### 1-Natural Persons PIC

#### *CP: States ought to ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities except for natural persons, and states ought to recognize the right to property for natural persons in space.*

#### The individual right to property is a basic human right that should be extended to space.

Faires 19 [Wes Faires, “The role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in supporting space property rights,” The Space Review, August 5, 2019. <https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3771/1>] CT

A long-discussed issue has been the absence of provisions pertaining to private entities under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Interpretations in favor of private property rights hold that the purpose of Article II’s ban on “national appropriation” was to place a limitation on member nations’ attempts to exercise territorial and political sovereignty over any part of outer space: to restrict territorial disputes between countries from extending beyond Earth. Without an explicit prohibition of private property rights in the treaty, their development with respect to private entities is unencumbered. Opposition has fluctuated from the position that the prohibition of national appropriation in Article II served to exclude development of property rights for private citizens: without a national entity with the ability to “confer” or pass down property rights to “sub-national” citizens, forward progress is rendered impossible. There were later attempts to classify private citizens as “nationals” in order to apply to them the prohibition of ‘national appropriation’. The 1979 Moon Agreement places an explicit ban on property for a host of entities, including “natural persons,” until such time as an international regime can be formulated. Two nations, the United States and Luxembourg, have enacted legislation favorable to property and mineral rights regarding space resources. This was met with opposition from some in the international community, who called into question whether such unilateral acts were in and of themselves a violation of the non-appropriation principle of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Perhaps in the future, the concept of “property rights” will have evolved beyond the terrestrial concepts of ownership, sovereignty, and territorial acquisition, under a new treaty framework structured by private entities, developed outside the auspices of any nation-state or supranational regime. Until such time, what is needed is a base-level favorable affirmation of private property rights in outer space, one that serves as a foundation for their evolution beyond national borders and which is accepted across the board. To this end, the solution to 50 years of ambiguity regarding private property rights under the under the current UN Outer Space Treaty framework is found within the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 17: (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. -UN General Assembly. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations, 217 (III) A,1948, Paris, Art. 17 The commercial space sector would welcome language favorable to private property rights in space, with specific emphasis on the re-affirmation of Article 17 as it pertains to property rights for private entities. Beyond Article 17, utilization of the UDHR as a default mechanism in situations where legislation is not yet developed can yield an immediate benefit for humanity. On the national level, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be seamlessly integrated into national space policy. Adoption of the UDHR into space policy by state parties to the Outer Space Treaty is essentially a reaffirmation of one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, and can take place without litigation or implementation of new national legislation, and with no accusation of violation of “national appropriation.” In the international arena, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be seamlessly into to conducting legislative proceedings pertaining to outer space, given that: The overarching thematic priority for UNISPACE + 50 and beyond is “Sustainable Development in Space.” A critical aspect of this calls for ensuring the principles of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are upheld. The 2030 Agenda is grounded in, and re-affirms, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/RES/70/1 para. 10, para. 19). The task at hand is to compel the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) to commit to upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Solidarity on such a core foundational UN principle as the UDHR solidifies reflection of Agenda 2030. I propose that UN Secretariat take this opportunity to move forward with Sustainable Development, and lead the way in incorporation the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into international space policy. It is time to recognize property rights as the universally declared human right that it is: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.” The definition of property and scope of the UDHR was not limited to any one definition or territory. The UDHR was intended from the outset to be universal: “It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement […] It is a Declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations.” -Eleanor Roosevelt, “On the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” December 9, 1948 Here in its 70th year of adoption, acceptance of the UDHR into space policy by the international community would be both timely and logical. It reaffirms adherence to a fundamental United Nations cornerstone, and provides an opportunity to strengthen the commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. At a time when feasibility of extraction of minerals from celestial bodies is fast approaching, it is our responsibility to ensure that the transition occurs free of any terrestrial shackles. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights offers an acceptable foundational framework from which property rights can evolve off-planet, that can be embraced by the private sector, adopted across national levels, and upheld in the international arena.

#### The CP protects individual property rights while solving case since the aff still applies to corporations.

#### No perms: The CP would expand the rights of individuals in space, from the mere right to use, to the full bundle of rights protected by private property.

#### Space settlement is coming now and prevents inevitable extinction. Space settlement with private appropriation is better than settlement without appropriation.

Gesl 18 [Paul M. Gesl (Maj, USAF JD), “PREPARING FOR THE NEXT SPACE RACE: Legislation and Policy Recommendations for Space Colonies,” A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF OPERATIONAL ARTS AND SCIENCES (April 2018). <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1053024.pdf>] CT

