### 1

### 1

#### Interpretation—the aff may not defend a subset of appropriation.

#### Appropriation is a generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf>

\*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars

French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

#### Their plan violates. Rules readings are always generalized – specific instances are not consistent. Cohen 01

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

In general, as, again, already noted by Aristotle, rules and definitions are not relativized to particular individuals; it is rarely the case that a specific individual¶ forms part of the description of a general rule.¶ Even DPs of the form a certain X or a particular X, which usually receive¶ a wide scope interpretation, cannot, in general, receive such an interpretation in the context of a rule or a definition. This holds of definitions in general, not¶ only of definitions with an IS subject. The following examples from the Cobuild¶ dictionary illustrate this point:¶ (74) a. A fanatic is a person who is very enthusiastic about a particular¶ activity, sport, or way of life.¶ b. Something that is record-breaking is better than the previous¶ record for a particular performance or achievement.¶ c. When a computer outputs something it sorts and produces information as the result of a particular program or operation.¶ d. If something sheers in a particular direction, it suddenly changes¶ direction, for example to avoid hitting something.

#### That outweighs—only our evidence speaks to how indefinite singulars are interpreted in the context of normative statements like the resolution. This means throw out aff counter-interpretations that are purely descriptive

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision –any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Limits—specifying a type of appropriation offers huge explosion in the topic since space is, quite literally, infinite.

#### Drop the debater to preserve fairness and education – use competing interps –reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### Hypothetical neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse, and theory checks cheaty CPs

#### No RVIs—it’s their burden to be topical.

### 2

#### Starlink is key to global internet access.

John Koetsier {journalist, analyst, author, and speaker}, 20 - ("Elon Musk’s 42,000 StarLink Satellites Could Just Save The World," Forbes, 1-9-2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/01/09/elon-musks-42000-starlink-satellites-could-just-save-the-world/?sh=85866264c2cd)//marlborough-wr/

Elon Musk’s other company, SpaceX, is building Starlink, a global communications constellation that could approach a [staggering 42,000 satellites](https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2019/12/20/apple-building-satellite-to-iphone-tech-spacex-launching-42000-satellites-2--2--/#5d1ee85668a7). And it could be all that stands between us and a fragmented world living in virtually — and actually — different realities. How? World War II can tell us the answer. In the early 1940s a tyrannical power using fake news, hate speech, military might and hegemonic power controlled most of Europe: the Nazis. They controlled public life, news and local economies. Resistance groups dotted the European mainland, with one lifeline for non-official communication from free countries: radio. As such, radios were [contraband](https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/life-in-nazi-occupied-europe/occupation-case-studies/) and confiscated. One of the activities the allies undertook to support resistance fighters was shipping in radios for communication and outside news. Today, radios aren’t at risk of being confiscated. And as a cloud-delivered service, hijacking the internet happens largely out of public sight, in servers and routers that enable services like Netflix and the BBC and Facebook and Google. It’s called [splinternet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Splinternet), and it’s the ongoing division of a worldwide interconnected internet into separate and isolatable fiefdoms, each of which can be controlled and managed so that governing powers can control what their populations see. The Great Firewall of China is the most well-known example, but Iran, Syria and Vietnam also control significant portions of the internet for their populations. Russia just [completed technology](https://www.pcmag.com/news/371347/russia-is-about-to-disconnect-from-the-internet-what-that-m) to wall off its internal networks, servers and internet users from the wider internet. And India, in its attempt to control unrest following its anti-Muslim citizenship law, has employed a particularly heavy-handed approach: simply [blocking](https://www.tellerreport.com/news/2019-12-27---india--new-internet-outages--protesters-back-on-the-street-.ryrh4IhQyI.html) the internet entirely. (One unintended result: contractors in India can’t reach their employers in the U.S.) Another country, United Arab Emirates, took a different approach: outlawing all messengers [except one that it built a digital backdoor into: Totok](https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2019/12/23/top-50-social-app-in-usa-outed-as-spying-tool-for-united-arab-emirates-apple-and-google-delete-it/#5790934b7291). However it happens, it allows governments to control what people see, read and hear from outside sources — and censor what their own people say. Starlink can change all of that. Elon Musk recently revealed [details](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1214548764054216704?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1214548764054216704&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.digitaltrends.com%2Fcool-tech%2Felon-musk-reveals-what-youll-need-to-connect-to-his-internet-satellites%2F) about how people will access StarLink. It will be incredibly simple, and it will enable access to the relatively free global internet from anywhere on the planet. What that means is that anyone can access the internet from anywhere. Chinese citizens will be able to access Google and information about Tiananmen Square. Russian citizens will be able to see external analysis of Putin’s financial dealings if even Russia blocks outside sources. Indian protesters can’t be cut off from the internet. Of course, governments will make the Starlink Terminal illegal. But that in itself will be a victory. Censorship works best when it is invisible: when people don’t even know that there is alternate information, other understandings of reality. (Chinese teenage exchange students at a relative’s house last year, for example, had never heard of Tiananmen Square, and refused to believe stories that, they felt, painted China in a negative light.) But when a device to connect to the outside world becomes contraband, the glass walls become opaque. People realize that walls have been erected to prevent them from seeing other opinions. And that is at least one step to maintaining a free, open and accessible internet globally, which should help combat fake news, propaganda and information deprivation aimed at controlling populations. And it’s a step towards making the splinternet harder to achieve. 1,000 satellites will be enough to enable basic service, Musk has said. SpaceX just [launched](https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/spacex-launches-60-more-starlink-satellites-amid-astronomer-concerns/) a third batch of 60 satellites, and is expected to continue launching that many [every two weeks](https://www.spaceitbridge.com/spacex-starlink-launch-targeted-for-november-11-will-questions-be-answered.htm) through the rest of 2020.

