# 1NC vs Troy Independent AP

## 1 Theory

#### A. Interp: debaters must link their role of the ballot warrants to a normative theory that determines what counts as good and bad.

#### B. Violation: all the moten cards

#### C. ground-making assertions without justifying why certain things are good and bad kills my ground since I don’t know how to link turns to the role of the ballot-there is no mechanism I can appeal to that warrants what counts as offense in the first place. Supercharged by the fact that the role of the ballot excludes my framework, there is no way to actually weigh offense in the round. Impacts: A. kills fairness since you’re the only one with offense left, B. causes intervention since just has to randomly pick one side without any basis-that means the round isn’t decided on the better debating but rather arbitrary things which also kills fairness. C. link turns the role of the ballot since otherwise we make assumptions that hurt the alternative you want to empower since it seems unjustified to people.

#### D. Voters:

#### Fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity and both sides need an equal chance of winning to keep it that way. Education is a voter it’s the only portable skill from debate. Drop the debater to deter further abuse. Competing interps because A] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention, B] there’s no predictable Brightline and prevents race to the bottom of what is considered reasonable C] Reasonability collapses to competing interps the brightline and counter interp are functionally the same. No RVI’s A] they will just bait theory and only prep that killing substance debate. B] it’s a litmus test for what counts as substance they shouldn’t win for meeting it. Don’t let them gain offense off anything other than counterinterpretation that is defending the violation as is, A] creates impossible to maintain norms since every round is different in its own way, B] using planks change how the violation functions in turn not justifying an entirely exclusive norm.

## 2

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Prefer –

#### [1] Ethics must be based on intuitions, Yudkowsky 8

Yudkowsky, Eliezer. The “Intuitions” Behind “Utilitarianism” - LessWrong 2.0. 28 Jan. 2008, [https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/r5MSQ83gtbjWRBDWJ/the-intuitions-behind-utilitarianism. //](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/r5MSQ83gtbjWRBDWJ/the-intuitions-behind-utilitarianism.%20//) JPark

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless. And this appears to be a general syndrome - people do much better when discussing whether torture is good or bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level wherever I possibly can. Occasionally people object to any discussion of morality on the grounds that morality doesn't exist, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that "exist" is not the right term to use here, I generally say, "But what do you do anyway?" and take the discussion back down to the object level. Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. I see the project of morality as a project of renormalizing intuition. We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. Delete all the intuitions, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, you're left with a rock. Keep all your specific intuitions and refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, you're left with a grunting caveperson running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. Even modus ponens is an "intuition" in this sense - it's just that modus ponens still seems like a good idea after being formalized, reflected on, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, if you try to violate "utilitarianism", you run into paradoxes, contradictions, circular preferences, and other things that aren't symptoms of moral wrongness so much as moral incoherence. After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. After the two hundred and eighty-seventh research study showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, you could look at this intuition, and think it was revealing some kind of incredibly deep moral truth which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? Or you could look at that and say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't successfully multiply by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. But it ought to, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. When you've read enough heuristics and biases research, and enough coherence and uniqueness proofs for Bayesian probabilities and expected utility, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, then you don't see the preference reversals in the Allais Paradox as revealing some incredibly deep moral truth about the intrinsic value of certainty. It just goes to show that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of symbols standing for small quantities - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. When you've reflected on enough intuitions, and corrected enough absurdities, you start to see a common denominator, a meta-principle at work, which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply." Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. And that's why I'm a utilitarian - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

#### [2] Pleasure and pain are intrinsic—solves regress, Moen 16

(Ole Martin, PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy @ University of Oslo, "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267). Modified for glang

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask what her~~is~~ end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail.

#### [3] All justifications for why a framework is good rely on consequentialism being true since they are consequences of using their standard which concedes the validity of consequentialism.

#### [4] Governments can only use util because it allows for tradeoffs and aggregate. Actor specificity comes first since ought is a question of function not ethics, Anscombe 58

Modern Moral Philosophy G. E. M. Anscombe Originally published in Philosophy 33, No. 124 (January 1958).

