### **2NC- Space Link**

#### **Their understanding of outerspace presupposes a dualist metaphysics between spirit and matter. Outer space is understood as an external object that humans can control. The human is viewed as the entity that can understand and control outerspace.**

LW

That you can still approprate space-

GEO stateillites

REM mining on earth

Stopping kessler effect

### **2NC Bio Centrism Link Ext.**

**The affirmative’s theorization of death is pre-determined by the dogma of western bio centrism i.e. the idea that death merely constitutes the physical degradation of the body. Death never destroys the subject because life itself is in a constant state of becoming that manifests as the natural world consisting of land, life, kinship, intimacy, and personhood continues to alter its form while retaining its essential components. At no point are the body and spirit ever separate from the natural world. The emotional, spiritual, and physical are all intimately entangled with one another - once death occurs the body returns to Mother Earth as the spirit transcends to the collective realm among the stars and trans lucent ancestors that coexist in harmony.**

**Prioritizing bio physical death disavows the entanglement of the spirit, body, and land, which is essential to Indigenous notions of being and becoming. All tenants of Indigenous life that cannot be incorporated into the material become unneeded and extinguishable. The perpetual interconnectedness of the spiritual and physical becomes synonymous with arcane and primitive forms of life that need to disappear so that humanity can secure its biophysical survival.**

**Even if extinction obliterates all traces of physical life – death releases the spirit and allows the consciousness to ascend to a new state of becoming that exceeds any notions of physicality or anatomical structure.**

**You should ignore their calls to disavow our impact because it is not falsifiable or physically tangible – this is contemporaneous with the same colonial principle of falsifiability that is continuously used to disavow Indigenous concepts of the spiritual and land.**

### **2NC Hetero Colonial IR Link Ext.**

**The affirmative recapitulates the same U.S. centric colonial and imperial logics that permeate all aspects of International Relations as a discipline. Extend Runyan - Colonized states, persons, and territory constitute a series of external threats to a gendered order from which the United States as a hetero paternal observer can act as a hetero patriarchal corrective. Duality is presumptive in their depictions of conflict between \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ who are distinct actors from the USFG within an external world that we can falsify and predict. The corrective to potential conflicts in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ is made by adjusting U.S. arms sales to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ because we presume that United States as a colonial state is distinct from an exterior colonized world composed of servile states and territories.**

**Turns the Case - \_\_\_\_\_ war is inevitable as long as the Hetero Patriarchal divide between the U.S. as a colonial state and \_\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_\_ as colonized outsiders permeates our view of international relations. Our dualistic mindset will legitimize ground invasions and first strikes because \_\_\_\_\_\_ still constitutes an external, irrational, and feminine threat that threatens the internal stability of the United States as a colonial and imperial power. Empirically, concepts of the colonized as threatening exteriority is what set in motion the tensions in the Southern China Sea and Korean Peninsula**

**Solvency Drops to Zero Risk - They only see what they already wanted to believe. Presume that their conceptions and depictions of foreign political economies and international relations merely exist to confirm an already prefigured understanding of an external world that is prone to conflict because of its composition of feminine and colonized alterity.**

**Naturalizes Gendered and Sexualized Violence – The divide between the United States as a colonial state and outside world of colonized states and territories reduces Indigenous and colonized women to mere objects who occupy an external world outside of the United States. Indigenous bodies subsequently become commodities that exist to sustain the reproduction and fertility**

### **2NC Impact Ext.**

**(?) Subject/world dualism reduces land to an unlimited resource that sustains production extracted from a usable commodity. Reducing relations to land to that of a dialectical subject and object naturalizes the anthropocentric deadening of being whereby all tenants of Indigenous economies and spirituality that centralize land as subject and enshrine the natural world as sacred become degraded components of arcane life.**

**The impact is the elimination of Indigenous Ontological Alterity - Indigenous alterity constitutes the network of intimate relationality that coincides with being in the natural world as an entangled entity. All aspects of the natural world permeate indigenous life and generates meaning that cannot be quantified with western register of bio centrism. Disavowal of Indigenous alterity eradicates all components of the inter relational, inter- generational, and spiritual – hence deadening being for indigenous people.**