Why the United States Needs to Think About Space Colonization Now

The United States’ space policies under the previous two Presidential administrations have not matched the ambition of the commercial sector. The author has criticized the National Space Policies of both President Obama and George W. Bush as being too “Earth-Centric.”6 Based on the current state of technologies, it is easy to dismiss space colonization as, at best, a problem to worry about tomorrow and, at worst, mere science fiction. This is irresponsible. Reaching space is difficult. Colonizing it will be even more difficult; however, we cannot overlook it as a likely possibility. NASA viewed space colonization as an endeavor within humanity’s reach in the 1970s.7 Now it is beginning to take shape as a reality. In 2015 at the Pioneering Space National Summit, policy makers, industry leaders and advocates agreed that “The long term goal of the human spaceflight and exploration program of the United States is to expand permanent human presence beyond low-Earth orbit in a way that will enable human settlement and a thriving space economy. This will be best achieved through public-private partnerships and international collaboration (emphasis in original).”8 Additionally, there have been several attempts in Congress to pursue space settlement.9 Private industry appears to be taking the lead in this race. Elon Musk, the CEO of SpaceX intends to establish a colony of a million settlers on the surface of Mars.10 SpaceX is targeting the first manned missions to make this a reality to launch in 2024.11 Mr. Musk envisions the full colonization to take 40-100 years.12 Even if this timeline misses its ambitious deadline by a decade, humanity will be a multi-planetary species in many readers’ lifetimes. It is important to note that Mr. Musk recently stated that SpaceX is “building the first Mars, or interplanetary ship, and I think we’ll be able to do short trips, flights by first half of next year.”13 Even though he joked that the company might miss their timeline, his comments highlight that colonization is an issue that is fast approaching.14 Another factor to consider is that a legal framework needs to be developed before a Martian colony is at its full capacity. Mr. Musk envisions using SpaceX’s BFR to send approximately 100 people per flight to Mars.15 Additionally, SpaceX appears to be planning for humans living on the lunar surface in their Moon Base Alpha.16 SpaceX is not alone in their ambitions. United Launch Alliance (ULA) published their plans to expand the population of humans living and working in space. Their Cis-lunar 1,000 framework is a 30-year plan to develop the cis-lunar economy and grow the population of humans living and working in space from six to 1,000.17 Space colonization is more important to our species than the economic benefits of a space economy and the conquests of exploration. The current world population is 7.4 billion people.18 According to the World Wildlife Foundation and the Global Footprint Network, “the equivalent of 1.7 planets would be needed to produce enough natural resources to match our consumption rates and a growing population.”19 The problem will likely grow worse as the population of the planet continues to grow. According to the United Nations, the Earth’s population will grow to over 11 billion people by 2100.20 Based partially on this, “Prof [Stephen] Hawking said it was only a matter of time before the Earth as we know it is destroyed by an asteroid strike, soaring temperatures or over-population.”21 Hawking further stated that, “When we have reached similar crisis in or (sic.) history there has usually been somewhere else to colonise (sic.). Columbus did it in 1492 when he discovered the new world. But now there is no new world. No Eutopia (sic.) around the corner. We are running out of space and the only places to go are other worlds.”22 The late Professor Hawking is not alone in his view, the National Space Society observed the benefits of expanding into space. “Outer space holds virtually limitless amounts of energy and raw materials, which can be harvested for use both on Earth and in space. Quality of life can be improved directly by utilization of these resources and also indirectly moving hazardous and polluting industries and/or their waste products off planet Earth.”23 These are just several of the many compelling reasons to colonize space advocated by groups such as the National Space Society and the Space Frontier Foundation.24 ULA appears to be taking steps to meet their ambitions for the future. ULA announced the first step towards making their Cis-lunar 1,000 vision a reality. In October 2017, they announced a partnership with Bigelow Aerospace to launch a habitat to low lunar orbit.25 The launch is expected to be completed before the end 2022.26 Some feel that colonization is going to happen, no matter what governments do.27 If colonization is going to happen, then it is in the United States’ best interest to develop a legal framework that supports the efforts and protects our citizens who will travel to and live in these habitats. This is important for several reasons. First, private corporations appear to have an interest in colonizing space, so it is in humanity’s future whether the government is involved nor not. However, governments can take actions that will accelerate things.28 Second, it is in the best interest of the United States’ economy to support commercial companies that are expanding into space. Third, if the United States does not create a favorable legal framework for space colonization, someone else will. Finally, as humanity expands away from the surface of the Earth, it is important to create a free society based on the principles of the Rule of Law rather than some other form of government, or an anarchistic company town.

#### Absent legally enforced personal rights, like property, space settlements are likely to be dominated by tyrannical governments or corporations. Turns case.

Cockell 08 [Charles S. Cockell (Center for Earth, Planetary, Space and Astronomical Research – Open University, Milton Keynes), “AN ESSAY ON EXTRATERRESTRIAL LIBERTY,” JBIS, VOL. 61, pp. 255-275, 2008. <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Charles-Cockell/publication/258317782_An_Essay_on_Extraterrestrial_Liberty/links/0c96053053a02cfb24000000/An-Essay-on-Extraterrestrial-Liberty.pdf>] CT

