#### We meet – linguistic ambiguity - everything can be a negative action – eating is a discontinuance of not eating. Their definition isn’t even for negative action, it’s for unjust which is an adjective

#### We meet- their definition *entails* the aff because in order to oppose appropriation, we have to define what would be unjust

#### The advantages say that appropriation is contrary to justice because the aff is the version of laws that would be just and appropriation is contrary, so appropriation is unjust

#### Counterinterpretation: the aff can be a negative or positive action. To outlaw one type of property rights regime is to necessitate having another to replace it, so not allowing us to propose an alternative doesn’t allow for any plans, which kills fairness because the aff can’t solve anything, and forces the debate to be so vague we get no educational value out of it. Vote aff on reasonability because competing interps causes a race to the top and crowds out substantive education

1. Not effects-T or extra-T – the global commons model is the one most grounded in the topic lit as evidenced by the fact that all our authors use the same nomenclature

#### No link – aff doesn’t ban private space industries; it only licenses it. Private companies don’t need to own outer space for them to innovate space tech

#### Space debris turn – Kessler Effect controls the internal link to space tech because Chinese space tech will get blown up and their orbits will become unusable

#### No link – censorship and control over the media ensures no public backlash

#### Diversionary War thesis is wrong and unapplicable to Xi

Yin 19 — (George Yin, Writer at Brookings, “Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict“, Brookings, 1-22-2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/domestic-repression-and-international-aggression-why-xi-is-uninterested-in-diversionary-conflict/, accessed 12-19-2020, HKR-AR)

Crucially, diversionary war theory rests on a number of assumptions, two of which do not hold for Xi today.

Assumption 1: Leaders prefer foreign adventure over addressing domestic troubles.

As discussed earlier, in the realm of domestic policies, Xi has been criticized for primarily two things: his promotion of his cult of personality and a slowing Chinese economy overly focused on inefficient SOEs. It is easy for Xi to dial back his cult of personality, and he has already done so. Reverting his policy of guo jin min tui (“as the state advances, the private sector retreats”) is not going to be easy and would entail important financial system and legal reforms (see discussions from the 2018 Chinese Economists 50 forum), but is quite doable. There is little reason why Xi would want to create international tension to distract his critics when it is much more straightforward to directly address the domestic issues. Furthermore, a diversionary skirmish involving Vietnam or the Philippines over one of the South China Sea islands would hardly be significant enough for diversion. To rally the nation behind him, Xi must pick on Taiwan, Japan, or even the United States. The problem is that a confrontation with either Taiwan or Japan is highly risky. The Chinese military, which has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979 and is embroiled in corruption scandals, might well suffer defeat. Perhaps China could take on the United States in the economics arena, but China has been unable to react effectively to the ongoing trade war with the United States.

Assumption 2: Key domestic political players want conflict.

Most importantly, the CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. This is not because the CCP elites like the United States, which is still seen by many as an imperial power that supports Japanese militarism and secessionism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, in Fan’s words, it is important “to deal with domestic issues before pacifying the barbarians” (an nei rang wai). In the eyes of his critics, any foreign adventure would indicate that Xi was getting the priorities wrong and further deviate from Deng’s grand strategy of fostering a favorable foreign environment to promote development. A diversionary conflict is therefore likely to further galvanize Xi’s opposition.

#### Non-unique and turn: Chinese investments are pulling ahead and the only way US maintains space dominance is through privatization, which will make the public much more angry than a joint agreement. Autry and Kwast 19:

Greg Autry, Steve Kwast {Greg Autry is a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management. He served on the 2016 NASA transition team and as the White House liaison at NASA in 2017. He is the chair of the Safety Working Group for the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee. Steve Kwast is a Lieutenant General and commander of Recruiting, Training, Educating and Development for the Air Force. He is an astronautical engineer and Harvard Fellow in Public Policy., }, 19 - ("America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China," Foreign Policy, 8-22-2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/22/america-is-losing-the-second-space-race-to-china/)//marlborough-wr/

The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on [June 18](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-national-space-council-signing-space-policy-directive-3/), “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already [undercutting](https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/02/beijing-is-taking-the-final-frontier-space-china/) U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the [Defense Innovation Unit](https://www.diu.mil/news-events), under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.