The terms "should" or **"ought"** or "needs" **relate[s] to good and bad: e.g. machinery needs oil, or** should or **ought to be oiled, in that running without oil is bad for it, or it runs badly without oil.** According to this conception, of course, "should" and **"ought" [is]** are **not used in a special "moral" sense** when one says that a man should not bilk. (In Aristotle's sense of the term "moral" ('O0KcS), they are being used in connection with a moral subject-matter: namely that of human passions and (non-technical) actions.) But they have now [it] acquired a special so-called "moral" sense-i.e. a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty / not guilty on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call "moral"-passions and actions-but also some of the contexts that he would call "intellectual.”\

#### [5] Prioritize extinction because we can’t access future value under any framework without life. Nonideal theory is necessary—even Korsgaard concedes extinction justifies moral loopholes, Korsgaard PhD 02

Korsgaard PhD 02 [Christine, PhD in Philosophy, works at Harvard] “Internalism and the Sources of Normativity” RE

But actions are also events in the world (or correspond to events in the world, at least), and they too have consequences. There are a number of different ways in which one can deal with worries about what happens to the consequences in Kant’s ethical theory. It is worth pointing out that Kant himself not only did not ignore the consequences, but took the fact that good actions can have bad effects as the starting point for his religious philosophy. In his religious thought, Kant was concerned with the question how the moral agent has to envision the world, how he has to think of its metaphysics in order to cope with the fact that the actions morality demands may have terrible effects that we never intended, or may simply fail to have good ones. I myself see the development of what Rawls has called “nonideal theory” to be the right way of taking care of a certain class of cases, in which the consequences of doing the right thing just seem too appalling for us to simply wash our hands of. But I do not want to say that just having bad consequences is enough to put an action into the realm of nonideal theory. I think there is a range of bad consequences that a decent person has to be prepared to live with, out of respect for other people’s right to manage their own lives and actions, and to contribute to shared decisions. But I also think that there are cases where our actions go wrong in such a way that they turn out in a sense not to be the actions we intended to do, or to instantiate the values we meant them to instantiate. I think that some of these cases can be dealt with by introducing the kind of double-level structure into moral philosophy that I have described in the essay on “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil.”3 But I also think there are cases that cannot be domesticated even in this way, cases in which, to put it paradoxically, the good person will do something “wrong.” I have written about that sort of case too, in “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution.”4

#### [6] Phenomenal introspection --- it’s the most epistemically reliable --- historical moral disagreement over internal conceptions of morality such as questions of race, gender, class, religion, etc prove the fallibility of non-observational based ethics --- introspection means we value happiness because we can determine that we each value it --- just as I can observe a lemon’s yellowness, we can make those judgements about happiness.

#### Util first —

#### [A] Parsimony – metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely.

#### [B] Hijacks – intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.

#### [C] Death outweighs—agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security—my framework constrains their aff.

#### [D] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### Use epistemic modesty –

#### [A] Substantively true since it maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent.

#### [B] Clash—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense

## 3

#### Increased strikes send a signal to terrorists that critical infrastructure is vulnerable by weakening organizations, Davies 6

(Ross Davies; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty, The Green Bag; “Strike Season: Protecting Labor-Management Conflict in the Age of Terror,” SSRN; 4/12/06; <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896185>) [recut Lynbrook MD]

Strikes (and, to a lesser extent, lockouts) are painful but necessary parts of private-sector American labor-management relations. Even if they weren't - even if sound public policy called for their eradication - we couldn't stop them. They are an inevitable byproduct of the conflicting interests and limited resources of organized workers and their employers. History shows that this is true even in times of warfare overseas or crisis at home: labor-management strife lessens at the beginning of a conflict and then bounces back. Now, however, we are confronted with warfare at home, a phenomenon that the United States has not had to deal with since the Civil War - before the rise of today's unprecedentedly large, complex, and interdependent economy and government.