#### Starlink is key to democracy movements. Banias 21

Mj Banias [editor and co-founder of The Debrief], 21 - ("Uncensored Satellite Internet Will Weaken Dictatorships," Debrief, 4-20-2021, accessed 1-13-2022, https://thedebrief.org/uncensored-satellite-internet-will-weaken-dictatorships/)//ML

As low-orbit satellite internet providers, such as Elon Musk’s Starlink, begin testing their services, security analysts [recognize](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/satellite-internet-services-fostering-dictators-dilemma) the potential disruption these systems could cause to authoritarian regimes as people start accessing an open and uncensored internet. In countries like Russia, China, and North Korea, where information dominance and control are essential to the regime’s survival, low-orbit internet [satellites](https://thedebrief.org/old-radioactive-russian-spy-satellites-fall-to-earth-and-more-will-soon-follow/) could pose a significant challenge.¶ “I think that these satellites provide an opportunity for democracies to turn the tables a bit on authoritarian regimes by providing low cost or free access to information via these satellite systems,” Michael Schwille, a senior policy analyst at RAND who has expertise in information warfare, told The Debrief.¶ Countries like Iran, [Russia](https://thedebrief.org/russian-hackers-currently-targeted-in-mysterious-cyberwar/), and [China](https://thedebrief.org/china-has-achieved-total-global-drone-supremacy/) allocate significant resources and energy to control how information disseminates across their respective nations. People, especially dissidents, attempting to access the open internet and communicate across that internet is difficult inside those countries. ¶ These low-orbit internet solutions pose a problem for dictators because state regulators can’t control them, and they can offer internet in the most remote areas of the planet.¶ BACKGROUND: THE UNCENSORED INTERNET¶ Starlink CEO Elon Musk told reporters in 2016 that China and its internet laws were a big concern for his company. ¶ “If they get upset with us, they can blow our satellites up, which wouldn’t be good. China can do that. So probably we shouldn’t broadcast there,” he stated in a 2016 interview. Recently China has [said](https://asiatimes.com/2020/11/china-launching-state-rival-to-elon-musks-spacex/) they will launch their own constellation of 10,000 low-orbit internet satellites called StarNet to rival Starlink. ¶ Russia has already begun contemplating [laws](https://arstechnica.com/science/2021/01/russia-may-fine-citizens-who-use-spacexs-starlink-internet-service/) to make Starlink illegal. The Russian government stated it would fine individual users 10,000 to 30,000 rubles (about $200-$400 USD) and larger entities close to a million (around $12,000 USD) rubles if caught using the service. ¶ Russia’s space chief Dmitry Rogozin, in [August](https://tass.ru/kosmos/9162215) of 2020, said that Starlink is “a rather predatory, clever, powerful, high-technology policy of the USA, which uses Shock and Awe in order to advance, before all, their military interests.” Rogozin publicly stated the more humanitarian aspects of Starlink, in that it would provide internet access to people living in remote areas, “nonsense.”¶ Like Iran and North Korea, other nations, who monitor and censor their internet, have been less vocal concerning satellite internet services. However, there is little reason to believe they would be any less warm to the idea of an open internet.¶ ANALYSIS: WEAPONIZING THE UNCENSORED INTERNET¶ These low-orbit satellites are relatively close to the Earth, and only a few hundred kilometers from the surface, compared to large telecommunications satellites that sit around 35,000 kilometers away. This allows for the terminals to access these near-Earth satellites to be pretty small and portable. A Starlink dish, for example, is about 19 inches in diameter or about the size of an extra-large pizza, and it only weighs a couple of pounds. ¶ According to Schwille, this makes them easy to smuggle, set up, and tear down quickly. These small ‘internet-in-a-box’ systems require no real estate, and they need a simple electrical source to operate.