## CP

**Counterplan: A just government ought to guarantee the right to strike except for violent strike tactics.**

**Strikes can be violent, South Africa proves. This link turns the AC by harming the affected sector and decking the economy.**

Tenzam ’20 - Mlungisi Tenzam LLB LLM LLD Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2020, The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1682-58532020000300004

The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike.11The Constitution grants these rights to a "worker" as an individual.12However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14¶ The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to "advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace".16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society.¶ Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike 17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally.18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful.19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers' demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows:¶ "[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike ... A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won't win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say '1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC'. You won't win a strike like that."21¶ The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers' homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour.22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families' living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer's business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26¶ These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations' sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment27, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment.

## NC Shell

### NC – Recommended K

#### The aff’s refusal to work is not a refusal of work – their endorsement of striking reinforces the belief that withholding labor puts people in a position of power. This reduces humans to labor capital, which causes work-dependency and inhibits alternatives.

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

The societal dependence on work

If work is associated with environmental pressures in at least four different ways, why do we have to maintain it at constant or increased levels? We hold that in industrial society four distinct levels of structural and cultural dependency on work may be discerned. These are to be understood as broad analytical categories which in reality comprise and cross individual and structural levels in various ways, and are all interdependent.

Personal dependence. A first aspect is individual or personal dependence on work: Work as regular, gainful employment constitutes one of the central social relations in modern ‘work society’ and is a central point of reference in people’s lives. As a principal source of income, waged work fulfils the existential function of providing livelihoods and social security. It is constructed to secure basic social rights, social integration, recognition, status, and personal identity (Frayne 2015b; Weeks 2011). This is probably why ‘social’ is so often equated with ‘work’.

State dependence. Secondly, dependence on work pertains to the modern welfare state: the revenues and economic growth generated through work contribute substantially to the financing of social security systems. Affording welfare is therefore a main argument for creating jobs. Wage labour is thus a dominating tool for redistribution; through wages, taxes on wages and on the consumption that production generates, almost all distribution takes place. Hence, what the job is, and what is being produced, is of secondary importance (Paulsen 2017). Work is moreover a convenient instrument of control that structures and disciplines society, and ‘renders populations at once productive and governable’ (Weeks 2011, 54; Gorz 1982; Lafargue 2014 [1883]). Specifically, the dominant neoliberal ideology, its condemnation of laziness and idealisation of ‘hardworking people’ has intensified the ‘moral fortification of work’. Accordingly, the neoliberal ‘workfare’ reforms have focused on job creation and the relentless activation for the labour market, effectively ‘enforcing work (…) as a key function of the state’ (Frayne 2015b, 16).

Economic dependence. Thirdly, besides the economic imperative for individuals to ‘earn a living’ and pay off debt, modern economies are dependent on work in terms of an industrious labour force, long working hours for increasing economic output under the imperatives of capital accumulation, growth and competition, and rising incomes for increasing purchasing power and demand. Creating or preserving jobs constitutes the standard argument for economic growth. In turn, work as one basic factor of production creates growth. However, the relation between growth and employment is conditioned, amongst other factors, primarily by constantly pursued labour productivity: for employment to rise or stay stable, the economy must grow at a sufficiently high rate to exceed productivity gains, in order to offset job losses and avoid ‘jobless growth’. Moreover, faltering expansion triggers a spiral of recession which not only affects economic stability but results in societal crises as a whole (Jackson 2009; Paech 2012). However, besides being unsustainable and insatiable, growth is also increasingly unlikely to continue at the rates required for economic stability (Kallis et al. 2018; IMF 2015). The individual and structural economic dependence on work and economic growth therefore implies profound vulnerability as livelihoods and political stability are fatefully exposed to global competition and the capitalist imperative of capital accumulation, and constrained by ‘systemically relevant’ job and growth creating companies, industries and global (financial) markets (Gronemeyer 2012; Paech 2012).

Cultural dependence. A fourth aspect concerns cultural dependence: The ‘work ethic’ is the specific morality described by Max Weber (1992[1905]) as constitutive of modern industrial culture, 2 and determining for all its subjects as shared ‘common senses’ about how work is valued and understood. It means an ingrained moral compulsion to gainful work and timesaving, manifested in the common ideals of productivity, achievement and entrepreneurship, in the feeling of guilt when time is ‘wasted’, in personal identification with one’s ‘calling’, in observations of busyness, even burnout as a ‘badge of honour’ (Paulsen 2014), and in descriptions of a culture that has lost the ‘capacity to relax in the old, uninhibited ways’ (Thompson 1967, 91). Even for those who do not share such attitudes towards work, in a work-centred culture it is normal to (seek) work. It is so commonsensical that it seems impractical to question it, and it continues to be normalised through socialisation and schooling. Consequently, people become limited in their imagination of alternatives, the prospect of losing one’s job usually causes heartfelt fear (Standing 2011). For a work society that ‘does no longer know of those other higher and more meaningful activities for the sake of which this freedom would deserve to be won’, there can be nothing worse than the cessation of work (Hannah Arendt, cited in Gorz 1989, 7–8).