6. EXTRATERRESTRIAL LIBERTY For Berlin [20], ‘negative’ liberty meant the pursuit of individual liberty by removing those mechanisms that exert control over one’s actions. Western liberal democracies pursue, for the most part, philosophies of negative liberty, by attempting to reduce the role of government in individual lives. A restricted sphere of negative liberty is created by tyrannies, in which encroachment into the lives of individuals reduces the number and scope of activities in which people consider themselves free, or at least able to make decisions that can be implemented independently of the State. Of course, by retreating into a core set of activities in which one is completely free, one is in the process of relinquishing liberty, as the scope of free actions is voluntarily reduced. This is in itself a form of slavery. Societies where the scope of negative liberty is reduced can be described as more enslaved, even if the people there may not describe themselves as such, because they have in fact escaped State slavery by retreating from those very activities in which control is exerted. The crucial point is that the sphere within which negative liberty is possible is necessarily constrained by the environmental conditions under which one exists. The more extreme the environmental conditions, the fewer social activities can occur without collective oversight. More saliently, the people themselves may actually request such oversight, to protect their safety from others who would abuse it, with the resulting dangers. Some of these systems of monitoring can be found in societies on Earth. We cannot drive automobiles without safety checks. Our water must be passed through treatment works— life support systems if you will—that ensure that what we are drinking is safe. Indeed, even in some of the most mature terrestrial democracies, a remarkable quantity of basic consumables and resources come to us through systems of compliance overseen by the State. This is a form of control that most people accept because we consider it in our interest. We do not usually see such invasions of our liberty as tyranny, but rather as benevolent actions by the State to ensure our safekeeping. But they are incursions nevertheless, and while democracy is functioning such oversights need not necessarily concern us; or at least they do not worry most of the public, who are more concerned with having fresh water than more abstract thoughts about the allowable extent to which the State should have influence over their water quality. In extraterrestrial environments, spacesuits, water quality, food production, habitat pressurisation and so on and so forth will be subject to regulation by corporations or the State. As on Earth, perhaps many of these incursions will be regarded as acts of beneficence by the State in the interests of safety, and will be willingly accepted. But one fact is undeniable: the extent of negative liberty must be less in extraterrestrial environments than on Earth, and quite significantly less. Even the air will be subject to quality controls and checks. Forms and permissions will be associated with the very act of breathing. No philosophy of advancing the domain of negative liberty, no clever sophistry, can change this truth, which is brought into being by basic survival needs. An undeniable effect will be to expand the opportunities for tyranny. Where the mechanisms for central control are necessarily enlarged in their scope and diversity, a greater number of levers exist, and enable individuals and organisations to exert control and assume power. A reduction in negative liberty does not necessarily imply greater tyranny, but it certainly makes it possible. In extraterrestrial environments, where centralised interventions must be frequent, how much weaker is freedom and how much easier is tyranny to enforce? We cannot know the answers until we undertake the experiment, but we can be fairly sure that the qualitative answer must be ‘more easily’. More insidiously, the restriction of the borders of negative liberty, caused by the apparent need to protect individuals from the irresponsible actions of others, can itself be perpetuated as a form of liberty. The use of alcohol in extraterrestrial environments is one example. On Earth, the excessive use of alcohol may result in broken windows and arrests, but once the windows are repaired little damage has been done to society as a whole. Hence, although there is a negative social collective impact of excessive alcohol use, the prohibition of alcohol consumption of any kind is generally regarded as an infringement of civil liberties that the public will not tolerate. This is why, of course, attempts to do exactly this in the past have been met by black marketeering. But in extraterrestrial environments, a broken window may imply depressurisation, and the instant death of many individuals. The potential impact on society of the irresponsible and thoughtless actions of individuals is greater, and it might seem justifiable to restrict greatly, or even prohibit, the civil liberty of alcohol use, in the interests of collective safety. This principle can be applied to many diverse social interactions that could be construed as threatening people, and the prevention of which can be advanced as the protection of individual and social freedom through the process of restricting negative liberty. Liberty encompasses the freedom that individuals have to actively pursue their own objectives (‘positive liberty’ sensu Berlin). An obvious mechanism by which this becomes practical is the creation of social mechanisms and institutions through which the ‘active’ pursuit of this ‘positive’ sense of liberty is made possible, for example the welfare State. Organisations established to act as conduits for the free expression of different points of view, or to act as means to achieve practical objectives, are not always liberal. Even in some of the most developed democracies, societies and organisations may become dominated by elite closed circles of people, and media channels may be influenced by moguls who use outlets to perpetuate specific corporate views. What prevents these incursions into the structures of liberty from descending into wholesale tyranny? In reality, very little. The subversion of democratic States, or States on the verge of democracy, into societies more reminiscent of dictatorships has many historical precedents. The principal mechanisms that allow individual freedom to triumph over the slide towards tyranny include the legally agreed freedoms that individuals have to establish competition against dominating organisations, and the culture that ensures that the freedom to create organisations is not then abused to destroy the very democratic organisations that guarantee that freedom. In a society in which the freedom to organise and assemble institutions is protected by law, those organisations that distort and alter their environments, or the information they propagate, are likely to be usurped by institutions that reflect a different style of thinking, by the process of individual choice. However, these alternative visions can only be effective, and one can only assert them over the prevailing opinions with confidence, when one has sufficient information to be confident of their likely veracity. On Earth, to express many ideas and counter-opinions one does not need supreme confidence in the truth. If one’s opinion turns out to be in error one gives up, accepts the viewpoint of the adversary and continues one’s life. These opportunities to challenge, however, are central to the power of the individual to confront institutions. But there is one social situation in which the individual’s power is markedly reduced, even rendered completely ineffective against a collective body. Health and safety is one of the most effective levers of social influence and justified coercion, because it invokes the protection of people confronted with life and death situations. Consider, for example, an oxygen supply system on the Moon. The authority that runs such a system might seek control over a political dissenter by threatening to move him or her and their family to a new zone of habitation, on the grounds that the oxygen supply to their habitat is faulty. By doing this, they will remind these individuals who is in control of their survival, and coerce them through fear into mitigating their dissent, thereby creating a more malleable individual and reducing the challenge to collective authority. Governing organisations have access to a vast realm of information that no single individual can hope to have [21]. They know, for example, about the oxygen demand, its rate of supply, the pipes that supply it, the maintenance history of the oxygen producing machines, and so on and so forth. For an individual to declare that the intention of the authority to move them to another habitat is for controlling political purposes, he or she must also have access to all such information, which they can then use to demonstrate that there is no safety concern. If they do not have access to this information, then it becomes a simple task for the authorities to portray them as dishonourable individuals inveighing against the hard work of other individuals who are working to secure their individual safety and the security of society [22]. They can be then be ostracised, and their general behaviour will be treated as disingenuous. However, to have access to all the information to convincingly uphold a complaint is never possible, because an individual can never know whether they are missing a single crucial fact that makes all the difference to their safety. Even armed with what they perceive to be all the information available, the individual is faced with a choice between allowing an incursion on their home and liberty, or taking the risk that their presumption of having full information is correct. Faced with such a choice, the individual is likely to opt for the former in the interests of caution, particularly in an environment where the other choice may imply death from a failed oxygen system. In the extreme case, this first course of action would be further reinforced in a particularly coercive, venal society where the individual might even be convinced of the capability of the authorities to engineer the failure of their oxygen system and their death, in order to crush dissent, even if their complaint was in fact justified. The end point of this process, when applied across many activities in life, is a colony of automatons performing tasks for an extraterrestrial authority, with their freedom reduced to a withered core of activities in the most private confines of their habitats. Extraterrestrial environments make such an endpoint not merely a possible outcome, but a likely one. This attack on liberty is made possible because the pursuit of individual safety can be made an unchallengeable requirement of a ‘free’ society [23]. Freedom from instantaneous death caused by the external environment is the common freedom on which all individuals should converge, and any social structure or plan that brings people closer to that reality must surely be praiseworthy? The removal of other freedoms to achieve the safety of society is excusable. From this position, the environment can itself become the instrument of positive liberty. In this way, and in a rather unique way, encroachment on freedom of thought and movement, in the interests of ensuring the protection of the freedom of the individual against the lethality of the environment, can be transformed into a justifiable and universalisable doctrine of control [24]. Unfortunately this approach receives succour from every major tradition of social philosophy that we know on Earth. From Grotius to J.S. Mill, the right to self-preservation has been considered the core of individual liberties [25], a point beyond which no State may go, and which every individual has the right to take it upon him or herself to secure—indeed, such a notion has even been referred to as a ‘natural law’ [26]. Even Hobbes’ view of the necessity of sovereign control [27] turns on the right of each individual in a fight to preserve themselves. It is possible to spend much of one’s life on Earth without undue concern for self-preservation. Apart from those unfortunate individuals who confront a burglar or gang, most people will not actually come face to face with the need to infringe others’ rights to self-preservation. Fortunately, although the right to self-preservation is theoretically an unchallengeable right of all people, it remains, in a civil society, one sufficiently protected by the laws, and by regulations against various street crimes that might infringe self-preservation. If, as has been traditional on the Earth, the right to selfpreservation is also held to be a basic right of all people in extraterrestrial environments, then the keys to despotism are handed over to those in control of society. Self-preservation is threatened on a day-to-day basis by the lethality of the environment. In such an environment, each individual does indeed represent a much greater threat to every other individual than on the Earth, because unpredictable and criminal actions against the infrastructure represent a continuously present and potentially catastrophic threat to self-preservation. The authorities therefore have the excuse to implement draconian systems of control to protect the right of every individual to self-preservation. Worse than this, however, the people will voluntarily, in exercising their right to selfpreservation, and to protect themselves, accept more farreaching control over the lives of others [28]. Where death is a more likely outcome of criminal action, the Hobbesian State of nature, and the tendency to vigorously guard against it, becomes a more tangible reality [29].