¶ Ultimately, it is feasible for users to quickly bypass any state’s internet controls and gain access to an open web. Moreover, users could place calls over the internet or via chat services, knowing that their conversation is not being tracked or monitored. ¶ “I see that access to information as a powerful tool in a democracies tool kit,” Schwille explained. “For too long, we have been getting hammered by authoritarian-sponsored attacks on U.S. institutions and populations via targeted disinformation campaigns.”¶ The inherent problem with the internet in democratic nations is that most of it is unfiltered. Ideas exist in a reasonably open environment, and misinformation and disinformation can be quickly spread. The open internet can therefore be used against democratic states by their adversaries. For example, Russia was able to easily influence the results of the [2016 U.S. Presidential election](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf) and the [Brexit campaign](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jul/21/russian-meddling-brexit-referendum-tories-russia-report-government). Analysts have called this [“democracy’s dilemma.”](https://bostonreview.net/forum-henry-farrell-bruce-schneier-democracys-dilemma) The critical issue is that the very openness of the internet can be weaponized to erode the foundations of democracy.¶ However, Schwille points out that systems like Starlink may be a good way for democratic states to fight back. “What authoritarians fear most is access to unfiltered information,” he told The Debrief.¶ Schwille points to the “[Dictator’s Dilemma](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10_dictators_digital_network.pdf)” and asserts that authoritarian regimes do not want “non-regime narratives” reaching their citizens, nor do they want any communication to occur outside of approved and monitored channels. ¶ Schwille suggests that democracies worldwide could “talk up” these low-orbit satellite internet options and create a global narrative. As that narrative reaches people in authoritarian states, the regimes will be forced to take action, allocating additional time and energy to another battle they may not necessarily have the war chest to fight. Or, they may be forced to be more open with their internet services.¶ Democracies could create messaging to target potential users in authoritarian states, and Schwille envisions a narrative that promotes the concept.¶ “‘Look how the internet will now be provided across all parts of the U.S., from the Appalachian mountains to the Alaskan wilderness. Now all Americans can have cheap access to information, no matter where they live,'” his adlibbed marketing pitch stated. As this message spreads, people all over the world will begin to take notice. ¶ “They could also talk it up throughout the development community. How [internet service] could be provided to sub-Saharan Africa at reduced prices,” Schwille explained. “You plant the idea that this technology can be used anywhere, by anybody. Is there an implied threat there for dictators? I would say yes.” ¶ A low-cost internet service accessible in remote areas would make a very compelling narrative and, as Schwille explains, develop a potent “underlying threat” an authoritarian regime would have to deal with. ¶ Moreover, Western democracies are well known for information warfare. During the Cold War, typewriters and Xerox machines were [smuggled](https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-offensive-us-strategy-combat-russian-information-warfare) into Eastern Europe to help increase the dissemination of uncensored information. ¶ “Smuggling in capabilities to produce, replicate and disseminate information are all well documented,” Schwille expressed. Simply put, these satellite systems are small enough that smuggling hundreds of them across a border would be straightforward. Schwille noted that any such act would escalate tensions with the regime. ¶ “While you could smuggle in these satellite systems and pass them around for use by dissidents, we argue for a more nuanced approach,” he concluded. ¶ The “threat” of these devices entering a regime’s borders and the spreading ‘free internet’ narrative would be enough to help leverage power against an adversary. Oddly enough, it would be warfare based not on active disinformation or deception but on simply providing access to information.