And history is repeating itself again. After a lull at the beginning of the war with terrorists, work stoppages have returned to their pre-war levels. The overall rate of strike activity is substantially lower than it was during previous wars (it has been slowly declining, along with overall union membership in the private sector, for decades). Today's war, however, is being fought in part on American soil, and against enemies who operate worldwide, but whose attacks tend to be small and local, seeking advantage from the unpredictability and brutality of the damage they inflict rather than from its scale. Thus, even small, localized, and occasional work stoppages - not just the large-scale strikes that arguably affected the military-industrial complex and thus the war efforts in the past - have the potential to increase risks to critical infrastructure and public safety during the war on terror. In other words, persistent strike activity at current levels poses risks of public harm, albeit risks that are difficult to anticipate with specificity in the absence of much experience or available data. This justifies taking some reasonable precautions, including the proposal made in this Article.

By its very nature, a labor strike increases the vulnerability of that employer's operations to a terrorist attack. A strike is an act specifically designed to disrupt and weaken an employer's operations, for the (usually) perfectly lawful purpose of pressing for resolution of a dispute with management. A weakened organization or other entity is, of course, less capable of resisting and surviving exogenous shocks, whether they be commercial competition or terrorist attacks. In the United States, with its fully extended and endlessly interconnected critical infrastructure that touches everything from food processing to energy distribution to water quality, a strike in the wrong place at the wrong time that disrupts and weakens some part of that infrastructure could be decisive in the success or failure of a terrorist attack of the small, local sort described above, on such a weakened link in some infrastructural chain. Of course, none of this is to suggest that any union or its members (or any employer or its managers) would knowingly expose their fellow citizens or their property to a terrorist attack. To the contrary, experience to date suggests that union members are at least as patriotic and conscientious as Americans in general. In fact, the effectiveness of the proposal made in this Article is predicated in part on the assumption that neither workers nor their employers will knowingly contribute to the incidence or effectiveness of terrorist attacks. The concern addressed here is, rather, that innocent instigators or perpetuators of a work stoppage might unwittingly facilitate a successful terrorist attack or aggravate its effects.

#### Terrorists could strike, causing mass chaos which hurts everybody, including the prisoners

## 4 CP

#### Counterplan: embrace a black aesthetic of quiet and a representation of anti-blackness as ontic not ontological which is key to breaking away from whiteness as a master signifier. That necessitates rejecting the aff because their reps inherently assume a position of blackness as resistance

bell hooks. We Real Cool. 2004 p144-7.