**We are all preconditioned to devalue Indigenous alterity as intangible under the norms of western bio physicality. You should therefore flip your decision calculus and presume that the intimate violence of deadening being and generating Indigenous life is of an infinitely negative and positive value respectively.**

**Any justification they give for prioritizing material impacts is tautological – i.e. “materialism is good because it can be falsified materially.” If they cannot provide a defense of materialism that doesn’t already presuppose materialism is true and good you should err negative on presumption**

### **2NC AT Biological Death Real**

#### **Bio logical death isn’t true – Our Shultz, Clutz, and Anderson evidence all validate a theorization of the consciousness whereby the mind, body, and natural world are all intertwined with one another rather than separate anatomical parts. When we die our consciousness doesn’t degrade or disappear, it transcends to a state of becoming as the spirit joins a collective network of immanence while the corporeal body returns to the earth. Though spirit and body transcend to different states of existing in flux, they remain entangled and never separate.**

#### **Consciousness occupies a terrain that cannot be falsified by the most scientific renditions of materialism. Neurophysiology can’t even falsify that physicality is true.**

**Evans 05** (Charles Stephen Evans, University Professor of Philosophy and Humanities at Baylor University.[1] Evans was born on May 26, 1948, in Atlanta, Georgia. He holds a BA with high honors (philosophy) from Wheaton College, an MPhil (philosophy) from Yale University, and a PhD (philosophy) from Yale University. “Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life after Death” Page 1-2 <http://www.newdualism.org/papers/C.Evans/Evans-Separable%20Souls%20-%20Dualism%20Selfhood%20and%20the%20Possibility%20of%20Life%20after%20Death.pdf>, RLA)

