# 1NC vs Nova 42 RS

## 1NC --- OFF

#### Interpretation: Debaters must have an NDCA LD 2021-2022 wiki. This wiki needs to have contact info and possibly preferred pronouns, if they want. To clarify, you don’t need to disclose personal narratives or identity relation information if you don’t want to.

#### Violation: No wiki, SS

Graphical user interface

Description automatically generated with low confidence

#### 1] prep and clash—two internal links—a) neg prep—b) wiki disclosure discourages cheap shot affs.

#### 2] Pre round prep – Contact info is key to ask for the aff, past 2nrs or clarify disclosure. I don’t know what the 1nc should be and can’t make one. Key to education because we won’t get clash. Key to fairness because you get an unfair prep advantage.

#### 3] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //nick]

1. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### 4] Evidence ethics – Can’t check the aff before round

#### 5] Accessibility – If debaters require accommodations or need you to read trigger warnings there’s no way for them to request that until it’s too late. Kills accessibility because there’s no way to make the round accessible if they can’t ask you to.

#### Standards:

#### Voters:

#### 1] Fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity

#### 2] Accessibility is a voter and comes first since rejecting it is morally abhorrent and it’s a prereq to debate

#### Drop the debater

#### 1] Rectify time spent on theory

#### 2] Deter future abuse

#### Competing interps

#### 1] Reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention

#### 2] Reasonability creates a race to the bottom where people try to find out how abusive they can be

#### No RVIs

#### 1] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance

#### 2] They chill abuse checking

#### 3] Incentivizes people to bait theory then win the RVI

## 1NC --- OFF

#### Space Commercialization is key to Space Deterrence – Commercial Flexibility is key to deterrence by denial.

Klein 19, John J. Understanding space strategy: the art of war in space. Routledge, 2019. (a Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research, Inc. and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute)//Elmer