The wage relation based on the commodity labour is, in other words, an essential functional feature of the industrial-capitalist system, and the exaltation of work remains its social ethic. For modern industrial society work is ‘both its chief means and its ultimate goal’ (Gorz 1989, 13; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2011); it is centred and structurally dependent on work, despite work’s environmentally adverse implications. This constellation constitutes the dilemma between work and the environment, and it is why we argue that work is absolutely central to present-day unsustainability and should accordingly be dealt with in sustainability research.

#### Work necessitates material throughput and waste that destroys the environment, even when the jobs are ‘green’

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

An ecological critique of work

What is the problem with modern-day work from an environmental perspective? A number of quantitative studies have researched the correlation of working hours and environmental impacts in terms of ecological footprint, carbon footprint, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy consumption, both on micro/household and on macro/cross-national levels, and for both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013; Nässén and Larsson 2015; Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007). Based on these findings, and going beyond them, we develop a qualitative classification of ecological impacts of work broadly (not working hours only), distinguishing four analytically distinct factors (Hoffmann 2017).

Fundamentally, all productive activity is based on material and energy throughputs within wider ecological conditions, which necessarily involves interference with the ecosphere. The appropriation and exploitation of non-human animals, land, soil, water, biomass, raw materials, the atmosphere and all other elements of the biosphere always to some extent causes pollution, degradation, and destruction. Thus, work is inherently both productive and destructive. However, this biophysical basis alone need not make work unsustainable, and it has not always been so (Krausmann 2017).

Contributing to its unsustainability is, firstly, the Scale factor: the greater the amount of work, the more ‘inputs’ are required and the more ‘outputs’ generated, which means more throughput of resources and energy, and resulting ecological impacts. In other words, the more work, the larger the size of the economy, the more demands on the biosphere (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013). Obviously, there are qualitative differences between different types of work and their respective environmental impacts. Moreover, besides the evident and direct impacts, indirect impacts matter also. The tertiary/service sector is therefore not exempt from this reasoning (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), not only due to its own (often ‘embodied’) materiality and energy requirements, but also because it administrates and supports industrial production processes in global supply chains (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Haberl et al. 2009; Paech 2012).

Additionally, modern work is subject to certain integrally connected and mutually reinforcing conditions inherent in industrial economic structures, which aggravate ecological impacts by further increasing the Scale factor. These include the systematic externalisation of costs, and the use of fossil fuels as crucial energy basis, which combined with modern industrial technology enable continuously rising labour productivity independently of physical, spatial or temporal constraints (Malm 2013). Taken together, this leads to constantly spurred economic growth with a corresponding growth in material and energetic throughputs, and the creation of massive amounts of waste. The latter is not an adverse side-effect of modern work, but part of its purpose under the imperatives of growth, profitability, and constant innovation, as evident in phenomena such as planned obsolescence or the ‘scrapping premium’, serving to stimulate growth and demand, and hence, job creation (Gronemeyer 2012). These conditions and effects tend to be neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised to resolve the ecological crisis (Paus 2018), disregarding that the systematically and continuously advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits (Haberl et al. 2009).

#### Unions are intrinsically invested in labor being good – they don’t strike to get rid of work; they strike to get people back to work. Lundström 14:

Lundström, Ragnar; Räthzel, Nora; Uzzell, David {Uzell is Professor (Emeritus) of Environmental Psychology at the University of Surrey with a BA Geography from the University of Liverpool, a PhD Psychology from the University of Surrey, and a MSc in Social Psychology from London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Lundstrom is Associate professor at [Department of Sociology](https://www.umu.se/sociologiska-institutionen/) at Umea University. Rathzel is an Affiliated as professor emerita at [Department of Sociology](https://www.umu.se/sociologiska-institutionen/) at Umea University.}, 14 - ("Disconnected spaces: introducing environmental perspectives into the trade union agenda top-down and bottom-up," Taylor & Francis, 12-11-2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212?scroll=top&amp;needAccess=true)//marlborough-wr/

Even though there was support for environmental perspectives in LO at this time – after all, the National Congress commissioned the programme, an environmental unit was established at headquarters and a majority of the congress accepted the programme – this waned significantly when the economy was threatened. This reflects the influence of the ‘jobs vs. environment’ conflict on processes of integrating environmental perspectives into the union agenda (Räthzel and Uzzell [2011](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)). Union policies are embedded in a mode of production marked by what Marx called the ‘metabolic rift’. The concept is one of the pillars upon which Foster develops ‘Marx’s Ecology’ (Foster [2000](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212), 155 f). It argues that the capitalist industrial system exploits the earth without restoring its constituents to it. More generally, Marx defined the labour process as metabolism (Stoffwechsel) between nature (external to humans) and human nature. When humans work on and with nature to produce the means of their survival, they also develop their knowledge and their capabilities, and transform their own human nature (Marx [1998](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)). Polanyi later reduced the concept of the ‘metabolic rift’ to the commodification of land (Polanyi [1944](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)), thus paving the way for a perspective that sees the solution in the control of the market, but disregards the relations of production as they are lived by workers in the production process. But to understand why trade unions have difficulties developing and especially holding on to environmental policies it is important to recognise that since nature has become a privately owned ‘means of production’ it has become workers’ Other. Unions have been reduced and have reduced themselves to care only for one part of the inseparable relationship between nature and labour. On the everyday level of policies this means that environmental strategies lose momentum in times of economic crises and when jobs are seen to be threatened. In this respect, unions are no different from political parties and governments. In spite of numerous publications by the ILO and Union organisations, which show that a move to a ‘green economy’ can create new jobs (Poschen [2012](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212); Rivera Alejo and Martín Murillo [2014](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2015.1041212)), unions have been reluctant to exchange ‘a bird in the hand for two in the bush’ – even if the bird in the hand becomes elusive.