What should Christians think about the constitution of the self? When the Heidelberg Catechism says "my only comfort in life and death is that I belong, body and soul, to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ," is this language to be taken as sober metaphysics or is it merely a poetic flourish? Recently a number of Christian philosophers, theologians, and scientists have argued that the traditional Christian view of the self, a dualistic account that sees human persons as having an immaterial soul as well as a physical body, should be rejected in favor of a monistic, physicalist view. There are various motivations for this move, some grounded in theology, others in philosophy, and others in science. A common argument of the theological type is that the monistic view of the self is the biblical one; dualism represents the deleterious influence of Greek philosophy on the Christian tradition. A common philosophical criticism is that a dualism of mind and body cannot account for interaction between the two entities. The third type of argument typically claims that dualism, while logically possible, is increasingly implausible in light of recent scientific findings, particularly with respect to neurophysiological research. In this paper I want to focus mainly on the third or scientific type of alleged difficulty for dualism, though I will very briefly indicate some reasons why I am less concerned about the first two types of arguments. In my view the claim that Scripture teaches a monistic materialism is mistaken; I believe that John Cooper has shown this in his book Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate.1 Cooper sees three possible biblical views of life after death: (1) A gap theory: future resurrection with a period of non-existence between death and the resurrection. (2) Immediate resurrection upon death. (3) The traditional view: there is a future resurrection with continued existence ("the intermediate period") between death and that resurrection. There are some scriptural passages consistent with the "gap" theory and some others that are consistent with the immediate resurrection theory. However, each is contradicted by the passages consistent with the other view, and no passages plainly teach either of those views.2 The traditional view that the resurrection is a future event, but that the deceased believer enjoys communion with Christ between death and that resurrection, is the only view that is consistent with all of the scriptural evidence and that seems to be plainly taught in some passages. This third view plainly presupposes a dualistic ontology, since the person must be distinct from his or her body to exist between the biological death of that body and the resurrection. (It is also at least arguable that without a dualistic ontology, the resurrection is not possible. There are difficulties in seeing how the new resurrected body can be identical to the body that died; I believe that it is the soul that continuously exists that makes the resurrected body to be the body of the person that died.) Many of the alleged philosophical difficulties are problems that have been repeatedly answered. In any case, the most commonly cited problem, which is that a non-material reality cannot interact causally with a physical entity, is one that a Christian should not take seriously, since if such a principle held, God could neither create a physical world nor act within it. It is in any case odd, I think, for Christians to advocate a form of materialism on philosophical grounds, since a careful look at recent work on the mind-body problem clearly shows that materialism is in what could be called a state of crisis.3 **Although most philosophers today are materialists, many will acknowledge that materialism currently has no solution to two major problems with respect to the nature of mind.** First, **contemporary materialists do not know how to explain consciousness. The problem is so severe that one group of materialists, the so-called "new mysterians," has more or less given up, conceding that consciousness simply is a mystery that materialism will never explain**.4 The second difficult problem for materialists is explaining the nature of intentionality or "aboutness." **Many mental states of acts have meaning, and it is not clear how a physical entity or state can be meaningful without a mind to provide that meaning.** Given these difficulties, why are most philosophers materialists about human persons? The only answer that makes sense to me is that they are materialists about everything. **Philosophers who are metaphysical naturalists and who are committed to materialism believe that there must somehow be a true materialist account of the human self, even if they have no idea what that account may be.** Christians, however, surely should not share this assumption. In any case I believe it is the third type of problem that is most influential in pressing against dualism today. For example, Nancey Murphy, while admitting that scientific evidence does not prove that dualism is false, claims that "recent scientific advances do indeed provide scientific evidence for [physicalism]".5 After discussing some recent work in neurophysiology, Murphy claims that non-reductive physicalism is "not merely a philosophical thesis, but also the hard core of a scientific research program." She concludes that there is "ample scientific evidence" for the physicalism she espouses.6 Even William Hasker, who in the end espouses a type of dualism and rejects physicalism, sees contemporary scientific evidence as presenting problems for traditional dualistic views. He argues that there are two problems with traditional Cartesian dualism: "**The first is that it cannot plausibly account for the extensive and intimate dependence of mind on brain that we find to exist."7 While dualism is compatible with mind-body interaction, it does not seem to Hasker to fit comfortably with the detailed scientific findings about the way that the mind is dependent on the brain for its activity.** The second problem Hasker sees is that dualism cannot plausibly be incorporated into an evolutionary account of human origins. Of course some scientific creationists might say "so much the better for dualism" at this point, but Hasker wants a view of mind and body that is consistent with evolutionary theory. In what follows I shall argue for two claims: (1) **Recent advances in neurophysiology give us no evidence in favor of physicalism; the plausibility of at least some forms of dualism, rightly conceived, has not been diminished at all.** Scientific findings have given us reason to reject particular versions of dualism but not to reject all versions. There are some dualistic views that are plainly incompatible with scientific findings, but these findings have not affected the plausibility of other forms of dualism at all. (2) Recent forms of socalled non-reductive materialism or physicalism advocated by Christians may, when closely examined (depending on how some crucial interpretive questions are answered), turn out not to be materialistic views at all, but rather forms of dualism. Such views are at least close enough to dualism that a dualist may incorporate some of their features into a dualistic account. Both of my theses turn crucially on what is to count as "dualism," as well as what is to count as "materialism." Before turning to those issues, I need to make one important terminological note. In this paper I shall use the terms "mind" "soul," "person," and "self" more or less synonymously, to refer to whatever a person refers to when that person uses the term "I" to refer to himself or herself as a conscious agent. Of course this terminological practice does not determine whether or not that entity that is referred to in this way is a material thing, a non-material thing, or some combination of the two.

**Murray 15** (Kath Murray, Life and Death Matters, Reflecting on Death: First Nations People 4/16/15 <https://www.lifeanddeathmatters.ca/reflecting-on-death-first-nations-people/>, RLA)

The Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation is located on the eastern shore of the Saugeen (Bruce) Peninsula on Georgian Bay. We have over 2,000 band members, and about 700 live on reserve. These numbers represent our family, and we are all connected through systems of caregiving. These structures extend beyond the nuclear family and include our clan relations, adoptions and extended relatives. Part of having a large family means grief continually affects the entire community as people’s lives as members finish their journey in this life. When tragedy such as death occurs, it is generally expected that people set aside their differences (whether political, cultural or religious) and gather together in support. Few communities are entirely homogenous in belief and custom. Ours is no exception. Some that pass away are traditional Anishinaabe, others Christian, and most are syncretic, practicing a fusion of beliefs. Within this diversity, no two funerals are the same. There are, however, general traditions that help ensure that the deceased is not alone in their final walk home, and that the remaining family is supported as they grieve. If someone is ill, many of the older people know how to listen to their breath and they can tell when the person only has a few days left on the earth. There are signs in nature as well, which indicate when someone is close to dying. When my great-grandpa passed away, his friend (now in his late 90s) saw four ducks circling in a pond. Then he looked up and, as if in reflection of the ducks, four birds circled overhead. He felt this was not a coincidence but was a message with important symbolism of the circle, the number four, and the birds. He immediately went home and his wife informed him that my great-grandpa had died. So we see it is not just people involved in care giving, but we can trust nature is also there to provide comfort and closure in important ways. This is not just a human endeavour but extends to the other realms as well. Days before the actual funeral, people gather and talk about the deceased. This is a time to honour the individual’s life, shed tears with relatives, and laugh! There is always humour as people get together and discuss memories. The older people speak Anishinaabemowin (our language), and we sing. The songs may include drumming, hymns in Anishinaabemowin or in English, or a special song that reminds people of the deceased. Sometimes the funeral is held at the community centre, other times at either the Catholic or United church on reserve. Both of these buildings are over three generations old. Sometimes a three-day wake is held at the home of the deceased. This protocol varies depending on the family and their needs. A sacred fire is held after the person’s death, and only stops until they have been successfully sent on their journey back to the Creator and they have been buried. The fire will often be burning for three days and young people continually keep watch. This isn’t seen as a punishment to keep the fire, but it is sacred. You enter a different dimension of time as you are engaged in that important work. You see and feel things that may not be apparent to others. People offer tobacco to the sacred fire and say a prayer when they arrive on the day of the funeral. Most consider themselves to be both a mourner and comforter as they rely on one another during these difficult times. As people arrive at the community centre or church, they are often walking hand in hand, giving hugs, and sharing words of comfort. Even the reserve dogs sit around the building. They seem to keep watch and act as a welcoming committee of sorts. During the service people sing again, share more memories, and take one last look at the body of the deceased. They may put sweetgrass, cedar, sage or tobacco in the coffin, or pray or cry as they say goodbye. This can take over two hours depending on the number in attendance. After the service, people follow the funeral hearse around the reserve, until it ends up at the graveyard. There will be drumming and a short prayer. As the person is buried tobacco, flowers, or other offerings gifts may be placed into the ground where the person is being buried as a sign of respect. Following the burial there is a community feast. A plate of food is prepared for the departed soul, and placed in the sacred fire while an elder says the prayer. People travel long distances to attend, and I usually overhear people say that we need to gather together more often, not just when someone passes on. To me this shows how positive the funerals are and even though there is great sadness, people feel good. They want to gather together more and remember how blessed we are to have life and to eventually be able to pass on in a good way.

### **2NC AT Materiality First**

#### **Prioritizing materiality confines indigenous being to the western domain of physicality where being indigenous is always understood as being the irrational savage at an anatomical level – this legitimizes Indigenous erasure.**

**Hokowhitu 09** (Brendan Hokowhitu, The University of Waikato Te Pua Wānanga ki te Ao, The Faculty of Māori & Indigenous StudiesHamilton, New Zealand Position Dean and Professor, The University of Waikato, Indigenous Existentialism and the Body Page 108 – 111, January 2009, RLA)