Recent U.S. space policy initiatives underscore the far-reaching benefits of commercial space activities. The White House revived the National Space Council to foster closer coordination, cooperation, and exchange of technology and information among the civil, national security, and commercial space sectors.1 National Space Policy Directive 2 seeks to promote economic growth by streamlining U.S. regulations on the commercial use of space.2 While the defense community generally appreciates the value of services and capabilities derived from the commercial space sector—including space launch, Earth observation, and satellite communications—it often overlooks one area of strategic importance: deterrence. To address the current shortcoming in understanding, this paper first describes the concept of deterrence, along with how space mission assurance and resilience fit into the framework. After explaining how commercial space capabilities may influence the decision calculus of potential adversaries, this study presents actionable recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to address current problem areas. Ultimately, DoD—including the soon-to-be reestablished U.S. Space Command and possibly a new U.S. Space Force—should incorporate the benefits and capabilities of the commercial space sector into flexible deterrent options and applicable campaign and contingency plans. Deterrence, Mission Assurance, and Resilience Thomas Schelling, the dean of modern deterrence theory, held that deterrence refers to persuading a potential enemy that it is in its interest to avoid certain courses of activity.3 One component of deterrence theory lies in an understanding that the threat of credible and potentially overwhelming force or other retaliatory action against any would-be adversary is sufficient to deter most potential aggressors from conducting hostile actions. This idea is also referred to as deterrence by punishment.4 The second salient component of deterrence theory is denial. According to Glenn Snyder’s definition, deterrence by denial is “the capability to deny the other party any gains from the move which is to be deterred.”5 The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) highlights deterrence, and specifically deterrence by denial, as a vital component of national security. The NDS notes that the primary objectives of the United States include deterring adversaries from pursuing aggression and preventing hostile actions against vital U.S. interests.6 The strategy also observes that deterring conflict necessitates preparing for war during peacetime.7 For the space domain, the peacetime preparedness needed for deterrence by denial occurs in the context of space mission assurance and resilience. Mission assurance entails “a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets—including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains—critical to the performance of DoD mission essential functions in any operating environment or condition.”8 Similar to mission assurance but with a different focus, resilience is an architecture’s ability to support mission success with higher probability; shorter periods of reduced capability; and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, despite hostile action or adverse conditions.9 Resilience may leverage cross-domain solutions, along with commercial and international capabilities.10 Space mission assurance and resilience can prevent a potential adversary from achieving its objectives or realizing any benefit from its aggressive action. These facets of U.S. preparedness help convey the futility of conducting a hostile act. Consequently, they enhance deterrence by denial. Commercial Space Enables Deterrence The commercial space sector directly promotes mission assurance and resilience efforts. This is in part due to the distributed and diversified nature of commercial space launch and satellites services. Distribution refers to the use of a number of nodes, working together, to perform the same mission or functions as a single node; diversification describes contributing to the same mission in multiple ways, using different platforms, orbits, or systems and capabilities.11 The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, in noting the benefits derived from the commercial space industry, states that DoD partners with the commercial sector’s capabilities to improve the U.S. space architecture’s resilience.12 Although U.S. policy and joint doctrine frequently acknowledge the role of the commercial space sector in space mission assurance and resilience, there is little recognition that day-to-day contributions from the commercial industry assists in deterring would-be adversaries. The commercial space sector contributes to deterrence by denial through multi-domain solutions that are distributed and diversified. These can deter potential adversaries from pursuing offensive actions against space-related systems. Commercial launch providers enhance deterrence by providing options for getting payloads into orbit. These include diverse space launch capabilities such as small and responsive launch vehicles, along with larger, reusable launch vehicles; launch rideshares for secondary payloads; and government payloads on commercial satellites. Various on-orbit systems also promote deterrence. For example, if an aggressor damages a commercial remote sensing satellite during hostilities, similar commercial satellites in a different orbital regime, or those of the same constellation, may provide the needed imagery. If satellite communications are jammed or degraded, commercial service providers can reroute satellite communications through their own networks, or potentially through the networks of another company using a different portion of the frequency spectrum. Regarding deterrence by punishment efforts, the commercial space sector can play a role, albeit an indirect one, through improved space situational awareness (SSA) and space forensics (including digital forensics and multispectral imagery). The commercial industry may support the attribution process following a hostile or illegal act in space through its increasingly proliferating network of SSA ground telescopes and other terrestrial tracking systems. The DoD may also leverage the commercial space sector’s cyber expertise to support digital forensic efforts to help determine the source of an attack. By supporting a credible and transparent attribution process, commercial partners may cause a would-be adversary to act differently if it perceives that its aggressive, illegal, or otherwise nefarious actions will be disclosed. Doing so can help bolster the perceived ability to conduct a legitimate response following a hostile attack, which may improve deterrence by punishment efforts. Commercial space capabilities may also facilitate the application of force to punish a potential aggressor. In addition to traditional military space systems, commercial satellite imagery and communication capabilities may be used in cueing and targeting for punitive strikes against an aggressor. Although the commercial space sector is not expected to be involved directly in the use of retaliatory force following a hostile act, commercial partners may help in providing the information used to identify those responsible and to facilitate any consequent targeting efforts.

#### Space Deterrence Breakdowns and destroys American supremacy over space.

Parker 17 Clifton Parker 1-24-2017 “Deterrence in space key to U.S. security” <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/deterrence-space-key-us-security> (Policy Analyst at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation)//Elmer