#### The alternative is rejecting the affirmative to embrace postwork – it questions the centrality of work and ontological attachments to productivity to enable emancipatory transformation of society to an ecologically sustainable form.

#### Your ballot symbolizes an answer to the question of whether work can be used as the solution to social ills. The plan doesn’t “happen,” and you are conditioned to valorize work – vote neg to interrogate these ideological assumptions.

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

What is postwork?

How can a ‘postwork’ approach contribute to resolving these issues? The notions critique of work (Frayne 2015a, 2015b) or postwork (Weeks 2011) have emerged in recent years in social science research and popular culture, building on a long intellectual tradition of (autonomist and neo-)Marxist, anarchist, and feminist theory (Seyferth 2019; Weeks 2011). The critique of work targets work in a fundamental sense, not only its conditions or exploitation. It is aimed at the centrality of work in modern ‘work society’ as a pivotal point for the provision of livelihoods through monetary income, the granting of social security, social inclusion, and personal identity construction, on which grounds unemployed persons and unpaid activities are excluded from recognition, welfare provision and trade union support. Moreover, the crucial role of waged work in the functioning of the welfare state and the modern industrialised economy is part of this critique (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015b; Paulsen 2017). Although commonly taken as naturally given, this kind of societal order and its institutions such as the wage relation, labour markets, unemployment, or abstract time are historically and culturally exceptional modes of human coexistence (Applebaum 1992; Graeber 2018; Gorz 1989; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Thompson 1967). This critique of the structures and social relations of work society is accompanied by the critique of its cultural foundation, the work ethic; an ideological commitment to work and productivism as ends in themselves, moral obligations, and as intrinsically good, regardless of what is done and at what cost (Gorz 1982; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2001).

Postwork, however, is not only a critical stance. Criticising work and work society, aware of their historical contingency, implies the potential for an emancipatory transformation of industrial society. The focus is thereby not necessarily on abolishing work tout-court, but rather on pointing out and questioning its relentless centrality and asking what a more desirable, free and sustainable society might look like; a society in which work is no longer the pivotal point of social organisation and ideological orientation, including all questions and debates around this objective (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015a; Weeks 2011).

As a relatively new and dynamically developing approach, postwork is, despite similar political claims, not uniform in its reasoning. Some, drawing on the classical ‘end-of-work’ argument (Frayne 2016), assume an imminent technology-induced massive rise in unemployment. This is welcomed as an opportunity to reduce and ultimately abolish work to liberate humankind (Srnicek and Williams 2015). Others emphasise the remarkable fact that throughout the past two centuries technological development has not challenged the centrality of work in modern lives, despite the prospect that technological change would allow for much shorter working hours (e.g., Keynes 1930). This has not materialised due to the requirements of a work-centred, work-dependent society. On the contrary, work has become more central to modern societies. These deeper structural and cultural aspects and dependencies seem to remain unaffected by technological trends (Paulsen 2017; Weeks 2011).

The ecological case for postwork

The perspective of postwork/critiques of work may enrich sustainability debates in many ways; here, our focus is again on ecological concerns. First, postwork offers a much needed change in focus in sustainability debates, away from narrow critiques of individual consumption and the overemphasis on ‘green jobs’, towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability. Postwork directs the focus towards crucial overlooked issues, e.g. the ways in which work is ecologically harmful, or which problems arise due to the social and cultural significance of modern-day work, including existential dependencies on it. Postwork seeks to re-politicise work, recognising that its conception and societal organisation are social constructs and therefore political, and must accordingly be open to debate (Weeks 2011). This opens conceptual space and enables open-minded debates about the meaning, value and purpose of work: what kind of work is, for individuals, society and the biosphere as a whole, meaningful, pointless, or outright harmful (Graeber 2018)?

Such debates and enhanced understanding about the means and ends of work, and the range of problems associated with it, would be important in several regards. In ecological regard it facilitates the ecologically necessary, substantial reduction of work, production and consumption (Frey 2019; Haberl et al. 2009). Reducing work/working hours is one of the key premises of postwork, aiming at de-centring and de-normalising work, and releasing time, energy and creativity for purposes other than work (Coote 2013). From an ecological perspective, reducing the amount of work would reduce the dependency on a commodity-intensive mode of living, and allow space for more sustainable practices (Frayne 2016). Reducing work would also help mitigate all other work-induced environmental pressures described above, especially the ‘Scale factor’ (Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), i.e. the amount of resources and energy consumed, and waste, including emissions, created through work. A postwork approach facilitates debate on the politics of ecological work reduction which entails difficult questions: for example, which industries and fields of employment are to be phased out? Which fields will need to be favoured and upon what grounds? Which kinds of work in which sectors are socially important and should therefore be organised differently, especially when altering the energy basis of work due to climate change mitigation which implies decentralised, locally specific, intermittent and less concentrated energy sources (Malm 2013)? These questions are decisive for future (un-)sustainability, and yet serious attempts at a solution are presently forestalled by the unquestioned sanctity that work, ‘jobs’ or ‘full employment’ enjoy (Frayne 2015b).