#### Free internet is crucial to the promotion of democracy. Pirannejad 17:

Ali Pirannejad {Department of Public Administration, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran; Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands, }, 17 - ("Can the internet promote democracy? A cross-country study based on dynamic panel data models," Taylor &amp; Francis, 4-1-2017, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02681102.2017.1289889?journalCode=titd20)//marlborough-wr/>

In the age of information revolution, information and communication technologies are penetrating all levels of societies and are also influencing the political aspect of each country by providing some facilities such as the Internet and web technologies. Democracy, as a universal value and a political system, is also well known and has an important role in the sublimation of the human societies. This study attempts to examine the effect of Internet extension on democracy promotion by using a panel consisting of 122 countries covering the period from the year 2000 to 2014. In order to estimate the effect, and also to deal with the endogeneity and autocorrelation problems, the dynamic panel data models are employed in the study. The results of estimation models indicate that Internet extension has a significantly positive effect on democracy promotion during the period. In the end, some ideas for further research are presented.

#### Democracy is an impact filter – solves war

Hegre, 14 (Håvard Hegre Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University & Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) “Democracy and armed conflict” SAGE) Henge

Although there is scholarly agreement that democracies rarely if ever have fought each other, there is less consensus as to why. The following five sets of explanations are important: First, the normative explanation (Doyle, 1986;Maoz& Russett, 1993) holds that ‘the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries as well’ (Ember, Ember & Russett, 1992: 576). States ‘externalize’ the domestic norms that encourage compromise solutions and reciprocation, and strictly inhibit the complete removal from political life of the loser in political contest. The absence of a monadic democratic peace is troublesome for the normative explanation, in particular since it implies that the probability of conflict between democracies and non-democracies must be higher than that between two non-democracies (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997). Rosato (2003) points to the frequent violation of liberal norms when democracies have decided to go to war – in imperial wars, as well as in frequent US interventions intended to overthrow democratically elected governments (Rosato, 2003: 589–590).11 Another notable caveat noted as early as in Kant (1795/1991), is the incentive to intervene in non-democracies to press for democratization (Peceny, 1999; Gleditsch, Christiansen & Hegre, 2007). A particularly critical view of democratic war behavior is found in Geis, Brock & Mu¨ller (2006). Second, according to the legislative constraints explanation, democratic leaders are constrained by other bodies (such as parliaments) which ensure that the interests of citizens and powerful organizations are taken into account. Debate is public, so information on the real costs of war is likely to enter the decision calculus. Democratic political leaders will be removed from office if they circumvent these constraints.12 Democracies’ ability to signal resolve is a third explanation. Why are states not able to agree to a solution that reflects the distribution of power and the actors’ ‘resolve’, without incurring the costs of war (Fearon, 1995)? One answer is that if crisis escalation is not very costly, both parties have an incentive to exaggerate their power or resolve, mobilize, and back down when the bluff is discovered. Fearon (1994) argues that audience costs – the costs that a leader suffers when backing down – lock leaders into their positions, increasing the costs of bluffing. Democracies have higher audience costs, Fearon argues, and may more credibly commit to policies with little crisis-inducing behavior to signal intentions.13 Making use of various empirical strategies to distinguish the explanations, Schultz (1999) and Prins (2003) find stronger support for the signaling argument than for the constraints explanation. Weeks (2008) builds on this argument by showing that single-party regimes also indicate behavior in line with a signaling argument. Downes & Sechser (2012), Snyder & Borghard (2011), and Trachtenberg (2012), on the other hand, find little empirical evidence for the audience cost argument.14 Fourth, in a mobilization argument Bueno deMesquita et al. (1999, 2003) argue that the democratic re-election pressures on leaders tend to make them more careful to select only wars they are likely to win, and to mobilize more resources for the war efforts they select than do autocratic leaders. This makes democracies unattractive targets, since they are likely to win the wars they fight (Reiter & Stam, 1998).15 Both of these tendencies tend to reduce the probability of war between democracies. One aspect of the effectiveness of democracies in war is their ability to form large alliances in important wars (Doyle, 1986; Raknerud & Hegre, 1997). The empirical analysis in Gartzke & Gleditsch (2004), however, suggests that democracies are less reliable allies. Leeds, Mattes & Vogel (2009), on the other hand, find that countries with democratic institutions are much less likely to abrogate international commitments than autocratic countries in instances where domestic leadership transitions result in leaders with different primary bases of societal support. Fifth, Gartzke (1998) points out that the democratic peace finding might be due to joint interests. Democracies may fail to disagree sufficiently on international policies to be willing to suffer the costs of war. Such joint interests may be due to the fact that most democracies were on the same side during the Cold War (Farber & Gowa, 1995).16 The failure to observe a monadic democratic peace (Gartzke & Weisiger, 2013: 172) and the observation of an ‘autocratic peace’ (Werner, 2000; Peceny, Beer & Sanchez-Terry, 2002) support this argument. 