#### Space is more important than ever for the security of the United States, but it’s almost like the Wild West in terms of behavior, a top general said today. Air Force Gen. [John Hyten](http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/108115/general-john-e-hyten.aspx), commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, spoke Jan. 24 at Stanford’s [Center](http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/) for International Security and Cooperation. His [talk](http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/events/us-strategic-command-perspectives-deterrence-and-assurance) was titled, “U.S. Strategic Command Perspectives on Deterrence and Assurance.” Hyten said, “Space is fundamental to every single military operation that occurs on the planet today.” He added that “there is no such thing as a war in space,” because it would affect all realms of human existence, due to the satellite systems. Hyten advocates “strategic deterrence” and “norms of behavior” across space as well as land, water and cyberspace. Otherwise, rivals like China and Russia will only threaten U.S. interests in space and wreak havoc for humanity below, he said. Most of contemporary life depends on systems connected to space. Hyten also addressed other topics, including recent proposals by some to upgrade the country’s missile defense systems. “You just don’t snap your fingers and build a state-of-the-art anything overnight,” Hyten said, adding that he has not yet spoken to Trump administration officials about the issue. “We need a powerful military,” but a severe budget crunch makes “reasonable solutions” more likely than expensive and unrealistic ones. On the upgrade front, Hyten said he favors a long-range strike missile system to replace existing cruise missiles; a better air-to-air missile for the Air Force; and an improved missile defense ground base interceptor. ‘Critically dependent’ From satellites to global-positioning systems GPS, space has transformed human life – and the military – in the 21st century, Hyten said. In terms of defining "space," the U.S. designates people who travel above an altitude of 50 miles as astronauts. As the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Hyten oversees the control of U.S. strategic forces, providing options for the president and secretary of defense. In particular, this command is charged with space operations (such as military satellites), information operations (such as information warfare), missile defense, global command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, global strike and strategic deterrence (the U.S. nuclear arsenal), and combating weapons of mass destruction. Hyten explained that every drone, fighter jet, bomber, ship and soldier is critically dependent on space to conduct their own operations. All cell phones use space, and the GPS command systems overall are managed at Strategic Command, he said. “No soldier has to worry about what’s over the next hill,” he said, describing GPS capabilities, which have fundamentally transformed humanity’s way of life. Space needs to be available for exploration, he said. “I watch what goes on in space, and I worry about us destroying that environment for future generations.” He said that too many drifting objects and debris exist – about 22,000 right now. A: recent Chinese satellite interception created a couple thousand more debris objects that now circle about the Earth at various altitudes and pose the risk of striking satellites. “We track every object in space” now, Hyten said, urging “international norms of behavior in space.” He added, “We have to deter bad behavior on space. We have to deter war in space. It’s bad for everybody. We could trash that forever.” But now rivals like China and Russia are building weapons to deploy in the lower levels of space. “How do we prevent this? It’s bigger than a space problem,” he said. Deterring conflict in the cyber, nuclear and space realms is the strategic deterrence goal of the 21st century, Hyten said. “The best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war,” he said. Hyten believes the U.S. needs a fundamentally different debate about deterrence. And it all starts with nuclear weapons. “In my deepest heart, I wish I didn’t have to worry about nuclear weapons,” he said. Hyten described his job as “pretty sobering, it’s not easy.” But he also noted the mass violence of the world prior to 1945 when the first atomic bomb was used. Roughly 80 million people died from 1939 to 1945 during World War II. Consider that in the 10-plus years of the Vietnam War, 58,000 Americans were killed. That’s equivalent to two days of deaths in WWII, he said. In a world without nuclear weapons, a rise in conventional warfare would produce great numbers of mass casualties, Hyten said. About war, he said, “Once you see it up close, no human will ever want to experience it.” Though America has “crazy enemies” right now, in many ways the world is more safe than during WWII, Hyten said. The irony is that nuclear weapons deterrence has kept us from the type of mass killings known in events like WWII. But the U.S. must know how to use its nuclear deterrence effectively. Looking ahead, Hyten said the U.S. needs to think about space as a potential war environment. An attack in space might not mean a response in space, but on the Earth. Hyten describes space as the domain that people look up at it and still dream about. “I love to look at the stars,” but said he wants to make sure he’s not looking up at junk orbiting in the atmosphere.

#### US space dominance prevents global war

**Zubrin 15** [(Robert Zubrin, president of Pioneer Energy, a senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy) “US Space Supremacy is Now Critical,” Space News, 1/22/15, <https://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-space-supremacy-now-critical/>] TDI