Postwork is also conducive to rethinking the organisation of work. There are plausible arguments in favour of new institutions of democratic control over the economy, i.e. economic democracy (Johanisova and Wolf 2012). This is urgent and necessary to distribute a very tight remaining carbon budget fairly and wisely (IPCC 2018), to keep economic power in check, and to gain public sovereignty over fundamental economic decisions that are pivotal for (un-)sustainable trajectories (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). An obstacle to this is one institution in particular which is rarely under close scrutiny: the labour market, a social construct linked to the advent of modern work in form of the commodity of labour (Applebaum 1992). It is an undemocratic mechanism, usually characterised by high levels of unfreedom and coercion (Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018; Paulsen 2015) that allocates waged work in a competitive mode as an artificially scarce, ‘fictitious’ commodity (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). 4 It does so according to availability of money and motives of gain on the part of employers, and appears therefore inappropriate for distributing labour according to sustainability criteria and related societal needs. As long as unsustainable and/or unnecessary jobs are profitable and/or (well-)paid, they will continue to exist (Gorz 1989), just as ‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria in order to be created. An ecological postwork perspective allows to question this on ecological grounds, and it links to debates on different modes of organising socially necessary work, production and provisioning in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode.

Finally, postwork is helpful for ecological reasons because it criticises the cultural glorification of ‘hard work’, merit and productivism, and the moral assumption that laziness and inaction are intrinsically bad, regardless the circumstances. Postwork is about a different mindset which problematises prevailing productivist attitudes and allows the idea that being lazy or unproductive can be something inherently valuable. Idleness is conducive to an ecological agenda as nothing is evidently more carbon-neutral and environment-sparing than being absolutely unproductive. As time-use studies indicate, leisure, recreation and socialising have very low ecological impacts, with rest and sleep having virtually none (Druckman et al. 2012). Apart from humans, the biosphere also needs idle time for regeneration. In this sense, laziness or ‘ecological leisure’, ideally sleep, can be regarded as supremely ecofriendly states of being that would help mitigate ecological pressures. Moreover, as postwork traces which changes in attitudes towards time, efficiency and laziness have brought modern work culture and modern time regimes into being in the first place and have dominated ever since (Thompson 1967; Weber 1992 [1905]), it provides crucial knowledge for understanding and potentially changing this historically peculiar construction. It can thereby take inspiration from longstanding traditions throughout human history, where leisure has usually been a high social ideal and regarded as vital for realising genuine freedom and quality of life (Applebaum 1992; Gorz 1989).

Conclusions: postwork politics and practices

We argued that modern-day work is a central cause for unsustainability, and should therefore be transformed to advance towards sustainability. We have contributed to this field of research, firstly, by developing a systematisation of the ecological harms associated with work – comprising the factors Scale, Time, Income, and Work-induced Mobility, Infrastructure, and Consumption – taking those studies one step further which investigate the ecological impacts of working hours quantitatively. One of the analytical advantages of this approach is that it avoids the mystification of work through indirect measures of economic activity (such as per capita GDP), as in the numerous analyses of the conflict between sustainability and economic growth in general. Our second substantial contribution consists in combining these ecological impacts of work with an analysis of the various structural dependencies on work in modern society, which spells out clearly what the recurring jobs-environment-dilemma actually implies, and why it is so difficult to overcome. While this dilemma is often vaguely referred to, this has been the first more detailed analysis of the different dimensions that essentially constitute it. Reviewing the literature in environmental sociology and sustainability research more generally, we also found the work-environment-dilemma and the role of work itself are not sufficiently addressed and remain major unresolved issues.

We proposed the field would benefit from taking up the long intellectual tradition of problematising modern-day work, through the approach of postwork or critiques of work. While the described problems of unsustainability and entrenched dependencies cannot easily be resolved, we discussed how postwork arguments can contribute to pointing out and understanding them, and to opening up new perspectives to advance sustainability debates. A third contribution is therefore to have introduced the concept of postwork/critiques of work into sustainability research and the work-environment debate, and to have conducted an initial analysis of the ways in which postwork may be helpful for tackling ecological problems. Besides being ecologically beneficial, it may also serve emancipatory purposes to ‘raise broader questions about the place of work in our lives and spark the imagination of a life no longer so subordinate to it’ (Weeks 2011, 33). In order to inspire such ‘postwork imagination’ (Weeks 2011, 35, 110) and show that postwork ideas are not as detached from reality as they may sound, in this last section we briefly outline examples of existing postwork politics and practices.