17 An autocratic peace can hardly be explained by constraints inherent in autocratic regimes, but must be due to shared interests. Gartzke (1998, 2000) shows that controlling for joint interests weakens the magnitude and significance of the evidence for a democratic peace.18 Joint interests and joint regime types may be linked through three pathways. First, joint democracy may itself give rise to joint interests, such as an interest in the promotion of democratic regimes or through similar incentives for political leaders to expand the territory they control. The profitability of occupation is less certain for democratic leaders than for autocratic countries, since the benefits of occupation have to be shared between almost as many as those who bear the costs (Rosecrance, 1986). Moreover, in order to extract much from the conquered territory, the people resident there have to be denied the political rights that are held by the citizens of the occupying country. 19 Hence, joint democracy may lead to the mutual acceptance of international borders, removing an important source of war (Huth & Allee, 2002). Relatedly, Schweller (1992) argues that regime type affects how declining powers behave. When challenged by rising powers, realist theory posits that leading powers wage preventive wars to maintain their military hegemony. Preventive wars are less attractive to democratic leaders. If the rising power is another democracy, the historical absence of war between democracies indicates that the threat is minimal. If it is non-democratic, the public is wary of the risks and costs of a war where the danger is not imminent, and the formation of alliances to counterbalance the non-democratic threat is often a preferable strategy.20 Internal conflict The earliest arguments for an internal democratic peace are related to the normative and structural explanations of the interstate variant. Democracy is seen as a system for peaceful resolution of conflicts, as conflicting claims by rival social groups are solved by majority votes or consensual agreements. If individuals are denied the political rights and the economic benefits they believe they are entitled to, they may react with aggression and organize violent political opposition. If conflict results from ‘relative deprivation’ (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968), democracies should be more peaceful internally than other regime types. Armed rebellion will not be profitable since democracies both allow discontent to be expressed and have mechanisms to handle it. Another argument holds that democratic institutions alter the risk of internal conflicts by facilitating effective bargaining and reducing commitment problems. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006: 24–25) note that citizens are excluded from de jure power in a nondemocracy. Still, they always enjoy some de facto power that sometimes allows citizens to obtain policy concessions from the elites in the short run. It is uncertain whether these will be maintained, however, since the balance between various social groups is transitory. Citizens, then, should demand that today’s de facto power is translated into de jure power that secures long-term concessions. This demand may be backed by a threat of revolution – a civil war. The elites cannot credibly commit to a promise of policy concessions in the indefinite future, however, as long as de facto power is transitory. Democratic institutions are the solution to this commitment problem (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). This explains democratization and shows why democratic institutions reduce the risk of (revolutionary) civil wars. Fearon (1995) likewise argues that bargaining failures and commitment problems are important explanations of war, and Fearon (2004: 288) argues that democratic regimes facilitate bargaining and credible commitments for internal conflicts.21 If either of these accounts is true, fully fledged democracies are less conflict-prone than repressive autocracies. One possible reason for not observing this is that democracies often are faced with opportunistic rebels whose aims do not reflect the interests of broad social groups. For internal conflicts, a parallel to the mobilization argument formulated for interstate conflict would encounter difficulties. Both democracies and non-democracies use military force to counter illegitimate armed opposition, but autocracies may make much more extensive use of repression without losing legitimacy – using violence to silence opponents, censorship, arbitrary imprisonment without trial, etc. Autocracies may indiscriminately target entire population groups to coerce influential individuals (Davenport& Armstrong, 2004; Carey, 2010).22 Autocracies also buy off other parts of the opposition by granting ministerial posts and by the selective channeling of public funds (Fjelde & de Soysa, 2009). The combination of these two methods allows effective divide-andrule strategies. Autocracies also repress the formation of organizations before they can reach the stage of armed insurgencies. Hence, regimes that feature both democratic and autocratic characteristics are partly open yet lack effective means of solving conflicts. In such political systems, repression is difficult since some organization of opposition groups and some opposition expression of discontent are allowed, but mechanisms to act on the expressed discontent are incomplete (cf. Davies, 1962; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Muller &Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001). Hence, repression is ineffective if ‘grievance’ is not simultaneously being addressed, which is why we observe an inverted-U relationship between democracy and peace.