Exhuming ghosts: A genealogy of the Indigenous body Indigenous studies, as with feminist cultural studies, is best to position itself outside the Western, white masculine intellectual tradition of mind/body dualism: ‘an approach which refuses to privilege mind over body … and which assumes that the body cannot be transcended, is one which … emphasises contingency, locatedness, the irreducibility of difference, the passage of emotions and desire, and the worldliness of being’.13 Such a positioning is double-edged, however, as **the colonial project ‘limited the identity of the colonised to the materiality of their bodies’14 and thus the analysis must be at once deconstructory and existential.** Meaning, it is dangerous ground not to firstly problematise Indigenous theorisation stemming from the body, prior to foregrounding the body as a realm of study from where Indigenous existentialism can develop. Hence, this sub-section entitled ‘exhuming ghosts’. In part, white colonial patriarchy effected colonisation because it claimed to embody the power of reason and, consequently, universal interests. Key to enlightenment rationalism and its reliance on reason to know and to authenticate the objective world was its faith in the mind/body dichotomy orated by Plato and canonised by Descartes. In his 1871 book, The Descent of Man, 15 Charles Darwin emphasises the key differences in intellectual development (that is to say language, observation, curiosity, memory, imagination and reason) between primitive and civilised peoples.16 Darwin and other evolution theorists played an indirect but nonetheless highly significant role in the tainting of European accounts of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous cultures as unenlightened were, from an occipital logic, inherently more ‘physical’, ruled by their passions, and less intelligent than their civilised brethren**. The apparent lack of division between the indigene’s mind, body, spirit and the external world only served to augment the belief of European colonisers that they were indeed encountering savage races. Moreover, Enlightenment philosophers avoided questions of inconsistency in equality and autonomy arising from colonial subjugation by locating the Indigenous being in the realm of the physical and irrational, a site that denied full humanity itself.**17 **If savagery is understood from the perspective of Enlightenment rationalism, then it is apparent that it portends a state of unenlightenment, where reason is ruled by physical impulses and/or superstition.** What Foucault refers to as the invisible ‘breath’ that inhabits discontinuous discourses, even as they mutate,18 I conceive of as ‘physicality’ with reference to the colonised Indigenous savage. **As a sub-theme of the primitive/modern dialectic, physicality describes a complex of interconnecting discourses that enables unitary discursive knowledge to develop around the colonised Indigenous subject.** The thematic of Indigenous 108 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 physicality in the colonial state was ‘capable of linking, and animating a group of discourses, like an organism with its own needs, its own internal force and its own capacity for survival’.19 Darwin’s evolutionary theory, for instance, ‘directed research from afar’ acting as ‘a preposition rather than named, regrouped, and explained … a theme that always presupposed more than one was aware of … forcibly transformed into discursive knowledge’.20 Such discursive knowledge underpinned Indigenous ‘savagery’ and was transcribed into physical terms, onto the Indigenous body and about Indigenous bodily practices. For this essay, it is important to establish that the collision of supposedly embodied Indigenous epistemologies with disembodied Enlightenment rationalism left an inauthentic void that the Europeans, at least, desired to chart through authenticating disciplines such as anthropology and archaeology**. Enlightenment reason, as the determinant of truth and falsehood, was applied to the untranslatable—the epistemologies of other cultures.** The process involved, firstly, authenticating Indigenous knowledge by translating the untranslatable. That is, by encompassing and reconfiguring the incomprehensible into comprehensible forms. The authentication element in this equation is crucial because from the premise of the Enlightenment reason, knowledge was only authentic if it was known to the mind. That is, the embodied cultural concepts from ‘other’ epistemologies were only authentic if they were comprehensible to Western cognition**. The first principle of colonising the Indigenous body, then, was to bring the philosophical underpinnings of the savage under the logic of the coloniser, to authenticate the inauthentic.**21 In the universe of disembodied Enlightenment rationalism, it was assumed that reason (that is, European reason) could differentiate between truth and falsehood and, thus, the physical world was inherently translatable. The embodied practices of Indigenous epistemologies challenged that knowable world and, as a result, the reason of Enlightenment rationalism. The embodied holistic epistemologies of Indigenous societies determined the non-compartmentalisation of the ‘physical’. As opposed to the rational European subject, Indigenous subjectivity was not divorced from the body, nor the rationale from the passions, and so forth.22 **It is also important to recognise Indigenous subjectivities and their consequent bodily practices were often communally defined. Here the distinction can be made with the Western individual subject (who has prevailed in Western thought since the Enlightenment), whose person is comprised of a central and unique core, which determines their distinct identity.** The dissimilarity is important because, as opposed to a singular self, it indicates an Indigenous existentialism that incorporates multiple identities across time, including genealogical and spiritual associations, and communally defined bodily practices. The importance of the visible appearance of indigeneity and its genealogical tithing to moral deficiencies cannot be underestimated to the conception of the Indigenous body today. The Western conception of what it means to be Indigenous is in great part a visual BRENDAN HOKOWHITU—INDIGENOUS EXISTENTIALISM 109 phenomenon, ‘with all the political and ideological force that the seemingly naturalness of the body as the locus of difference can claim … [a] cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not only how but what to see’.23 Allegorically, it is crucial to make the connection of the rationality of the European with the body of the colonised Other, underscored by: the eighteenth century resurrection of classical values of beauty and their similitude with the criteria of value in the classical economic tradition. Equilibrium and utility functioned in classical economic theory in ways analogous to proportion, symmetry, and refinement for classical aesthetics. Both sets of criteria determined an order of balance and harmony established on the basis of the geometric model ... By the late eighteenth century, beauty was established in terms of racial properties: fair skin, straight hair, organthous jaw, skull shape and size, well composed bodily proportions, and so on. To fail to possess these traits was considered a fault inheritance … Aesthetic value solidified into natural law, which in the eighteenth century was considered as compelling as the laws of nature, economics and morality precisely because they were all deemed to derive from the same rational basis.24 **The corporeal ‘reality’ of the asymmetrical Indigenous body undoubtedly naturalised colonial endeavour and Indigenous subjugation, allowing colonialist claims to moral superiority dependent upon what Robyn Wiegman refers to as ‘bodily fictions’ that ‘unproblematically reflect the natural meaning of flesh**’.25 Here, Bourdieu is useful as he conceives of the body metaphorically: ‘the bearer of symbolic meaning and values and a key site through which social differences are created, perpetuated and reinforced’.26 Bourdieu is also useful in thinking of the Indigenous body in terms of ‘physical capital’,27 especially in relation to mind/body duality in that symbolic meaning inscribed onto the Indigenous body determined inferior mental capacity and thus only contained capital in the inverse sense. The Indigenous body symbolised the physical realm and, thus, was employed for its physical labour, observed for its performativity, and humanised through the physical pursuits of sport.28 For many of the Indigenous parents of my generation, Bourdieu’s analysis becomes important because of its concern with the body in relation to the working class who, through bodily cognition as a necessary effect of a physically intensive life, developed different relations to their bodies than the white middle or dominant classes.29 Moreover, for Indigenous communities, sub-cultures developed throughout much of the twentieth century based on a relationship with a physically labouring body that, in turn, has come to symbolise traditional Indigenous cultures. For instance, the relationship between physical labour and sport with the Mäori male body has determined a traditional Mäori masculinity symbolically reified within the physical realm.30 As a consequence, many Indigenous communities remain predominantly working class. However, if we are to perceive of present day culture 110 VOLUME15 NUMBER2 SEP2009 as ‘postmodern’ then the relationship to the body with work and production becomes less important than an analysis of the fragmentation of the Indigenous body within late-capitalism.