#### Property rights are the essential building blocks of a fully inclusive and functional government. Turns case since they envision a democratically governed space that is impossible without appropriation.

UNDP ’08 - Working Group on Property Rights, 2008, 'Empowering the Poor Through Property Rights', in Making the Law Work for Everyone Volume II, Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, United Nations Development Programme, New York, pp. 63-128 <https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/ch2.pdf> AT

This transition has reduced global poverty substantially, but as outlined above, billions of people around the world still lack secure property rights, which hinders their economic, political and social security. In order to examine how poverty can best be relieved, and why access to property rights is fundamental to the empowerment of the poor, it is necessary to identify building blocks of a fully-functional property system. Such a system operates in the following four ways: 1) As a system of rules that defines the bundle of rights and obligations between people and assets.15 Property ownership creates ties that bind individual citizens together through the formation of networks of economic and legal rights and corresponding obligations. The credible enforcement of these rights and obligations requires a judicial mechanism that allows for equitable, transparent and efficient dispute resolution. 2) As a system of governance. Property systems are a central facet of state functionality, and as such are an important measurement of fiduciary and administrative effectiveness. The institutional order of the state is based on technical rules and relationships which define interactions between stakeholders, ranging from direct ownership of land to promulgation of rules that govern security of land and house tenure, land planning, zoning, taxing and other aspects of property management. Technological innovation, which has radically reduced the cost of information, has generated the possibility for further transparency and accountability in property systems as an instrument of governance. 3) As a functioning market for the exchange of assets. A fully functional property system allows land, houses, moveable property, equity shares, and ideas to be transformed into assets to be bought and sold at rates determined by market forces. This subjects the exchange of property to a level of transparency and accountability, and allows for the development of financial mechanisms — including credit 67 and insurance — to facilitate transactions and improve economic outcomes. Land, houses and moveable property can thus be leveraged, and assets transformed from static investments into capital which can be bought and sold. However, property rights are a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the development of these financial mechanisms; they also develop through partnership between the market, special funds targeted at access to finance, and the state. 4) As an instrument of social policy. In the absence or failure of the market, the state often plays a direct role in addressing the needs of the poor. The state has at its disposal instruments that can be used to endow its citizens with assets as they relate to property, such as public housing, low interest loans and the distribution of state land. Such instruments help to overcome natural competition for assets. The state also supports social cohesion through the development of co-ownership of infrastructure and services by government and the citizen, supporting the equilibrium between individual and collective interests. Provision of infrastructure by the state critically affects the value and desirability of assets, and can therefore fundamentally affect opportunities for the poor.

#### Impact is Democide – Empirically, murder by tyrannical governments is the biggest impact. It outweighs war and cap. There is a direct relationship between the lack of personal freedom and democide.

Wayman 17 summarizing Rummel [Wayman F.W. (2017) Rummel and Singer, DON and COW. In: Gleditsch N. (eds) R.J. Rummel: An Assessment of His Many Contributions. SpringerBriefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, vol 37. Springer, Cham. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54463-2_9>] CT

At Rummel’s website, the dominant theme is that power kills (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/). As he began one of his books (Rummel, 1994: 1), ‘Power kills; absolute power kills absolutely. This new Power Principle is the message emerging from my previous work on the causes of war and from this work on genocide and government mass murder … The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily.’

A major supporting idea is the term regime, as operationalized by Rummel (1995) and used as the organizing principle for his datasets on ‘democide—genocide and mass murder’ (Rummel, 1998: 1). This idea of a regime is important to his work because there is a lot of variation from regime to regime in the regime’s amount of power, and also in the number of people the regime kills. And Rummel’s dominant theme is that those two characteristics of a regime (power and deaths) co-vary. In my own ordinary language, a regime is a type of government controlling a state apparatus. As Rummel (1995: 9) says, ‘The changes from the Kaiser monarchy to the Weimar Republic to Hitler’s rule … give us three different German regimes. … I count 432 distinct state regimes during the period from 1900 to 1987’. Hence, there would be the czarist regime in Russia until 1917, and then the communist regime from 1917 to 1991. Between February and October 1917, there should I think be a transition period and transitional regime (under Kerensky). Individual rulers, such as general secretaries Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, and their governments, do not represent distinct regimes of their own, but instead are all leaders, successively, of different administrations in the communist regime.

To me, Rummel’s (1983) article made the first really convincing case for the inter-liberal or inter-democratic peace. I have since challenged thousands of people, from classrooms to conferences where I am speaking, to name any other proposition in the social sciences that is surprising or counter-intuitive, and that has (according to its advocates at least) no exceptions. No one has ever been able, in my presence, to name such a proposition—other than Rummel’s.

