, as mentioned earlier, the idea that there is a need for queers to discipline themselves to adhere to a hegemonic idea of queerness that stands in opposition to a hegemonic idea of straightness. We run into the danger of cutting out far more queers that we should desire to struggle alongside than those whom we do not wish to struggle alongside, our comrades being working-class queers who may be monogamous, vanilla, or gender-conforming, for instance.

**Radical alterity gets co-opted by larger systems of domination, naturalizing violence and reversing liberatory politics. Turns case yet again and guts solvency.**

**Sallydarity 12** Stacy, creator and editor of anarchalibrary.blogspot.com, formerly the “resources” section of anarcha.org, which provides a vast archive of items of interest to anarcha feminists. *Queering Anarchism: Addressing and Undressing Power and Desire*, “Gender Sabotage,” edited by C.B. Daring, J. Rogue, Deric Shannon, and Abbey Volcano

That said, we need to dismantle gender stratum, to separate the power dynamics attached to gender, in that masculinity often means domination, and femininity, subordination. Since men are taught to be dominating—that this is equated with masculinity (being a “real man”)—we need to make a particular point to change this. Men are denied their emotions, and as bell hooks writes, “Patriarchy both creates the rage in boys and then contains it for later use, making it a resource to exploit later on as boys become men. As a national product, **this rage can be garnered to further imperialism, hatred, and oppression of women and men globally**.”[39] At the very least it teaches men in general to be apathetic about the plight of others. Because it is instilled in men that their nature requires them to be dominating, we must **extract the domination imperative from what it means to be a man**. Hooks distinguishes patriarchal masculinity from masculinity, and this deserves further consideration. Without the naturalization of a man/woman dichotomy, masculinity and femininity (gender inclination) and all their various meanings are either exposed as social only, and/or as more about individual tendencies of personality and affinity. It is this domination that should be opposed, no matter who is doing it or in what form. No one ought to identify domination as part of who they are, nor should women excuse their own (or other women’s) participation in domination just because they believe they cannot be oppressors. This applies to male privilege, hetero privilege, class privilege, white privilege, etc., in addition to hierarchies perhaps **inadvertently created by those judging others as not revolutionary, queer, or gender nonconforming enough**. In the past there was an expectation that the radical lesbian movement (and before that, women’s suffrage) would strongly threaten the dominant order. In fact, it has been viewed as a threat, but **as we can see, it has been defeated, recuperated or co-opted under the larger system of domination.** [40] If much of radical feminism/lesbianism was really the only real threat to the system,[41] then it served the dominant order to marginalize the particularly militant tendencies and/or those of women of color, or divert the movements to re-embrace essentialism, which reinforced the order of things. Some radical feminists were certainly on to something. According to Celestine Ware, a black woman activist (1970) who was quoted in bell hooks’ Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, “Radical feminism…postulates that the domination of one human being by another is the basic evil in society. Dominance in human relationships is the target of their opposition.” Hooks comments, “As feminist movement progressed, critiques of the notion of power as domination and control were submerged as bourgeois activists began to focus on women overcoming their fear of power (the implication being that if they wanted social equality with men, they would need to participate equally in exercising domination and control over others).”[42] **Attributing violence and abuse to** the nature or necessary political position of **men gives women the opportunity to participate in domination while insisting that they can do so in a more ethical way** (or that they are by definition incapable of participating in domination). In addition, this attitude makes male violence seem inevitable and **allows us to avoid critical thinking** about systemic/institutional oppressions, such as the likelihood that capitalism and the state promote rape.[43] If rape is natural to men, then the survivors (mostly women) can rationalize that their only recourse is through the state. Yet prisons and police are not the solution to this problem. In addition, acknowledging that being a woman, queer, or transgressing gender boxes, and/or having feminist or anarchist politics **does not make one necessarily incapable of being a perpetrator of abuse and sexual assault**, we must see this as a larger project of addressing issues of consent. Additionally, uniting around the freedom to choose what will be done or not done to or with our bodies ties together many people’s struggles. As far as identity politics go, there must be some focus on identity in the sense that there are very real effects of these unreal constructs. Yet the point is to understand the gender and race divisions not only to end gender and race oppression, but to end domination totally—to undermine these crossclass alliances created in the process of power seeking to naturalize itself, its law, and its divisions. **Certainly capitalism, with the state, made the divisions between genders and races politically significant in a way that they never had been before.** This shows that much of the racism and sexism that has existed in the last few centuries is not innate, not organic, not grassroots, but rather manufactured. Part of this struggle will be in exposing the ways in which our beliefs have been shaped in the interest of power—that many of the things we consider to be natural are in fact not just man-made, but **statemade**. Illuminating the ways that our oppression is not “natural” can be done partly through the actual demonstrations and experiences of gender fluidity and queerness, sometimes referred to with other concepts as “queer.” “Queer is…an identity that problematizes the manageable limits of identity. Queer is a territory of tension, defined against the dominant narrative of white-hetero-monogamous-patriarchy, but also by an affinity with all who are marginalized, otherized, and oppressed.”[44]

**The alternative is to reject subversivism and the labeling of genders and sexualities as “deviant” or “conformist,” and instead challenge all forms of gender entitlement. Solves better than the aff because it fosters coalitions that actually effect material change.**