### **2NC AT Extinction First**

**Saying extinction first fulfills a white settler-colonialist fantasy that you should ignore in your decision calculus -**

**Dalley, 18**

(Hamish, professor at Daemen College, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature”, Settler Colonial Studies Vol 8 No 1 NL)

**Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction**; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language **representations of settler colonialism** produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. **Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present**. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is **counterintuitive**, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have **all retained the basic features that define them as settler states** – namely, the **structural privileging of settlers** at the expense of indigenous peoples, and **the normalization of whiteness** as the marker of political agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps **because**) **that ending seems unlikely ever to happen**. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a **useful foil** to traditional analyses of settlercolonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to **erase and evoke** the native, to **make the indigene both invisible and present** in a **contradictory pattern** that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, **settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time.** The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce **when the settler gaze is turned to the future**. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because **settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise**.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settlercolonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘**extinction’** should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is **no surprise**. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is **apparent** in **archetypal** settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenthcentury novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds, which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’. 11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, **working to** foster racial solidarity, **suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who,** by any objective measure, **are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers** who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of **ideological mystification**, **obscuring** the brutal inequalities of the frontier **behind a mask of white vulnerability** – an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically **settler-colonial framework for imagining the future**, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do, is necessarily to preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspective is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization thinkable.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist?