### 3

#### Counterplan: The appropriation of outer space by private entities via Large Satellite Constellations in Lower Earth Orbit is unjust unless states charge private entities orbital use fees for each satellite put into low-Earth Orbit.

#### Solves the case while also boosting the economy. Vergoth 20:

Karin Vergoth {CIRES-NOAA Science Writer}, 20 - ("Solving the space junk problem," CU Boulder Today, 5-26-2020, https://www.colorado.edu/today/2020/05/26/solving-space-junk-problem)//marlborough-wr/

Space is getting crowded. Aging satellites and space debris crowd low-Earth orbit, and launching new satellites adds to the collision risk. The most effective way to solve the space junk problem, according to a new study, is not to capture debris or deorbit old satellites: it’s an international agreement to charge operators “orbital-use fees” for every satellite put into orbit. Orbital use fees would also increase the long-run value of the space industry, said economist Matthew Burgess, a [CIRES Fellow and co-author of the new paper](https://cires.colorado.edu/news/solving-space-junk-problem). By reducing future satellite and debris collision risk, an annual fee rising to about $235,000 per satellite would quadruple the value of the satellite industry by 2040, he and his colleagues concluded in a paper published today in the [Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences](https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2020/05/20/1921260117). “Space is a common resource, but companies aren’t accounting for the cost their satellites impose on other operators when they decide whether or not to launch,” said Burgess, who is also an assistant professor in environmental studies and an affiliated faculty member in economics at CU Boulder. “We need a policy that lets satellite operators directly factor in the costs their launches impose on other operators.” Currently, an estimated 20,000 objects—including satellites and space debris—are crowding low-Earth orbit. It’s the latest tragedy of the commons, the researchers said: Each operator launches more and more satellites until their private collision risk equals the value of the orbiting satellite. So far, proposed solutions have been primarily technological or managerial, said Akhil Rao, assistant professor of economics at Middlebury College and the paper’s lead author. Technological fixes include removing space debris from orbit with nets, harpoons, or lasers. Deorbiting a satellite at the end of its life is a managerial fix. Ultimately, engineering or managerial solutions like these won’t solve the debris problem because they don’t change the incentives for operators. For example, removing space debris might motivate operators to launch more satellites—further crowding low-Earth orbit, increasing collision risk, and raising costs. “This is an incentive problem more than an engineering problem. What’s key is getting the incentives right,” Rao said. A better approach to the space debris problem, Rao and his colleagues found, is to implement an orbital-use fee—a tax on orbiting satellites. “That’s not the same as a launch fee,” Rao said, “Launch fees by themselves can’t induce operators to deorbit their satellites when necessary, and it's not the launch but the orbiting satellite that causes the damage.” Orbital-use fees could be straight-up fees or tradeable permits, and they could also be orbit-specific, since satellites in different orbits produce varying collision risks. Most important, the fee for each satellite would be calculated to reflect the cost to the industry of putting another satellite into orbit, including projected current and future costs of additional collision risk and space debris production—costs operators don’t currently factor into their launches. “In our model, what matters is that satellite operators are paying the cost of the collision risk imposed on other operators,” said Daniel Kaffine, professor of economics and RASEI Fellow at CU Boulder and co-author on the paper. And those fees would increase over time, to account for the rising value of cleaner orbits. In the researchers’ model, the optimal fee would rise at a rate of 14 percent per year, reaching roughly $235,000 per satellite-year by 2040. For an orbital-use fee approach to work, the researchers found, all countries launching satellites would need to participate—that's about a dozen that launch satellites on their own launch vehicles and more than 30 that own satellites. In addition, each country would need to charge the same fee per unit of collision risk for each satellite that goes into orbit, although each country could collect revenue separately. Countries use similar approaches already in carbon taxes and fisheries management. In this study, Rao and his colleagues compared orbital-use fees to business as usual (that is, open access to space) and to technological fixes such as removing space debris. They found that orbital use fees forced operators to directly weigh the expected lifetime value of their satellites against the cost to industry of putting another satellite into orbit and creating additional risk. In other scenarios, operators still had incentive to race into space, hoping to extract some value before it got too crowded. With orbital-use fees, the long-run value of the satellite industry would increase from around $600 billion under the business-as-usual scenario to around $3 trillion, researchers found. The increase in value comes from reducing collisions and collision-related costs, such as launching replacement satellites. Orbital-use fees could also help satellite operators get ahead of the space junk problem. “In other sectors, addressing the tragedy of the commons has often been a game of catch-up with substantial social costs. But the relatively young space industry can avoid these costs before they escalate,” Burgess said.