The most obvious example is the reduction of working hours during the 19th and 20th centuries. These reforms were essential to the early labour movement, and the notion that increasing productivity entails shorter working hours has never been nearly as ‘radical’ as today (Paulsen 2017). As concerns about climate change are rising, there is also renewed awareness about the ecological benefits of worktime reduction, besides a whole range of other social and economic advantages (Coote 2013; Frey 2019).

Worktime reduction is usually taken up positively in public debate. Carlsson (2015, 184) sees a ‘growing minority of people’ who engage in practices other than waged work to support themselves and make meaningful contributions to society. Frayne (2015b) describes the practical refusal of work by average people who wish to live more independently of the treadmill of work. Across society, the disaffection with work is no marginal phenomenon (Graeber 2018; Cederström and Fleming 2012; Paulsen 2014, 2015; Weeks 2011); many start to realise the ‘dissonance between the mythical sanctity of work on the one hand, and the troubling realities of people’s actual experiences on the other’ (Frayne 2015b, 228). Public debates are therefore increasingly receptive to issues such as industries’ responsibility for climate change, coercive ‘workfare’ policies, meaningless ‘bullshit jobs’, or ‘work-life-balance’, shorter hours, overwork and burnout; topics ‘that will not go away’ (Coote 2013, xix) and question the organisation of work society more fundamentally. 5

The debate about an unconditional basic income (UBI) will also remain. UBI would break the existential dependency of livelihoods on paid work and serve as a new kind of social contract to entitle people to social security regardless of paid economic activity. In addition to countless models in theory, examples of UBI schemes exist in practice, either currently implemented or planned as ‘experiments’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015).

The critique and refusal of work also takes place both within the sphere of wage labour and outside it. Within, the notions of absenteeism, tardiness, shirking, theft, or sabotage (Pouget 1913 [1898]; Seyferth 2019) have a long tradition, dating back to early struggles against work and industrialisation (Thompson 1967), and common until today (Paulsen 2014). The idea of such deliberate ‘workplace resistance’ is that the ability to resist meaningless work and the internalised norms of work society, and be idle and useless while at work, can be recognised and successfully practised (Campagna 2013; Scott 2012). Similarly, there is a growing interest in productive practices, social relations, and the commons outside the sphere of wage labour and market relations, for example in community-supported agriculture. This initiates ways of organising work and the economy to satisfy material needs otherwise than by means of commodity consumption (Chamberlain 2018; Helfrich and Bollier 2015).

For such modes of organising productive social relations in more varied ways, inspiration could be drawn from the forms of ‘work’ that are prevalent in the global South in the so-called informal sector and in non-industrial crafts and peasantry, neither of which resemble the cultural phenomenon of modern-day work with its origins in the colonial North (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; Thompson 1967). This, however, contradicts the global development paradigm, under which industrialisation, ‘economic upgrading’, global (labour) market integration and ‘structural transformation’ are pursued. Modern work, especially industrial factory jobs and ideally in cities, is supposed to help ‘the poor’ to escape their misery (Banerjee and Duflo 2012; UNDP 2015). Many of these other forms of livelihood provisioning and associated ways of life are thus disregarded, denigrated or destroyed as underdeveloped, backward, poor, and lazy (Thompson 1967), and drawn into the formal system of waged work as cheap labour in capitalist markets and global supply chains – ‘improved living conditions’ as measured in formal pecuniary income (Rosling 2018; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987). There are indications that these transformations create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour (while few viable wage labour structures exist) (Hickel 2017; Srnicek and Williams 2015). There is also clear evidence of numerous struggles against capitalist development and for traditional livelihood protection and environmental justice (Anguelovski 2015). These are aspects where a postwork orientation is relevant beyond the industrialised societies of the global North, as it puts a focus on the modern phenomenon ‘work’ itself and the conditions that led to its predominance, as it questions the common narrative that ‘jobs’ are an end in themselves and justify all kinds of problematic development, and as it allows to ask which alternative, postcolonial critiques and conceptualisations of ‘work’ exist and should be preserved.

To conclude, we clearly find traces of postwork organisation and politics in the present. However, these ideas are contested; they concern the roots of modern culture, society and industrial-capitalist economies. Waged work continues to be normalised, alternatives beyond niches appear quite impractical for generalisation. Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo (Lundström, Räthzel, and Uzzell 2015). Job creation and (global) labour market integration (regardless of what kind) are central policy goals of all political parties, and presently popular progressive debates on a Green New Deal tend to exhibit a rather productivist stance.

There is one particular aspect that appears hopeful: the present socio-economic system is unsustainable in the literal sense that it is physically impossible to be sustained in the long run. It was Weber (1992[1905]) who predicted that the powerful cosmos of the modern economic order will be determining with overwhelming force until the last bit of fossil fuel is burnt – and exactly this needs to happen soon to avert catastrophic climate change. 6 This is the battlefield of sustainability, and lately there has been renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change, where it might be realised that a different societal trajectory beyond work and productivism for their own sake is more sustainable and desirable for the future.

