### FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] Pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 2] Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

#### 3] Actor specificity:

#### ---A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, so side constraints freeze action.

#### ---B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions.

#### ---C] No act-omission distinction—governments are responsible for everything in the public sphere, so inaction is implicit authorization of action: they have to yes/no bills, which means everything collapse to aggregation.

#### ---D] Actor-specificity first since different agents have different ethical standings. Link turns calc indicts because the alt would be *no* action.

#### 4] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

#### 5] Use epistemic modesty – that’s multiplying the probability of a framework being true by its general contention impact –

#### ---A] It maximizes the probability of achieving net most moral value—beating a framework acts as mitigation to their impacts but the strength of that mitigation is contingent

#### ---B] EC is too high a burden—thousands of years of philosophy can’t be resolved in 40 minutes.

#### ---C] Topic education—disincentives debaters from going all in for framework which means we get the ideal balance between topic ed and phil ed—it’s important to talk about contention-level offense because we only have the topic for two months.

#### ---D] Clash — we don’t know if our frameworks are true, but we can debate the topical question. That incentivizes debating both layers instead of solely focusing on framework.

#### 6] Extinction comes first under any framework

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT, recut BWSEKL.

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

### 1AC – Global Vaccination

#### COVID in the Global South is getting worse – Only quick vaccine waiver implementation reduces global spread.

OAG 6/26 [July 26, 2021, “Report warns that Global South faces “deadliest stage of pandemic”,” Open Access Government, https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/global-south-pandemic/116091//lhs-ap]

The Institute for Government and Wellcome Trust report says that attempts to globally end the pandemic have been “weak and fragmented” – with the Global North leaving the Global South to face an increasingly devastating pandemic

Right now, richer countries in the world are reaching points of general population immunity. The UK is well beyond 60% vaccinated, with access to three leading vaccines – Moderna, Pfizer and AstraZeneca. But as the country acclimatises to the “new normal”, other countries continue to undergo waves of COVID hospitalisation and death.

Will the pandemic end if it continues in some parts of the world?

This report, authored by Tom Sasse at the Institute for Government (IfG), is supported by insight from a roundtable of scientists and healthcare experts from the Wellcome Trust. He examines the difference between Global North and Global South countries, and asks the question that haunts most policy-makers – is the pandemic going to truly end?

The answer appears to be a resolute no, unless more vaccinations are delivered to countries which are hardly 1% single-dosed.

He writes: “Many low-and middle-income countries are facing the deadliest stage of the pandemic to date. The speed at which the virus is evolving and spreading – and the ease with which new variants move across borders between highly connected countries – should tell us that, as much as they might like to, no country or group of countries will exit the Covid-19 crisis alone.”

The G7 meeting in the UK did little to resolve issues in the Global South, including vaccine accessibility. The seven countries agreed to fund $7 billion in vaccines, which are far less than what is needed by countries in the Global South.

Intellectual property limitations?

Additionally, some countries in the Global North continue to support an intellectual property law that restricts Global South countries from manufacturing a generic form of COVID vaccine themselves. This limitation remains as a key issue, as countries like Bangladesh have factories capable of producing vaccines – but will be subject to immense legal retaliation if they do so. The WTO continue to meet and debate the possibility of a waiver on this law, but it appears to be a continued stalemate as South Africa and India push for support.

According to the IfG, the G20 meeting in October, 2021 needs to be a turning point in global strategy.

Sasse further says: “The next few months will be crucial. The world needs to take urgent action to avoid repeated India-style outbreaks.”

#### Current solutions like COVAX have failed – Many populations remain dangerously unvaccinated

Osborn 8/6 [Catherine Osborn is the writer of Foreign Policy’s weekly Latin America Brief. She is a print and radio journalist based in Rio de Janeiro. August 6, 2021, “COVAX Is Not Working,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/06/latin-america-covid-pandemic-who-wto-covax-vaccine-delay-delta-variant//lhs-ap]

It’s Big Pharma’s World

Last week, Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benítez spoke with unusual candor about the problems plaguing the world’s only multilateral mechanism for equitable COVID-19 vaccine distribution, COVAX. “COVAX did not work,” he said of the initiative, operated jointly by the World Health Organization (WHO) and two nonprofits.