The COW Project generated the data for the bulk of the hypothesis tests in IR for decades (Wayman & Singer, 1990: 247–248). And ‘realist theory informed 90% of the hypotheses tested by IR scholars up to the 1970s’ (Walker, 2013: 148). It was a bit of a shock that an anti-realist hypothesis, the inter-democratic peace, had produced such a paradigm-shattering result. Sadly, I never heard Singer say a good word about Rummel’s studies confirming the inter-democratic peace hypothesis. Rummel had used COW data on wars, plus other people’s data on democracy, Liberalism, and freedom of nations, to contradict one of Singer’s claims (namely, Singer’s contention that the inter-democratic peace was based on too few cases and too flawed in other ways to be taken to be true; Small & Singer, 1976). Deciphering Singer’s true position on this is complicated. When Geller & Singer (1998) produced a literature review of scientific studies of international conflict, while they did caution that the evidence is ‘not indisputable’, they did acknowledge that ‘the evidence in the area of the joint freedom proposition is consistent and cumulative. Democratic dyads are less likely to engage in war than are non-democratic pairs’ (Geller & Singer, 1998: 87–88). But on the other hand, on his own at his weekly COW seminar, Singer was much more skeptical about the inter-democratic peace. So it is not surprising that, four years after Geller & Singer’s assessment, one of Singer’s students, Henderson (2002) wrote a book that constituted an attack on the democratic peace literature. In the opening paragraph, Henderson says, ‘It struck me as strange that one of the doyen of the behavioral revolution would be such an avid critic of what some scholars hail as the closest thing to an empirical law in the field’.

Instead, Singer seemed more interested in the international or interstate system. While Waltz (1979: 94) defined ‘international political structures in terms of states’, Singer spoke of ‘the national state as level of analysis’ (Singer, 1961: 82–89). Thus, whereas Waltz writes of a system whose basic units are sovereign states, Singer ends up with two systems: an inter-state system and an international system. The international system consists of entities that have an international political goal (including … state creation or survival), engage in international political behavior (including inter-state or extra-state conflict, alliances, trade, or international organizations), or engage in political behavior that has international consequences (such as civil wars). The [international] system … includes … terrorist groups (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010: 27).

Nested within this international system is the interstate system, beginning in 1816, distinguished in terms of ‘recurring international interactions between and among the interstate system members’ (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010: 16). Singer’s COW data are organized around a focus on state system membership. Basically, between 1816 and 1919 an entity is a state system member if it has 500,000 people or more and is diplomatically recognized at an adequate level by Britain and France, while after 1919 it is a state if it is a League of Nations or UN member or has 500,000 people and diplomatic recognition by two major powers. (Note that ‘state’ becomes a short-hand for ‘state system member’; Bremer & Ghosn, 2003.)

Much confusion results from the short-hand expressions ‘state’ and ‘system’. ‘Whenever the word “system” was used without a modifier, Singer & Small were referring to the interstate system’ (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010: 16). Likewise, the ‘states’ whose characteristics are listed in the COW datasets are not the population of states, but the population of state system members.

Singer’s most widely-cited explanatory articles on interstate war are probably Deutsch & Singer (1964) and Singer, Bremer & Stuckey (1972). Both operate at the system level of analysis. It may be that Singer’s devotion to the interstate system is part of what made him reluctant to embrace the inter-democratic peace. As he said in another widely-cited article, the international system level of analysis ‘almost inevitably requires that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy codes of our national actors’, and ‘the system-oriented approach tends to produce a sort of “black box” or “billiard ball” concept of national actors’. This is consistent with his foreign policy instincts, which were loath to attribute ‘white hats’ to the ‘free world’ and ‘black hats’ to the Soviet Union, in the assigning of blame for the dangers to world peace in the Cold War era. Singer’s posture was very different from Rummel’s, with Rummel in favor of Reagan’s foreign policy and against détente. In these Cold War contexts, Singer may have been uncomfortable with Rummel’s summary that ‘freedom preserves peace and life’.

Singer wrote ‘it is evident that my research and teaching has unambiguously been problem-driven’, and ‘for reasons that I struggle to articulate, the problem has been, and remains, that of war’ (Singer, 1990: 2). The COW Project was founded by him at the University of Michigan in 1963, the year after the world nearly was destroyed, had the Cuban Missiles Crisis gone badly. International war attracted Singer’s best efforts at finding the ‘causes of war and conditions of peace’ (1990: 3). As he and Small put it, their focus is a ‘preoccupation with the elimination of international war and the possible role of solid explanatory knowledge in that enterprise’ (Small & Singer, 1982: 17). The first COW war handbook, Wages of War (Singer & Small, 1972) was consequently limited to international wars. Karl Deutsch subsequently convinced Singer that there was a need for a comparable list of civil wars. This led to a new handbook, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, presenting a ‘comprehensive list that will enhance … study of civil wars’ (Small & Singer, 1982: 204). The civil war list is accompanied with a cautionary note, ‘International war remains our major concern … A research assault on [explanation of] civil war … is clearly a task better left to others’ (Small & Singer, 1982: 17). Consequently, the COW project had many datasets (such as the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset) on the correlates of interstate war, but nothing comparable on the civil war data. Nevertheless, the publication of the civil war data was a valuable contribution to studies of civil war, and was also a step toward the full delineation of the totality of modern war. This was followed, in the third COW handbook (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010) with a definition and list of non-state wars, completing the full reckoning of the patterns of war in the past two centuries. Also, the focus of Singer on international war was somewhat vindicated by his co-authored article revealing that, over the time since the Congress of Vienna, inter-state wars had resulted in 32 million battle deaths, intra-state wars only 18 million (Sarkees, Wayman & Singer, 2003).

Critics often ask if the COW project has a state-centric bias. A more subtle and I think effective line of inquiry is to ask why the COW project has emphasized state-system-membership rather than simple sovereignty and independence as the defining characteristic of the state. This can cause confusion. For example, a number of non-state wars, including the main phase of one of the deadliest wars in history, the Taiping Rebellion, have been fought in areas that would be considered to be states by students of comparative politics. This and other related difficulties have led pioneers outside the COW project (Gleditsch, 2004; Fazal, 2007), as well as Singer’s successor at the COW Project (Bremer & Ghosn, 2003) to propose various revisions and expansions of the concept of the state, to go beyond the COW state membership definition. These difficulties and challenges continue to provide important frontiers for research on war and the state in coming years.