The United States needs a new national security policy. For the first time in more than 60 years, we face the real possibility of a large-scale conventional war, and we are woefully unprepared. Eastern and Central Europe is now so weakly defended as to virtually invite invasion. The United States is not about to go to nuclear war to defend any foreign country. So deterrence is dead, and, with the German army cut from 12 divisions to three, the British gone from the continent, and American forces down to a 30,000-troop tankless remnant, the only serious and committed ground force that stands between Russia and the Rhine is the Polish army. It’s not enough. Meanwhile, in Asia, the powerful growth of the Chinese economy promises that nation eventual overwhelming numerical force superiority in the region. How can we restore the balance, creating a sufficiently powerful conventional force to deter aggression? It won’t be by matching potential adversaries tank for tank, division for division, replacement for replacement. Rather, the United States must seek to totally outgun them by obtaining a radical technological advantage. This can be done by achieving space supremacy. To grasp the importance of space power, some historical perspective is required. Wars are fought for control of territory. Yet for thousands of years, victory on land has frequently been determined by dominance at sea. In the 20th century, victory on both land and sea almost invariably went to the power that controlled the air. In the 21st century, victory on land, sea or in the air will go to the power that controls space. The critical military importance of space has been obscured by the fact that in the period since the United States has had space assets, all of our wars have been fought against minor powers that we could have defeated without them. Desert Storm has been called the first space war, because the allied forces made extensive use of GPS navigation satellites. However, if they had no such technology at their disposal, the end result would have been just the same. This has given some the impression that space forces are just a frill to real military power — a useful and convenient frill perhaps, but a frill nevertheless. But consider how history might have changed had the Axis of World War II possessed reconnaissance satellites — merely one of many of today’s space-based assets — without the Allies having a matching capability. In that case, the Battle of the Atlantic would have gone to the U-boats, as they would have had infallible intelligence on the location of every convoy. Cut off from oil and other supplies, Britain would have fallen. On the Eastern front, every Soviet tank concentration would have been spotted in advance and wiped out by German air power, as would any surviving British ships or tanks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. In the Pacific, the battle of Midway would have gone very much the other way, as the Japanese would not have wasted their first deadly airstrike on the unsinkable island, but sunk the American carriers instead. With these gone, the remaining cruisers and destroyers in Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher’s fleet would have lacked air cover, and every one of them would have been hunted down and sunk by unopposed and omniscient Japanese air power. With the same certain fate awaiting any American ships that dared venture forth from the West Coast, Hawaii, Australia and New Zealand would then have fallen, and eventually China and India as well. With a monopoly of just one element of space power, the Axis would have won the war. But modern space power involves far more than just reconnaissance satellites. The use of space-based GPS can endow munitions with 100 times greater accuracy, while space-based communications provide an unmatched capability of command and control of forces. Knock out the enemy’s reconnaissance satellites and he is effectively blind. Knock out his comsats and he is deaf. Knock out his navsats and he loses his aim. In any serious future conventional conflict, even between opponents as mismatched as Japan was against the United States — or Poland (with 1,000 tanks) is currently against Russia (with 12,000) — it is space power that will prove decisive. Not only Europe, but the defense of the entire free world hangs upon this matter. For the past 70 years, U.S. Navy carrier task forces have controlled the world’s oceans, first making and then keeping the Pax Americana, which has done so much to secure and advance the human condition over the postwar period. But should there ever be another major conflict, an adversary possessing the ability to locate and target those carriers from space would be able to wipe them out with the push of a button. For this reason, it is imperative that the United States possess space capabilities that are so robust as to not only assure our own ability to operate in and through space, but also be able to comprehensively deny it to others. Space superiority means having better space assets than an opponent. Space supremacy means being able to assert a complete monopoly of such capabilities. The latter is what we must have. If the United States can gain space supremacy, then the capability of any American ally can be multiplied by orders of magnitude, and with the support of the similarly multiplied striking power of our own land- and sea-based air and missile forces be made so formidable as to render any conventional attack unthinkable. On the other hand, should we fail to do so, we will remain so vulnerable as to increasingly invite aggression by ever-more-emboldened revanchist powers. This battle for space supremacy is one we can win. Neither Russia nor China, nor any other potential adversary, can match us in this area if we put our minds to it. We can and must develop ever-more-advanced satellite systems, anti-satellite systems and truly robust space launch and logistics capabilities. Then the next time an aggressor commits an act of war against the United States or a country we are pledged to defend, instead of impotently threatening to limit his tourist visas, we can respond by taking out his satellites, effectively informing him in advance the certainty of defeat should he persist. If we desire peace on Earth, we need to prepare for war in space.