Last October, Paraguay made its first payment for an order of 4.3 million vaccine doses from COVAX, which was designed to get countries better prices than deals reached directly with manufacturers. But COVAX had only delivered the country 340,800 doses by the end of July. As of the most recent official data on July 25, just 4 percent of Paraguayans had been fully vaccinated.

“We bet on the COVAX mechanism to generate equity,” Abdo Benítez said. “I have to say it with pain. I cannot stay quiet.”

Globally, COVAX is running half a billion doses short of its delivery goals. Though one of its architects said COVAX aimed to “ensure that ability to pay does not become a barrier to accessing [vaccines],” the opposite appears to have occurred. Vaccine-makers have been reluctant to sell to COVAX, and wealthy countries bypassed the initiative to scoop up much of manufacturers’ available supply in direct deals. And there has been little technology transfer to expand global vaccine production, meaning that a delay at one plant can cause huge backups that ripple around the world.

Global vaccine distribution has overwhelmingly functioned according to the preferences of pharmaceutical companies and wealthy countries, rather than through an equity-based system. Though the United States, the largest vaccine donor to date, says it allocates doses based on criteria aimed at saving lives, it is doing so at a scale that is a mere one-hundredth of what the WHO says is necessary to get the pandemic under control globally.

Now, as the delta variant takes hold, several Latin American policymakers are scrambling to redefine their vaccine strategies and boost local production.

Seeking new supply. With its COVAX shots delayed, Paraguay has secured new contracts with Pfizer and Moderna. The Dominican Republic, which also complained about COVAX delays, increased its orders from China’s Sinovac.

These moves have come with their own challenges. An official from Paraguay, which diplomatically recognizes Taiwan, said a subsidiary of Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm canceled a vaccine contract for “geopolitical reasons,” while Pfizer reportedly pressured Latin American governments to sign over unprecedented sovereign assets as guarantees against the cost of potential lawsuits.

Countries have also slowly worked to build local production capacity. A plant in Argentina had its first full course of locally produced Sputnik V doses approved for quality this week. Cuba is exporting its homemade vaccine Abdala to Venezuela and may soon send it to Bolivia, while Brazil’s Butanvac and Mexico’s Patria shots are in clinical trials. On Wednesday, Chile announced plans to build a plant that will fill and finish doses of Sinovac’s vaccine.

At the request of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the United Nations’ Alicia Bárcena presented the group with a road map to strengthening regional vaccine access at its annual meeting last week. It includes collaborating on intellectual property (IP) access and bringing more production capacity online.

Weighing compulsory licensing. While negotiations on a special IP waiver for COVID-19 health technologies are stalled at the World Trade Organization (WTO), an existing WTO agreement already permits countries to sidestep pharmaceutical patents and other IP rights in certain emergencies. Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador have passed resolutions facilitating this process in the face of COVID-19.

In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro’s executive branch has opposed an IP waiver. But the country’s legislature is in the final stages of approving a bill that would allow Congress to issue compulsory licenses according to WTO agreements, permitting local firms to produce and export COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics without the patent holders’ consent. Brazil used the threat of such licenses in the early 2000s to pressure pharmaceutical companies to lower HIV drug costs.

The Brazilian bill is backed by groups ranging from AIDS activists and Black activists to center-right senators—a sign of the broad support that remains in the country for this kind of measure.

The cost of current trends. Health experts have warned that, the slower the rate of vaccination around the globe, the more likely it is that new—and potentially more lethal—variants of the coronavirus will develop. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that a roughly $50 billion push to vaccinate 40 percent of all countries’ populations by the end of 2021 and 60 percent by mid-2022 will bring $9 trillion in global GDP gains.

Continuing vaccinations at their current scale has consequences for political stability and migration, too. For example, more Nicaraguans were encountered at the U.S. southern border in the last three months than in any 12-month period in the last 20 years. Political repression in Nicaragua plays a role in this, but so too does the fact that Costa Rica’s tourism-focused economy, where Nicaraguan migrants usually seek work, remains hard-hit by COVID-19.