## Case

### Hacking

#### No link - Sat attacks don’t cause nuke war

Zarybnisky 18 [Eric J. Zarybnisky, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. March 28, 2018. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf>]

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F 8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space

### Space Debris

**Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away.**

Peter **Stubbe**, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, **’17**, State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris, Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the number of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt around the Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:

Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of **30% in the next 200 years.** The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

**Space debris is hype---there are thousands of satellites and only 15 debris collisions ever**

Mark **Albrecht 16**, Chairman of the board of USSpace LLC & fmr. head of the National Space Council, “Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria, 5/9/16, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/

There are over a half million pieces of human-made material in orbit around our planet. Some are the size of school buses, some the size of BB gun pellets. They all had a function at some point, but now most are simply space debris littered from 100 to 22,000 miles above the Earth. Yet, all behave perfectly according to the laws of physics. Many in the space community have called the collision hazard caused by space debris a crisis.

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion.

Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are **exaggerated and misleading**. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it **certainly** is **not a crisis.**

So what are the facts?

On the positive side, space is **empty** and it is **vast**. At the altitude of the International Space Station, **one half a degree** of Earth longitude is almost **40 miles long**. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, **nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects** and **they behave quite predictably**. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance.

Since we first started placing objects into space there have been 11 known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, **hundreds** of telecommunications satellites, **1,300 functioning satellites** on orbit today, **half a million** total objects in space larger than a marble, and **fewer than 15 known collisions**. **Why** do people **worry?**

### Militarization

#### Space commercialization is a strong constraint on conflict – solves space war

Wendy N. Whitman **Cobb 20**, is currently an associate professor of strategy and security studies at the US Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 7-21-2020, "Privatizing Peace: How Commerce Can Reduce Conflict in Space," Routledge & CRC Press, <https://www.routledge.com/Privatizing-Peace-How-Commerce-Can-Reduce-Conflict-in-Space/Cobb/p/book/9780367337834> // AAli

By the end of the twentieth century, scholars zeroed in on the democratic peace theory which attempts to explain why democracies do not go to war with other democracies and why, in some analyses, they seem to be more prone to peace in general than non-democracies. Similar to the golden arches, what is it about democracy that seems to induce such peacefulness? Academics have proposed everything from the nature of mediating institutions to the restraint of public opinion, to trade relations. While these variations will be explored further in Chapter 3, of interest here are the versions that focus explicitly on trade, commercial ties, and capitalism. Along these lines, Erik Gartzke argues, "peace ensues when states lack differences worthy of costly conflict."31 If the costs of conflict are too high, then states should be more unlikely to engage in it. To this end, economic globalization can provide the means through which costs are raised. “The integration of world markets not only facilitates commerce, but also creates new interests inimical to war. Financial interdependence ensures that damage inflicted on one economy travels through the global system, afflicting even aggressors."32 Focusing his analysis primarily on the influence of capitalism, Gartzke's findings suggest that states with markets more closely tied to the global economy are far less likely to experience a militarized dispute.