### **2NC Alt Ext.**

#### **Rejecting the 1AC enacts of the continuation of an earth centered consciousness – Mother Earth and all entities within her domain are not autonomous nor distinguishable from one another they are entangled parts of a larger collective whole. Earth centered conscientization envisions the mind and network of thoughts as they are entangled with the spiritual, emotional, and physical through processes of ongoing intimate relationality.**

#### **Earth Centered Conscientization dissolves colonial and imperial consciousness which created the foundations for international conflict. As per the decree of Descartes, subjects and states had to emerge as autonomous actors that competed for control over an external and separate external world.**

#### **(?)Radical conscientization amalgamates the collective histories and lived realities of Indigenous people to activate a radical historical consciousness for activists and organizers in which notions of stewardship and intimate connectivity inform our interactions with the natural world. This solves the affirmative – their scenarios for conflict don’t make sense if we are all inter relational stewards of the land as opposed to autonomous actors competing for territories and land. Conscientization affectively compels us to protect the natural world because we recognize that the natural world consist of a complex social web of human and non- human relations that are collectively beneficial and interdependent**

### **2NC AT Perm Do Both**

#### **Links prove that the perm makes continuing an earth centered conscientization impossible**

#### **Permutation doesn’t make sense – we are impact turning core assumptions of their research model – things like conflict projections, scenario analysis, and policy simulation all presuppose a distinguishable subject that interacts with the natural world as a separate falsifiable entity.**

#### **(?)The logic of the perm is a double turn with the critique – the perm assumes that a subject can shift between being an autonomous actor that makes policy prescriptions about an external world and being a subject that is entangled with the natural world. It only makes sense to presume that the subject can shift in and out of conscientization if the subject has autonomy and retains it separation from the natural world.**

#### **(?)Reject the Perm in Bad Faith – Violent Cartesian Assumptions about Consciousness as autonomous and distinguishable from the natural world already prefigures the modules of research and falsifiability that inform their policy proposal. Continuing an Earth Centered Consciousness requires an absolute rejection of the 1AC’s research model to truly affectively compel revision and refinement of how we situate ongoing consciousness that centralizes the earth.**

#### **The perm absorbs and appropriates the alternative without prioritizing an Indigenous model of Conscientization. This allows settlers within academic spaces like debate to remain complicit in its degradation and devaluation.**

**Bazinet 16** (Trycia Bazinet, Ottawa, Canada, 2016, A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Globalization and International Development with Specialization in Women’s Studies School of International Development and Global Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa “White Settler-Colonialism, International Development Education, and the Question of Futurity: A Content Analysis of the University of Ottawa Master’s Program Mandatory Syllabi in Globalization and International Development” Page 34 – 37 <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/35156/1/Bazinet_Trycia_2016_thesis.pdf>, RLA)