#### The key internal link is manufacturing capacity not vaccines – Only future production resolves increased travel and new variants

Gostin 6/10 [Lawrence O. Gostin, JD, Georgetown University Law Center; June 10, 2021; “9 Steps to End COVID-19 and Prevent the Next Pandemic: Essential Outcomes From the World Health Assembly,” JAMA Health Forum. 2021;2(6):e211852. doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2021.1852//lhs-ap]

Chronic vaccine shortages have resulted in skewed distribution, which if not remedied, will prolong the pandemic. As SARS-CoV-2 widely circulates in low- and middle-income countries, more variants of concern will emerge—some will be more transmissible or pathogenic, while others could evade current vaccine technologies. With international travel rebounding, variants may reseed epidemics in higher-income countries. Consequently, the world needs more capacity to produce vaccines. Vaccine-producing countries and manufacturers should provide voluntary licenses and the WTO should waive intellectual property protections. Manufacturers holding multiple patents impede vaccine discovery and production in low- and middle-income countries.

#### The vaccine shortage will worsen global political instability –

#### 1 – Increases the number and severity of violent protests

Labott 7/22 [Elise Labott, a columnist at Foreign Policy and an adjunct professor at American University’s School of International Service. July 22, 2021, “Get Ready for a Spike in Global Unrest,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/22/covid-global-unrest-political-upheaval//lhs-ap]

To call 2021 the summer of discontent would be a severe understatement. From Cuba to South Africa to Colombia to Haiti, often violent protests are sweeping every corner of the globe as angry citizens are taking to the streets.

Each country has different histories and realities on the ground, particularly in Haiti, where years of violence and government corruption culminated two weeks ago in the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. But they all faced a perfect storm of preexisting social, economic, and political hardships, which fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic only inflamed further. And they are merely a foreshadowing of the post-coronavirus global tinderbox that’s looming as existing tensions in countries across the world morph into broader civil unrest and uprisings against economic hardships and inequality deepened by the pandemic.

The coronavirus pandemic was a once-in-a-century crisis that not only shocked countries’ existing health systems but also demanded a response that impacted—and was itself shaped by—economic, political, and security considerations. The efforts to contain it may have curbed fatalities in the short term but have inadvertently deepened vulnerabilities that laid the groundwork for longer-term violence, conflict, and political upheaval and should serve as a danger sign to world leaders as countries reopen—including in the United States.

History is full of examples of pandemics being incubators of social unrest, from the Black Death to the Spanish flu to the great cholera outbreak in Paris, immortalized in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables. Underlying it all this time around is a pervasive inequality. COVID-19 has ripped open economic divides and made life harder for already vulnerable groups, including women and girls and minority communities.

It has also exposed weaknesses in food security and dramatically increased the number of people affected by chronic hunger. The United Nations estimates around one-tenth of the global population—between 720 million people and 811 million—were undernourished last year. The impacts of climate change and environmental degradation have only compounded the despair.

Take the Sahel, where, due to a toxic cocktail of conflict, COVID-19 lockdowns, and climate change, the scale and severity of food insecurity continues to rise. Countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan are among the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with catastrophic levels of hunger. Droughts and locusts are coming at a critical time for farmers ready to plant crops and are stopping herders in their tracks from driving their livestock to greener pastures.

The global vaccine shortage is fueling the instability. A majority of Africa is lagging far behind the world in vaccinations, meaning COVID-19 will continue to constrain national economies and, in turn, become a source of potential political instability. The same is true for much of Latin America and Asia, where countries don’t have enough vaccines to protect their populations and simmering sources of protest—such as rising living costs and deepening inequalities—are more likely to boil over.

The global risk firm Verisk Maplecroft has warned that as many as 37 countries could face large protest movements for up to three years. A new study by Mercy Corps examining the intersection of COVID-19 and conflict found concerning trends that warn of potential for new conflict, deepening existing conflict, and worsening insecurity and instability shaped by the pandemic response.