#### Democratic erosion is occurring because the Supreme Court is a lawless, partisan institution, not because of a lack of strikes

Keck 20 – Thomas Keck, Michael O. Sawyer Chair of Constitutional Law and Politics and Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University, “Court-Packing and Democratic Erosion,” 12/17/20, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3476889

Scholars of democratic erosion have noticed the GOP’s partisan capture of the federal courts and flagged it as a potential warning sign, but may well have understated the severity of the danger to democratic norms and institutions. For example, remarking on the Supreme Court twenty months into Trump’s pvresidency, Kaufman and Haggard diagnosed “a serious threat that a constitutionally-created branch of the government—one that is already deeply divided along partisan lines—will become even more politicized and delegitimated.” On their reading, “[t]he most direct threat to American democracy would be judicial acquiescence to restrictions on voting rights” (2019: 426). Ginsburg and Huq have likewise noted that partisan judges, like legislators, “may be willing to allow a president to dismantle democratic governance so long as their own policy preferences are furthered” (2018a: 219). Such judicial acquiescence in the face of legislative restrictions on voting rights is indeed a significant threat, but the bigger danger to American democracy is judicial evisceration of legislative expansions of voting rights. Consider David Landau and Rosalind Dixon’s account of “abusive judicial review,” by which they mean the use of judicial power to undermine the “minimum core of electoral democracy.” Drawing on comparative evidence from a range of states experiencing democratic erosion, Landau and Dixon identify two variants of the phenomenon. In its weak form, abusive judicial review involves courts “stand[ing] by passively as democracy is dismantled”; in its strong form, it involves courts actively undermining key democratic norms and institutions (2020: 1316-17). The Roberts Court has engaged in both versions of the practice.¶ In this section, I briefly review two instances in which the contemporary Court has declined to check legislative infringements on fair democratic procedures, and two others in which it has reached out to actively thwart legislative enhancements of democratic procedures. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008), the Court upheld Indiana’s strict voter ID law, despite clear evidence that the photo identification requirement would “impose nontrivial burdens on the voting rights of tens of thousands of the state’s citizens . . . [, with] a significant percentage of those individuals . . . likely to be deterred from voting.”11 The law had been enacted on a party-line vote in Indiana’s Republican-controlled legislature, and Seventh Circuit Judge Terence Evans characterized it as “a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage electionday turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”12 In subsequent litigation regarding an even stricter law from Wisconsin, Circuit Judge Richard Posner noted that roughly nine percent of registered voters in the state lacked the required state-issued identification. Posner also reviewed sworn testimony from multiple registered voters who had attempted to obtain such identification, but had been unable to do so. 13 Relying on Crawford, Posner’s colleagues nonetheless upheld the Wisconsin law as well. ¶ A decade after Crawford, the Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) that claims of intentional and excessive partisan gerrymandering are not subject to judicial resolution under the U.S. Constitution. The case featured uncontroverted evidence that following the 2010 census, the Republican-controlled North Carolina legislature had “instructed their mapmaker to use political data to draw a map that would produce a congressional delegation of ten Republicans and three Democrats.” In all recent election cycles, votes for statewide offices and aggregate votes for House candidates have evinced a state split nearly 50-50, with Democrats winning the aggregate House vote in 2012 and the Governor’s race in 2016. But the Republican gerrymander successfully maintained a 10-3 GOP majority in the House delegation across three consecutive election cycles. Despite this context, Chief Justice Roberts declined to impose any constitutional limits on the drawing of district lines to “subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power,” even where that desire represents the “predominant purpose” of the line-drawing.14¶ The central premise of Roberts’s argument for allowing such partisan gerrymandering is that the Constitution grants such authority to state legislatures in the first instance (and to Congress secondarily), and hence that the American people should bring their complaints about existing districting practices to their elected representatives, not to the Court. But relying on selfinterested legislators to reform the procedures under which they themselves have been elected has the same shortcomings that it had in Baker v. Carr (1962), which authorized courts to weigh in when district maps featured massive departures from the principle of “one person, one vote.” With the Court declining to serve as democratic guardrail, Crawford and Rucho are paradigmatic examples of weak-form abusive judicial review. ¶ Contrast the Court’s broad posture of judicial restraint in those cases with its aggressive interference with the 2002 McCain-Feingold Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In Citizens United v. FEC (2010), the Court held that for-profit corporations have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited sums advocating the election or defeat of political candidates, thereby invalidating a central provision of the most significant federal campaign finance law since the Watergate era. Citizens United is the most notable in a long string of Roberts Court decisions invalidating campaign finance regulations, with the Court’s most conservative justices repeatedly holding that state and federal legislative institutions lack authority to limit election spending.15 In Shelby County v. Holder (2013), the Court gutted a central provision of the Voting Rights Act, holding that Congress had unconstitutionally required certain state and local jurisdictions to get federal approval for all changes to their election laws. Technically, Roberts’s opinion for the Court only invalidated the formula that determined which state and local jurisdictions were required to seek such federal “pre-clearance,” but both his majority opinion