Given my empirical results and the discussion explaining the drive behind such results, I will now situate where the program stands in terms of which future is assumed. **Settler moves to innocence are the adaptations that occur when settler sovereignty or settler capacities to possess land and Indigeneity are perceived to be challenged.** With varying outward appearance and manifestations, they all serve to restore settlers’ feelings of security, but do nothing to contribute to decolonization (Battell Lowman & Barker, 2015, p. 107). Engaging with settler-colonialism means to recognize that the settler institutions and structures are not only always visceral – but that the actions emerging after the recognition of this fact are also deeply ingrained -visceral (Hayes-Conroy & Hayes-Conroy, 2008, p. 1274). For instance, current white settler confessions of their privileges and complicity have been shown to be performative when they only cater to settler discomfort, enabling them to avoid taking any real responsibilities (Barker & Batell Lowman, 2015, p. 102-103). **White settler curricula are skilled and equipped to “re-occupy the spaces” that anticolonial, anti-racist, queer and feminist critiques struggle to create** (Tuck & GaztambideFernandez, 2013, p. 73). The point of this section is to highlight how good intentions behind the impulses to overcome and relegate to the past the oppressive systems in which we bathe often serve to “most potently re-entrench” these same systems (Ahmed, as cited in De Leeuw & al, 2013, p. 391) for the sake of a certain futurity. **White settler curricula, whether well-intentioned or not, can absorb, tame and distort progressive language and ideas so that it leaves its own core unaffected.** In settler-colonial universities, what is often ignored in decolonizing efforts is the existing marginalized individuals who, in the first place, produced the progressive language and ideas from a place of survival, sacred duties and resurgence. But, white settler futurity is fragileand easily threatened. When this occurs, feelings of anger, resentment and anxiety concentrate on re-attaining settler certainty, especially in regards to property (Mackey, 2014). Settler certainty, which has to do with being able to assume white settler futurity, is protected and higher education, including in its reforms. It is protected to such an extent that it is rarely perceived to be threatened in the first place. Given my empirical results, this is what seems to be happening in the master’s of international development. Settler attachments are turned into material quotidian representations, such as in school curricula, in which presences and absences of Indigeneity/Indigenous might first appear like a simple result of ignorance or dismissal when in reality they are not. Meanwhile, issues of colonization and Indigenous perspectives are seen as a “difficult knowledge” (Marker, as cited in Kerr, 2014, p. 94) to engage with given the implications of trauma, violence, responsibility and reparations that educators might not be ready or equipped to unravel. At times, it is even seen as a threat to academic freedom (Horne, 1999, as cited in Kuokkanen, 2007, p. 18). Educators might also simply think that teaching is and/or should be neutral and apolitical (Tuck & Gorlewski, 2016, p. 203). **It remains easier to focus on Indigenous communities, sometimes labeling them as “difficult”. Likewise, continued and present land assault and dispossession can even be ignored in “decolonizing talks”, rather than being at the center of them.** Much of what is called progressive education today still leaves settler occupation unchallenged (De Leeuw, Greenwood, & Lindsey 2013; Tuck & Gorlewski, 2016, p. 213). As we have seen, **Indigeneity is detached from the body of the Indigenous person to be appropriated by settlers themselves to try to make themselves Indigenous. Indigeneity is also circulating elsewhere; in most theories, it, stands as a sign, an exception, which serves to “reboot the colonialist discourse”** (Byrd, 2011, p. 221). This means that **when Indigeneity is presentand/or appears, it does not necessarily decolonize but rather it often helps a settler institution to adapt and tame the decolonizing challenges it brings up. When Indigeneity poses challenges, settler futurity is ensured by “the absorption of any and all critiques**”, but also through the “replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization” (Tuck & GaztambideFernandez, 2013, p. 73). This is so because settler-colonialism is constantly “producing the conditions of its own supersession”, even when it becomes self-aware or “announces its passing” (Veracini, 2011, as cited in De Leeuw & Al, 2013, p. 385). **The presences and circulation of Indigeneity can be called “epistemic collisions” when they take place in educational places against the “secular cosmology and neutral positioning of Western scientific materialism”** (Kerr, 2014, p. 84). Epistemic collisions lead to a vast range of settler reactions and reassertions towards innocence. Indeed, decolonization is not simple, rather, it is most often “messy, dynamic and contradictory” (Sium, Desai & Ritskes, 2012, as cited in De Oliveira Andreotti & Al, 2015, p. 22). **Moves to innocence are among the vast range of techniques and reflexes of settler people and settler institutions to reinscribe their non-complicity in the present structure settler-colonialism from which they benefit** (Tuck & Yang, 2012). They can happen voluntarily but also under the pressure to “to collapse decolonization into coherent, normative formulas with seemingly unambiguous agendas” (De Oliveira Andreotti & Al, 2015, p. 22). In light of the recent Truth and Reconciliation commission for instance, there is a current incentive to institutionally integrate its recommendations, including in the academy. This understandable rush to do things right creates epistemic collisions that have different results. Unfortunately, these results may lead to the securing of settler futurity (Tuck & GaztambideFernandez, 2013). The entrenchment of colonial relations in higher education means that even good intentions to decolonize, once cornered with all the contradictions of Canada, result in further embedding of these relations (Deborah Bird Rose, 1996, as cited in De Leeuw & al, 2013, p. 385). I discuss moves to innocence in light of my analysis and observe how efforts and/or practices towards decolonization may not be serving Indigenous communities who are still at the receiving end of shifting but ongoing colonization (Tuck & Yang, 2012). This section is important because it unsettles reform changes that might be taken today, not yesterday. It helps us to remain uncomfortable and invites learning from the tensions arising from decolonization while keeping in mind which future we are producing. The following table summarizes how various curricula interventions have understood and tried to “decolonize”, but have resulted in the reinscribing of settler-colonialism in the first three cases (Tuck & Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2013, p.73).