In contrast to Singer, Rummel seems to me to have taken a more inductivist, practical approach to states and similar entities. On his website, powerkills.com, one finds a focus on killing, even of one person. The perpetrators are often leaders of totalitarian states, such as Mao, but can also be rebel leaders (the young Mao) or a king (Leopold of Belgium) who controls what some call a colony (the Belgian Congo) but Rummel calls Leopold’s personal property. The unit of analysis becomes the regime and regime-like power-centers such as Leopold’s Congo or Mao’s rebel territory.

Rummel (1986) concluded that ‘War isn’t this century’s biggest killer’. As he said then, ‘About 35,654,000 people have died in this century’s international and domestic wars, revolutions, and violent conflicts. … The number of people killed by totalitarian or extreme authoritarian governments already far exceeds that for all wars, civil and international. Indeed, this number already approximates the number that might be killed in a nuclear war’. He itemized 95 million killed by communist governments, but only ‘831,000 killed by free democratic governments’. Those killed by free democratic governments were always foreigners:

In no case have I found a democratic government carrying out massacres, genocide and mass executions of its own citizens … Absolutist governments (those that Freedom House would classify as not free) are not only many times deadlier than war, but are themselves the major factor causing war and other forms of violent conflict. They are a major cause of militarism. Indeed, absolutism, not war, is mankind’s deadliest scourge of all. In light of all this, the peaceful, nonviolent fostering of civil liberties and political rights must be made mankind’s highest humanitarian goal … because freedom preserves peace and life (Rummel, 1986).

### Defense

#### LINK FILTER – The affirmative does not stop the commercialization of space. Barring appropriation only limits the ownership of real property, use is still allowed. 100% of aff harms result from use, like the claiming of resources in space, not ownership of real estate. Terraforming isn’t appropriation because it just involves weapon use and development, not ownership.

#### *The aff doesn’t have a single piece of solvency or link evidence that is actually about appropriation, or even says the word appropriation, so you should give it ZERO WEIGHT. Go ahead, control F the doc.*

Švec et al 20 [Martin Švec, Petr Boháček, and Nikola Schmidt, “Utilization of Natural Resources in Outer Space: Social License to Operate as an Alternative Source of Both Legality and Legitimacy,” Oil Gas Energy Law J, 2020. <https://planetary-defense.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ov18-1-article17-notitle.pdf>] CT

2.2.1. Is the Utilization of Space Resources Implicitly Prohibited by the OST?

When the OST was drafted, exploitation of space resources was not considered feasible. Thus, the treaty does not contain any specific reference to space resource activities. However, silence of the OST does not necessarily imply unlawfulness of these activities. On the contrary, the freedom of exploration, use and access is one of the most fundamental principles of international space law. Art I of the OST reads: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.“25 It is worth mentioning that France already in 1966, during the negotiations of the OST, emphasised that it is important to know exactly what is meant by the term ‘use’, and whether it is an equivalent to the term ‘exploitation’. 26 While there is a general consensus on the interpretation of the term “exploration” as referring to discovery activities of the space environment for scientific reasons, a large disagreement exists concerning the term ‘use’.27 In this context the Board of Directors of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) hold that there is no international agreement whether the right of “free use” includes the right to take and consume nonrenewable natural resources, including minerals and water on celestial bodies.28 The authors of this article are of the opinion that the term “use” seems to be broad enough to encompass the exploitation of natural resources. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. First, the term “use” usually refers to both the non-economic and economic utilization and, thus, the use of outer space for economic ends can include exploitation with the objective of making economic profit.29 Second, the OST’s preamble reveals that the treaty does not aim to restrict the use of outer space, but rather to promote free exploration and use of outer space and the opposite interpretation would lead to an unnecessary impediment to the development of the uses of outer space.30 What is more, these conclusions may also be derived from the Moon Agreement. Although this agreement has been ratified only by 18 states, it may help understand the meaning of the international space law principles enshrined in the OST. The preamble of the Moon Agreement refers to the “benefits which may be derived from the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies,” and art 11 envisages the establishment of an international regime to govern the exploitation of natural resources of the Moon. In addition, Hobe argues, that specific uses are only excluded if they are explicitly excluded in other provisions of the OST, such as prohibition of certain military activities.31

2.2.2. Does the Utilization of Space Resources Contradict the Principle of NonAppropriation?

The principle of non-appropriation is one of the most fundamental rules regulating the exploration and use of outer space. Art II of the OST reads as follows: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” As a consequence, outer space is generally understood as a res communis omnium, 32 in its legal characterisation similar to the law governing the high seas or the deep seabed. An analysis of these already existing regimes based on the non-appropriation principle reveals that an exploitation of natural resources is perfectly compatible with the principle of nonappropriation.33 Additionally, even the Moon Agreement suggests that the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon does not constitute a means of appropriation. In particular, art 11 of the Moon Agreement reiterates that outer space is not subject to national appropriation and it explicitly envisages the establishment of an international legal regime to govern the exploitation of space resources.34

**CASE**

### ROB

#### The ROB is to determine the desirability of the plan. Anything else is a self-serving and arbitrary way to erase the NC and ensure we can’t catch up, justifying infinite unpredictable interps and destroying fairness and clash. Weigh the aff against a competitive alt – there is no argument free of ideology which means going for prefiat impacts leaves material oppression in place. Vote for the debater who did the best debating-any other ROB can be constructed around a specific position to guarantee the win instead of fostering competition and discussion.