and a concurrence from Justice Thomas suggested that even with a revised coverage formula, the Court’s conservative majority would view such a requirement as an unconstitutional intrusion on state sovereignty. The decision unleashed a wave of new state restrictions on voting rights—with Republican legislatures and executives enacting voter ID laws, purging voter rolls, and closing polling sites—that previously would have required federal pre-clearance (Rocco in this volume). ¶ As these examples make clear, the current Court’s relevance for democratic erosion is twofold. First, it has significantly scaled back its role as an institutional check against partisan attempts to undermine fair democratic procedures. It is not yet clear that it has abandoned this role altogether, but it is fair to say that its performance is not currently reliable. Indeed, early reports from the Bright Lines Project have shown that “Judiciary can limit executive” and “Judicial independence” are among the democratic norms and institutions on which both expert and mass public confidence dropped most sharply during the Trump era (Carey, et al. 2019). Consider the Court’s response to legal disputes regarding vote counting in the 2020 presidential election. Once it was clear that Joe Biden had won a decisive victory, the Court dismissed multiple frivolous lawsuits seeking to reverse the results.16 But in the weeks leading up to the election, four conservative justices had signaled that they were prepared to give a sympathetic ear to Trump campaign arguments that could have reversed an election defeat if the outcome were close.17 Justice Barrett was not yet on the Court when those disputes were heard, and there is good reason to worry that she would have provided a fifth vote in such a scenario.18¶ Second, the Court has proven willing on key occasions to thwart legislative attempts to enhance fair democratic procedures.19 A variety of signs indicate that this latter effort has not yet run its course. In the campaign finance context, for example, Justices Thomas and Alito have set their sights on disclosure requirements, and Senate Majority Leader McConnell echoed their arguments in a January 2019 op-ed.20 On the gerrymandering front, reform advocates have used the ballot initiative process in several states to transfer redistricting authority from partisan state legislatures to non-partisan commissions. The Supreme Court upheld such an initiative from Arizona in 2015, but it did so by a vote of 5-4, with Roberts, Thomas, and Alito (along with Scalia) in dissent. 21 If any two of Trump’s three nominees agree with them, they now have the votes to hold that neither judges nor voters may take districting authority away from partisan legislators. Roberts’s dissenting opinion in the Arizona case suggests that this same judicial coalition may invalidate any congressional attempt to mandate non-partisan redistricting as well (Keck 2019b). ¶ In sum, even before the Trump era, the Roberts Court was sometimes willing to actively deploy judicial power to undermine core features of electoral democracy. President Trump’s three appointments have shifted the Court’s median justice substantially to the right—both in general and on voting rights in particular. As such, Democratic advocates of democracy reform have reason for concern that when they next recapture Congress and the White House, their Republican opponents will have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold. In this context, any comprehensive program of democratic preservation and renewal in the 2020s will need to grapple with the issue of court reform (Jones 2020). ¶ Conclusion: Reestablishing the Court’s Role as Democratic Guardrail¶ Calls for Court reform are a recurring feature of U.S. history. They have repeatedly been prompted by controversial actions taken by the justices themselves and by the partisan coalitions with which they are allied. Remarkably, contemporary Republican elites—acting across all three branches of the federal government—seem poised to provoke such calls in nearly every way that they have been provoked in the past. When Biden is sworn in as President in January 2021, he will find himself facing a Court that has been illegitimately packed by the opposition party on its way out of power; that stands opposed to majoritarian, multi-racial democracy; and that is committed to a constitutional vision under which much of the platform on which Biden was elected is constitutionally suspect. If history is any guide, Court reform will remain on the table until President Biden’s political coalition collapses or Chief Justice Roberts steers a non-obstructionist path. If neither of those paths unfold, serious discussion of Court reform is virtually inevitable. ¶ In this concluding section, then, I highlight some key lessons from our constitutional history regarding how to pursue such reforms in ways that are most beneficial for—and least risky to—democratic health. On my reading of the relevant history, some instances of attempted Court-packing contributed to democratic erosion in the United States, while others operated, on balance, to promote democratic preservation and renewal. Indeed, it seems to me incontrovertible that court-packing can be undertaken in ways that both hinder and foster democratic governance. If and when small-d democrats regain control of Hungary, Turkey, or Venezuela, would any decisions on their part to alter the size or structure of their judicial institutions be best understood as undue assaults on democratic norms? Surely we would need to know additional contextual details before reaching that judgment. As Joseph Fishkin and David Pozen have noted, “all acts of constitutional hardball create systemic risks, . . . [but] specific acts may be justified for a variety of contextual normative reasons; sound political judgment might even require that certain types of hardball be played in certain situations” (2018: 925; see also Bateman in this volume; Tushnet 2020). ¶ In the ongoing debates about how best to respond to processes of democratic erosion once they have been diagnosed, Levitsky and Ziblatt have famously called on opposition party elites to exercise forbearance, resisting the urge to respond to the authoritarian leader's normbreaking with more norm-breaking of their own. But such forbearance strategies may not be viable when facing incumbents—including judicial incumbents—who are deliberately tilting the playing field. In such circumstances, some sort of hardball opposition may be more effective at protecting and renewing democracy, particularly if small-d democracy advocates deploy such tactics in pursuit not just of their