The group found a collapse of public confidence in governments and institutions was a key driver of instability. People in fragile states, already suffering from diminished trust in their government, have felt further abandoned as they face disruptions in public services, rising food prices, and massive economic hardships, such as unemployment and reduced wages. Supply chains disrupted during the pandemic have seen food prices skyrocket, while in the global recession humanitarian aid budgets are being slashed, bringing many countries to the brink of famine. For the first time in 22 years, extreme poverty—people living on less than $1.90 a day—was on the rise last year. Oxfam International estimates that “it could take more than a decade for the world’s poorest to recover from the economic impacts of the pandemic.”

#### Pandemic instability goes nuclear – Extinction

RECNA et al. 21 [Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) & Nautilus Institute (2021) Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 4:sup1, 6-39, DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867//lhs-ap]

The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come.

The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5

Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order.

In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply.

The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the existential risks posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition.

A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies.

In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.

To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines by implementing a COVID-19 medicine waiver.

### 1AC – Solvency

#### Waiver drives information sharing and accelerates vaccine innovation and production within months

Kavanagh et al. 7/1 [Matthew M. Kavanagh, PhD1,2; Lawrence O. Gostin, JD1; Madhavi Sunder, JD1; 1Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC; 2Department of International Health, Georgetown University, Washington, DC; July 1, 2021, “Sharing Technology and Vaccine Doses to Address Global Vaccine Inequity and End the COVID-19 Pandemic,” JAMA. 2021;326(3):219-220. doi:10.1001/jama.2021.10823//lhs-ap]

Waiving Intellectual Property

One important step is an intellectual property (IP) waiver. The Biden administration recently reversed US policy and was joined by France in endorsing a proposal by India and South Africa to temporarily waive countries’ World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations to enforce IP on COVID-19 technologies. The proposal still faces negotiations over its scope and opposition by certain high-income countries.

A WTO waiver would not remove US patents on vaccines. It would simply give governments the option to allow local manufacturers to produce, import, and export SARS-CoV-2 vaccines. Investments in production facilities could occur without concern about lawsuits or prosecution for IP infringement. Although countries have rights to issue compulsory licenses under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Article 31) agreement, the rules are legally complex. Messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccine technologies are covered by more than 100 patents, with many different patent holders.5 Procedures on importation of medical technologies for countries without manufacturing capacity are so cumbersome they have been used only once, by Canada and Rwanda, in a process that took years. A blanket waiver would eliminate complex regulations to facilitate vaccine manufacture.

There are some concerns that a waiver could threaten innovation. Yet COVID-19 vaccines were developed with significant public funding, also yielding high profits. Monopoly protection in every country is unnecessary for innovation. Patents have not incentivized companies to provide vaccines to LMICs. Intellectual property waivers could actually spur new discoveries and better vaccines, such as single-dose vaccines. Giving countries the freedom to produce vaccines could address both market and ethical failures.

With the pandemic escalating in LMICs, a broad, simple IP waiver that covers all IP, including patents and trade secrets, and extends to all COVID-19 technologies is urgent. Negotiators must avoid delay. Waiver negotiations among WTO members in 2003 took 9 months and governments have so far been slow in negotiating the current IP waiver proposal. Movement toward a waiver also might support voluntary action. Following President Biden’s announcement supporting an IP waiver, Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech both pledged additional doses to LMICs, a welcome sign that waiver negotiations might incentivize sharing.

Sharing Technology and Expanding Manufacturing Capacity

On June 21, South Africa, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Africa Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced an important new hub for producing mRNA vaccines for the African continent and asked the US and Europe to share the technology to make these vaccines. Waiving IP removes legal barriers, but sharing knowledge on how to make vaccines, including ingredients, methods, sourcing, and technologies, is a justice-oriented move that would help LMIC manufacturers move quickly. When Moderna needed added manufacturing capacity, it contracted Swiss company Lonza and transferred technology confidentially. Production started within a few months, showing that arguments suggesting local manufacturing will take too long are unfounded. But exclusive contract manufacturing agreements limit access. Sharing technology more openly could enable manufacturers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to make vaccines for themselves. WHO created a platform for such technology transfer; however, US-based companies have thus far not shared vital information.