In thinking about the space environment today, there are obvious principles of capitalism at work. However, China, a major spacefaring state that has been making capitalist reforms, arguably remains far from a true capitalist country. This is especially true in their space industry which is heavily subsidized by the state and almost wholly integrated with China's military.34 Many other states continue to subsidize space activities heavily as well. A better approach through which to examine conflict in space is presented by an offshoot of the capitalist peace which is termed the commercial peace. The commercial peace thesis emphasizes the role of trade and the connections made through it to explain a lack of conflict. Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward write:

Trade is important not only because it creates an economic interest in peace but also because trade generates 'connections' between people that promote communication and understanding.... Based on these ideas, the flow of goods between countries creates a network of ties and communication links. If two countries are more embedded in this network, their relations should be more

peaceful 35

Given the interconnectedness of the global economy to space-based assets, a version of the commercial peace thesis can be used to argue that the chance of conflict in space is less than is commonly understood or recognized precisely because of the extent to which the global economy has become dependent on space-based assets.

To understand this argument, consider a scenario in which Russia, in preparation for a new assault on Eastern Europe, attacks a key US military satellite with the purpose of disrupting and disabling military communications in Europe. This action would conceivably enable the Russians to undertake their attack under more favorable conditions and prevent a quicker response from America and its allies. However, if the satellite was attacked via an ASAT that kinetically destroyed the US satellite, the debris cloud created from the attack could have disastrous consequences beyond military communications Much like the movie Gravity, the debris cloud could cause a chain reaction, hitting and ~~disabling~~ dismantling other satellites that would in turn disrupt civilian communications, business transactions, and perhaps even Russian military satellites. The economic effects of lost satellites would not be restricted to one country alone; the global economic consequences in terms of lost property (satellites), lost transactions, and financial havoc would echo throughout the world, including in Russia itself. Finally, the attack on one satellite could even ultimately endanger the ISS and its inhabitants, several of which are Russians. Destruction of the ISS would negate billions of dollars in investment from not just Russia, but other countries that have participated in it including Japan, Italy, and Canada. Therefore, an attack on a US military satellite would not just be an attack on one but an attack on all.

While the previous scenario highlights several reasons why it would not be in Russia's best interest to attack a US satellite, this book argues that the economic argument is both the strongest and the most restraining especially as space becomes more congested, competitive, contested, and commercialized. The emergence of private space companies enhances this argument. "In the commercial sector, companies need reliability and legal enforcement mechanisms if they are going to operate profitably in a shared environment."36 In order to foster the growing area of space commercialization, companies must be assured that the activities they undertake in space will be protected in some way or, at a minimum, allowed to proceed to the extent where they can reap the profit. This could be done through international organizations that would provide some sort of space traffic control, but the likelihood of a major international breakthrough on rules regarding space is unlikely in the near term. Therefore, actors must rely on the protections afforded them by an increasingly globalized economy that is ever more dependent on space-based assets.

#### No space war and terrestrial conflict turns it

Luke Penn-Hall 15, Analyst at The Cipher Brief, M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, B.A. in International Relations and Religious Studies from Claremont McKenna College, “5 Reasons “Space War” Isn’t As Scary As It Sounds”, The Cipher Brief, 8/18/2015, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/5-reasons-%E2%80%9Cspace-war%E2%80%9D-isn%E2%80%99t-scary-it-sounds

The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites. If a less satellite-dependent opponent launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, it would have far greater impact on the U.S. than the attacker. However, it’s not as simple as that – for the following reasons: 1. An ASAT attack would likely be part of a larger, terrestrial attack. An attack on space assets would be no different than an attack on territory or other assets on earth. This means that no space war would stay limited to space. An ASAT campaign would be part of a larger conventional military conflict that would play out on earth. 2. Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs satellites. While the United States is the most dependent on military satellites, most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a vested interest in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely hurt them far more than it would hurt the United States. 3. Destruction of satellites could create a damaging chain reaction. Scientists warn that the violent destruction of satellites could result in an effect called an ablation cascade. High-velocity debris from a destroyed satellite could crash into other satellites and create more high-velocity debris. If an ablation cascade were to occur, it could render certain orbital levels completely unusable for centuries. 4. Any country that threatened access to space would threaten the global economy. Even if a full-blown ablation cascade didn’t occur, an ASAT campaign would cause debris, making operating in space more hazardous. The global economy relies on satellites and any disruption of operations would be met with worldwide disapproval and severe economic ramifications. 5. International Prohibits the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly prohibit signatory nations from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain. While it remains necessary for military planners to create contingency plans for a, space war it is a highly unlikely scenario. All involved parties are incentivized against attacking. However, if a space war did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth. Those concerned about the potential for war in space should be more concerned about the potential for war, period.

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.