### Solvency

#### No solvency—none of their evidence says that stopping the appropriation of outerspace can solve for anti-queer violence

#### Governments will just appropriate space if private companies don’t, which means that there is no way for space to remain unintelligible

#### Space is not unintelligible—there have been multiple missions to space, there are thousands of satellites and telescopes that monitor space, and the ISS which proves that space is already surveilled

#### THEIR METHOD DOES NOT SOLVE-“Queering” isn’t subversive – it still centers heterosexism

Meyers 97 (Helene, assistant professor of English and Chair of Women’s Studies at Southwestern University in Texas. “To Queer or Not to Queer: That's Not the Question,” Pg. 176, JSTOR)

Such open-minded ignorance being perpetuated in the name of queer studies is a reminder that the putting of queerness into discourse isn't in itself necessarily subversive or progressives Indeed, it seems reasonable to ask about the cultural forces that are enabling queer theory to become a hot commodity. A progressive and liberationist view of history would suggest that this queer moment is a natural and inevitable extension of democratic ideals. However, such a view assumes that culture—academic and otherwise—is working for the minority, and recent right turns all over the country suggest little evidence for this view of labor relations. Thus we might ask what cultural work queer theory is doing? Put another way, to what extent is queer theory being deployed to shore up heterosexuality? To be sure, heterosexuality needs all the help it can get. Divorce rates, domestic violence statistics, and the date-rape epidemic read like a negative ad campaign for the cultural institution that used to be such a norm that it need not speak its name. Add to the cultural mix the decline of living wages, the rise of single-parent households, the daycare crisis, and the nuclear family threatens to live up to its name. One response—elected in the Reagan-Bush years and still going strong in Republican (and sometimes Democratic) primaries all over America—is nostalgia for a heterosexual couple and a stable, functional family that never was. Another response might be that of Lynn Segal, whose explicit goal in Straight Sex: The Politics of Pleasure (1994) is to "rethink heterosexuality, and in the process all other sexualities as well" (xiii). Although her project clearly is to "ridicule hierarchies of sexuality and gender" (318), heterosexuality is still front and center, bolstered by those "others." Countering the "remarkable absence of heterosexual celebration" (216), Segal ends with the assertion that "straight sex, with its tactile, olfactory, oral and visual bodily connections can be no less perverse' than its queer' alternatives" (318). The categories of the normal and the perverse have been collapsed; however, it seems fair to ask for whose pleasure and whose danger? Just as the feminization of men does not necessarily lead to better lives for women, so the queering of heterosexuality is no guarantee that gays and lesbians will have their lives represented, respected, and legally protected.6Segal acknowledges the unequal playing field that dominates the play of sexuality by ending the chapter entitled "Gay and Lesbian challenges" with the following: "The question is whether heterosexuals can recognize themselves as part of both a compulsory system and an intrinsic comedy. For until they can, the comedy hides only tragedy—for everyone—with the most difficult and painful roles reserved, still, for women and gay men" (212). Such a collapse—once again—of lesbianism into womanhood may be a sign that "lesbian challenges" are in fact a threat and that queering heterosexuality may, in some cases, be a strategy of containment.

### Politics good

#### Preventing conflicts and preserving rights is not inherently anti-queer, and the aff maintains queer abjection

Powers, Prof @ Roehampton University, 9

(Nina, “Non-Reproductive Futurism,” borderlands, vol.8 No.2, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no2_2009/power_futurism.pdf>)

Edelman’s desire to conflate all politics with reproductive futurism does an injustice to the politics behind some of the historical shifts in the way abortion, for example, has been conceived. Even in the examples Edelman himself gives of anti-reproductive movements, he is quick to state that these campaigns for abortion rights frame the argument in terms of a ‘fight for our future – for our daughters and sons’ (Edelman, 2004: 3). But, whilst it is true that the anti-abortion debate (especially in America) is often played out on the territory of the right (where the rhetoric of pro-life reigns), it is certainly not the case in other parts of the world that abortion is defended in the name of those children already born, i.e. trapped in the framework of reproductive futurity. Elsewhere, it is the rationality of the woman, her ability to make economic and pragmatic decisions that feature foremost in any debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion. Historically, too, discussions about abortion took place in broader contexts that stressed abortion alongside questions of the equal right to work, progressive notions of family structure and so on. Before Stalin repealed the laws, the Soviet Union under Lenin was the first to provide free and on demand abortions. These laws were couched not in terms of ‘life,’ but in terms of pragmatism predicated on a notion of political equality. As Wendy Z. Goldman puts it: Soviet theorists held that the transition to capitalism had transformed the family by undermining its social and economic functions. Under socialism, it would wither away and under communism, it would cease to exist entirely. (Goldman, 1993: 11) Unless the family is considered in its social and economic function, it makes no sense to speak of its power as an image, however powerful this image might be. Edelman ultimately concedes far too much to a very narrow ideological image of the family that, whilst pernicious, is easier to undo with reference to history and practice than he seems to think. As Tim Dean puts it: ‘the polemical ire that permeates No Future seems to have been appropriated wholesale from the rightwing rants to which he recommends we hearken’ (Dean, 2008: 126). In the first section I tried to identify some of the contradictions between the contemporary family and the demands of capitalism, while above I gave examples of politics not based on reproduction and reproduction not based on futurity: what follows from this is that there are important historical shifts in the way in which the family and the image of the child comes to shift in and out of focus. Take the discussions surrounding in vitro fertilisation. First viable as a reproductive practice in the late 1970s, early artificial insemination was regarded as a ‘paganistic and atheistic’ practice (Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 11). Now, however, despite the wastage of potential viable embryos in the process, it is generally regarded as a practical option for infertile couples. Here the contradictions of contemporary social feeling towards children is exposed once again: reproductive futurism turns out not to be invested in all children, but only those it chooses to keep out of a pragmatism enabled by technology. Edelman talks about the ‘morbidity inherent in fetishization as such’ when opponents of abortion use photos of foetuses to highlight the proximity of the foetus to the ‘fully-formed child’ (Edelman, 2004: 41). He is right that morbidity and the politics of life seem to go hand-inhand, but then proceeds to argue that it is the queer alone that has a duty to remain true to this morbidity, to expose the ‘misrecognised’ investments of ‘sentimental futurism’: The subject … must accept its sinthome, its particular pathway to jouissance … This, I suggest, is the ethical burden to which queerness must accede in a social order intent on misrecognising its own investment in morbidity, fetishisation, and repetition: to inhabit the place of meaninglessness associated with the sinthome; to figure an unregenerate, and unregenerating, sexuality whose singular insistence on jouissance, rejecting every constraint imposed by sentimental futurism, exposes aesthetic culture – the culture of forms and their reproduction, the culture of Imaginary forms – as always already a “culture of death” intent on abjecting the force of a death drive that shatters the tomb we call life. (Edelman, 2004: 47-8) This does not exactly seem like a revelation. We live for the most part in pragmatic acceptance of this culture of death. It hardly shocks us when, for example, statistics reveal that, in 2004, 60% of women who had abortions had already given birth to at least one child (Sharples, 2008). Those people most identified with children – mothers – turn out, quite often, to deal with ‘life’ rather more pragmatically than we might otherwise believe. Edelman has to ignore historical and current examples of abortion rights campaigns, and other attitudes towards the family, in order to shoehorn all politics into a single vision to which he then opposes his notion of the queer. As Brenkman puts it: ‘To grant the Right the status of exemplary articulators of “the” social order strikes me as politically self-destructive and theoretically just plain wrong’ (Brenkman, 2002: 177). There are genuine moments of historical and political importance in terms of thinking about the family that seem to escape Edelman’s dismissal of politics as inevitably futural. We do not need to give up on politics altogether, whilst still accepting that the image of the child is a massive ideological obstacle. Rancière’s notion of political equality (‘Politics … is that activity which turns on equality as its principle’ (Rancière, 1999: ix)) neither concedes ground to politics as it appears (the ordering of the state, the police, a supposed consensus) nor does it think that politics is impossible or nondesirable, as Edelman does. We must ask: is all politics conservative by definition? Does negativity or resistance to existing power structures always translate back into some stable and positive form? The examples of the kibbutzim and the various contradictions in the ideology and practices of contemporary reproduction make it clear that Edelman, whilst having a strong argument about the shape that the ideology of the child takes, has to ignore the unstable compromises that the contemporary world has already made with itself regarding life and death i