The Biden administration has leverage to incentivize sharing, given extensive public funding. mRNA vaccines are a prime target for sharing because manufacturing advantages make them rapidly scalable.6 The Moderna mRNA vaccine was developed jointly with the National Institutes of Health, which also holds key patents. Operation Warp Speed allocated Moderna $2.5 billion, covering development and clinical trials. Public funding should come with ethical obligations to share knowledge for the global public good. If necessary, the Biden administration could use the Defense Production Act and government-owned patents to compel technology sharing or could pay companies to share technology.

If technology is shared, Senegal’s Pasteur Institute has plans to make hundreds of millions of viral vector doses. Companies in South Africa, Vietnam, Brazil, India, and other countries could make mRNA vaccines with appropriate support for specialized processes involved. A Thai government-run manufacturer, which could be a model, is already working on mRNA vaccine production. A Chinese company will produce BioNTech’s vaccine, although only for Chinese markets. Far more is achievable.

Quality control is critical, but arguments that LMIC producers cannot produce quality vaccines are misplaced. Many are global companies and government-run facilities with excellent records and strong oversight. WHO’s prequalification/emergency use process can help ensure quality.

Sharing technologies openly could also allow scientists worldwide to collaborate on innovations; for example, on mRNA vaccine formulations stored at room temperature for lower-resource settings.

#### No alt causes – Waiver includes broader information sharing, not just patent enforcement

Labonté 5/21 [Ronald Labonté, School of Epidemiology and Public Health, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada; Mira Johri, École de santé publique, Université de Montréal, Montréal, QC, Canada; Katrina Plamondon, School of Nursing, Faculty of Health & Social Development, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada; Srinivas Murthy, Faculty of Medicine, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada; 21 May 2021; Canada, global vaccine supply, and the TRIPS waiver. Can J Public Health 112, 543–547 (2021). https://doi.org/10.17269/s41997-021-00541-4//lhs-ap]

Will the TRIPS waiver increase vaccine supply?

Yes, if patent-holding companies are willing to share the technology and know-how associated with their vaccines. Early in the pandemic, the WHO’s COVID-19 Technology Access Pool was created to promote this, but no patent-holding manufacturers have joined, and its open-access intention was ridiculed for undermining their business model. There is now a proposal to create a ‘technology transfer hub’, with WHO calling specifically for an mRNA technology transfer hub since these vaccines show the most efficacy, the greatest likelihood of adaptation to variants, and a relative ease in scaling up production capacities. To be successful, “owners…of technology and/or intellectual property rights” of these vaccines must be “willing to contribute” their “know-how and technology” (WHO 2021b).

The proposed TRIPS waiver becomes leverage to incentivize such sharing. Without it, there would be little compulsion for current vaccine patent-holders to voluntarily share, given their reluctance to do so since the race for COVID-19 vaccine discovery began. It would allow governments that presently oppose the waiver to recognize its role less as a temporary denial of intellectual property rights than acknowledgement that the ‘warp speed’ development of COVID-19 vaccines was almost entirely funded or underwritten by public funds. It will also require governments that are home countries to vaccine patentee companies to persuade them to share, which could include some modest royalties but not the multi-billion-dollar profits some of them anticipate.

#### Err aff on probability – Academic consensus supports a waiver, and government funding solves innovation

McDermott 7/14 [Eileen McDermott is the Editor-in-Chief of IPWatchdog.com. Eileen is a veteran IP and legal journalist, and no stranger to the intellectual property world, having held editorial and managerial positions at several publications and industry organizations. She has acted as editorial consultant for the International Trademark Association (INTA), chiefly overseeing the editorial process for the Association’s twice-monthly newsletter, the INTA Bulletin. Eileen has also served as a freelance editor for the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); as senior consulting editor for the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO) from 2015 to 2017; as Managing Editor and Editor-in-Chief at INTA from 2013 to 2016; and was Americas Editor for Managing Intellectual Property magazine from 2007 to 2013. July 14, 2021, “International Academics Push for TRIPS COVID IP Waiver Hold-Outs to Drop Opposition,” IP Watchdog, https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/07/14/international-academics-push-trips-covid-ip-waiver-hold-outs-drop-opposition/id=135455//lhs-ap]

One-hundred-twenty-four professors and academics from around the world have penned an open letter supporting India and South Africa’s proposed

## 2ar:

1. Extend Util

#### 1] Pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable

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3] Use epistemic modesty

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