## Case

### Contention 1:

#### Capitalism is adaptable and sustainable – it reforms with new technologies and innovations in a way that benefits the whole of society. Any alternative is a system of oppression and mitigation of the poor.

Ashworth 10 [Stephen, academic publishing at Oxford, December 18, Oxford, “Towards the Sociology of the Universe, part 2,” http://www.astronist.demon.co.uk/space-age/essays/Sociology2.html, 7/2/11]

Under capitalism, social benefit is primarily expressed in monetary terms, and society is stratified economically, with richer classes nearer the top of the social scale and poorer classes nearer the bottom. Under the socialist mode of society, the central function of capital – deciding the allocation of resources – is performed by political ideology. Social benefit is now primarily expressed in terms of ideological capital, being the level of influence, official or unofficial, which an individual enjoys within the institutions, such as in the Soviet Union the Communist Party, which express, teach and propagate that ideology. The rich in such a system are therefore the ideologically rich: those who rise to prominence in the political process and occupy official posts in the Party apparatus; while the poor are those who merely dutifully consume the Party propaganda. The poorest are those who disagree with or actively resist the ruling ideology, and who end up marginalised or criminalised as a result. In view of historical precedents such as the Soviet Union, it is highly unlikely that any realistic socialist society represents an advance over capitalist society in terms of the well-being of the majority of its members (as judged by those members). It is not known whether any third option exists that is compatible with industrialism; however, it is highly plausible that new options will appear in due course, given continued technological development and corresponding social change. Recent history suggests that politically driven attempts at creating a socially just society put all its members, except those at the very top of the Party hierarchy, at a considerable material disadvantage to corresponding members of capitalist societies. One reason for this is that democratic capitalist institutions tend to be flexible and thus capable of responding to changing circumstances, while ideology tends to resist change even in changing circumstances. It must also be clear that any beneficial changes to the modern global liberal democratic market capitalist order can only come about in an incremental fashion, as argued in the social philosophy of Karl Popper (in his book The Open Society and its Enemies). Violent political revolution would, judging by historical precedents, be so destructive that it cannot be contemplated except with extreme horror. Incremental changes in technology, for example the recent introduction of the internet, allow the institutions of democratic capitalism to evolve in ways which are unpredictable but generally beneficial to most groups in society. As civilisation continues to change under the influence of new technologies of computing, medicine and transport, particularly space transport, the democratic capitalist system will naturally also change. Considering the freedoms and privileges enjoyed by the peoples of developed countries compared with their forebears of a few generations ago, it is reasonable to look forward to continued incremental social evolution with optimism concerning the nature of future society, while setting impractical utopian dreams aside

#### Key to solve disease – covid proves disease causes massive structural violence

Jackson ‘16 (Kerry, Pacific Research Institute; 12/19/16; Free Market Policies Needed To Incentivize Creation Of New Life-Saving Treatments; https://www.pacificresearch.org/article/free-market-policies-needed-to-incentivize-creation-of-new-life-saving-treatments/)