Serano ’16 - Julia Serano [American writer, spoken-word performer, trans-bi activist; Ph.D. in biochemistry and molecular biophysics from Columbia U.; Post-doctoral Fellow, University of California, Berkeley (1995-2003); Research Specialist, University of California, Berkeley (2003-2012)], Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, 2nd Ed. Berkeley: Seal Press (eBook) (2016). AT

I worry that the dominance of cissexual voices in the queer/ trans community, and **the exclusionary practice of subversivism**, are together **foster**ing **a sense of queer/trans “oneness” that excludes trans women** such as myself. My fears stem not so much from my own concern about being excluded, or for the many other subgroups not mentioned here who also feel increasingly left out of this community. Rather, I fear that **this inward, homogenizing trend represents a lost opportunity to learn from one another and to change the minds of the public at large.** If we hope to correct this insular, exclusionary trend, then **we must begin to** (once again) **think in terms of alliances rather than monolithic communities. Alliance-based activism begins with the recognition that we are all individuals, each with a limited history and experiencing a largely unique set of privileges, expectations, assumptions, and restrictions.** Thus, none of us have “superior knowledge” when it comes to sexuality and gender. **By calling ourselves an alliance, we explicitly acknowledge that we are working toward a common goal** (how about “**making the world safe and just for people of all genders and sexualities**”?), **while simultaneously recognizing and respecting our many differences.** There can be no legitimate accusations of “divisiveness” in an alliance, as differences of opinion would be expected from the start. Thinking in terms of alliances can encourage us to move beyond the single goal of creating safe queer/trans spaces, to recognize that, in reality, there is no such thing as a “safe space.” After all, the very notion of safety is often predicated on a presumed and exclusionary sense of “sameness” and “oneness.” And unlike subversivism, which fosters a grim and belittling view of the heterosexual, gender-normative majority, alliance-based gender activism recognizes that the only way we will change society is by engaging the mainstream public and working with, rather than against, our straight allies. ¶ If we hope to build alliances that are respectful of all queer and transgender perspectives, then **we must stop talking about the gender binary system, as if there is only one**. As a trans woman, I deal with lots of gender binaries: male/female, heterosexual/homosexual, cissexual/transsexual, cisgender/transgender, and so on. As someone who is marginalized in queer/trans spaces for not being “subversive” or “transgressive” enough, I find that calls to “shatter the (male/female) gender binary” sound hollow. And **when cissexual queers try to frame all forms of gender/sexual discrimination in terms of “heterosexist gender norms,” they deny** the fact that, as a transsexual woman, I experience way more **cissexist and transmisogynistic animosity and condescension** from members of my own lesbian community than I ever have from my straight friends and acquaintances. The truth is that whenever we enter a different space, or speak with a different person, we are forced to deal with a somewhat different set of binaries and assumptions. Indeed, my experience living in the San Francisco Bay Area—where most straight people I know are very comfortable with queerness, yet many queer people I know harbor subversivist attitudes toward straightness—makes it clear that there needs to be a more general strategy to challenge all forms of sexism, not just the typical or obvious ones. ¶ Rather than focusing on “shattering the gender binary,” I believe **we should turn our attention instead to challenging all forms of gender entitlement, the privileging of one’s own perceptions, interpretations, and evaluations of other people’s genders over the way those people understand themselves.** After all, **whenever we assign values to other people’s genders and sexualities—whether we call them subversive or conservative, cool or uncool, normal or abnormal, natural or unnatural—we are automatically creating or reaffirming some kind of hierarchy**. In other words, when we critique any gender as being “good” or “bad,” we are by definition being sexist. After all, isn’t what drives many of us into feminism and queer activism in the first place our frustration that other people often place rather arbitrary meanings and values onto our sexed bodies, gender expressions, and sexualities? Is there really any difference between the schoolyard bullies who teased us for being too feminine or masculine when we were little, the arrogant employer who assumes that we aren’t cut out for the job because we’re female, the gay men who claim that we are holding back the gay rights movement because we are not straight-acting enough, and the people—whether lesbian-feminists of the 1970s and 1980s, or subversivists in the 2000s—who decry us for not being androgynous enough to be “true gender radicals”?

# Case

#### The aff only gets offense off of what’s read in the debate – don’t evaluate external things like the zines they sent.

#### No solvency – there is no explanation as to how people can take IPR away from the state, which means nothing changes

#### IPR is not the only thing that causes oppression of gender minorities – their own evidence talks about how IPR is just one part of a system, so their own card says the aff can’t solve

#### Turn: their calls for radical ameuturism are dangerous and undermine liberation. Their aff is no different than the people taking horse dewormers becayse they’ve done their own research. The idea that we should reject the whole institution is divorced from the lived experience of trans people who fight to get access to medical institutions

#### Link turn: declaring that there are no experts cuts trans folks off from the medical care they need to live safe and happy lives

#### Obscurantism disad to the aff – if you can’t explain what it means don’t vote for it

Misunderstanding of our K –we critique the way you advocate for anti assimilationsims and how that affects trans bodies – that is a form of subversivism because it others those who want to assimilate and undermines real activism now

They advocate for the complete destruction of the medical field

Alt is reject subversivism which means rejecting ideas like that of radical amateurism, perm severs out of that

Exclusion of trans people who might not want to use those medications, saying some people aren’t queer enough

Solves better than the aff -