own narrow partisan interests but also pro-democratic reforms that promise to break the cycle of tit-for-tat escalation (Bateman in this volume; Pozen 2019). ¶ If systemic threats sometimes justify constitutional hardball, then scholars of democratic erosion and resilience are in good position to help policymakers reflect on how such tactics can be deployed in maximally legitimate fashion. One issue here is timing—i.e., how to know when we have reached the point where hardball tactics are merited. With regard to Court expansion, both its normative legitimacy and its political viability are likely to increase if and when the Roberts Court acts as a partisan roadblock to a Democratic administration. If the conservative justices refrain from doing so, they may be able to forestall Court reform. But the historical pattern suggests that emergence of an obstructionist Court is likely, at which point Democratic Court reformers will be emboldened. I have argued that judicial obstruction of legislative expansions of voting rights (and related democracy reforms) would provide particularly weighty justification for Court reform. In theory, the threat of such judicial contributions to democratic erosion might justify preemptive action—e.g., expanding the Court before it eviscerates a new voting rights act—but in practice, such preemptive action would require substantially greater political investment. Convincing the American public that Court packing is called for would be a tall order on any occasion, but it is more likely to succeed once the Court has begun actively obstructing a broadly popular policy agenda. ¶ In addition to the question of when to resort to hardball tactics, reformers should reflect on how to do so in ways that minimize the threat of tit-for-tat escalation. Here, one’s prescription for reform is likely to depend on one’s diagnosis of the systemic democratic defects in which the Court plays a role. If the chief threat to U.S. democracy is partisan polarization, then the cure is likely to involve institutional changes designed to empower centrists of both parties and to weaken their extremist flanks. If the diagnosis is partisan degradation rather than polarization— i.e., if the key defects facing American democracy are rooted not in a bipartisan refusal to compromise, but in one party’s abandonment of the rules of the game—then the prescription would be different. Rather than promoting bipartisanship, the cure would involve institutional changes that weaken the structural pro-GOP biases in our electoral and policy-making systems, thereby disrupting the party’s playbook for maintaining its hold on power without offering a platform that appeals to popular majorities (Bateman in this volume). ¶ To the extent possible, the goal of Court reform should be reestablishing the Court’s role as democratic guardrail, not reestablishing its role as Democratic agent. Given that the reforms would be enacted by partisan legislators, some consideration of partisan payoffs is inevitable, but scholars of democratic erosion and resilience can help call attention to particular reforms that are most beneficial for (or least risky to) democratic health. On this front, Pozen (2019) has called for greater consideration of “anti-hardball” reforms, by which he means institutional changes that reduce the likelihood of constitutional hardball being played by either side moving forward. For example, when a new state legislative majority comes to power, they could respond to a prior pattern of partisan gerrymandering by creating a non-partisan redistricting commission rather than deploying a new partisan gerrymander of their own. The dilemma is that the existing gerrymandered districts may prevent a new state legislative majority from coming to power, or that a captured court might prevent the new majority from altering the redistricting procedures. ¶ With regard to Court reform, anti-hardball measures might include reducing the length of Supreme Court terms and regularizing the occurrence of Supreme Court vacancies, changes that would lower the stakes of any given nomination fight. Scholars were calling for such reforms long before Trump’s election, and good government reformers have continued to advocate them (Cramton and Carrington 2005; Cramton 2007; Galston, et al. 2019). The dilemma is that most such reforms would have to survive judicial review by the existing Court. ¶ If the key defect ailing American democracy is partisan degradation rather than polarization, then even anti-hardball reforms that have in the past drawn bipartisan support may require hardball tactics to enact (Pozen 2019). In other words, successful Court reform may require combining good government improvements to judicial selection and tenure rules with hardball efforts to wrest judicial institutions away from the anti-system party’s control. The institutional design choices are complex, and I close with one recent proposal that illustrates the challenges. ¶ In September 2020, less than two weeks after Justice Ginsburg’s death, Representative Ro Khanna introduced legislation that would authorize the president to nominate a Supreme Court justice every two years, during the first and third years of each four-year presidential term. Once confirmed by the Senate, each justice would serve an 18-year, non-renewable term, after which she would rotate off of active duty on the Supreme Court. The bill would eventually produce a stable Court membership of nine, but the justices sitting at the time of enactment would be grandfathered, retaining their life terms, thereby producing the possibility of a Court larger than nine until all of those sitting justices have concluded their service. 22 When the basic structure of Rep. Khanna’s reform bill was first floated by advocates in 2019, conservatives held a five-to-four majority on the Court (Schwartz 2019). In that context, the combination of temporary Court expansion with permanent improvements to judicial selection and tenure rules may have seemed a workable marriage of hardball and anti-hardball reforms. With Justice Barrett having expanded the conservative majority to six justices, the horns of the dilemma have sharpened. The Khanna bill is one of a variety of anti-hardball reforms that would ameliorate the partisan degradation of the federal courts, but if those reforms cannot survive judicial review by the current Court, then it will take some form of hardball tactics to achieve them. That this dilemma faces Court reform advocates should not be surprising, as it is the same dilemma facing democracy reform more broadly. Solving it will be the central challenge of the post-Trump era in U.S. politics. ¶