“Our strongest antibiotics don’t work and patients are left with potentially untreatable infections,” Director Dr. Tom Frieden said when the CDC issued its warning. He asked doctors, hospitals and public health officials to “work together” to “stop these infections from spreading.” The 2014 Report to the President expressed a similar concern: “The evolution of antibiotic resistance is now occurring at an alarming rate and is outpacing the development of new countermeasures capable of thwarting infections in humans. This situation threatens patient care, economic growth, public health, agriculture, economic security and national security.” For those thinking this sort of thing shouldn’t be happening when medical science is more advanced than can almost be conceived, be assured that it is. And unless there are public policy interventions, it’s likely to get worse. “More and more microorganisms will continue to gain resistance to the current drug therapies because (antimicrobial resistance, or AMR) is basic evolution,” Wayne Winegarden writes in the Pacific Research Institute’s newly-released report “Incenting the Development of Antimicrobial Medicines to Address the Problem of Drug-Resistant Infections.” The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers says the problem is caused by “a dearth of new antibiotic medicines.” At the same time that there’s been an increase in AMR, there has been “a sharp decline in the development of new antibiotic medicines.” The group reports that only two new classes of antibiotics have been discovered in the last three decades compared to 11 in the previous 50 years. The answers to many medical problems are still not within reach of researchers. But the hazards of AMR can be diminished. Winegarden suggests we begin with public health campaigns that encourage handwashing, which he calls a highly effective and low-cost way to reduce the spread of infection. He further recommends policy that would address the problem of antibiotic overuse and greater use of vaccines to cut the incidents of infection. But Winegarden’s primary concern is establishing the correct incentives for developing new antimicrobial medicines that would be effective against AMR microorganisms. He’s specifically referring to policies “based on a thorough understanding of the disincentives that are currently inhibiting their development.” “These disincentives are well-recognized,” he writes. “Despite the medical need, and despite the generally strong return on investment for many other drug classes, the return on investment for developing new antimicrobial medicines (particularly antibiotics) is too low.” Producing a new drug is a grinding and expensive endeavor. It can take 10 to 15 years to develop a single prescription drug that is introduced to the market, and a company can spend as much as $5.5 billion on research and development for each medication that is eventually approved and prescribed. Less than 2 percent of all projects launched to create new drugs succeed. This is not an environment in which pharmaceutical companies can get too amped up about pursuing new treatments. Yet new drug approvals increased over the last decade. Don’t look for a surge of antimicrobial drugs in that pipeline, though. Winegarden says that particular drug class is among several that “face unique impediments” that serve as disincentives for innovation. To overcome the steep hill that impedes the development of new AMR drugs, lawmakers must implement policies that unleash the incentives of the free market. Policymakers also should look at the 1983 federal Orphan Drug Act and its market-oriented reforms that increased the number of drugs developed to treat rare diseases. More than 400 have been introduced to the market since the law was enacted, compared to fewer than 10 in the 1970s. Put another way, government needs to remove its anchors from the process and let the market do what it does so well. In this case, that’s restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs, and inspiring biotech start-ups such as the group of Stanford undergraduates that has been capitalized to develop new antibiotics. If the proper incentives are in place, the needed treatments will follow.

#### Vote neg on presumption – space privatization may be an example of neolib, but no chance that they solve it:

#### None of their ev is reverse causal – industrial agriculture, the defense industrial base, Amazon, Koch Industries are all examples of capitalism – plus capitalism predates space exploration, which proves they don’t control the root cause

#### No brightline for when spatial fixes on Earth are exhausted – corporations will continue extracting resources from Earth even if it’s less lucrative

That means only let them weigh the sum total of capitalism that they resolve – I’ll give you a hint – it’s *next to nothing*.

No methodological offense – it’s infinitely regressive and super subjective – only evaluating the direct consequences of the affirmative solves.

### Contention 2:

#### Turn – space wars are more likely when governments are the only ones with vested interest in space, because they’re the ones with military interests.

**Bender 18** [Bryan Bender, “Space war is coming – and the US is not ready”, Futurism. 6 April 2018 https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/06/outer-space-war-defense-russia-china-463067]

W**ar is coming to outer space, and the Pentagon warns it is not yet ready**, following years of underinvesting while the military focused on a host of threats on Earth. Russia and China are years ahead of the United States in developing the means to destroy or disable satellites that the U.S. military depends on for everything from gathering intelligence to guiding precision bombs, missiles and drones. Now **the Pentagon is** trying to catch up — **pouring billions more dollars into hardening its defenses against anti-satellite weapons, training troops to operate in the event their space lifeline is cut, and honing ways to retaliate against a new form of combat that experts warn could affect millions of people**, cause untold collateral damage and spread to battlefields on Earth. “We are now approaching a point where ‘Star Wars’ is not just a movie,” said Steve Isakowitz, CEO of The Aerospace Corp., a government-funded think tank that serves as the military’s leading adviser on space. He said **the U.S. can no longer afford to take its dominance for granted.**

#### 1] No shot of a disarming strike --- we’d be able to retaliate --- that makes our threats credible, Harrison 9

(Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, “Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk,” Space and Defense, Volume 3, No. 1. Summer 2009. <http://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_3_1.pdf>)