Soul healing for wounded black males necessitates a return to the inner self. It requires that black males not only “come home” but that they dare to make of home a place where their souls can thrive. Mystic and spiritual teacher Howard Thurman was a black male of the blues generation. In seeking ecstatic union with the divine he found a way to be whole. Offering a strategy of healing in Deep Is the Hunger, Thurman tells us to bring a healing aesthetic to where we live, to create beauty. He writes: “To bring to the place where you live only the best and most beautiful, what a plan for one’s life! This is well within the reach of everyone. Think of using one’s memory in that way. As one lives from day to day, there are all sorts of experiences, good, bad, beautiful, ugly, that become a part of one’s past. To develop the ability to screen one’s memory so that only the excellent is retained for one’s own room! All kinds of ideas pass through one’s mind, about oneself, about the world, about people. Which do you keep for your own room? Think it over now, which ideas do you keep for the place where you live?” Creating beauty through art has been one of the most powerful ways individual black males have chosen to recover themselves, to declare their essential humanity. Whether it is the beauty of a Romare Bearden collage, a John Coltrane solo, or the exquisite photos of Roy DeCarava, individual black males have traditionally found a way to let their souls speak. And by that very act of speaking, of breaking silences, they resist dehumaniza tion. John Coltranes creates “A Love Supreme” after he chooses to do the work of recovery, turning away from the addiction that threatened to extinguish the creative spirit within him. Today’s young black males seeking to find wholeness can find direction in the work and life of Coltrane, learning what not to do and what to do. Coltrane took the broken bits and pieces of his heart and put them together again. His healing required that he assume accountability for driving away the life-threatening demons that led him to self-sabotage again and again. He was not afraid to face the truth of his life. Fear of facing the truth of their lives prevents most black males from finding themselves. As long as young black males believe that fronting, wearing the mask of “cool,” is the thing to do when deep down a hot rage corrupts their spirit, black men will suffer. Every black male is diminished by the wanton destruction of black masculinity that is commonplace in our nation. Although Orlando Patterson has yet to embrace fully a critique of patriarchy he is one of the few black male scholars who has dared to speak the truth about the intense loneliness most black people, especially black males, feel in this culture. Even though popular culture has made the black male body and presence stand for the apex of “cool,” it is a death-dealing coolness, not one that is life-enhancing, for black males or the folks they associate with. Young males embrace a notion of cool that is about getting pussy and getting ready to kill (or a least to make somebody think you can kill) because as an identity this one is easier to come by than the quest to know the self and to create a life of meaning. Right now in our nation not enough adult black males chart the path to healthy selfesteem for younger black males. That path requires selfacceptance, assuming accountability, letting go the politics of blame, telling the truth, and being positive. In the wake of the militant sixties, the patriarchal black power movement ushered in a politics of cool that was all about dominator culture, asserting power in the very ways righteous black men had criticized from the moment they touched earth in the so-called new world. This notion of cool was all about exploitation, the con, the hustle, getting over, getting by. Even though it dumped on the white man, it was all about being the white man, with all the perks and goodies that come with patriarchal dominator power. No wonder then that these black males had no respect for a notion of cool that was predicated upon black males’ ability to use their prophetic imaginations to transcend the politics of domination and create beloved community. Patriarchal notions of cool have diminished the spirit of black male creativity. It has contained and in many cases crushed black male imagination. Right now there is a generational divide between black males. Older black males often understand that embracing the cowboy masculinity of patriarchy dooms black men (they’ve seen the bodies fall down and not get up). They know cowboy culture makes black men kill or be killed, but younger black men are more seduced by the politics of being a gangsta, whether a gangsta academic or a gangsta rapper or a gangsta pimp. It is a seductive invitation to embrace death as the only logic of black male existence. In Finding Freedom Jarvis Jay Masters speaks to the reality that many black men seek prison, believing it to be their true destiny, their true home. He confesses: “Secretly we like it here. This place welcomes a man who is full of rage and violence. He is not abnormal here, not different. Prison life is an extension of his inner life.” Refusing to accept a death sentence while still alive, Masters has found spiritual healing, a new life within prison walls. Importantly, he shares the path that led him to resurrection on death row: “When I first got charged with murder, it seemed unreal to me…. As other people started to do their job of finding a way to save my life, I joined the crusade. I had never cooperated before. But for the first time ever, I was determined to find out what was going on with me. I didn’t want to justify the things I had done, and I wasn’t cooperating now just to save my skin. Wanting to know the facts about myself made me take my life seriously for the first time.” Masters offers black males a crucial insight into the healing process that begins when he makes the choice to take his life seriously.

#### Also DA to their oppression standards, since constructing race as not-Whiteness affects non-Black racial identities as well. Turns their card about why blackness comes first because non-Black races are more likely to turn anti-Black due to a) framing race as anti-White means its equally viable to affirm Asianness as anti-Black and b) they erase non-Black identities—even if they as a debater don’t their reps do, meaning their more likely to be anti-Black

#### Also solves for the DAs – quiet means a) being black does not mean everything is against you—you have a life outside of racial resistance b) it’s not about black suffering anymore since we value their human qualities too and c) it builds cross-cultural connections so racial justice is less about white guilt and more about acknowledging each others’ humanity

## Case