n reproduction. Alan Sinfield has questioned whether we should really conflate all political aspirations with Edelman’s conception of reproductive futurism: ‘perhaps reproductive futurism is capturing and abusing other political aspirations and they should be reasserted’ (Sinfield, 2005: 50). It is not, then, that all politics is reproductively futural, but that this image has come to pervert other political desires, which may have a more complex relationship to children and a progressive conception of humanity. Edelman polemically dismisses the ‘left’ attitude to the queer, as ‘nothing more than a sexual practice in need of demystification’ (Edelman, 2004: 28). Whilst a certain strain of leftist thinking does pursue this demystificatory line (arguing, for example, that many forms of sexual expression are ‘natural’), Edelman reduces the left position on sexuality to a simple question of acceptance, as a way of arguing that the queer can mean nothing to the left. But there are, as indicated above, quite different ways of thinking about the family (in a non-futural, non-ideological way) and about politics, and the two together. When Rancière discusses the ‘subject of politics’, he makes it clear that: The subject of politics can precisely be identified neither with “humanity” and the gatherings of a population, nor with the identities defined by constitutional texts. They are always defined by an interval between identities, be these identities determined by social relations or juridical categories. (Rancière, 2006a: 59) Could this ‘interval between identities’ be the jouissance that Edelman aligns with the queer? Whilst Edelman’s psychoanalytic subject could in no way be understood as a similar (non)entity to Rancière’s ‘subject of politics,’ this idea of the interval seems to indicate a site of noncapture that could be described in a certain sense as ‘queer.’ In Edelman’s response to John Brenkman he states that: ‘Sexuality refuses demystification as society refuses queerness’ (Edelman, 2002: 181-5). By reifying sexuality as something that ‘refuses’ meaning, Edelman oddly substantialises it; Rancière’s way out of the identities determined by social relations or juridical categories is much less dependent on any pre-existing identity, even though he retains the very concept of politics that Edelman rejects. There seems to be no reason why the subject of politics for Rancière couldn’t be a ‘queer’ subject in Edelman’s sense, at the same time as reclaiming a notion of rationality away from the categories of the state. Before turning to a brief summary of this tentative queer rationalism, one more structural element of Edelman’s argument will be addressed: that of the death drive.

## **State Good**

#### Discussions about queerness and heteronormativity are certainly important, and it isnt the neg burden to attempt to deny it. However, the aff, by not having a plan or taking a policy action, is striking a radical pose and claiming to endorse queerness while supporting what is essentially the status quo allows for complacency and the assumption that these issues have been fixed.

#### Struggles for legal reform have successfully altered civil society for the better-this is what the neg does. Brenkman ‘02

Brenkman, John. “Politics, Mortal and Natal: An Arendtian Rejoinder.” Narrative, vol. 10, no. 2, 2002, pp. 186–192. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20107285.ZW

Innovation is a crucial concept for understanding **the gay and lesbian movement**, **which emerged from within civil society as citizens who were stigmatized and** often **criminalized for their sexual lives** created new forms of association, **transformed their own lifeworld**, **and organized a political offensive on behalf of** political and social **reforms.** There was an innovation of rights and freedoms, and what I have called innovations in sociality. ∂ Contrary to the liberal interpretation of liberal rights and freedoms, I do not think that gays and lesbians have merely sought their place at the table. **Their struggle has radically altered the scope and meaning of the liberal rights and freedoms they sought**, first and foremost by making them include sexuality, sexual practices, and the shape of household and family. **Where the movement has succeeded in changing the laws of the state, it has also opened up new possibilities within civil society**.

To take an obvious example, **wherever it becomes unlawful to deny housing to individuals because they are gay, there is set in motion a transformation of the everyday life of neighborhoods**, including the lives of heterosexuals and their children. Within civil society, this is a work of enlightenment, however uneven and fraught and frequently dangerous. **It is not a reaffirmation of the symbolic and structural underpinnings of homophobia; on the contrary, it is a challenge to homophobia and a volatilizing of social relations within the nonpolitical realm.**

1. **On their debate space args- Insularity DA – Making debate entirely about the debate space replicates the insular logic of academia where the only relevant consideration is contributing to the discipline rather than changing material conditions. Their Aff doesn’t solve any manifestation of anti-queerness in debate they have described. Voting for the Aff strikes an anti-heteronormative pose that effects privileged catharsis while requiring no commitment to actual change. What happens in this round stays in round-without actually taking action, which the aff says they don’t do, we make no significant change.**