The second mitigating factor is that even in the absence of dedicated ASAT systems, a potential attacker is not likely to perceive the U.S. lacks capability to retaliate against the space assets of an adversary. Many nations perceive existing U.S. ballistic missile defense systems as having a dual-use nature, including potential anti-satellite capability. The U.S. reportedly has an active and acknowledged program of “negation” designed to deny an adversary the use of his space assets as force multipliers in the case of hostilities within the atmosphere. We may safely assume that other nations are pursuing similar programs. In our judgment, the most likely scenario for future space conflict is a “war of negation,” i.e. an attempt by each side to preserve the product of its space assets while denying those space services to the opponent. To win such a contest requires technological superiority, which the U.S. should make every effort to maintain and which, in this area as in others, is a vital element in maintaining space deterrence. We conclude that the threat of retaliation can remain a credible element of our overall space deterrence. The attribution of attack is not an insuperable obstacle, and that questions of resolve will ultimately depend on the perceptions of a potential attacker in the circumstances existing when his decision to attack is being considered. A credible threat of retaliation may require willingness to escalate into other domains. It could include fielding ASAT systems if such systems are deployed by others, but the resulting arms race would not be in the interests of the United States. The U.S. should not be the first to deploy such systems and the U.S. use the full extent of its influence internationally to avoid that outcome. Ultimately, a threat of retaliation is never more credible than the leader and the government that issues it. No declaratory policy can compensate for an irresolute commander in chief, one who is misinformed or badly served by his subordinates. An opponent will tend to judge the likelihood of retaliation not according to proclamations made months or years earlier, but according to the situation pertaining at the time – as Hitler did in Europe and Saddam did in the Middle East. What a President does in the run up to and conduct of a crisis will have far more to do with an adversaries decisions than libraries full of ultimatums and guarantees. Subordinates who doubt the resolution of a commander will try to limit his or her flexibility to respond other than in ways the subordinates think appropriate. A wise commander in chief, on the other hand, will strive to maintain flexibility, to approach a particular conflict in the context of wider responsibilities, to take account of factors which were unforeseen when the doctrine or battle plan was devised – in short, to balance one risk off against others. No bureaucratic arrangement, declaratory doctrine or weapon capability will compensate when such leadership is not present.

#### 2] If tensions were going to escalate, they already would have. There have been many near misses and some debris currently in space right now, but nothing has happened, so tensions won’t escalate.

#### 3] Private actors solve space war and specifically ASAT restraint, Cobb 21

(Wendy N. Whitman Cobb, Associate Professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, “Privatizing Peace: How Commerce Can Reduce Conflict in Space,” 2021, Routledge, pp. 68-69)

Finally, given the involvement of an ever-larger number of private actors in space, states also need to consider the lost opportunity costs if private actors choose to forego research, development, and deployment of new technologies because the danger in space is too high. As space becomes more commercialized, these private actors can exert pressure on states to behave peacefully in order to promote further economic development. Gartzke and Quan Li argue that this can happen through the movement of capital from conflict-prone states or areas to non-conflictual states.50 This is not necessarily applicable to space because there is no area in space which is formally protected, but commercial space actors may choose not to engage in new economic investment which can in turn affect a state’s economic performance. To date, the size of the space sector is comparatively small, so, arguably, the potential economic loss would not be that great. Where the harm comes from is state reliance on private actors for military and national security space services. As states contract out space services to a greater extent, private actors exert an even greater influence over the state by having a capability they do not. Why might private companies want a more conflict-free space? If there is weaponized conflict in space, they could potentially benefit through new launches to send up replacement satellites; this is similar to an argument that war can actually be beneficial to an economy because companies are needed to create materiel and weapons.51 But, in a debris filled environment, sending replacements is more difficult and dangerous. Some private companies want to engage in human spaceflight; a conflictual or more dangerous orbital environment would likely prevent those activities or increase their costs to such an extent that it becomes economically infeasible. James Clay Moltz argues specifically that “the growing presence of space tourists in low-Earth orbit would greatly increase the incentives for restraint in any future [ASAT] test programs.”52 Those foregone development costs and commercial activities can have a similar cost to states simply by discouraging private actors from participating in the market.